

Security of OpenSSL Tool

John Phillips 2nd Abhaya Shrestha 3rd Joe Granmoe 4th Patrick Curran 5th Collin McDade
johphill@mines.edu ashrestha@mines.edu jgranmoe@mines.edu pcurran@mines.edu collinmcdade@mines.edu

6th Noor Malik
nmalik@mines.edu

Abstract—There have been small but catastrophic modifications to openssl in the past [?] [?] [?] that cause massive security problems and in some cases exploits that can disclose private keys, or limit the number of possible keys. We explore in depth one such instance, a modification made to the OpenSSL package distributed in debian that resulted in only 32,768 possible keys that could be generated. We also explore similarities to heartbleed. Finally, we investigate methods that have been put in place to prevent such bugs from happening in the future.

Index Terms—OpenSSL, security vulnerability, debian

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background

In 2008 a debian developer made a patch to openssl to fix valgrind warnings [?] [?]. OpenSSL has a flexible system for generating random numbers that uses an interface-like approach with functions prefixed with `RAND_*` delegating to a particular implementation. Since this API was designed for cryptographic applications, the random bytes generated need to not just satisfy particular statistical properties, but be truly unpredictable. In order to achieve this property, this particular random number generator allows the user to add 'entropy' by feeding it buffers full of random bytes. These bytes could be from `/dev/urandom`, the user, or somewhere else. When adding entropy in this way to the message digest-based random API, an internal hash state is updated each time with the random bytes given by the user. The hash state then can be used to get random bytes back out of the system.

In the OpenSSL code in 2006, there were several places where uninitialized memory was deliberately read, in a couple ways. In order to understand this, we mention two `RAND_*` functions: `RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy, int rand_type)` and `RAND_bytes(unsigned char *, int num)`. The first function, `RAND_add`, inputs the buffer `buf` into the 'pool' of entropy, adding `entropy` to the total entropy count. The buffer is `num` long.

With that understood, the first thing that the OpenSSL code would do was call `RAND_add` with a buffer that wasn't completely initialized [?]. For example, a function to initialize the random library would read some bytes from a file into a buffer without filling the buffer, and then call `RAND_add` with that buffer and its full size as a parameter – *not* the number of bytes read into the buffer. This ended up with uninitialized memory being used to add to the entropy pool. One result of this deliberate over-reading of buffers was that valgrind

emitted errors coming from the default implementation of the `RAND_add` function, in `md_rand.c`, `ssleay_rand_add`. Although that code itself was correct, it would read uninitialized memory (which it was told to do by callers), and cause a valgrind error to be emitted. This code was *critical* to the random number generator, and the line of code generating the error in particular was essential to generating entropy. To help understand this, we include a code excerpt that could cause such an error (from `crypto/rand/randfile.c`):

```
i = fread(buf, 1, n, in);
if (i <= 0) break;
/* even if n != i, use the full array */
RAND_add(buf, n, i);
```

Note the comment – `buf` is `n` long, but `i` may be less than `n`. The end result is that the code called by `RAND_add` that actually reads and extracts entropy from `buf` will cause valgrind to emit a warning about reading from uninitialized memory. However, if you commented out this code, you'd also comment out the code that was actually extracting the entropy, which is what happened.

The next cause of valgrind errors was also in `md_rand.c` – there, the function `ssleay_rand_bytes` would update an internal hash with uninitialized memory – the buffer that was supposed to be a region to *output* random bytes to was being read from as a potential source of entropy. This code could be commented out harmlessly, and probably shouldn't have been there in the first place.

These two lines of code were the source of a complaint that first came to the debian bug tracker [?]. The debian developer quickly spotted the 'culprit' code – that is, the lines of code that valgrind identified as reading uninitialized memory – but didn't know what it did. Observing that commenting it out didn't cause anything to crash or obviously function incorrectly, he asked on the openssl development mailing list if it was okay to remove the two lines of code – and got the go-ahead (See Fig.??).

