

## Book Reviews

*Confucianism for the Modern World*. Edited by DANIEL A. BELL and HAHM CHAIBONG. [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xiii + 383pp. £18.99. ISBN-521-82100.]

Few Asians reject the basic hallmarks of modernity: a market economy, some form of democracy, some type of rule of law, and some human rights. At the same time, many Asians and for that matter non-Asians – including, we are told, the contributors to *Confucianism and the Modern World* – “are somewhat disenchanted with Western-style liberal modernity” (p. 24).

The editors are well aware that Confucianism must be adapted to modernity if it is to remain relevant. They are also well aware that it is necessary to move beyond the often frustratingly abstract assertions about the compatibility or incompatibility of Confucianism with capitalism, democracy, rule of law and human rights. Accordingly, they organize the book into sections that correspond roughly to the first three topics, human rights having been discussed at length elsewhere.

The section on democracy contains Hahm Chaihark’s exploration of *li* (rites, propriety) as a constitutional norm; Jongryn Mo’s invocation of the censorate as a possible mechanism for administrative accountability; Wang Juntao’s historical account of prominent intellectuals who supported aspects of Confucianism and democracy; Chang Yun-shik’s discussion of mutual help and democracy in Korea; David Hall and Roger Ames’s account of a pragmatic Confucian democracy; and Geir Helgesen’s call for an updated Confucian moral education to offset the existential insecurity individuals feel in this era of globalization.

The section on capitalism includes Gilbert Rozman’s argument that Confucianism may support decentralization while also bolstering East Asian regionalism; Lew Seok-Choon, Chang Mi-Hye and Kim Tae-Eun’s study of affective networks in Korea; Daniel Bell’s chapter on Confucian constraints on property rights; and Joseph Chan’s Confucian-inspired social welfare program that seeks to address the needs of those who lose out in competitive markets.

The section on law consists of Albert Chen’s meditation on mediation, litigation and justice past, present and future; Lusina Ho’s development of a Confucian law of succession; Chan Sin Yee’s attempt to grapple with the implications of yin-yang theory and Confucianism for gender and law today; and Hahm Chaibong’s study of the politics of marriage laws in Korea. This rich, interdisciplinary volume concludes with William Theodore de Bary’s argument for the continuing relevance of Confucianism.

The authors have undoubtedly moved the ball forward by exploring the institutional ramifications of Confucianism for the contemporary world. The best chapters in the book are those that identify and make at least a *prima facie* case for some Confucian value, institution or practice and

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then try to demonstrate its contemporary relevance by considering specific modern institutions or practices.

While this is a much welcome volume, there are some concerns. First, there is no definition of Confucianism. It is understandable why there is not. Confucianism is vague term that covers two millennia of diverse ideas and practices. Thus, identifying the core values or elements of Confucianism is problematic to say the least, and probably not possible. Yet in the absence of any attempt to state the key elements or outside parameters of Confucianism, the authors are left to their own devices. In some cases, authors appear to have picked at random one or two aspects that sound Confucian and have some modern resonance. Ignoring the context in which these ideas were embedded and all of the related values and practices that are inimical to modernity, they then contrast these isolated features with an equally decontextualized and stylized “West.” As several authors observe, Confucianism is a living tradition, and traditions change. But that does not mean that one is free to attribute anything one wants to Confucianism. The editors note that the authors did not intend to simply pick and choose from the large Confucian corpus aspects that resonated with capitalism, democracy and rule of law while ignoring the differences in which those institutions were embedded. Unfortunately, the problem is not motivation but result.

Secondly, plunging into a discussion of the compatibility of some aspect of Confucianism with a particular practice or subfeature of capitalism, democracy or rule of law without having first provided some more general theoretical account of the main hallmarks of modernity and the issues that they give rise to for Confucianism may be putting the cart before the horse. To take one example, rule of law presents problems for Confucianism, given Confucian emphasis on the unlimited legal authority of the ruler, the lack of an independent judiciary and so on. A revisionist Confucianism may be able to support some credible version of rule of law – and indeed I think it can. However, one must first at least set out what the general issues are before delving into details about the importance of mediation or whether this or that law can be given a Confucian spin to make it more compatible with late-stage capitalist modernity.

In short, the challenge would seem to be twofold: to articulate a Confucian *theory* of modernity, and then to spell out in sufficient detail the implications of this alternative form of modernity in terms of institutions, norms, legal rules, social practices and outcomes. Without a credible theory to ground the more detailed institutional work, the myriad suggested reforms appear to be at best *ad hoc* tweakings of the basic institutions of liberal modernity – a Confucian-inspired variant rather than a Confucian alternative to modernity or even a full-fledged Confucian variant of liberal modernity. What remains of Confucianism seems less like a coherent system and more like isolated values, often hardly unique to Confucianism, that serve as a communitarian corrective on liberal extremism. Nevertheless, this volume will provide interesting insights for those seeking to construct a more ambitious Confucian

theoretical alternative to liberalism, and will also be useful for liberals seeking to ameliorate some of the disadvantages of liberalism by drawing on selected aspects of a broad Confucian humanitarianism.

RANDALL PEERENBOOM

*Chinese Marxism.* By ADRIAN CHAN. [London and New York: Continuum, 2003. vi + 218 pp. £60.00; \$125.00. ISBN 0-8264-5033-4.]

At a time when the discussion of Marxism has disappeared from China scholarship almost completely, the publication of a study that takes Chinese Marxism seriously is to be welcomed, especially as the study is by a scholar who holds this Marxism in great esteem. It is also an important historical reminder against the ideological forgetfulness of the present. It is too bad, then, that the study is guided not by a self-reflexiveness that comes with an appreciation of historical complexity and political wisdom, but a self-righteous dogmatism that substitutes tendentious interpretation for careful consideration of evidence. For all Chan's political professions, the study seems to be driven more by academic one-upmanship than by any serious theoretical and historical engagement that might contribute to furthering the political causes of the theory it upholds.

Chan's thesis can be summarized easily. "Sinologists," beginning with Benjamin Schwartz in the United States, and under his dominating influence, have all missed the point about both Marxism and Chinese Marxism, first by declaring Marxism to be irrelevant to a peasant society such as China, and secondly, by therefore attributing the appeals of Marxism to the mediation of Lenin's interpretation of Marxism and the influence on Chinese radicals of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union. Against these "arguments," he posits that:

- a) Marx always stressed the importance of peasantry to the socialist revolution;
- b) Chinese radicals were quite aware of Marx's ideas through their familiarity with Marx's works even before the establishment of the Communist Party of China in 1921;
- c) In dealing with Chinese Marxism, we need not emphasize all those who called themselves Marxists; "the criterion for selecting a particular thinker's ideas for inclusion is the impact and durability of his ideas on the development of Marxism in China" (p. 4). By this measure, Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai and Mao Zedong are the architects of Chinese Marxism; Chen and Mao for recognizing and developing the importance of the peasantry, but also for their commitment to the importance of the cultural sphere in revolution, enunciated clearly first by Qu and developed further by Mao;
- d) The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution put these ideas to the test, but failed due to circumstances over which they had little control (such as international circumstances, but also including the weather); and

- e) After Mao's death, Chinese Marxism declined, and has lasted only as legitimation for the Communist Party, which would be devoid of all legitimacy otherwise.

There could be little quarrel with what Chan sets out to accomplish. Marx was complicated, of course, and while at the broad level of theory there are problems presented by revolution in Third World peasant societies, his own response to revolutions outside of Europe offered some legitimation for those revolutions. We should take Chinese Marxism seriously, and not reduce it to a replica of Leninism. And, of course, we should recognize that there is no reason other than Eurocentric hubris to view Chinese Marxism as a "deviation" from Marxism while lauding the interpretations of an Althusser or Lukacs for their development of theory.

The problem is that all of this is in the existing literature, which Chan simply sweeps aside by abolishing the significant differences among so-called "Sinologists" over the question of Marxism and Chinese Marxism, and reducing them to variations on the interpretation offered by Schwartz half a century ago. That interpretation he misreads almost willfully; the problem with Schwartz's interpretation was not that he imprisoned Chinese Marxism in Leninism, but that he made it into a function of Chinese nationalism to do just the opposite: rescue it from Stalinism. While Chan repeatedly stresses the interpretive nature of any judgment on Marxism and Chinese Marxism, somehow his interpretations are offered with claims to truth against which all former readings appear wrong, and ideological. He freely accuses others of misreading evidence, overlooking that he has little or no evidence to offer for some of his most crucial assertions. Indeed, while it is based on claims to new evidence, the book not only draws on a narrower body of evidence than previous works, but also fails to make use of all the important documentation that has come to light over the last two decades, presumably because it fails to support his criteria of "durability and impact," of which he is the sole judge.

