

Misaligned Priorities: A Strategic Audit of Systemic Bias in Canada's 2025 Community Resilience Fund (CRF) Regarding Antisemitism and Islamist Extremism

Executive Summary

The allocation of public funds toward national security initiatives serves as a direct reflection of a government's threat assessment and strategic priorities. In the architecture of the modern state, the budget is not merely an administrative document; it is the operational manifestation of the social contract, determining which threats are deemed existential and which communities are afforded the protection of the state. In Canada, the primary financial instrument for preventing terrorism and countering radicalization to violence (CRV) is the Community Resilience Fund (CRF), administered by Public Safety Canada's Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre).

On October 20, 2025, the Government of Canada announced a new funding tranche exceeding \$36.9 million, allocated to 19 distinct projects designed to enhance research and programming in the counter-radicalization domain.¹ This substantial investment represents the government's definitive statement on the nature of the threat facing the Canadian homeland. This report provides an exhaustive forensic audit of that portfolio, evaluating its alignment—or lack thereof—with the prevailing threat landscape as articulated by Canada's own intelligence community. The central conclusion of this analysis is that the 2025 CRF allocation exhibits a profound, systemic, and dangerous bias that results in a strategic inversion of the actual threat picture.

While the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have publicly identified Islamist-inspired violent extremism—specifically Daesh-inspired plots targeting Jewish communities—as a primary source of lethal threat in

the 2024–2025 period, the CRF portfolio is heavily weighted toward research into far-right extremism and broad, "ideology-agnostic" social programs.² This misalignment is not merely an issue of bureaucratic inefficiency; it creates a distinct capability gap. The mechanisms funded to prevent radicalization are structurally ill-equipped to detect or disrupt the specific ideological pathways currently mobilizing youth toward mass-casualty violence.

The audit reveals that while the portfolio adequately resources efforts against "Right-Wing Extremism" (RWE) and emerging nihilistic threats like the COM/764 network, it maintains a near-total programmatic silence on Islamist extremism. This asymmetry is particularly jarring given the "kinetic reality" of recent months, which witnessed advanced-stage plots in Toronto and Ottawa orchestrated by actors adhering to Salafi-Jihadist ideology.²

Furthermore, the application of a rigorous *CRF Recipient Bias Scoring Rubric (2025 Edition)* reveals a troubling governance failure regarding antisemitism. Despite a documented surge in anti-Jewish hate crimes—which constituted 40% of hate occurrences in Toronto in 2024—the CRF portfolio marginalizes this threat. Antisemitism is rarely named as a primary focus, appearing instead as a diluted sub-category within broader "anti-hate" mandates.⁵ When combined with a near-total absence of formal partnerships with Jewish security infrastructure and a failure to operationalize the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, the current funding strategy risks reproducing the failures observed in the United Kingdom's "Prevent" strategy. In that jurisdiction, broad "anti-polarization" mandates have frequently been weaponized to mislabel mainstream Jewish advocacy as "extremist" while failing to protect Jewish students from actual harassment.⁶

This report argues that without an immediate strategic pivot, the CRF risks becoming a vehicle for social policy preferences rather than a rigorous instrument of national security. The analysis that follows details the disconnect between the kinetic reality of terrorism in Canada and the programmatic priorities of the federal government.

1. Strategic Context: The Kinetic Reality vs. Programmatic Priorities

To assess the efficacy of the Community Resilience Fund, one must first establish the baseline security environment it is intended to address. The CRF's mandate is explicitly the prevention of "radicalization to violence," not merely the amelioration of social friction or the promotion of diversity. Therefore, the allocation of resources must be judged against the specific ideologies, networks, and methodologies currently demonstrating the capability and intent to commit acts of terrorism in Canada.

1.1 The Intelligence Benchmark: The Resurgence of Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism

In the period leading up to the 2025 funding allocation, the Canadian intelligence community provided a granular assessment of the threat landscape that stands in stark contrast to the priorities evident in the CRF portfolio. The assessment was characterized by a specific resurgence of Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE), specifically inspired by Salafi-Jihadist ideology, often referred to in intelligence circles as "Daesh-inspired" or "ISIS-inspired" extremism.

The analytic significance of this period lies in the transition from theoretical threats to "kinetic" realities—actual plots disrupted in advanced stages. While the CRF portfolio continues to prioritize the "ideological" threats of the Far-Right (Right-Wing Extremism or RWE), the operational reality facing the RCMP and CSIS has been dominated by Islamist extremism targeting Jewish populations and utilizing youth as primary actors.

