


## **TASK**



We were hired by the Theta company to perform security assessments on some of their critical data center infrastructure.


The scope of activities is mainly focused on:

- -A Web server that exposes various services on the internet (and therefore accessible to the public)
- -An Application server that exposes on the internal network an e-commerce application accessible only by employees of the Theta company (therefore not accessible from external sources, i.e. the internet) Based on the information above, the head of IT security of Theta, also called CISO (chief information security officer), requires us:
- 1. To propose a network model (design) to secure the two critical components, including in the analysis the security devices that could be used to increase network protection.
- 2. To carry out specific tests on the two critical components to evaluate their safety status. In this case, the CISO asks us to carry out the checks reported in the next slide.

On the Web Server:

- Scan for active services on the machine.
- Possible enumeration of HTTP methods enabled on the HTTP service listening on port 80. On the application server:
- Enumeration of enabled HTTP methods.
- Evaluation of the robustness of the login page to Brute Force attacks. The CISO explicitly asked us not to carry out any invasive tests in the production environment, and therefore we proposed to him to reproduce the two components in our test laboratories, so as to be able to carry out the tests safely, separating the test environments from the Work.

## THETA STRUCTURE




The Theta corporate IT structure has been reconstructed to make it easier to understand.

There are **Intranet** areas (where it is not accessible from the outside, therefore from the internet, but only from the company network)

There is an internal e-commerce **server** (also accessible only from the intranet.

Finally, a DMZ with a web server accessible to all.



To drastically and immediately improve network security, we hypothesize the insertion of a **perimeter Firewall**, positioning it between the internal network and the external network (for example the Internet) and acting as a **defense barrier** that *controls* and *filters* incoming network traffic and output. In summary it will be used for: monitor traffic, filter packets, proxy, VPN and to create custom security rules



# **WEB SERVER**

SERVER THAT EXPOSES VARIOUS SERVICES ON THE INTERNET

04



## SCAN OF ACTIVE SERVICES ON THE MACHINE

The Metasploitable2
machine was simulated on
the Theta Web Server.
We therefore simulated a
port scanner of the services
on the Theta server with
output the list of open and
closed ports.

#### ENUMERATION OF ENABLED HTTP METHODS

We simulated a series of **HTTP** requests to the server in order to determine which HTTP **verbs** are supported for further analysis.

Enter the desired option: 4
Enter the URL to check: http://192.168.50.101/dvwa/vulnerabilities/brute/
Supported HTTP verbs for http://192.168.50.101/dvwa/vulnerabilities/brute/: [OPTIONS], [GET], [POST], [PUT], [DELETE]
Enter the desired option:

```
[1] English
[2] Italiano
Enter the correct choice (Inserire la scelta corretta): 1

Language set to English.

EMG
[1] Port scanner
[2] Phypmyadmin
[3] DWMA
[4] HTTP verbs
[5] View packet tracer schema
[6] View documentation
[7] Open preventive
[8] Open phymyadmin's report
[9] OPen DWMA's report
[10] Reload the menu'
[11] Select language
[12] Exit

Enter the desired option: 1

Enter the paddress: 192.168.50.101
Enter the proving (format ex: 1-65535): 1-20
Scanning host 192.168.50.101 from port 1 to 20:
Port 1 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 3 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 4 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 5 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 5 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 6 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 7 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 9 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 9 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 10 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 11 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 9 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 10 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 11 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 12 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 13 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 14 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 15 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 17 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 17 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 18 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 19 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
Port 10 - UDP [CLOSE] - TCP [CLOSE]
P
```



# APPLICATION SERVER ENG

**E-COMMERCE SERVER ONLY ON INTRANET** 



#### **ENUMERATION OF ENABLED HTTP METHODS**

We simulated a series of **HTTP** requests to the server in order to determine which HTTP **verbs** are supported for further analysis.



#### **EVALUATION OF THE ROBUSTNESS OF** THE LOGIN PAGE TO BRUTE FORCE **ATTACKS**

We simulated several Brute Force attacks to test the actual security of the login forms.



We have detected multiple fragilities IN ALL the company's login forms, we will subsequently explain why and how to resolve them.





