## Groth16 is not dead

Exploring the tradeoff space of zero knowledge proof systems



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
# i'm not a cryptographer,

note to cryptographers:

please excuse loose notation

#### **SNARK**

I know 
$$x: f(x) = y$$




#### **Toolbox**

- Pairing-based cryptography
- Accumulators (for committing to data)
- Knowledge of Exponent (fundamentally required)
- Standard assumptions / Generic Group Model / Algebraic Group Model
- Recursion? BLS12-377, MNT, ...?
- 2-adic pairing-friendly curve for efficient verifiers (eg BN254, BLS12-381)
- Instantiation: public parameters (random)
  - Public coin
  - MPC
  - → Trusted
- ...

# Statement → Information theoretic protocol → SNARK

### CS Proofs / PCPs / IOPs / Linear IOPs, oh my



Non-interactive via Fiat-Shamir in ROM Loop iters = 1: PCP, else IOP

#### **SNARKs**

$$\pi \leftarrow P(R, x)$$
  
 $\{1, 0\} \leftarrow V(R, \pi)$ 

### **Preprocessing** snarks

$$\pi \leftarrow P(\mathbf{PK}, R, x)$$
  
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Evaluate circuit at random points→ (PK, VK) → encode in CRS

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Evaluate circuit at random points
 → (PK, VK) → encode in CRS
 trusted or expensive MPC :(

What's deployed today?

#### **State of the art: Groth16**

arith circuits	CRS Size	Proof Size	Prover Time (exp)	Verification Time
PHGR13/ BCTV14	linear circuit	7 G1, 1 G2	7G1, 1 G2	12 pairings
Gro16	size	2 G1, 1 G2	2 G1, 1 G2	3 pairings

#### Universal setup

1. Emulate CPU inside SNARK (TinyRAM / vnTinyRAM):

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- 1. Emulate CPU inside SNARK (TinyRAM / vnTinyRAM):
- 2. Unstructured CRS → Circuit-specific SRS
  - a. BGM17: O(N) CRS, not updateable designed for Groth16, was used in Sapling
  - b. GKMMM18: O(N^2) CRS impractical

universal & updateable & practical?

## **Polynomial Commitments & IOPs**

$$f(X) = a_n x^n + a_{n-1} x^{n-1} + ... a_0$$

- F ← Commit(f(X), ...)
- $(f(z), w) \leftarrow Open(f(X), z, ...)$
- $\{0, 1\} \leftarrow Verify(F, w, z)$

#### Constant size PC schemes require a setup

$$f(X) = a_n x^n + a_{n-1} x^{n-1} + ... a_0$$


- $F \leftarrow Commit(pp, f(X), ...)$
- (f(z), w) ← Open(pp, f(X), z, ...)
- {0, 1} ← Verify(**pp**, F, w, z)

### Which polynomial commitment scheme?

- KZG10 + variants → setup, but O(1) openings
- DARK: Groups of unknown order
  - RSA: Fast → setup
  - UFO → too big / no setup
  - Class Groups → slow (?) / no setup
- FRI- w/ merkle trees: no setup

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- FRI- w/ merkle trees: no setup (STARK-like efficiency)



#### A DARK caveat

Scheme	Transp.	pp	Prover	Verifier	$ \pi $
DARK (this work)	yes	O(1)	$O(d^{\mu}\mu\log(d))$ EXP	$2\mu \log(d)$ EXP	$2\mu \log(d) \; \mathbb{G}_U$
Based on Pairings	no	$d^{\mu} \; \mathbb{G}_{B}$	$O(d^\mu)$ EXP	$\mu$ Pairing	$\mu~\mathbb{G}_B$
$[BCC^+16b, \sqrt{\cdot}]$	yes	$\sqrt{d^{\mu}}\mathbb{G}_{P}$	$O(d^\mu)$ EXP	$O(\sqrt{d^{\mu}})$ EXP	$O(\sqrt{d^\mu}) \; \mathbb{G}_P$
Bulletproofs	yes	$2d^{\mu}\mathbb{G}_{P}$	$O(d^\mu)$ EXP	$O(d^\mu)$ EXP	$2\mu \log(d) \; \mathbb{G}_P$
FRI $(\mu = 1)$	yes	O(1)	$O(\lambda d)$ H	$O(\lambda \log^2(d))$ H	$O(\lambda \log^2(d))$ H

Table 2: Comparison table between different polynomial commitment schemes for an  $\mu$ -variate polynomial of degree d.

#### A DARK caveat

Class group benchmarks: <a href="https://github.com/cambrian/accumulator/pull/35">https://github.com/cambrian/accumulator/pull/35</a>)

If using RSA group then it's fast but it's not transparent :/


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$[BCC^+16b, \sqrt{\cdot}]$	yes	$\sqrt{d^{\mu}}\mathbb{G}_{P}$	$O(d^\mu)$ EXP	$O(\sqrt{d^{\mu}})$ EXP	$O(\sqrt{d^\mu})~\mathbb{G}_P$
Bulletproofs	yes	$2d^{\mu}\mathbb{G}_{P}$	$O(d^\mu)$ EXP	$O(d^\mu)$ EXP	$2\mu \log(d) \mathbb{G}_P$
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
#### A universal setup example

public params

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


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



### "Implementation detail" of continuous setup

public params




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




#### "Implementation detail" of continuous setup



#### **Updated CRS must be distributed**



Bob needs pk' to make proofs / Miner has to keep vk (bad?)

