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# **Ready to ATT&CK?**

**Bring Your Own Data  
(BYOD) and Validate Your  
Data Analytics!**

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# | @Cyb3rWard0g & @Cyb3rPandaH

- Projects
  - @HunterPlaybook
  - @THE\_HELK
  - ATTACK-Python-Client
  - @OSSEM\_Project
  - @Mordor\_Project
  - OpenHunt
  - Blacksmith & More
- Founders:
  - @HuntersForge



# Agenda

- Explore ATT&CK
  - 2018 -> 2019
- ATT&CK Data Sources Opportunities
- Enter Mordor
- Mordor & CAR
- CAR & Threat Hunter Playbook (Notebooks)
- Hunters Forge!

# Explore ATT&CK

How do I query ATT&CK?

# Exploring ATT&CK Metadata!



# How do I access ATT&CK Metadata?




# ATTACK-Python-Client Github Project

- A Python module to access up to date ATT&CK content available in STIX via public TAXII server. It leverages **cti-python-stix2** and **cti-taxii-client python** libraries developed by MITRE.
- **Goals**
  - Allow the integration of ATT&CK content with other platforms
  - Allow security analysts to quickly explore ATT&CK content and apply it in their daily operations
  - Explore all available ATT&CK metadata at once
  - Learn STIX2 and TAXII Client Python libraries

# ATTACK-Python-Client Installation


- Via PIP: *pip install attackcti*
- Or Straight from Source
  - *git clone https://github.com/hunters-forge/ATTACK-Python-Client*
  - *cd ATTACK-Python-Client*
  - *pip install .*
- Jupyter Notebooks Available
  - *pip install -r requirements.txt*
  - *cd notebooks*
  - *jupyter lab*



# Some Available Functions

- `get_enterprise`
- `get_enterprise_techniques`
- `get_enterprise_mitigations`
- `get_enterprise_groups`
- `get_enterprise_malware`
- `get_enterprise_tools`
- `get_enterprise_relationships`
- `get_enterprise_tactics`
- `get_pre`
- `get_pre_techniques`
- `get_pre_groups`
- `get_pre_relationships`
- `get_pre_tactics`
- `get_mobile`
- `get_mobile_techniques`
- `get_mobile_mitigations`
- `get_mobile_groups`
- `get_mobile_malware`
- `get_mobile_tools`
- `get_mobile_relationships`
- `get_mobile_tactics`
- `get_data_sources`
- `get_techniques_by_datasources`

# ATT&CK Metadata - Jupyter Notebook



# Explore ATT&CK

Querying ATT&CK 101

JupyterLab Not Secure | 0.0.0.0:8888/jupyter/lab#ATT&CK-PYTHON-CLIENT

File Edit View Run Kernel Tabs Settings Help

Launcher query\_attack\_101.ipynb Python 3

# ATT&CK PYTHON CLIENT

Demo: ATT&CKcon 2019

## Import ATT&CK Python Client

```
[ ]: from attackcli import attack_client
```

## Initialize ATT&CK Client Class

```
[ ]: lift = attack_client()
```

## Getting Metadata From All Techniques

```
[ ]: all_techniques = lift.get_techniques(stix_format=False)
```

```
[ ]: print('A total of ', len(all_techniques), ' techniques')
```

0 3 Python 3 | Idle Mode: Command Ln 3, Col 1 query\_attack\_101.ipynb

The image shows a Jupyter Notebook interface with the following details:

- File Bar:** File, Edit, View, Run, Kernel, Tabs, Settings, Help.
- Tab Bar:** query\_attack\_database.ipynb, Untitled.ipynb, Untitled1.ipynb.
- Toolbar:** icons for file operations (New, Open, Save, etc.), a search bar, and a "Code" dropdown.
- Python Version:** Python 3.
- Code Cells:** Several code cells are visible, showing Python code for interacting with an attack client and translating STIX techniques using Google Translate.

```
[ ]: from attackcti import attack_client
      from googletrans import Translator

[ ]: lift = attack_client()

[ ]: all_techniques = lift.get_techniques(stix_format=False)
      all_techniques = lift.remove_revoked(all_techniques)


[ ]: needs_translation = []
      translated = []
      for t in all_techniques:
          try:
              translator = Translator()
              espanol = translator.translate(t['technique'], dest='es')
              translated.append(espanol.text)
              print("From: ", t['technique'], " To: ", espanol.text)
          except:
              needs_translation.append(t['technique'])
              continue

[ ]:
```

# Explore ATT&CK



Any New Data Sources?

