'INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS CANNOT BE SOLVED, ONLY MITIGATED TO A LIMITED DEGREE'. DO YOU AGREE, WHY/WHY NOT?

To define international security, consider the actions or combination of actions taken by states and multilateral organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union, and others to avert conflict and protect people (Sheehan, 2005). International agreements can take a variety of forms. States and international organisations are attempting to maintain mutual survival and safety for their citizens through these actions, which is a resilient strategy because it avoids crossing a threshold or establishing a new base. (Kolodziej, 2005). I'm convinced that international problems can only be mitigated to a limited degree with the points I will make below.

To rule out the possibility that international security problems can be mitigated completely, it is an understatement to say that resilience has shifted from one of national protection to one of localised prevention and self-organizing responses. As its scope and application expanded, internal tensions and contradictions increased proportionately. Resilience entails safeguarding citizens against terrorists while also fostering grassroots activism and collective efficacy in the face of threats (including those from the government). By combining these disparate approaches and understandings of resilience, it becomes apparent. By examining a case study from Birmingham, UK, we can gain a better understanding of these internal conflicts and how it can be mitigated to a certain degree. In June 2010, Birmingham was scheduled to receive 290 security cameras, which in my opinion is a way of mitigating international security to a degree because it cannot be totally solved, and this approach is called governing from the distance. Despite its familiarity, the British public was unfamiliar with many aspects of this initiative. However, due to the operation's size, technological sophistication, and geographic location, such practises were unheard of. Military-developed ANPR technology also enabled 150 high-tech surveillance cameras (governing from distance) which catches the plate number

automatically, this is yet another point that international security can only be mitigated to a certain level using this resilient approach. To help understand better why international security problems can be mitigated to a degree, two predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods in the city were encircled by surveillance architectures and borders. There are numerous variations on the theme of encirclement, with technological perimeters replacing physical ones and containment and categorical suspicion taking the place of intramural spaces. Media coverage highlighted concerns about security-driven resilience philosophies versus fundamental concepts such as protection, prevention, anticipation, and localism. Project Champion's fallout demonstrates how the three logics of security-driven resilience collide, with one fault line converging on the scheme's divisive nature and local state efforts to engage citizens in security and crime-reduction programmes. (Coaffee, 2013)

To gain a detailed understanding of why international security can only be mitigated, I will reference to a case study in UK. The United Kingdom's counterterrorism efforts have primarily concentrated on a few densely populated urban areas. When highly targeted security architectures were implemented, the emphasis shifted away from the intended subjects and toward their associates, networks, and physical locations. Between 2007 and 2011, 11 individuals were convicted of terrorism in Sparkbrook and Washwood Heath, both of which have a sizable Muslim population. These were the areas monitored by the 290 cameras installed as part of Project Champion. Both Sparkbrook and Washwood Heath have populations in excess of 30,000. The United States is defined by a high level of racial and ethnic diversity, as well as by unemployment and other economic difficulties. The two largest ethnic groups in Sparkbrook are Asian/Asian British Pakistani (42%), and Arab (10%), with significant Somali populations (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015). Residents of Washwood Heath are more likely to identify as Pakistani or Indian (57 percent) than they are to identify as Bangladeshi or Kashmiri

(both of which are distinct from the other two), each area has over 40% of households without working adults, emphasising the socioeconomic divide (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015).

The term "resilience" has become increasingly popular in urban policy circles since its introduction in 2000. Previously, it was understood to refer to a city's capacity to recover from "natural" or "environmental" disasters. For a long time, the government has placed a premium on protecting Western cities from international terrorism, but state security services have been largely responsible for this. Local governments were previously responsible for disaster response in the event of a "shock" event, according to O'Brien and Read (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015). Protests across the country in 2000 over the high cost of fuel sparked significant changes in the economy. Organizing protests such as blockades of oil refineries and go-slow convoys on highways had a significant impact on Venezuela's economy. At this point, the government's response to these protests lacked a clear "chain of command," raising serious questions about who oversaw coordinating petrochemical industry and emergency response efforts (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015). In 2000–2001, the country was ravaged by foot-and-mouth disease and severe flooding. These occurrences brought the same issues to light. As demonstrated by these events, a significant shift in government preparedness for emergencies was long overdue, both individually and collectively. This process was accelerated following the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent fear that terrorists would target strategic locations in and around UK cities. As a result, Washington made reforming the emergency preparedness system a top priority. The term "resilience" became official in the early 2000s as a result of the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 (CCA) to describe this material and institutional change. The CCA is a British government initiative aimed at establishing a unified approach to disaster preparedness. This strategy is predicated on forewarning, prevention, preparation, response, and recovery (Cabinet Office, 2003). The UK has gradually implemented new resilience policies and practises since the early 2000s. This is because political priorities have shifted (Coaffee & Fussey,

