State-dependent pass-through from monetary policy to lending rates

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➢ Understanding the source of pass-through heterogeneity is crucial to assess the real effects of MP on the macroeconomy.

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- **Key Result 3:** Skewness is relevant dimension of dispersion rather than Variance.
- **HOW:** Local Projections & detailed micro-data on lending
    - **High-Frequency Proxy** identification of exogenous variation in MP rate changes.
    - Panel Local projections with **interaction terms**
    - **Branch/product-level** lending rates on new loans.

This Paper: Theoretical Contribution

Q: How can we explain my empirical findings?

A: Theoretical model of lender imperfect competition

- Bertrand **competition**
- Customers' **switching friction**

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3 Lenders' larger potential for capturing borrowers from competition.

4 Stronger lenders' price complementarity ⇒ larger MP pass-through.

▸ Literature Review

Outline

Core Micro-Data

Branch-Level Offered Base Loan Interest Rates from S&P GMI Ratewatch (New to the literature):

- 30+ Loan Products (House, Consumer Durables, Small Business Loans, Commercial RE).
- Time Span: 2001-2019. Monthly frequency.
- 100,000+ branches (brick-and-mortar offices, cyber offices,...).
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- Loan product characteristics.
- Branch location, ownership & rate-setting rights.

Other Data

1 **Macro Indicators**:

- National/State-level: GDP, Prices, Excess Bond Premium, House Prices.
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3. **Robustness Loan-Level Data**:
   - Freddie-Mac Data on Mortgage Loans.
   - Loan Characteristics, Borrower Characteristics, Renegotiation/Cashout Status.

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Outline

Local projection specification

Methodology: Local projections. county(c)/product(p)/month(m) panel.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Outcome Variable}_{t+h,c,m} \quad = \quad & \alpha + \boldsymbol{\beta_0}\mathbf{MP}_t + \underline{\boldsymbol{\beta_1}}\left[\mathbf{MP}_t \times \widehat{\textbf{Skewness}}_{t-1,c}\right] + \sum_{k=0}^{2}\beta_{3,k}\widehat{\text{Skewness}}_{t-k-1,c} + \\ + \quad & \sum_{k=1}^{2}\rho_{1,k}\text{MP}_{t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^{2}\rho_{2,k}\left[\text{MP}_{t-k} \times \widehat{\text{Skewness}}_{t-k-1,c}\right] + \\ + \quad & \sum_{k=1}^{2}\gamma_k X_{t-k,c,m} + \sum_{k=1}^{2}\delta_k X_{t-k,US} + \sum_{k=1}^{2}\chi_k X_{t-k,lender} + \varepsilon_{t,c,m}\end{aligned}$$

Outcome Variables: County/Product Average Lending Rate, County Unemployment Rate.

Controls: National GDP, Defl, Stock Market, Excess Bond Premium, county: wage growth, unemployment, home prices, Herfindal Index, ROA, Cost of Funds, Loan Loss Provisions, lags of the outcome variable, Product/County FE.

Identification: High Frequency Proxy from Bauer and Swanson (2022).

Note: $\widehat{\text{Skewness}}$ defines the county-level skewness subtracted of its long-run mean.

Coefficient Plots: Lending Rates

Average response of county lending rates to 100 b.p. MP shock



(a) Response with skewness at long-run mean (β_0).

- **Result 1:** Pass-Through significantly higher when ex-ante skewness is high.

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

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

(b) Additional impact with skewness 1 s.d. above mean (β_1)

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Robust Specification: Lending Rates

Average response of county average lending rates to 100 b.p. MP shock, robust specification



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

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

(c) Additional impact: variance 1 s.d. above mean (β_3)

- **Result 2:** Skewness remains highly significant. Variance is NOT significant.
- **Result 3: Higher ex-ante Skewness higher MP effects on Unemployment**

Table Results

Robustness

- Variance vs Skewness.
- Increased Set of Interaction Terms.
- Different High-Frequency Proxy.
- Average Interest Rate Expense.
- Robustness with Respect to US pooled Skewness.
- Real Personal Income (State/Lender Level Data).
- Loan-Level Data on Realized Rates.

More Robustness

Outline:

Main Model Ingredients: courtyards and brand loyalty

- Structure: Bertrand Duopoly between Bank H and Bank L.

