

Following the Global Rejection: The Motives of Majelis Ulama Indonesia's Fatwas on Ahmadiyah

by Fariz Alnizar

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Fariz Alnizar, Fadil Munawwar Manshur, Amir Maruf

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Following the Global Rejection: The Motives of Majelis Ulama Indonesia's Fatwas on Ahmadiyah

Abstract: *This article examines the motives behind the decisions of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), in 1980 and 2005, to issue fatwas condemning the Ahmadiyah. Using critical discourse analysis, this study reveals MUI's motives behind its fatwas on the Ahmadiyah by drawing on the text and the context of the issuance of the fatwas. Underpinning MUI's issuance of its fatwa on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan in 1980 was the global rejection of the Ahmadiyah, particularly in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, MUI's fatwa on the Ahmadiyah in 2005 was informed by an increased rejection of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia, which was based on the Jalsa Salana Ahmadiyah meeting in 2005, in Parung, Bogor. In the fatwa's dictum, MUI positions itself as the guardian of the Islamic creed. MUI's choice of wording and language style in its fatwas demonstrates its desire to display its authority as a quasi-non-governmental organization.*

Keywords: Fatwa, Ahmadiyah, Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Language, Critical Discourse Analysis.

Abstrak: Artikel ini menelaah motif di balik dikeluarkannya fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) tentang Ahmadiyah tahun 1980 dan 2005. Dengan menggunakan Analisis Wacana Kritis penelitian ini mengungkap motif fatwa MUI tentang Ahmadiyah berdasarkan teks dan konteks dikeluarkannya. Latar dikeluarkannya fatwa MUI tentang Ahmadiyah Qadiyan tahun 1980 adalah konteks penolakan global terhadap Ahmadiyah di dunia Internasional. Sementara situasi yang menjadi latar dikeluarkannya fatwa MUI tentang Aliran Ahmadiyah tahun 2005 adalah menguatnya wacana penolakan di Indonesia yang didasari oleh pertemuan Jalsa Salana Ahmadiyah tahun 2005 di Parung, Bogor. Dalam diktum fatwa, MUI memosisikan diri sebagai pihak yang menjaga kemurnian akidah Islam. Pilihan kata dan gaya bahasa membuktikan bahwa MUI ingin menunjukkan otoritasnya sebagai lembaga kuasi non-governmental organization (kuango).

Kata kunci: Fatwa, Ahmadiyah, Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Bahasa, Analisis Wacana Kritis.

ملخص: تبحث هذه المقالة في الدوافع وراء قرارات مجلس العلماء الإندونيسي (MUI)، عام ١٩٨٠ و ٢٠٠٥، لإصدار فتاوى تدين الأحمدية. باستخدام تحليل الخطاب النقدي، تكشف هذه الدراسة عن دوافع مجلس العلماء الإندونيسي وراء فتاوى الأحمدية من خلال الاعتماد على النص وسياق إصدار الفتاوى. كان أساس إصدار مجلس العلماء الإندونيسي لفتاواه بشأن الأحمدية القاديانية في عام ١٩٨٠ هو الرفض العالمي للأحمدية، ولا سيما في باكستان والمملكة العربية السعودية. وفي غضون ذلك، استلهمت فتوى مجلس العلماء الإندونيسي بشأن الأحمدية في عام ٢٠٠٥ من خلال الرفض المتزايد للأحمدية في إندونيسيا، والتي استندت إلى الاجتماع السنوي للأحمدية في عام ٢٠٠٥، في بارونج، بوجور. في فتواه، يعتبر مجلس العلماء الإندونيسي نفسه وصي العقيدة الإسلامية. يوضح اختيار مجلس العلماء الإندونيسي للصياغة وأسلوب اللغة في فتاواه رغبته في إظهار سلطته كمنظمة شبه غير حكومية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الفتاوى، الأحمدية، مجلس العلماء الإندونيسي، اللغة، تحليل الخطاب النقدي.

Ahmadiyah is a religious movement that was founded by Mirza Gulam Ahmad in 1889 in Punjab, India. To his followers, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed to be a reformer, messiah, and Imam Mahdi (Darmadi 2013, 24; Saeed 2007, 135). In its early years, the Ahmadiyah interacted well with various religious groups, including Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, and Buddhists (Ropi 2015, 310).

Wilar (2015, 100) argues that three factors informed the establishment of the Ahmadiyah: (1) its theological background, namely that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed to have had a revelation; (2) its ideational background, namely concerning the idea of the arrival of Imam Mahdi; and (3) the social political context of India at that time. In line with that, Zulkarnaen (2005, 1) explains that the main cause of the emergence of the Ahmadiyah was the decline of Indian Muslims in various fields, including religion, social, economic, political, and other fields. At the same time, the Indian Rebellion of 1857 against the rule of the British East India Company, which the British successfully contained and suppressed. As a result, India was transferred to the British Crown as a colony of great geostrategic value given its positioning in Asia.

In Smith's view (1979, 367) another factor that led to the idea of establishing the Ahmadiyah was the intense attacks of the Aryans and Christian missionaries on Indian Muslims. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad felt the need to establish a reform movement so that Muslims could survive the attacks.

There are two competing versions of the Ahmadiyah's inception. According to the first version, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad received a revelation in 1888, while according to the second version, the Ahmadiyah was officially established as a movement after the allegiance of followers carried out by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1989. The debate over the two versions is one of the causes of division within the Ahmadiyah, which resulted in two Ahmadi sects: the Ahmadiyah Lahore and the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan. The Ahmadiyah Lahore believes that the Ahmadiyah was founded in 1888, while the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan argues that the Ahmadiyah was founded in 1989 (Zulkarnaen 2005, 5; Khan 2015, 54).

In 1914, shortly after the death of Maulana Hakim Nuruddin, the first Caliph who succeeded Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the Ahmadiyah split into two. This split was the result of differing views on the status

of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. The first group calls itself the Ahmadiyah Community based in Qadiyan, while the second group is based on the Pakistani district of Lahore and calls themselves *Ahmadiyah Anjuman Isbatil Islam*. In 1984, the then-current political climate and strong pressure from the Pakistani government saw the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan move their control center to England (Khan 2017, 144).

The Ahmadiyah Qadiyan constitutes the majority group, which is estimated to have more than 15 million followers worldwide. Besides Pakistan, in the Asian context, the Ahmadiyah has followers in India, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. In Pakistan, the government officially refers to the Ahmadiyah as a non-Muslim group. In some other places, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Bangladesh, the status of the Ahmadiyah is still shrouded in controversy and conjecture, whereas the Saudi Government placed a firm ban on the Ahmadiyah movement and openly labelled them “infidels” (Platzdasch 2013, 223).

