
## Appendix 5B

## Comparative Assessment: Assessment of Risks



Appendix 5B

Risk Assessment

		Probability	bility	Impact	act	(H)	Risk Comparison (Higher / Eaual / Unique)	Risk Comparison 2her / Eaual / Unia	rison Unique			
No.	Risk	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Higher in	er in		Unique in	te in	Description	Comparison
		(PV)	(EV)	(PV)	(EV)	PV	EV	II	PV	EV		
R.1	Machine failure (small scale)	Zero	Low	None	Tiny					>	A machine simply stops working, or starts to misbehave in some manner and has to be shut down.	There is no comparable problem in the current paper-based system.
R.2	Power failure at a polling station	Low	Low	Tiny	Tiny			>			Power fails at a polling station.	Neutral. The risk here is similar in both systems.
R.3	Loss of ballots (small scale)	High	Very low	Tiny	Large	>					A vote is lost between ballot and final count.	This is highly improbable with electronic voting and close to certain in the current paper-based system, but the impact in the chosen electronic system, should this occur, would be much more significant.
R.4	Accidental damage to voting machines (small scale)	Zero	Low	None	Small					>	A machine is damaged at a polling station (for example by being knocked over or dropped).	There is no comparable event in the current paper-based system.
R.5	Single ballot not recorded	Zero	Very low	None	Small					>	A ballot is cast by the voter, but not recorded on the ballot module.	A small risk in the chosen electronic system, which does not exist in the paperbased system.
R.6	No ballots recorded on a ballot module	Zero	Very low	None	Large					>	No votes are recorded on the ballot module due to a fault in the voting machine. It should be noted that if this were to happen, there would also be no votes recorded on the backup ballot module.	A small risk in the chosen electronic system, which does not exist in the paperbased system.

Risk Assessment, continued

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		Probability	bility	Impact	act	(Hi <sub>2</sub>	Risk Comparison (Higher / Equal / Unique)	mparis ual / U	son 'nique)		
No.	Risk	Paper Voting	. 0.0	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Higher in	r in	-	Unique in	Description	Comparison
		(( <b>PV</b> )		(PV)	(EV)	PV	EV	<i>'</i>	$PV \mid EV$		
R.7	Ballot recorded incorrectly (small scale)	Zero	Very low	None	Tiny				>	The vote recorded differs from the vote cast.	A small risk in the chosen electronic system, which does not exist in the paperbased system.
R.8	Accidental damage to ballots during transportation (small scale)	Low	Very low	Mod.*	Mod.*	>				Ballots are damaged during transit.	The existence of a backup module makes this risk slightly lower in the chosen electronic system.
R.9	Accidental electromagnetic interference (small scale)	Zero	Very low	None	Small				>	A bit or bits in the machine are altered by electromagnetic radiation (called a single event upset or SEU). There are other possible ways this could happen which range from a machine in a polling booth being placed close to a transformer, to radioactive decay in a silicon chip, or even cosmic rays.	A very small risk in the chosen electronic system, which does not exist in the paper-based system.
R.10	Error in translocation/uploading of ballots (small scale)	Very high	Very low	Tiny	Small	>				The votes are correctly recorded on a ballot module, but are incorrectly read/transferred to the CD prior to loading onto the count PC.	This is a small risk in the chosen electronic system, but a near certainty in the paper-based system although in the latter, it can normally be resolved to an acceptable margin of error.
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Risk Assessment, continued

					74	MSN ASSESSINCILL, COMMINGE	Cooling	111, co	minne	2		
		Probability	ility	Impact	act	(Hig	Risk Comparison (Higher / Equal / Unique)	ompari qual / l	son Jnique)			
No.	Risk	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Higher in	· in		Unique in	e in	Description	Comparison
		((PV)	(EV)	(PV)	(EV)	PV .	EV	l <sub>l</sub>	PV	EV		
R.11	Accidental miscounting of ballots (small scale)	Certain	Very	Small	Cat.*	>					Votes are counted incorrectly at a centre.	This is a much greater probability in the paper-based system than in the chosen electronic system. However the impact of an electronic count error, should one occur, would be much greater.
R.12	Accidental voter identification (small scale)	Very low	Low	Tiny	Mod.*		>				An individual voter's vote becomes known to others.	This could be a moderate risk with the chosen electronic system, but it can be almost eliminated with good procedures. There is a slight, but insignificant, risk in the paper-based system.
R.13	Postal voter identified (small scale)	Very Iow	Low	Small	Small		>				The vote of a postal voter is identified.	This is a slightly greater risk in electronic voting, but the risk is not material in either case.
R.14	Disabled voter identified (small scale)	Low	Mod.*	None	Tiny		>				A disabled voter's vote is identified.	This is marginally less of a risk in the current paper-based system than it is with the chosen electronic system.
R.15	Software error in voting machines (small scale)	Zero	Low	None	Large					>	Each machine has to be configured for a specific constituency. It is possible that in doing this, a software error could give an incorrect result.	This is a risk in the chosen electronic system, which does not exist in the paper-based system.
*	* Catastrophic											