Most linux distributions maintain small set of 'patches' for each package they distribute. These patches normally are designed to fix critical bugs that haven't been fixed upstream or are in the process of being fixed. So although the debian project doesn't maintain OpenSSL, they could patch the particular version of OpenSSL distributed by debian. And that was the solution arrived at in the bug ticket and over email [?] [?].

```
List:      openssl-dev
Subject:   Re: Random number generator, uninitialised data and valgrind.
From:      Ulf_Möller <ulf () openssl ! org>
Date:      2006-05-01 22:34:12
Message-ID: 44568CE4.9020906 () openssl ! org
[Download RAW message or body]
```

Kurt Roeckx schrieb:

```
> What I currently see as best option is to actually comment out
> those 2 lines of code. But I have no idea what effect this
> really has on the RNG. The only effect I see is that the pool
> might receive less entropy. But on the other hand, I'm not even
> sure how much entropy some unitialised data has.
>
```

Not much. If it helps with debugging, I'm in favor of removing them.
(However the last time I checked, valgrind reported thousands of bogus
error messages. Has that situation gotten better?)

Fig. 1. A reply to the email from the Debian Developer telling him to go ahead and modify the OpenSSL code. [?]

The debian developer then applied the patch and distributed the debian version of OpenSSL with this critical vulnerability built in. One of the two lines commented out was in fact essential to adding entropy to the system, and with it commented out, none of the calls to `RAND_add` actually did anything. This vulnerability was distributed to all users of debian from 2006 to 2008 [?]. During that entire time, any code using the random number generator could only really have 32,768 possible outputs from the random number generator. Examples of affected functions included TLS modules and SSH key generation – actually, anything that generated RSA keys was vulnerable.

B. Motivation and Goal

Because of the infamous vulnerability that OpenSSL had in the past, we aim to understand one of the vulnerabilities of the past (2008 OpenSSL vulnerability), research OpenSSL methods in place to prevent vulnerable code from being shipped, and experiment on the library by seeing if the vulnerability of the past could be detected with methods they have set up in the present (particularly functional, and fuzz testing).

II. RECREATING THE 2008 BUG

In order to gain a better understanding of exactly how the bug worked, and how easy (or difficult) it would be to exploit such a flaw, we used virtual machines and code from the 2008 era to see what exploiting the vulnerability might look like. The basic idea was to create two virtual machines. One would be the exploited machine – a stand-in for a server on the Internet or other network that had an open SSH port that was believed to be secure. The other machine would try to access the target server over SSH by repeatedly generating trial keys until it was able to successfully get in. Although this is not as simple as just writing code to guess the key and compare two files, it is arguably a more realistic demonstration of how

exploits really work, and a better way of understanding them, putting the ‘applied’ in ‘applied cryptography’.

A. Code modifications

First, we created two different versions of the OpenSSL code. The first one had the two lines that the debian developer asked about on the OpenSSL mailing list commented out (see [?]), and nothing more. It was a re-creation of what existed in the debian project from 2006-2008. We looked for the exact code (for example, a .deb binary distribution, or the actual patchsets applied to the OpenSSL project) on the Internet but were unable to find it (links pointing to the patches were all dead, possibly in a deliberate attempt by debian to prevent anyone accidentally using the code again).

The next branch of the OpenSSL code was similar to the first except it had a way to manually set the only real source of variability left to the random number generator – the PID (process ID). We did this by replacing calls to `getpid()` in `md_rand.c` to references to a static variable in `md_rand.c` called `fake_pid`. We also introduced a globally-visible function called `RAND_exploit_set_pid()`, to allow client code to set the PID.

B. Virtual machine setup

We built two virtual machines based on debian 5. The machines were connected to a single virtual switch, and had static IPs assigned. On one virtual machine, we built and installed the re-created debian-distributed OpenSSL. We used `ssh-keygen` to create and authorize a key as an authorized SSH key on that host.

On the other (attacker) machine, we used a program derived from `ssh-keygen` to try to SSH to the target machine with a given PID seed. That program then was repeatedly invoked by another script that iterated over all possible PIDs, from 1 to 32,768 (in 2008 that was the number of possible PIDs).