- Each period a new measure one cohort of customers wakes up and knows $r_{H,t-1}, r_{L,t-1}$.

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Where the fun happens: demand and profit functions

Demand Functions:

Bank H:

$$X_H(r_H, r_L) = \left[\bar{Q}_H - \beta_H r_H + \kappa r_L\right]$$

Bank L:

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Solution Details: Best Responses), (Equilibrium Rates), (Pass-Through)

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- If search costs $= \infty \Rightarrow$ NO borrowers search $\Rightarrow$ banks are local monopolists $\Rightarrow$ NO Competition $\Rightarrow$ Pass-Through $= 1/2$.
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- **Prop 3**; Pass-Through$(H) >$ Pass-Through(L). details empirical test

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- **Search & Switching Frictions** create skewness-based state-dependent responses of lending rates to MP.
- **Future work:**
  1. Include data on loan applications to measure search efforts empirically.
  2. Extend analysis to deposit rates.
  3. Explore GE outcomes in general dynamic macro model.

THANKS!

APPENDIX

Literature Review

State-Dependence of Monetary Policy

- Mortgage Refinancing/Prepayment channel. Berger et al. (2021), Eichenbaum et al. (2022).

⇒ **Explore state-dependence arising from bank's strategic pricing and customer search & switching frictions.**

Monetary Policy Transmission through Banks

- Long stream: banks' regulatory and asymmetric information constraints. Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Kashyap and Stein (2000).
- Recent stream: banks' market power in liquidity provision. Nagel (2016), Drechsler et al. (2017), Wang et al. (2020).

⇒ **Expand to role of bank imperfect competition and consumer frictions.**

IO literature on Customer Search and Switching costs.

- Yankov (2018),Luco (2019), Andersen et al. (2020)

⇒ **Expand on the role of search & switching costs on interest-setting.**

back

Outline

Data: Macro at all levels.

1. **National - Level** :
   - GDP, CPI Index, Commodity Price Index, Excess Bond Premium, Home Price Index, Home Ownership Indexes.
2. **State - Level** :
   - GDP (total and by Industry), Personal Income,
   - Inflation (Hazell et al. (2020))
   - State Home Price Index.
3. **County/MSA - Level** :
   - Unemployment (BLS-LAUS)
   - Wages (BLS-QCEW & CES)
   - House Prices (Zillow)

back

Data: Lending at all levels

4 **Lender - level** (Call Reports):

- Assets and liabilities.
- Interest revenue and expense by Asset & Liability category.

5 **Other: Branch - level** (FDIC Summary of Deposits):

- Location, dates of activity, ownership.
- Total deposits by year.

6 **Other: Loan - level** (Freddie-Mac Data):

- Loan characteristics. (Location, LTV)
- New/Renegotiation/Cash-out status.
- Borrower characteristics. (FICO)

▸ Skewness On Request

Outline

Branch-Level Data: variation over time and space

Example: New advertised Loan Rates for Personal Recreational Vehicle purchase.



Lending rates skewness, US overall distribution.

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

Lending rates skewness, US overall distribution.

▸ Cross-Section ▸ LendingTree ▸ Cross-County Mean ▸ Realized Rates ▸ More Product Types ▸ back

Facts: The curious shapes of the lending rate distributions.



(a) 30Y Mortgage Rates. Minneapolis-MSA. 2019-M1.

- Pronounced Asymmetric shape, market concentration but...

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

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

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

(b) Skewness Time-Series. Minnepolis-MSA

- Pronounced Asymmetric shape, market concentration but...
- Asymmetry is time-varying (next slides)

MSA-Cross Distribution
Branch-Level Distribution
Online Marketplace dispersion
Row Rates
MP Pass-Through Heterogeneity
Back

Facts: The curious shapes of the lending rate distributions.

Mortgage Rates cross-section. Minneapolis MSA vs All MSAs. Purged Borrower/Loan type.



(a) Distribution in 2019-M1.



(b) Skewness Distribution Over MSAs. (Recessions in grey)

- Pronounced Asymmetric shape, market concentration but...
- Skewness cross-section MSA distribution centered around 1 and positive.

Back

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

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

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Mortgage Rates cross-section. Minneapolis MSA. Specific Borrower/Loan type.