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Risk Assessment, continued

		Comparison		This is a risk in the chosen electronic voting system, which does not exist in the paper-based system.	This is a small risk in the chosen electronic system, which does not exist in the paper-based system.	This is a risk in the paper-based system that does not exist with the chosen electronic system.	This is a risk in the paper-based system that does not exist with the chosen electronic system.  Note: Whether this is a risk is a matter of perspective. If it is the view that a voter does not have a 'right' to spoil a vote, this is a risk.  Otherwise, it is not.
		Description		A voter who does not cast or deliberately spoils a vote can be identified.	In the chosen system, the two key-switch system could give rise to accidental overwriting of a ballot module at the service centre if a ballot module were accidentally put in the programming rather than the reading slot.	A vote is spoiled unintentionally. Common errors are repeating a preference and putting a tick or an X instead of a number beside two or more preferences.	A vote is spoiled deliberately by the voter for example, to make a political point.
nen	ue)	Unique in	EV	>	>		
NISK ASSESSIBEIL, COMINUEA	Risk Comparison (Higher / Equal / Unique)	Unia	PV			>	>
ieiit, (	Risk Comparison gher / Equal / Unig		П				
SCSSII	Risk 'igher/	er in	EV				
ISK AS	(F)	Higher in	PV				
4	Impact	Elect. Voting	(EV)	Mod.*	Small	None	None
	Imj	Paper Voting	(PV)	None	None	Small	Small
	bility	Elect. Voting	(EV)	High	Low	Zero	Zero
	Probability	Paper Voting	(( <b>PV</b> )	Zero	Zero	Certain	Certain
		Risk		Abstaining voter identification (spoiled, null or blank ballot) (small scale)	Ballot module accidentally overwritten at service centre	Inadvertently spoiled ballot	Deliberately spoiled ballot
		No.		R.16	R.17	R.18	R.19

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Risk Assessment, continued

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		Probability	bility	Impact	act	l (Hig.	Risk Comparison (Higher / Equal / Unique)	mparisa ual / Ui	on <i>tique</i> )		
Z o	Risk	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Higher in	in .	7	Unique in	Description	Comparison
		((PV)	(EV)	(PV)	(EV)	$PV \mid I$	EV	= P	PV EV		
R.20	Ballot paper not stamped	Low	Zero	Small	None					A ballot is deemed invalid because it is not stamped due to either failure of the clerk to stamp it at the polling station or to press hard enough on the stamping device.	This is a risk in the paper-based system that does not exist in the chosen electronic system.
R.21	Accidental misreading of ballot papers	Very high	Zero	Small	None					A member of the count staff misreads a ballot, for example mistaking a '5' for a '6'.	This is a risk in the paper-based system that does not exist in the chosen electronic system.
R.22	Alteration of ballots (small scale)	Very low	Zero	Small	None					A small number of ballots are altered after they are cast.	While it is theoretically possible to alter a small number of ballots in the chosen electronic system, the chance of this is a close to zero as makes no difference. It is easier to do this in a paper-based system.
R.23	Impersonation (small scale)	Mod.*	Mod.*	Small	Small			>		A voter claims to be somebody else and casts more than one vote.	Neutral. This risk is the same in both cases.
R.24	Deliberate voter identification (small scale)	Very	Very low	Small	Small					A person seeks to find out how a specific voter has voted.	Neutral. The risk is insignificant in both systems.