The results were as expected – the attacker machine was able to generate the public/private key pair of the target machine within fifteen to twenty minutes. On a fresh boot, because there haven’t been as many processes run, it takes only about five minutes.

C. Running the exploit

Since the virtual machines are connected over a virtual network, to run the exploit, we simply boot them and run a script on the attacker machine that will eventually break the key of the target machine. The attacker script will then write the public/private key pair to a file. See Appendix A for details.

D. Alternative approaches

III. SIMILARITIES TO HEARTBLEED

The debian bug bears certain similarities to another bug that occurred in 2014 – Heartbleed [?]. Both bugs compromised private keys, and both were not the result of any protocol design errors, cryptanalytic breakthroughs that allowed algorithms to be broken, or any other issue commonly learned about in a cryptography class. Instead, both errors were the result of human error. Simple, and (in hindsight) rather obvious bugs made their way into OpenSSL packages that were distributed to an untold number of machines.

With heartbleed, the issue was simply a missing boundary check [?]. First, code was added to allow for an extension to the SSL/TLS protocol that sent ‘heartbeats’. This allows for the SSL connection to be kept alive [?]. The fix was only a few lines of code [?].

Although one bug was an alteration of working code and the other was adding a buggy feature, the critical piece of both involved reading past array bounds. In the debian bug, a call to `MD_Update()` was uninitialized memory and caused a valgrind error, which triggered the faulty fix. In Heartbleed, a boundary check was not made that allowed attackers to read uninitialized memory.

This raises the question of how, if possible, to catch such simple implementation errors? Possible solutions are using CI/CD and a good automated test suite that has high code coverage and covers edge-cases. We can see that both bugs would have been stopped if:

- The OpenSSL library was designed from the start to use static and dynamic analysis tools like valgrind (no false positives as in the case of the debian bug, and possible warnings in the case of Heartbleed), sanitizers, and static code analysis tools like cppcheck.
- The OpenSSL library had high-coverage functional testing, and a test suite that was automatically run before anyone distributed a new or modified OpenSSL. This can be accomplished with compiler tools that generate test coverage data like gcov and lcov.

In the next section we examine if this situation has improved.

IV. INVESTIGATING THE CURRENT CODE

A. Architectural differences

In the current code, the old `md_rand.c` has been removed. It was renamed to `ossl_rand.c` in June of 2017 [?], and removed in August, to be replaced by the DRBG api [?]. The DRBG api is based on the NIST standard NIST SP 800-90A, for ‘Deterministic Random Number Generator’ [?] [?].

The current code also has a much greater unit test coverage in the `test/` directory. Where previously there were a few very simple and esoteric tests based on shell scripts to check basic correctness – for example, the file `test/trsa` is a shell script that tests if the `openssl rsa` command can convert RSA keys between different plaintext formats – there are now much more comprehensive tests that test the DRBG for duplicate results. If these had been in place before the debian key bug, perhaps it never would have happened.

B. Code quality improvements

We were able to demonstrate that the valgrind errors observed in [?] actually were visible in the unit tests themselves in the old OpenSSL (version 0.9.7e), when running the test `exptest` in the `test` directory (see Appendix A for details). Not only that but the OpenSSL code in general from that era was littered with valgrind errors, with valgrind not counting more errors on some tests because there were so many. Using the `lcov` tool, code coverage was measured at around 41.7%, covered in Appendix C (see Table ?? also). This left lots of room for bugs to slip through, and none of the tests failed on the branch that contained the debian modifications – so the debian developer had no way to test his work other than trust in the mailing list.

The current state of the code (the master branch as of March 25, 2022) is certainly better, although perhaps by not as much as would be ideal. We ran the functional test suite in the `test/` directory to see code coverage, using the same method for 0.9.7e. Code coverage improved to a total of 65.1% of lines (see Appendix C for how to get this information for yourself). We noticed that some of the implementation files for the DRBG, in `providers/implementations/rands/drbg.c` had many uncovered edge-cases. Although the code may work now, uncovered edge cases in the test suite mean that the code isn’t defended from potential future changes like the one made by the debian developer in 2006.

