

Black-box Laser Fault Injection on a Secure Memory

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Secret protection in embedded systems

Microcontrollers

- FLASH memory, basic readout protection fuses
- Low-cost
- Low resistance against hardware attacks

Secure Elements

- Physical attacks counter-measures
- Evaluated by accredited labs
- Restricted access (JCVM, NDA, ...)

Microchip ATECC508A

- Secure memory
- IoT applications
- Easy access, no NDA
- Is this secure ?

Coldcard Wallet

Bitcoin hardware wallet

Version Mk2 studied

STM32L4 Microcontroller

Main firmware



ATECC508A

Stores the "Seed" (private key)

Protected with authentication



ATECC508A

Reduced software attack surface


Confidential firmware

Voltage glitch sensors

Top-metal shield

Internal clock generator

No laser counter-measures





Silicon is transparent to infra-red light

Integrated circuits are photosensitive

Light can enable transistors conduction...

... hence introducing computation errors!

Laser is a powerful and semi-invasive tool



What's the plan?


Identify assets and seek an attack path

Prepare and instrument the sample

Target

Test


ATECC508A Memory Layout



ATECC508A Memory Layout

CONFIG	
#0 - 36 bytes	#1 - 36 bytes
#2 - 36 bytes	#3 - 36 bytes
#4 - 36 bytes	#5 - 36 bytes
#6 - 36 bytes	#7 - 36 bytes
#8 - 416 bytes	
#9 - 72 bytes	
#10 - 72 bytes	
#11 - 72 bytes	
#12 - 72 bytes	
#13 - 72 bytes	
#14 - 72 bytes	
#15 - 72 bytes	
OTP	

ATECC508A Memory Layout



Accessing data slots

ReadMemory command:

03	07	02	82	1800	0a78
Command	Length	OpCode Read Memory	DATA zone + Length	Adresse	CRC

Response when access granted:

23	303132333435363738396162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70717273747576	384a
Length	Data (32 bytes)	CRC

Accessing data slots

ReadMemory command:

03	07	02	82	1800	0a78
Command	Length	OpCode Read Memory	DATA zone + Length	Adresse	CRC

Response when access denied:

1	10	384a
Length	Error code EXECUTION_ERROR	CRC

PIN1 data slot configuration

Raw	0x8f43
Write config	Encrypt
Write key	3
Read key	15
Is secret	Yes
Encrypt read	No
Limited use	No
No MAC	No



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Code hypothesis

```
1 config_address = get_config_address(slot);
2 config = eeprom_read(config_address);
3
4 if (!config.is_secret){
5     data_address = get_data_address(slot);
6     data = eeprom_read(data_address);
7
8     if (config.encrypt_read)
9         encrypt(data);
10
11    i2c_send(data);
12 } else {
13     i2c_send(EXECUTION_ERROR);
14 }
```

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
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When?


Power analysis

Circuit processing activity can be observed on the power trace



Power analysis

Reading a granted data slot




Power analysis

Reading a denied data slot



Power analysis

Reading a denied data slot



Power analysis

Comparison of averaged traces




Power analysis

Comparison of averaged traces




Where?


Circuit Dissection




Circuit Dissection




Circuit Dissection




Backside decapsulation




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
Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




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
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
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
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
Backside decapsulation




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
Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




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
Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Backside decapsulation




Infrared imaging




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
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
Targeting




Targeting




Targeting




Targeting



Targeting



Targeting



Testing campaign

Known data is loaded prior to testing:

303132333435363738396162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70717273747576

Testing campaign

For each test:

1. Laser shooting time configuration
2. Laser beam displacement
3. Power-on
4. Initialization
5. Laser activation
6. *ReadMemory* command + Laser shoot
7. Laser deactivation
8. Response readout
9. Power-off
10. Result and parameters logging

Testing campaign

Testing campaign

343617

faults injected

Many days of testing


1546 responses received

No success observed...


Top 20



Analysis



Analysis



Oh wait!

The attack seems to work!

Can we do it without losing data?

Attack refinement

Optimal parameters identification

New sample preparation and programming

Test run

Success!

Two minutes of testing only

PIN1 and pairing secret data slots can be revealed
Grants access to Seed1 data slot

Coldcard Mk2 vulnerable

Realistic attack

Did we killed chips?

Yes!

Misconfiguration due to misunderstanding

Failed sample preparation

Data corruption with bad EEPROM write

Possible software mitigations

Double checking

Sensitive constants value

Kill-chip

Possible hardware mitigations

Light sensors for laser detection

Power trace jamming

CPU clock frequency randomization

Error-Detection-Codes on memories

Cost of mitigations

Implementing them correctly is difficult.

More counter-measures requires more silicon area.

Power and performance is impacted.

Counter-measures may be patent protected.

Security is expensive!

Conclusion

High potential attack

Very expensive equipment


Specific configuration

P-256 keys are not affected

Less resistant than a Secure Element

ATECC508A now deprecated

Superseeded by ATECC608A



Thank you!

