The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960s: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution

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THE recent events in China are surely drama of the highest order, but at times it has seemed that the actors themselves were not entirely sure who was writing the lines. In fact what we seem to be witnessing is a form of *commedia dell'arte*: improvisation within a certain tacitly understood framework. The cultural revolution appears to have taken new turns and to have broken into new channels precisely because the actors have been faced with new and unforeseen circumstances as it has run its course. No faction in the struggle has been able to impose its will on the Party or the country by fiat; new devices and stratagems have been brought into play in what has looked like desperate attempts to gain the upper hand. It has clearly been a battle of the utmost seriousness, but there appear to have been limitations on the resultant chaos. Economic disorganisation does not seem to have occurred on the scale of the later stages of the Great Leap Forward. Nor, despite the clashes, confusion and bitter infighting, have new centres of power, totally divorced from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself, arisen. The cultural revolution has been pre-eminently a struggle within the Party.

Indeed, this is the central point made by the resolution of the 11th Plenum of the Party's (Eighth) Central Committee in August 1966: the spearhead of the struggle was to be directed against those "persons in authority following the capitalist path" *within* the Party.[1] In the process, however, a good deal of dirty linen has been washed in public. Despite the tendentious nature of much of this material, much light has been thrown on the issues and disputes that precipitated the present tug-of-war. Already certain institutions—most notably the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and some organs of the Party itself—have been thrown into high relief, and certain periods of CCP history have acquired new importance. The most obvious of these periods are the most recent: the era of relaxation of 1960–62 and its aftermath, the effort to re-energise the Party following the 10th Central

[1] See *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (*SCMP*) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), no. 3761, p. 3.

Committee Plenum. For if anything is clear about the present upheava it is that the tensions and disputes that brought it into being did no arise overnight, but are deep-seated and have been growing throughou the 1960s.

Signs of malaise within the CCP were not lacking. The Nintl Party Congress, due to meet in 1963, was never convened. Follow ing the 10th Plenum in September 1962 the Central Committee did no meet in plenary session for nearly four years. For almost the sam length of time discussions of the Party *qua* Party, the specific self criticism and adumbration of CCP strengths and weaknesses that ar normally a feature of the press, were very largely absent from Chines media. While unexplained absences of Party congresses and lack o Central Committee plena are by no means unknown in CCP history such phenomena may well reflect the presence of unresolved issues a a very high level; the last such hiatus occurred in the early 1950s, prio to the purge of Kao Kang.

But the CCP's troubles were not confined to the Party centre By 1960 the Party organisational structure was clearly in disrepair. That the Great Leap Forward proved traumatic for the CCP hardl needs emphasis. Morale, already shaken by the all too apparent chasn between the promises of the Great Leap programme and the resultan reality, was further eroded by the anti-rightist campaign of 1959. Nor should it be forgotten that in many respects the CCP was sufferin badly from growing pains. By mid-1961 the CCP comprised som 17 million members and most were relatively new recruits. No mor than 20 per cent. of all Party members in 1961—a mere 3·4 million— had joined the Party prior to the establishment of the Chinese People' Republic.[4] This huge mass of fairly new recruits undoubtedly include a considerable number of careerists, and among the remainder th level of ideological training often was not high. Furthermore, th Party continued to grow—perhaps to 20 million by the end of 1965

In a very real sense the Party could be said to be suffering als from an identity-crisis. One aspect of this was of course the stead loss of revolutionary élan as Party cadres became enmeshed in th increasingly complex bureaucratic and managerial problems of govern ing the country.[5] "Old cadres" who had joined the Party while i

[2] James R. Townsend, *Political Participation in Communist China* (Berkeley, Calif. University of California Press, 1967), p. 192.

[3] For evidence see *Collection of Documents Seized in Guerrilla Attack on Lien-Chian Fukien* (Taipei: Ministry of Defense, 1964 (Lien-Chiang Documents; in Chinese) p. 9.