We did confirm that similar alternations to the DRBG code to the ones made in 2006 by the debian developer *did* cause unit tests to fail in the newer test suite (version 3.0.0), see Appendix B for more.

Although code coverage and the state of the unit tests has improved, 65.1% unit test coverage leaves a lot to be desired. In a security-critical library, the 35% of untested code could easily have devastating un-tested flaws, that could wait for years before being found.

Next, we ran fuzz testing with their specified directions to see if it would detect any of those changes. Particularly, we

ran AFL library. The library timed out on two of the fuzzers (bignum and asn1) and failed. When we extend the timeout of afl fuzzer with `-t 5000` flag for those two fuzzers and it did not timeout anymore. All of the other fuzzers did not timeout and fail. These two fuzzers only failed due to timeout and not because they detected a vulnerability. Therefore, we conclude that fuzz testing were unable to detect the alterations made to DRBG code. For more details, we further explain our process on Appendix B.

V. PROCESSES IN THE OPENSSL PROJECT IN PLACE TO PREVENT FURTHER EXPLOITS

Exploring OpenSSL project contribution process, we looked into what it takes to be a committer in their repo, whether they have any kind of automated checking in place (CI or Continuous Integration), and what their approval process looks like.

Before we delve into the process, we need to define a few terms from their glossary.

- 1) **OMC (OpenSSL Management Committee)**: they oversee all managerial and administrative aspects of the project. They are the final authority for the project [?]
- 2) **OTC (OpenSSL Technical Committee)**: they oversee all technical aspects of the project [?].

A. What it takes to be a Committer of OpenSSL?

To become a committer, one has to be granted access by the OMC on the recommendation of OTC [?]. This access can be withdrawn at any time by a vote of the OMC [?]. In order to maintain their committer status, a committer must have authored or reviewed at least one commit within the previous two calendar quarters [?].

They expect committers to be experts in some part of low-level crypto library as well as generalists who contribute to all areas of the codebase [?]. Committers are expected to oversee the health of the project: fixing bugs, addressing open issues, reviewing contributions, and improving tests and documentation [?]. According to OpenSSL, to be a committer, one can start by contributing code, reading code style, and getting to know build and test system [?]. In short, anyone can be a committer as long as they are granted access by OMC on recommendation of OTC. Their contributions can range from small documentation fixes, spelling errors, to large code base contributions.

B. What automation checks does OpenSSL have to ensure code safety?

Based off of their glossary, we were able to understand that OpenSSL uses Continuous Integration which is a suite of tests and checks that are run on every pull request, commit on a daily basis. Some of their tests include functional tests, performance testing, and fuzz testing [?]. These kinds of tests are described as follows.

- 1) **Functional Tests**: given a set of inputs, it will produce a correct set of outputs [?].

2) **Performance Tests**: These tests test performance, and will be performed automatically via CI on a regular basis for certain components. Examples include:

- Individual algorithm performance operating over different input sizes
- SSL/TLS handshake time over multiple handshakes and for different protocol versions and resumption/non-resumption handshake.

[?].

3) **Fuzz Tests**: Systematic methodology that is used to find buffer overruns (remote execution); unhandled exceptions, read access violations (AVs), and thread hangs (permanent denial-of-service), and memory spikes (temporary denial-of-service) [?].

According to their testing policy, a pull request does not require testing if the changes are as follows [?].

- Documentation (including CHANGES/NEWS file changes)
- The test suite
- perl utilities
- include files
- build system
- demos

Additionally, they recommend adding fuzz testing when implementing significant new functional tests or at least consider adding fuzz testing when refactoring to check all corner cases are covered [?]. OpenSSL particularly uses either LibFuzzer or AFL to do fuzz testing [?]. While performance tests improve the functionality of OpenSSL, fuzz testing and functional testing helped us ensure that OpenSSL codebase is at least sanity checked. Fuzz tests especially help since they are basically dynamic analysis detection for any vulnerabilities or bugs in the codebase.

C. What does their approval and code review process look like?

OpenSSL approval and code reviews process are as follows.