The readers will derive the most benefit from reading chapters five to seven, where Chan has some fresh material and insights to offer. In any case, some familiarity with existing literature is necessary to evaluate Chan's claims about Chinese Marxism, which are likely to be highly misleading for the uninitiated.

ARIF DIRLIK

*Private Entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam: Social and Political Functioning of Strategic Groups.* By THOMAS HEBERER, translated by TIMOTHY J. GLUCKMAN. [Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003. vii + 398 pp. €100.00; \$135.00. ISBN 90-04-12857-3.] Originally published as *Unternehmer als strategische Gruppen: Zur sozialen und Politischen von Unternehmern in China and Vietnam* [Hamburg: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde, 2001.]

This volume, first published two years ago in Germany, is a welcome

addition to the growing number of English language studies on entrepreneurship and private sector development in Vietnam and China. But, whereas other work aims to account for the operation, financing and development of this sector, Heberer's work has a narrower, if no less ambitious mission: to demonstrate that entrepreneurs are on the way "to replace the state as an agency of development and modernization" (p. 1).

For Heberer, this process is an amalgam of various and often contradictory forces that find private entrepreneurs, intentionally or otherwise, driving substantive social and political change. For this reason, Heberer rejects a number of alternative labels that might be used to describe these actors, such as "class," "interest group," and "strata." Instead, he argues that they are best regarded as a "strategic group," a phrase meant to indicate the power of entrepreneurs not only as collective self-interested actors, but also as symbols of new values and beliefs (p. 69 and p. 341).

The first part of the volume is devoted to describing his approach in relation to alternative accounts, and within the context of each country's history. The middle section, over 200 pages long, offers primary and secondary source evidence of entrepreneurs as a "strategic" group. Along the way, Heberer illustrates how the political attitudes and social composition of entrepreneurs, as well as their relations with local government, differ across countries. This is by far the most interesting part of the work. The study ends with speculation of future trends, most notably the prospect of an intensified alliance between entrepreneurs and "functionaries." The conclusion is not surprising, except that Heberer links it not to cronyism, but instead to the shared frustrations of each group with their country's transitional political economy.

The real gem of this volume is its comparative element, including a bibliography rich in source material from the Chinese, Vietnamese, and German literature. Vietnam area specialists will especially appreciate, although not be surprised by, Heberer's finding of regional variation in the attitudes and social composition of Vietnamese entrepreneurs. China scholars, in contrast, will enjoy his early discussion of philanthropy and its variation by region and type of entrepreneur. Across the two country cases, differences in the social composition, family origin, and attitudes of entrepreneurs, especially towards political participation, are most notable, although some readers may be left wanting more in-depth historical discussion and explanation.

There are also problems of translation and editing, but methodologists are more likely to take exception to the survey on which Heberer's conclusions depend (pp. 78–84). His sample, numbering 202 and 178 for Vietnam and China respectively, is comprised largely of male industrial firm owners, but the private sector in both countries remains heavily concentrated in the service and trade sectors. Moreover, local officials had a heavy hand in drawing the research sample and in accompanying the research team during its work. Heberer is not alone in facing this challenge of fieldwork in Vietnam and China. Moreover, he is aware of the problem, noting in one case how a Vietnamese respondent changed answers during the momentary absence of an official (p. 81).

As a counter-balance, Heberer complemented the survey with qualitative interviews and considerable integration and comparison of his material with available secondary sources. Indeed, even if readers regard the survey as non-representative of the general population, the descriptive statistics that result from it offer intriguing hints of possible change to come. Most notably, Vietnamese respondents expressed displeasure with state and local government policies, but claimed that entrepreneurs should not concern themselves with politics. Chinese entrepreneurs held the opposite view on both counts. Clearly, Heberer's work has something important to say to political scientists, sociologists and area specialists.

REGINA ABRAMI

*The Development of China's Stock Market, 1984–2002.* By STEPHEN GREEN. [London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. xv + 287 pp. £65.00. ISBN 0-415-32466-1.]

Does the spectacular development of China's stock market present a theoretical puzzle? On one hand, within a short period of a little more than a decade (1990–2002), the total capitalization of the market grew from a negligible size to a level equivalent to more than 50 per cent of the country's GDP, and even if excluding non-floating shares held by the state and legal persons, the capitalization level was still equivalent to some 16 per cent of GDP. On the other hand, until very recently few of the institutions that underpin successful stock markets elsewhere were present. This seems to be in contradiction to the teaching of neo-institutional economics, which holds that only when the state is credibly committed to clarifying and defending functional institutions will people feel confidence enough to engage in complex transactions like stock trading. Does this imply a paradox? The author argues in this book that it is not so straightforward.

The book provides detailed and convincing evidence to show that the impressive growth of China's stock market since 1990 has been to a great extent a result of policy-driven development favoured by a lack of alternative investment opportunities for increasingly wealthy private investors. Chinese companies in general viewed stock listing as a privilege and a fund-raising mechanism. Market participants perceived that the quality of listed companies was generally poor but that investors were protected because of the constant financial and policy supports provided by both local and the central governments. As a consequence, market participants had little incentive to pay much attention to corporate governance and other fundamentals. Would such features lead to a pessimistic scenario, meaning that the development would not be sustainable? Not so simple, the author suggests.

The book in fact presents an evolutionary story of the emergence and development of China's stock exchanges. One implicit intention in establishing the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in December 1990 and July 1991 was to legitimate the flourishing stock trades in informal kerb markets and to eliminate black market transactions. These reflected the fact that the enormous pool of household savers generated by economic growth in the 1980s was eagerly looking for alternative investment opportunities beyond the traditional repressed financial sector. The development in the early years (1990–1997) was regarded by the leadership and the society as local experiments, similar to the cases of all other major reform initiatives in China. When necessary experience had been accumulated and lessons learned, progressive improvements followed. Once the government sufficiently recognized its long-term needs, for the market to productively manage the government's own financial assets and to encourage private investors to commit more of their financial assets to the market, the government's short-term needs for financing ailing state-owned enterprises were played down, and a unified and more rigorous regulatory system was established and gradually empowered. Although it certainly takes time for China's stock market to fully adapt to international best practices, the outlook is cautiously optimistic.

Unlike more pedantic research, which relies on the explanatory power of existing theories, the book does not sacrifice the richness of the evolution to fit into selected theories. The author is right not to try to fit the book into the scholastic tradition because any existing theory, however robust, is bound to be narrow and specific in comparison with the vivid stories presented in the book. In summary, the thesis of the book is well established, carefully examined, and meticulously documented. The book can serve as a very valuable reference to scholars, business professionals, policy makers, and general readers concerned about the dynamics of China's equity market and the growing importance of China in the world economy. Furthermore, the research process underpinning the book is itself interesting. When carrying out about 60 confidential and in-depth interviews with key officials in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and important financial institutions, the author was just a "naïve" research student from a foreign country. In this connection too, the book can provide inspiration and valuable illustrations for researchers planning fieldwork.

LAIXIANG SUN

*Chinese Science and Technology Industrial Parks.* By SUSAN M. WALCOTT. [Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 2003. x + 220pp. £55.00. ISBN 0-7546-0952-9.]

One of the institutional innovations in China's reform and open-door era



is the establishment of economic and technological development zones, export processing zones, science and technology parks, and other “zones” or “parks” at geographically diverse regions. This book represents an effort to investigate some of the science and technology industrial parks (STIPs). For the geographer Walcott, such parks are oriented to multinational development, multinational learning, and local innovation learning, based on “the type of activity contained and the type of company profiled” (p. 13). In particular, she shows that multinational corporations (MNCs) have become the growth engines for China’s leapfrog into the 21st century with their contributions to China’s exports, high tech as well as low tech, and the creation of new jobs. Therefore, in cities like Shenzhen, Dongguan, and Suzhou, MNCs have mainly processed and assembled products using foreign-imported critical parts plus locally-made components with the help of cheap labor and easy access to major ports such as Hong Kong and Shanghai. On the other hand, in Shanghai, the best example of a multinational learning zone capable of providing a wide range of skills, goods and services, MNCs are engaged in manufacturing activities in proximity to Chinese firms, research and development entities, both within and outside designated STIPs. Finally, Beijing, Shenzhen (again), and Xi’an, according to Walcott, have represented another model where the proximity of domestic firms to institutions of learning has facilitated knowledge transfer.