# ATT&CK Techniques (519) and Data Sources



- Almost **51%** of techniques have data sources defined
- Around **49%** of techniques do **NOT** have data sources defined
- Pre-ATT&CK data sources maybe?
- Opportunities to collaborate and define those without data sources?

# ATT&CK Techniques (519) and Data Sources




	matrix	Ind_DS	technique
0	mitre-attack	With DS	265
1	mitre-attack	Without DS	1
2	mitre-mobile-attack	Without DS	79
3	mitre-pre-attack	Without DS	174

# Looking for anything to do this weekend?

matrix	platform	tactic	technique	technique_id	data_sources	Count_DS	Ind_DS
11	mitre-attack	[GCP, Azure, AWS]	[persistence]	Implant Container Image	T1525	NaN	NaN Without DS


# ATT&CK Techniques with Data Sources (265)



# ATT&CKing with the right data

ATT&CKcon 2018 Talk!

# Credentials in Registry -> DS -> Sub-DS -> Events



# ATT&CK Data (OSSEM-> attack\_data\_sources)

Data Source	Sub - Data Source	Data Object	Relationship	Data Object	Event ID	Description	Provider Name
File monitoring	file access	user	accessed	file	5145	A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
File monitoring	file access request	user	requested_a_handle	file	4656	A handle to an object was requested.	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
File monitoring	file deletion request	user	requested_a_handle	file	4656	A handle to an object was requested.	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
File monitoring	file access	user	accessed	file	4663	An attempt was made to access an object.	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
File monitoring	file deletion	user	deleted	file	4663	An attempt was made to access an object.	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
File monitoring	file permissions change	user	changed_permissions	file	4670	Permissions on an object were changed.	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Loaded DLLs	module load	process	loaded	module	7	The image loaded event logs when a module is loaded in a specific process .	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
Named Pipes	win pipe creation	process	created	pipe	17	This event generates when a named pipe is created.	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
Named Pipes	win pipe connection	process	connected_to	pipe	18	This event logs when a named pipe connection is made between a client and a server.	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
Process monitoring	process creation	process	created	process	4688	A new process has been created	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Process monitoring	process creation	process	created	process	1	Process creation	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
Process monitoring	process termination	process	terminated	process	4689	A process has exited	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Process monitoring	process termination	process	terminated	process	5	The process terminate event reports when a process terminates.	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
Process monitoring	process write to process	process	wrote_to	process	8	The CreateRemoteThread event detects when a process creates a thread in another process.	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
Process monitoring	process access	process	opened	process	10	The process accessed event reports when a process opens another process.	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
Process use of network	process network connection allow	process	connected_to	ip	3	The network connection event logs TCP/UDP connections on the machine.	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
Process use of network	process network connection allow	process	connected_to	host	3	The network connection event logs TCP/UDP connections on the machine.	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon


# A lot more to do..

Going deeper!