As a religious movement, one of the main activities undertaken by the Ahmadiyah is preaching and spreading its ideas. The activists, preachers, and Ahmadiyah missionaries preach to various countries outside Pakistan, including Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Jonker (2016, 14) notes that Ahmadiyah missionaries also seek to proselytize in Europe.

Platzdasch (2013, 220) states that the Ahmadiyah arrived in Indonesia in 1925, while Beck (2005, 221) argues that two Ahmadiyah Lahore missionaries named Mirza Wali Ahmad Baiq and Maulana Ahmad first set foot in Indonesia, in Yogyakarta specifically, at the end of March 1924. Blood (1974, 25) notes that there are three versions of the story that develop. First, the two missionaries aimed to preach in Hong Kong. While on their way, they stopped in Singapore, where they learned that there was significant Christianization taking place in Java. They therefore decided to go to Yogyakarta. Second, the purpose of the two missionaries was to preach in China, but they had financial problems, which meant they had to stop in Java. Seeing that Christianization was conspicuous there, they finally requested the permission of the Ahmadiyah headquarters in Lahore to preach in Java and to commence in Yogyakarta. Another version of this story states that two Ahmadiyah missionaries were deliberately sent by the Lahore Ahmadiyah center to preach on Java. The common thread of the various versions is the primary purpose of the missionary, namely stemming Christianization on Java.

Shortly after arriving in Yogyakarta, Mirza Wali Ahmad Baiq and Maulana Ahmad were welcomed by the Muhammadiyah Central Board. They were invited to give lectures at the 13th Congress of Muhammadiyah held in Yogyakarta on March 28th to April 1st, 1924. Secretary of the Muhammadiyah Central Board, Djojosoegito, in one of his remarks at the opening ceremony of the congress, said that the Ahmadiyah have an important role in progressing Islam in Western countries, especially in Europe. He also mentioned that the Ahmadiyah had similarities with Muhammadiyah in terms of the way they sought to spread Islam and ward off Christianization. In addition, another factor that caused the Muhammadiyah Central Board to accept the Ahmadiyah was the Ahmadiyah's alignment with the nationalist struggle, which was also one Muhammadiyah's ideas at the time. Both the Ahmadiyah and Muhammadiyah share the view that Islam is compatible with modernity, which applies a pressure point on rationality, knowledge, and also technological progress (Blood 1974, 15).

At that time, Mirza Wali Ahmad Baiq delivered his lecture in English, but because it was poorly translated into Javanese, his audience could not fully appreciate the material he delivered. Otherwise, Maulana Ahmad delivered the material eloquently in Arabic, notably on the issue of denying the divinity of Jesus and some Christian creeds. Maulana Ahmad's lecture was very well translated by H. Hadjid, a member of the Muhammadiyah central leadership. The lecture impressed the congress participants and Maulana Ahmad was widely praised for his knowledge and views (Beck 2005, 226).

Since then, many participants have studied and consulted with the two missionaries, especially Maulana Ahmad, who is known for his extensive knowledge and excellent mastery of Arabic. Due to health reasons, Maulana Ahmad had to return home in June 1924, meaning he only stayed in Yogyakarta for thirteen months. Maulana Mirza Wali Baiq, who would later learn Javanese, continued the mission in his absence. Blood (1974) notes that Mirza Wali Baiq's mission received sympathy. Several members of Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam were recorded as students of H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, the founder of Sarekat Islam, and himself a student of Mirza Wali Baiq. What is of greatest importance is Djojosoegito and Muhammad Chusni, Mirza Wali Ahmad Baiq's two greatest proponents.

In July 1924, Mirza Wali Ahmad Baiq also initiated the sending of young Muhammadiyah cadres to study Islam in Lahore. The young cadres were Maksum, Sabit, and Jundam. After returning from Lahore, Maksum joined the Islamic Union (*Persatuan Islam*, PERSIS), and later Darul Islam as an activist, under the leadership of Kahar Mudzakir, while Sabit joined the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Jundam, which later changed its name to Erfan Dahlan, decided to remain affiliated with the Lahore group and become missionaries in Thailand (Soedewo 1937, 94).

A very close relationship between Lahore Ahmadiyah and Muhammadiyah was established between 1924 and 1927. Muhammadiyah figures praised Ahmadiyah in the magazine *Bintang Timur* as a prototype of the modern Islamic movement. In 1925, there was a proposal in the magazine *Javabode* to merge these two organizations. In fact, in 1926, the Muhammadiyah Central Board issued a Muhammadiyah calendar, which praised Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a reformer or *mujaddid* figure (Ropi 2015, 289).

Cracks in relations began to occur when Muhammadiyah figures began to detect the differences between Ahmadiyah teachings and standard Islamic doctrine, especially in terms Ahmadi's excessive worship of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. In addition, Beck (2005, 236) writes that the arrival in Yogyakarta of an Indian cleric named Abdul Alim Shiddiqi in October 1927 changed Muhammadiyah's perception of Ahmadiyah. Hamka disputed this, stating that long before Abdul Alim Shiddiqi came to Yogyakarta, Hadji Rasul (Hamka's father) had warned people of the Ahmadiyah doctrine, right after debating Mirza Wali Baiq in 1925 (Blood 1974, 31).

In July 1928, the Muhammadiyah Central Board notified all its branches of the need to prohibit the publishing or teaching of anything related to the Ahmadiyah. The announcement also emphasized that for anyone who believes that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a *mujaddid*, Muhammadiyah members must either return to the Sunni teachings of Muhammadiyah or leave Muhammadiyah. This generated internal chaos within Muhammadiyah. Djojosogito and Muhammad Chusni ultimately left Muhammadiyah and, on December 10, 1928, established the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Movement (*Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia*, GAI) (Ropi 2015, 290).

In 1929, at the 18th Muhammadiyah congress forum in Solo, Muhammadiyah officially issued a fatwa stating that anyone who

believed in the existence of the Prophet after the Prophet Muhammad was deemed an infidel (Plaszdatsh 2016, 220). Although they did not explicitly mention Ahmadiyah, all groups believed that the people mentioned in the decision were Ahmadiyah followers. This is the earliest decision officially issued by a mass organization in Indonesia to respond to the Ahmadiyah (Ropi 2015, 290).