### **APPLICATION SERVER**

# **ENG**

06

#### **E-COMMERCE SERVER ONLY ON INTRANET**


**RESULTS: VERY VULNERABLES** 

With the tests carried out in complete **safety** in our virtual machines we can state that the login pages are totally vulnerable to ANY **attack**, here are some screenshots:

```
kali@kali: ~/Desktop
File Actions Edit View Help
                    Utente root con la password:
                                     la password:
                                     la password:
                    Utente root con la password:
                    Utente root con la password:
                    Utente root con la password:
                    Utente root con
                                     la password:
                                     la password:
                    Utente root con la password:
                                     la password:
                    Utente root con la password:
[X] LOG - FALLITO: Utente root con la password: 43243243243:
[*] LOGIN EFFETTUATO: Utente root con la password: password
—(kali⊕kali)-[~/Desktop]
-$ ■
```

**Brute Force** attack inside the index.php in the login **form** 

Login with the relevant credentials





## **APPLICATION SERVER**

#### **E-COMMERCE SERVER ONLY ON INTRANET**

erire %'oprione deniderata: []




**RESULTS: VERY VULNERABLES** 

The server that hosts the e-commerce has also highlighted very obvious flaws in the **DVWA** login page, where it is also possible to perform a sql **injection** inside <u>as well</u> as using Brute Force

```
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It is distributed under the News Public Source license as provided in the LICENSE File of the source distribution or at https://mmap.org/mpsi/. Note that this license requires you to license you own work under a compatable open source license, or to license you wish to embed Mmap technology into proprietary software, we sell alternative licenses at https://mmag.org/own/.
blem reading gackedriver versions: error sending request for url (https://raw.glthubusercontext.com/SeleniumHQ/selenium/trunk/com
re was an error managing gackedriver (error sending request for url (https://glthub.com/morilla/gackedriver/releases/latest): error
Login page
Sql Injection - Level tom
Brute Force complete (log-in + tutti i livelli)
Back...
```

Brute Force attack inside the **DVWA** login page



Furthermore, we have also implemented an **AUTOMATIC** login via the python script which logs in once the correct credentials are found!



# **HOW TO IMPROVE**



The services we tested in totally secure environments highlighted multiple flaws.

Below we have compiled a list of how to improve security:

In the **LOW** security level of the DVWA (accessible with sql injection)

- 1. **Using Query Parameterization or ORM**: Use parameterized SQL statements or an Object-Relational Mapping (ORM) to avoid SQL injection attacks.
- 2. **Using Secure Hash Algorithms**: Replace MD5 hashing with more secure hashing algorithms such as bcrypt or Argon2 to protect passwords from rainbow table hash attacks.
- 3. **Lockout Mechanism**: Implement an account lockout mechanism after a certain number of failed attempts.

In the **MEDIUM** safety level of the DVWA

- 1. **Using Modern Sanitization Features:** Use modern sanitization features such as `mysqli\_real\_escape\_string` or query parameterization to prevent SQL injection attacks.
- 2. **Using Secure Hash Algorithms**: Replace MD5 hashing with more secure hashing algorithms such as bcrypt or Argon2 to protect passwords from rainbow table hash attacks.

In the **HIGH** security level of the DVWA

- 1. **Using Modern Sanitization Features**: Use modern sanitization features such as `mysqli\_real\_escape\_string` or query parameterization to prevent SQL injection attacks.
- 2. **Using Secure Hash Algorithms**: Replace MD5 hashing with more secure hashing algorithms such as bcrypt or Argon2 to protect passwords from rainbow table hash attacks.
- 3. **Implement Anti-Brute Force Controls**: Implement brute force attack detection and mitigation mechanisms, such as login attempt limits, captchas, or escalating delays.



# **HOW TO IMPROVE**



The services we tested in totally secure environments highlighted multiple flaws.

Below we have compiled a list of how to improve security:

phpMyAdmin's index.php page There can be multiple *solutions*:

- 1) **Access monitoring**: Implementation of controls on requests from the same IP and consequently a temporary block/ban of that particular IP
- 2) **Attempt Limitations**: If a login page does not enforce any limitations on login attempts, an attacker can make an unlimited number of attempts without restrictions. This allows them to carry out brute force attacks without hindrance.
- 3) **Weak passwords**: If users use weak or easily guessable passwords, it becomes easier for an attacker to identify the correct combinations via a brute force attack.
- 4) **Attack detection mechanisms**: Login pages must have brute force attack detection, not having them could allow an attacker to carry out the attack without being detected or blocked by the system.
- 5) **Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) measures**: Using MFA, such as sending a verification code via SMS or using an authenticator application, can make it more difficult for an attacker to obtain the even if he can guess the password.

We remind you that the quote we have already sent lasts 30 days