



Sigma for Cloud With MITRE ATT&CK™?

by Andrii Bezverkhyi, SOC Prime

> _ whoami

Infosec since 2007

SOC Prime, Inc. since 2014

uncoder.io

<https://github.com/socprime/SigmaUI>

tdm.socprime.com

[←](#) Tweet



Ihor Kravchuk
@ingvar_ua



Cloud is the place where everything is fast, API driven and has extremely good bandwidth. It takes only few minutes for an attacker to wipe out your infra or exfiltrate your data. If you not using autoremediation or near real time SOC for cloud security events - you doomed.

4:27 AM · Sep 9, 2019 · Twitter for iPhone

1 Retweet 3 Likes



Andrii Bezverkhyi @andriinb · Sep 9



Replying to @ingvar_ua

Agreed for 100%. Can I quote you in this?



Ihor Kravchuk @ingvar_ua · Sep 9



Sure!



Problems with cloud security monitoring

1. Cloud Logs are Veeeeery Reactive
2. MITRE ATT&CK is ~~Retrospective~~ Proactive for Cloud
3. In 2019 we mostly ~~talk~~ hunt on Sysmon

Cloud Logs are not real time

It can take up to 30 minutes or up to 24 hours after an event occurs for the corresponding audit log entry to be displayed in the search results. The following table shows the time it takes for the different services in Office 365.

Office 365 service	30 minutes	24 hours
Advanced Threat Protection and Threat Intelligence	✓	
Azure Active Directory (user login events)		✓
Azure Active Directory (admin events)		✓
Data Loss Prevention	✓	
Dynamics 365 CRM	✓	
eDiscovery	✓	
Exchange Online	✓	
Microsoft Flow	✓	
Microsoft Project	✓	
Microsoft Stream	✓	
Microsoft Teams	✓	
Power BI	✓	
Security & Compliance Center	✓	
SharePoint Online and OneDrive for Business	✓	

<https://support.google.com/a/answer/7061566?hl=en>

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL support.google.com/a/answer/7061566?hl=en in the address bar. The page is titled "G Suite Admin Help" and features a search bar with the placeholder "Describe your issue". The main content area has a title "Data retention and lag times". Below the title, a note states: "You might find that your Admin console reports and audit logs are not fully populated with the latest data. Keep in mind reports do not reflect real-time data, and some reports may take longer to display updated information." A note also specifies: "Note: Many of the categories listed below (such as *Gmail* and *Drive*) are relevant for G Suite only, and not for other Google services such as Cloud Identity." The section "Lag times" is described as follows: "The lag times in this table reflect how long it takes before collected data tied to specific Admin console reports and audit logs is available to view." A table provides the following data:

Item name	Report name	Lag time
Highlights		
Gmail	Gmail report	1–3 days
Drive	Drive report	1–3 days
Hangouts	Hangouts report	1–3 days
Google+	Google+ report	1–3 days
Calendar	Calendar report	1–3 days
Document Link Shared Status	Drive report	1–3 days
Security		
External Link Shared Files	Drive report	1–3 days
External Link Shared Files	Security report	1–3 days

ATT&CK for Cloud

Suggestions not from CTI

Technique: Calendar Event Injection

Tactic: Initial Access

There is a possibility for an attacker to create an important event in the Calendar (social engineering) and send invitation to target. The message may contain a phishing link or a malware link.

Ref: <https://usa.kaspersky.com/blog/spam-through-google-services/17799/>

Technique: Publicly Shared Calendar

Tactic: Exfiltration

There is a possibility to ‘create an event’ when replying to email from O365, Outlook or GSUITE. Such reply can leak up to 8000 bytes of email data. **Text in reply is not logged**. By using T1074/Data Staged attacker can prepare any number of events and exfiltrate them all by sharing Calendar Link or making it public. **Remember delay of 24+ hours**.

Ref: soon at SOC Prime blog

Adam [REDACTED]

Looking forward to it!

On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 12:48 PM Adam Swan

<[REDACTED]@gmail.com> wrote:

>

> Perfect! See you then.

>

> On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 12:48 PM Adam Swan

<[REDACTED]@socprime.com> wrote:

>>

>> Cool. I can meet at 12pm EST on 10/23/2019 for
lunch at Chipotle in Silver Spring

>>

>> On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 12:47 PM Adam Swan

<[REDACTED]@gmail.com> wrote:

>>>

>>> Noon? Let's get it on our calendars!