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

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

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

(b) Skewness over time. (Recessions in grey)

- Pronounced Asymmetric shape, market concentration but...
- Asymmetry is time-varying (next slides)

Back

The Distribution of Offered Base Rates by lender branch

Offered Rates on Pers Rec Veichle Loans



(a) L.A. Cross-sectional Distribution Lending Rates. 2016m1.



(b) National distribution of cross-sectional skewness.

▸ Skewness Time-Series ▸ Robustness Freddie Mac ▸ Online Dispersion ▸ back

Facts: The lending rate dispersion on Online Marketplaces



Interest Rate Dispersion on LendingTree.com

back

Freddie Mac Data on Realized House Mortgage Rates



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- Displayed distribution is residualized wrt Borrowers and Loan Observables as in Hurst et al. (2016).
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

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

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

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

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- asymmetry is time-varying.

back

Branch-Level Data: cross-sectional skewness over time

Example: New advertised Loan Rates for Personal Recreational Vehicle purchase.



(a) Lending rates skewness, US overall distribution.

Back
Realized Rates
More Product Types
Loan-level Distribution
Syndacated Loans

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

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

(b) Mean of within-county skewness measures.

Back Realized Rates More Product Types Loan-level Distribution Syndacated Loans

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

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

(b) Mean of within-county skewness measures.

$\Rightarrow$ High variation.

$\Rightarrow$ Distribution of skewness across counties shifts over time.

Back   Realized Rates   More Product Types   Loan-level Distribution   Syndicated Loans

Loan-Level Distribution: higher order moments non-trivial dynamics

Freddie Mac Mortgage Rates. Purged. Moments over time.

Skewness and Kurtosis, County-Level Mean



Skewness and Kurtosis, pooled-US Mean



Back

Evolution of Interest Rate Distribution 1st to 4th Moment. Ratewatch

Ratewatch interest rate spreads moments over time (30 Yr Fxd Mtreplace @ 175K)

Mean and Variance



Skewness and Kurtosis



Interest rates at monthly frequency.

Back

Evolution of Interest Rate Distribution 1st to 4th Moment. Ratewatch

Ratewatch interest rate spreads moments over time (3 Year ARM @ 175K)

Mean and Variance



Skewness and Kurtosis



Interest rates at monthly frequency.

Branch-Level Distribution: higher order moments non-trivial dynamics

Personal Recreational Vehicle Advertised Loan Rates.

Mean and Variance



Skewness and Kurtosis



Back to Outline

Evolution of Interest Rate Distribution 1st to 4th Moment. Ratewatch

Ratewatch interest rate spreads moments over time (Construction Loan @ 175K)

Mean and Variance



Skewness and Kurtosis



Interest rates at monthly frequency.

Evolution of Interest Rate Distribution 1st to 4th Moment. Ratewatch

Ratewatch interest rate spreads moments over time (Bus Loan Secured @ 50K)

Mean and Variance



Skewness and Kurtosis



Interest rates at monthly frequency.

Evolution of Interest Rate Distribution 1st to 4th Moment. Ratewatch

Ratewatch interest rate spreads moments over time (Comm Real Estate @ 1M)

Mean and Variance



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

Interest rates at monthly frequency.

Evolution of Interest Rate Distribution 1st to 4th Moment. Ratewatch

Ratewatch interest rate spreads moments over time (Boat New)

Mean and Variance



Skewness and Kurtosis



Interest rates at monthly frequency.

Evolution of Interest Rate Distribution 1st to 4th Moment. Ratewatch

Ratewatch interest rate spreads moments over time (Personal Vehicle New)

Mean and Variance



Skewness and Kurtosis



Interest rates at monthly frequency.

▸ Back

Evolution of C&I Loans Dynamic Beta full distribution

Beta: Measure of sensitivity of Loan Rate to movements in the policy rate (Drechsler et al. (2017))

$$\Delta \text{Rate}_{bank,t} = \alpha_{bank} + \alpha_t + \sum_{k=1}^{4} \beta_{bank,k} \Delta FFR_t + \varepsilon_{bank,t} \quad \textbf{BETA} = \sum_{k=1}^{4} \beta_k$$



Back

Evolution of Interest Rate Distribution 1st to 4th Moment. Dealscan

Dealscan interest rate spreads moments over time (average moment value over all Loan Types

Mean and Variance



Skewness and Kurtosis



Interest rates spread on base rate from Dealscan Data at monthly frequency.