It is undeniable but worrying that almost all of the STIPs in China have depended upon MNCs for their growth, as the United Nations statistics that Walcott cites indicate: the contributions of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China’s high-tech exports have increased from 59 per cent in 1996 to 81 per cent in 2000 (p. 66). One may argue that at its current stage of economic growth – with a *per capita* gross domestic product (GDP) of US\$1,000 in 2003 – China has no choice but to adopt a foreign investment and technology-driven development strategy and that the country will gradually climb the global production chain. However, in setting up high-tech parks, the Chinese government intended to encourage indigenous innovation and technology transfer from domestic institutions of learning to domestic enterprises; at least that was the case when the Beijing High Tech Industry and Development Zone (or the Zhongguancun Science Park) was inaugurated in 1988. The irony seems to be that the development of China’s STIPs thus far has significantly departed from the original goal of their planners.

For one thing, the extent to which so many parks and zones have been approved by the central as well as local governments is itself the legacy of the planned economy in the first 30 years of the People’s Republic. Further, a park bearing “high tech” in its name is politically correct, and the local leadership could take advantage of preferential policies to attract FDI and MNCs so as to showcase its achievements. Even in Shanghai, for example, “very little technology transfer seemed to be occurring” (p. 121), let alone assimilation and absorption of the technology and



innovation. In addition, many of the MNC operations in China – regardless of whether they are labour intensive and low-skill assembly lines or high-tech industries – are not environmentally friendly; the chip making that has caused enormous environmental concern in Silicon Valley and other high tech clusters is favoured in the Chinese STIPs.

Even worse, as Walcott correctly observes in Shenzhen, many of the high-tech exports have actually re-routed back into the Chinese market. As a result, “many companies (particularly FDI firms who are strongly encouraged to export) can show export figures that actually mask how much of their product is destined for the Chinese market” (p. 76). If that is not an isolated phenomenon existing in Shenzhen alone, then how much a Chinese STIP has learned and built up its indigenous technological capability is mostly irrelevant. Is this a failure of the implementation of STIP policy, or is this an ill-conceived policy? Unfortunately, Walcott does not address this fundamental question seriously.

CONG CAO

*The Employment Impact of China's WTO Accession.* By A.S. BHALLA and SHUFANG QIU. [London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. xix + 204 pp. £65.00. ISBN 0-415-30839-9.]

This is a well-informed and readable study by two economic consultants. They argue that liberalization of trade in anticipation of and following China's accession to the WTO will result in short-term losses for a number of China's economic sectors, but in long-term net overall benefits. They expect “enormous problems related to the restructuring of SOEs and banking and other financial services, and also to the social effects such as unemployment and greater income inequalities.” Successive chapters treat agriculture, selected industries (textiles, garments, automobiles and household appliances) and the services of distribution, banking and insurance, and telecommunications. The authors summarize the main English-language and some Chinese studies on employment prospects in these sectors, and point out the weaknesses in their assumptions and models. Nevertheless, they are not afraid to add some forecasts of their own. Confronted with conflicting data (their statistical tables do not go beyond 1999) and opinions, often they refrain from drawing firm conclusions. The book ends, in a rather summary manner, with three scenarios of China's possible response to social destabilization owing to massive unemployment: non-compliance, devaluation and a shift to non-tradeables and the domestic market.

With hindsight, some of the feared consequences of WTO-entry appear not to have materialized, for domestic or international reasons. While

China's overall *nominal* rate for industrial products was lowered, its *real* (actually collected) rate rose from 2.7 per cent in 1997 to 4 per cent in 2000. China continued to boost economic growth and employment through deficit spending. Huge infrastructural investments in west China and "green-for-grain" subsidies have reduced the local unemployment effects of national market integration. Employment reduction and profit enhancement in state-owned industries have been greater and faster than anticipated. Following the weak US dollar, the *yuan* depreciated against the yen and euro. All this has mitigated the WTO's impact.

The authors estimate that for every one per cent of GDP growth, primary sector jobs would be reduced by 250,000 and secondary and tertiary sector jobs would increase by 150,000 and 970,000 respectively. However, subsequent official statistics show that between 1999 and 2002 primary sector employment *increased* by 11 million, and secondary sector employment *decreased* by 640,000. Only the 19 million job growth in the tertiary sector comes close to their prediction. The authors espouse the idea that following agricultural trade liberalization "cheaper, better-quality foodgrains are likely to flood the Chinese domestic market" (p. 73), but elsewhere they note that if transportation costs are counted in, local produce may be cheap after all, and "the effect of accession on the subsistence economy might be minimal" (p. 82). Actually, with less labour Chinese farmers have continued to produce more than enough food grain of improved quality even at declining prices. Tariffs had only marginal effects on a domestic market characterized by over-supply.

For China's textile and clothing sectors, the authors are less upbeat than most. Time has proven them right as to employment in this sector, but exports have risen by over 40 per cent and labour productivity in state-owned textile enterprises by 50 per cent between 1999 and 2002. Production has not been relocated to low labour cost areas in the Chinese interior. Rather, coastal industries prefer to use migrant and local labour. The automobile sector, where local content requirements were eliminated and import tariffs lowered, has performed better (also in terms of employment) than expected. The authors' view that China's manufacturing industry as a whole does not offer prospects for creating additional employment has been proven right so far. That also goes for their optimism about China's dynamic comparative advantage in many labour-intensive services. Yet the banking sector has gone further in combining expanded activities with reduced employment than they and many other people expected.

Application of the "flying geese" theory leads the authors to conclude that migration to coastal areas is a less efficient strategy than relocating production in the hinterland. They calculate revealed comparative advantages in labour-intensive manufactures that are much higher for non-coastal than for coastal provinces, and note signs of relocation of foreign direct investment. Such conclusions are difficult to reconcile with the lack of employment opportunities in manufacturing. Recent developments give a different picture. Interior provinces have performed at or below national average. The main shift has been *within* the coastal area.

Expansion of FDI and employment has been several times higher in the Chang (Yangtze) delta provinces than in Beijing, Guangdong or Fujian.

Some minor errors should be noted. Ianchovichina did not project positive employment effects in foodgrains (p. 63), some tariff cuts changed after final negotiations (p. 72), China's "only about 2%" level of agricultural subsidies disregards local subsidies (p. 73), column headings in Table 4.3 are mixed up, Shandong's FDI did not decline (p. 159), and Sichuan figures include Chongqing (p. 158).

Strong aspects of this study are its intelligent discussion of the vast literature on the consequences of WTO-entry for China, and testing of economic theories. It combines a succinct treatment of many relevant topics with in-depth analysis of major problems. Macro-economists and students of China's present and future position in world trade will find it stimulating and useful.

EDUARD B. VERMEER

*China's New Voices: Popular Music, Ethnicity, Gender, and Politics, 1978–1997.* By NIMROD BARANOVITCH. [Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2003. xiv + 332 pp. £16.95; \$24.95. ISBN 0-520-23450-2.]

An enjoyable overview of the world of pop, rock and politics in Beijing, accessible for students of Chinese culture and popular music studies. This is an area that has been exceptionally well covered in the literature, and Baranovitch's claim to originality lies mainly in his focus on ethnicity and gender. The overview of the development of pop from 1978–97 does a useful job of drawing together the various strands, though most of this is very familiar from the writings of Geremie Barmé, Andrew Jones et al. We begin with the introduction of *Gangtai* (Hong Kong and Taiwan pop) to the mainland, led by Deng Lijun whose 'coquettish nasal slides,' Baranovitch rightly suggests, were more truly subversive in China in 1978 than any of the subsequent rock and punk styles. Baranovitch chronicles the rise of the *xibeifeng*, the Shaanbei folk-infused rock style, linking it into the *xungun* roots movement and Tiananmen. An interesting section on *qiuge* or 'prison songs,' popular in 1988, explores somewhat less well-known territory. We follow the rise of the commercial, the karaoke craze and Mao fever, and the co-option of at least some of the rebellious rockers by the state. Baranovitch enthusiastically reveals the significance of music in the political arena, and its ability to prefigure, even shape the political.

The chapter on ethnic minority singers focuses on two Beijing-based artists Teng Ge'er and Lolo. Baranovitch discusses the ambivalence of ethnic minority singers in the rock scene, Han views of the 'primitive' and 'wild' ethnic minorities, and minority artists' willingness to embrace and exploit such stereotypes. The prominence of minorities in the Beijing

underground scene has always been striking, but they tend to be Chinese-educated (*minkaohan*), oriented towards the Chinese scene, and have a rather tangential relationship with the concerns and attitudes of their own communities, and the vibrant pop scenes which flourish within these communities.

