


Cryptography background

Cryptography Background

cryptographic hash functions:

An efficiently computable function $H: M \rightarrow T$

where $|M| \gg |T|$



Collision resistance

Def: a collision for $H: M \rightarrow T$ is pair $x \neq y \in M$ s.t. $H(x) = H(y)$

$|M| \gg |T|$ implies that many collisions exist

Def: a function $H: M \rightarrow T$ is collision resistant if it is “hard” to find even a single collision for H (we say H is a CRHF)

Example: **SHA256:** $\{x : \text{len}(x) < 2^{64} \text{ bytes}\} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{256}$

Application: committing to data on a blockchain

Alice has a large file m . She posts $h = H(m)$ (32 bytes)

Bob reads h . Later he learns m' s.t. $H(m') = h$

H is a CRHF \Rightarrow Bob is convinced that $m' = m$
(otherwise, m and m' are a collision for H)

We say that $h = H(m)$ is a **binding commitment** to m
(note: not hiding, h may leak information about m)

Committing to a list (of transactions)

Alice has $S = (m_1, m_2, \dots, m_n)$

32 bytes

Goal:

- Alice posts a short binding commitment to S , $h = \text{commit}(S)$
- Bob reads h . Given $(m_i, \text{proof } \pi_i)$ can check that $S[i] = m_i$
Bob runs $\text{verify}(h, i, m_i, \pi_i) \rightarrow \text{accept/reject}$

security: adv. cannot find (S, i, m, π) s.t. $m \neq S[i]$ and
 $\text{verify}(h, i, m, \pi) = \text{accept}$ where $h = \text{commit}(S)$

Merkle tree (Merkle 1989)

commitment

h

Merkle tree
commitment

$m_1 \ m_2 \ m_3 \ m_4 \ m_5 \ m_6 \ m_7 \ m_8$

list of values S


Goal:

- commit to list S of size n
- Later prove $S[i] = m_i$

Merkle tree

(Merkle 1989)

commitment



Goal:

- commit to list S of size n
- Later prove $S[i] = m_i$


To prove $S[4] = m_4$,
proof $\pi = (m_3, y_1, y_6)$

length of proof: $\log_2 n$

Merkle tree

(Merkle 1989)

commitment



To prove $S[4] = m_4$,
proof $\pi = (m_3, y_1, y_6)$

Bob does:

$$y_2 \leftarrow H(m_3, m_4)$$

$$y_5 \leftarrow H(y_1, y_2)$$

$$h' \leftarrow H(y_5, y_6)$$

accept if $h = h'$

Merkle tree (Merkle 1989)

Thm: H CRHF \Rightarrow adv. cannot find (S, i, m, π) s.t. $m \neq S[i]$ and $\text{verify}(h, i, m, \pi) = \text{accept}$ where $h = \text{commit}(S)$


(to prove, prove the contra-positive)

How is this useful? Super useful. Example

- When writing a block of transactions S to the blockchain, suffices to write $\text{commit}(S)$ to chain. Keep chain small.
- Later, can prove contents of every Tx.

Abstract block chain

blockchain



Merkle proofs are used to prove that a Tx is “on the block chain”

Another application: proof of work

Goal: computational problem that

- takes time $\Omega(D)$ to solve, but
- solution takes time $O(1)$ to verify

(D is called the **difficulty**)

How? $H: X \times Y \rightarrow \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 2^n - 1\}$ e.g. $n = 256$

- puzzle: input $x \in X$, output $y \in Y$ s.t. $H(x, y) < 2^n/D$
- verify(x, y): accept if $H(x, y) < 2^n/D$

Another application: proof of work

Theorem: if H is a “random function” then the best algorithm requires D evaluations of H in expectation.

Note: this is a parallel algorithm

\Rightarrow the more machines have, the faster solve the puzzle.