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Risk Assessment, continued

No.   Risk   Paper   Elect.   Paper						1	CT VIC	MSK ASSESSINCILL, COMMUNE	ات (۱۱۱۰	Otterer	7		
Risk         Paper Vointing Vointing Vointing Vointing (IPV)         Paper Vointing Vointing Vointing Vointing Vointing (IPV)         Paper Interference with (IPV)         Paper Interpretate with (IPV)			Proba	bility	Imp	act	$(H_i)$	Risk ( ïgher / I	Sompa. Equal /	rison ' <i>Uniqu</i>	(e)		
Interference with Low Low Mod.* Mod.	No.	Risk	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	High	er in		Uniq	ue in	Description	Comparison
Interference with be works ballots during storage or transportation (small scale)  Semall scale)  Low Very Mod.* Mod.* Mod.*  Small scale)  Deliberate damage to Low Very Mod.* Mod.*  Small scale)  Deliberate damage to Zero Low None Small scale)  Small scale)  Deliberate damage to Zero Low None Small scale)  Small scale)  An attempt to alter the votes on a ballot module during transportation from polling station to the service centre.  An attempt to steal, destroy or damage a ballot module or transportation from polling station to service or count centre.  Count centre.  An attempt to damage a machine either by physical assault or by magnetic or interference.			((PV)	(EV)	(PV)	(EV)	PV	EV	IJ	PV	EV		
Deliberate damage to Low Very Mod.* Mod.*  Small scale)  Deliberate damage to Low None Small scale)  Small scale)  Deliberate damage to Zero Low None Small scale)  Small scale)  An attempt to steal, destroy or damage a ballot module during transportation from polling station to service or count centre.  An attempt to damage a machine either by physical assault or by magnetic or electromagnetic interference.	R.25	Interference with ballots during storage or transportation (small scale)	Low	Low		Mod.*			>			An attempt to alter the votes on a ballot module during transportation from polling station to the service centre.	This type of malpractice is possible under both systems.
Deliberate damage to Zero Low None Small An attempt to damage a voting machines (small scale)  (small scale)  An attempt to damage a machine either by physical assault or by magnetic or electromagnetic interference.	R.26	Deliberate damage to ballots during storage or transportation (small scale)	Low	Very low	Mod.*	Mod.*	>					An attempt to steal, destroy or damage a ballot module during transportation from polling station to service or count centre.	This is a slightly greater problem with an electronic system given the greater vulnerability of electronic components. However, the backup module more or less eliminates the risk thus making the risk slightly higher with a paper-based system.
	R.27	Deliberate damage to voting machines (small scale)	Zero	Low	None	Small					>	An attempt to damage a machine either by physical assault or by magnetic or electromagnetic interference.	This is a risk in the chosen electronic system that does not exist in the paper-based system.

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Risk Assessment, continued

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		Probability	bility	Impact	act	l (Hig.	Risk Comparison (Higher / Equal / Unique)	ompari <i>qual /</i> l	son Jnique			
No.	Risk	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Higher in	in		Unique in	e in	Description	Comparison
		((PV)	(EV)	(PV)	(EV)	PV 1	EV	l)	PV	EV		
R.28	Voter coercion or bribery	Very low	Low	Mod.*	Mod.*		>				A voter is bribed or intimidated into voting in a particular way.	Save in the case of "chain voting" under the paper system (which is difficult to achieve in practice on any significant scale), the problem here is verification that the voter has voted as instructed or has cast the ballot. For a large-scale operation, the risk is slightly greater with an electronic system. For small scale, the situation is comparable in both systems.
R.29	Substitution of ballot box/ballot module	Very low	Low	Mod.*	Mod.*		>				A ballot module or modules is switched for a pre-setup module, either at the polling station or at a service centre.	Doing this is theoretically possible in both cases. Doing it with a paper-based system would require careful observation, suborning several officials and a certain amount of luck. This is a theoretical possibility with the current system, but impractical in reality.
R.30	Substitution of ballots in CD	Zero	Very	None	Large					>	The CD with the votes generated at the service centre is switched with a CD prepared earlier or with another CD written subsequently.	This is a risk in the chosen electronic system that does not exist in the paper-based system.
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Moderate

