

RSA® Conference 2019

San Francisco | March 4–8 | Moscone Center



BETTER.

SESSION ID: GRC-R02

What makes a good KRI? Using FAIR to discover meaningful metrics

Steve Reznik

Director, Operational Risk Management
ADP

#RSAC

Metrics

Love them!

“Without data, you are just another person with an opinion”


W. Edwards Deming

... or hate them?



Why stay?

- FAIR-based approach to better metrics
- Process workflow
- Case studies



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Poll Question: Do your metrics indicate risk?

Poll the Audience

- GRC-R02
- Do your metrics indicate risk?
 - Yes
 - No
 - Maybe
- <https://rsa1-live.eventbase.com/polls?event=rsa2019&polls=3860>

Where's the risk?

- Inappropriate access privileges
- Absence of patching
- Disgruntled insiders
- Wireless access points
- Data breach
- Lack of user awareness
- Reputation damage
- Regulatory compliance
- Web applications

Which ones are:

- Objectives/requirements?
- Threats?
- Assets?
- Control deficiencies?
- Scenarios/events?
- Outcomes?



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
- Objectives/requirements?
- Threats?
- Assets?
- Control deficiencies?
- Scenarios/events?
- Outcomes?



Courtesy of Robert Stroud

Risk is...

- The probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss associated with a specific event
- The way in which possible losses may materialize are articulated in risk scenarios describing the action of a threat onto an asset of value and the resulting effect



Where's the risk *indicator*?

- Policy acknowledgements (%)
- Security alerts (#)
- Unpatched servers (#)
- Audited vendors (%)
- Incident response cost (\$)
- Records breached (#)
- Application test time (Hrs)
- Open audit findings (#)
- NIST CSF efficacy level (1 → 5)
- FICO Score (300 → 850)

Which ones indicate:

- Performance?
- Control?
- Compliance?
- Risk? *Does it affect loss exposure?*



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Which ones indicate:

- Performance?
- Control?
- Compliance?
- Risk? *Does it affect loss exposure?*



Courtesy of Robert Stroud

Key Risk Indicator

Of crucial
importance*

The probable
frequency and
probable magnitude
of future loss
associated with a
specific event

A gauge or
meter of a
specified kind*

*Source: Oxford Dictionary


What makes a **BETTER.** metric?

Traditional Candidates	Loss Event	Risk Factor	Loss Exposure Leverage	Cost to Measure & Report
Policy acknowledgements (%)				
Security alerts (#)	Various	TEF?		
Unpatched servers (#)		RS		\$
Audited vendors (%)				
Incident response cost (\$)	Various	PLM	CASE STUDIES WILL LOOK AT	\$
Records breached (#)	Data Breach	PLM		
Application test time (Hrs)				
Open audit findings (#)				¢
NIST CSF efficacy level (1-5)				\$\$

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Now, let's dig in!


KRI Identification Process Workflow



Normalize Risk Register


Which ones are:

- Objectives/requirements?
- Threats?
- Assets?
- Control deficiencies?
- Scenarios/events?
- Outcomes?




“Those are my top two...let me know how you plan to monitor”



Identify Risk Factors




Risk Factors in Action – Monte Carlo Illustration



From Risk Factor to Risk Indicator





Loss Exposure




Resistance Strength

From Risk Indicator to Key Risk Indicator




Perform Sensitivity Analysis

- 1) Choose Factor
- 2) Change It
- 3) Observe LE
- 4) Reset Factor
- 5) Repeat
- 6) Compare Leverage




KRI Identification Process Workflow




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Case Study 1



Case Study 1 – Introduction


Risk Scenario: External Fraud



Risk Factor Components		Min	Most Likely	Max	
Loss Event Frequency	TEF (#)	Cyber Criminals	6,000	7,000	10,000
	TCap (%)	General Hacking Community	1,000	1,150	2,000
		Hacktivists	0	15	100
	TEF (%)	Cyber Criminals	60	75	99
	TCap (%)	General Hacking	20	50	80
		Hacktivists	25	60	90
Resistance Strength* (%)		0--80	25--85	50--90	
Primary Loss Magnitude	Replacement Cost (\$)	0	900	1,800	
	Response Hours (#)	1	4	7	
Secondary Risk	SLEF (%)	0	0.5	1	
	Reputation Damage (\$)	0	1M	5M	


* Varies across five vulnerability control components

Case Study 1 – Baseline Estimate



"I see that cyber criminals are our top threat...now what factors, as they change, could indicate a fraud risk appetite violation, i.e., a 50% increase in loss exposure?"

