




## Mixed Methods

- Ethics
- Employee relationships



# Agenda

- **Method:** Ethics/ Multi-methods
  - Facebook and OkCupid story
  - How to do multi-method correctly: Mix and match!
- **Topic:** Employee relationships
  - Beyond leaders: leader-member exchange (LMX) theory
  - Mentorship
  - Friendship
  - Multi-methods in employee relationship: Hur et al. 2021
  - Discussion questions
- **Next class**
  - Discussion facilitation



## **Method: Ethics**

## **Belmont report: 3 principles for human subject research**

- Respect for human (e.g., informed consent)
- Beneficence (e.g., negative impact)
- Justice (e.g., burdens/ benefits distributed equally)

## Why the regulation? Some psychology studies...

- Milgram experiment: obedience
- Bystander experiment (e.g., seizure)
- Zimbardo Stanford prison experiment: social role

## **IRB (Institutional Review Board)**

- Each university has its own IRB
- CITI training (mandatory)
- "The most formalized process ever" (let me show you)

In-Draft →

Awaiting Authorization →

Pre-Review →

Under Review →

Post Review →

My Studies		My Tasks	Submissions by Type
<a href="#">IRB-FY2022-6524</a>	Affective Forecasting and Job Choice		Renewal 0
<a href="#">IRB-FY2020-3794</a>	Incentives		Initial 4
<a href="#">IRB-FY2019-2407</a>	Incentives and Sustainability	✓	Modification 0
<a href="#">IRB-FY2019-2869</a>	Advice Selection		Incident 0

## **IRB (Institutional Review Board)**

- Each university has its own IRB.
- CITI training (mandatory)
- "The most formalized process ever" (let me show you)

No part of this manuscript has been previously published, nor is it under consideration anywhere else. All data reported in the manuscript are not used in prior papers that are published, accepted, or under review. Moreover, our research was conducted with human subject approval from the Institutional Review Board at our respective institutions, and informed consent was obtained from all participants. The manuscript was written in accordance with *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* guidelines.

## **IRB (Institutional Review Board)**

- But at least academic institutions have one...
- What if a company wants to run an experiment?
- IRB vs. Legal, public relations teams

## **Facebook and OkCupid experiments**

- Facebook: Negative content > posts
- OkCupid: Perceived compatibility > conversation

## Evaluate: Facebook and OKCupid experiments

- Respect for human (e.g., informed consent, deception)
- Beneficence (e.g., negative impact)
- Justice (e.g., burdens/ benefits distributed equally)

## **Companies with not enough "experiments"**

- Trust issue (vs. academic institutions, hospitals), why?
- A lack of evidence-based management
- Google's "which blue" experiment

## **Method: Multi-method research**

## Goals: Why multi-methods?

- Test causality (e.g., survey results)
- Improve generalizability (e.g., college students, sports players, military organizations)
- Strengthen your evidence (e.g., reciprocity, social norm across cultures)

## **How: Not all multi-methods are created equal.**

- The key word is "complement"
- Think about how adding this method bring closer to the goals
- Start from analyzing weaknesses of your method
- Consider sample, sample size, independent variable, dependent variable, measurement, context, culture

## **Practice: How to come up with additional study**

## **Topic: Employee Relationships**

## **History of employee relationships**

- Beyond leaders: leader-member exchange (LMX) theory
- Mentorship
- Friendship

## Mentor-mentee relationship

- Advice-giving/ advice-taking (e.g., Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006)
- Mentorship (e.g., Scandura, 1992)
- Career mobility/ psychological support/ "fit"

## Friendship

- "Can you be friends with your co-workers?!"
- Strategic, calculative mindset (e.g., Casciaro et al., 2014)
- Authenticity (e.g., Ménard & Brunet, 2011)
- Collaboration/ motivation/ well-being

**Multi-methods in employee relationship: Hur et al. 2021**

# Are They Useful? The Effects of Performance Incentives on the Prioritization of Work versus Personal Ties

Julia D. Hur et al. (2021)







"Rewards given for meeting or exceeding certain standards in the target task" (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999)

## Performance

Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, & Mazar, 2009; Baker, 1992; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Heyman & Ariely, 2004; Jenkins Jr et al., 1998; Lazear, 1986

## Intrinsic motivation

Cameron, Pierce, Banko, & Gear, 2005; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Eisenberger et al., 1999; Fehr & Falk, 2002; Kreps, 1997; Miceli et al., 1991; Wiersma, 1992

"Rewards given for meeting or exceeding certain standards in the target task" (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999)



