

SALUS SECURITY

JULY 2023



CODE SECURITY ASSESSMENT

FILEDOGE

Overview

Project Summary

- Name: Filedoge
- Version: commit [78cd538](#)
- Platform: Filecoin
- Language: Solidity
- Repository:
 - <https://github.com/Filedoge/Token>
- Audit Range: See [Appendix - 1](#)

Project Dashboard

Application Summary

Name	Filedoge
Version	v2
Type	Solidity
Dates	July 19 2023
Logs	July 17 2023; July 19 2023

Vulnerability Summary

Total High-Severity issues	0
Total Medium-Severity issues	0
Total Low-Severity issues	1
Total informational issues	2
Total	3

Contact

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Risk Level Description

High Risk	The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive information at risk, or is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for clients' reputations or serious financial implications for clients and users.
Medium Risk	The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental to the client's reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to a moderate financial impact.
Low Risk	The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Informational	The issue does not pose an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or defense in depth.

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Introduction

1.1 About SALUS

At Salus Security, we are in the business of trust.

We are dedicated to tackling the toughest security challenges facing the industry today. By building foundational trust in technology and infrastructure through security, we help clients to lead their respective industries and unlock their full Web3 potential.

Our team of security experts employ industry-leading proof-of-concept (PoC) methodology for demonstrating smart contract vulnerabilities, coupled with advanced red teaming capabilities and a stereoscopic vulnerability detection service, to deliver comprehensive security assessments that allow clients to stay ahead of the curve.

In addition to smart contract audits and red teaming, our Rapid Detection Service for smart contracts aims to make security accessible to all. This high calibre, yet cost-efficient, security tool has been designed to support a wide range of business needs including investment due diligence, security and code quality assessments, and code optimisation.

We are reachable on Telegram (<https://t.me/salusec>), Twitter (https://twitter.com/salus_sec), or Email (support@salusec.io).

1.2 Audit Breakdown

The objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specifications and best practices. Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Risky external calls
- Integer overflow/underflow
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Access control
- Call stack limits and mishandled exceptions
- Number rounding errors
- Centralization of power
- Logical oversights and denial of service
- Business logic specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication

1.3 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues with the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues.

Findings

2.1 Summary of Findings

ID	Title	Severity	Category	Status
1	Centralization risk with initial token distribution	Low	Centralization	Acknowledged
2	Use of floating pragma	Informational	Configuration	Acknowledged
3	Usage of transfer instead of call	Informational	Business Logic	Acknowledged

2.2 Notable Findings

Significant flaws that impact system confidentiality, integrity, or availability are listed below.

1. Centralization risk with initial token distribution	
Severity: Low	Category: Centralization
Target: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- filedoge.sol	

Description

When the contract is deployed, all tokens are sent to tokenOwnerAddress. This is a potential centralization risk as this address can distribute tokens without the consensus of the community.

Recommendation

It is recommended to set the constructor argument tokenOwnerAddress to a multi-signature account with timelock governors for enhanced security.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

2.3 Informational Findings

2. Use of floating pragma

Severity: Informational

Category: Configuration

Target:

- filedoge.sol

Description

```
pragma solidity ^0.5.0;
```

The Filedoge codebase uses a floating compiler version ^0.5.0.

Using a floating pragma ^0.5.0 statement is discouraged, as code may compile to different bytecodes with different compiler versions. Use a locked pragma statement to get a deterministic bytecode. Also use the latest Solidity version to get all the compiler features, bug fixes and optimizations.

Recommendation

It is recommended to use a locked Solidity version throughout the project. It is also recommended to use the most stable and up-to-date version.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

3. Usage of transfer instead of call

Severity: Informational

Category: Business Logic

Target:

- filedoge.sol

Description

The constructor utilizes the transfer function to transfer funds between accounts. However, using transfer() to send funds can introduce potential security vulnerabilities and limitations as transfer() passes fixed gas stipend which may not be sufficient to work with smart contracts or multi-sig wallets and can lead to out-of-gas exception.

filedoge.sol:L464

```
feeReceiver.transfer(msg.value);
```

Recommendation

Consider using call instead of transfer.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

Appendix

Appendix 1 - Files in Scope

This audit covered the following files in commit [78cd538](#):

File	SHA-1 hash
filedoge.sol	c2bc6078f2b2a88c31ae227802348990aca1dd46