



BETTER.

SESSION ID: MBS-W12

Hacking Healthcare Live: Digital Disease, Clinical Crisis

MODERATOR: **Christian Dameff**

University of California at San Diego, Emergency Physician and Clinical Informatics Fellow
@cdameffmd

PANELISTS:

Suzanne Schwartz

Center for Devices &
Radiological Health – US FDA,
Associate Director for
Science & Strategic
Partnerships

Jeff Tully

UC Davis Medical Center,
Resident Anesthesiologist
@jefftullymd

Beau Woods

I Am the Cavalry,
Cyber Safety Advocate
@beauwoods

Teresa Wu

University of Arizona, College of
Medicine-Phoenix; Banner University
Medical Center-Phoenix, Director,
Simulation Curriculum; Associate
Professor, Emergency Medicine
@teresawumd

#RSAC



UAH

UAH

GNH

IND REED

UAH





I Am The Cavalry

The Cavalry isn't coming... It falls to us

Problem Statement

Our society is adopting connected technology *faster than we are able to secure it.*

Mission Statement

To ensure connected technologies with the potential to impact public safety and human life are *worthy of our trust.*



Medical



Automotive



Connected Home



Public Infrastructure

Why Trust, public safety, human life

How Education, outreach, research

Who Infosec research community

Who Passionate volunteers


What Long-term vision for cyber safety

Collecting existing research, researchers, and resources

Connecting researchers with industry, media, policy, and legal

Collaborating across a broad range of backgrounds, interests, and skillsets

Catalyzing positive action sooner than it would have happened on its own





“No one has ever died from a hacked medical device.”

- Doctors don't look
- Investigators aren't trained
- Data doesn't exist

...how would you know?



NEWS MAY 17 2017, 9:39 AM ET

Why 'WannaCry' Malware Caused Chaos for National Health Service in U.K.

by ALEXANDER SMITH, SAPHORA SMITH, NICK BAILEY and PETRA CAHILL

An ambulance worker at an NHS hospital in London on Friday. Andy Rain / EPA


SPECIAL ARTICLE

Delays in Emergency Care and Mortality during Major U.S. Marathons

Anupam B. Jena, M.D., Ph.D., N. Clay Mann, Ph.D., Leia N. Wedlund,
and Andrew Olenski, B.S.

ABSTRACT

Healthcare Cybersecurity is in Critical Condition

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- Severe Lack of Security Talent**
The majority of health delivery orgs lack full-time qualified security personnel.
 - Legacy Equipment**
Equipment is running on old, unsupported, and vulnerable operating systems.
 - Premature/Over-Connectivity**
'Meaningful Use' requirements drove hyper connectivity without secure design & implementation.
 - Vulnerabilities Impact Patient Care**
One security compromise shut down patient care at Hollywood Presbyterian and UK Hospitals.
 - Known Vulnerabilities Epidemic**
One legacy, medical technology had over 1,400 vulnerabilities.

Source: US Department of Health and Human Services
Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force
Report On Improving Cybersecurity In The Health Care Industry, June 2017
<https://www.phe.gov/preparedness/planning/CyberTF/Pages/default.aspx>



The single biggest risk to the health of future generations is trust and trustworthiness of care delivery.

A Hippocratic Oath for Connected Medical Devices

I will revere and protect human life, and act always for the benefit of my patients. I recognize that all systems fail; inherent defects and adverse conditions are inevitable. Capabilities meant to improve or save life, may also harm or end life. Where failure impacts patient safety, care delivery must be resilient against both indiscriminate accidents and intentional adversaries. Each of the roles in a diverse care delivery ecosystem shares a common responsibility: As one who seeks to preserve and improve life, I must **first do no harm.**

To that end, I swear to fulfill, to the best of my ability, these principles.

- **Cyber Safety by Design:** I respect domain expertise from those that came before. I will inform design with security lifecycle, adversarial resilience, and secure supply chain practices.
- **Third-Party Collaboration:** I acknowledge that vulnerabilities will persist, despite best efforts. I will invite disclosure of potential safety or security issues, reported in good faith.
- **Evidence Capture:** I foresee unexpected outcomes. I will facilitate evidence capture, preservation, and analysis to learn from safety investigations.
- **Resilience and Containment:** I recognize failures in components and in the environment are inevitable. I will safeguard critical elements of care delivery in adverse conditions, and maintain a safe state with clear indicators when failure is unavoidable.
- **Cyber Safety Updates:** I understand that cyber safety will always change. I will support prompt, agile, and secure updates.

Connections and Ongoing Collaborations



Security Researchers



Patients



Device Makers



Policy Makers



Insurers & Payers



Physicians & Care Givers



Standards Organizations



Healthcare Providers



Government Agencies

I Am The Cavalry



I Am The Cavalry

⚠ WARNING ⚠

LIVE HACKING
MEDICAL DEVICE SECURITY
RESEARCH IN PROGRESS



MOST MEDICAL DEVICES ARE DESIGNED AND TESTED TO
REDUCE RISK FROM FORESEEABLE HAZARDS. NO
SECURITY WORKS PERFECTLY AGAINST ALL ACCIDENTS
AND ADVERSARIES. **PATIENTS WITH CONNECTED MEDICAL**
DEVICES ENTER AT THEIR OWN RISK.

#We ❤️ Hackers



Medtronic

Medtronic



Becton Dickinson



Philips Health



Abbott

**ThermoFisher
SCIENTIFIC**

Thermofisher Scientific

elektra labs

Elektra Labs



Mayo Clinic

**SIEMENS
Healthineers**

Siemens Healthineers

RSA® Conference 2019



Suzanne Schwartz
Center for Devices &
Radiological Health – US Food
& Drug Administration,
Associate Director for Science
& Strategic Partnerships

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Physician Debrief

“Apply” Slide

- Learn
 - FDA Safety Communications
 - JMIR article on Hippocratic Oath
- Participate
 - Clinical simulations and table top exercises
 - #wehearthackers
 - CyberMed Summit 2019
- Share with executives

RSA® Conference 2019

Thank you!



Resources

- JMIR article on Hippocratic Oath
<https://preprints.jmir.org/preprint/12568>
- Nightline segment on CyberMed Summit
<https://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/video/fears-hackers-targeting-hospitals-medical-devices-48343190>
- US HHS Task Force report on improving cybersecurity in the healthcare industry.
<https://www.phe.gov/preparedness/planning/CyberTF/Pages/default.aspx>

Resources

- FDA pre-market and post-market guidance for medical device cybersecurity.
- <https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm356190.pdf>
- <https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm482022.pdf>
- <https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM623529.pdf>

Resources

- The Healthcare Sector Coordinating Council Joint Security Plan for securely developing medical devices.
<https://healthsectorcouncil.org/the-joint-security-plan/>
- The Healthcare Sector Coordinating Council guidance for healthcare provider security
<https://healthsectorcouncil.org/hhs-and-hscc-release-voluntary-cybersecurity-practices-for-the-health-industry/>