# FAMILIAR STRANGERS: OVERSEAS CHINESE, LINEAGE CONNECTION AND FOREIGN FIRMS IN CHINA

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#### **Motivation**

- Governments of developing countries strive to attract FDI.
  - often in the form of introducing new foreign firms.
  - in the hope that FDI generates positive spillovers to the domestic sector (Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare, 2010).
- · Yet, the entry of foreign firms has been scarce in many developing countries.
- · "Why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries?" (Lucas, 1990)
  - · information frictions
  - · institution weaknesses
  - corruption
  - infrastructure insufficiency

#### **Motivation**

- The case of China challenges the conventional wisdom:
  - · having remained closed for 30 years before the reform in 1979.
  - rose to a hub for multinationals and foreign firms within very short time.
  - IFDI volumn only second to the US from 1979 to 1999 (Huang, 2003).
- Anecdotes attribute this achievement to the "Huaren", i.e. overseas Chinese (Vogel, 1990; Tang, 2006):
  - · socially connected to ancestral hometowns through lineage.
  - · pioneered in an immature market.
  - · used informal networks to overcome entry barriers.
  - planted the seed investment for later industrial growth of China.
- How important are the roles of Huaren in explaining the entry and survival of foreign firms? Is there a causal effect of lineage connection? What are the long-term implications?









Figure 1. Examples of Huaren Foreign Firms

# **This Paper**

- Build a comprehensive dataset on the universe of foreign firms (inlcuding wholly-owned, joint-venture, foreign-invested) controlled by Huaren in China from 1980 to 2014, using firm registration data.
  - · leveraging the spellings of Chinese surnames.
  - account for more than 60% of all foreign firms; ≥ 90% before 1995.
- Exploit variations from both China's gradual openness and surname distributions across prefectures, and adopt a DID design with differential treatment.
- Find that stronger lineage connection facilitates the entry and survival of Huaren foreign firms, following the local openness reform, through reducing information frictions and smoothing contract enforcement.
- $\boldsymbol{\cdot}$  Show that Lineage-driven FDI brings about long term economic benefits.

# **Historical Background**

- · China has a long history of emigration.
  - · 1300s-1840s: South East Asia
  - 1840s-1949: North and South America, Australia
  - · 1949-1979: HMT
  - · 1979-present: US, Canada, Europe
- · One of the largest migrant network in the world.
  - 5.8 million in stock (Global Migrant Origin Database, 2007)
  - · high income level and social status in host countries
  - 3/4 of \$ 369 billion worth wealth was controlled by Huaren (The Economist, 2020)
- Though as emigrants, Huaren (of earlier generations) remained socially connected to their ancestral hometowns (Kuhn, 2008).
  - During 1949 and 1979, they kept in touch with lineage members through letters and remittance.

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


Figure 2. Letters, Remittance, Ancestral Temple, and Genealogy




Figure 3. Foreign Firm Entry by Cohort




Figure 4. Breakdown of Foreign Entrants by Cohort and Ethnicity

#### **Related Literature and Contribution**

- **Social affinities on trade and investment**: Rauch and Trindade (2002), Javorcik et al. (2011), Ma (2018), Burchardi et al. (2019)
  - · a new type of social tie: lineage connection (between surname and locality)
  - · a dynamic perspective: separate two margins——entry & survival

• International migration and economics of names: Sequeira et al. (2019), Tabellini (2020). Abramitzky et al. (2020)

- effects of emigration on home countries: facilitate foreign investments
- use surnames to proxy one's lineage/ancestry
- FDIs and their spillovers in China: Cheng and Kwan (2000), Gao (2003), Tong (2005), Amit and Javorcik (2008), Du et al. (2008), Huang et al. (2016), Lu et al. (2017)
  - a causal examining of the role played by lineage network on Huaren foreign firms across Chinese prefectures.
- Studies on Chinese economy using firm registration data: Dai et al. (2019), Allen et al. (2019), Bai et al. (2020). We focus on the subset of foreign firms.

#### **Data**

#### · Firm registration data

- the universe of firms ever registered in China up till 2014
- · entry & exit dates
- · industry code (4-digit), region code (6-digit), ownership code (4-digit)
- up-to-date registered capital (2014). strongly correlated with assets, employment, and sales (Bai et al. 2020)
- · list of shareholders & key personnel members.