The mission of disseminating Ahmadiyah propaganda and the movement itself to Africa and Asia began in the early 1920s. If the Lahore Ahmadi missionaries arrived in 1924, then the Ahmadi Qadiyan missionaries arrived in the Nusantara in October 1925. One of the missionaries, named Maulana Rahmat Ali, arrived at Tapak Tuan, Aceh. His arrival was a response to the invitation of students from the Nusantara who had studied in Qadiyan earlier. Those of note who studied in Qadiyan included Ahmad Nurudin, Zaini Dahlan, and Abu Bakar Ayyub. The three studied were Thawalib students who left for Qadiyan, India in 1922 at the instigation of Zainuddin Labai El-Yunusiah (Ropi 2015: 284), having heard that studying Islam in India was no less reputable than studying Islam in the Middle East.

Maulana Rahmat Ali's preaching in Sumatra is relatively slow. Many parties opposed it. Hadji Rasul was the most vocal in his opposition to, and disapproval of, the Ahmadiyah doctrine, as Maulana Rahmat Ali had preached it. Hadji Rasul knew Ahmadiyah's gait and doctrine from various readings and information received from the story of the pilgrims, who also met with Ahmadi in Saudi Arabia. Based on this constant rejection, in 1930, Maulana Rahmat Ali decided to move to Jakarta. Maulana Rahmat Ali's arrival in Jakarta was met with negativity. Ahmad Hassan from the Islamic Union, for example, openly debated and criticized Maulana Rahmat Ali in 1933 and 1934 (Blood 1974, 34).

After preaching for about twenty-five years, Maulana Rahmat Ali left Indonesia in 1950. The preaching of Ahmadiyah Qadiyan was continued by his successors. In 1953, this organization gained clarity of legal status through the Ministry of Justice's decision number JA / 23/1095 which was also included in the state gazette in 1953 (Ropi 2015: 287).

This article examines the motives behind the issuance of the fatwas of the MUI on Ahmadiyah in 1980 and 2005. Using Critical Discourse Analysis, this study uncovered the motives of the MUI fatwa on

Ahmadiyah based on the text and context of events. This study uses a qualitative approach with a critical paradigm that uses CDA as a tool and method of analysis. The CDA used in this paper is Fairclough's conceptualization thereof (1989; 1992), with the three-dimensional method, including text, discourse practice, and social practice. Based on these three levels, the data in this research are (1) text: MUI's fatwas on the Ahmadiyah in 1980 and 2005; (2) discourse practice: interviews conducted with the MUI Fatwa Commission; and (3) socio-cultural practice: focused on exploring the relationship between the texts, discourses, discursive practices, and social processes.

The Language of MUI Fatwas on the Ahmadiyah: Textual and Intertextual Analysis

The text analysis in this study uses a domain analysis approach (Fishman 2000, 83; Rydenvald 2019, 77). This approach is one of the categories of language selection study approaches in Fasold's study (1984, 183), besides the social psychology and anthropology approaches. The domain referred to in the context of this study is a struggle between participant factors, location, and topic (Fishman 2000, 85; 1991, 44; Ferguson 1996, 57).

In societies with diglossic characters, there are two categories of language (Fishman 2000, 89; Coulmas 2013, 56), namely high type language and low type language. High language is the language used in formal situations, while low language is a variety of languages used in informal situations. In the context of the 1980 MUI fatwa on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan and in 2005 on the Ahmadiyah sect, text producers used formal language as a tool to convey ideas.

Choosing formal language indicates that the text producer wants to convey a very important message. The choice of a certain language cannot be said to be a momentary and incidental tendency. Language choice is a phenomenon that is motivated by various aspects and motivations (Labov 2006, 41; Edwards 2009, 30; Riley 2007, 56).

The formal language used in the MUI fatwa dictum in 1980 about the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan, and in 2005 about the Ahmadiyah sect, was chosen based in consideration of the context of the situation, participants, content of discourse, and interaction functions. In the Grosjean study (1982, 136-137), these four factors became the socio-cultural factors that informed the background of the language choices, as outlined in MUI's fatwa text.

From socio-cultural considerations in choosing languages, the participant factor refers to the actors involved in the communication framework when the text is issued. Participants in the context of the issuance of a fatwa on the Ahmadiyah are MUI as a text producer and the text consumers are *mustafti* (those who request the fatwa) and the general public, including the Indonesian Ahmadiyah population. As a semi-governmental institution, MUI uses formal language as a medium to convey its institutional decisions. It is different from what is done by non-governmental organizations that have similar functions and can issue fatwas and legal opinions. As points of comparison, the Muhammadiyah Tarjih Council and also the Bathsul Masail Institute of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) tend to use informal language in their texts.

In addition, the choice of formal language refers to the dictum of similar fatwas about the Ahmadiyah, as issued by the International Institute. This step is a logical choice because the context of the Ahmadiyah's rejection is global. MUI directly referred to the 1985 Organization of Islamic Conference (now changed to Organization of Islamic Cooperation) on the Ahmadiyah, which also ratified the 1974 Muslim World League (MWL) fatwa. Both of them use formal language.

From the situational factors, three things become a reference: (1) setting or location; (2) level of formality; and (3) level of familiarity. The background to the issuance of MUI's fatwa on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan in 1980 was a global rejection of the Ahmadiyah. Meanwhile, the situation that informed MUI's issuance of its fatwa on the Ahmadiyah sect in 2005 was the swift rejection of the Ahmadiyah *Jalsah Salana* meeting in 2005, in Indonesia. As a national scale fatwa, the location of the issuance of the two fatwas was Jakarta.

As a national-scale decision, MUI's fatwa on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan in 1980 and the Ahmadiyah sect in 2005 had a fairly high level of formality, although there were differences in form between the two. The first fatwa used formal language that was more concise and straightforward.

In terms of the structure and form of the fatwa and the language used, the second fatwa appears to have had a higher level of formality, similar to judicial dicta. The choice of words and emphasis of the sentence with the technique of thickening certain diction indicates that MUI wanted to emphasize the important things that became the pressure points in the fatwa.¹

Both the 1980 MUI fatwa on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan and the 2005 MUI fatwa on the Ahmadiyah had the topic of conversation and type of vocabulary in common. The topic of the fatwa is a transnational movement that was rejected on a global scale. Because the topic concerns a global issue, the choice of language and diction must also be formal and official. The choice of formal vocabulary and diction becomes a logical choice in terms of reflecting the urgency of the issue and topic of conversation.