[4] Liu Shao-ch'i, "Speech on the 40th Anniversary of the CCP," in *Current Back ground* (CB) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 655, p. 1.

[5] For an excellent discussion see Ezra Vogel, "From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureau crat: the 'Regularisation' of Cadres," *The China Quarterly*, No. 29 (January March 1967), p. 36.

was still struggling for mastery of China found their revolutionary experience increasingly irrelevant to the problems now confronting them; "new cadres" lacked this experience but also lacked the sense of total involvement with the Party that it imparted. Furthermore, the Party could not govern without the assistance of non-Party technical experts. These people were often given pride of place.[6] Pressures within the Party to reverse this trend played a part in the decision to embark on the Great Leap Forward. But in the subsequent period of retrenchment the trend toward technical expertise and separation of functions was once more resumed, only to be reversed again—partially and hesitatingly—in the period following the 10th Plenum.[7]

Against this background of strain and difficulty the disputes of the 1960s were played out within the Party. The fact that there *were* disputes is of itself hardly surprising; the policy-making levels of the CCP had by no means always agreed unanimously. But the conflicts of the past several years eventually shook the Party to its foundation. In part this was a result of the disaster brought on by the Great Leap Forward. Far-reaching decisions of great importance were urgently required to retrieve the situation. Faced with a series of natural disasters, increasing economic dislocation and stagnation, and widespread disaffection, the Party relaxed its controls, retreated in the countryside, and lowered its goals in the industrial sector. This programme was largely successful in the economic sphere, but though it alleviated the immediate political crisis it created a host of new political problems.

The attitudes engendered by this period of relaxation placed expertise, bureaucratic rationalisation and efficiency and pragmatism in commanding positions. Not a few CCP members in the upper and middle levels came to feel that precisely these qualities would guarantee that the 1959–60 collapse would not be repeated. For them the goal of the Chinese revolution became largely bound up with considerations of wealth and power: the growth of the productive and military capacity of the state, and a rise in the people's standard of living. But this emphasis on rationalisation implied a general distrust of "revolutionary spontaneity," a relegation of purely ideological considerations to second place and a tacit admission that the philosophy and techniques of the Great Leap Forward had been mistaken. This view was by no means universally held, particularly among those whose prestige had been most closely bound up with the Great Leap experiment —above all Mao Tse-tung himself.

[6] *Ibid.* p. 39.
[7] Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1966), p. 303.

The issue as this second group saw it was in its simplest form the question of "revisionism"—the question of whether revolutionary fervour and momentum could be maintained over a long period of time, of whether China would in fact "change its colour." There can be no doubt that Mao had become increasingly preoccupied with this problem and with a nexus of related issues—the "revolutionary successors" problem, the proper relationship of ideology to economic considerations, the "red and expert" issue and the proper tasks of literature and the arts in fostering revolutionary attitudes and enthusiasm.[8]

It is tempting to see in these two divergent philosophies and conflicting areas of primary concern two clear-cut and self-conscious factions within the CCP, one represented by Mao Tse-tung, the other perhaps by the "rationalising" bureaucrat, Liu Shao-ch'i. But reality appears to have been more complicated. What might be called the "Maoist" position seems reasonably well defined, at least in the period following the 10th Plenum, but that of the "opposition" is more complex. Despite the many charges of "plotting" thrown up by the cultural revolution, there is very little evidence that Mao's opponents were acting in concerted, organised fashion for any extended period prior to 1966. While opposition to, and even sabotage of, several "Maoist" policies was real enough after 1962, it is possible that some of the "rationalisers" believed they were in fact carrying out the broad policy directives of the Chairman. However, given their preoccupation with order, efficiency, technical progress and similar concerns, in the process of "gearing down" these general directives they in fact distorted them. But this was a subtle process, and one that was probably not always immediately apparent to Mao himself.