#### Population census 2005

- · 0.2% representative sample of population
- region code (6-digit)
- · individual surnames

#### Other sources

- CSMAR
- · China National Compendium of Statistics

# **Identifying Huaren Foreign Firms & Surnames**

- Use ownership code to select the subgroup of foreign firms.
  - any change in the nature of ownership will automatically create a new legal entity (Chen et al. 2019)
    - immediate shareholding structure do not imply ultimate control structure, e.g., the existence of holding shells (Bai et al. 2020)
    - joint-venture (JV): a specific form of foreign firms
- Use surnames to identify Huaren.
  - extract surnames of all personnel members in foreign firms.
  - Huaren = Chinese surname + non-mainland ID (passport, HMT residency)
- Use the surname of the Huaren legal representative to proxy the firm's lineage
  - surnames of shareholders in foreign-registered firms not observable.
  - · legal rep. unique in every firm. See details

# **Surname-based Lineage Connection**

• The lineage connection between surname s and prefecture p is:

$$m_{sp} = \frac{E_{sp}}{\sum_{n} E_{sp}} \tag{1}$$

- where  $E_{sp}$  denotes the population of surname s in prefecture p.
- · a measure of lineage connection not necessarily driven by surname size
- novelty of this measure:
  - · practical: lack of data for emigration in China
  - methodological: pre-determined variable (Clark, 2015; Bai and Kung, 2020)
  - ▶ See details
- assume surname distribution remains relatively stable from 1981 to 2005.
  - · Hukou registration not formally relaxed until 2000s (Tombe and Zhu, 2019)
  - exclude ethnic minority provinces and prefectures that experience influx of internal immigrants: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen




Figure 5. Distribution for Top 20 Surnames

# **Comparison with Other Data and Cross Validation**

- Foreign Firm Entry vs. Official FDI Inflows. See details
- Firm registration data vs. Annual Survey of Industrial Firms. See details
- Huaren foreign firms vs. HMT firms. See details
- Huaren foreign firms in Fujian Province during the 1980s. See details
- Lineage Connection measures based on 2005 Census vs. based on firm registration data.

# **Empirical Strategy**

$$Y_{spc} = \eta_{sp} + \theta_{sc} + \phi_{pc} + \beta \times Openness_{pc} \times m_{sp} + \lambda \times S_{spc} + \epsilon_{spc}$$
 (2)

- surname s, prefecture p, cohort c (1981-1996)
- $\cdot$   $Y_{spc}$ : outcome variable, e.g. number of entrants, number of survived firms
- $m_{sp}$ : lineage connection between surname s and prefecture p
- $S_{spc}$ : firm stock in counts
- $\cdot \eta_{sp}, \phi_{pc}, \phi_{pc}$ , controlling for:
  - · geographic characteristics, entrepreneurial culture
  - place-based policies (and agglomerations)
  - surname-specific advantages
- $Openness_{pc}$ : =1 if prefecture p has conducted openness reform in year c, =0 otherwise

# China's Gradual Openness Reform: $Openness_{pc}$

- · Special Economic Zone, 1980
  - · Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen
  - · excluded; no pre-trends can be tested.
- · Coastal Open City, 1984
  - · Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, Beihai
- · Coastal Open City, 1985: Yingkou
- · Coastal Open City, 1987: Weihai
- · Special Economic Zone, 1988: Hainan Province
- · Special Economic Zone, 1990: Shanghai Pudong District
- · Deng Xiaoping's Sour Tour, 1992: Comprehensive

# **Event Study**

$$Y_{spc} = \eta_{sp} + \theta_{sc} + \phi_{pc} + \beta^{\tau} \times \sum_{\tau \in \{ \le -4, -3, \dots 0, \dots 3, \ge 4 \}} Openness_{pc}^{\tau} \times m_{sp} + \lambda \times S_{spc} + \epsilon_{spc}$$
 (3)


- surname s, prefecture p, cohort c (1981-1996)
- $\tau = c \tau^p$  is the normalized time window relative to reform
- $\cdot$   $au^p$  is the year of openness reform firstly launched in prefecture p
- $Openness_{pc}^{\tau}=1$  if prefecture p in year c is  $\tau$  year relative to reform, =0 otherwise
- · Common trend assumption holds if  $oldsymbol{eta}^{ au}$  insignificant for au < 0

#### **Baseline Results**

	Number of	Survival-	Number of	Survival Ratio
	Entrants	adjusted	Survived Firms	Conditional on
		Number of	(2014)	Entry (2014)
		Entrants (last ≥		
		4 years)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mean of Dep. Var.	0.075	0.061	0.031	0.438
Openness × Lineage Connection	1.767***	1.517***	0.218*	-0.333
	(0.574)	(0.527)	(0.399)	(0.825)
$Adj.R^2$	0.570	0.555	0.399	0.364
N	1344421	1344421	1344421	20633
Firm Stock	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Surname-Prefecture FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Surname-Cohort FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Prefecture-Cohort FES	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at surname-prefecture level.

