

RSA® Conference 2019

San Francisco | March 4–8 | Moscone Center



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SESSION ID: MBS-W03

Attack Vectors in Orbit: The Need for IoT and Satellite Security

William J Malik, CISA


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Satellites



Sputnik 1 – Oct 4, 1957



Echo 1 – Aug 12, 1960

N.A.S.A.



END
C.R.O.

Telstar 1 – July 10, 1962



Skylab – May 14, 1973




Voyager 1 – Sept 1977



Illustration

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
Types of Satellite Orbits




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Deep Dive on Hubble

Hubble Telescope – April 24, 1990




Hubble Support Systems



NASA Space Network



TDRS



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Satellite Applications

Primary Satellite Uses

- Communications
 - Earth to Satellite
 - Satellite to Satellite
 - Satellite to Earth
- Terrestrial Information
 - Beacons (GPS, time signals)
 - Observations (Weather, crops, disasters, spying)
- Space Exploration


Satellite Role in 5G and IoT

- 5G Backhaul
 - High data capacity
 - Remote coverage areas
 - Latency an issue
- Industrial IoT
 - SIM/firmware updates
 - N-tier backhaul
 - Latency an issue

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Threats to Satellites

Vulnerabilities



Unintentional Threats to Satellites

Type of threat	Vulnerable satellite system components
Ground-based:	
Natural occurrences (including earthquakes and floods; adverse temperature environments)	Ground stations; TT&C and data links
Power outages	
Space-based:	
Space environment (solar, cosmic radiation; temperature variations)	Satellites; TT&C and data links
Space objects (including debris)	
Interference-oriented:	
Solar activity; atmospheric and solar disturbances	Satellites; TT&C and data links
Unintentional human interference (caused by terrestrial and space-based wireless systems)	

Kessler Syndrome

Intentional Threats to Satellites

Type of threat	Vulnerable satellite system components
Ground-based:	
Physical destruction	Ground stations; communications networks
Sabotage	All systems
Space-based (anti-satellite):	
Interceptors (space mines and space-to-space missiles)	Satellites
Directed-energy weapons (laser energy, electromagnetic pulse)	Satellites; TT&C and data links
Interference and content-oriented:	
Cyber attacks (malicious software, denial of service, spoofing, data interception, and so forth)	All systems and communications networks
Jamming	All systems

NASA Restore-L with Landsat-7



Types of Satellite Hacks

- Jamming
 - Flooding a communications channel to block information transfer (DDoS)
- Eavesdropping
 - Intercepting a communication channel
- Hijack
 - Replacing content (not taking over the satellite itself)
- Control
 - Taking over the TT&C ground station, bus, or payload

Intrusions into NASA Systems

1997, Goddard Space Flight Ctr, data exfil

1998, US-German ROSAT blinded by unplanned turn towards the Sun (RU)

2002, Huntsville, engine design (CN)

2003 – 2006, data exfil propulsion systems

2004, Ames Research supercomputer shut down to halt intrusion

2005, Kennedy VAB. Johnson Space Ctr, data exfil (TW)

2006, NASA HQ, phishing, data exfil satellite design

2006. NASA bans Word attachments

2007, Goddard, EOS network compromised (CN)

2007, Landsat-7 12 minute interference

2008, Landsat-7 another 12+ minute takeover

2008, Terra EOS AM-1, 2+ minute takeover

2008, Terra EOS AM-1, 9+ minute TT&C takeover

2008, Johnson Space Ctr, Trojan disrupted ISS and infected obsolescent on-board computers

2010, seven NASA systems compromised, Chinese national detained

2010, China Telcom routed 15% of Internet traffic through Chinese servers, including .gov and .mil sites

2011, NASA and ESA identity and authentication data hacked and published

Control Takeover Hacks

- February 1999, SkyNet, UK. Hackers controlled one of four British military satellites, moving its position and demanding ransom
- 2000, US Abrams and British Challenger tank trials in Greece meaconed by French intelligence agencies – GPS takeover

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Remediation

Threat-specific Detection and Response

- Anti-jamming
 - Spread-spectrum
- Hardening
 - EMP and radiation shielding
 - GPS Authentication
- Embedded security processor
 - Encryption
 - Digital signing
 - Identity management – authentication and authorization
- Detection and blocking

Systemic Detection and Response

- Deploy security orchestration
 - Real-time anomaly detection and response
- Apply ISO 7498-2
 - Authentication
 - Authorization
 - Encryption
 - Data Integrity
 - Non-repudiation
- Expand monitoring and logging
- Exploit secure chip architectures

Long Term Solutions

- View satellite as just another communication channel
- Use comprehensive information security, privacy, and identity management across appropriate layers
- Imbed security and privacy by design (both IT and OT)

Conclusions and Next Steps

- Costs plummeting per Moore's law
 - Both satellite costs and hacker RF attack kit
- Attack surfaces widening
- 5G fringe coverage will require satellites
- Industrial IoT firmware updates via satellites
- Private sector regulation required

Apply What You Have Learned Today

- Next week you should:
 - Extend your information security architecture to include OT – and possibly satellites. Upgrade to 13-bit “week” counter by April 6
- In the first three months following this presentation you should:
 - Assess the potential value to satellite infrastructure for your Industrial IoT deployments
- Within six months you should:
 - Train your architectural, infrastructure, and procurement teams to include enhanced information security criteria in design, deployment, and acquisition

References

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