Risk Assessment, continued

		Prob	Probability	Impact	act	(Hi,	Risk Comparison (Higher / Equal / Unique)	Risk Comparison gher / Equal / Uniq	ison Inique)			
No.	Risk	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Higher in	r in		Unique in	n Description	ជ	Comparison
		((PV)	(EV)	(PV)	(EV)	PV	EV	IJ	$PV \mid EV$	Λ		
R.31	Adding votes before opening of poll	Low	Low	Small	Small			>		There is an opportunity for corrupt officials to 'vote' a number of times before the polling station opens.	opportunity officials to oer of times lling station	There is less chance of getting caught in paper-based fraud, especially if done on a small scale. Also, with a paper-based system, it might be possible to prepare the false votes during the course of a day whereas an electronic fraud would have to be done outside polling hours.
R.32	Deliberate miscounting of ballots by staff	Low	Zero	Small	None				>	Count staff may deliberately put ballots in incorrect pigeonholes.	may ballots in oles.	This would be risky. Any such errors spotted might lead to a call for a recount.
R.33	Deliberate alteration of ballots by staff	Low	Zero	Tiny	None				>	Count staff may deliberately alter a ballot.	may a ballot.	This would be risky. Any such errors spotted might lead to a call for a recount.
R.34	Deliberate spoiling of ballots by staff	Very low	Zero	Tiny	None				>	Count staff might try to invalidate a ballot by deliberately defacing it.	ht try to allot by zing it.	This would be risky and could only be done on a small scale and with some collusion and planning.
R.35	Deliberate destruction of ballots by staff	Very low	Zero	Tiny	None				>	Count staff destroy remove a ballot.	stroy or	This would be risky and could only be done on a tiny scale (otherwise there would be unacceptable reconciliation errors).

Risk Assessment, continued

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		Probability	bility	Impact	act	H)	Risk Comparison (Higher / Equal / Unique)	ompar 'qual /	ison Unique)			
No.	Risk	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Higher in	er in		Unique in	in	Description	Comparison
		(( <i>PV</i> )	(EV)	(PV)	(EV)	PV	EV	IJ	$PV \mid I$	EV		
R.36	Deliberate substitution	Very	Zero	Small	None						Count staff substitute	This would be risky and
	of ballots by staff	low							>		prepared ballots for real ballots at the count centre.	could only be done on a small scale.
R.37	Machine failure (wide	Zero	Low	None	Cat.*						A general failure of the	This is a risk in the chosen
	scale)										system to operate through	electronic system that does
											failure of one or more	not exist in the paper-based
										<u>`</u>	components. This is the	system.
											single largest risk in the	
											system.	
R.38	Loss of ballots (wide	Zero	Very	None	Cat.*					. 1	Ballots are cast, but not	This is a risk in the chosen
	scale)		low							-	written to the ballot	electronic system that does
										<u>``</u>	module.	not exist in the paper-based
6	-	t	ļ	;	-					ľ		system.
R.39		Zero	Very	None	Cat.*						The vote recorded differs	This is a risk in the chosen
	incorrectly (wide scale)		low								from the vote cast.	electronic system that does
										<u> </u>		not exist in the paper-based system.
R.40	Accidental	Zero	Zero	None	Cat.*						Extensive disruption of	This is a theoretical risk in
	electromagnetic									-	machines caused by	the chosen electronic system
	interference (wide scale)										electromagnetic	that does not exist in the
										` <u>`</u>	interference.	paper-based system, but the
										,		chance of it happening in the
												chosen electronic system are
												so low that it can be
												regarded as zero.
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Catastrophic