>>>

>>>

>>> On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 12:46 PM Adam Swan

<[REDACTED]@socprime.com> wrote:

>>>>

>>>> What time works for you?

>>>>

>>>> -Swan

>>>

>>>> On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 12:45 PM Adam Swan

<[REDACTED]@gmail.com> wrote:

>>>>>

>>>>> Sure!

>>>>

>>>>> On Mon, ...



10 minutes before



Adam [REDACTED]

Going?

Yes No Maybe

^



strandjs @strandjs · 15h

Something is wrong with this calendar... Come see @dafthack and @ustayready @WWHackinFest. Stage one at 2:00.

The screenshot shows a Google Calendar interface with a weekly view for December 1-6, 2019. The left sidebar displays the time from 1 AM to 12 PM. The main calendar grid is filled with many overlapping blue event blocks, suggesting a high density of scheduled events. The top navigation bar includes links for 'Today', 'December 2019', and 'Week'.

Technique: Publicly Shared Calendar

Tactic: Exfiltration

There is a possibility to ‘create an event’ when replying to email from O365, Outlook or GSUITE. Such reply can leak up to 8000 bytes of email data. Text in reply is not logged. By using T1074/Data Staged attacker can prepare any number of events and exfiltrate them all by sharing Calendar Link or making it public. Remember delay of 24+ hours.

ID: T1537

Tactic: Exfiltration

Platform: Azure, AWS, GCP

Permissions Required: User

Data Sources: Stackdriver logs, Azure activity logs, AWS CloudTrail logs, **O365 Logs, GSUITE logs**

Requires Network: Yes

Contributors: Praetorian, **SOC PRIME** ? ☺

Version: 1.0

Transfer Data to Cloud Account

An adversary may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service to avoid typical file transfers/downloads and network-based exfiltration detection.

Sigma for Cloud MFA Bypass

action: global

title: Multi-factor authentication (2-step verification) disabled.

description: Require multi-factor authentication for all user accounts, on all systems, whether managed onsite or by a third-party provider. The presence of an event leads to a mismatch with control. Recommended one day event search period. Sigma covers G Suite, AWS Console, Slack log sources.

references:

- <https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/>
- https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf
- <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf>
- <https://gdpr-info.eu/art-32-gdpr/>
- <https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/user-accounts>
- <https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html>
- <https://api.slack.com/docs/audit-logs-api>

author: Alexandr Yampolskyi

status: stable

modified: 2019/08/15

detection:

- condition: selection

falsepositives:

- unknown

level: medium

tags:

- GDPR Art 32.1
- GDPR Art 32.2
- CSC16
- CSC16.3
- ISO 27002-2013 A.9.1.1
- NIST CSF 1.1 PR.AC-1
- PCI DSS 3.2 7.1
- attack.T1089
- attack.defense_evasion
- Attack.T1078
- Attack.initial_access

logsource:

product: G Suite

detection:

selection:

- events.name: 2sv_disable

logsource:

product: AWS Console

detection:

selection:

additionalEventData.MFAUsed: "No"

logsource:

product: Slack

detection:

selection:

- event.name: pref.two_factor_auth_changed
- Details: "")



MITRE ATT&CK
Sigma
Community
Marketplace

Threat Bounty



#threatbounty

Top Latest People Photos Videos

Andrii Bezverkhyi @andriinb · Oct 17
#threatbounty stats for September 2019 @SOC_Prime Threat Detection Marketplace:
minimum content threshold to get payout = 1 rule
average payout per developer per month = \$510 (up from \$400 in August)

You can do it!
my.socprime.com/tdm-developers/

14 33

Andrii Bezverkhyi @andriinb · Oct 4
#threatbounty payouts stats for August 2019 at @SOC_Prime Threat Detection Marketplace:
minimum content threshold to get payout = 1 rule
average payout per developer per month = \$400

learn σ , earn money while you sleep
details at my.socprime.com/en/tdm-developers/

1 5 17

Show this thread


PolySwarm @PolySwarm · Oct 2
Looking for free analysis of **#malware** samples & URLs? Try PolySwarm: polyswarm.network where AV companies & **#cybersecurity** experts' scanning engines compete & are rewarded when right (**#ThreatBounty** bit.ly/threatbounty **#VirusTotal** alternative **#infosec** **#threatintel** **#SoC**)