The Toronto Father-Son Plot (July 2024)

In late July 2024, the RCMP's Greater Toronto Area Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET) executed a disruption of a plot involving a father and son in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Authorities confirmed that these individuals, Ahmed Fouad Mostafa Eldidi (62) and Mostafa Eldidi (26), were in the advanced stages of planning a mass-casualty attack and had already acquired weapons, specifically an axe and a machete.⁴

Crucially, law enforcement officials explicitly identified the suspects as "Daesh-inspired," confirming that the ideology of the Islamic State (ISIS) remains a potent mobilizer within Canada.⁹ The plot involved conspiracy to commit murder on behalf of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), representing a direct ideological linkage to transnational terror networks.⁹ The gravity of this threat was underscored by revelations regarding the father, Ahmed Eldidi. Investigation revealed he was allegedly visible in a 2015 ISIS propaganda video engaging in the dismemberment of a prisoner with a sword prior to his immigration to Canada.¹¹

This case underscores three critical failures in the "resilience" model:

1. **Intergenerational Transmission:** The involvement of a father and son unit suggests a familial transmission of extremism that standard youth programs, which often focus on

peer-to-peer radicalization in schools, are structurally ill-equipped to detect.⁴

2. **Persistence of Ideology:** The plot demonstrates the persistence of Jihadist ideology despite the territorial defeat of the ISIS Caliphate. The advanced stage of the plot—where weapons were procured and the target was imminent—highlights a failure of early-warning systems that the CRF is ostensibly designed to bolster.⁴
3. **Screening vs. Prevention:** The fact that an individual allegedly involved in gross human rights violations abroad could enter and mobilize within Canada points to a failure in upstream screening, necessitating a more robust domestic detection grid—precisely what the CRF is supposed to fund.

The Ottawa Youth Plot (2024)

A second critical vector identified by intelligence officials is the rapid acceleration of youth involvement in terrorism. In late 2023 and early 2024, a disruption in Ottawa involved two youths, one as young as 15, who were allegedly accessing instructional material on explosives.² The target of this conspiracy was explicitly the Jewish community, potentially involving the detonation of an explosive device at a pro-Israel rally or Jewish institution.²

This case exemplifies the acute intersection of youth radicalization and antisemitic intent. It challenges the prevailing "social worker" model of prevention by demonstrating that minors are not merely consuming passive hate speech but are actively seeking tactical instruction for lethal violence. The CSIS Director explicitly noted that this plot targeted the Jewish community in Canada's capital, reinforcing the centrality of antisemitism to the current threat picture.¹²

The Cross-Border Plot (September 2024)

In September 2024, the threat crossed international borders but remained rooted in the North American ecosystem. Muhammad Shahzeb Khan, a Pakistani national, was intercepted while attempting to cross into the United States with the specific intent of attacking Jewish targets in New York City.¹³ The U.S. Department of Justice confirmed the suspect aimed to carry out a mass shooting at a Jewish center, explicitly driven by support for ISIS and timed to coincide with the anniversary of the October 7 attacks.¹³

This incident highlights Canada's role as a potential staging ground or transit point for transnational Jihadist terrorism, further emphasizing the need for a domestic counter-radicalization strategy that is attuned to international Jihadist narratives. The suspect

utilized encrypted messaging platforms to distribute propaganda and coordinate the plot, underscoring the digital dimension of the threat.¹³

1.2 The Youth Radicalization Surge: A Dual Threat Landscape

The demographic profile of the threat has shifted dramatically, a trend that the 2025 CRF portfolio attempts to address structurally but fails to address ideologically. CSIS officials, including Director Daniel Rogers in his seminal November 2025 address, have noted that "nearly one in ten terrorism investigations now includes at least one subject under the age of 18".²

Director Rogers identified two distinct streams of youth radicalization in his speech, providing a critical benchmark for evaluating the CRF portfolio:

1. **The Islamist Stream:** Exemplified by the Ottawa plot and the Montreal teen arrested in August 2025 for planning an attack on behalf of Daesh.³
2. **The Nihilist/NVE Stream:** Exemplified by the May 2025 arrest of a 15-year-old in Edmonton related to the COM/764 network—a transnational online group that manipulates youth into self-harm and violence for entertainment.³

This distinction is vital for the audit. The CRF portfolio, through its heavy funding of the Canadian Anti-Hate Network (CAHN) and digital safety initiatives, *does* address the second stream (COM/764 and NVE). CAHN lists "764 / Com" as a specific priority area in its mandate.¹⁶ However, the portfolio exhibits a total programmatic vacuum regarding the *first* stream (Islamist extremism).

A rational counter-radicalization strategy would invest in programs capable of detecting *both* forms of grooming. It would fund programs that understand the nihilistic gaming subcultures of COM/764 *and* programs that understand the theological grooming of Daesh. As this report will demonstrate, the 2025 CRF portfolio heavily resources the former while ignoring the latter, creating a dangerous asymmetry in national defense.

1.3 The Strategic Disconnect

This intelligence picture establishes a clear "kinetic reality": the actors currently mobilizing toward lethal violence in Canada are disproportionately young, influenced by specific Islamist-inspired ideologies (Daesh), and are prioritizing Jewish targets.³ Yet, the October

2025 CRF allocation reveals a strategic disconnect where these specific vectors are systematically under-resourced in favor of generalized resilience models and far-right research.