# groth16 dead?

#### Sonic

 $R1CS \rightarrow S(X, Y) \rightarrow S(XY, 1) \rightarrow univariate polycommit \rightarrow SNARK$ 

Scheme	Universal SRS	Circuit SRS	Size	Prover computation	Verifier computation
Groth'16 [45]	_	$3n + m \mathbb{G}$	3 G	$4n + m - \ell \operatorname{Ex}$	$3P + \ell \text{ Ex}$
Bulletproofs	$\frac{n}{2}\mathbb{G}$	_	$2\log_2(n) + 6 \mathbb{G}$	8n  Ex	4n Ex
This work (helped)	$\bar{4d}\mathbb{G}$	$12n\ \mathbb{G}$	7 G, 5 F	18 <i>n</i> Ex	10P
This work (unhelped)	$4d\mathbb{G}$	$36n  \mathbb{G}$	20 G, 16 F	273n  Ex	13 <i>P</i>

Evaluate S(X, Y) at (z,y) chosen by verifier  $\rightarrow$  can we abuse that?

- Parallel proof gen (eval of s does not depend on statement)
- 2. Helped mode: batch  $s(z_i, y_i) \rightarrow bigger$  asymptotic, but more practical
- Fully succinct: write polynomial as sum for permutations → more constraints
  → big constants

#### **PLONK**

$$(Q_{L_i})a_i + (Q_{R_i})b_i + (Q_{O_i})c_i + (Q_{M_i})a_ib_i + Q_{C_i} = 0$$

- 1. Addition & multiplication gates: set Q coeffs depending on wires
- 2. Output of gate as input to other: "copy" wires  $\rightarrow$  permutation argument

Table 1: Prover comparison. m = number of wires, n = number of multiplication gates, a = number of addition gates


	$\mathbf{size} \leq d$ $\mathbf{SRS}$	$egin{array}{c} \mathbf{size} = n \ \mathbf{CRS/SRS} \end{array}$	prover work	proof length	succinct	universal
Groth'16	-	$3n+m  \mathbb{G}_1$	$3n + m - \ell \ \mathbb{G}_1 \ \text{exp},$ $n \ \mathbb{G}_2 \ \text{exp}$	$2 \mathbb{G}_1, 1 \mathbb{G}_2$	1	×
Sonic (helped)	$12d \mathbb{G}_1, 12d \mathbb{G}_2$	$12n  \mathbb{G}_1$	$18n  \mathbb{G}_1  \exp$	$4 \mathbb{G}_1, 2 \mathbb{F}$	X	1
Sonic (succinct)	$4d \mathbb{G}_1, 4d \mathbb{G}_2$	$36n \mathbb{G}_1$	$273n \ \mathbb{G}_1 \ \exp$	$20  \mathbb{G}_1,  16  \mathbb{F}$	1	1
Auroralight	$2d \mathbb{G}_1, 2d \mathbb{G}_2$	$2n \mathbb{G}_1$	$8n \mathbb{G}_1 \exp$	$6 \mathbb{G}_1, 4 \mathbb{F}$	Х	1
This work (small)	$3d  \mathbb{G}_1,  1  \mathbb{G}_2$	$3n+3a \mathbb{G}_1, 1 \mathbb{G}_2$	$11n + 11a \ \mathbb{G}_1 \ \exp \ ,$ $\approx 54(n+a)\log(n+a) \ \mathbb{F} \ \text{mul}$	$7~\mathbb{G}_1, 7~\mathbb{F}$	1	1
This work (fast prover)	$d \mathbb{G}_1, 1 \mathbb{G}_2$	$n+a \mathbb{G}_1, 1 \mathbb{G}_2$	$9n + 9a \mathbb{G}_1 \exp$ , $\approx 54(n+a)\log(n+a) \mathbb{F} \text{ mul}$	$9~\mathbb{G}_1, 7~\mathbb{F}$	1	1


## **PLONK** verifying performance

	verifier work	elem. from helper	extra verifier work in helper mode
Groth'16	$3P$ , $\ell \mathbb{G}_1 \exp$	-	-
Sonic (helped)	10P	$3 \mathbb{G}_1, 2 \mathbb{F}$	4P
Sonic (succinct)	13P	-	-
Auroralight	$5P, 6 \mathbb{G}_1 \exp$	$8 \mathbb{G}_1, 10 \mathbb{F}$	12P
This work (small)	$2P, 16 \mathbb{G}_1 \exp$	-	-
This work (fast prover)	$2P$ , $18 \mathbb{G}_1 \exp$	-	-

#### Marlin performance

(concurrent work with PLONK & DARKs, targetted to R1CS instead of CSAT)






post quantum?

### FRI-based SNARKs (or STARKs?)

- 1. Quantum-secure polycommit → quantum-secure SNARK
- 2. FRI + low-degree testing
- 3. Hashes are quantum-secure (to some extent)
- COS19 (Fractal): "marlin extension"
- 5. VP19 (proof size  $O(log^2n)$ )

#### Verifier & Prover are *practically* the same




Gro16 + Marlin too small to be shown

### **Practical arguments for Groth16**

- R1CS!!!
- Groth16 implemented w/ multiple backends
  - Circom
  - o Bellman
  - libsnark
- Batch verifiable
- GPU Provers (Coda), Distributed Provers (DIZK)
- Real world bounty to break it (Zcash)
- Proofs can be aggregated using MV19 inner-product argument [logN \* (2G1 + G2) size for N proofs], I think

#### Tradeoff Space



https://vitalik.ca/general/2019/09/22/plonk.html

# Thank you for your attention

Is the R1CS abstraction enough? Does it need to be lifted to be more expressive?

@gakonst / me@gakonst.com gakonst.com/zksummit2019.pdf