- OpenSSL pull requests are reviewed and approved by at least two committers, one of whom must be an OTC member. Neither of the reviewers can be the author of the submission [?]. The only exception to this policy is during the release process when the author's review does not count towards the two needed reviews for the automated release process and NEWS and CHANGES file updates [?].
- In case two committers make a joint submission, they can review each other's code, but not their own. Additionally, a third reviewer will be required [?].
- An OMC/OTC member may apply a needs OMC decision label to a submission which can hold the submission. This hold may only be removed by OTC/OMC member who put the hold or the OTC/OMC [?].
- Approved submission (besides automated release process and NEWS and CHANGES file updates) will only be applied after 24-hour delay from approval. An exception to

the delay exists for build and test breakage fix approvals which will be flagged with the severity: urgent label [?].

Additionally, on their commit workflow, their public github repository is just a mirror and pulls from the real repo where only committers have access [?] (When someone becomes a committer, OpenSSL will send instructions to get commit access to the repository [?]). Finally, they also have strict documentation design process whenever minor or major code changes the design, and changes to existing public API functions and data are forbidden [?]. However, they encourage a new API call to be implemented if need be as a minor release [?]. From this information, we can definitely tell that today it is difficult to be able to commit anything without prior granted permissions and approval to OpenSSL. Furthermore, even if changes were to occur, they always run their automation process to detect any defects or vulnerabilities with their test suites which is very assuring for a user of OpenSSL.

However, there are still chances that a defect or vulnerability could be shipped out. Particularly, when they suggested that refactors do not need a test but recommend Fuzz testing to cover edge cases. In the refactor case, there is a possibility that the committer misses an edge case in fuzz testing and creates a bug or vulnerability. Another challenge of a cryptographic tool such as OpenSSL is that professionals do not know how to test for security. An algorithm implementation is only secure if an attacker cannot decipher or find vulnerabilities to exploit for the algorithm. Furthermore, Fuzz tests are basically just shooting in the dark and hoping to find a vulnerability before the adversary finds it. Nonetheless, we have to say their process for who gets to commit code to the master is solid; however, there is no assurance that a vulnerability will not be shipped out. The best we could do is hope that the code review and automation process detects a defect or vulnerability and prevents it from being shipped out.

VI. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

When fuzz testing the intentional vulnerability with the current codebase, we definitely could have waited longer. However, due to the lack of time, we limited it to 3 minutes until the tests found anything. If the experiment were to be conducted again, we could try and increase the wait time to 15, or 30 minutes per fuzzer.

VII. CONCLUSION

To understand how a vulnerability like the 2008 debian OpenSSL bug happens and can be exploited, we read the code from that period and built an exploit that would be able to unlock affected machines using SSH keys.

Next, we did a survey of the state of the code then and now to see if the introduction of such code was due to incompetence on the debian developer's part, or an understandable error that no automated tools were in place to catch. We concluded that there was no easy way to tell if the code modification

would adversely affect the security of the library, and that, furthermore, the debian developer was given the go-ahead.

The current state of the code is much better however, having more thorough unit-testing coverage that can catch more accidental errors made by OpenSSL developers or package distributors. Furthermore, the current implementation of OpenSSL's random number generator is based on a specification and is therefore much easier to reason about.

We concluded that the security of the OpenSSL tool has increased substantially since the 2008 debian OpenSSL bug was caught, the heartbleed vulnerability notwithstanding.

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APPENDIX A

BUILDING AND RUNNING THE EXPLOIT

For the project we built a git repository found at <https://github.com/john-w-phillips/crypto-project>. The file `README.md` there contains detailed information about running the exploit but we include some here as a general overview.

First, we'll cover alterations we made to the OpenSSL code.

A. The OpenSSL Repository

We added a subrepository in the `openssl` folder that contains a mirror of the OpenSSL git repository. From there we were able to analyze the state of OpenSSL code from several points in time. To make things easy we checked out these points in time on branches. See Table ?? for details.