# **Testing Common Trend Assumption**




**Figure 6.** Estimates of  $\beta^{\tau}$ 

#### **Robustness Checks**

- Using alternative functional forms. See details
- · Clustering standard errors at prefecture level. See details
- Using alternative lineage connection measures. See details
  - based on personnel members of domestic firms established before 1992 from firm registration data
- Excluding FDI-intensive prefectures. See details
- Excluding emigration-intensive prefectures. See details
- Excluding emigration-intensive surnames. See details
- · Within Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang provinces. See details

#### Placebo Test: Reshuffling Lineage Connection Measures Within Prefecture






Figure 7. Placebo Test

#### Placebo Test: Reshuffling Lineage Connection Measures Across Prefecture




Figure 8. Placebo Test

Coefficient
The estimated coefficient is 218, at 100% quantile of 50 simulated results

#### **Mechanism: Information Channel**

	Number of	Survival-	Number of	Survival Ratio
	Entrants	adjusted	Survived Firms	Conditional on
		Number of	(2014)	Entry (2014)
		Entrants (last ≥		
		4 years)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A:				
Openness × Lineage Connection	-2.507	-1.814	-0.355	0.223
	(1.908)	(1.846)	(0.765)	(1.404)
Openness × Lineage Connection × Telephone Exchanger Capacity	1.074***	0.868**	0.161	-0.246
	(0.409)	(0.386)	(0.184)	(0.193)
$Adj.R^2$	0.454	0.437	0.244	0.317
N	666397	666397	666397	8825
Panel B:				
Openness × Lineage Connection	-9.356***	-7.201***	-0.407	8.830***
	(2.936)	(2.899)	(1.110)	(3.015)
Openness × Lineage Connection × Surname Fragmentation	11.963***	9.365***	0.719	-10.014
	(3.336)	(2.899)	(0.399)	(3.900)
Adi.R <sup>2</sup>	0.409	0.395	0.208	0.295
N	1186664	1186664	1186664	12149
Panel C:				
Openness × Lineage Connection	7.424**	6.390**	0.702**	-0.568
	(3.063)	(2.712)	(0.282)	(0.823)
Openness × Lineage Connection × Pioneer Firm	-13.080**	-11.263**	-1.186**	-0.073
	(5.650)	(4.974)	(0.477)	(0.404)
Adi.R <sup>2</sup>	0.465	0.458	0.321	0.554
N	2690048	2690048	2690048	24936
Additional Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Surname-Prefecture FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Surname-Cohort FEs	Υ	Υ	Y	Υ
Prefecture-Cohort FES	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ

Additional controls include firm stocks at surname-prefecture-cohort level and pioneer firm dummy in panel C.

#### **Mechanism: Contract Enforcement**

	Number of	Survival-	Number of	Survival Ratio
	Entrants	adjusted	Survived Firms	Conditional or
		Number of	(2014)	Entry (2014)
		Entrants (last ≥		
		4 years)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A:				
Openness × Lineage Connection	8.795***	7.633**	1.034***	-0.258
	(3.363)	(2.997)	(0.379)	(0.833)
Openness × Lineage Connection × Branch Firm	-15.823***	-13.749***	-1.850***	-0.961
	(6.255)	(5.547)	(0.676)	(0.936)
Adj.R <sup>2</sup>	0.452	0.444	0.300	0.566
N .	2690048	2690048	2690048	23274
Panel B:				
Openness × Lineage Connection	-1.864*	-1.650*	-0.193*	-0.922
	(1.043)	(0.928)	(0.099)	(1.284)
Openness × Lineage Connection × Labor Intensive	4.990**	4.433**	0.535**	-0.031
	(2.466)	(2.226)	(0.257)	(0.328)
Adj.R <sup>2</sup>	0.665	0.645	0.345	0.567
V .	2690048	2690048	2690048	18799
Panel C:				
Openness × Lineage Connection	-2.331*	-2.030**	-0.256**	-0.161
	(1.156)	(1.010)	(0.104)	(0.814)
Openness × Lineage Connection × Intermediate Goods Contract Intensive	6.196**	5.397**	0.693***	-0.619**
-	(2.736)	(2.427)	(0.258)	(0.292)
$Adj_*R^2$	0.688	0.673	0.376	0.545
v .	2690048	2690048	2690048	25245
Additional Controls	Y	Y	Y	Υ
Surname-Prefecture FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Surname-Cohort FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Prefecture-Cohort FES	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: ""," denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at surmame-prefecture level. Additional controls include firm stocks at surmame-prefecture cohort level and branch firm dummy in Panel A, labor intensive dummy in Panel B, intermediate good contract intensive dummy in panel C.