Risk Assessment, continued

No.   Richard   Probability   Impact											
Risk         Paper (PV) (EV)         Elect. (PV)         Paper (PV)         Elect. (PV)         Paper (PV)         Elect. (PV)         Profiting (PV)         Voting (PV)         Profit (PV)		Probal	bility	Imp	act	(Hig	Risk Col ther / Eq.	mpariso. ual / Un	n ique)		
Error in Error in Cat.*  Error in Cat.*  Error in Cat.*  Error in Error in Error in Each (PV) (EV) (None Cat.*  I bow of ballots (wide scale)  Accidental voter scale)  Accidental voter identified (wide scale)  Postal voter identified (wide scale)  I bow Small Small Small Small Small Small sidentified (wide scale)  Berror in Error in the Arcidental voter in the manual count.  The votes of a large numbers of voters are or in the manual count.  The votes of a large numbers of voters are identified (wide scale)  I bow Small Sm	No.	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Higher	· in	$U_{l}$	nique in	Description	Comparison
Error in Error in bow None Cat.*  It can be converted by the correction by loading of ballots (wide scale)  Accidental voter dentified (wide scale)  Accidental voter dentified (wide scale)  It can be comment that while the count in the manual count.  Accidental voter dentified (wide scale)  It can be comment that while the count in the manual count.  Accidental voter dentified (wide scale)  It can be comment that while the count in the manual count.  Accidental voter dentified (wide scale)  It can be count in the count sortium of ballots  Accidental voter dentified (wide scale)  It can be count in the manual count.  Accidental voter dentified (wide scale)  It can be count in the manual count.  An error i		(( <b>PV</b> )	(EV)	(PV)	(EV)		I				
Accidental Certain Very Small Cat.*  (wide scale)  Accidental voter  I count.  The votes of large numbers of voters become known to others.  Accidental voter identified  Accidental voter  I low  Postal voter identified  Accidental voter  Accidental voter  Accidental voter  Accidental voter  I low  Accidental voter  A	R.4]	Zero	Very low	None	Cat.*				>	or hat settly ulles y int ng. ade s of the the	This is a risk in the chosen electronic system that does not exist in the paper-based system.
Accidental voter  Accidental voter  Jow  Postal voter identified (wide scale)  Disabled voter  Accidental voter  Jow  Small  A  The votes of a large number  of postal voters are identified.  The votes of a large number  of postal voters are identified (wide scale)  low  Of disabled voters are identified (wide scale)  In the votes of a large number of disabled voters are identified.	R.42	Certain	Very low	Small	Cat.*	>				An error in the count software or in the manual count.	This is a higher risk in the paper-based system than in the chosen electronic system.
Postal voter identified Very Low Small Sma	R.4	Zero	Very low	None	Small				>	The votes of large numbers of voters become known to others.	This is a risk in the chosen electronic system that does not exist in the paper-based system.
Disabled voter  Very  Low  Small  Small  Small  M  The votes of a large number of disabled voters are identified (wide scale)  In the votes of a large number of disabled voters are identified.	R.4	Very	Low	Small	Small		>			The votes of a large number of postal voters are identified.	This is slightly higher in the chosen electronic system.
	R.45	Very	Low	Small	Small		>			The votes of a large number of disabled voters are identified.	This is slightly higher in the chosen electronic system.

\* Catastrophic

Risk Assessment, continued

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		Probability	bility	Impact	act	(H)	Risk Comparison (Higher / Equal / Unique)	Risk Comparison ;her / Equal / Unig	ison Unique)			
No.	Risk	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Higher in	er in		Unique in	; in	Description	Comparison
		(( <i>PV</i> )	(EV)	(PV)	(EV)	PV	EV	IJ	by V	EV		
R.46	System cannot cope with features of an election	Zero	Low	None	Cat.*					>	The software or hardware cannot handle the particular features of an election (e.g. too many parties, too many candidates, etc.).	This is a risk in the chosen electronic system that does not exist in the paper-based system.
R.47	System cannot cope with number of voters	Zero	Very low	None	Small					>	There are two scenarios where this could happen. Due to the slow pace of voting, voters cannot get to a machine or due to the high volume of votes cast, the system cannot deal with the throughput.	This is a risk in the chosen electronic system that does not exist in the paper-based system.
R.48	Votes accidentally lost during counting	Very low	Very low	Small	Large			>			The vulnerable point here is where votes are read from the ballot modules into the service centre PC and to a lesser extent into the count PC. A loss of votes subsequent to this could arise from a failure in the count software or a hardware failure on the PC.	In theory this could happen in a paper-based count. However this is extremely unlikely and can be disregarded.
R.49	Inherent fault in voting machine hardware	Zero	Very low	None	Cat.*					>	An error in the hardware design leads to incorrect results being written to ballot modules.	This is a risk in the chosen electronic system that does not exist in the paper-based system.
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Catastrophic