Back

Lender-Level Distribution: higher order moments non-trivial dynamics

C&I Loan average interest rates

Mean and Variance



Skewness and Kurtosis



- Significant Time-Variation.
- Correlation between Skewness and Kurtosis.
- Different behaviour across different Recessions.

MP Pass-Through heterogeneity Across-States



Figure: IRF to 1% MP Shock. IV Local Projections.

Back

MP Heterogeneity Across States

Methodology: IV Local Projections with High-Frequency Proxy by State.[1]

$$\text{Pers}\dot{\ }\text{Inc}_{t+h,s} = \alpha_s + \beta_s \underline{\textbf{FFR}}_t + \sum_{k=1}^{2} \rho_k \text{FFR}_{t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^{2} \gamma_k X_{s,t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^{2} \delta_k X_{US,t-k} + \varepsilon_{s,t}$$

2 Years Cumulative Impulse Response of Real Personal Income to MP shock



[2] Proxy Identification as in Jarociński and Karadi (2020)

Back

US States/Bank Panel: Real Personal Income

Methodology: Local projections. State (s) /month (m) level.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Outcome Variable}_{t|t+h,s} &= \alpha + \beta_0 \mathbf{MP}_t + \underline{\beta_1}\left[\mathbf{MP}_t \times \widehat{\mathbf{Skewness}}_{t-1,s}\right] + \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^{2} \rho_{1,k} \mathrm{MP}_{t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^{2} \rho_{2,k}\left[\mathrm{MP}_{t-k} \times \widehat{\mathrm{Skewness}}_{t-k-1,s}\right] + \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^{2} \gamma_k X_{t-k,s} + \sum_{k=1}^{2} \delta_k X_{t-k,s} + \sum_{k=1}^{2} \chi_k X_{t-k,BANK} + \varepsilon_{t,s}\end{aligned}$$

Outcome Variables: State Real Personal Income.

Controls: National GDP, Defl, Stock Market, Excess Bond Premium, state personal income, home prices, Bank Herfindal Index, Bank ROA, Cost of Funds, Loan Loss Provisions, Category/State FE.

Identification: High Frequency Proxy from Bauer and Swanson (2022).

Note: $\widehat{\text{Skewness}}$ defines the state-level skewness subtracted of its long-run mean.

Coefficient Plots



(a) Standard MP response (β_0).

- Response to 100 b.p. MP shock.

Coefficient Plots



(a) Standard MP response (β_0).



(b) Difference in MP response with high skewness (β_1)

- Response to 100 b.p. MP shock.
- 1/4 higher when skewness is high.

Coefficient Plots



(a) Standard MP response (β_0).



(b) Difference in MP response with high skewness (β_1)

- Response to 100 b.p. MP shock.
- 1/4 higher when skewness is high.

Coefficient Plots: Unemployment Rate

Average response of county unemployment rate to 100 b.p. MP shock



(a) Response with skewness at long-run mean (β_0).

- Efficacy significantly higher when skewness is high.

back

Coefficient Plots: Unemployment Rate

Average response of county unemployment rate to 100 b.p. MP shock



(a) Response with skewness at long-run mean (β_0).



(b) Additional impact with skewness 1 s.d. above mean (β_1)

- Efficacy significantly higher when skewness is high.

back

Robust Specification: Lending Rates

Table: Average response of average county lending rates to a 100 b.p. MP shock, robust specification