The 11th Plenum resolution, not to mention subsequent events, makes it clear that Mao and the "Maoists" had eventually come to believe that revisionist rot was centred in the Party apparatus itself. What then had gone wrong with the Party? In what way did the "Maoists" and the opposition differ in their conception of the Party's organisation and its role? How had the Party apparatus failed to perform to the Chairman's satisfaction? If the situation within the Party itself was, as prima facie evidence would suggest, a root cause of the cultural revolution, then exploration of these questions provides a means of understanding the upheaval itself.

(i) There appear to be three broad problem areas within the CCP

[8] Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution: Origin and Development," *The China Quarterly*, No. 29 (January-March 1967), pp. 8-9.

in the 1960s: first, that of basic-level cadres, where the problems stemming from hasty recruiting, deficient ideological training and questionable motivation were most evident. In the early 1960s the "rationalisers" saddled the basic levels with much of the blame for the failure of the Great Leap Forward. Following the 10th Plenum, however, Party policy emphasised the "Maoist" concept of the basic-level cadres as a reservoir of great revolutionary potential. The "rationalisers" within the Party nevertheless continued to distrust the capabilities and ideological understanding of the basic levels, and as a result tended to distort in practice a number of Party programmes, in particular the socialist education campaign in the countryside.

Another problem area was that of Party organisation, primarily involving the middle levels of the CCP. In the early 1960s great emphasis was placed on the strengthening of the organisational sinews of the Party and on the importance of Party discipline. This emphasis, however, tended to multiply bureaucratic abuses within the CCP, and a "Maoist" attempt to counter this tendency through the device of allowing criticism of individual Party members by groups outside the CCP was strongly resisted by apparatchiks at the middle level of the Party.

The third problem involved the implementation of the many national campaigns introduced in the years following the 10th Plenum. Opposition to the sloganeering and simplistic solutions to complex problems fostered by these campaigns cut across all levels of the Party but was concentrated in the middle and upper levels of the CCP, particularly in those Party organs concerned with propaganda and culture and with education. Here the effort of certain Party elements to avoid another Great Leap debacle was most evident.

Intertwined with these problems was the crucial question of personal power. Party figures were able to resist "Maoist" pressures, often with considerable success because they were in a position to modify the "Maoist" programmes while continuing to mouth the orthodox "Maoist" slogans. Indeed, the history of the CCP from mid-1964 and particularly since the start of the cultural revolution itself can be seen as an attempt on the part of Mao Tse-tung to re-assert his personal authority over all aspects of Party policy and over all levels of Party organisation. But as the pressures toward this end grew, personal animosities were exacerbated and philosophic and policy differences personalised. The ultimate result of this trend was the explosion that has convulsed China since mid-1966.

Basic-Level Cadres

In the wake of the extensive failures growing out of the Great Leap

experiment, and especially with the introduction of the "agriculture in first place" slogan, the Party turned its primary attention to its basic-level cadres. These men were the infantry of the Party who of course encompassed the vast majority of Party members.[9] Upper-level functionaries were frequently inclined to treat them with considerable contempt. Indeed, a provincial committee secretary, deploring this tendency, noted that senior personnel discussing study programmes for basic-level cadres "adopt a negative attitude, declaring that the cultural level of these cadres is so low that regular studies are simply impossible."[10] Most importantly, the basic-level cadres were accused of failure to understand properly the directives and policies of the Party Central—above all, failure to understand, and in turn make the masses understand, that pure communism could not be created overnight and that the transitional period would be long and painful.[11] Here of course the lower levels were being attacked for faithfully implementing the millennial policies of the Party Central in 1958. But it is probably true that as the desires of the dominant element of the Party leadership were interpreted at lower levels, basic-level cadres went further than the centre had intended, particularly with regard to the institution of the "free supply" system. Moreover, the "cultural backwardness" of those at the lower levels could on occasion lead to incredible gaffes, such as the case of the cadre who had his peasants pull up the sweet potato crop after it had been planted on the grounds that it was no longer needed in the new golden age.[12]