Baranovitch's description, in the chapter on gender, of the machismo and misogyny of the rock scene pulls no punches and rings very true, from Zang Tianshuo's vision of a mountain of beautiful girls "*Meili de guniang shan*," to the punk singer He Yong's bitter critique of the materialism of Chinese women. The reading of Chinese rock's machismo as a reaction to feelings of emasculation by repressive policies – the Party as "She" – has again been well rehearsed in the literature. By contrast, Baranovitch's discussion of gender in *Gangtai* is less persuasively theorized. This is a music culture that enjoys enormous popularity and influence and which, in contrast to the rock scene, is crying out for analysis and deeper understanding. In the concluding chapter on music and politics, Baranovitch develops Barmé's observations on the 'greying of Chinese culture,' discussing the symbiosis of the state and the music market. He provides a useful discussion of state-organized concerts and China MTV, its strategy and mission "to reflect the deep love of the people for the homeland and life."

Baranovitch is quite clear on the extremely marginal position of rock in China, compared to the far greater popularity of *Gangtai*, citing the relative popularity of Cui Jian and Andy Lau in Shanghai some years ago (3.5 vs 600 *yuan* for a ticket to their respective concerts). So why this veritable '*meili de yaogun shan*'? If we can drag our attention away from the Beijing scene which nurtured so many of us as overseas students, there are many other pop music cultures in China, from the numerous regional styles and markets to teenage fan sites on the Internet; from night market karaoke stalls in small towns to the opera troupes who incorporate pop into their shows at temple fairs. They may not be quite so cool or so self-knowing but they might just reward our attention.

RACHEL HARRIS

*Xinjiang: China's Muslim Far Northwest*. By MICHAEL DILLON. [London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. ix + 201 pp. £65.00. ISBN 0-415-32051-8.]

*Xinjiang: China's Muslim Far Northwest* is, as the preface notes, primarily a work of synthesis. The author gathers together an impressive amount of documentary data from a range of sources, including domestic Chinese and world news media, Han Chinese scholarship, and, to a lesser extent, reports by Uighur émigré organizations. These data are employed to illustrate patterns of separatist opposition and state reaction in Xinjiang, particularly since the 1990 Baren riots, identified as the 'turning point' in

regional state-minority relations. In this, the book might be characterized as the extension of Dillon's earlier paper "Xinjiang: ethnicity, separatism and control in Chinese Central Asia" (1995).

Part one, an introduction to Xinjiang, is the section that most closely approaches the stated goal of providing an updated 'survey of breadth and depth' in the style of Owen Lattimore's celebrated *Pivot of Asia* (1950). In it, the author sketches a broad outline of Xinjiang's geography, history, ethnic make-up, and economy. As he forewarns, the result of his attempt to cover such a wealth of topics may disappoint the specialist. It nonetheless provides a timely snapshot of a rapidly developing society and political economy in a region of growing strategic importance; this is likely to be of interest to non-specialists from a wide range of disciplines.

In part two, "Turkic opposition and CCP response," the real object of the author's interest becomes apparent: political and, especially, religious nationalism in Xinjiang, and the state's ever more draconian attempts to contain it (a focus suggested in part one when the author briefly departs on a discussion of Sufism and its ability to mobilize opposition across Central Asia). This is the first documentary record of separatist disturbances in Xinjiang and state response to be published in the English language. It provides detailed descriptions of incidents dating from 1949 to the present, painstakingly pieced together from independent reports: an invaluable resource for scholars seeking to understand ethno-nationalism and ethnic conflict in northwest China and other contexts perceived to be 'colonial' by self-styled 'un-represented nations' (for instance, the Yaqi region of Indonesia). Particularly rich are the descriptions translated from Chinese scholar Xu Yuqi's *History of the Struggle Against Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang* (1999), though some passages that seem to have an agenda of "turning the broad masses against the handful of separatists" while presenting the Chinese security forces in an artificially positive light are not problematized. In terms of state reaction, the picture that emerges is one of intensified government repression of religion and of control maintained over the region by means of a substantial military presence.

Part three, "The changing international context," illustrates the successes of the Chinese government over the past decade in securing the loyalty of countries (Turkey, Iran, the independent Central Asian states) potentially sympathetic to Uighur separatism. It has achieved this goal, it emerges, through a combination of arms, trade, and energy deals. A second important theme is the alleged connection between Uighur separatists and the Taliban. Although China has been quick to link its 'terrorists' to Al-Qaeda and international Islam, there is little evidence to support this claim (the Taliban denied in 1997 that it had political links with Uighur groups, pointing out the virtual impassability of the narrow China-Afghanistan border). New research suggests that recent Islamic revival in Xinjiang is centred on the veneration of Sufi saints and a reformist version of orthodox Islam rather than on Wahhabist fundamentalism.

One problem with relying principally on documentary data is that one

often hears only about the extreme, and thus more ‘newsworthy,’ instances of conflict. There is, however, a growing body of ethnographic fieldwork carried out since the early 1990s, which suggests that many Uighurs employ non-violent, symbolic means of opposition. Examples include the alternative representations of national identity disseminated through popular music and the negotiation of spatial and social boundaries by Uighurs vis-à-vis their Han neighbours.

Secondly, we rarely hear from the actors, that is, Uighurs and others who consider themselves in conflict with the Chinese state and Xinjiang’s now substantial Han population (the two eye-witness accounts in chapters nine and ten are refreshing exceptions). For example, despite noting that the Chinese government hopes to maintain stability in Xinjiang by promoting economic development, the fact that most Uighurs consider the Western Development Campaign to benefit only Han immigrants (well documented elsewhere) goes largely un-remarked. Interviews tend to target high-ranking Chinese officials, neglecting grassroots perspectives on the sources of disaffection.

On the whole, however, this documentary work will complement recent ethnographic studies and constitutes an important and valuable contribution to the emerging field of Xinjiang Studies.

JOANNE. N. SMITH

*Toward Critical Patriotism: Student Resistance to Political Education in Hong Kong and China.* By GREGORY P. FAIRBROTHER. [Hong Kong University Press, 2003. x + 218 pp. £26.95. ISBN 962-209-622-0.]

Fairbrother’s *Toward Critical Patriotism* is a timely publication in the “Hong Kong Culture and Society” series: political squabbles and conflicts over the idea of patriotism in the context of the national security legislation in Hong Kong are inflamed following the spectacular mass demonstration by 500,000 people on 1 July 2003. As the author points out, patriotism and nationalism are relatively recent historical phenomena in China. In mainland China, Marxist-Leninism became the guiding ideology after 1949. Yet, from the early 1980s, in the face of a legitimacy crisis, the leadership shifted toward patriotism as a unifying and justificatory ideology while professing ultimate objectives in line with Marxist principles. In Hong Kong, civic education had been de-emphasized under the ideology of de-politicization by the colonial government until the handover in the 1990s. The book rejects the typical characterization of Hong Kong students as simply having a weak sense of patriotism and nationalism, and of mainland students as patriotic dupes under the state and presents a more nuanced analysis.

The book is a comparative study of the political attitudes of patriotism and nationalism of the university students in Hong Kong and mainland China in the 1990s with a focus on the factors that lead individual



students to resist. Drawing on Gramsci's notion of hegemony, as well as Giroux's idea of resistance, the author analyses both the exercise of ideological power and the students' perception of it. He first discusses how the governments in the two places promulgate their ideologies through schooling, as reflected in the content of textbooks and policy documents. After explaining the theoretical framework, the contexts and the government ideologies in chapters two to four, the author then devotes four empirical chapters to the presentation and analysis of data from a questionnaire survey administered to 535 students and from interviews with 20 students. The findings confirm the general impression that mainland students were considerably more patriotic and nationalistic whereas Hong Kong students were mostly ambivalent toward China. Yet when breaking national attitudes down into seven dimensions along a patriotism scale and a nationalism scale, the author finds that although mainland and Hong Kong students differed in strength on these dimensions, the Hong Kong students held the strongest attitudes with relation to a desire for national power, a sense of duty to the nation, and an emotional attachment to the nation.

The students of the two places also differed in their perceptions of the major sources of their national attitudes (for example, secondary school, mass media and other agents) and, more important, in their evaluations of such influences. Based on the latter the author coins the term "critical thinking," which generates the idea of resistance. The idea of critical thinking or resistance opens up the conceptual space for examining the discrepancy between policy intentions and unintended consequences. Three dispositions are highlighted, namely scepticism, curiosity, and an openness to multiple perspectives. Using qualitative data from interviews, the author demonstrates how the students of the two places, in different degrees, were distrustful of the agents of political socialization, might hope to know more about the nation, and were receptive to alternative understandings of the nation. And the author also shows the relative strength of the effect on national attitudes of socialization and critical thinking factors by comparing three multiple regression models.