Case Study 1 – Choose Factor, Change It, Observe LE



Fraud Risk Appetite = \$6.5M


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	TCap (%)	General Hacking Community	1,000	1,150
		Hacktivists	0	15
	TEF (#)	Cyber Criminals	60	75
	TCap (%)	General Hacking	20	50
		Hacktivists	25	60
Resistance Strength* (%)		0--80	25--85	50--90
Primary Loss Magnitude	Replacement Cost (\$)	0	900	1,800
	Response Hours (#)	1	4	7
Secondary Risk	SLEF (%)	0	0.5	1
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Case Study 1 – Reset Factor, Repeat, Compare Leverage

External Fraud Risk Factor Component	RFC Change	Loss Exposure Change	Leverage
RS – Authentication Control	5%	79%	1:16
RS – Structural Integrity Control		10%	1:2
TEF – Cyber Criminals		7%	1:1
SLM – Reputation Damage		5%	1:1

Case Study 1 – Compare Leverage Graph

Risk Factor – Component	20%	10%	5%	1%
TEF – Cyber Criminals	29%	14%	7%	1%
	5.4M	4.8M	4.5M	4.2M
RS – Authentication Strength	16%	8%	4%	1%
	4.9M	4.5M	4.4M	4.2M
RS – Structural Integrity	29%	10%	4%	1%
	5.4M	4.6M	4.4M	4.2M
RS – Authentication Control	395%	176%	79%	17%
	20.8M	11.6M	7.5M	4.9M
RS – Structural Integrity Control	69%	24%	10%	2%
	7.1M	5.2M	4.6M	4.3M
PLM – Replacement Cost	6%	3%	1%	0%
	4.4M	4.3M	4.3M	4.2M
PLM – Response Cost	3%	1%	1%	0%
	4.3M	4.3M	4.2M	4.2M
SLM – Reputation Damage	21%	10%	5%	1%
	5.1M	4.6M	4.4M	4.2M



Case Study 1 – Business Leader Decision


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	4.3M	4.3M	4.2M	4.2M
SLM – Reputation Damage	21%	10%	5%	1%
	5.1M	4.6M	4.4M	4.2M



“Now we’re getting somewhere! I’ll obtain budget to track those two external fraud risk indicators. But what about service disruption risk? We don’t want more than \$10M of that.”


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Case Study 2



Case Study 2 – Introduction

Risk Scenario: Service Disruption




Risk Factor Components		Min	Most Likely	Max
Loss Event Frequency	TEF	1	4	10
	Threat Capability ¹ (%)	30	56	85
	Resistance Strength ² (%)	50	70	90
Primary Loss Magnitude	Primary Response Cost ³ (\$)	10,000	10,000	100,000
	Productivity Loss (\$)	0	50,000	500,000
Secondary Risk	SLEF (%)	50	50	100
	Secondary Response Cost (\$)	10,000	100,000	1,000,000
		0	500,000	5,000,000
		0	0	50,000,000

- Latest threat intel says a 1:3 mix of cyber criminals / general hackers is attacking →
- Effectiveness of vulnerability control system (firewalls, traffic scrubbing) as calibrated against the known threat continuum
- Responsive controls in place and expected to contain 50% of successful attacks


TCap Blend	Min	Most Likely	Max
Cyber Criminals	60%	75%	99%
General Hacking	20%	50%	80%
1:3	30%	56%	85%

“FAIR Friendly” Control Categories



Source: Risk Analysis (O-RA), an Open Group Standard (C13G), October 2013
www.opengroup.org/library/c13g

Case Study 2 – Baseline Estimate Input




Case Study 2 – Baseline Estimate Output

Analysis Results

Risk


The Annualized Loss Exposure (ALE) that results from the estimated probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss for this scenario.



“A 20% chance of service disruption losses greater than \$10M within the next 12 months... not bad... now show me how to keep an eye on this with better metrics.”