In general, the attack on the basic-level cadres was threefold: it focused on their relations with the masses, on their ideological understanding and adherence to the Party line, and on problems of their control and discipline. Few complaints were new, but the wide range of charges and the continuation of the attack over a considerable period was in itself somewhat unusual. Discussions of basic-level cadre problems showed great sensitivity to the unspoken accusation that the Party had pushed the general populace too hard during the Great Leap Forward. Numerous instances of "commandism" were cited, and cadres were charged with ignoring the complaints of the masses and of assuming the airs and prerogatives of pre-Liberation officials.[13] Cadres at the basic level were accused not only of failure to understand Party

[9] In the wider sense "basic-level cadres" can of course refer to non-Party as well as CCP personnel. The more restricted sense is generally employed here.
[10] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*People's Daily*), July 9, 1960 in *SCMP*, No. 2304, p. 11.
[11] *People's Daily*, October 31, 1960 in *SCMP*, No. 2379, p. 4.
[12] Edwin Winckler, "On Rectification," manuscript in Harvard East Asian Research Center Library, p. 22.
[13] *Nan-fang Daily*, November 26, 1960 in *SCMP*, No. 2416, p. 1.

policy, but of failure to study CCP ideology, resulting in a crude understanding of even the most basic and accessible works of Chairman Mao, and of failure even to read Party directives.[14]

Concurrent with these charges was a drive towards relaxation and rationalisation in the factories and countryside. The basic-level cadres in turn were urged to reward and defer to people with technical skills. They were to encourage the entrepreneurial and acquisitive instincts of the peasants and to avoid applying rigid formulas to problems of local resistance or local conditions requiring special handling.[15] The watchword "learn from the masses" in this period meant deference to local opinion and a general effacement of the cadres themselves. They were admonished to establish easy working relationships both with natural local leaders and with the general populace.[16]

These measures and admonitions reflected a profound distrust of the basic-level cadres themselves, reducing and circumscribing their direct leadership role. Concurrent emphasis on technical ability and expertise tended to erode further their activities. Production, rather than politics, was in command. The Party press warned against the tendency on the part of many cadres to place the two in opposition to each other,[17] but the distinction was inevitable. While ideological training was by no means abandoned—new Party schools for cadre training were established and a large number of teachers were accepted into the Party—it was not to interfere with production and regular work.[18] Continued insistence that basic-level cadres act strictly in accordance with higher-level Party directives and not take matters into their own hands restricted initiative at the lowest levels of the Party.

These tendencies were endorsed at the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee in January 1961, which sanctified the "agriculture in first place" approach. The plenum decision paid lip-service to the anti-rightist campaign of 1959 but called for a new rectification campaign within the Party. In fact, the campaign had been under way since April 1960 [19] and at the time of the plenum had probably been concluded in many places. In retrospect it would appear that many "rightists" ousted or censured in the campaigns of 1959 and 1957–58 were reinstated or pardoned at this time. Attacks on "revisionists" in the cultural revolution mention that large numbers of previously disciplined personnel "clamoured" for a review of their cases during this period.[20]

[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Nan-fang Daily*, October 7, 1960 in *SCMP*, No. 2380, p. 12.
[16] *People's Daily*, March 4, 1961 in *SCMP*, No. 2455, p. 10.
[17] *People's Daily*, January 25, 1961 in *SCMP*, No. 2424, p. 1.
[18] *Nan-fang Daily*, October 7, 1960.
[19] Chin Szu-kai, "The Party, 1961," in *Communist China, 1961* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1962), p. 3.
[20] *Yang-ch'eng Wan-pao*, Canton, May 3, 1966 in *SCMP*, No. 3698, p. 5.