The government appears to be fighting the "last war"—the war against the Alt-Right and white nationalist accelerationism that dominated the 2019-2022 period—while the "new war" of post-October 7 Islamist resurgence proceeds largely unchecked by the preventive apparatus.

2. Methodology: The Bias Scoring Rubric

To rigorously quantify the systemic nature of these observations and move beyond subjective criticism, this audit applied a *CRF Recipient Bias Scoring Rubric (2025 Edition)* to the funded cohort. This methodological tool uses a standardized 0–20 point scale to measure the extent to which an organization’s mandate and project scope contribute to the alleged bias—specifically, the over-emphasis on far-right threats and the neglect of Islamist and antisemitic radicalization.⁵

The rubric operates on the principle of "Negative Space Analysis." In intelligence and security auditing, what is *missing* from a portfolio is often as significant as what is present. If a national security fund systematically avoids naming the primary lethal threat, that omission is a data point indicating structural bias or political constraint.

2.1 The Scoring Categories

The rubric evaluates each recipient across seven categories, assigning points based on the presence or absence of specific indicators. A *higher* score indicates a higher risk of bias.

Category	Max Points	Scoring Logic
1. Explicit focus on Far-Right/IMVE threats	4	4 points if the project focuses exclusively/primarily on the far-right. 0 points if there is no specific mention. This measures the

		<i>overrepresentation</i> of a single threat stream relative to the intelligence picture.
2. Explicit focus on Islamist/Jihadist radicalization	4	4 points if the threat is <i>never</i> mentioned. 0 points if it is a primary focus. This measures <i>avoidance</i> or neglect of the threat identified by the RCMP/CSIS.
3. Explicit focus on Antisemitism	4	4 points if <i>never</i> mentioned or only in generic lists. 0 points if it is a declared primary focus. This measures <i>dilution</i> of the threat facing the Jewish community.
4. Operational use of IHRA definition	2	2 points if the project description/materials do not cite/use the IHRA definition. 0 points if IHRA is operationalized. This measures a <i>lack of standards</i> in defining hate.
5. Ideology-agnostic framing	2	2 points for exclusively agnostic language ("polarization," "social cohesion"). 0 points for typology-specific language. This measures <i>vagueness</i> that obscures specific threats.
6. Jewish community partnerships	2	2 points if no formal partnership with Jewish security bodies (CIJA, B'nai

		Brith) is listed. 0 points if listed. This measures <i>exclusion</i> of affected communities.
7. Leadership/Staff red flags	2	2 points if key personnel have public records of anti-Israel or October 7 minimizing statements.

2.2 Risk Stratification

The cumulative scores are stratified into risk levels to provide a comparative analysis of the portfolio:

- **Very High Risk (15-20):** Indicates an organization that acts as a "poster child" for systemic bias—obsessively focused on the Far-Right while maintaining total silence on Islamist threats and antisemitism. These projects are conceptually "blind" to half the threat spectrum.
- **High Risk (10-14):** Suggests clear evidence of skew, where generic framing masks a reluctance to address specific "uncomfortable" extremisms. These projects often use "safety" or "cohesion" language that avoids hard security targets.
- **Medium Risk (5-9):** Indicates a balanced or targeted approach that acknowledges non-RWE threats.
- **Low Risk (0-4):** Indicates high alignment with the full threat spectrum.

As the detailed audit below demonstrates, the 2025 portfolio is overwhelmingly clustered in the "High" and "Very High" risk categories.

3. Sector Audit: The Academic and Research Sector

The intellectual foundation of Canada's counter-radicalization strategy is laid by its academic partners. These institutions do not merely study the threat; they define the taxonomy that policymakers and frontline practitioners use. If the academic sector decides that "Right-Wing Extremism" is the only ecosystem worth mapping, then the government's response will be

structurally blind to everything else. The audit reveals a profound *Epistemic Bias* in this sector.

3.1 Ontario Tech University

- **Project:** *Right-wing Extremism in Canada: Conceptualizing the Movement*
- **Risk Score:** 16/20 (Very High)

The allocation to Ontario Tech University represents the most explicit institutionalization of the portfolio's ideological tilt. The project title itself—"Right-wing Extremism in Canada: Conceptualizing the Movement"—signals an exclusive focus.⁵ While academic specialization is not inherently biased, the context of a national security fund matters. The government is purchasing a service: the mapping of threats.

When the state funds a project dedicated solely to "white nationalist ideals, conspiracy theories, and disinformation" while funding zero equivalent projects for Islamist extremism, it elevates RWE to the status of the premier existential threat facing the nation.¹⁷ The project summary notes a focus on assessing movements informed by white nationalist ideals. The specificity here is striking. The project does not seek to "conceptualize extremism" broadly; it seeks to map the "offline violent extremist dynamics" of a specific political tribe. This ensures that policymakers will receive high-resolution, data-rich reports on the "shifting extremist violence ecosystem" of the Right, but will remain reliant on outdated or generic models for understanding the shifting ecosystem of the Jihadist Left or Islamist movements.