If examined in terms of the function factor of interaction, which includes aspects of (1) raising status, (2) creating social distance, (3) the process of exclusion of someone from the conversation, and (4) ordering or requesting, MUI's decision to use formal language in the two fatwas is understandable. Aside from increasing its institutional status, formal language can create social distance between text producers (MUI) and text consumers and the targets of such fatwas, in this instance, namely the Ahmadiyah.

Furthermore, in a review of the interaction function, it is very clear how the fatwa text is used to exclude certain groups that are the object of the fatwa, again, namely the Ahmadiyah. The fatwa dictum mentions how text producers take a position on one side as the party that maintains the purity of teaching. While on the other hand, the Ahmadiyah is positioned on the other side by using the phrase "outside Islam".² As Coulmas (1998, 76) writes, the choice of diction, variety and style of language has specific communication objectives, including (1) identifying membership, in this context MUI as an institution that maintains a teaching that is believed by the majority; (2) exclusion, by affirming MUI's position, which is opposite of the Ahmadiyah; and (3) affirming self-domination, which in the context of MUI's 1980 fatwa, was written with the phrase, "In dealing with the Ahmadiyah issue, the Indonesian Council of Ulama is always in contact with the Government." While in MUI's 2005 fatwa, the affirmation of dominance is evident in the use of the phrase, "For those who already follow the Ahmadiyah sect, to immediately return to the teachings of Islam that haq (*al-rujū' ila al-haqq*), which is in line with al-Qur'an and al-Hadith" and "The government is obliged to prohibit the spread of the Ahmadiyah ideology throughout Indonesia, freeze the organization and close all places of its activities."

Burke's study (1966, 31) notes that diction choices, besides having the power to attract the attention of the public so that they focus on personal-specific problems, can also be used as a tool to direct certain

beliefs and points of view. In the context of MUI's 2005 fatwa, this was achieved by boldly printing two words "obliged" and "to prohibit." The two verbs are used as a tool to attract the attention of text consumers that the main emphasis and message of the fatwa are the obligation to ban the dissemination of Ahmadiyah teachings.

The message emphasized in the 2005 fatwa is the government's obligation to ban, freeze, and also close all places of Ahmadiyah congregation activities. Interestingly, the bold words in the fatwa relate to the prohibition on dissemination, while the other two obligations, namely the freezing of the organization and also the closure of all places of its activities, are not written in bold. However, if the review is formally legal, then the main task of the government is to freeze the Ahmadiyah organization because the organization is legally registered by RI Decree No. JA / RI / 23/13 dated 13-3-1953 (Additional State Gazette: dated 31-3-1953 No. 26).

The Global Exclusion and The Process of Production of the MUI Fatwa on the Ahmadiyah

The decision to issue these two fatwas proves that there is a fatwa production and reproduction process, and there are a variety of factors, contexts, and motivations behind this process. First, in the context of the issuance of MUI's 1980 fatwa on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan, there was a continuity of a chain that could not be separated from the global context of the Ahmadiyah's rejection. Global rejection has further strengthened the variety of fatwas and decisions about the Ahmadiyah in Nusantara, which began in 1929 with a fatwa issued by the Muhammadiyah Tarjih Council.

It is important to note that the decision of the Muhammadiyah Tarjih Council on the Ahmadiyah cannot be separated from the influence of Rasyid Ridha's opinion. In his capacity as an international mufti in Egypt, the caretaker of *Al-Manar* Magazine issued a negative response to the Ahmadiyah. Rasyid Ridha answered Basyuni Imran's question about the law using *tafsir* (Qur'anic exegesis) by an Ahmadiyah cleric named Mulana Rahmat. The second correspondence was recorded in *Al-Manar* Magazine on July 17, 1928.

MUI's 1980 fatwa on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan can also not be separated from the influence of decisions and fatwas of two international Islamic institutions, namely the Muslim World League (MWL) and the

Organization of Islamic Conference (now changed to Organization of Islamic Cooperation). Both the MWL and OIC issued fatwas on the Ahmadiyah.

MWL is an international organization based in Saudi Arabia. It was founded on the recommendation of the General Islamic Conference, which was held on May 18, 1962. Meanwhile, the OIC is an inter-Muslim organization comprising fifty-seven member states, and was founded in Rabat, Morocco on September 25, 1969.

In both international organizations, Indonesia plays a significant role and holds an important position. At the OIC, Indonesia was listed as one of the organization's founders, while in the MWL, Indonesia once placed its representative, Mohammad Natsir, as Secretary-General. In addition, Natsir is also listed as a founding member of the MWL council.

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Natsir and M. Rasjidi translated MWL ideas in Indonesia. One step they took was to establish the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (*Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia*, DDII) whose main mission is to oversee the deviation of creeds in Indonesia. Natsir and M. Rasjidi played a pivotal role in building the discourse about the Ahmadiyah movement in Indonesia, so that at MUI's peak, on June 1, 1980, it issued a fatwa on the Ahmadiyah.

Secondly, the message conveyed by MUI's fatwa about the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan was brief and concise, but it created some uncertainty. The basis for referring to the fatwa is not the reality in the community as it should be but the results of a study of nine books about Ahmadiyah that are not identified. It is interesting to note that the fatwa is concise and that it contains neither quotations from religious sources (Quran and Hadith, Ijmak, Qiyas) nor scholarly opinions (Hooker 2003, 234).

The absence of the original fatwa documents, other than copies circulating in public and displayed on the official MUI website, raises several important questions. First, why did the fatwa, which was issued in 1980, refer to the decision issued in 1984? Second, is it true that the signing of the official document only consisted of Buya Hamka and Haji Kafrawi as MUI chairman and secretary? Indeed, there is an opinion that states that the fatwa was also signed by the Trustees of MUI, who is also the Minister of Religion, namely Alamsjah Prawiranegara (Rofiqoh 2010, 57).

To prove how language is used as a tool to legitimize power, the fatwa dictum contains the Ahmadiyah's position vis-a-vis Islam. First,

the use of the terms to describe the position of the Ahmadiyah: if the 1980 fatwa used the phrase “outside of Islam”, then the 2005 fatwa used the phrase “Being outside of Islam.” In the last fatwa, the position of the Ahmadiyah emphasized more clearly that its existence was outside of Islam.

This emphasis on the position is connoted by the use of the word “being”. My position is that the use of the word “being”, considering that from 1980 to 2005 the Ahmadiyah was still in existence, is that it was then even more widespread. Therefore, it was necessary to further emphasize that the position of the Ahmadiyah is outside of Islam.

The phrase “being outside of Islam” emphasizes position and classification. The Ahmadiyah belongs to the category of teachings whose position is outside the teachings of Islam. This categorization and labeling creates problems because the fatwa does not use specific religious categories and terminology.