To build this code you can read the `INSTALL` file. Basically the steps are as follows:

Branch name	Function
debian-mod-point	The code that was distributed by Debian starting in 2006
hacked-ssl-for-running-exploit	Code we used to run the exploit.
openssl-broken-tests-demo	Code in version 3.0 deliberately broken to demonstrate that test coverage improved.
master	Current OpenSSL code

TABLE I
BRANCHES IN THE OPENSLL SUBREPOSITORY AND THEIR FUNCTION.

```
$ ./config shared
$ make -j
$ make install # if needed.
```

This will install ssl libraries and headers in /usr/local. If SSL is already installed, you may need to modify LD_LIBRARY_PATH to link existing executables against the compiled SSL libraries. With OpenSSL built we can do several things with it.

B. The OpenSSH Repository

One way to take advantage of the vulnerability in question was to attack SSH keys. We decided to demonstrate how such an attack would work. To do so, we used the standard ssh-keygen on the target box (one that came with the debian distribution – ssh had no built-in vulnerability other than its dependency on OpenSSL), but a heavily modified version of this program on the attacker box to iteratively generate the potential SSH keys that a machine with the flawed code could have, and try them out, using a brute-force style attack. There are two components to this: ssh-exploit-driver.bash and ssh-keyexploit.c. The ssh-exploit-driver.bash script takes an IP address and iterates over all possible PID seeds, 1-32,768, and runs ssh-keyexploit.c with each one.

See Algorithm ?? for how ssh-keyexploit.c works.

Algorithm 1 SSH key exploit

```
1: procedure EXPLOIT(IP, PID)
2:   Set the PID in the OpenSSL modified library from PID
3:    $RSA_{PU}, RSA_{PR} \leftarrow$  Modified OpenSSL generated key with PID as only source of variability.
4:   success  $\leftarrow$  Try to SSH into host given by IP with  $RSA_{PR}$ .
5:   if success then
6:     Report success
7:   else
8:     Report Failure
9:   end if
10: end procedure
```

We run the exploit by running the script with the IP address of the target machine. With the provided virtual machines, this would look like this:

```
$ ./ssh-exploit-driver.bash 10.10.1.5
```

Eventually on the attacker machine you will get the output seen in Fig.??.

You can then SSH to the target machine with the trial_identity file.

APPENDIX B MEASURING EFFECTS OF UNIT AND FUZZ TESTS

As part of our analysis we wanted to see if the new unit test framework (since 2008) would catch the kind of error the debian developer introduced in 2006. Since the new random number generator, DRBG, is specification-based and much less arbitrary, this isn't an apples-to-apples comparison.

First, we tried running the old test suite to see if it would have caught the debian-introduced bug, or if the debian developer was simply negligent. In that version of OpenSSL, tests are run with the comand make alltests in the test directory. No tests failed – so the automated test suite didn't catch this modification.

Since we can't comment out the same lines in newer OpenSSL versions, we decided to find an area of code that's critical to updating the entropy of the DRBG random number generator. The DRBG random number generator, as specified in [?], has a few different sources of potential entropy to be mixed in to the 'pool'. The secure source of entropy, which must remain secret, is only used while seeding the DRBG. The critical activity here occurs when that entropy is hashed into the internal state of the DRBG. This occurs in drbg_hash.c in the hash_df function, which is an implementation of Hash_df as specified in [?]. After that, users also have the option to mix (untrusted) entropy into the random number generation process using 'additional input' strings, which are optional.

In order to see if the debian bug could happen again today with a similar error, we commented out all lines of code that updated the internal hash state of the hash-based DRBG, and ran unit tests to see if this caused them to fail. To run unit tests, complete the basic build process as described above and then type:

```
make test
```

We determined that this error is caught, see the error message in Fig.?? that was the output of make test.