These reinstatements involved a tacit admission that the critics of the Great Leap policies who were the primary target of the 1959 campaign had turned out to be very largely correct. Indeed, the dislocations of 1960–61 undoubtedly led many additional Party members to espouse the "rightist" position on such related issues as economic rationalisation, centralised control and strict accounting procedures, as well as close supervision of lower level cadres coupled with restrictions on initiatives from below. The general economic recovery beginning in 1962 reinforced pressures to expand and deepen these "rightist" policies. In February of that year Ch'en Yün, a principal advocate of economic raretionalisation and opponent of the Great Leap policies, apparently put forward a proposal for further extension of the relaxation programme which was discussed and evidently tentatively endorsed at high levels of the Party.[21] But those most committed to the Great Leap Forward, who had reluctantly endorsed relaxation as a necessary evil when the crisis of 1960 seemed to provide no alternatives to a drastic reorientation of state and Party priorities, found them intolerable in a period of economic recovery. Mao's reaction to Ch'en's proposals was negative in the extreme.[22] And in September 1962 the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee brought the period of relaxation to an abrupt end.

The hallmark of the 10th Plenum was of course an all-out attack on revisionism. The importance of class struggle was emphasised and a new effort at ideological rectification and education demanded. Basic-level cadres were told to abandon the relaxed procedures of the period of retrenchment. A socialist education campaign was launched. The problems this policy reversal presented are illustrated by the experience of Lien-chiang *hsien*, Fukien.[23]

Lien-chiang *hsien* inaugurated a programme of socialist education and ideological training almost as soon as the 10th Plenum had concluded, but quickly discovered that problems at the basic level were so numerous that a new rectification campaign would have to be conducted before a more ambitious programme could properly be launched. The first two months of 1963 were devoted to this task. The *hsien* Party committee insisted that it retain close control over the campaign; basic-level cadres were allowed little initiative and were told to refer all important matters to the *hsien* [24]; moreover, coercion was prohibited—"soft winds and gentle rain" was the order of the day. Nevertheless, struggle meetings were in fact convened, and several "extraordinary" deaths occurred,

[21] Liu Shao-ch'i, "Self-Criticism," in *Mainichi Shimbun*, January 28, 1967.
[22] *Ibid.*
[23] The following discussion draws on materials from the *Lien-Chiang Documents*, *op. cit.*
[24] *Ibid.* p. 233.

apparently by beating.[25] Perhaps more interesting was the reluctance of many basic-level cadres to go along with the new policies: the *hsien* Party committee was forced to keep a box score of the number of cadres (presumably many were non-Party members) who tried to resign, and of those who had been pressured into staying on.[26] The cadres opposed the new policies for four basic reasons: fear of engaging in "struggle" because they might be disciplined or lose face if the policy changed; fear that the populace might "retaliate" against them; fear that all that would come of the new movement would be further trouble with the masses; and above all, a cynical suspicion that the socialist education movement was useless and would not change anything.[27]

The *hsien* committee also had great difficulty convincing the cadres that the practice of *tan kan*, "going it alone" in agricultural production rather than farming collectively, was a major error. Not only did many cadres indulge in this practice themselves; they argued that it created good management, stimulated production, was popular with the masses, and was in line with socialism because reward was equal to work and it created a good attitude among the people. Furthermore, the cadres resisted the counter-arguments of the *hsien* committee: as one remarked, "the higher-ups always talk about morality, but they have something different in their hearts. Their words and actions never coincide."[28]

The situation in Lien-chiang is illustrative of the tensions between the basic-level cadres and the general populace on the one hand, and the cadres and the higher levels of the Party organisation on the other. Moreover, in the *hsien* committee's insistence on its supervisory role we can see a determined attempt to maintain close and strict control over the lower levels during the initial stages of the new policy: the distrust of the basic-level cadres had not been dissipated. But this approach was in fact a distortion of the directives of the Party centre. In May 1963 the Central Committee issued over its signature general instructions regarding the socialist education campaign and the related Party rectification movement known as the *ssu ch'ing* or "four clean-ups." Known as the "early 10 points," this document has since been attributed to Chairman Mao himself.[29]

The "early 10 points" took a very different view of the basic-level cadres than that prevalent during the period of relaxation. Stating that 95 per cent. of the basic-level cadres were "good or comparatively good,"[30]