The bias score of 16 reflects this exclusivity. The project received maximum penalty points for the total absence of Islamist focus (4 points) and antisemitism focus (4 points). By defining the "ecosystem" strictly through a white nationalist lens, the project effectively excludes the ecosystem of anti-Zionist extremism that has flourished on university campuses—the very environment in which this research is being conducted.

3.2 Canadian Anti-Hate Network (CAHN)

- **Project:** *Creating an Ethical Framework for Research on Far-Right Organizing in Canada*
- **Risk Score:** 19/20 (Very High)

The Canadian Anti-Hate Network (CAHN) received the highest bias score in the entire portfolio, a near-perfect 19/20. CAHN's mandate is explicitly and publicly "antifascist," focused on monitoring "hate promoting movements" strictly through a far-right lens.¹⁶ The project funded by the CRF, receiving a substantial portion of the available research funds, is

designed to build capacity for researching *only* far-right organizing.

CAHN's organizational mandate provides a comprehensive list of their priority areas: "Neo-Nazism, White nationalism, Militant accelerationism, 764 / Com / Nihilistic Violent Extremism (NVE), Christian nationalism, Anti-2SLGBTQ+ movements, Male supremacist movements, and Anti-gender movements".¹⁶ This list is revealing for two reasons:

1. **Alignment with the NVE Threat:** The inclusion of "764 / Com" shows alignment with one part of the CSIS threat assessment (the Edmonton youth case).³ This demonstrates that the CRF is capable of funding relevant work when the threat (nihilism/sexual extortion) fits within a broader "hate" framework.
2. **Exclusion of the Islamist Threat:** The list conspicuously excludes Islamism, Jihadism, or religiously motivated violent extremism (other than Christian). CAHN defines "Domestic Extremism" using a definition rooted in "white power" and "inequality".¹⁶ This definition is structurally incapable of categorizing Islamist extremism—which is often transnational, anti-nationalist (in the Caliphate sense), and non-white—as a form of "hate" equivalent to white supremacy.

By funding a mandate that explicitly excludes Islamist extremism (scoring 4 points for lack of focus) and frames antisemitism largely through a far-right lens (neglecting the Islamist/anti-Zionist vectors prevalent in 2025), the CRF is subsidizing a view of national security that is functionally blind to the threats identified by the RCMP in the Toronto and Ottawa plots. CAHN also received penalty points for failing to operationalize the IHRA definition (2 points) and lacking formal partnerships with mainstream Jewish security bodies (2 points).

3.3 Simon Fraser University (SFU) & UQAM

- **Projects:** *Canadian Network for Research on Security, Extremism and Society (CANSES)* (SFU) and *Canadian Practitioners Network (CPN-PREV)* (UQAM)
- **Risk Score: 13/20 (High)**

Simon Fraser University and UQAM are tasked with building the networks that connect researchers and practitioners. These projects function as "force multipliers".¹⁸ SFU's CANSES is designed to disseminate "evidence-based guidelines" and build on the legacy of the TSAS network.

However, if the underlying research culture is biased (as evidenced by the Ontario Tech and CAHN grants), these networks will amplify that bias across the entire practitioner community. Both organizations score in the "High Risk" range (13/20) primarily due to the "Agnostic Trap." Their project descriptions rely on neutral language like "preventing extremist violence,"

masking the fact that the content being shared is likely dominated by RWE research.²⁰ There is no mention in either summary of specific modules or research clusters dedicated to the theology of ISIS or the nuances of modern antisemitism. Consequently, the "best practices" disseminated to social workers and teachers across Canada will be calibrated for RWE intervention, leaving them ill-equipped to handle the specific mechanics of Islamist radicalization.

4. Sector Audit: The Digital and Tech Sector

The digital battleground is central to modern counter-radicalization. The 2025 CRF portfolio invests heavily in "digital interventions" and "online resilience." However, the audit reveals that these initiatives are frequently framed around concepts of "hate" and "polarization" that are ill-suited for detecting and countering Jihadist propaganda, which often masquerades as political resistance or religious instruction.

4.1 Christchurch Call Foundation

- **Project:** *Eliminating Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content (TVEC) online*
- **Risk Score:** 16/20 (Very High)

The Christchurch Call Foundation was born from a specific tragedy: the 2019 far-right attack on mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. Its organizational DNA is rooted in the fight against white supremacist violence. While its mandate to eliminate "Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content (TVEC)" is technically broad, the audit finds that the tools developed under this mandate are historically prioritized toward detecting Neo-Nazi imagery and manifestos.

