Introduction to Side Channel Attacks

through Power Analysis

FdLSifu @ Ph0wn 2024

Who am I?

ID: Nabil Hamzi - FdLSifu

Hobbies

 CTF (soudure au beurre), Football player & coach, cryptography, security, programming languages

Exp

- Embedded crypto developer @ Gemalto (now Thales) [8 years]
- Crypto and Payment expert @ Ingenico [4 years]
- Now Head of Product Security since 5 years

Feel free to ask any questions!

What will not be covered?

- Cryptography internals
- Hardware, Signal processing
- Power acquisition, Oscilloscopes
- EM, Fault injection
- High order attacks/masking
- Statistical tools
- Deep dive into counter measures
- Secure elements, Certification

What will be covered?

- Leakage model
- Hamming weight
- Simple Power Analysis
- Differential Power Analysis
- Correlation Power Analysis
- AES internals
- RSA modular exponentiation
- Key recovery techniques

Agenda

Power Analysis

- Grey box attack model
- Leakage model
 - Hamming weight

Simple Power Analysis

- RSA and modular exponentiation
- Hands on

Differential Power Analysis

- AES internals
- Hands on

Correlation Power Analysis

Hands on


Set up for the workshop


1. Install docker and docker-compose

2. Clone this git repo: https://github.com/FdLSifu/2024_ph0wn_intro_sca

- 3. Open terminal and set as current directory the cloned repo
- 4. Run: \$ sh launch workshop.sh rsa

You should have a prompt! → ~ _






What can be observed?

- Power consumption
- Electromagnetic emanation
- Radio signals
- Temperature change
- Timing

•••

Power analysis is a form of side channel attack in which the attacker studies the power consumption of a cryptographic hardware device. These attacks rely on basic physical properties of the device: semiconductor devices are governed by the laws of physics, which dictate that changes in voltages within the device require very small movements of electric charges (currents). By measuring those currents, it is possible to learn a small amount of information about the data being manipulated.

Simple power analysis (**SPA**) involves visually interpreting power *traces*, or graphs of electrical activity over time. **Differential power analysis** (**DPA**) is a more advanced form of power analysis, which can allow an attacker to compute the intermediate values within cryptographic computations through statistical analysis of data collected from multiple cryptographic operations. SPA and DPA were introduced to the open cryptography community in 1998 by Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe and Benjamin Jun.^[1]



Leakage model

Hamming weight

=> Sum of the bits set

Hamming distance

=> Difference of the bits set between 2 bytes/words

Time


=> Difference timing analysis

Value

=> Value of the byte/word


Hamming weight

Hamming weight distribution



$$56 = 0x38 = 00111000$$

$$HW(56) = 3$$



Differential timing analysis

Code PIN: x000 => 5us

Code PIN: 1000 => 6us

Code PIN 1x00 => 6us

Code PIN 1200 => 7us

Code PIN: 12x0 => 7us


Code PIN: 1230 => 8us

Code PIN 123x => 8us

Code PIN 1234 => 9us => UNLOCK

40 attempts!!

Power consumption leaks information



RSA

Public Key: (n, e)

Private Key: (d) or (dp, dq, p, q, iq)

Encryption/Decryption

$$c = m^e / m = c^d$$

Signature/Verification

$$s = hash(m)^d / hash(m) == s^e$$

RSA

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
How a modular exponentiation is performed?

Modular exponentiation

```
func square and multiply (m, exp, n)
   x = 1
   for bit in bit array msb(exp)
       x = x*x \mod n \# do square
       if bit == 1
          x = x*m # do multiplication
   return x
```

Modular exponentiation

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                         # do multiplication
           x = x*m
   return x
```



Hands on

```
$ sh launch_workshop.sh rsa
# cd /attack/
# python3 spa.py
```

Recover the key

Observation

- SPA requires visually identifying patterns in power traces
- This is difficult with noisy power signals

Enter DPA

- DPA is a statistical technique overcoming noise limitations
- It analyzes power traces from multiple inputs

How it works

- 1. Choose an intermediate value that depends on the secret key
- 2. Make a guess about the secret key
- Divide power traces into two groups based on the predicted bit of the intermediate value
- 4. Calculate the average power trace for each group
- 5. Subtract the averages to find the differential trace

Why it works

- If key is the right one, the device will manipulate the predicted bit
- Average of bit 1 power trace minus average of bit 0 power trace will give a spike


QUICK LIVE DEMO

```
import random
def power(bit):
    power 0 = 50
    power_1 = 60
    if bit == 0:
        return power_0 + random.randint(0,2)
    else:
        return power_1 + random.randint(0,2)
trace0 = 0
trace1 = 0
for i in range(10000):
    guess = random.randint(0,1)
    if quess == 0:
        trace0+= power(guess)
    else:
        trace1+= power(quess)
print(trace1-trace0)
```

Let's target AES

- Message is 16 bytes long
- Key0 is the actual AES key for AES-128
- SBOX is a byte-substitution table

```
for i in range(16):
    state[i] = sbox[m[i] ^ k[i]]
```




Let's target AES

 Choose an intermediate value that depends on the secret key => One of the Sbox output bit

Make a guess about the secret key => Try all key bytes

3. Perform the DPA



Hands on

```
$ sh launch_workshop.sh aes
# cd /attack/
# python3 acquisition.py
# python3 dpa.py
```

Recover the key

- DPA focuses on one bit leakage
- However, an operation on byte involves 8 bits.
- To simplify, the power consumption is dependent on the number of 1s to be processed
- Said differently:

The power consumption is correlated with the Hamming Weight

How it works

- 1. Choose an intermediate value that depends on the secret key
- 2. Make a guess about the secret key
- 3. We compute the **correlation coefficient** between the hamming weight of intermediate values and the power traces at a given point of time
- 4. If the correlation is high => the key guess is correct
- 5. Else => the key guess is incorrect
- 6. If all key guesses are incorrect, the point of time is incorrect

Correlation coefficient: Pearson correlation coefficient

It measures linear correlation between two sets of data.

$$r = rac{\sum \left(x_i - ar{x}
ight)\left(y_i - ar{y}
ight)}{\sqrt{\sum \left(x_i - ar{x}
ight)^2 \sum \left(y_i - ar{y}
ight)^2}}$$

r = correlation coefficient

 x_i = values of the x-variable in a sample

 \bar{x} = mean of the values of the x-variable

 y_i = values of the y-variable in a sample

y = mean of the values of the y-variable

Hands on