On the whole, the book presents a balanced and refined discussion of concepts and data. The theoretical framework used is clearly explained and aptly applied; the research solidly draws on first-hand data based on the use of multiple methods including content analysis, survey, and interview, which distinguishes it from studies that rely solely on survey or ethnographic data. The analysis of the empirical findings, which forms the bulk of the book, is carefully delivered and systematically presented. Yet, when it comes to the interview data, the idea of critical thinking could have been further contextualized to increase the "thickness" of the analysis, by, for example, illuminating the differences between the two systems and the processes of influence in different contexts of everyday experiences. The argument of the book, as well as the analysis, can potentially be developed into a socio-cultural explanation of nationalist attitudes, but in some places this would require the author to go beyond the comparative statistics to tease out the implications for a renewed



understanding of patriotism and nationalism in the two societies. Despite the shortcomings, the book makes a valuable contribution to the literature on Hong Kong and China studies and is recommended to colleagues, students, and policy-makers interested in the field.

AGNES S. KU

*Taxation and Economic Development in Taiwan.* By GLENN P. JENKINS, CHUN-YAN KUO and KEH-NAN SUN. [Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2003. 284 pp. Paperback £10.95, ISBN 0-674-01133-3.; hard cover £20.95, ISBN 0-674-01102-3.]

This book analyses the evolution of the tax system and economic development in Taiwan over four decades, and argues that three crucial factors – prudent public sector expenditure, an effective revenue system and a set of export-oriented trade policies – contributed to the achievement of macroeconomic stability and growth in Taiwan from 1955 to 1995. It is divided into seven broad themes: evolution of the tax system; various stages of Taiwan's economic development; assessment of tax incentive policies in relation to investment, savings and economic growth; the evolution of Taiwan's trade policies; the correlation between tax policies and other macroeconomic variables; innovation and pragmatism in the inland tax administration; and the management of transaction costs with respect to the trade administration.

The authors argue that like many other countries, Taiwan experienced hyperinflation and fiscal crisis after the Second World War. In order to solve the difficulties, instead of relying on foreign borrowing or using domestic private savings to finance itself, the Taiwanese government effectively limited public spending, which not only pushed inflation rates down but also created a stable macroeconomic environment. In addition, the operation of the tax system played a significant role in promoting economic development. For instance, instead of emphasizing the importance of income tax as a main tool for raising revenues, the government introduced state-run monopolies in alcoholic beverages and tobacco in 1950 and enforced the value-added tax system in 1986, providing a solid foundation for the revenue system. The authors find trade and macroeconomic policies, rather than income tax policies or subsidized finance measures, to be the main determinants in successful industrialization. On this basis, the authors conclude that the trade policies and tax administrative systems in Taiwan have been pragmatic and innovative, resulting in lower compliance costs and improved effectiveness and thereby making a direct contribution to the country's rate of economic growth.

The authors contend that the reason why the tax policies and adminis-

tration in Taiwan could be continuously modernized and effectively adapted to various stages of economic development is that the Ministry of Finance (MoF) made massive investment in human capital formation. Through comprehensive training in the MoF and abroad, financial officials regularly gained professional knowledge in conducting tax system reforms. The authors' explanation is sensible but insufficient. For example, might the historical experience of the Kuomintang regime in mainland China not have enhanced financial officials' resolution in implementing prudent government expenditure when the regime attributed its loss of the Chinese civil war to its financial mismanagement? In addition, the successful introduction and operation of land tax did not rely on officials' innovativeness only, but is also linked to cultural factors. For instance, investment in housing and land is usually the top preference when Taiwanese make investments. This cultural factor may also explain why the asset-based tax could yield a greater amount of revenue than the combined personal and enterprise income tax revenues.

This book has done an impressive job in challenging many conventional beliefs as well as providing useful insights into Taiwan's experience. Furthermore, it has many constructive policy implications for countries undergoing recurring cycles of fiscal crisis and inflation. Certainly, this is an essential reference book for scholars, students and policy makers interested in the role of the tax system in bringing about economic growth. In particular, it will benefit others doing research in the field of fiscal and trade policies.

I-RU CHEN

*China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past.* By PAUL A. COHEN. [London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. xii + 226. £18.99. ISBN 0-415-29823-7.]

Paul Cohen's *Discovering History on China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past*, which critically analysed a number of common approaches to the history of modern China, was a very welcome contribution to critical methodology when it appeared in 1984, although the book has aged rather rapidly with the rise of cultural studies over the last 20 years. Readers who benefited from Cohen's arguments in favour of a more 'China-centered approach' will be forgiven for thinking that this might be a much needed revision of *Discovering History in China*. Despite a promising title, however, we are offered instead a sampling of the author's writings to date. The volume reprints excerpts from several of his previous books, starting as far back as his study of Wang Tao published in 1974 and also including a chapter from his 1984 study on American writings on modern China, and presents several talks based on his important study of the Boxer rebellion which were originally delivered in China. The collection also contains a discussion of 1949 as a

watershed date, originally given at a workshop held at Harvard University in 1994, and an article on ‘national humiliation’ published as recently as 2002.

While collections of articles previously published in hard-to-find journals can be a welcome addition to the field, this compendium no doubt targets the student who wishes to have a handy introduction to the career of Paul Cohen, and a helpful introductory essay in which the author reflects on how his thinking has changed over half a century of active scholarship, as well as a brief chapter in which his earlier work is revisited, no doubt facilitate this goal. Whether or not a compendium which includes work published several decades ago can still offer “fresh ways of approaching the Chinese past,” as the book description promises, is no doubt a matter of perspective, although readers in Europe may find the constant use of terms like ‘the West,’ on occasion 12 times a page, a tad tiring, all the more as this often appears to mean ‘America’ – a world on its own. America-bound as *China Unbound* may be, the volume will nonetheless be read with profit by students from a variety of backgrounds, in particular if they are interested in the craft of historical inquiry as practiced by an important historian of modern China.

FRANK DIKÖTTER

*War and Nationalism in China, 1925–1945.* By HANS J. VAN DE VEN.  
[London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. xii + 377 pp.  
£70.00. ISBN 0-415-14571-6.]

This book may seem to be two books in one. In the first, we are given a cogent, superbly researched description of the creation of the Nationalist Army, of its later history in the reunification of China (1926–1937) and then of its fate during the War of Resistance (1937–1945). In the second book, a European scholar undermines one of the icons of the US presence in China, Joseph Stilwell, the salty, profane commander of US forces in China during the War, whose scathing denunciations of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists set the stage for holding Chiang’s incompetence and Nationalist corruption responsible for the Communist victory in China.

At first glance the second story might seem a sidebar to the larger topic of the book – war and nationalism in China. But it turns out to be integral to Western academic understanding of modern China. Views of the War of Resistance were so conditioned by Stilwell and his protagonists (what van de Ven calls the Stilwell–White paradigm, referring to Theodore White whose writings made Stilwell a hero) to accept that the Nationalists were the authors of their own downfall that there has been no room for an examination of where the Nationalists *were* seriously weakened – on the battlefields fighting the Japanese invaders.

The general lack of interest in modern Sinology, in Chinese and Japanese, as well as in Western languages, in the military and in warfare is hard to understand, given that China was continuously at war from 1937 until 1949, an 11-year period of all-out warfare bracketed by the

warlord period and by the Korean War. Yet for the tiny number of books that discuss warfare and the impact of war on politics, society, economy, there are dozens of studies of ideology, the intellectual world, culture, the arts and literature. Other historians seem to share Prasanjit Duara's contention (quoted by van de Ven) that wars were "like natural disasters utterly devastating but ultimately temporary" (p. 150). Van de Ven's book is one of a number of recent efforts to rectify the balance, to show how overwhelming a role warfare played – and to show incidentally that the Nationalists lost power and Communists came to power on the battlefield. The message of this book is the need for more research, particularly into the impact of warfare on the course of modern history. The way in which the Japanese war machine wore down the Nationalists is so discounted in most historical writing as to be almost invisible. There is no book in English on the Ichigo campaign of 1944, in which more troops were involved than in any other campaign of the War. Nationalist forces suffered horrible losses, while Communist forces suffered few, and were in good shape for the Civil War. The Ichigo campaign can almost be read as an effort by the Japanese high command to help the Communists to power – an enormous irony given that the invasion of China was premised on the need to defeat Communism.

Only about half this book is devoted to the War of Resistance, but it is this half that contains the most important revisions of standard interpretations. The War presented huge problems for an agrarian society that was in no way equipped to wage war against an industrialized invader, but was forced by the international context and a shortage of resources into "assuming defensive attitudes, avoiding unnecessary confrontations and waiting for changes in the future" (p. 251). These attitudes were later interpreted as passivity – a travesty, given the great courage shown by many Chinese, and their acceptance of terrible suffering and loss, which were recognized at the time by China's international partners, as van de Ven's skilful use of diplomatic records shows.