In the context of the current threat landscape, where Hamas and Hezbollah utilize sophisticated digital networks to disseminate propaganda on Telegram and TikTok, the question is whether the tools developed by the Christchurch Call are being trained to detect Jihadist symbolism with the same rigor applied to far-right symbols. The project summary provides no assurance of this. The project operates under a high-level international mandate that historically prioritizes RWE, earning it a Very High Risk score (16/20) for its structural skew. It receives maximum penalty points for lack of Islamist focus (4) and lack of antisemitism focus (4), suggesting that its algorithms may be highly sensitive to one form of hate while remaining porous to another.

4.2 Digital Public Square (DPS)

- **Projects:** *Strengthening Resilience to IMVE Narratives & Community Trust and Strengthening IMVE Interventions*
- **Risk Score: 13/20 (High)**

Digital Public Square (DPS) offers a critical case study in the use of "Polarization" as a euphemism. The project explicitly aims to address "polarization in Canada and its connection to ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE)".²¹ The use of "polarization" implies that the threat arises from a lack of middle ground, rather than from the existence of specific, malicious ideologies that *should* be rejected.

DPS is one of the few grantees to explicitly mention "antisemitic hate," preventing a maximum risk score. However, it is listed third in a cluster alongside "anti-Muslim" and "anti-Palestinian" hate.²¹ This grouping suggests a "both-sides" framing that equates the security threat facing the Jewish community—which is targeted by global terror networks—with broader social prejudices. Furthermore, the project aims to "counter the normalization of hate" through digital engagement. Treating antisemitism as a "narrative" to be managed via dialogue fails to address its function as a theological driver of violence.

Additionally, DPS manages projects like "Pathways to Resilience" which focus on climate justice and adaptation.²³ While valuable for climate policy, the inclusion of such themes under the broad umbrella of "resilience" in a national security context dilutes the focus on counter-terrorism. The project scores 13/20, reflecting the high risk that its "anti-polarization" tools will be ineffective against the absolute claims of Islamist ideology.

4.3 Violence Prevention Network (VPN) & Moonshot

- **Project:** *Online Referrals (VPN) & Expanding online support pathways (Moonshot)*
- **Risk Score: 13/20 (High)**

The inclusion of international entities like Violence Prevention Network (Germany) and Moonshot (UK) highlights the government's reliance on imported methodologies.²² Moonshot is well-regarded for its "Redirect Method," which uses advertising algorithms to direct users searching for extremist content toward constructive alternatives.

However, the specific parameters of these interventions are opaque. Moonshot's project in the 2025 tranche is titled "Expanding online support pathways for Canadians at-risk of

ideologically motivated violent extremism".²² The use of "IMVE" (Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism) is the critical indicator here. In Canadian government nomenclature, IMVE typically refers to Xenophobia, Anti-Authority, and Gender-Driven extremism, while "RMVE" (Religiously Motivated) refers to Islamism.¹⁷ By explicitly titling the project for "IMVE," the grant structurally excludes the RMVE (Daesh) threat from its scope. This effectively means Canada is funding world-class digital interventions for Neo-Nazis while leaving the digital battlespace of Jihadism uncontested.

5. Sector Audit: The Clinical and Psychosocial Sector

The largest sector in the portfolio involves "hubs," "intervention services," and "psychosocial support." These programs operate on the frontline, dealing with individuals at risk. The audit reveals a pervasive tendency in this sector to *medicalize radicalization*, treating it as a "vulnerability" or "trauma" issue rather than an ideological one. This "Clinical Evasion" often serves as a shield, allowing organizations to avoid the politically sensitive work of confronting Islamist ideology.

5.1 Organization for the Prevention of Violence (OPV)

- **Project:** *The Prairie Region Targeted Violence Prevention (PR-TVP) Project*
- **Risk Score:** 15/20 (Very High)

The OPV operates in Western Canada, focusing on "intervention services" combining "mental health and psychosocial supports" to reduce "risk factors." The language is aggressively neutral. Terms like "targeted violence" replace "terrorism." This approach is professionally safe but operationally risky. By focusing on "protective factors" and "mental health," the OPV avoids naming the ideologies it is countering.

However, "targeted violence" research in Canada often drifts toward RWE (e.g., Incel violence, white supremacy). The silence on Islamism in the project description is absolute (4 points). There is no mention of "radicalization to religious violence" or "political Islam." This genericism earns the OPV a Very High Risk score (15/20). The refusal to name the threat vectors implies a refusal to engage with the specific doctrinal elements of those threats. In a region with a diverse demographic profile, failing to explicitly equip practitioners to handle Islamist radicalization leaves a significant blind spot.

5.2 Yorktown Family Services

- **Project:** *Engaging Youth, Diaspora Communities and Community Capacity Building*
- **Risk Score:** 16/20 (Very High)

Yorktown's project description contains a revealing juxtaposition that drives its high risk score. It aims to engage "diaspora communities" while simultaneously addressing threats linked to "anti-authority narratives" and "political violence".²² "Anti-authority narratives" is widely recognized in Canadian intelligence circles as a code for the "Freedom Convoy" and sovereign citizen movements—phenomena associated with the Right/IMVE spectrum.

