

Biased Summary

Delegation from the United States of America

Adithi S., Madhav T., Mitansh K. & Vineeth B.

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The United States presents its thoughts on the General Assembly session on extending the European Union's digital governance frameworks, which consist of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Digital Services Act (DSA), Digital Markets Act (DMA), and Data Governance Act (DGA), globally. Washington appreciated the regulatory zeal that functions as the core tenets of the aforementioned data regulation acts but draws notice towards discussions that bring out the realities of real-world digital systems. The caucuses accurately presented the deeply rooted impracticalities and unintended consequences of attempting to extend EU regulations wholesale at a global scale. It echoes the discussions around the subtleties existing between diverse national contexts and the possibility for dangerous overreach that risks stifling innovation, exacerbating economic disparity, and undermining the very objectives it claims to protect.

The United States agrees with the repeatedly emphasized fact that many nations simply lack the foundational technological and legal frameworks to implement the EU's requirements. It supports X's stance that the regulations' requirements for independent data intermediaries and real-time content moderation is an endeavour that can only be undertaken by well resources jurisdictions. Tiktok, subsequently, supported this perspective by noting that elaborate workflows for audits and data deletion requests require infrastructure that is currently lacking in the developing world. Moreover, the absence of a genuine independent intermediary sector, a cornerstone of the DGA, highlighted a conceptual mismatch - notions of neutral data altruism organizations and fiduciary intermediaries have timid resonance in environments dominated by state-led or vertically integrated models. India repeated these observations stating that the required infrastructure is severely lacking in multiple nations. Washington notes that attempts to meet EU thresholds risk producing regulatory theatre rather than substantive data protections and urges that any cross-border data-flow agreements prioritize voluntary alignment around shared principles of openness. The United States also believes that American companies such as Amazon must agree to a cross-border data flow between nations that have voluntarily agreed to certain conditions in line with American values of freedom.

The United States notes that the most pressing objections came from developing economies and delegations representing small and medium-sized enterprises. Nations such as India raised that the heavy compliance costs of GDPR's sophisticated mandates could cripple its growing digital ecosystem. The prospect of dedicating a high amount of resources threatens to annihilate innovators before they can grow. South Africa emphasized the complexities inherent in the GDPR's fine regime, which allows penalties of up to two percent of global turnover. In economies without deep financial reservoirs, such fines would not merely be corrective- they could lead to the withdrawal of companies from vital markets. The delegate of SA warned that it lacks space in that area, emphasizing that such penalties would discourage investment.

The United Kingdom's contributions further supported the US raised economic anxiety, where delegates cited a startling statistic - nearly one-quarter of UK SMEs had already chosen to exit EU markets to avoid the recurring costs of GDPR compliance. Quantitative analyses presented during the caucus painted an equally grim picture for U.S. providers - by 2024, American firms had already expended an estimated \$8.6 billion to satisfy GDPR obligations, and projected additional burdens from the DMA and DSA ranged from \$22 billion to \$50 billion figures that dwarf the collective marketing budgets of many mid-tier firms. The United States further echoes that existing voluntary frameworks and bottom-up regulations are adequate and criticizes India's characterization of U.S. data regulation as merely economically driven, insisting that its approach is grounded in core principles of individual liberty and open markets, not profit motives alone.

Further, delegates lamented that the requirement to secure explicit consent for each novel use of data was discouraging R&D, particularly in the field of artificial intelligence. Delegates highlighted that GDPR-style consent restrictions have reduced available training datasets for AI by an estimated one-third. This contraction in data access has had consequences - Only two of the top twenty large language models launched in early 2025 originated from EU-based developers, a small number to the output from North American and Asia-Pacific labs. Complementing this, venture capital flows illustrate the widening ravine - in 2024, EU startups attracted €6.2 billion in AI funding, while U.S. ventures secured \$42 billion. The Meta delegation, while acknowledging concerns about data usage without explicit consent, framed their past practices as symptomatic of the inherent tension between governance and innovation - had regulators provided clearer frameworks for use, the need for after-the-fact remediation might have been significantly mitigated. Instead, the current regime forces companies into a binary choice between forgoing novel applications and risking noncompliance. Washington also raises doubts about Paris' motivations to declare transparency and uniformity in EU regulation fines citing that due investigation and procedures have only been raised against American companies.

Besides these overall concerns, each part of the EU package was closely examined. The DGA's goals to encourage data sharing for the public good and to set up neutral intermediaries were praised in theory, but delegates universally