 POLYSWARM Scan Search Communities Mergenomes Pricing Log in / Sign up

Detections File Details


Allsafe	Bid: 0.5	ClamAV	Bid: 0.5
Qihoo 360	Bid: 0.5	Rising	Bid: 0.5
0xA1815D9b8f718e018E8957F4e013F725a4331cb8	Bid: 0.5	DrWeb	Bid: 0.5
Jiangmin	Bid: 0.5	K7	Bid: 0.5
NanoAV	Bid: 0.5	Quick Heal	Bid: 0.5
c3ae	18 kB	VenusEye	Bid: 0.5
813e2080e37802b2f8162364ea3c4		Trustlook	Bid: 0.5

88 threat bounty hunters signed up since May 2019, some are on list



Source: leaderboards, threat detection marketplace

Unique detections per month




Source: leaderboards, threat detection marketplace

216 techniques coverage


811 sigma rules

33232 translations and native rules



Source: leaderboards, threat detection marketplace

Periodic Table Of Cyber Elements



Coverage May 2019 (EU ATT&CK COMMUNITY BRUSSELS)



Coverage OCT 2019 (EU ATT&CK COMMUNITY HACK.LU)

Tools: 348/352

 Actors: 80/81

 Techniques: 215/244

Threat Bounty needs You!

my.socprime.com/en/tdm-developers

C uncoder.io/#

Sign up to TDM About TDM | Light/Dark theme

Sigma Kibana ArcSight Detect Splunk Qualys IOC Regex Elasticsearch Select Translate 

Share my query to improve translation!


Select document

```
1 action: global
2 title: Multi-factor authentication (2-step verification) disabled.
3 description: Require multi-factor authentication for all user
   accounts, on all systems, whether managed onsite or by a third
   -party provider. The presence of an event leads to a mismatch
   with control. Recommended one day event search period. Sigma
   covers G Suite, AWS Console, Slack and PipeDrive logsources.
4 references:
5 - https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/
6 - https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI\_DSS\_v3-2-1.pdf
```

(events.name:"2sv_disable")
(additionalEventData.MFAUsed:"No")
(event.name:"pref.two_factor_auth_changed" AND Details(""))
(event.name:"Disabled Two\-\factor Authentication \(\2FA\\"))

Suggest translation Copy 

Translating to: Elasticsearch



<https://uncoder.io>



Possible Powershell obfuscation. (Invoke-Obfuscation)

Author: Roman Ransky | Logsource : product: windows; service: sysmon



SOURCE CODE EDITOR

```
SHA 256: 53327dfcfaa36c71d191f43fe64897db30d7c93c7327d0ce496313397d671d34

1 title: Possible Powershell obfuscation. (Invoke-Obfuscation)
2 description: Powershell command included some specific obfuscation, which may indicate
   attempts to bypass specific detection logic.
3 references:
4 - http://www.danielbohannon.com/blog-1/2017/12/2/the-invoke-obfuscation-usage-guide
5 - http://www.danielbohannon.com/blog-1/2017/12/2/the-invoke-obfuscation-usage-guide-part-2
6 author: Roman Ransky
7 status: stable
8 logsource:
9   product: windows
10  service: sysmon
11 =====excluded for presentation purposes=====
12 tags:
13 - attack.Execution
14 - attack.t1086
15 - attack.Defense Evasion
16 - attack.t1027
```

612 / 5000



VISUAL EDITOR

▼ SIGMA

title : Possible Powershell obfuscation. (Invoke-Obfuscation)

description : Powershell command included some specific obfuscation, which may indicate attempts to bypass specific detection logic.

▶ references

author : Roman Ransky

status : stable

▼ logsource

product : windows

service : sysmon

((selection0 or selection1 or selection3 or selection4 or selection9) and selection5 or (selection6 or selection7 or selection8)) or ((selection10 and selection11 and selection12) or (selection10 and selection13 and selection12 and selection14)) or (selection20 and selection21 and selection22) or ((selection30 or selection31) and selection32) or (selection40 and selection41 and (selection42 or selection43) and selection44 and (selection45 or selection46))

▶ falsepositives

level : high

▶ tags

<https://github.com/socprime/SigmaUI>