# API-To-Event Project (Windows Security)

API Call	EventID	Event Name	Log Provider	ATT&CK Data Source
<a href="#">LogonUserA</a>	<a href="#">4624</a>	An account was successfully logged on	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows event logs, Authentication logs
<a href="#">LogonUserExA</a>	<a href="#">4624</a>	An account was successfully logged on	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows event logs, Authentication logs
<a href="#">LogonUserExW</a>	<a href="#">4624</a>	An account was successfully logged on	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows event logs, Authentication logs
<a href="#">LogonUserW</a>	<a href="#">4624</a>	An account was successfully logged on	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows event logs, Authentication logs
<a href="#">WNetAddConnection2</a>	<a href="#">4624</a>	An account was successfully logged on	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows event logs, Authentication logs
<a href="#">LogonUserA</a>	<a href="#">4625</a>	An account failed to log on	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows event logs, Authentication logs
<a href="#">LogonUserExA</a>	<a href="#">4625</a>	An account failed to log on	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows event logs, Authentication logs
<a href="#">LogonUserExW</a>	<a href="#">4625</a>	An account failed to log on	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows event logs, Authentication logs
<a href="#">LogonUserW</a>	<a href="#">4625</a>	An account failed to log on	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows event logs, Authentication logs
<a href="#">NtOpenProcess</a>	<a href="#">4656</a>	A handle to an object was requested	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	process monitoring
<a href="#">OpenProcess</a>	<a href="#">4656</a>	A handle to an object was requested	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	process monitoring
<a href="#">OpenSCManagerA</a>	<a href="#">4656</a>	A handle to an object was requested	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	file monitoring
<a href="#">OpenSCManagerW</a>	<a href="#">4656</a>	A handle to an object was requested	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	file monitoring
<a href="#">RegOpenKeyA</a>	<a href="#">4656</a>	A handle to an object was requested	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows Registry
<a href="#">RegOpenKeyExA</a>	<a href="#">4656</a>	A handle to an object was requested	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows Registry
<a href="#">RegOpenKeyExA</a>	<a href="#">4656</a>	A handle to an object was requested	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows Registry
<a href="#">RegOpenKeyExW</a>	<a href="#">4656</a>	A handle to an object was requested	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows Registry
<a href="#">ZwOpenKey</a>	<a href="#">4656</a>	A handle to an object was requested	Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing	Windows Registry


# Security



# API-To-Event Project (Windows Sysmon)

API Call	EventID	Event Name	Log Provider	ATT&CK Data Source
<a href="#">CreateProcessA</a>	<a href="#">1</a>	Process Creation	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	Process monitoring
<a href="#">CreateProcessAsUserA</a>	<a href="#">1</a>	Process Creation	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	Process monitoring
<a href="#">CreateProcessAsUserW</a>	<a href="#">1</a>	Process Creation	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	Process monitoring
<a href="#">CreateProcessW</a>	<a href="#">1</a>	Process Creation	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	Process monitoring
<a href="#">CreateProcessWithLogonW</a>	<a href="#">1</a>	Process Creation	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	Process monitoring
<a href="#">CreateProcessWithTokenW</a>	<a href="#">1</a>	Process Creation	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	Process monitoring
<a href="#">OpenProcess</a>	<a href="#">10</a>	ProcessAccess	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	process monitoring
<a href="#">NtOpenProcess</a>	<a href="#">10</a>	ProcessAccess	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	process monitoring
<a href="#">CopyFile</a>	<a href="#">11</a>	FileCreate	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	file monitoring
<a href="#">CopyFile2</a>	<a href="#">11</a>	FileCreate	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	file monitoring
<a href="#">CopyFileEx</a>	<a href="#">11</a>	FileCreate	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	file monitoring
<a href="#">CreateFile2</a>	<a href="#">11</a>	FileCreate	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	file monitoring
<a href="#">CreateFileA</a>	<a href="#">11</a>	FileCreate	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	file monitoring
<a href="#">CreateFileW</a>	<a href="#">11</a>	FileCreate	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	file monitoring
<a href="#">MoveFile</a>	<a href="#">11</a>	FileCreate	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	file monitoring
<a href="#">NtCreateFile</a>	<a href="#">11</a>	FileCreate	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	file monitoring
<a href="#">NtWriteFile</a>	<a href="#">11</a>	FileCreate	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	file monitoring
<a href="#">RegCreateKeyA</a>	<a href="#">12</a>	RegistryEvent (Object create and delete)	Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon	Windows Registry

# Sysmon



# A few opportunities!

Exploring Data Sources 2.0!