Van de Ven's major revision of standard interpretations of the Nationalists and of the War of Resistance is very persuasive, but as with all revisionism the pendulum may swing a little too far. His account is quite generous to Chiang Kai-shek, whose inability to capitalize on the nationalist reaction produced by the invasion, and whose difficulty in commanding the loyalty of his regionalist subordinates were serious limitations. The book is also inadvertently generous to the Japanese Imperial Army, in that there is little discussion of its behaviour in China. But these are small caveats to a remarkable and bold piece of scholarship.

DIANA LARY

*China's Maritime Customs and China's Trade Statistics, 1859–1948.* By THOMAS P. LYONS. [Trumansburg, NY: Willow Creek Press, 2003. 171 pp. \$34.95. ISBN 0-97291475-7.]

Any historian with a serious interest in China's modern economic history

will be grateful for Thomas Lyons's study of the trade statistics produced by the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. Those wishing to use the Customs' statistics will find it indispensable. By means of a detailed demonstration of how to reconstruct statistics for the Fujian tea trade between 1862 and 1948, Lyons shows all the pitfalls and dangers of using Customs data, and how to deal with them.

Lyons, who has published on Fujian's and China's economic history in the past, constructs his study as a test of the tea trade statistics used by Robert Gardella and Chen Ciyu. He convincingly demonstrates that both made errors, which in the case of Gardella were of relatively minor consequence but in that of Chen of a much more serious nature. But his study is not a pedantic exercise in cliometric propriety. Rather, Lyons provides us with a sourcebook to the statistical publications of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. He sets out in brief form the Service's organizational history and its bureaucratic structures. He then explains the Maritime Customs Service's accounts, the statistics it produced, and their dangers. He finally applies the lessons learned to a reconstruction of the Fujian tea trade.

Some problems that Lyons points out are fairly obvious, such as the fact that coverage shifted as China lost territory or the Maritime Customs Service extended its reach as it opened new Customs Houses. Others are not: the Customs Service changed its classification schemes at certain times, rearranged its tables, and altered its valuation procedures. As Lyons points out, the Customs statistics of course did not cover smuggling, while it also important to keep in mind that some items, such as arms, were imported free of duty. Aggregate sums of China's imports and exports must be understood against these realities.

None of these problems justify the conclusion that the statistical publications of the Customs Service should not be used, only that one should do so with due caution. Lyons has done us all a great service by providing us with a systematic introduction to the problems of Customs statistics. Like Endymion Wilkinson's *History of Imperial China: A Research Guide* and Philip Kuhn's *Introduction to Qing Documents*, this book should be included on all reading lists for introductory courses to research on Chinese history.

HANS VAN DE VEN

*Assignment Shanghai: Photographs on the Eve of Revolution.* By JACK BIRNS, edited by CAROLYN WAKEMAN and KEN LIGHT. [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. 144 pp. \$34.95; £22.95. ISBN 0-520-23990-3.]

The image of a desperate Shanghai on the eve of Liberation – memorably

conveyed in Henri Cartier-Bresson's picture of a crowd queuing for gold outside a bank – is amplified by this fine volume of photos from Jack Birns, then on assignment for *Life* magazine. Many of his China negatives, which include some taken on side trips to cover the defence of Mukden and the battle of Xuzhou, were unused and lay in the TimeLife archives for half a century before being disinterred.

*Life*, as Orville Schell notes in his foreword, was the vehicle for some of the best photo-journalism of the mid-2000s, merging “a gritty current-affairs realism with a keen eye and fine sense of composition.” Yet the picture of Kuomintang brutality, muddle and corruption was often too gritty for *Life*'s publisher Henry R. Luce who over the years had placed Chiang Kai-shek seven times on the cover.

Birns's New York editors ignored a picture series in which he followed a pedicab as it toured the city, collecting the bodies of children who had died from illness, starvation or exposure. Another series showing refugee families seeking shelter in a mortuary and coffinmaker's workshop was also spiked.

Carolyn Wakeman in her introduction writes of how, hearing of a skirmish at Songjiang (then a separate town and not part of suburban Shanghai as now), Birns grabbed his camera and rushed down. He was invited by the local KMT commander, keen to boast of his troops' prowess, to photograph “a dozen bodies trussed and disembowelled, along with the dripping head of Communist commander Ding Xishan.” Luce was enraged when he saw the proofs, and yelled “pull that damn picture.” It was eventually run by the magazine – half a century late in 1998.

This volume contains dramatic pictures from all these sequences plus others that are just as evocative for their lack of drama. An exhausted pedicab driver lies slumped on his seat at a street corner. A family watch street acrobats perform, peeking through a bamboo fence to avoid buying tickets. A soldier with his wife – dressed in a borrowed uniform – wait in an open boxcar at the station.

In admiring *Assignment Shanghai*, we should recall a similar volume of pictures taken by Sam Tata (*Shanghai: 1949, End of an Era*, New Amsterdam Books, 1989). Tata, who was born in Shanghai, had been inspired by a meeting with Cartier-Bresson. One day in May 1949 he happened to walk past police headquarters on Fuzhou road where some alleged communists were being put on trial. Squeezing in with his camera, he recalls, he followed “a photographer from *Life* who had got permission to take pictures in the courtyard – which was also the so-called ‘court’.”

Both photographers have preserved for us the image of an otherwise anonymous “communist,” standing erect and as fearless as the hero of a revolutionary opera. Only Birns gets to see the actual execution – perhaps because he was “a photographer from *Life*.”

New York was more interested in a picture series taken by Birns titled “Fun and sin,” which showed idle hostesses, and a few American sailor clients, in the almost empty bars and clubs near the Hongkou waterfront.

It is a pity we cannot read the copy for this feature written by Roy Rowan, head of *Life's* Hong Kong bureau with whom Birns worked – and who also wrote the (unpublished) words for the execution story.

Finally, whatever happened to “Bo” Brown whom we see here, the tattooed owner of the Diamond Bar, a Chicagoan who had jumped ship in Shanghai to make his fortune? Leaning over the counter with a half-glass of beer and a modest smile, he seems to know that the game is over. Birns made an effort to cover the Liberation that would end the fun and the sin, but had to flee from Longhua airport under machine-gun fire. Tata was there to see the People’s Liberation Army arrive, and to take a very different set of pictures.

JOHN GITTINGS

*The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation.* By PHILIP SNOW. [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003. xxvii + 477 pp. £25.00. ISBN 0-300-09352-7.]

This title has been used before, but usually with reference just to the conquest of Hong Kong by Japan in 1941, and here the battle for the territory is covered in a mere 20 pages. The main subject matter is indeed the Japanese occupation, but the title may be taken to have double reference because it is Snow’s thesis that it was this brief period of less than four years that led inexorably to the handover of Hong Kong in 1997. He argues that the loss of Britain’s imperial prestige was exacerbated and set in concrete by the clear message of post-1945 history that it was the Chinese who were the driving power behind Hong Kong and her development. Too weak (sometimes too insensitive) to take full economic advantage from events, the British presided over “an astonishing explosion of wealth. But in the process their own role had become so exiguous that it no longer really mattered, was indeed barely noticeable ....” This may be rather too harsh a judgement on the British (who in their ‘second innings’ hung on for more than half a century after all) but Snow is surely right in tracing the beginning of the distant end to the Japanese conquest which drew a line under received truths and cleared the way for the emergence of new attitudes on all sides.

The political history of the pre-invasion period from the late 1930s, of the occupation itself, and of the immediate years after British resumption of control in August 1945 is nicely pieced together from a wide variety of sources, and Snow has tried hard to draw on Chinese, Japanese and Eurasian writings as well as on the much greater wealth of British accounts, both official and private. In this striving after balance he has had only limited success, the result still being an *Anglocentric* history, though certainly not entirely an *Anglophile* one. The problem is not of his



making, but reflects the relatively sparse and unsystematic nature of sources available at present in Chinese especially.

It would be unfair to take Snow to task for not writing the social history that he did not set out to write, but the effect of reading his very full exposition of the political scene is a hunger for more. What was happening in daily life during the occupation to the 98 per cent of the population who were Chinese and not in prison camps? What was life like in the New Territories (an area mentioned very little in the book)? And how can we fill the gaps in our knowledge about life between major events, gaps which in political histories are apt to fall into the “nothing happened” category made famous by *1066 and All That*? The 1943–1944 period, for instance, is not neglected in the book, but it is perhaps rather more thinly covered than either the 1942 aftermath of conquest or the 1945 end game. It may be that the only way to flesh out this robust political skeleton into a full-bodied social history will be through active programmes of research interviews with as many as possible of those of all nationalities and social groups who lived through the so dismal period, and this task, certainly too great for one researcher working alone, needs urgent attention given the already great lapse of time.