# Lineage-driven Foreign Entrants as IV for Huaren FDI

$$\widehat{Entry_{spc}} = \widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}} \times Openness_{pc} \times m_{sp} \tag{4}$$

$$\overline{Entry_{p}} = \sum_{i} \widehat{Entry_{spc}} \tag{5}$$

$$F\hat{D}I_p = \alpha \times \overline{Entry_p} + \lambda \times X_p + \epsilon_p \tag{6}$$

$$\pi_p = \alpha \times F \hat{D} I_p + \lambda \times X_p + \epsilon_p \tag{7}$$

- · following Sequeira et al. (2019)
  - isolate lineage-driven FDI that is orthogonal to geographic characteristics, entrepreneurial culture, place-based policies, surname-specific advantages, etc.

s, c = 1981/1996

 $\cdot \hat{\beta}$  estimated from Equation 2

$$\overline{Entry_{spc}} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}} \times Openness_{pc} \times m_{sp} \tag{8}$$

$$\overline{Entry_p} = \sum_{s,c=1981/1996} \overline{Entry_{spc}} \tag{9}$$

$$F\hat{D}I_p = \boldsymbol{\alpha} \times \overline{Entry_p} + \boldsymbol{\lambda} \times X_p + \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_p \tag{10}$$

$$\boldsymbol{\pi}_p = \boldsymbol{\alpha} \times F\hat{D}I_p + \boldsymbol{\lambda} \times X_p + \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_p \tag{11}$$

- Entry<sub>snc</sub>: number of entrants
- $\cdot$   $F\hat{D}I_{p}$ : aggregated registered capital of Huaren Foreign Firms active by 2014 (in log)
- $\cdot$   $\pi_n$ : measures of long-term economic development
- $X_p$  is a vector of control variables: log GDP per capita in 1996, years since openness reform, distance to sea, surname fragmentation, SEZ dummy, Coastal Open City dummy, province FEs.

# Long-term Spillovers of Huaren FDI on Economic Development

	Log GDP per	Log Number of	Log Average	Log	Log Import	Log Export
	capita (2014)	Patents (2014)	Wage (2014)	Non-Huaren	(2017)	(2017)
				FDI (2014)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log Huaren FDI	0.704*** (0.138)	0.937*** (0.184)	0.029* (0.015)	1.139*** (0.258)	1.047*** (0.246)	0.962*** (0.225)
Anderson-Rubin Wald Test F Statistics	45.543***	34.207***	3.413*	15.111***	12.675***	14.482***
N	242	242	238	226	241	241
Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at surname-prefecture level. Controls include log GDP per capita in 1996, years since openness reform, distance to sea, surname fragmentation, SEZ dummy, Coastal Open City dummy, province FEs.

# **Conclusions & Follow-ups**

- Document quantitatively for the first time the prevalence of Huaren foreign firms in China.
- Lineage connection lowers entry barriers by overcoming information frictions and smoothing contract enforcement.
- · Lineage-driven FDI leads to long-term economic benefits.
- Implications: Developing countries have comparative advantage to make use of informal institutions.
- More follow-up questions: transition from informal to formal institution during development process.