For the fuzz tests, OpenSSL recommended using LibFuzzer or AFL. We tried AFL following their instructions on the README at <https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/fuzz/README.md>. Their fuzzers run infinitely until the tester kills the program or fuzzer detects a crash according to the instructions; therefore, we only timed the fuzzers for 3 minutes

Fig. 2. Console output of successful exploit

```
30-test_evpr.t ..... 19/?
# INFO: @ test/testutil/stanza.c:21
# Reading ../../test/recipes/30-test_evpr_data/evprand.txt
# INFO: @ test/testutil/stanza.c:122
# Starting "CAVP Large Seed" tests at line 17
# INFO: @ test/testutil/stanza.c:122
# Starting "CTR DRBG No Reseed Tests (from NIST test vectors)" tests at line 34
# INFO: @ test/testutil/stanza.c:122
# Starting "Hash DRBG No Reseed Tests (from NIST test vectors)" tests at line 6324
# ERROR: (memory) 'got == item->output' failed @ test/evpr_test.c:2599
# --- got
# +++ item->output
# 0000:-919f858c8a03c8a6 7eb2a0f54d2a409a 5b4bb94ecaefeeffe b1c9b31ac049d127
# 0000:+0e28130fa5ca1led d3293ca26fdb8ae1 810611f78715082e d3841e7486f16677
#      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
# 0020:-7ccfeec0a2a85df 16d23b14ad21b87a 5fffd238e2ae34a41 59a3fb4f39377975
# 0020:+b28e33ffe0b93d98 ba57ba358c1343ab 2a26b4eb7940f5bc 639384641ee80a25
#      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
# 0040:-15f91a5edeca7aa1 7d30428bf31cd0dd
# 0040:+140331076268bd1c e702ad534dda0ed8
```

Fig. 3. A test failure, catching the modified DRBG. This didn't happen in the earlier OpenSSL.

until it crashed or caught something. With AFL, we were able to successfully run all fuzzers without any problems, but found timeout on bignum and asn1. We wanted to further investigate the cause of the timeout. Therefore, we increased the timeout to 5 seconds with the command

```
afl-fuzz -t 5000 -i fuzz/corpora/$FUZZER
-o fuzz/corpora/$FUZZER/out fuzz/$FUZZER
```

where \$FUZZER is bignum or asn1, it was successfully able to execute those tests as we saw the statistics screen on Figure 4 (asn1 example, but same screen was shown when using bignum).

In conclusion, we would have to say the fuzz testing were not able to detect any vulnerabilities. The results are show in Figure 3 for the timeout failure, and Figure 4 when timeout gets updated with -t 5000 option run with AFL (this test in particular ran for almost two hours before we decided to conclude nothing was found).

APPENDIX C

MEASURING TEST COVERAGE

We also wanted to measure test coverage. Test coverage is a way of measuring how much code actually gets executed during a test run. You can get two basic kinds of measurements: percentage of lines executed, or percentage of functions. We focus on percentage of lines, since percentage of functions can leave out edge cases.

To measure code coverage, we used the --coverage flag with GCC, and the view-test-coverage.sh script which generates a graphical report of test coverage viewable in a web browser. See Fig.?? for an example of what the coverage

Fig. 4. AFL test timeout for asn1 fuzzer

```
len = 4, map size = 3001, exec speed = 1911 us
[!] WARNING: No new instrumentation output, test case may be useless.
[*] Attempting dry run with 'id:000236,orig:1316f75018bf86b017115f7fcc6bae98c8df220'...
len = 30, map size = 4898, exec speed = 2822 us
[*] Attempting dry run with 'id:000237,orig:13471d1596fd3435e883875fed4ad21f9a820db'...
len = 358, map size = 5543, exec speed = 5159 us
[*] Attempting dry run with 'id:000238,orig:13833ed2732fb38128aebecdcda539faacdb2e'...
len = 1489, map size = 6185, exec speed = 5741 us
[*] Attempting dry run with 'id:000239,orig:1389cd4044d41d940d94dbf6a4953719bbf88e3'...
len = 5, map size = 4643, exec speed = 2455 us
[*] Attempting dry run with 'id:000240,orig:13a4c314b0bd880908698cb6d6ded98ca02ceb104'...
len = 40, map size = 4723, exec speed = 2701 us
[*] Attempting dry run with 'id:000241,orig:13b2f8b48d75f31614ab119062650375cd4f6a14'...
len = 176, map size = 7020, exec speed = 3864 us
[*] Attempting dry run with 'id:000242,orig:13bc5ec152a75d586b696c1fcdffa21e98bb23f1'...
len = 4098, map size = 4899, exec speed = 38302 us
[*] Attempting dry run with 'id:000243,orig:13e7afb8a2265e26030968f71f6a5d5d0519d012'...

[-] The program took more than 1000 ms to process one of the initial test cases.
This is bad news; raising the limit with the -t option is possible, but
will probably make the fuzzing process extremely slow.

If this test case is just a fluke, the other option is to just avoid it
altogether, and find one that is less of a CPU hog.

[-] PROGRAM ABORT : Test case 'id:000243,orig:13e7afb8a2265e26030968f71f6a5d5d0519d012' results in a tim
Location : perform_dry_run(), afl-fuzz.c:2777
```