There are some excellent insights into Hong Kong political life, in particular the full treatment that Snow gives to the role of the Chinese and Eurasian ‘gentry’ (i.e. rich) leaders before, during and after the Japanese occupation. He argues that these men were consistently loyal to Hong Kong, and hence the ability many of them had to survive changes in government without too many ‘Vicar of Bray’ accusations being leveled at them. Oddly in the light of this, he makes a rare slip on p. 317 when he says that the territory had a permanent rather than a floating Chinese population for the first time only after 1949.

Despite the considerable quantity of detail presented in this book, the author has succeeded through clarity of organization and immaculate writing style in producing an immensely readable work which, without in any way compromising high standards of academic rigour, will be accessible to non-specialist readers. Thoughtful and well researched, there is not a better book on this subject nor any as full in its treatment.

HUGH D. R. BAKER

*Engineering the State: The Huai River and Reconstruction in Nationalist China, 1927 – 1937.* By DAVID A. PIETZ. [New York and London: Routledge, 2002. ix + 142 pp. £45.00. ISBN 0-415-93388-9.]

Imperial China was known for its massive water control projects, most famously the Huang (Yellow) River dykes and the Grand Canal. Today’s China is now constructing the largest hydroelectric project in human history, the Three Gorges dam. Sandwiched between these two eras was Republican China, when the traditional methods of construction and

engineering gave way to new processes grounded in the principles of scientific hydrology and engineering largely developed in the West. In this brief but fascinating study, David A. Pietz examines the efforts of the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek during the Nanjing decade of 1927–1937 to re-shape the Huai River basin. A student of William Kirby, Pietz adopts the Kirby view that one should see 1949 not as an unbridgeable divide between two eras, but find much continuity in the growth of the modern developmental state in China.

Pietz has chosen the Huai River basin for his case study primarily because it witnessed the Kuomintang government's largest such project. In addition, the ecology of no other area of China has been more impacted by human action. Although draining over a relatively flat alluvial plain, the Huai was far more stable in ancient times than its northern neighbor, the Huang River, because of a much lower silt content. Yet all changed in 1194 when the Huang broke through its banks and began to flow south into the Huai, radically altering the ecology of north central China. From 1194 until 1855 the Huang River entered the ocean through the old Huai River channel, rendering the Huai a mere tributary. Subsequent imperial governments attempted to contain the Huang River while at the same time stabilizing the Grand Canal, so essential for grain transport from the south.

The pattern reversed with the Huang River flood of 1855, which led the river to re-establish its northern channel through Shandong. The Huai River then lacked sufficient water flow to move the silt from the old Huang–Huai route to the ocean, which dried up; Huai waters flowed instead southward into the Chang (Yangtze). This shift blocked the Grand Canal in the area, greatly diminishing Beijing's interest in the Huai. The 1911 Revolution brought new ideas and grand schemes for the Huai basin, but little money or political stability to enact them. The famous reformer Zhang Jian undertook engineering surveys as part of his leadership of the All China Water Conservancy Bureau, but Zhang resigned in 1915 and nothing more was done until the Nanjing decade.

The heart of Pietz's study is the Huai River Conservancy Commission (HRCC) established by the Chiang Kai-shek government in 1929. Pietz places this project within the context of the government's concept of "reconstruction." Very much the vision of Sun Yatsen, the reconstruction of China was to have included massive infrastructure projects such as railroads and dams. Following his break with the left in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek preferred to embrace this part of Sun's legacy rather than the more radical social programs Sun had endorsed in the latter years of his life. Pietz also grounds his study of the HRCC within the context of the politics of the Nanjing government. Throughout the decade the HRCC was involved in political and bureaucratic infighting in Nanjing and struggles between the centre and provincial and local governments.

During the 1927 to 1931 period, Chiang allied with the conservative Hu Hanmin, allowing the latter to place followers in various government positions. Yet Chiang often cut off these agencies from meaningful funding and authority, leaving smaller bodies such as the HRCC to get

caught in the crossfire. A similar process occurred after 1931 when Chiang broke with Hu and turned to Wang Jingwei. Eventually the HRCC came under the domination of Chen Guofu and the Jiangsu provincial authorities. Despite politics, Pietz argues that HRCC was able to add more technical experts to its staff and to undertake real engineering studies of the Huai Valley as early as 1929.

Yet little had actually been accomplished when disaster struck with the 1931 floods. Millions died in the Chang (Yangtze) and Huai basins. A sudden breach in the canals along the Huai in late August killed over 200,000 in a matter of hours. A global relief effort was mounted; T. V. Soong arranged an American commodities loan to help with the effort. When the waters receded the dykes would be rebuilt and the HRCC would start anew, this time with assistance from the League of Nations. The commission began the new construction in 1934, claiming it the largest public works project in recent Chinese history. The old Huang River/Huai route directly east to the sea would be rebuilt and would carry 30 per cent of the water flow; 70 per cent would continue along the existing route to the Chang. Despite funding problems, labour unrest and banditry, the re-digging along the old channel made steady progress. Yet all was for naught. After Japan invaded China in 1937, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the dykes on the Huang River blown. The northern giant reclaimed its old southern route through the Huai Valley, destroying countless lives and washing away all of the work done by the HRCC. It would remain for Mao's China to complete restoration of the Huai.

This study by Pietz is based on solid archival research; it will be an essential read for students of Republican China. Though focused on a narrow topic, *Engineering the State* reveals much about the political and ecological history of modern China.

PARKS M. COBLE

*Questions of Style: Literary Societies and Literary Journals in Modern China, 1911–1937.* By MICHEL HOCKX. [Leiden: Brill, 2003. 310 pp. \$79.00; €63.00. ISBN 90-04-12915-4.]

This book aims to analyse the rise of modern Chinese literature from the perspective of cultural production. With selected literary communities and publications from the 1910s to the 1930s as points of reference, the book argues that the emergence of Chinese “new literature” hinged not so much on avant-garde thoughts and texts as on a re-configuration of contextual, and sometimes conventional, “relations.” Whereas the extant paradigm sees the literary field from the May Fourth period to the eve of

the second Sino-Japanese War as one characterized by gestures such as individualism and iconoclasm, Hockx points to the fact that this field was no less marked by a call for communal solidarity, and a reinstatement of the traditions thought to have been overthrown.

Hockx's case in point is the paradoxical situation that, their searches for selfhood notwithstanding, among modern Chinese writers and literati it has been fashionable to join societies or cliques, as if only group bonding could support personal confidence. In so doing they unwittingly maintained forms of social gathering characteristic of premodern Chinese literature. Meanwhile, these new literary groups capitalized on the modern medium of literary journal, through which they were able to solidify their textual and contextual relationships, and cultivate their "styles."

The making and circulation of such "styles" serves as the core of Hockx's investigation. For him, style does not mean merely a rhetorical register that highlights an individual author's mode of writing. Rather it encompasses a whole array of social implications. Again by harking back to premodern literary history, Hockx comes to an interpretation of style as an embodiment of both form and content, both linguistic trait and social mannerism, and above all, both individual option and institutional expectation. Moreover, Hockx finds his up-to-date understanding of this Chinese "style" by consulting Western literary sociologists, among whom Pierre Bourdieu stands out as the most inspirational. He then proceeds to analyse the transaction and contestation of this style during the Republican period, as evinced by cases such as the conflation of the societal and the textual in selected societies (chapter three), the fashioning of individual style within a collective will (chapter four), the dispute over questionable styles and ideologies (chapters five and six), and the implementation of censorship as a factor in the dissemination of styles (chapter seven).

Hockx's book guides us into territory rarely trod by scholars, in China or overseas. It succeeds in proving that style is not a mere aesthetic entity but an endeavour that brought literary "habitus," print culture, market tactics, and political networking of the Republican time into play. Thanks to the very broad scope of subjects the book tries to cover, Hockx has raised (but not necessarily fully answered) a few questions, and I find the following particularly worthy of pursuit: How did style figure in relation to the quarrels and negotiations of the elite and popular writers of the time? How was style as cultural capital invested to enact societal and even national imaginaries? Beyond the proposed time frame of this book (1911–1937), how did literary societies and literary styles undergo reformation and re-form themselves at the call of war and revolution? Finally, how could one generation of avant-gardes label themselves revolutionary modernists when they were in fact advocating only well-established forms of modernism and revolution? How did traditionalists refashion themselves to survive, or sometimes even initiate, the tides of modernity? Hockx's book is provocative in methodology and meticulous in scholarship; it must be hailed as a groundbreaking achievement.

DAVID DER-WEI WANG

*Lily Briscoe's Chinese Eyes: Bloomsbury, Modernism and China.* By PATRICIA LAURENCE. [Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2003. 488 pp. £45.95. ISBN 1-57003-505-9.]

