

MAN IN THE MIRROR

Upping Your Threat Hunting Game
By Seeing Yourself Like An Attacker.



July 2020



ERIC MCINTYRE

DIRECTOR OF R&D

HI, I'M ERIC.

I'm Eric McIntyre, Director of R&D at Randori. Previously, I served as a security researcher at Kyrus Tech, where I worked for six years leading teams supporting clients in the national and commercial security spaces. I love landing exploits, running, and exploring the outdoors.

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OUTLINE

01 | The Beginning and The End

02 | Flipping the Script

03 | Think Like an Attacker

04 | Take Action

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THE POINT

FIRST...

- I'm not a threat hunter.
- I'm not here to teach you how to threat hunt.
- I'm here to tell you how we hack companies at scale and explain the attacker's perspective.
- When I say red in this talk, I mean adversary.

AND FINALLY...

- You can't hunt what you don't detect.
- Understanding how attackers think will make you a better threat hunter.
- Better prediction leads to effective prioritization leads to optimization of resources and reduction of risk.

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**RED HAS TO BE RIGHT
ONCE. BLUE HAS TO BE
RIGHT ALL THE TIME.**


**RED HAS TO BE RIGHT
ONCE. BLUE HAS TO BE
RIGHT ALL THE TIME.**

WRONG.

**BLUE HAS TO BE RIGHT
ONCE. RED HAS TO BE
RIGHT ALL THE TIME.**

IRL.

KILL CHAIN



ADVANTAGE BLUE

- Every action I take is a opportunity to get caught
- You know the playing field
- Getting caught is expensive



ADVANTAGE RED

- I know your tools
- You lack control
- Time is on my side



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
03 | Think Like an Attacker

04 | Take Action


**THIS TALK IS ABOUT
HOW YOU CAN OPTIMIZE
YOUR DEFENSES.**

**BY THINKING LIKE
AN ADVERSARY.**


KILL CHAIN




EXTERNAL RECONNAISSANCE




EXTERNAL RECONNAISSANCE




EXTERNAL RECONNAISSANCE



EXTERNAL RECONNAISSANCE



EXTERNAL RECONNAISSANCE



SIX FACTORS OF TEMPTATION

ENUMERABILITY

Precision of detection

WEAKNESS

Known disclosures and exploits

CRITICALITY

Importance of function

APPLICABILITY


Level of adoption

POST-EXPLOITATION POTENTIAL

Usefulness after compromise

RESEARCH POTENTIAL

Ease of development




ENUMERABILITY

PRECISION OF DETECTION


Detecting an exact version, patch level, and configuration



Detecting a major and minor version



Detecting only the software name




PUBLIC/PRIVATE WEAKNESS

KNOWN DISCLOSURES AND EXPLOITS


Critical, reliable, unauthenticated remote code execution with PoC



Local privilege escalation, post-authentication



Possible information disclosure vulnerability




CRITICALITY

IMPORTANCE OF FUNCTION


Services that inherently define a critical security boundary



Services infrequently, but possibly on a security boundary



Services not commonly on a security boundary




APPLICABILITY

LEVEL OF ADOPTION

A ubiquitous service found in most enterprises



A service found in limited segments



An unusual service with few users




POST-EXPLOITATION POTENTIAL

USEFULNESS AFTER COMPROMISE


Well-known environment where few defenses exist



Common environment with likely defenses



Esoteric or highly defended environment



RESEARCH POTENTIAL

EASE OF DEVELOPMENT

Tooling, research, PoCs, and exemplars exist

Research Potential




Some prior research, but may lack development tools

Research Potential



Difficult to obtain hardware, no tools, no prior research

Research Potential



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
Level of adoption

POST-EXPLOITATION POTENTIAL

Usefulness after compromise

RESEARCH POTENTIAL

Ease of development



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TAKE ACTION

IF YOU BELIEVE THIS...

- You can't hunt what you don't detect.
- Understanding how attackers think will make you a better threat hunter.
- Better prediction leads to effective prioritization leads to optimization of resources and reduction of risk.

THEN DO THIS...

- Utilize black box discovery to see your attack surface like an attacker.
- Gain an attacker's perspective.
- Rank your targets and prioritize them based on risk, accounting for both temptation (likelihood) and impact.



Randori

JOIN US ON 9/3

HIDING IN THE NOISE



EVAN ANDERSON
DIRECTOR OF OFFENSE

Adding new security tools to your OSOC toolset may help alert you to your business's latest cyber threats. However, when a million unprioritized alerts hit you in a day, it's easy to quickly reach for the snooze button without understanding what is truly going on. Drowning in alerts, the best enterprises are discovering that to cut through the chaos and triage alerts accurately, operators need to understand the attack from the adversary's perspective.

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