Month	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
MP_t	0.22***	0.34***	0.48***	0.44***	0.37***	0.23***	0.29***	0.55***	0.38***	0.44***	0.52***
	(8.44)	(10.84)	(13.62)	(11.87)	(8.95)	(5.55)	(6.67)	(12.54)	(8.62)	(8.87)	(10.12)
Skew.	0.15***	0.12**	0.22***	0.20***	0.18***	0.17***	0.24***	0.12*	0.16**	0.00	-0.00
	(3.73)	(2.48)	(3.95)	(3.37)	(2.91)	(2.59)	(3.40)	(1.77)	(2.34)	(0.06)	(-0.03)
Mean	-0.13***	-0.04**	-0.17***	-0.28***	-0.31***	-0.15***	-0.27***	-0.22***	-0.18***	-0.30***	-0.32***
	(-6.14)	(-2.03)	(-6.72)	(-9.33)	(-9.16)	(-4.01)	(-7.27)	(-5.38)	(-4.67)	(-7.56)	(-7.90)
Var.	0.04	0.09	-0.21***	-0.02	-0.05	0.14	-0.16*	-0.00	-0.23**	-0.34***	-0.13
	(0.73)	(1.25)	(-2.73)	(-0.18)	(-0.53)	(1.32)	(-1.67)	(-0.00)	(-2.45)	(-3.29)	(-1.16)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	123775	111611	108658	105835	101058	98156	96266	92717	91096	88863	85569
R^2	0.974	0.967	0.963	0.956	0.950	0.947	0.942	0.937	0.935	0.931	0.927

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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Robust Specification: Unemployment Rate

Table: Average response of county unemployment rate to 100 b.p. MP shock, robust specification

Month	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
MP_t	0.04***	0.28***	0.36***	0.26***	0.21***	0.23***	0.37***	0.49***	0.56***	0.57***	0.19***
	(4.96)	(20.15)	(24.02)	(17.23)	(13.41)	(14.27)	(21.92)	(26.25)	(29.86)	(31.73)	(11.42)
Skew.	0.04***	0.12***	0.11***	0.09***	-0.05**	0.02	0.04*	0.09***	0.05**	0.02	0.02
	(3.12)	(6.67)	(5.50)	(4.58)	(-2.38)	(0.91)	(1.91)	(3.54)	(2.00)	(0.67)	(1.01)
Mean	0.09***	-0.04***	-0.11***	-0.02*	-0.03**	-0.00	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.17***	-0.28***	-0.05***
	(14.53)	(-4.12)	(-10.29)	(-1.71)	(-2.44)	(-0.26)	(-14.68)	(-13.21)	(-12.38)	(-21.11)	(-3.81)
Var.	-0.00	0.04*	-0.02	-0.11***	-0.03	-0.11***	0.07**	-0.05	0.02	0.08**	-0.04
	(-0.12)	(1.70)	(-0.65)	(-3.80)	(-1.06)	(-3.77)	(2.39)	(-1.38)	(0.53)	(2.45)	(-1.48)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	121832	110059	107270	104565	99944	97147	95369	91929	90388	88241	85016
R^2	0.969	0.939	0.928	0.929	0.931	0.928	0.920	0.909	0.907	0.920	0.933

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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More Robustness

- Internal Instrument vs Two Stage Least Square.
- Different Lags of the State Variables.
- Refinancing Channel. Berger et al. (2021), Eichenbaum et al. (2022).

Back

Loan/MSA-Level Data: Freddie Mac House Mortgage Loans

Methodology: IV Local Projections with High Frequency Proxy.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{Refinancing Rates}_{t+h,s} \quad = \quad & \alpha + \underline{\boldsymbol{\beta_0}\,\textbf{Treasury Rate}_t} + \underline{\boldsymbol{\beta_1}}\left[\underline{\textbf{Treasury Rate}_t} \times \underline{\textbf{Skewness}_{t,s}}\right] + \\
+ \quad & \sum_{k=1}^{2} \rho_{1,k}\,\text{Treasury Rate}_{t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^{2} \rho_{2,k}\left[\mathit{TreasuryRate}_{t-k} \times \mathit{Skewness}_{t-k,s}\right] + \\
+ \quad & \sum_{k=1}^{2} \gamma_k X_{s,t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^{2} \delta_k X_{US,t-k} + \varepsilon_{s,t}
\end{aligned}
$$

Controls: CPI, GDP, Unemployment, Home Equity, Bank Herfindal Index, LTV, Age/Maturity, FE.

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Loan/MSA-Level Data: Freddie Mac House Mortgage Loans

Impulse Response of Refinancing Rate to 50 b.p. exogenous decrease in MP rate.



Red line: Standard Pass-Through. Purple Line: High Skewness Pass-Through. SE clustered at the county level.