Proof of work is used in some consensus protocols (e.g., Bitcoin)

Bitcoin uses $H(x, y) = \text{SHA256}(\text{SHA256}(x.y))$

Cryptography background: Digital Signatures

How to authorize a transaction

Cryptography

Cryptography fundamentals which are necessary in blockchain technology

- Public Key Cryptography
- Digital Signatures
- Hash Puzzles
- Hash functions and their properties
- Hash Pointers
- Merkle Tree Data Structures


Encryption/ Decryption

Plaintext :The data message

Encryption: Encoding of data message into another form


Ciphertext : the encrypted data message.

Decryption :decoding of ciphertext back to original form




Must hold true: $D(C) = M$, where $C = E(M)$ and $M = D(E(M))$

types of Cryptography techniques



Signatures

Physical signatures: bind transaction to author



Problem in the digital world:


anyone can copy Bob's signature from one doc to another

Solution: digital signature

- a mathematical technique used to validate the authenticity and integrity of a digital document, message or software.
- A digital signature is exactly what it sounds like a modern alternative to handwritten signing documents with paper and pen.
- guarantees that the contents of a message are not altered in transit
- intended to solve the problem of tampering and impersonation in digital communications.
- Digital signatures also provide additional information such as the origin of the message, status, and consent by the signer.

Digital signatures

Solution: make signature depend on document



digital signature

- Using a mathematical algorithm, digital signing solution providers such as Zoho Sign will generate two keys: a public key and a private key. When a signer digitally signs a document, a cryptographic hash is generated for the document.
- That cryptographic hash is then encrypted using the sender's private key, which is stored in a secure HSM (hardware security module) box. It is then appended to the document and sent to the recipients along with the sender's public key.
- recipient can decrypt the encrypted hash with the sender's public key certificate. A cryptographic hash is again generated on the recipient's end.
- Both cryptographic hashes are compared to check its authenticity. If they match, the document hasn't been tampered with and is considered valid.
- Digital signatures are based on public key cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptography.
 - Using a public key algorithm -- such as RSA(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) -- two keys are generated, creating a mathematically linked pair of keys: one private and one public.


Digital signatures: syntax


Def: a signature scheme is a triple of algorithms:

- **Gen()**: outputs a key pair (pk, sk) \leftarrow to generate two keys
- **Sign**(sk, msg) outputs sig. σ \leftarrow to produce signature
- **Verify**(pk, msg, σ) outputs 'accept' or 'reject' \leftarrow to verify

Secure signatures: (informal)

Adversary who sees signatures on many messages of his choice, cannot forge a signature on a new message.





Families of signature schemes

1. RSA signatures (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) (old ... not used in blockchains):
 - long sigs and public keys (≥ 256 bytes), fast to verify
2. Discrete-log signatures: Schnorr and ECDSA (Bitcoin, Ethereum)
 - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
 - short sigs (48 or 64 bytes) and public key (32 bytes)
3. BLS signatures: 48 bytes, aggregatable, easy threshold
(Ethereum 2.0, Chia, Dfinity)
4. Post-quantum signatures: long (≥ 768 bytes)

signature schemes

- **Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)(1992)**
 - uses shorter keys and requires fewer computational requirements than the RSA system, while maintaining strong security
- **SCHNORR SIGNATURES (2008) :BITCOIN**
 - ECDSA lacks one key property is that there is no efficient way to compress and verify signatures together.
 - switched to a new Schnorr signature scheme to improve the cryptocurrency's scalability, efficiency, and privacy
- **BLS SIGNATURES (Boneh-Lynn-Shacham) :ETH2**
 - when Ethereum moves to Proof of Stake with eth2, ECDSA will no longer support its validation requirements.
 - for efficient signature verification in consensus
 - uses a bilinear pairing for verification, and signatures are elements of an elliptic curve group.

Signatures on the blockchain

Signatures are used everywhere:

- ensure Tx authorization,
- governance votes,
- consensus protocol votes.