This book project began in 1991 when Patricia Laurence, a scholar of Virginia Woolf, encountered a collection of unpublished letters and papers belonging to some members of the Bloomsbury Group and to Ling Shuhua, a renowned modern Chinese woman writer. Although some scholars have read and responded to the materials Laurence used in this book, her expansive coverage, freely traversing the boundaries of time, nation and artistic genres, is exceptional.

The work deals mainly with the intercultural communications between Chinese and British intellectuals in the first half of the 20th century, particularly those between the modernist literary 'communities' of the Crescent Moon Group and Bloomsbury. The work is the outcome of the author's dedicated research on the subject over ten years, ever since her discovery of the letters, which motivated her to learn the Chinese language and to attend lectures and seminars in modern Chinese literature.

Trans-cultural activities were often accompanied by trans-marital relations, which included an intense relationship between Ling Shuhua and Julian Bell, and a less serious one between Xu Zhimo and Pearl Buck. The love affair between Ling and Bell, which was brought to a wider audience because of Chen Xiaoying's lawsuit against Hong Ying's novel *K*, is an important part of the book since it brought about further communication between the two communities. At the heart of the book is also the interrelation between Xu Zhimo and Cambridge intellectuals.

The author claims that one of the primary goals of this study was to "reconfigure international modernism" by including China and the Chinese aesthetic. China's place in the map of modernism is considered within the wide scope of art: literature, especially letters and diaries; painting; architecture; and consumer products, such as the popular blue and white willow pattern plate. Laurence's discussion of modernism is enriched by comparative approaches to issues such as subjectivity, sentimentality, homosexuality and nationalism, and by her resourceful employment of cross-cultural references and theories. Yet it is doubtful whether her numerous and rather fragmentary citations of theories in fact lead her to develop or sharpen the issues.

This is a book into which the author is integrated. Laurence's journeys to the archives in England and China, and her interviews with Chinese literati, such as Xiao Qian, themselves become interesting subject matters. Yet her deep immersion also seems to hinder her from keeping an adequate distance from her predecessors. In this context, Laurence's comfortable identification with Lily Briscoe, a female character in Virginia Woolf's *To the Lighthouse*, that is the location of herself within the house of Woolf, is problematic. Laurence in many cases limits herself to eulogizing the Chinese and English intellectuals' attraction to the other's artistic vision. She admits at the end of the book that she has somewhat

generalized each culture, particularly Chinese culture. This might have been avoided, for instance, if she made a clear distinction between her view of Chinese painting and that of Ling Shuhua, Julian Bell or Roger Fry.

I also find the author's reading of the letters in those archives too sympathetic. I can hardly agree that these materials, which I have also read in the course of my own research, buttress Laurence's argument that the artistic interchange between the Chinese and British intellectuals, unlike economic and political relations between the two nations, can be exempted from the imperialist model or that the intercultural practices between the two modernisms were reciprocal. Questions can also be raised over some of the main concepts, which she takes as settled terms and celebrates: Chinese painting, difference and international modernism.

Whether or not one agrees with the author's view, this book, a fine example of intercultural studies, presents fertile discursive ground for both modern Chinese and English literature. It will contribute to scholarship about the Bloomsbury Group and the Crescent Moon Group, and the study of modernism.

The reader with a background in English literature may find her aesthetic explorations of the relationship between Chinese painting and (Western) modernism insightful and refreshing. The general standard of coverage of Chinese history is professional, but there are some incorrect and incoherent spellings of Chinese names. This book does not discuss materials written in Chinese. It can be used as a reference, a very informative and intelligent one, for both undergraduate and graduate students in Chinese literature and culture. It also offers a look at paintings and photographs that are not often seen.

JEESON HONG

*The Columbia History of Chinese Literature.* Edited by VICTOR MAIR.  
[New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 1,342 + xxiv pp.  
\$75.00; £52.50. ISBN 0-231-10984-9.]

Following his *Columbia Anthology of Traditional Chinese Literature* (1994) and the *Shorter Columbia Anthology of Traditional Chinese Literature* (2000), the *Columbia History of Chinese Literature* intends to complement these two widely used readers. Edited by Victor H. Mair, the 55 chapters of this single-volume history of Chinese literature are chronologically arranged with thematic chapters interspersed. Indeed, a closer look at the chapters reveals that the book at hand follows the traditional dictum of *wen shi zhe bu fenjia*, i.e. that literature, history and philosophy should not be separated but regarded as one field of studies. Hence the scope of this history goes far beyond the scope of what is traditionally subsumed under the heading of literature. In addition to the topics (all genres and periods of poetry, prose, fiction, and drama) that one expects

in a book of this sort, wit and humour, proverbs and rhetoric, historical and philosophical writings, classical exegesis, literary theory and criticism, traditional fiction commentary, as well as popular culture, the impact of religion upon literature, the role of women, and the relationship with non-Chinese languages and peoples (ethnic minorities, Korea, Japan, Vietnam) feature as topics of individual chapters.

Most of the chapters are written by leading specialists in those areas and are highly informative as well as concisely presented. Moreover, a number of chapters are thought-provoking enough to inspire questions that may lead towards a more focused research on hitherto neglected or less well-documented topics. In this sense, *The Columbia History of Chinese Literature* may also be perceived as a potential major impetus for further developments in the study of pre-modern and modern Chinese literature and related fields. Since the volume aims at bringing the riches of China's literary tradition into focus for a general readership, the majority of chapters can probably be best described as outlines of specific developments that should encourage readers to consult more specialized publications.

This volume is complemented by a number of glossaries, an index, a useful suggestions for further readings, and an online bibliography (see <http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/chineselitbib>). The main text is well edited, biographical data are added to persons' names and translations of book titles and Chinese terms are supplied.

Having used *The Columbia History of Chinese Literature* in the classroom for a while, we may add that more detailed pointers to reference and source material would have been desirable. For practical reasons, the suggestions for further readings cannot be considered substitutes for focused and detailed footnotes or endnotes. Given the scale of the book it may be understandable that such documentation is not supplied but from a reader's – especially a learner's – perspective, the lack of source references makes it difficult to trace a particular author's views and to contextualise them in the wider framework of Sinological scholarship.

Nevertheless, the Columbia History of Chinese Literature is indeed the most comprehensive single-volume introduction to Chinese literature, pre-modern and modern. It goes without saying that no library can afford not to make this impressive volume available to its readers, and that nobody with a serious interest in Chinese literature can possibly disregard this comprehensive and most inspiring volume.

BERNHARD FUEHRER

*Leaving China: Media, Migration and Transnational Imagination.* By WANNING SUN. [Lanham, Boulder, London, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. 243 pp. \$24.95. ISBN 0-7425-1797-7.]

*Leaving China* is, in part, a study of the televisual and filmic representa-



tion of Chinese emigration. The book is partly autobiographical, since it draws on the author's own lived experience as a China-born scholar established abroad. The author, born in the PRC, is now based in Australia, but as the list of acknowledgements indicates, she is imbricated in a global network of China-related academics. The other strand of Wanning Sun's research is imaginary travel and virtual migration: the Chinese spectator's consumption of a filmed elsewhere – especially the elsewhere inhabited by émigré Chinese.

This is a book about recent migration from the PRC and Chinese perceptions of emigration. *Leaving China* does not attempt to address the history of the older diaspora of the 19th and 20th centuries, for instance, the now forgotten communities whose story is told in the Chinese-Australian writer Brian Castro's book *Birds of Passage* (Allen & Unwin, 1983). In the parts of the book that focus on lived migratory experience, Sun is concerned more with people like herself, her generation, and her class.

The main threads running through this work are those of “transnational” imaginary, nostalgia, memory and their articulation in the Chinese “media landscape,” from PRC-produced televisual representation to Internet websites devoted to the Nanjing and Tiananmen massacres, but also less heroically to the Chinese everyday. The title of chapter six, “Eating food and telling stories: from home(land) to homepage” captures the spirit of the book and of this author's quest, which is at once academic and personal. “Those who want to leave China,” writes Sun, “either vicariously or bodily, look forward and outward and partake of an endless cycle of reproduction of fantasies, desires, and yearnings for the foreign and the modern; others who want to return to China – culturally, if not physically – look backward and inward towards China's collective history and memory for continuous cultural nourishment” (pp. 215–16).

Sun's book constitutes a timely and imaginative contribution to the questions of alterity and identity posed by contemporary Chineseness, a reflection on a new chapter of a story that started a century and half ago. We are far from reaching its conclusion. In 2008, China will be the object of global attention and Sun Wanning predicts that the Olympics will “showcase the outcome of these processes of the Chinese transnational imagination.” What is certain is that the world's gaze will focus on a comparatively recent spectacle that is the commodity capitalist nation-state called China. Wanning Sun's post-2008 analysis of that globally mediated moment will make interesting reading.

GREGORY B. LEE