2015). These three waves of urban resilience policies occurred concurrently, resulting in more sophisticated interactions between city dwellers and those responsible for national security and disaster preparedness. The point of this post is that policy changes will not occur in a linear fashion. A "messy" policy change process, on the other hand, reveals several significant shifts in thinking. When it comes to resilience policy, the article will argue that this evolutionary policy narrative has resulted in the emergence of a new "fourth wave." With current austerity and localism policies in place, urban resilience policy is shifting away from national-level securitization and toward locally integrated place-based outcomes. (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015)

International terrorists were expected to attack cities in the run-up to and following the CCA. As a result, local governments have been forced to address the issue. Since the emergence of the terrorist threat, resilience policies aimed at mitigating risk have gained popularity. Individuals could go about their daily lives with confidence and liberty as a result of this policy (HM Government, 2006). The government's primary objective was to maintain critical services in the UK's critical national infrastructure (CNI). Additionally, the government sought to strengthen urban infrastructure in order to assist urban systems in "recovering" to pre-shock levels (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015). Many people became aware of their own vulnerability and the importance of developing resilience as a result of adversity. 4 The physical resistance of security systems as well as their safeguards are referred to in this context as "first wave resilience." CPNI5 and NCTSO6 were instrumental in bringing attention to the first wave of community resilience through security and law enforcement (NaCTSO). (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015)

To begin, high-risk areas have been outfitted with fortress-like security measures. At the time of this writing, professionals in the built environment, such as architects and urban planners, had little interaction, one tangible manifestation of this territorial response to security concerns is the installation of steel barriers or crash-rated bollards around key locations, such as the

Houses of Parliament and national embassies. Efforts to eradicate terrorism and restrict vehicular traffic access to these locations have been unsuccessful, this was not an isolated incident in the United Kingdom, it was many people's first international response to post-9/11 anxiety. It was necessary and obtrusive, but its political purpose was to demonstrate that the government was taking steps to safeguard the country against terrorism"', many viewed it as an overly ambitious plan considering the numerous unknown threats that cities face (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015).

Over the last couple of years, we have witnessed the entrance of the 21st century globalisation into the issues of security. Considering the rapid technological developments and global threats that have emerged from the processes of globalisation, the "multi-sum security principle" of the philosopher, neuroscientist, and geostrategist Nayef Al-Rodhan comes in handy as an exhaustive definition of security which assumes that security in a globalised world like we have today can no longer be described in the context of the involvement of states alone (Nayef R F Al-Rodhan, 2007). This is supported by the existence of five well described security elements which include environmental (resilience and climate change), human, national, Transnational Organised Crime (TOC), and transcultural security (resilience and public security) (resilience and public security). Having all these therefore means that to mitigate international security to a limited degree, there must be good governance that guarantees security across all five dimensions for all states and individuals alike. The existence of this multidimensional security structure demonstrates the essentiality of ensuring that all five dimensions of security receive equal attention if we intend to achieve international security that is sustainable. Ultimately, this necessitates cooperation between states, as well as peaceful existence between civilizations and cultural groups. Looking at these security issues which are interrelated and transnational, it is obvious that attempting to address them in isolation will fail. These issues are too complex for

countries to manage on their own, hence the need for international cooperation which in my opinion is a resilience approach (Nayef R F Al-Rodhan, 2007).

In recent decades, a significant shift has occurred, from the initial wave of disaster response focused on mitigating the impact of these events on society to a more preparedness-oriented approach. The resilience of businesses, governments, and communities was just one aspect of the second wave's resilience policy. It investigated ways in which they could be avoided at all costs during the investigation (i.e., the socio-economic agility of society to respond to crisis). While many believe that the objective of second-wave resilience is to restore pre-event conditions, this is not the case. It is critical to establish a "new normal" following a crisis (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015).