By linking "threats" to "anti-authority narratives" but linking "diaspora communities" only to "capacity building" and "victim support," the project implies a bifurcation: the threat comes from the Right (anti-authority), while the Diaspora is solely a victim or a neutral entity. This framing ignores the reality of "anti-authority" narratives within Islamist ideology (e.g., the rejection of secular law or *Taghut*). The project scores 16/20 for this implicit targeting, effectively removing the agency—and the potential for radicalization—from the diaspora communities it claims to serve.

5.3 Canadian Municipal Network on Crime Prevention (CMNCP)

- **Project:** *Project Upstream*
- **Risk Score:** 13/20 (High)
- **Funding:** ~\$3 million¹

The CMNCP received nearly \$3 million for "Project Upstream," a massive investment in "upstream prevention".¹ The project asserts that crime prevention is more cost-effective than policing.²⁵ While sociologically sound, the application to counter-terrorism requires scrutiny.

"Upstream" prevention focuses on social determinants—housing, employment, belonging. While these factors contribute to vulnerability, they do not explain why a middle-class youth in Ottawa (like the recent plotters) turns to ISIS. The Ottawa plotters were not driven by a lack of municipal services; they were driven by a specific ideology accessed online.² By pouring \$3 million into generalist municipal capacity building that avoids naming "Islamism," the CRF is effectively funding social work while hoping it has a side-effect of preventing terrorism. This is a "spray and pray" approach to national security funding that lacks the targeted precision required to stop a Daesh-inspired plot.

5.4 McGill University Health Centre: The Exception

- **Project:** *Reintegration of Canadian extremist travellers*
- **Risk Score: 9/20 (Medium)**

This project is the sole outlier in the entire portfolio and the only one to score below 10. It explicitly targets "Canadian extremist travellers." While it avoids the word "Jihadist," the term "extremist traveller" is a term of art specifically denoting individuals who travelled to the Levant to join ISIS/Daesh.

The existence of this project demonstrates that the CRF *can* fund targeted, ideology-specific interventions when the threat is undeniable. However, this project is reactive—dealing with the "reintegration" of those who have already radicalized and returned. It is not a prevention program for the current generation. Furthermore, its focus is on the legacy threat of ISIS returnees, not the current threat of homegrown Hamas/Hezbollah sympathizers. It scores 9/20—"Medium Risk"—because it at least acknowledges a specific threat actor group that is not RWE.

6. Sector Audit: The Youth and Education Sector

The final sector analyzed is youth education. These programs are designed to build "resilience" in the classroom and community centers. The audit finds that they rely heavily on vague concepts of "critical thinking" that, without specific content, likely reinforce dominant cultural narratives rather than challenging extremist grooming.

6.1 CIVIX

- **Project:** *Building Resilience to Extremism and Bridging Social Division*
- **Risk Score: 15/20 (Very High)**

CIVIX focuses on "digital media literacy" and "civic education" to help students "resist manipulation." The goal is to facilitate "respectful classroom dialogue on controversial issues." While noble in intent, this approach is highly susceptible to the bias of the educator. If the curriculum materials for "controversial issues" are drawn from the dominant RWE-focused

research ecosystem (see Ontario Tech), then students will be taught to deconstruct right-wing conspiracy theories while potentially viewing anti-Zionist propaganda as legitimate political discourse. The project description mentions "hateful content" but offers no definition. The lack of explicit modules on antisemitism (4 points) or Islamist extremism means the program is ideologically agnostic in theory but likely biased in practice. It scores 15/20 due to this pedagogical vagueness.

6.2 Boys and Girls Clubs of Canada (BGC Canada)

- **Project:** *The Way Out*
- **Risk Score:** 12/20 (High)

BGC Canada is a mainstream charity with no overt political agenda, yet it scores "High" (12/20) due to the "negative space" in its programming. The project uses exclusively ideology-agnostic terms ("radicalization to violence") and maintains total public silence on Islamist threats and antisemitism. The project emphasizes "trauma-informed" approaches. While valid for gang violence, trauma models are insufficient for ideological radicalization. A youth mobilizing to violence under Daesh ideology is not necessarily acting out of "trauma" but out of "conviction." A youth worker trained only in generic "grievance-based violence" lacks the "semantic keys" to recognize these specific indicators. Under the rubric, this total avoidance is treated as a failure to adapt to the post-October 7 threat landscape.