[25] *Ibid.*
[26] *Ibid.* p. 198.
[27] *Ibid.* p. 229.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Kuan-yü Nung-ts'un Kung-tso-chung Jo-kan Wen-ti Chüeh-ting Ts'ao-an* (*Draft Decision on Several Questions Concerning Current Work in Rural Areas*) (Taipei, n.d.).
[30] *Ibid.* sec. 4.

it discussed methods of tapping the energy and revolutionary enthusiasm latent in both cadres and the masses. Primarily this meant ideological study and struggle sessions, seen almost in terms of a religious revival. The cadres were to apply these methods first to themselves, then to the poor and lower-middle peasants, with whom they were to form an alliance in the course of village class warfare.[31] The resultant upsurge in revolutionary enthusiasm would provide the energy to carry the revolution forward; the implication was that the failure properly to tap this enthusiasm had caused the failure of the Great Leap Forward. In the process of "arousing" the peasants, poor and lower-middle peasants' associations were to be formed. These would among other things provide an independent check on the actions of the cadres; the basic levels would be controlled not so much from above, from the *hsien*, but from below, by the masses themselves.

This programme did not imply that the Party apparatus was to be bypassed. Clearly the upper levels of the Party were to exercise general supervision and to set the tone and terms of the campaign, but the basic-level cadres were to be allowed far greater initiative than in the early 1960s. Nor were the shortcomings of the basic-level cadres ignored[32]; they were simply outweighed by the revolutionary virtues of the lower levels.

This programme of the "early 10 points" was soon supplemented by a remarkable Central Committee directive issued in September 1963, known as the "later 10 points."[33] It mouthed the same slogans as its predecessor regarding such matters as the class struggle, the necessity to arouse the poor and lower-middle peasants, and the potential revolutionary fervour waiting to be tapped in the countryside. But in ostensibly clarifying and refining the earlier document, in fact it negated the premises upon which it had been based. Once again the basic-level cadres were circumscribed and denied initiative: all matters of importance were to be referred to the *hsien* Party committee for clarification and final decision.[34] Moreover, despite the lip-service accorded to class struggle, the role of incentives in increasing and maintaining production was strongly emphasised. The Party aim in the countryside was said to be a continued growth in production and a further increase in material advantages for the peasantry.[35] Cadres were warned to be especially careful in designating individuals "rich

[31] *Ibid.*
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *Kuan-yü Nung-ts'un She-hui-chu-i Chiao-yü Yü-tung-chung I-hsieh Chü-t'i Chang-ts'e t'i Kuei-ting Ts'ao-an* (*Draft Regulations on Several Concrete Policies in the Rural Socialist Education Movement*) (Taipei, n.d.)
[34] *Ibid.* sec. 6.
[35] *Ibid.* sec. 2.

peasants," since the role of advanced and enterprising peasants was most important for production; private plots were to be encouraged even when they exceeded regulation size, and the "free market system" was to be left intact.[36] Organisation and control were stressed. In the context of later 1963, this was a highly revisionist document; its impact was further enhanced when in June 1964 regulations on the establishment of the poor and lower-middle peasants' associations emphasised careful separation of the new organisations from commune, brigade, and work team administrations but left the associations under the close control of the *hsien* Party committee.[37]

Matters did not rest here, however. In January 1965 still another Central Committee directive was issued, repudiating aspects of the "later 10 points" and the peasant association regulations and making it clear that the new document had been issued specifically to correct erroneous tendencies contained in those directives. This new document, the famous "23 articles,"[38] has also been closely associated with Mao Tse-tung. Its language was far shriller than that of either of the "10 points" and in fact closely prefigures the "16 points" issued in August 1966 by the 11th Central Committee Plenum. Once more the class struggle was proclaimed and the positive role of the basic-level cadres and of the poor and lower-middle peasants stressed. Once more supervision of the cadres' work from below by the masses was emphasised.[39] But most startling was the proclamation that revisionism had rotted the Party itself: "persons in authority following the capitalist road" existed at all levels of the CCP, specifically including the central organs of the Party.[40]