In 2004, as part of the CCA agreement, the UK implemented this multi-level governance system for resilience. Local governments collaborated to develop resilience plans for a variety of threats. Emergency preparedness was also discussed among national government officials and those working in the construction industry (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015). This is not to say that a terrorist attack in a populated area is impossible. Since the events of July 7, 2005, in London, urban terrorism and the built environment's role in combating it have received increased attention (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015).

Increased public safety in densely populated cities was made possible in the summer of 2007 by terrorist attacks in London and Glasgow. Not until November 2007 were official assessments of these incidents and their potential national security ramifications conducted. Critical national infrastructure (stations and ports), as well as densely populated areas, should be strengthened against vehicle bombings in terms of resilience and physical protection. 10 Since then, a national network of counterterrorism experts and security advisors has been established11 to assist local stakeholders in better comprehending the dangers they face and

implementing protective security measures. These national threat inventories have been forwarded to city officials who will be responsible for their implementation. Security features had to be integrated in a way that was socially acceptable and reasonable. Whenever possible, the use of a discrete security system should be prioritised (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015). Urban designers and planners were tasked with the responsibility of developing "softer" alternatives to militarised urban design. According to some, security features have been concealed and integrated into the urban landscape in order to combat terrorism. (Coaffee & Fussey, 2015).

Aside the terror attacks mentioned earlier we can see how covid-19 has become a big threat to the international security, to demonstrate in detail because international security can only be mitigated to a certain extent. Without a doubt, the covid-19 pandemic is one of the most dangerous pandemics we could ever face. COVID19 has resulted in well over 5 million deaths worldwide, with more than 750,000 deaths in America alone (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). Apart from the deaths, the pandemic has disrupted the politics and economies of numerous vital states, having far-reaching consequences years from now. Without a doubt, this pandemic exemplifies the negative synergy between great power competition and transnational threats; this covid-19 outbreak resulted in the mandatory use of face masks, hand sanitization, and vaccination against covid-19, which is also a resilience strategy introduced by the World Health Organization (WHO). As Jamie P. Horsley of Yale Law School reported, China withheld critical information about the virus from the World Health Organization (WHO) during the virus's early stages of spread (Horsley, 2020). The way China has conducted itself throughout the crisis demonstrates the extent to which the country has increased its influence on international bodies, oblivious to the consequences for other nations' interests. In my opinion, if China had made the virus public in the first instance, there might have been a chance of eradicating the virus; this is yet another reason why international security is a concern.

Additionally, considering the COVID19 pandemic, the World Bank reports that China's economy grew by 2.3 percent in 2020, while the US economy contracted by 3.5 percent (Overview, n.d.). Numerous other countries suffered even greater economic losses. As Thomas Wright of the Centre on the United States and Europe puts it, China is now five years ahead of the US and is expected to overtake the US as the world's largest economy by 2027. (Wright, 2021). The projection appears to refute the State Council's Development Research Centre's earlier prediction of China's takeover in 2032. China, interestingly, has a history of using global crises to strengthen its economy, the first being the aftermath of the financial crisis (Chow, 2010), during which it intensified its "geopolitical assertiveness." Thus, in less than fifteen years, China has annihilated Hong Kong, fought India, and is now attempting to increase its diplomatic influence in international systems through the selective distribution of medical supplies and vaccines. According to reported data, China has produced the most vaccines and has already commercially exported 1.1 billion doses of its vaccines to 123 countries as of October 8, 2021. ("Covid-19 vaccines: Has China made more than other countries combined?" 2021). Additionally, as of October 6, China had administered 2.2 billion doses domestically, while other countries such as India, the EU, and the US had only administered 923.5 million, 571.4 million, and 398.7 million doses, respectively. These figures demonstrate how China's goal of capitalising on the crisis to boost its own economy and strengthen its international competitiveness has been greatly accomplished. We could argue that the virus's rapid spread was natural, but China is not entirely clean, as evidenced by Chinese authorities' mismanagement of critical information about the outbreak. During the same period that Chinese health authorities prohibited doctors and researchers from disseminating unapproved information about the outbreak and failing to report any cases, Wuhan, a virus hotspot, held nearly two weeks of local political meetings. According to a retrospective study (Lai et al.,

2020), if China had taken critical measures earlier, infections could have been significantly reduced.