# A few opportunities..

- ATT&CK Data sources covered by other data sources
- Windows Event Logs data source is too broad!
- ATT&CK data sources and the wrong platforms!
- Validation of ATT&CK data sources
  - recommendations
  - What specific event logs per data source?


# A few opportunities!

- ATT&CK Data sources covered by other data sources
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
# Credentials in Registry - Windows Registry




# Windows Registry & Windows Security Event Logs?




# ATT&CK Techniques with Data Sources (265)




# ATT&CK Techniques with Data Sources (265)




# Windows Event Logs ... a Universe Behind?




# Windows Event Logs




# Windows Event Logs




# Windows Event Logs




# Windows Event Log 4656: A handle to an object was requested



# Windows Event Log 4657: A registry value was modified



# Windows Event Log 4658: The handle to an object was closed




# Currently collaborating with ATT&CK team..



# A few opportunities!

ATT&CK data sources and the wrong platforms!


# ATT&CK Windows Data Sources & Platform (2019)



# A few opportunities!

- Validation of ATT&CK data sources recommendations
  - What specific event logs per data source?


# Credentials in Registry - Windows Registry




| Wait! Where is all this happening so far?



# Data Analytics Development (Example)




# Data Analytics Development (Example)




# I How do we validate our data recommendations?




# Data Analytics Development (Example)



# More than just testing security controls!



# A basic adversary simulation flow!



# What do we need for Credentials in Registry?

## Credentials in Registry

The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.

Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: [1]

- Local Machine Hive: `reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s`
- Current User Hive: `reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s`

**ID:** T1214

**Tactic:** Credential Access

**Platform:** Windows

**System Requirements:** Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related Registry keys.

**Permissions Required:** User, Administrator

**Data Sources:** Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring

**Contributors:** Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu\_C

**Version:** 1.0

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**Contributors:** Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu\_C

**Version:** 1.0

# What else do we need for Credentials in Registry?

- Windows Registry?
  - Enable Audit Object Access > Audit Registry
- Process Monitoring?
  - Enable Audit Detailed Tracking > Audit Process Creation
- Process Command-line Parameters?
  - Enable Administrative Templates\System\Audit Process Creation > Include command line in process creation events

# What else do we need for Credentials in Registry?

- Windows Registry?
  - Enable Audit Object Access > Audit Registry
  - **Set Audit Rule to trigger event!**
- Process Monitoring?
  - Enable Audit Detailed Tracking > Audit Process Creation
- Process Command-line Parameters?
  - Enable Administrative Templates\System\Audit Process Creation > Include command line in process creation events

# What else do we need for Credentials in Registry?

- What are we testing?
  - Available default automatic logon user Settings!!

```
Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -  
Name AutoAdminLogon -Value 1
```

```
Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -  
Name DefaultUserName -Value pgustavo
```

```
Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -  
Name DefaultPassword -Value W1n1!2019
```

# What else do we need for Credentials in Registry?

- Set Audit Rule! How?

- Download <https://github.com/hunters-forge/Set-AuditRule>
- Import-module Set-AuditRule.ps1
- `Set-AuditRule -RegistryPath "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -IdentityReference Everyone -Rights QueryValues -InheritanceFlags None -PropagationFlags None -AuditFlags Success`

# What **else** do we need for Credentials in Registry?

- Testing Commands?
  - reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /f password /t REG\_SZ /s

# What about technique variations?



# What else do we need for Credentials in Registry?


- Testing Commands?

- reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /f password /t REG\_SZ /s
- Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" -Name \*password\*
- C#, Python, etc!