doubted how practical they really are. To date, only eleven data-intermediation services have registered globally, a figure far below what would be required for meaningful network effects. OpenAI’s mention of data altruism was questioned. Even though the company has made public promises, it has mainly formed exclusive deals with companies like Reddit and NewsCorp for private data. It also keeps its models closed-source, making many believe that its claims of altruism are more about words than real actions. Apple’s representative called the DMA’s rules, like the ban on self-preferencing without clear proof of harm, annoying. They pointed out that 68 percent of users prefer smooth, all-in-one experiences exactly what integrated ecosystems provide. Required interoperability, shown clearly by Apple’s expensive \$3.2 billion shift to USB-C, not only forces companies to spend heavily on updates, but also creates cybersecurity risks. It can also harm the environment by increasing electronic waste. Google’s submission echoed these concerns, observing that specialised encryption requirements (e.g., CLS 1.3) and extensive auditing protocols represent a substantial diversion that only the largest firms can sustain. The DSA was criticized for using vague and broad terms like illegal content and systemic risk. These unclear terms give regulators and platform moderators a lot of power to decide how the rules are applied. Delegates from X and Meta warned that this lack of clarity pushes platforms to take down too much content, which can limit free expression and slow down progress in algorithm development. Even smaller platforms, warned the United Kingdom, face immediate obligations for risk assessments, reporting, and transparency measures for which they lack the resources. China added another dimension that the DSA’s mandate for algorithmic audits by government agencies risks exposing trade secrets, undermining intellectual property protections, and deterring investment in next-generation recommendation systems.

Supporters of global harmonization claimed the EU’s framework would reduce barriers and facilitate data flows. However, firsthand accounts contradicted these assertions. The combined impact of different adequacy assessments seen in ongoing disputes over the EU–U.S. Data Privacy Framework has created legal uncertainty. This has made it harder for cross-border research partnerships and trade in data-based services to grow. Meta’s testimony on the pressures of data localization were particularly insightful; the requirement to deploy redundant data centers in every jurisdiction raises costs, multiplies cybersecurity risks, and shifts digital access in an unfair way toward wealthier areas. Apple shared concerns about mass surveillance when data is controlled locally, while Amazon highlighted the environmental effect of having redundant infrastructure. They also warned that emerging economies might struggle to bear these burdens. Trade experts warned that the DMA’s gatekeeper designations could act as a non-tariff barrier. Since six of the first seven designated platforms are based in the United States, the rules might violate WTO principles and lead to retaliatory actions, which could harm global cooperation. Japan’s delegate, initially optimistic about compatibility, later underscored inconsistent treatment of pseudonymization standards as symptomatic of cherry-picking, rather than genuine regulatory alignment. Washington also commends Japan’s interest

in broadening the existing frameworks between the two nations for voluntary based cross border data flow regulations and a coalition of a Clean Network with trusted entities.

Rather than supporting a monolithic framework, delegates pushed for diverse models that are customized to different priorities and capabilities. India outlined its Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, centered on mutual recognition and adaptive compliance thresholds. Brazil's LGPD, Australia's Privacy Act, and China's cyber-sovereignty statutes were mentioned as examples of sovereign alternatives. Each balances privacy, innovation, and security in ways that make sense locally. Even within the EU, fragmentation persists. France's delegate warned that the DGA's unclear definitions might encourage regulatory arbitrage between member states. They pointed to CNIL's stricter enforcement of cookie rules compared to EU standards as proof that true uniformity is unrealistic. This difference within Europe itself, they argued, shows how unrealistic it is to expect one set of rules to work for an even wider range of countries around the world. In response, South Africa proposed the establishment of an Inclusive Global Digital Governance Council, wherein nation-state delegates hold equal representation and multinational corporations are expressly excluded from voting rights. Washington wholeheartedly supports the establishment of such an institution but contests that it must not be expected to support it in terms of financing as implied by the certain delegate.

Many delegates did not appreciate the idea of extending the EU frameworks as a global standard. They felt that the EU was unilaterally attempting to impose its regulations, thus undermining principles of democratic consent. Every country has its own history, culture and economy, which should be respected while creating laws that affect everyone. There was thus a feeling that the EU was trying to control how the world should embrace digital rules. Critics warned that bypassing local governance frameworks by accepting external rules would lead to weakening of their respective democratic structures. Important decisions regarding protection of data and managing online content should be done through open discussions within each country and not be enforced by external players.

The delegates rallied around a vision grounded in cooperation, learning from one another, and employing flexible approaches to accommodate every country's pace of digital development. The key ideas around which this approach revolves include allowing countries with similar data protection regulations to allow improved data flows. It's also important to note that rules are based on risks; therefore, it makes sense for the bigger companies to have more responsibility than the smaller ones. Finally, a need for a common council consisting of various government officials, researchers, and experts was voiced to regularly review and update the global policies accordingly. This renewed system thus encourages innovation instead of posing a blanket ban on new ideas by allowing safe experiments through things like special testing zones and temporary exceptions.

After participating in the moderated caucuses and hearing all the arguments, the United States believes that despite the positive intentions that reside in the EU's digital governance framework, they are not well suited for universalisation. The delegates from across the world warn of the high compliance burdens and the impact that enforcement of these regulations would cause on them. Act-specific discussions hint that the EU frameworks of DGA, DSA and DMA possess deep flaws. There was clear consensus among the delegates to embrace a diverse approach and move away from the "one-size-fits-all" approach of the EU law by replacing it with a more nuanced framework, one that supports flexibility and equity over blanket uniformity. In this setting, the EU's plans seem very less helpful for framing and conceptualising global policies. In order to create universalizable frameworks, there is thus a need to listen to varied views and on a deeper level understand that not all countries share similar resources and needs.