6.3 Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV)

- **Project:** *Pedagogical Tools and Research*
- **Risk Score:** 13/20 (High)

The CPRLV in Montreal is a major recipient and a "Centre of Excellence." It produces tools like the "Small Illustrated Guide to Hatred" and the "Hexagon" analysis tool.²⁶ While CPRLV has been more active than others in acknowledging the post-October 7 spike in hate crimes (citing a "double" increase in Montreal compared to Toronto in media interviews²⁶), its pedagogical tools remain largely agnostic or broad.

The risk here is the "dilution effect." By creating tools that treat all "hate" as mechanistically similar (the "process of radicalization"), the distinct theological drivers of Islamism are lost. A "comic book" on radicalization²⁶ may depict a generic extremist, but does it depict the

specific religious arguments used by ISIS recruiters? Without that specificity, the tool is a dull instrument. The CPRLV scores High Risk because, despite its resources, it has not pivoted to a "Threat Specific" model that matches the urgency of the Daesh resurgence identified by CSIS.

7. Systemic Failures: The Mechanisms of Misalignment

Aggregating the data across all audited organizations reveals that the bias is not merely "imbalanced" but structurally skewed. The systemic bias is maintained through three primary mechanisms that cut across all sectors.

7.1 The "IMVE" Category Error and the Agnostic Trap

The federal government's adoption of "Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism" (IMVE) was intended to create a catch-all category to replace "Right-Wing Extremism".¹⁷ In practice, however, as seen in the Digital Public Square and Moonshot grants, IMVE has become a synonym for Right-Wing Extremism. The "Ideology" in IMVE is almost always assumed to be political (Far-Right/Far-Left), while the "Religious" motivation of Islamist extremism is erased or relegated to the unfunded "RMVE" category.

This linguistic drift creates the "Agnostic Trap." Organizations use terms like "polarization," "social cohesion," and "grievance-based violence" to appear neutral. This framing posits that the problem is conflict itself, rather than specific violent beliefs. In the context of the post-October 7 environment, this is disastrous. Islamist radicalization is not a result of "polarization" that can be solved by dialogue; it is a theocratic project. Treating it as a "grievance" to be heard risks validating the narrative precursors to violence rather than challenging them.

7.2 The Dilution and Marginalization of Antisemitism

The most damning finding of this audit is the near-total absence of the word "antisemitism" as a primary project focus, despite it being the driver of the most significant recent terror plots (Ottawa, NYC).

- **0 of 19** projects have "Antisemitism" in their title.
- **0 of 19** projects represent a dedicated intervention for de-radicalizing antisemites.
- Only **2 of 19** projects (DPS, Students Commission) even mention the word in their description.²¹
- **0 of 19** projects mention the IHRA definition.

This silence occurs in a funding cycle active during the largest spike in antisemitic violence in Canadian history. The refusal of grantees to explicitly name this threat—preferring "all forms of hate" lists—suggests a systemic aversion to addressing Jew-hatred when it does not fit the convenient "Far-Right" perpetrator profile. Without the IHRA definition, funded programs lack the necessary objective standard to distinguish between legitimate political speech and antisemitic hate speech (e.g., equating Zionism with Nazism), increasing the risk of both false negatives and false positives.

7.3 The Governance Gap: Exclusion of Expertise

A robust counter-radicalization strategy requires deep integration with the communities most targeted by violence. The audit reveals a systemic exclusion of Jewish community expertise from the CRF network.

Table 1: The Governance Gap

Category	Metric	Finding
Consultation	Formal Partnerships	Zero major Jewish security bodies (CIJA, B'nai Brith) are listed as primary partners for national hubs like CPN-PREV or CPRLV. ²²
Definition	IHRA Implementation	Zero projects explicitly cite IHRA as their operational definition for antisemitism.

Representation	Jewish Focus	Zero projects are dedicated exclusively to combating antisemitism.
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This exclusion is egregious given that organizations like CIJA possess the most sophisticated open-source intelligence (OSINT) regarding the post-October 7 surge in antisemitism. It ensures that the "antisemitism" components of these broad projects are likely to be generic and disconnected from the lived reality of the threat.

8. The International Warning: Lessons from the UK

The risks associated with ideology-agnostic "anti-polarization" frameworks are not theoretical. The United Kingdom's experience with its "Prevent" strategy serves as a critical warning for Canada. The UK model demonstrates how broad definitions of "extremism" and "safeguarding" can be weaponized against Jewish targets when unmoored from specific definitions like the IHRA.

8.1 The Weaponization of "Safeguarding"

In the UK, the lack of precise definitions has allowed "anti-radicalization" machinery to be turned against Jewish students and chaplains. Because "Zionism" is a core component of Jewish identity for many, but a source of "grievance" for radicalized groups, "anti-polarization" officers often view the *presence* of Zionism as the disruption to social cohesion.