## Performance

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## Values and beliefs

Castilla & Benard, 2010; Hur & Nordgren, 2016; Hur & Tian, in progress; Larkin, Pierce, & Gino, 2012; Pai, DeVoe, & Pfeffer, 2020

## **Research Question**

**Q. How do performance incentives affect everyday social interactions?**

## **Research Question**

### **Predict opposing effects of performance incentives**

- Focus attention to money and decrease motivation to socialize
  - Hershfield, Mogilner, & Barnea, 2016, Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006
- Increase connection and cooperation in group tasks
  - Berger, Herbertz & Sliwka, 2011, Dur & Sol, 2010
- Performance incentives have diverging effects on social interactions depending on the type of relationship

## Research Question



Hur, J.D., Lee-Yoon, A., & Whillans, A.V. 'Are They Useful? The Effects of Performance Incentives on the Prioritization of Work versus Personal Ties.' R&R at OBHDP

## Research Question



Hur, J.D., Lee-Yoon, A., & Whillans, A.V. 'Are They Useful? The Effects of Performance Incentives on the Prioritization of Work versus Personal Ties.' R&R at OBHDP

## **Central Prediction**

Exposure to performance incentives increases prioritization of work relationships over personal relationships.

## Theoretical Development

### Performance incentives shapes instrumentality

- Performance incentives make reward-seeking goals salient \
  - Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2007; Rusbult, Campbell, & Price, 1990
- Saliency biases one's behavioral systems in a goal-driven manner
  - Bird, 2001; Block & Heineke, 1973; Diaz-Serrano, 2005
- Shape perceived instrumentality of relationship partners
  - Lusardi, 1997; Skinner, 1988

## Theoretical Development

### Perceived instrumentality shapes social interactions

- Play an important role in relationship formation
- Belmi & Pfeffer, 2018; Gallant, Spitze, & Prohaska, 2007
- “Useful” people are evaluated more positively and prioritized
  - Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008; Gruenfeld et al., 2008
- Make people prioritize instrumental, work ties to personal ties

## Hypotheses

- H1.** Exposure to performance incentives will increase the prioritization of work relationships over personal relationships
- H2.** Exposure to performance incentives will increase the perceived instrumentality of work relationships.
- H3.** The effect of performance incentives on prioritization of work relationships will be mediated by increases in perceived instrumentality of work relationships.

## Overview of Studies


- o **Study 1:** Survey on Work vs. Personal Ties
- o **Study 2:** Experiment with Incentive Manipulation
- o **Study 3:** Experiment with Task Dependence
- o **Study 4:** Experiment with Actual Task
- o **Study 5:** American Time Use Survey

# **Study 1**

**Goal: Test the effect on the trade-offs between work and personal ties**


## Study 1

545 full-time employees ( $M_{age} = 36.69$ , 41% female) via MTurk




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## Study 1: Results

Variable	(1)		(2)	
	B	SE	B	SE
Performance incentives	.97***	.10	.51***	.12
Age			-.01	.01
Gender			.16	.10
Education			.14**	.05
Marital status			.18	.13
Income			.001	.001
Household size			-.13*	.06
Workhour (log)			-.01***	.003
Tenure			.01	.01
Hourly pay			-.25*	.11
Social status			.11***	.03
Money scarcity			.10**	.04
Social desirability			.04	.17

## Study 1: Results


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# **Study 2**

**Goal: Test the effect with incentive manipulation**


## Study 2

401 full-time employees ( $M_{age} = 36.74$ , 38% female) via MTurk Between subject design




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


## Study 2


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## Study 2: Results



## Study 2: Results




Note. \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$  \*\*\* $p < .001$

# **Study 3**

**Goal: Test the effect with task interdependence**


## Study 3

- 801 full-time employees ( $M_{age} = 37.54$ , 40% female) via MTurk
- 2 (Incentive: performance vs. participation)  $\times$  2 (collaboration: high vs. low)




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


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## Study 3: Results




$F(3,797) = 6.577$ ,  $MSE = 19.316$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.037$

# **Study 4**

**Goal: Test the effect with decision-making measure**


## Study 4

- o 400 participants ( $M_{age} = 36.74$ , 38% female) via MTurk
- o Between subject design




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


## Study 4

- o 400 participants ( $M_{age} = 36.74$ , 38% female) via MTurk
- o Between subject design