⇒ MSA with High Mortage Rate Skewness stronger response in Refinancing rates.

Back

Loan/MSA-Level Data: Freddie Mac House Mortgage Loans

Impulse Response of Refinancing Rate to 50 b.p. exogenous decrease in MP rate.



Red line: Standard Pass-Through. Purple Line: High Skewness Pass-Through. SE clustered at the county level.

⇒ MSA with High Mortage Rate Skewness stronger response in Refinancing rates.

Sample Dynamics   Robustness with Eich et al. (2022) channel   Back

Loan/MSA-Level Data: Freddie Mac House Mortgage Loans

Methodology: IV Local Projections with High Frequency Proxy.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{Refinancing Rates}_{t+h,s} \quad = & \quad \alpha + \underline{\boldsymbol{\beta_0}\textbf{Treasury Rate}}_t + \underline{\boldsymbol{\beta_1}}\left[\underline{\textbf{Treasury Rate}}_t \times \underline{\textbf{Skewness}}_{t,s}\right] + \\
+ & \quad \underline{\boldsymbol{\beta_2}}\left[\underline{\textbf{Treasury Rate}}_t \times \underline{\textbf{Rate Gap}}_{t,s}\right] + \\
+ & \quad \sum_{k=1}^{2} \rho_{1,k}\text{Treasury Rate}_{t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^{2} \rho_{2,k}\left[\text{Treasury Rate}_{t-k} \times \textit{Skewness}_{t-k,s}\right] + \\
+ & \quad \sum_{k=1}^{2} \gamma_k X_{s,t-k} + \sum_{k=1}^{2} \delta_k X_{US,t-k} + \varepsilon_{s,t}
\end{aligned}
$$

Controls: CPI, GDP, Unemployment, Home Equity, Bank Herfindal Index, LTV, Age/Maturity, FE.

Loan/MSA-Level Data: Freddie Mac House Mortgage Loans

Impulse Response of **refinancing rates** to MP with Refinancing and Bank Moment Channels



Impulse responses to 50bp exogenous decrease in 30Y Mortgage Rate. Red line: pure shock. Blue Line: Refinancing Channel is active. Purple Line: bank moment channel is active. SE clustered at the county level.

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Model Appendix

Model Appendix: (Very Simple framework, Graphical Intuitions and Model Details)

(Very) Simple Conceptual Framework

	Bank	**Borrower**
Type A	high market power	high switching cost ϕ
Type B	low market power	low switching cost ϕ

Borrower's Choice

$$\min e(r) = \begin{cases} r_{t-1,A}, & \text{if old loan product} \\ r_{t,A} + \psi, & \text{if new loan product} \\ r_{t,B} + \phi_A & \text{if switch bank B} \end{cases}$$

Bank's problem:

$$\begin{aligned} &\max_{r_{t,A},S} && \pi = [r_{t,A} - c]\,\mathbf{1}_{S=\text{Lend}} \\ &\text{(IC1)} && r_{t,A} \leq r_{t,B} + \phi_A && \text{if } r_{t,A} = r_{t-1,A} \\ &\text{(IC2)} && r_{t,A} + \psi \leq r_{t,B} + \phi_A && \text{if } r_{t,A} \neq r_{t-1,A} \end{aligned}$$

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(Very) Simple Conceptual Framework

Assume:

- $r_{t,b} = c$
- $c = r_{FED}$
- $n - x$ banks type B, x type A

Starting Point :

$r_{t,B} = r_{t,FED} = c = 9\%$

$r_{t,A} = 10\%$



Quarter 1: Bank Rates Distribution

Back

(Very) Simple Conceptual Framework

One quarter later FED easens by 0.5%:

$r_{t,B} = c = 8.5\%$

Assume:

1. $\phi_A = 1\%$
2. $\psi_A = 0.5\%$

$r_{t,A} = 9\%$

Pass-Through: $\frac{(n-x)*(9\%-8.5\%)+x*(10\%-9\%)}{0.5\%} > 1$



Quarter 2: Bank Rates Distribution

Back

(Very) Simple Conceptual Framework

One quarter later FED easens again by 0.5%:

$$r_{t,B} = c = 8\%$$

$$r_{t,A} = r_{t-1,A} = 9\%$$

Pass-Through: $\frac{(n-x)*(8.5\%-8\%)+x*(9\%-9\%)}{0.5\%} < 1$



Quarter 3: Bank Rates Distribution

- **Competition among banks with local market power gives rise cross-sectional differences among banks**
- **Higher order moments can act as a state for MP efficacy.**