Second, the use of the term “heretical and misleading”. This term is included in both fatwas. It is translated from a popular term in books on *‘aqidah* (creed) and *kalām* (speculative theology), namely the term *ḍāllun mudillun*. The use of the term “heretical and misleading” is intended to emphasize that the Ahmadiyah sect, in addition to being heretical, is also active in what is called misleading activity. The term “heretical and misleading” suggests that the Ahmadiyah community is carrying out a series of active propaganda to attract the masses to enter their sect, so the label that must be embedded in the sect is not only heretical but also misleading.

In the MUI’s 2005 fatwa on the Ahmadiyah, there was a decision⁸ which read, “The government is obliged to prohibit the spread of the Ahmadiyah ideology throughout Indonesia and freeze the organization and close all places of its activities.” At this point, there are two words in bold, namely “obliged” and “prohibit”. This is certainly intended to give emphasis.

As a transnational movement, the Ahmadiyah has a very broad range and scope of preaching across continents. As a consequence, various responses were received by the Ahmadiyah. In the context of Southeast Asia, the earliest response to the teachings of the Ahmadiyah came from Singapore. On July 13, 1925, strong protests were carried out by hundreds of people in response to the teachings of the Ahmadiyah written by Mulana Kamaludin Khawja. The writing was translated into

Malay. The demonstrators called on the government to ban the spread of Ahmadiyah teachings (Darmadi 2013, 24).

Between 1926 and 1927, Hadji Rasul voiced his objections to the Ahmadiyah doctrine and, at the same time, implored Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) to take a firm stance against the Ahmadiyah. This condition also inspired Haji Agus Salim from Sarekat Islam. After he returned from Mecca in 1927, he encouraged his colleagues to establish an organization called the Muslim Shura Council (Masyumi). One of the missions of this organization was to challenge those sects considered to comprise deviant creeds.

In 1928, Rasyid Ridha responded to the Ahmadiyah movement. He explicitly stated that the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan was a heretical group and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was the *Dajjal* (deceiver). This response was published in the magazine *Al-Manar*, sourced from correspondence and questions from a Muhammadiyah figure named Muhammad Basyuni Imran. Basuni Imran asked Rasyid Ridha about the law using the interpretation of the Qur'an by Muhammad Ali from the Ahmadiyah (Ichwan 2001: 156). Rasyid Rida's fatwa became one of the factors that further strengthened the decision to issue a fatwa banning joining the Ahmadiyah at the 18th Muhammadiyah Congress in 1929, which was held in Solo.

Correspondence and consultation, as mentioned, were common among Muslims in the Nusantara, especially in the early 19th century. Important questions about Islamic law were raised directly to scholars in the Middle East. This condition, in Kaptein's view (1995, 142), is evidence that Muslims in the Nusantara identify as part of the global *ummah* (Muslim population).

Polemic and debate also emerged in Pakistan. In February and March 1953, a riot broke out in Lahore. The main cause of the riot was Maulana Maududi, the author of a book about the Aqeedah Ahmadiyah congregation. He is the leader of the Jamaat Islami political party. There were three hundred victims who died in the riot. The main target of the riot was Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's first foreign minister. Maududi is Zafrullah Khan's political opponent (Wolf 2019, 8; Nijhawan 2016, 7; Darmadi 2013, 26). As a result of the riot, Maududi was sentenced to death, but under pressure from conservative groups, the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. In fact, due to intense pressure, a few years later, Maududi was released by the government.

In February 1974, the Ahmadiyah polemic was revived after Pakistani Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, launched a program to bring Pakistan closer to Arab countries. In the same year, Maududi was given the title *Imamul Muslimin*, at the meeting of the MWL, which, as mentioned¹⁰, is an organization based in Saudi Arabia and was founded in 1962 by the Saudi government. As one of the concrete efforts to implement his program, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made Pakistan the host of the OIC meeting in Lahore.

As a result, Pakistan became an active member of the world Islamic organization and developed close relations with Arab countries. In April 1974, the MWL held a congress in Saudi Arabia, where one item on the agenda was addressing the issue of the growing Ahmadiyah. For the first time, the issue of the Ahmadiyah received a global response, insofar as international Islamic organizations issued fatwas about the Ahmadiyah heresy. The decision dictum stated that the Ahmadiyah is an organization outside of Islam and its followers are non-Muslims.

The declaration, which was endorsed by 140 delegates from various Islamic countries around the world, explained that:

2 “Qadianism or Ahmadiyya: It is a subversive movement against Islam and the Muslim world, which falsely and deceitfully claims to be an Islamic sect; who under the guise of Islam and for the sake of mundane interests contrives and plans to damage the very foundations of Islam. Its eminent deviations from the basic Islamic principles are as follows: (1) Its founder claimed that he was a Prophet. (2) They deliberately distort the meanings of the verses of the Holy Quran. (3) They declared that Jihad has been abolished (Muslim World League 1974).

Furthermore, the declaration stated that the Ahmadiyah was a movement controlled by British imperialism and that it had a hidden agenda considered harmful to Muslims. The loyalty of the Ahmadiyah movement led to British imperialism and Zionism. The congress found that the Ahmadiyah uses three methods to spread its ideas: (1) building mosques in various places; (2) establishing educational institutions and also orphanages; and (3) publishing corrupted versions of the Holy Qur'an in local and international languages. Based on these considerations, the congress decided on five recommendations: (1) all Islamic organizations in the world must be aware of all Ahmadiyah Qadian activities in their respective countries; (2) they must be declared non-Muslims, expelled from Islam, and prohibited from entering the holy land; (3) they must be dissolved socially, economically, and

culturally, including not being permitted to be buried in Muslim graveyards; (4) all Muslim countries must impose restrictions on the activities of followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad; (5) the Qur'anic texts that they change must be published and people are to be briefed on them, while it is then prohibited for further publication; and (6) all groups that deviate from Islam must be treated equally, like the Qadianis (World Muslim League 1974).

The fatwa issued by the MWL had a significant impact. In April and May 1974, riots emerged in Pakistan. Through the fatwa, supporters of the *Jemaat Islami* political party and Maududi attacked the Ahmadiyah. The government, meanwhile, merely stood by and did nothing to quell the rioters. The group, led by the *Jemaat Islami* and Maulana Maududi, campaigned that the Ahmadiyah were non-Muslim and heretical, citing the 1974 MWL fatwa as supporting evidence (Darmadi 2013, 27). Furthermore, in September 1974, the Pakistani government issued a constitutional amendment stating that anyone who believes in the existence of the Prophet after the Prophet Muhammad is a non-Muslim. While this amendment does not mention specific groups or sects, the context and timing of the amendment make it clear that the amendment was made specifically with the Ahmadiyah in mind (Wolf 2019, 6).