# Are we ready?







# We need an environment setup.. working!



# Execute -> Collect -> Analyze -> Repeat



# Same Technique + Some Variations



Data produced



Test Security Controls




Model Adversary Behavior




# Credentials in Registry Data Mapping




# Credentials in Registry Data Mapping




# Credentials in Registry Data Mapping







# Credentials in Registry - Windows Registry



# Credentials in Registry - Windows Registry



# Spending +time producing data & -time analyzing



## Data produced



# Test Security Controls







# Model Adversary Behavior



# Takes Time! Similar Events?

# Same Technique + Some Variations



EVENT ID	TASK
4688	Process Creation
4673	Sensitive Privilege Use
4656	Registry (Request Handle)
4690	Handle Manipulation
4663	Registry (Access)
4658	Registry (Closing Handle)
4689	Process Termination


Test Security Controls




Model Adversary Behavior




# We might be all doing this..




EVENT ID	TASK
4688	Process Creation
4673	Sensitive Privilege Use
4656	Registry (Request Handle)
4690	Handle Manipulation
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4689	Process Termination




EVENT ID	TASK
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


EVENT ID	TASK
4688	Process Creation
4673	Sensitive Privilege Use
4656	Registry (Request Handle)
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


EVENT ID	TASK
4688	Process Creation
4673	Sensitive Privilege Use
4656	Registry (Request Handle)
4690	Handle Manipulation
4663	Registry (Access)
4658	Registry (Closing Handle)
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
# We might be doing this over and over..




EVENT ID	TASK
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


EVENT ID	TASK
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
EVENT ID	TASK
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


EVENT ID	TASK
4688	Process Creation
4673	Sensitive Privilege Use
4656	Registry (Request Handle)
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4689	Process Termination

# What if we share our datasets?



# From Zero to Data Analytics Validation!



# Enter Mordor

# Mordor Project @Mordor\_Project

- Pre-recorded security events generated by simulated adversarial techniques in the form of JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)
- Pre-recorded data categorized by platforms, adversary groups, tactics and techniques defined by the Mitre ATT&CK Framework.
- Data represents not only specific known malicious events but additional context/events that occur around it.




# Mordor Standard Environments

- Environment designed to replicate a small research network
- Standardized and documented setup
- Platforms
  - Windows
  - Linux
- Endpoints Telemetry
  - Windows Security Auditing
  - Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) (NEW!!)
- Network Telemetry
  - Network Logs
- Environments Available: Shire and Erebor


# Mordor Environments: The Shire




# The Shire Design



# The Shire Telemetry: Win Logs & Sysmon




# The Shire: Event Log -> WEC -> HELK




# Mordor Environments: Erebor (Lonely Mountain)




# Erebor Design



# Erebor Telemetry: ETW Events via SilkETW



# Erebor: ETW Events -> Event Log -> WEC -> HELK



# How do you collect data?


- We use **Kafkacat**!
- kafkacat is a generic non-JVM producer and consumer for Apache Kafka >=0.8, think of it as a netcat for Kafka.
- **In consumer mode**
  - Kafkacat reads messages from a topic and prints them to standard output (stdout). You can also redirect it to a file (i.e. JSON)
- **In producer mode**
  - Kafkacat reads messages from standard input (stdin). You can also send data to kafkacat by adding data from a file.

# Consuming Data (Taking a snapshot of data)

```
$ kafka-cat -b <Kafka-IP>:9092 -t  
<kafka-Topic> -C -o end > file.json
```

- **-b** : Kafka broker
- **-t** : Topic to consume from
- **-C** : Consumer Mode
- **-o** : Offset to start consuming from

# Consuming Data -> Creating Mordor File (Video)



[Dashboard](#)[Listeners](#)[Launchers](#)[Grunts](#)[Templates](#)[Tasks](#)[Taskings](#)[Graph](#)[Data](#)[Users](#)

## Grunts

Show 50 entries

Search:


Name	ImplantTemplate	Hostname	UserName	Status	LastCheckin	Integrity	OperatingSystem	Process
baf75e314d	GruntHTTP	IT001	pgustavo	Active	10/30/2019 00:32:34	Medium	Microsoft Windows NT 10.0.18362.0	powershell

[Previous](#) 1 [Next](#)

keys — ubuntu@ip-172-18-39-6: ~ — ssh -i aws-ubuntu-key.pem ubuntu@3.95.165.162 — 108x9

```
ubuntu@ip-172-18-39-6:~$  
ubuntu@ip-172-18-39-6:~$ kafka cat -b localhost:9092 -t winlogbeat -C -o end > covenant_credentials_in_registry_$(date +%F%H%M%S).json
```