#### Thank you

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# Backup Slides

#### Registered Capital vs. Other Economic Outcomes

	Log Registered Capital			
	(1)	(2)		
Log Employment	0.025***	0.018***		
	(0.003)	(0.004)		
Log Assets	0.976***	0.416***		
LOS MOSCOS	(0.003)	(0.004)		
	(0.003)	(0.004)		
Log Sales	-0.124***	-0.005		
	(0.003)	(0.003)		
$R^2$	0.710	0.946		
N	15065	124964		
	13000	12 1701		
Year Fixed Effects	Υ	Υ		
Industry Fixed Effects	Υ	N		
Firm Fixed Effects	N	Υ		

Notes: Samples are foreign firms according to ownership code from Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF), 1998-2007. Industry is at 2-digit level. \*\*\*\*\*\* denote significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level.



# **Algorithm to Extract Surname**

- · Names of key personnel members in foreign firms:
  - English entries: e.g. "Fanghao Chen" (7.51%)
  - · Chinese entries: e.g. "陈方豪"(91%)
  - ・ mixed entries: e.g. " 陈方豪 (Fanghao Chen)" (1.49%)
- Construct a English spelling-Chinese spelling mapping based on mixed entries.
  - ・ e.g. 1 Zhang =0.8 张 + 0.2 章 (an illustrative case)
- · Rule out non-Chinese surnames using Chinese spelling.
  - e.g. Japanese, Korean, transliterated names.
- Manually process highly-unstructured entries.



#### **Personnel Structure of Foreign Firms**

	Percentage	
Has a legal representative	96.84%	
Has a chairman on the board	23.90%	
Has a CEO	20.57%	
Has more than one legal representative	1.35%	
Has more than one chairman	4.78%	
Has more than one CEO	1.24%	

Notes: The samples are all personnel working in foreign firms ever existed from 1985 to 2014.



# Legal Representative vs. Top Executive Position within Foreign Firms

_	Is Top Executive	Not Top Executive	Total
Is Legal Representative	1334367	94956	1429323
Not Legal Representative	458908	1065118	1524026
Total	1793275	1160074	2953349

Notes: The samples are all personnel working in foreign firms ever existed from 1985 to 2014. Conditional on being a legal representative, a person has 93.35%(=1334367/1429323) chance of holding a top executive position within a foreign firm. Conversely, the chance is reduced to 74.41% (=1334367/1793275) for one's being a legal representative given that he or she holds a top executive position



# Bai and Kung (2020)

Table A1: Correlation of historical surname share with that in the 2005 census

	Surname share in total population				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	All sur- names	Top-100 surnames	Non-top-100 surnames	All sur- names	All sur- names
Surname share in CBDB	1.134*** (0.194)	1.202*** (0.241)	0.934*** (0.136)	1.176*** (0.223)	1.222*** (0.260)
Surname rank				0.040 (0.029)	0.191 (0.154)
Squared term of surname rank					-0.029 (0.024)
Observations	493	100	393	493	493
R-squared	0.774	0.742	0.347	0.778	0.781

Note: \* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%; robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A2: Correlation of historical surname share with that in the 2005 census

	Surname sl	Surname share in total population of each prefecture					
	(1)	(1) (2) (3) (4)					
		Small sam- ple size	Medium sample size	Large sam- ple size			
Surname share in CBDB	0.375***	0.255***	0.442***	0.637***			
	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.041)			
Observations	52,751	17,748	17,748	17,255			
R-squared	0.284	0.191	0.339	0.480			

Note: \* significant at 10%; \*\*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%; robust standard errors in parentheses.

### Foreign Firm Entry vs. Official FDI Inflows




Figure 9. Foreign Firm Entry vs. Official FDI Inflows

## Firm Registration Data vs. Annual Survey of Industrial Firms




Figure 10. Comparing two popular data sources

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## Firm Registration Data vs. Annual Survey of Industrial Firms




Figure 11. Comparing two popular data sources



# Huaren Foreign Firms vs. HMT Firms




Figure 12. Huaren Foreign Firms vs. HMT Firms

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### Huaren Foreign Firms in Fujian Province during the 1980s




Figure 13. Huaren Foreign Firms vs. HMT Firms



### Lineage Connection Measure: 2005 Census vs. Firm Registration data




Figure 14. Lineage Connection: Census vs. SAIC

#### **Alternative Function Forms**

	Entry Dummy	Survival-	Survival	arcsinh(Number	arcsinh(Survival-	arcsinh(Numbe
		adjusted Entry	Dummy	of Entrants)	adjusted	of Survived
		Dummy			Number of	Firms)
					Entrants)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Openness × Lineage Connection	0.766***	0.672***	0.165***	0.924***	0.802***	0.167***
	(0.112)	(0.102)	(0.053)	(0.156)	(0.139)	(0.066)
$Adj.R^2$	0.383	0.373	0.255	0.563	0.547	0.361
N	1344421	1344421	1344421	1344421	1344421	1344421
Surname-Prefecture FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Surname-Cohort FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Prefecture-Cohort FES	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ

### **Clustering Standard Errors at Prefecture Level**

	Number of	Survival-	Number of	Survival Ratio
	Entrants	adjusted	Survived Firms	Conditional on
		Number of	(2014)	Entry (2014)
		Entrants (last ≥		
		4 years)		
-	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Openness × Lineage Connection	1.767***	1.517***	0.218*	-0.333
	(0.493)	(0.456)	(0.119)	(0.735)
$\mathrm{Adj.}R^2$	0.570	0.555	0.399	0.364
N	1344421	1344421	1344421	20633
Surname-Prefecture FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Surname-Cohort FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Prefecture-Cohort FES	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
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### **Using Alternative Lineage Connection Measure**

	Number of	Survival-	Number of	Survival Ratio
	Entrants	adjusted	Survived Firms	Conditional on
		Number of	(2014)	Entry (2014)
		Entrants (last ≥		
		4 years)		
_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Openness × Lineage Connection	2.874***	2.511***	0.463	-0.111
	(0.946)	(0.903)	(0.403)	(0.537)
$Adj.R^2$	0.612	0.596	0.445	0.373
N	539376	539376	539376	18324
Surname-Prefecture FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Surname-Cohort FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Prefecture-Cohort FES	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Notes - +++ ++ +	- II -+ 40/ F0/	/ 1 1 0 0/	l Ct d d	



#### **Excluding FDI-intensive Prefectures**

	Number of	Survival-	Number of	Survival Ratio
	Entrants	adjusted	Survived Firms	Conditional or
		Number of	(2014)	Entry (2014)
		Entrants (last ≥		
		4 years)		
_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Openness × Lineage Connection	1.534*** (0.440)	1.308*** (0.380)	0.172** (0.072)	-1.870*** (1.373)
$\mathrm{Adj.}R^2$	0.451	0.435	0.230	0.400
N	1272091	1272091	1272091	11858
Surname-Prefecture FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Surname-Cohort FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Prefecture-Cohort FES	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ



## **Excluding Emigration-intensive Prefectures**

	Number of	Survival-	Number of	Survival Ratio
	Entrants	adjusted	Survived Firms	Conditional on
		Number of	(2014)	Entry (2014)
		Entrants (last ≥		
		4 years)		
_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Openness × Lineage Connection	1.447***	1.207***	0.007	-1.942***
	(0.472)	(0.432)	(0.053)	(0.684)
A.J.: p2	0.402	0.467	0.274	0.206
$Adj.R^2$	0.493	0.467	0.271	0.396
N	1167420	1167420	1167420	13208
Surname-Prefecture FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Surname-Cohort FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Prefecture-Cohort FES	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ



## **Excluding Emigration-intensive Surnames**

	Number of	Survival-	Number of	Survival Ratio
	Entrants	adjusted	Survived Firms	Conditional on
		Number of	(2014)	Entry (2014)
		Entrants (last ≥		
		4 years)		
_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Openness × Lineage Connection	1.733***	1.480***	0.258***	0.023
	(0.332)	(0.292)	(0.092)	(0.884)
$Adj.R^2$	0.409	0.394	0.208	0.294
N	1250024	1250024	1250024	12149
Surname-Prefecture FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Surname-Cohort FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Prefecture-Cohort FES	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ



## Within Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang Provinces

	Number of	Survival-	Number of	Survival Ratio			
	Entrants	adjusted	Survived Firms	Conditional on			
		Number of	(2014)	Entry (2014)			
		Entrants (last ≥					
		4 years)					
_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Openness × Lineage Connection	6.001**	5.152**	0.694	-0.953			
	(2.476)	(2.186)	(0.532)	(1.261)			
$Adj.R^2$	0.690	0.682	0.491	0.337			
N	181447	181447	181447	9678			
Surname-Prefecture FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ			
Surname-Cohort FEs	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ			
Prefecture-Cohort FES	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ			
Notes, *** ** * denote significance	Notes: *** ** denote significance level at 10/ F0/ and 100/ respectively. Chandard every are elustrated						