## Study 4: Results



# **Study 5**

**Goal: Test the effect with daily social interaction**



## **Study 5**

### **American Time Use Survey (ATUS)**

- A large and diverse set of U.S. households by Census Bureau
- Waves 2010-2015 with 75,210 respondents (Mage = 39.18, 47% female)

### **Measures**

- Time spent on social interactions
  - Day Reconstruction Method (DRM; Kahneman et al., 2004)
  - Phone interviews to reconstruct 4am (previous) – 4am
  - DV: the time that respondents spent in the last 24 hours socializing with work ties/ the time they spent socializing with non-work, personal ties

## **Study 5**

### **Measures**

- Incentive system (1 = performance incentive; 0 = participant incentive)
  - Whether they received performance incentives (N = 12,467) or participation incentives (N = 62,743)
- Happiness
  - Randomly selected 3 time intervals and asked respondents to rate how they felt engaging in the activity (1 = Not at all; 7 = Extremely)
- Control variables
  - Gender, age, income, relationship status, work hours, hourly pay
  - Dummy coded survey year, day of week (weekend), occupation types

## Study 5: Daily Interactions

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
Performance incentive	2.44*** (.18)	1.13*** (.17)	0.90*** (.17)
Age (log)		5.56*** (.51)	5.36*** (.50)
Gender		-2.01*** (.13)	-2.06*** (.14)
Spouse Present		3.96***	3.96***
Unmarried Spouse		(.31)	(.31)
Married Spouse		-6.57*** (.17)	-6.41*** (.17)
Household size (log)		-14.26*** (.48)	-14.72*** (.47)
Income (log)		-2.82*** (.42)	-1.69*** (.43)
Work hours (log)		12.81*** (.41)	13.26*** (.42)
Hourly status		2.21*** (.13)	1.75*** (.14)
Day of week dummy		YES	YES
Year dummy		YES	YES
Occupation dummy			YES

## Study 5: Daily Interactions

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
Performance incentive	2.44*** (.18)	1.13*** (.17)	0.90*** (.17)
Age (log)		5.56*** (.51)	5.36*** (.50)
Gender		-2.01*** (.13)	-2.06*** (.14)
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Work hours (log)		12.81*** (.41)	13.26*** (.42)
Hourly status		2.21*** (.13)	1.75*** (.14)
Day of week dummy		YES	YES
Year dummy		YES	YES
Occupation dummy			YES

## Study 5: Happiness

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
C vs. FamFri	-.01*** (.001)	-.01*** (.001)	-.01*** (.001)
PFP			-.002 (.03)
C vs. FamFri * PFP			-.001 (.001)
Age (log)		-.30*** (.08)	.29*** (.09)
Gender		.09** (.02)	.10** (.02)
Spouse Present		.14* (.05)	.16* (.03)
Unmarried Spouse			
Married Spouse		.14*** (.03)	.15*** (.03)
Household size (log)		.22** (.07)	.17* (.08)
Income (log)		-.49*** (.07)	-.40*** (.07)
Work hours (log)		.24*** (.07)	.27*** (.07)
Hourly status		-.05 (.03)	-.01 (.02)

## Study 5: Happiness

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
C vs. FamFri	-.01*** (.001)	-.01*** (.001)	-.01*** (.001)
PFP			-.002 (.03)
C vs. FamFri * PFP			-.001 (.001)
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Married Spouse		.22** (.07)	.17* (.08)
Household size (log)		.49*** (.07)	.40*** (.07)
Income (log)		.24*** (.07)	.27*** (.07)
Work hours (log)		-.05 (.03)	-.01 (.02)
Hourly status			

# Summary

**Q. How does performance incentives affect everyday social interactions?**



# Theoretical Implications

## Incentive system & social motivation

- Hershfield, Mogilner, & Barnea, 2016; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006
- Berger, Herbertz & Sliwka, 2011; Dur & Sol, 2010

## Relationship formation & consequences

- Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008; Gruenfeld et al., 2008
- Mogilner, Whillans, & Norton, 2018; Saphire-Bernstein & Taylor, 2013

## Organizational practices & work-life balance

- Allen et al., 2000; Goh, Pfeffer, & Zenios, 2015; Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985; Kelly et al., 2015; Lockwood, 2003; Schieman, Milkie, & Glavin, 2009

# Current Directions

## Quality of relationship

Do incentive systems affect objectification or friendship formation?

## Performance Incentives & Social Class

Do performance incentives provide a better/ worse fit for lower SES individuals?

## Performance Incentives & Gender

Do performance incentives benefit or penalize women?

## **Discussion Questions**

## **Next Class**

**Discussion facilitation**