# Producing Data (Injecting Adversary Dataset)



# Producing Data (Injecting Adversary Dataset)

```
$ kafka-console-producer -b <Kafka-IP>:9092 -t  
<kafka-Topic> -P -l file.json
```

- **-b** : Kafka broker
- **-t** : Topic to produce to
- **-P** : Producer Mode
- **-l** : Send messages from a file

# I just want to download all the datasets..

```
$ git clone https://github.com/hunters-forge/mordor.git
```


```
$ cd mordor/small_datasets/
```

```
$ find . -type f -name "*.tar.gz" -print0  
| sudo xargs -0 -I{} tar xf {} -C .
```

# Expedite Analytics Validation!




Data produced



YOU CAN DO IT NOW!



# Validate Analytics!



Validate Analytics



$$2 + 2 = 4$$

# Where do we get analytics from?



I have data with me and I am ready!



# Mordor & CAR

The MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR)!

# CAR-2019-08-001: Credential Dumping via Windows Task Manager

- The Windows Task Manager may be used to dump the memory space of lsass.exe to disk for processing with a credential access tool such as Mimikatz. This is performed by launching Task Manager as a privileged user, selecting lsass.exe, and clicking “Create dump file”. This saves a dump file to disk with a deterministic name that includes the name of the process being dumped.
- This requires filesystem data to determine whether files have been created.
- **Contributors:** Tony Lambert/Red Canary

# But, How do I simulate that technique?



# Interactive Task Manager Lsass dump (Demo 03)



1:50 AM  
10/27/2019

```
[ubuntu@ip-172-18-39-6:~$  
ubuntu@ip-172-18-39-6:~$ kafkacat -b localhost:9092 -t winlogbeat -C -o end > remoteinteractive_taskmgr_lsass_dump_  
$(date +%F%H%M%S).json
```

# CAR-2019-08-001: Procdump - File Create (Pseudocode)

```
files = search File:Create  
  
lsass_dump = filter files where (  
    file_name = "lsass*.dmp"    and  
    image_path = "C:\Windows\*\taskmgr.exe")  
  
output lsass_dump
```

| But, where do I run that?



# Enter Jupyter Notebooks


# What are Jupyter Notebooks?

- Think of a notebook as a document that you can access via a web interface that allows you to save:
  - **Input** (live code)
  - **Output** (evaluated code output)
  - **Visualizations and narrative text** (Tell the story!)
- Uses include:
  - Data cleaning and transformation
  - Statistical modeling
  - Data visualization
  - Machine learning, and much more

# How Do Jupyter Notebooks Work?

- Jupyter Notebooks work with what is called a **two-process model** based on a **kernel-client** infrastructure.
- This model applies **Read-Evaluate-Print Loop (REPL)**:
  - Takes a single user's inputs
  - Evaluates them
  - Returns the result to the user

# Jupyter Notebooks Architecture



# Mordor -> Jupyter Notebooks

CAR-2019-08-001: Credential Dumping via Windows Task Manager

# The ThreatHunter-Playbook @HunterPlaybook

- A Threat hunter's playbook to aid the development of techniques and hypothesis for hunting campaigns by leveraging security event logs from diverse operating systems.
- It documents detection strategies in the form of **interactive notebooks** to provide an easy and flexible way to visualize the expected output and be able to **run the analytics against pre-recorded mordor datasets**



# OpenHunt Library

- Via PIP:

```
pip install openhunt
```

- Or Straight from Source

```
git clone
```

```
https://github.com/Cyb3rPanda/openhunt
```

```
cd OpenHunt && pip install .
```

openhunt 1.6.4

pip install openhunt 



[Latest version](#)

Last released: Sep 26, 2019

Binder JupyterLab Not Secure | 3.95.165.162/jupyter/lab

File Edit View Run Kernel Tabs Settings Help

Launcher remote\_interactive\_taskmng\_lsass\_dump.ipynb

PySpark\_Python3

# Remote Interactive Task Manager LSASS Dump

## Playbook Tags

ID: WINEXEC191030201010

Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g

References:

## ATT&CK Tags

Tactic: Credential Access

Technique: Credential Dumping

## Applies To

## Technical Description

Is You Ready? haha



# Hunt The Planet!

# | Threat Hunters Forge Community!



Threat Hunters Forge

Data Science, Threat Hunting & Open Source Projects

# Threat Hunters Forge Slack Community!



## ThreatHunting

Threat Hunters Forge

Join the Threat Hunters Forge Slack  
Community!

A community led effort to share detection  
strategies and to support open source  
projects to aid the development of security  
analytics and tooling for threat hunting!

Get access today!


FREE to join

Email

Join Now

<https://launchpass.com/threathunting>

# Remember this initiative with Mordor?



# What if everyone gets a notebook too?




EVENT ID	TASK
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
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# Wait, Whaaat?



imgflip.com

# | Wait, Whaaat?



# The Binder Project

- The Binder Project is an open community that makes it possible to create shareable, interactive, reproducible environments.
- The main technical product that the community creates is called **BinderHub**, and one deployment of a BinderHub exists at **mybinder.org**.
- Who is it for?:
  - **Researchers, Educators, people analyzing data and people trying to communicate the data analysis to others!!**




# BinderHub


BinderHub connects several services together to provide on-the-fly creation and registry of Docker images. It utilizes the following tools:

- **A cloud provider** such Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, Amazon EC2, and others
- **Kubernetes** to manage resources on the cloud
- **Helm** to configure and control Kubernetes
- **Docker** to use containers that standardize computing environments
- **A BinderHub UI** that users can access to specify Git repos they want built
- **BinderHub** to generate Docker images using the URL of a Git repository
- **A Docker registry** (such as gcr.io) that hosts container images
- **JupyterHub** to deploy temporary containers for users

# Binder Design!




# Open Infrastructure for Open Hunts!



# Open Infrastructure for Open Hunts! (LIVE!)

<https://mybinder.org/v2/gh/hunters-forge/ThreatHunter-Playbook/master>

# Threat Hunter Playbooks via Binder (Video)



GitHub - hunters-forge/ThreatHunter-Playbook

Watch 273 ⭐ Star 1,691 Fork 388

Code Issues 2 Pull requests 3 Projects 0 Security Insights

A Threat hunter's playbook to aid the development of techniques and hypothesis for hunting campaigns.

threat-hunting sysmon hunting-campaigns hypothesis hunting dfir hunter mitre-attack-db mitre

296 commits 2 branches 0 releases 10 contributors GPL-3.0

Branch: master ▾ New pull request Find File Clone or download ▾

File	Description	Time Ago
Cyb3rWard0g Update README.md		Latest commit 4f7a799 16 minutes ago
library	Updated Remote Service Control Manager Handle	last month
playbooks	Updated location for DPAPI MasterKey	5 days ago
pre-hunt	Quick Update	2 months ago
resources	Docker Update & Playbook Format	last month
signatures/sigma	ThreatHunter Playbook 2.0	last month
.gitignore	Revamping Project	5 months ago
Dockerfile	Update Dockerfile	3 hours ago
LICENSE	Book Test & License Update	2 months ago
README.md	Update README.md	16 minutes ago

# Goal: Share and Empower the Community!



# | Let's do it together!



# Threat Hunters Forge References

- **GitHub:** <https://github.com/hunters-forge>
- **Python Library:** <https://github.com/Cyb3rPanda/openhunt>
- **Slack Invitation:** <https://launchpass.com/threathunting>
- **Official Blog:** <https://medium.com/threat-hunters-forge>
- **Founders:** @Cyb3rWard0g & @Cyb3rPandaH
- **Official Twitter:** @HuntersForge
- @HunterPlaybook
- @THE\_HELK
- @OSSEM\_Project, @Mordor\_Project & More

# Thank You! Muchas Gracias!