Risk Assessment, continued

		Probability	bility	Impact	act	(H	Risk Comparison (Higher / Equal / Unique)	Risk Comparison gher / Equal / Uniq	ison Unique			
No.	Risk	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Higher in	er in		Unique in	e in	Description	Comparison
		(( <i>PV</i> )	(EV)	(PV)	(EV)	PV	EV	li	PV	EV		
R.50	Software error in voting machines (wide scale)	Zero	Very low	None	Cat.*					>	A bug in the voting machine software causes it to fail or incorrectly record votes.	This is a risk in the chosen electronic system that does not exist in the paper-based system.
R.51	Inherent fault in counting process	Certain	Very low	Mod.*	Cat.*	>					The votes are recorded and transferred correctly, but the count is wrong.	It is virtually certain that there will be errors in a paper-based count. The chances of errors in an electronic count are almost zero and, in any event, the count can be tested using different software if necessary. This is therefore, a higher risk in a paper-based system.
R.52	Inherent fault in counting hardware	Zero	Very low	None	Cat.*					>	A hardware problem causes an error in the count.	This is a risk in the chosen electronic system that does not exist in the paper-based system.
R.53	Different results on recounts	Certain	Zero	Small	None				>		Repeated recounts produce different results because of recovered ballots, miscounted ballots or changes in classification.	This is a risk in the paper-based system that does not exist in the chosen electronic system.

\* Catastrophic\* Moderate

Risk Assessment, continued

		Probability	bility	Impact	act	(Hi	Risk Comparison (Higher / Equal / Unique)	Risk Comparison gher/Equal/Unig	son Inique)	-	
No.	Risk	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Higher in	ır in		Unique in	Description	Comparison
		(PV)	(EV)	(PV)	(EV)	PV	EV	lı	$PV \mid EV$		
R.54	Incorrect outcome resulting from sampling error	Very low	Very low	Small	Small			>		A bias in the sample of distributed votes causes an incorrect outcome.	Neutral. The risk in both systems is the same. However by modifying the chosen electronic system, this risk can be reduced by full sampling and eliminated by using the Gregory method; neither of these options is practical with the current paper-based system.
R.55	Reinterpretation of ballots by returning officers	Certain	Zero	Small	None				>	In any election, Returning Officers have to make numerous decisions on problematic ballots, not just spoiled votes, but unclear writing and miscounted ballots, which turn up on later counts.	This is a risk in the paper-based system that does not exist with an electronic system. See also Risk 53.
R.56	Widespread interference with voting machine software or hardware	Zero	Very low	None	Cat: *				>	The hardware or (more likely) the software of the voting machine is altered in such a way as to alter votes either ab initio or on instruction (e.g. by pressing a certain combination of keys on the keyboard).	This is a risk in the chosen electronic system that does not exist in the paper-based system.
R.57	Impersonation (wide scale)	Mod.*	Mod.*	Small	Small			>		As for local impersonation, but done systematically and on a wide scale.	Neutral. This risk is the same in the current system.
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\* Catastrophic\* Moderate

Risk Assessment, continued

		Probability	bility	Impact	act	(Hi,	Risk C	Risk Comparison gher / Equal / Uniq	Risk Comparison (Higher / Equal / Unique)	(		
No.	Risk	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Paper Voting	Elect. Voting	Higher in	r in		Unique in	e in	Description	Comparison
		((PV)	(EV)	(PV)	(EV)	PV	EV	l)	PV	EV		
R.58	Deliberate voter identification (wide scale)	Zero	Zero	None	None			>			An attempt to find out how a large number of people voted.	Neutral. There is effectively no risk of this in either system.
R.59	Alteration of ballots (wide scale)	Very	Low	Large	Large		>				An attempt to alter the votes on several ballot modules during transportation from polling station to service or count centre.	This is a broadly comparable risk with both systems. It would probably be marginally easier to do electronically given the relative size and manageability of ballot boxes and ballot modules. However, the logistical problems make both frauds improbable.
R.60	Deliberate damage to voting machines (wide scale)	Zero	Very low	None	Small					>	An attempt to damage several machines either by physical assault or by magnetic or electromagnetic interference.	This is a risk in the chosen electronic system that does not exist in the paper-based system.
R.61	Widespread tampering with count software	Zero	Low	None	Large					>	The counting software is altered so as to give an incorrect result.	This is a risk in the chosen electronic system that does not exist in the paper-based system.

The Policy Institute Trinity College Dublin July 2005