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Graphic Intuition, Strategic L fixed H



Low skewness.

back

Graphic Intuition



Lower skewness. MP easing.

back

Graphic Intuition



Higher skewness. Same MP easing.

back

Graphic Intuition



No/Low/High Skewness. MP Easing.

back

Best Responses:

Best Responses for Duopoly with Bank H:

Bank H:

$$r_H = \frac{\left[\bar{Q}_H + \kappa r_L + \beta_H c\right]}{2\beta_H}$$

Bank L:

$$r_L = \frac{\left[\bar{Q}_L + \kappa r_H + \beta_L c\right]}{2\beta_L}$$

Substituting r_H into r_L: Bank L:

$$r_L = \left[\frac{\bar{Q}_L}{2\beta_L} + \frac{\bar{Q}_H}{4\beta_H\beta_L}\right] + \left[\frac{\kappa^2}{4\beta_H\beta_L}\right] r_L + \left[\frac{\kappa\beta_H}{4\beta_H\beta_L} + \frac{1}{2}\right] c$$

$$\frac{\partial r_L}{\partial c} = \left[\frac{4\beta_H\beta_L}{4\beta_H\beta_L - \kappa^2}\right]\left[\frac{\kappa\beta_H + 2\beta_H\beta_L}{4\beta_H\beta_L} + \frac{1}{2}\right] = \left[\frac{\kappa\beta_H + 2\beta_H\beta_L}{4\beta_H\beta_L - \kappa^2}\right]$$

Back

Results about the Pass-Through.

Proposition 2

$$\frac{\partial r_i^*}{\partial c} \text{ is increasing in } \left(r_{t-1}^H - r_{t-1}^L\right) \text{ and } \lambda_1.$$

Intuition: Larger difference among past rates $\Rightarrow$ More clients search.

Variance vs Skewness back

Results about the Pass-Through.

Proposition 2

$$\frac{\partial r_i^*}{\partial c} \text{ is increasing in } \left(r_{t-1}^H - r_{t-1}^L\right) \text{ and } \lambda_1.$$

Intuition: Larger difference among past rates $\Rightarrow$ More clients search.

Larger initial mass of Bank H clients $\Rightarrow$ More clients search.

Variance vs Skewness back

Results about the Pass-Through.

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Larger initial mass of Bank H clients $\Rightarrow$ More clients search.

More clients on the search $\Rightarrow$ higher pass-through.

Variance vs Skewness back

Results about the Pass-Through.

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More clients on the search $\Rightarrow$ higher pass-through.

Note: Skewness increases in $\left(r_{t-1}^H - r_{t-1}^L\right)$ and λ_1.

Variance vs Skewness back

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Larger initial mass of Bank H clients $\Rightarrow$ More clients search.

More clients on the search $\Rightarrow$ higher pass-through.

Note: Skewness increases in $\left(r_{t-1}^H - r_{t-1}^L\right)$ and λ_1.

Take-Away: Larger Skewness $\Rightarrow$ more clients on the search $\Rightarrow$ higher pass-through.

Variance vs Skewness back

Results about the Pass-Through.

Proposition 3

$$\frac{\partial r_H^*}{\partial c} > \frac{\partial r_L^*}{\partial c}^{1}$$

Intuition: L faces only "upside-risk" of acquiring clients from Bank H.

[1] Technical Condition $\lambda_2 > \lambda_1 S$

Variance vs Skewness back

Results about the Pass-Through.

Proposition 3

$$\frac{\partial r_H^*}{\partial c} > \frac{\partial r_L^*}{\partial c}$$ [1]

Intuition: L faces only "upside-risk" of acquiring clients from Bank H.
Bank H faces "downside-risk" of losing clients to Bank L.

[1] Technical Condition $\lambda_2 > \lambda_1 S$

Variance vs Skewness back

Results about the Pass-Through.