looks like. The details of compiling for coverage testing varied.

For the master branch, the following commands worked:

```
./config CFLAGS="--coverage -fprofile-arcs" \
LDLAGS="-fprofile-arcs -lgcov"
make -j
make test
../view-coverage.sh
```

However, for the debian-mod-point branch, a slightly different set of commands was needed:

```
./config -lgcov -fprofile-arcs \
-ftest-coverage shared
make -j
```

Fig. 5. AFL test with timeout increased

american fuzzy lop 2.52b (asn1)

process timing		overall results	
run time : 0 days, 1 hrs, 25 min, 41 sec		cycles done : 0	
last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 24 min, 39 sec		total paths : 3460	
last uniq crash : none seen yet		uniq crashes : 0	
last uniq hang : none seen yet		uniq hangs : 0	
cycle progress		map coverage	
now processing : 51 (1.47%)		map density : 9.09% / 26.63%	
paths timed out : 0 (0.00%)		count coverage : 5.25 bits/tuple	
stage progress		findings in depth	
now trying : interest 32/8		favored paths : 425 (12.28%)	
stage execs : 49.8k/54.2k (91.91%)		new edges on : 466 (13.47%)	
total execs : 451k		total crashes : 0 (0 unique)	
exec speed : 106.9/sec		total touts : 0 (0 unique)	
fuzzing strategy yields		path geometry	
bit flips : 51/15.7k, 6/15.7k, 3/15.7k		levels : 2	
byte flips : 0/1967, 0/1960, 1/1946		pending : 3454	
arithmetics : 22/110k, 2/71.6k, 0/21.2k		pend fav : 421	
known ints : 3/8137, 5/43.6k, 6/24.7k		own finds : 137	
dictionary : 0/0, 0/0, 0/852		imported : n/a	
havoc : 36/39.0k, 0/0		stability : 90.64%	
trim : 0.00%/924, 0.00%			

[cpu000: 51%]

make test

../view-coverage.sh

See Table ?? for our results.

LCOV - code coverage report

Current view: top level		Hit	Total	Coverage
Test: coverage.info	Lines:	25909	63014	41.1 %
Date: 2022-05-10 13:30:22	Functions:	1805	4093	44.1 %











Directory	Line Coverage ↕			Functions ↕	
apps		17.5 %	2150 / 12289	31.0 %	65 / 210
crypto		54.0 %	527 / 976	50.4 %	60 / 119
crypto/aes		88.5 %	369 / 417	78.6 %	11 / 14
crypto/asn1		41.3 %	2230 / 5406	39.1 %	188 / 481
crypto/bf		100.0 %	220 / 220	100.0 %	8 / 8
crypto/bio		31.7 %	885 / 2790	36.0 %	67 / 186
crypto/bn		73.1 %	1946 / 2662	82.3 %	102 / 124
crypto/bn/asm		86.7 %	247 / 285	80.0 %	8 / 10
crypto/buffer		89.4 %	76 / 85	100.0 %	8 / 8
crypto/cast		92.1 %	232 / 252	100.0 %	7 / 7

Fig. 6. Example test coverage output using the lcov tool

Branch name	Coverage % (by line)
debian-mod-point	41.7%
master (version 3)	65.1%

TABLE II

BRANCHES IN THE OPENSSSL SUBREPOSITORY AND TEST COVERAGE.