Four years later, the OIC adopted a fatwa on the Ahmadiyah, based on one of the decisions of the congress in 1978. Some prominent figures from Islamic countries, including HM. Rasjidi, who represented Indonesia, signed the document. Darmadi (2013, 29) notes that between 1970 and 1980, Indonesia was represented by M. Natsir in various global Islamic organization meetings. Natsir was recorded as having held the position of Secretary-General in the MWL. However, political activities in the country prevented him from attending important forums during those years, so he appointed M. Rasjidi to represent him. M. Natsir and Rasjidi enjoyed a close and good relationship. They were eventually involved in the founding of the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), an organization that carries the idea of connecting the ideas of the Arab world to Indonesia.

The campaign on fatwas produced by the MWL was carried out intensively. The Saudi government gave enormous support to the campaign for the fatwa. Through diplomatic relations, they approached Muslim-populated countries to intensify and disseminate the fatwa.

In Indonesia, MWL ideas are implemented by the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII). This is understandable considering that M. Natsir is a prominent figure in both organizations. He disseminated the ideas through certain activities and also published in the magazine *Media Dakwah*, on one occasion writing about the fatwas on the Ahmadiyah (Ropi 2015, 298).

MUI, of course, issued a fatwa on the Ahmadiyah in June 1980. The fatwa was issued at the Second National Deliberation Forum in Jakarta, held between May 26 and June 1, 1980. It was signed by MUI chairman Buya Hamka and MUI secretary H. Kafrawi. The contents explained that the decision referred to the results of the MUI National Working Meeting held between March 4 and 7, 1984 (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2011, 101-105).

Suaedy (2018, 263) noted MUI's 1980 fatwa on the Ahmadiyah was not followed by acts of violence and attacks. In Ropi's view (2015, 299-300), the implementation of a weak fatwa is caused by inadequate government support. The New Order government under President Soeharto ignored the fatwa (Mas²⁶ 2017, 91). The fatwa dictum states that the MUI should always be in contact with the government in responding to the Ahmadiyah.

The lack of government support made some scholars react. They sent a letter to the MWL urging the Indonesian government to be more assertive in handling the Ahmadiyah issue. In 1981, Saudi Arabia sent a letter to Indonesia's Ministry of Religion, imploring it to take decisive steps against the Ahmadiyah. Responding to this, the Ministry of Religion issued a notification letter through the Directorate General of Islamic Community Guidance³². D / BA / 01/3099/1984 about the Ahmadiyah (Rofiqoh, ³10: 59). One important dictum explained that the Ahmadiyah is a forbidden movement because it considers Mirza Ghulam Ahmad a Prophet. The letter was sent widely to all branch offices and regions of the Ministry of Religion throughout Indonesia (Ropi 2015, 301).

Another opinion, raised by Rofiqoh (2010), was that, according to KH. Ma'ruf Amin, nine Ahmadiyah branches were closed after the 1980 fatwa was issued. MUI did not, however, have the power to close any Ahmadiyah branch; rather, the closures were based on Minister of Religion Instruction No. 8 of 1978 concerning Coaching, Guidance and Supervision of Organizations and Sect in Islam that is contrary to the teachings of Islam (Tim Puslitbang Kehidupan Beragama 2009, 44).⁷

The Minister of Religion Instruction was addressed to the Directorate-General of Islamic Community Guidance, the Head of the Religious Research Agency, the Inspector-General, and the Head of the Provincial Religious Affairs Office. The instructions comprised five points: (1) Improving relations and cooperation with the Attorney-General's Office, the Ministry of Home Affairs, BAKIN and the Regional Government apparatus, and the MUI/Regional MUI and Islamic Religious Institutions to improve coaching, guidance, and supervision of the aforementioned organizations and sects according to their respective fields of work; (2) Improving coaching, guidance and the direction of the organization and the sect in accordance with Islamic teachings; (3) Coaching, guidance, and direction of organizational activities and the sect is carried out according to applicable laws and regulations; (4) Perform these Instructions as well as possible; and (5) Report the implementation to the Minister of Religion.

KH. Ma'ruf Amin confirmed that the high public demand for MUI to address the Ahmadiyah informed the issuance of the 1980 fatwa on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan (Rofiqoh 2015, 52). Huzaemah Tahido Yanggo expressed similar sentiment, namely that the community was eager to learn of MUI's attitude towards the Ahmadiyah. Yanggoe specifically said that there were *mustafti* who requested the fatwa, even though it was not mentioned in the fatwa dictum.³

***Jalsa Salana* and the Ahmadiyah Congregation: The Socio-cultural Practice Dimension of the MUI Fatwa on Ahmadiyah**

Mirza Thahir Ahmad, the fourth Caliph of the Ahmadiyah, visited Indonesia in 2000. He attended the *Jalsa Salana*, which is an annual meeting held by the Ahmadiyah Indonesian Congregation, which, on this occasion was also held to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. On the sidelines of the meeting, Mirza Thahir Ahmad had the opportunity to meet with Indonesian President KH. Abdurrahman Wahid and Chair of the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, MPR), M. Amien Rais (Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia 2000, 2-4).

Riots and debates over the Ahmadiyah continued after the meeting. In Pancor, Lombok some Ahmadiyah groups were removed from their homes. The East Lombok government responded to the incident by

providing the Ahmadis in question two options: renounce their beliefs or leave their villages (Masnun 2017, 92).

In response to these events, several local governments in West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) issued decrees and laws. First, the Decree of the Regent of West Lombok No. 35 of 2001 regarding the Prohibition and Termination of the Ahmadiyah Teachings / Ideology in West Lombok Regency, which was based on the Recommendation of MUI West Lombok No. 12 / MUI-LB / 7/2001 (July 5, 2001). This contained a request that the West Lombok Government “strictly prohibit the activities of this group and take action against any violations of the prohibition.” Secondly, East Lombok Regent Decree No. 045.2 / 134 / KUM / 2002 dated 13 September 2002, which prohibits the dissemination of Ahmadiyah teachings and ideologies, both oral and written, in East Lombok (Masnun 2017, 93).

MUI’s response to the arrival of Mirza Thahir Ahmad and his meeting with the President of Indonesia and the Chair of the MPR was negative. A few moments after the meeting, MUI sought to discuss the Ahmadiyah.