Proposition 3

$$\frac{\partial r_H^*}{\partial c} > \frac{\partial r_L^*}{\partial c}$$ [1]

Intuition: L faces only "upside-risk" of acquiring clients from Bank H.
Bank H faces "downside-risk" of losing clients to Bank L.

Take-Away Bank H responds by more than Bank L to MP.

[1] Technical Condition $\lambda_2 > \lambda_1 S$

Variance vs Skewness back

Results about the Pass-Through.

Proposition 3

$$\frac{\partial r_H^*}{\partial c} > \frac{\partial r_L^*}{\partial c}^{1}$$

Intuition: L faces only "upside-risk" of acquiring clients from Bank H.
Bank H faces "downside-risk" of losing clients to Bank L.

Take-Away Bank H responds by more than Bank L to MP.

Implications:

1 Empirical Test of Proposition 3. (next slide)
2 **Path Dependence** of Monetary Policy.

[1] Technical Condition $\lambda_2 > \lambda_1 S$

▸ Variance vs Skewness ▸ back

Empirical Test of Proposition 3

Table: Responsiveness of High vs Low Rate lender to a 100 b.p. monetary policy shock when skewness is high

Month	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low Rate	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.04*	0.06**	0.08***	0.42***	0.45***	0.38***	0.09***	0.20***
	(-0.69)	(-0.39)	(1.25)	(1.89)	(2.35)	(3.40)	(16.37)	(17.43)	(14.81)	(3.41)	(7.91)
High Rate	-0.06*	-0.04	0.01	0.13***	0.15***	0.13***	0.10***	0.07*	0.09**	0.20***	0.14***
	(-2.56)	(-1.24)	(0.40)	(3.46)	(3.91)	(3.31)	(2.61)	(1.69)	(2.21)	(4.90)	(3.52)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	2317536	2200605	2139583	2080359	2028567	1983506	1943036	1898621	1860857	1823443	1784944
R^2	0.977	0.968	0.961	0.955	0.950	0.946	0.943	0.940	0.938	0.936	0.934

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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Graphical Intuition



Graphical Intuition



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

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

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

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

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

Graphical Intuition



Model Simulation: Variance vs Skewness



Initial Variance vs Pass-Through

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Model Simulation: Variance vs Skewness



Initial Skewness vs Pass-Through

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Model Simulation: Variance vs Skewness



Example: 2 parameters draws, different pass-through, different initial skewness, same initial variance.

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Consumer Problem: stage 0 to 3

- Consider the case $r^A_{t-1} > r^B_{t-1}$ then:
- For each z only consumers with θ: $v - \mathbb{E}[r^A_t - z] \geq v - \mathbb{E}[r^B_t - (2-z) - \theta]\}$ will stay Type 1.
- Hence $v - r^A_{t-1} - 1 \geq v - r^B_{t-1} - 1 - \theta \leftrightarrow \theta \geq [r^A_{t-1} - r^B_{t-1}]$
- Finally for each z $\int_0^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{1}{\bar{\theta}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\theta > gap_{t-1}\}} = \left[\frac{\bar{\theta} - gap_{t-1}}{\bar{\theta}}\right] = P(gap_{t-1})$
- After z is realized the number of type 1 consumers for each z will be P.
- Once c is realized banks chose r_t. The final demand of type 1 to Bank A will hence be:

$$
\begin{aligned}
X^1_A(r^A_t) &= \int_0^2 \lambda_1 \int_0^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{1}{\bar{\theta}} \mathbb{1}_{\{v - z - r^A_t > 0 | \text{ Type 1 choice}\}} \mathbb{1}_{\{\theta > gap_{t-1}\}} d\theta dz \\
&= \lambda_1 (v - r^A_t) \mathbb{P}(gap_{t-1})
\end{aligned}
$$

- Demand of type 3 to Bank A should hence be: $X^3_A(r^A_t, r^B_t) = \lambda_1(1 - \mathbb{P})(\frac{r^B_t - r^A_t}{2} + 1)$
- Finally Total demand of type 2 and 3 to Bank B should be: $X_B(r^A_t, r^B_t) = X^2_B(r^B_t) + X^3_B(r^A_t, r^B_t) = \lambda_2(v - r^B_t) + \lambda_1(1 - \mathbb{P})(\frac{r^A_t - r^B_t}{2} + 1)$

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