In my opinion, great power competition makes it more difficult to conquer the covid-19, which supports my argument that international security problems cannot be completely solved. When we put all these factors together, we can easily assume that an attempt at great power competition in a crisis would be at the expense of the cooperation that is expected and required to combat such a problem. According to experts, a long-term effect of the pandemic is expected to be the deepening of poverty in some parts of the developing world. While we are discussing China's role in this, we must also acknowledge that the US government obtained critical information that it mishandled as well. With all available evidence, the US government downplayed the threat and refused to prepare for possible disease spread within the country, resulting in the country's great disaster. All these behaviours were diametrically opposed to cooperation and exhibited more competitive characteristics. As a result, human security came under severe strain, and we all witnessed the global impact, with many lives lost and many families thrust into unexpected poverty. This demonstrates that international security issues can be mitigated only to a certain extent.

Another example of how governments have embraced competition over cooperation is in the development of clean technology to mitigate the effects of climate change (Wright, 2021). Three regions—the United States, Europe, and China—have been integrated into this competition, despite the current global COVID19 crisis. China appears to be the primary competitor here, with Europe and the US vying for a technological edge in the development of a carbon-neutral economy, as well as raw material access. We do not know how this will unfold, but one thing is certain: it will be difficult for these governments to cooperate and refrain from fighting for autonomy.

In my opinion, great power competition makes it more difficult to conquer the covid-19, which supports my argument that international security problems cannot be completely resolved. When we consider all of this, we can easily assume that an attempt at great power competition during a crisis would be detrimental. We may need to examine some theories in order to gain a better understanding of the motivations behind these actions and their likely outcome. According to John Mearsheimer, an American political scientist, the international system forces states to act aggressively even when their primary concern is security. It is possible that great powers seeking power and dominance over other states in the international system now have no natural or conscious reason to fight. We can see this in action today in the international system, using the previous case studies as examples. International politics is thus a cruel and treacherous business that will almost certainly remain so regardless of the states involved or their interests. These assumptions include the absence of a global government; states' ability to use force against one another; states' uncertainty about the intentions of others; and all states value territorial integrity and domestic autonomy and strive to maintain them.

One of China's major goals under Xi Jinping's leadership is to become a global power by 2049. A well-documented strategy for accomplishing this is to build a military capable of winning wars by 2035 (Leehy et al., 2012). Is this possible? To be sure, I believe that this is highly dependent on changes in international circumstances as well as domestic developments within the nation that contribute to the nation's territorial integrity, just as Mearsheimer assumed. Increasing military capability requires financial resources. China's government announced a 6.8 percent annual increase in its military budget in 2021, as well as an additional increase in defence spending that will last more than two decades. This would undoubtedly place China in a position where they could use force against any other state, regardless of its military capability. As I mentioned earlier in this essay, China has increased its economic and financial power in the last fifteen years by capitalising on the global financial crisis and pandemic. This

could be one way in which China is bolstering its financial capabilities in order to achieve their goal of fortifying their military and defence departments in order to be war ready. When combined with their recent announcement to increase military and defence spending, this reflects the country's profound desire to become a global world power. This would alert other great powers to the possibility of matching or even exceeding China's capabilities in the future. Ultimately, developments like this one will continue to stifle international cooperation, jeopardising efforts by bodies such as NGOs to address security challenges. This leads me to believe that international security can be mitigated only to the extent that the cooperation required to combat a disaster of this magnitude is expected and required. According to experts, a long-term effect of the pandemic is expected to be the deepening of poverty in some parts of the developing world. While we are discussing China's role in this, we must also acknowledge that the US government obtained critical information that it mishandled as well. With all available evidence, the US government downplayed the threat and refused to prepare for possible disease spread within the country, resulting in the country's great disaster. All these behaviours were diametrically opposed to cooperation and exhibited more competitive characteristics. As a result, human security came under severe strain, and we all witnessed the global impact, with many lives lost and many families thrust into unexpected poverty. This demonstrates that international security issues can be mitigated only to a certain extent (Leehy et al., 2012).

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will be difficult for these governments to cooperate and refrain from fighting for autonomy (Wright, 2021). In conclusion, the international security cannot be mitigated totally, it can only be controlled to certain level, the likes of climate change, terror attacks and so on cannot be solved totally yet controlled by resilience measures.

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