In 2002, M. Amin Djamaluddin from the Institute for Research and the Study of Islam (*Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam*, LPPI) held a seminar entitled “The Ahmadiyah Heresy and its Dangers” at the Istiqlal Mosque, which also houses MUI’s offices. The seminar was attended by certain MUI figures and administrators from both local and national level. Four speakers presented at the seminar, namely Shaykh Abdul Hafiz Makki (Head of the Nubuwwah Khataman Movement, Pakistan), Hasan Audah (Ex-Ahmadi Da’i from London), Fauzy Agus Tjik (Researcher of heretical sects), Sudjangi (Expert researcher and former Head of Research and Development at the Ministry of Religion), and M. Amin Djamaluddin, Chair of the Institute for Research and the Study of Islam (LPPI) (Anwar 2003, 23; Burhani 2016, 156).

As a follow-up, from April 17 to 21, 2005, MUI held a congress of Indonesian Muslims (KUII). Four agendas were discussed at the meeting. One of them addressed the concept of religious ethics and *ukhūwah Islāmīyah* (Islamic brotherhood). One of the dictums decided at the congress was a recommendation that heretical sects should be prioritized over other social issues, such as corruption, bribery, adultery, abortion, pornography, action porn, drugs, gambling, alcohol, intellectual property rights, crime, environmental destruction, violence, and also hostility (Olle 2009, 95).

Discussions and debates about the Ahmadiyah continued into early 2005. The Surveillance of Societal Beliefs and Societal Religions (*Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat dan Keagamaan Masyarakat*, PAKEM) coordinating body held two coordinating meetings discussing the development of deviant beliefs, including the Ahmadiyah. The meeting was attended by representatives of MUI, the Attorney-General, Police Headquarters, Army Headquarters, Ministry of Internal Affairs (Depdagri), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Deplu), Ministry of Religion (Depag), State Intelligence Agency (BIN), and the Ministry of Education and Culture (Depdikbud). Utang Ranuwijaya and M. Amin Djamaluddin were appointed MUI representatives at the meeting regarding the development of the Ahmadiyah case, which originated from a MUI regional report.

The regional MUI branch asked the central board to take a firm stance by issuing a decision regarding the clashes between Ahmadiyah and non-Ahmadiyah that occurred in the community. This coordination meeting resulted in a decision stating that both the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan and Ahmadiyah Lahore were the same, insofar as they deviated from Islamic teachings. Huzaemah T. Yanggo said that although the Ahmadiyah Lahore did not claim Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as their Prophet, they believed him. Trusting someone who claims to be a Prophet, in MUI's view, is askin to acknowledging him as a Prophet.

At the forum, the Attorney-General's representative asked the representatives of the Ministry of Religion (Depag) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (Depdagri), the Police Headquarters, and MUI, to draw up a Presidential Decree on the banning of the Ahmadiyah. Each party agreed to hold another meeting to discuss the draft Presidential Decree. A meeting to discuss the draft was conducted on May 12, 2005 (Rofiqoh 2015, 58-59), but no further information subsequently emerged explaining why the Presidential Decree was never issued.

Meanwhile, the Ahmadiyah obtained permission from the West Java Regional Police and Bogor Police to hold the *Jalsa Salana* event. This condition made M. Amin Djamaluddin from the LPPI send a letter to the West Java and Bogor Regional Police offices, requesting that the permit for the event be rescinded. In addition to sending letters, LPPI also established a post to disband the Ahmadiyah.

On the morning of July 8, 2005, some people suddenly approached the Mubarak Campus, the office of the Ahmadiyah Congregation in

Pondok Udik Village, Kemang, Bogor. For three days, from July 8 to 10, 2005, the Ahmadiyah community held a *Jalsa Salana*. Around 1500 Ahmadis attended, with guests including Indonesians, foreign Ahmadis, government representatives, and scholars.

Some unknown people attended and erected banners proclaiming that “Ahmadiyah is not Islam, the Prophet Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, their Holy Book is Tadzkirah.” After erecting the banners, they left the Mubarak campus.

At noon, after Friday prayers, dozens of people, led by M. Amin Djamaluddin, attended the Mubarak Campus. They came to meet with representatives of the Ahmadiyah. Amin said that his party had sent a letter to the Chief of West Java Police and the Head of the Bogor Regional Police on July 5, 2005. The letter requested that the permit for the Ahmadiyah activities on the Mubarak Campus be rescinded.

Letter No. 50/VII/ LPPI/05 also contained several statements stating that it has held meetings with various government parties, such as the Attorney-General's Office, TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or the Indonesian National Military) Headquarters, Polri (Police of the Republic of Indonesia), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Deplu), Ministry of Home Affairs (Depdagri), and the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) Center. The letter also stated that the outcome of the meeting was that the Ahmadiyah, in all regions across Indonesia, were to be dissolved (Hamdi 2007, 224-225; Connley 2016, 37-38; Alnizar 2019, 419).

Afterwards, M. Amin Dajamaluddin met with Ahmadiyah representatives at the Office of the Head of Pondok Udik Village, Kemang, Bogor. Ahmadiyah is represented by Ahmad Supardi, Ruhdiyyat Ayyubi, Qomaruddin and also one of Muslim Television Ahmadiyahh (MTA). While M. Amin Djamaluddin came with Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf. The Commander of the Kemang Military Rayon (Danramil), Chief of the Kemang Sector Police Office (Kapolsek), Kemang Sub-District was present as a representative of the government. During the meeting, Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf stated that Ahmadis were heretics.

“Listen to what I say today. From the aspirations of the Parung Islamic community and all Muslims are asking you to disperse. If within 7x24 hours there is no official statement that you disband, then you have declared war on Indonesian Muslims.”⁴

Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf gave an ultimatum to the Ahmadiyah congregation to leave the Mubarak Campus. The building must be emptied. If this does not happen, Habib Abdurrahman stressed that the masses would take over and force their way. The Ahmadiyah was given 7x24 hours to carry out the ultimatum.

On July 9, 2005, the masses arrived in greater numbers. Some who arrived at the Mubarak Campus erected a banner that read: "Disband Post of the Ahmadiyah". The crowd pushed its way through, asking to enter via the main gate. An amateur videotape revealed that several elements of the Civil Service Police Unit (Satpol PP) had contributed by tearing down the signs bearing the identity of the Mubarak Campus, which belongs to the Ahmadiyah.

