
TUTORIAL 2

CSCI361 – Computer Security

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- Introduced in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman at Stanford University.
- The idea:
 - Two keys, a private key and public key are used.
 - A recipient (let's say Bob) can announce (make public) his public key, and all senders (public) who wants to send Bob, the recipient, secret messages, can send the messages by encrypting the messages using Bob's public key.

- Bob and all senders need not have to have a predefined (or pre-agreed) secret key; i.e., no secret channel is required.
- A required condition is that the private key (known only to the recipient, in this case Bob) is not computationally feasible to be computed or derived from the public key.

- Public key cryptosystems use trapdoor functions
 to ensure that the private key cannot be derived
 or computed easily.
- A public key cryptosystem can provide:
 - Confidentiality because only the receiver can decrypt and find the plaintext, and
 - Authenticity because only the sender can create such a cryptogram (encrypted data).

Three broad category of applications:

- Public-key cryptosystem can be used as:
 - Encryption/decryption system
 - When used as an encryption/decryption system, the sender encrypts a message with the recipient's public key and sends the encrypted message to the intended recipient. Upon receiving the encrypted message, the recipient will then use his/her private key to decrypt the encrypted message to retrieve the plaintext. Only the intended recipient can retrieve the plaintext because only he/she knows the private key.

- Digital signature
 - When used as a digital system, the sender "signs" a
 message with its private key. Signing is achieved by a
 cryptographic algorithm applied to the message or to a
 small block of data that is a function of the message.
 When the intended recipient received the encrypted
 message, the recipient use the sender's public key to
 decrypt and retrieve the signed message.
- Key exchange
 - When used as a key exchange system, two sides cooperate to exchange a session key. Several different approaches are possible, involving the private key(s) of one or both parties

Two public parameters:

- A prime number p, and
- A generator g such that

"
$$y \hat{1} [1; p-1]: \$k; y = g^k \mod p$$

An example of a generator in z_p^*

Generator in Z_{11}^{*} : " $y \hat{1} [1; p-1]: \$k; y = g^{k} \mod p$

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	1	1								
2	2	4	8	5	10	9	7	3	6	1 /
3	3	9	5	4	1	3				
4	4 2	2, 6,	7 a	nd 8	are	gen	erate	ors i	$n Z_1^*$	1.
5	5	3	4	9	1	5				
6	6	3	7	9	10	5	8	4	2	1
7	7	5	2	3	10	4	6	9	8	1
8	8	9	6	4	10	3	2	5	7	1
9	9	4	3	5	1	9				
10	10	1	10							

How it works?

- 1. Alice generates a private random integer *a* Bob generates a private random integer *b*
- 2. Alice generates her public value $g^a \mod p$ Bob generates his public value $g^b \mod p$
- 3. Alice computes $g^{ab} = (g^a)^b \mod p$ Bob computes $g^{ba} = (g^b)^a \mod p$
- 4. Both now have a shared secret k since $k = g^{ab} = g^{ba}$

This protocol is also known as Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

Some popular public key cryptosystems are:

- RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (1978)) based on factorization problem
- ElGamal (1984) based on discrete logarithm problem
- Merkle-Hellman (1977) based on knapsack problem

Other public key cryptosystems are:

- Rabin based on factorization
- Blum-Goldwasser based on factorization problem

Weakness

Vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack

How does Man-in-the-Middle attack work against public-key based key distribution?

Man-in-the-Middle attack can be carried out as follow:

- An attacker Eve computes her own public key as $y_E = g^{k_E} \mod p$.
- Eve then intercepts the public keys sent by the sender Adam $(y_A = g^{k_A} \mod p)$, and receiver Barbie $(y_B = g^{k_B} \mod p)$.

- Eve then replaces both the public key y_A and y_B with y_E and sends it to both Adam and Barbie. As a result, Adam receives y_E instead of y_B and Barbie also receives y_E instead of y_A .
- Not knowing they are receiving what they are not suppose to receive, both Adam and Barbie will use y_E as the key to encrypt. The encrypted message by Adam to Barbie will be $m_A^{y_E} \mod p$ and the encrypted message by Barbie to Adam will be $m_B^{y_E} \mod p$.

- Eve can decrypt both $m_A^{y_E} \mod p$ and $m_B^{y_E} \mod p$ using her own private key to obtain m_A and m_B .
- Eve can also encrypt $m_A^{y_B} \mod p$ and forward it to Barbie, and encrypt $m_B^{y_A} \mod p$ and foward it to Adam.
- In this way, Eve can read all messages send by Adam and Barbie without Adam and Barbie knowing it.