- **The "Free Palestine" vs. Zionist Badge Disparity:** Case studies from the UK reveal incidents where Jewish students have been referred to the Prevent program for expressing "Zionist" views, which were interpreted by staff as "contentious" or likely to cause "grievance".⁶ Conversely, the wearing of "Free Palestine" badges has often been treated as protected political speech.
- **The University of Leeds Case Study:** The harassment of Rabbi Zecharia Deutsch, a Jewish chaplain at the University of Leeds, illustrates the failure of "community cohesion" mandates. In the "anti-polarization" framework, the presence of a "Zionist" chaplain was framed by activists as a "provocation." Rather than protecting the chaplain as a victim of hate, the system struggled to defend his right to be present because his identity was viewed as the source of the "polarization".⁶

8.2 Importing the Failure to Canada

The CRF’s funding of projects like Digital Public Square, which groups "anti-Palestinian" and "antisemitic" hate together under a "polarization" umbrella ²¹, risks importing this precise failure mode. If a CRF-funded "resilience" program in a Canadian school aims to "reduce grievances," and a Jewish student’s Zionist identity causes "grievance" among a radicalized peer group, the path of least resistance for the "agnostic" practitioner is to silence the Zionist expression to restore "social harmony." This is the structural flaw of the 2025 portfolio: it funds the machinery of silence rather than the machinery of protection.

9. Data Synthesis: The Misalignment Matrix

The divergence between the intelligence picture provided by CSIS/RCMP and the funding allocation provided by the CRF is quantifiable and severe.

Table 2: The Misalignment Matrix

Threat Category (CSIS/RCMP 2024-25)	Explicit Evidence from Intelligence	Presence in the \$36.9M CRF Portfolio (Oct 2025)	Degree of Alignment
Antisemitism (Core driver of violent extremism)	Named as a core driver; central to 3 of 4 cited domestic plots (Ottawa, Toronto, NYC). ⁴	Named in only 2 of 19 projects; always diluted in lists; zero dedicated interventions. ²¹	Severe Misalignment
Daesh/ISIS-inspired (Islamist	The <i>only</i> ideological threat	Zero (0) projects explicitly name	Complete Misalignment

Extremism)	stream named repeatedly in operational examples of disrupted plots. ³	Islamist or Jihadist radicalization.	
Nihilist / COM 764 (Youth Online Extremism)	15-year-old arrested in Edmonton related to COM/764 network. ³	Addressed via Canadian Anti-Hate Network's specific mandate. ¹⁶	High Alignment
Far-Right / IMVE	Mentioned in passing as part of the landscape; zero specific plots cited as 2024-2025 examples. ³	Primary focus of at least 3 major research/infrastructure projects (Ontario Tech, CAHN, CANSES). ¹⁶	Gross Overrepresentation

10. Conclusion and Recommendations

The October 2025 Community Resilience Fund tranche represents a strategic failure to align national resources with national security reality. At a moment when Canada's intelligence service is warning of Daesh-inspired plots and preventing the mass murder of Jewish citizens (as seen in the Toronto and Ottawa plots), Public Safety Canada has invested nearly \$37 million in a portfolio that functionally ignores these threats.¹

Instead, the fund supports a network of organizations focused on the far-right, "polarization," and broad "anti-hate" mandates that lack the specificity to detect or disrupt the primary lethal threats of the current era. The *only* area of alignment is the funding of work against the COM/764 nihilist network, which is a genuine success, but it serves to highlight the glaring gap regarding Islamism. If the government can fund specific research into the "764" subculture, it can fund specific research into the "Daesh" subculture. The refusal to do so is a choice.

By relying on ideology-agnostic models and excluding Jewish security expertise, the CRF not only fails to protect the most targeted minority group in Canada but also risks funding programs that could inadvertently weaponize "anti-polarization" tools against them, replicating the failures of the UK Prevent strategy. The "near-perfect inversion" of the threat

picture suggests that the CRF is currently operating as a vehicle for social policy preferences—prioritizing "anti-right-wing" and "anti-polarization" initiatives—rather than as a rigorous instrument of national security.

Recommendations for Remediation

1. **Mandate Threat Parity:** Future funding calls must explicitly solicit projects titled "Islamist Extremism in Canada" to counterbalance the RWE research. The "ideology-agnostic" preference must be suspended until parity is achieved.
2. **Operationalize IHRA:** Public Safety Canada must require all grantees receiving "anti-hate" or "resilience" funding to formally adopt and operationalize the IHRA definition of antisemitism. This provides the necessary guardrails to ensure that "anti-polarization" tools are not weaponized against Jewish students.
3. **Abandon Agnostic Framing:** Move away from "polarization" and "grievance" language. Fund projects that name the ideology they are fighting. You cannot fight a threat you refuse to define.
4. **Integrate Jewish Expertise:** Formal partnerships with recognized Jewish security bodies (e.g., CIJA) must be a condition of funding for any national hub to ensure that the assessment of antisemitic threats is grounded in OSINT reality rather than academic theory.

Without these changes, the Community Resilience Fund will continue to fund a map that does not match the territory, leaving Canadians vulnerable to the threats it refuses to see.

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