The situation deteriorated into complete chaos. The masses outside the gate, which were scattered along the Parung-Bogor highway, were out of control. Some of them shouted and squealed "infidels", "apostates", and "heretics". The masses, some of whom bore the attributes of the Islamic Defenders' Front (*Front Pembela Islam*, FPI), knocked down the gates, as well as ornaments the Ahmadiyah congregation had made in celebration of *Jalsa Salana*.

The Ahmadiyah congregation that was still inside, especially women and children, were scared. While some men tried to calm them down, others were emotionally triggered, while others reminded those in attendance that all actions must be directed toward Amir (the leader of the Ahmadiyah congregation).

The riots peaked on July 15, 2005. In lieu of valid data regarding the number of people involved, we are left with two competing versions of events: one that says that some 10,000 people were involved, and another that suggested only around 3000 people attended. Either way, they arrived on campus at around 14:00 WIB (Western Indonesian time), carrying a variety of weapons, including wooden planks, clubs, and bamboo spears. Urging that the Ahmadiyah congregation immediately vacate the campus, the masses threatened that if by 16:00 WIB they were still on campus, the mob would raze the campus to the ground.

The Kemang sub-district head summoned Mulyadi Sumarto and Ahmad Supardi, as Ahmadiyah representatives, to the front gate, where the mass of protestors had gathered. The sub-district head, who tried to negotiate with the representatives of the Ahmadiyah

congregation, was accompanied by the Bogor Regent, the Head of the District Attorney's Office (Kajari), the Head of the West Java Regional Police Office (Kapolwil), as well as the Head of the Bogor Police Headquarters (Kapolres). They offered the Ahmadiyah congregation the option to leave the Mubarak campus with security guarantees from the authorities. This had been agreed to by the government and the leaders of the demonstration, including Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf. However, Mulyadi Sumarto and Ahmad Supardi refused, stating that they did not want to leave a building built on their land. The negotiations proceeded until then Amir *Jemaah Ahmadiyah*, H. Abdul Basit, spoke via cellphone with the police chief and decided to have the Ahmadiyah congregation evacuate the premises.

When the evacuation scenario was agreed upon, the masses nevertheless damaged and burned the *Lajnah Imaillah* (LI) building complex located at the back of the Mubarak campus. They then continued towards the main Mubarak campus complex through the back door, where they burned books, a motorcycle, and also looted the *Jemaah* house.

The evacuation was not a success. From the amateur video footage of the attack, the Ahmadiyah could be seen being transported in buses, while the masses pelted rocks at police trucks. "We were dropped off at Bogor Cibinong Kejari in the afternoon. Then we were recorded, one by one, and told to go home. The police yelled at us and said we were all monkeys. How can we go home when we don't have any money?"⁵

Two weeks later, MUI issued a fatwa on the Ahmadiyah at its 7th National MUI Conference, on July 26-29, 2005, in Jakarta. The fatwa, numbered 11/Munas VII/MUI/15/2005 on the Ahmadiyah, was issued together with eleven other fatwas, including MUI's infamous 2005 fatwa on Liberalism, Secularism, and Pluralism (Alnizar, Ma'ruf, & Manshur 2021, 4).

Conclusion

The form and use of language in MUI's 2005 fatwa on the Ahmadiyah was more formal than its 1980 fatwa on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan. The choice of vocabulary and writing procedures that provided emphasis on certain words were evidence of the ⁸firmation of the essence of the fatwa.

The fatwa dictum makes mention of how text producers take positions as guardians of the purity of Islamic teachings. On the other

hand, the Ahmadiyah is positioned 'over the line' with the phrase "being outside of Islam". The choice of diction, variety, and style of language has specific communication goals. As to confirm membership identification, in this context, MUI is a semi-state institution that has authority. In addition, the choice of diction is also used to make exclusions by strengthening MUI's position, which is in direct opposition to the Ahmadiyah. Furthermore, MUI's choice of diction established self-domination, which in the context of the 1980 MUI fatwa on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan, was demonstrated by a call to deal with the Ahmadiyah issue. The message MUI seeks to convey is that it enjoys a close affinity with the government. The affirmation of dominance was also reflected in the way MUI asked those who had already followed the Ahmadiyah to return to the right path. In this context, MUI positions itself as an institution that has the authority to assess the quality of one's teachings and faith.

MUI's fatwas on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan in 1980 and the Ahmadiyah in 2005 were on the same topic. The fatwas speak of a transnational movement that is experiencing a variety of rejections on a global scale. This topic has a direct influence on MUI's choice of formal language styles. It is a logical choice in terms of the urgency of the issue and topic. In addition to being motivated to raise its institutional status, formal language can create social distance between text producers (MUI) and text consumers, who are targeted by fatwas.

MUI fatwas enjoy both a global and historical context. MUI's 1980 fatwa on the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan reflected its close relations with the Middle Eastern countries and Pakistan, insofar as these countries also rejected the Ahmadiyah. Meanwhile, the 2005 MUI fatwa on the Ahmadiyah was informed by the local rejection of the *Jalsa Salana* event, which was attended by the fourth Ahmadi Caliph, Mirza Tahir Ahmad.

Endnotes

- This article is the result of postdoctoral research that supported by Directorate Research of Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) in 2021. Thank you to the reviewers and colleagues who gave input and criticism in improving this article.
- 1. Interview with Asrorun Ni'am Sholeh, Secretary of the Fatwa Commission of the MUI at the MUI Office, Jakarta, September 11th, 2019.
- 2. KH. Ali Yafie believes that the use of the term "outside of Islam" is a political diction. The MUI tries to avoid using harsher terms like infidels and so on. Interview with Ali Yafie, Chair of the MUI in 1990-2000, South Tangerang, August 1st, 2019.
- 3. Interview with Huzaemah Tahido Yanggo, Head of the Fatwa Division of the MUI at the Qur'an Institute of Sciences (IIQ), South Tangerang, July 13th, 2019.
- 4. Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf, July 8, 2005. Video recording of the attack on the Al-Mubarak campus, Parung.
- 5. Interview with Murtiyono Yusuf Ismail, Ahmadiyah activist at Mubarak Campus, Bogor, July 28th 2018.

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Interview with Murtiyono Yusuf Ismail, Bogor, July 28th 2018.

Interview with Ali Yafie, South Tangerang, August 1st 2019.

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Video Recording of the attack on the Al-Mubarak campus, Parung.

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6. Ms. *Undhang-Undhang Banten*, L.Or.5598, Leiden University.
7. Interview with K.H. Sahal Mahfudz, Kajen, Pati, June 11th, 2007.

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