
To be refer as

Appendix X

System Safety Plan



Anti-lock braking system—Safety plan

The anti-clock braking system (ABS) is an automobile product of AAAFAS. This safety-critical system allows the wheels on the automobile to maintain tractive contact with road surface while barking, thus preventing the automobile from skidding.

Document Control Panel

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List of Acronyms

- ABS Anti-lock Braking System
- AAAFAS Abbas Ali Ahsan Fitash Automotive Systems

Definitions

No.	Term	Definition
1.	Hazard	Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death
		to personnel, damage to or loss of a system, equipment or property, or damage to the environment
2.	Hazard Area	A geographical or geometric surface area that is susceptible to hazard from a planned event or unplanned malfunction
3.	Life cycle	All phases of the system's life including design, research, development, test and evaluation, production, deployment, operations and support, and disposal
4.	Mishap	An unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, injury, occupational illness, damage or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment
5.	Mishap risk	An expression of the impact and possibility of a mishap in terms of potential mishap severity and probability of occurrence
6.	Mishap probability	The aggregate probability of occurrence of the individual events/hazards that might create a specific mishap (the likelihood that a mishap will occur)

7.	Mishap probability levels	An arbitrary categorization that provides a qualitative measure of most reasonable likelihood of occurrence of a mishap resulting from personnel error, environmental conditions, design inadequacies, procedural deficiencies, or system, subsystem or component failure or malfunction
8.	Mishap severity	An assessment of the consequences of the most reasonable credible mishap that could be caused by a specific hazard
9.	Mishap risk assessment	The process of characterizing hazards within risk areas and critical technical processes, analyzing them for their potential mishap severity and probabilities of occurrence, and prioritizing them for risk mitigation actions
10.	Residual mishap risk	The remaining mishap risk that exists after all mitigation techniques have been implemented or exhausted, in accordance with the system safety design order of precedence
11.	Safety	Freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, damage or loss of equipment and property, or damage to the environment
12.	Safeguard	Hardware component, software routine, operator procedure, or some combination intended to mitigate risk

1. Overview

This section provides a brief, but not complete overview about our safety plan for ABS product of the company AAAFAS.

1.1 Scope

System safety is implemented to perform a systematic safety analysis on the anti-lock braking system product of our company. This document plan states and plans all the required safety measures for closure and elimination of hazards or/and to minimize the probability of failure to an acceptable level.

1.2 System Safety Objective

The prime objective of the overall system is to provide a safest possible system to our client with conformance to the standard ISO 26262.

1.3 References

ISO 26262: https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:26262:-1:ed-1:v1:en

1.4 Definitions and Acronyms

See the Section Definitions.

2. System Safety Administration

2.2 System Safety Organization

The following heretical tree diagram shows our structure of safety team.




Figure 1 Safety Team Structure

2.2.1 System Safety Engineering

The system safety engineer is responsible for development, implementation and maintenance of the safety program. Establish how authority is given to engineers and act accordingly on safety issues. The responsibilities assigned to the safety engineer are:

- Implementation and maintenance of safety program
- Identifying safety requirements for implementation in design
- Preparing safety checklists and reviewing for safety
- Participating in design and code reviews
- Utilizing interfaces to comply with applicable safety requirements
- Coordinating safety artifacts

2.3 System Safety Process

The safety process is presented throughout the development process. The safety engineer must give input in design keeping in mind the safety requirements. Safety assessment should be performed by the safety engineer. Identification, management and elimination of hazard should also be done throughout the project life cycle.

3. System Safety Overview

3.1 System Safety Milestones

This section describes the critical checkpoints for review of the system safety program.

Safety review after formulating requirements

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- Preliminary and Critical design review
- Review after installation and checkout
- Review after integration and testing
- Review after operation

3.2 Safety Task Schedule

Please see the project giant chart in the document "Overall Project Plan".

4. General Requirements and Criteria

4.1 Safety Approach and Standards

Safety criteria in our case is imposed and managed by external regulatory body of ISO 26262. The system should must meet at least all the safety objective in the standard ISO 26262 listed in Sheet 2 (02 Mgmt of Funl. Safety) of the file "SAFE_D2.1b.xls".

4.2 Hazard Identification

See the Functional Safety Assessment Plan.docx.

4.3 Severity, Probability, Controllability and Risk Assessment

See the Functional Safety Assessment Plan.docx.

4.4 Hazard Closure Process

See the Functional Safety Assessment Plan.docx.

4.5 Engineering and Operational Changes

On update for accommodation of any safety requirement must be circulated using a configuration management tool, to all the stack holders.

4.6 System Safety Precedence

To satisfy the safety requirements and to resolve the hazard the following precedence is to be followed:

- Design with minimum hazards
- Re-Design to eliminate hazard
- Providing warning devices
- Providing pre-use safety training
- Incorporate the use of other protective equipment (Like Air-Bag etc.)

5. Hazard Analysis

See the Functional Safety Assessment Plan.docx

5.1 Analysis Techniques

See the Functional Safety Assessment Plan.docx

5.2 Safety Assessment Report

The safety assessment report should be presented after review of the Safety Assessment plan.

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5.3 Subcontractor Safety Program Integration

Some of the sensors/actuators to be used in the system to be develop are supplied by Texas Inc. Texas Inc. have already done safety assessment of their supplied sensors and actuators with compliance to ISO 26262.

5.4 Hazard Tracking System

See the Functional Safety Assessment Plan.docx

6. Safety Data

Products: The actuators, sensors and ECU all are imported from Texas Inc., Texas, USA.

Hazardous Products: Pump, Sensor, Modulator and ECU.

Physical Data: N/A

Fire or Explosion Data: The accident caused by failure of the ABS can cause fire or explosion in case of fuel leak and ignition only.

Prevention for Hazards: Redundant elements, warning messages and proactive actions (Air-Bag) are taken in hazard analysis phase.

7. Safety Verification / Testing

The software safety requirements are verifiable and testable. The critical functions for hazardous behavior are required to be tested to satisfy MCDC code coverage criteria. The simulation must conform to the safety requirements. The system must be test for safety in test environment. The test environment should be close enough with aim to simulate all the possible hazardous scenarios. There should be fail-safe modes in the safety requirements and must be tested.

The verification should actually be tested with input from actual operator interface (Braking paddle).

8. Safety Training

All the team was trained by STC, Lahore, Pakistan. The team was trained to design safety-critical systems in automotive industry. Our software and systems engineers were also trained for safe development and implementation of critical systems.

It is recommended for end users of our ABS product to avail safety training named "Defensive Driving" from STC, Lahore.

9. Mishap Investigation and Reporting

Mishap Investigation and reporting is discussed in detail in our Functional Safety Assessment Plan.

10. System Safety Interfaces

An automotive-grade ARM based microcontroller is used to compare speed sensor data, control brake cylinder pressure and control the return pump for each wheel brake cylinder. The ECU is also responsible for diagnostics, warning notification and communication with other on board control units. Newer automotive ECUs from Texas can provide evidence of their suitability for use in systems where IEC61508 and ISO26262 safety standards compliance are required. This include discrete sensor data bus, brake fluid pipes interfaces, connected to CAN with CAN type of "High Speed CAN Signaling. ISO 11898-2".

11. Acronyms and Notes

STC – Safety Training Center, Lahore, Pakistan, http://www.stc.org.pk/

CAN – Controlled Area Network

ISO – International Organization for Standardization