Case Study 2 – Choose Factor, Change It, Observe LE

TCap	Min	Most Likely	Max	
Cyber Criminals	60%	75%	99%	
General Hacking	20%	50%	80%	
1:3	30%	56%	85%	Blended Capability Increase
1:2	33%	58%	86%	4%
1:1	40%	63%	90%	11%
2:1	47%	67%	93%	19%
3:1	50%	69%	94%	22%



Service Disruption Risk Appetite = \$10M

Case Study 2 – Wash, Rinse, Repeat

RS	Min	ML	Max
Baseline	50%	70%	90%
Degrade 5%	48%	67%	86%
Degrade 10%	45%	63%	81%
Degrade 20%	40%	56%	72%

Resistance Strength

When vulnerability control strength degrades by ...	20%	10%	5%	0%
Loss exposure increases by...	236%	105%	920%	0%
Loss Exposure	\$13.1M	\$8M	\$7.5M	\$3.9M
Leverage	1:12	1:11	1:18	

Service Disruption Risk Appetite = \$10M

Case Study 2 – Compare Leverage

Service Disruption Risk Factor Component	RFC Change	Loss Exposure Change	Leverage
Resistance Strength		105%	1:11
Threat Capability		95%	1:9
TEF, Reputation Damage		10%	1:2
Primary Response Cost, Productivity Loss, SLEF, Secondary Response Cost, Fines & Judgments	10%	Nominal	

Case Study 2 – Business Leader Decision

Service Disruption Risk Factor Component	RFC Change	Loss Exposure Change	Leverage
Resistance Strength	10%	105%	1:11
Threat Capability		95%	1:9
TEF, Reputation Damage		10%	1:2
Primary Response Cost, Productivity Loss, SLEF, Secondary Response Cost, Fines & Judgments	Nominal		



“Wow! So we should monitor more than just resistance strength in this case. Our vulnerability controls could be humming along while only 10% more bad guy capability doubles service disruption risk.”

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Pulling it all together!



Risk Monitoring Dashboard Design



Risk	Appetite	KRI	Metric	Baseline	RAV Threshold	Quarterly Reporting	Trend
Service Disruption	\$10M	TEF	Frequency of DoS Attack	1 / Qtr.	3		
		Active Threat Capability	Ratio of Cyber Criminals to General Hacking Community	1:3	1:1		
		Vuln Control System Status	Relative Strength of Firewalls & Traffic Scrubbing	70% effective vs. baseline threat capability	60% (15% decrease)		
External Fraud	\$6.5M	Authentication Strength	Compliance of Passwords & Practices	90%	86% (5% decrease)		
		System Structural Integrity	Compliance of Patch Levels & Asset Configurations	80%	65% (20% decrease)		



Risk Monitoring Dashboard – Nine Months Later

Risk	Appetite	KRI	Metric	RAV	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Trend	
Service Disruption	\$10M	TEF	Frequency of DoS Attack	3	1	0	2			
			Active Threat Capability	1:1	1:3	1:3	1:2			
			Vuln Ctrl System Status	60%	70%	70%	70%			
External Fraud	\$6.5M	Authentication Strength	Compliance of Passwords & Practices	86%	90%	90%	90%			
			System Structural Integrity	65%	80%	75%	65%			

Risk Monitoring Dashboard – Twelve Months Later

Risk	Appetite	KRI	Metric	RAV	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Trend
 Service Disruption	\$10M	TEF	Frequency of DoS Attack	3	1	0	2	2	
		Active Threat Capability	Ratio of Cyber Criminals to General Hacking Community	1:1	1:3	1:3	1:2	1:2	
		Vuln Ctrl System Status	Relative Strength of Firewalls & Scrubbing	60%	70%	70%	70%	75%	
	\$6.5M	Authentication Strength	Compliance of Passwords & Practices	86%	90%	90%	90%	92%	
External Fraud		System Structural Integrity	Compliance of Patch Levels & Asset Configurations	65%	80%	75%	65%	80%	

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Poll Question: Do your metrics indicate risk?

Poll the Audience

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- Do your metrics indicate risk?
 - Yes
 - No
 - Maybe
- <https://rsa1-live.eventbase.com/polls?event=rsa2019&polls=3861>

Recap

Risk indicators
should...

- Alert on required course corrections
- Reduce the likelihood of unacceptable loss

A KRI should...

- Relate to a factor of loss exposure
- Have a risk appetite violation threshold

Now you can...

- Identify **BETTER!** metrics!

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Applying what you've learned

Apply it

By next week...

- Select a top risk scenario



By next month...

- Gather risk factor data
- Estimate loss exposure*

Before summer
vacation...

- Choose candidates with more leverage
- Set risk appetite violation thresholds
- Track and report!

* FREE TOOLS AVAILABLE!!! → FAIR-U and The Open FAIR™ Risk Analysis Tool

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Q&A