Yet, despite this series of directives, and despite the rather generalised but unremitting exhortation that filled the press in the years after the 10th Plenum, there was in fact no general "revolutionary upsurge" in the countryside. For all the vehemence and urgency of the "23 articles," 1965 was clearly not a revolutionary year in China, and in fact as we shall see, the debate on the role and utility of the basic-level cadres was still continuing in January 1966. The issues involved—whether the basic levels could be trusted to carry out policy, whether or not they needed close supervision from above or were in fact being unduly restrained by the dead hand of bureaucracy, whether

[36] *Ibid.* sec. 5.
[37] *Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho Kuo Ping Nung Hsia Chung Nung Hsieh-hui Tsu-chih T'iao-li Tsao-an* (*Draft Articles of the CPR for the Organization of Poor and Lower Middle Peasant Associations*) (Taipei, n.d.).
[38] *Nung-ts'un She-hui-chu-i Chiao-yü Yün-tung-chung Mu-ch'ien T'i-ch'u ti I-hsieh Wen-t'i* (*Several Problems Currently Arising in the Course of the Rural Socialist Education Campaign*) (Taipei, n.d.).
[39] *Ibid.* sec. 1.
[40] *Ibid.* sec. 2.

the basic level contained an untapped reservoir of revolutionary potential or had to be coaxed and rewarded for performance and production—remained unresolved. There was certainly no denial that major problems existed among the basic-level cadres. But the crucial question of how to treat and utilise the great mass of poorly trained, undereducated and perhaps indifferently motivated Party members at the bottom of the pyramid remained unsettled until the spring of 1966.

Organisation

If the Party's first concern in the crisis of 1960–61 was with its basic-level cadres, concern with the state of the Party organisation followed as a close second. The policies of the Great Leap Forward, and in particular the moves toward decentralisation that accompanied it, had tended to dislocate the Party command structure; thus, the first moves in organisational refurbishing were directed toward making the weight of the Party centre felt more strongly at all levels of the CCP. To this end new regional bureaus were established in 1960. Unlike the regional bureaus that had existed in the early 1950s, the new bureaus were clearly organs of the Central Committee itself, and were obviously designed to facilitate the work and increase the power of the Central Committee Secretariat.

With the establishment of the regional bureaus came a strong assertion of Party discipline from the centre. At the same time there was a concerted effort to clear and improve channels of communication both from the top down and in the opposite direction. If the basic-level cadres had been accused of failing to understand Party policies, the intermediate levels of the CCP—the provincial and *hsien* committees—were charged with failure properly to implement and supervise those policies.[41] Above all, the intermediate levels were accused of blocking and suppressing information needed by the centre to formulate correct decisions.[42] "Learn from the masses" in this context meant supplying the policy-making organs at the centre with specific and accurate information about conditions and attitudes at the working levels; it was specifically stated that without such information the Party could not make correct decisions.

At the same time, an effort was made to renovate and refurbish Party activity in cells and committees at all levels. The press insisted that Party meetings could not become mere ratifying sessions where Party work was hardly discussed. Nevertheless, emphasis was also increasingly placed on the importance of "personal responsibility"

[41] *People's Daily*, July 21, 1961 in *SCMP*, No. 2550, p. 2.
[42] *People's Daily*, October 31, 1960 in *SCMP*, No. 2379, p. 1.

in Party work, and a clear distinction was frequently drawn between the "hard-core leadership elements" of the Party—that is, the Party secretaries—and other members of the CCP.[43] Such emphasis of course tended to vitiate any moves toward "democratisation" of Party life in the committees, and in fact it seems likely that the role of the Party secretary was enhanced, rather than reduced, during this period. Reassertion of central authority, routinisation, and an increasing emphasis on discipline all tended to calcify further the bureaucratic aspects of Party life.

In an attempt to obviate the unhealthy tendencies of such a situation, new emphasis was placed on the Party control commissions. For the first time, these organs became an important feature of CCP organisational structure.[44] Unlike other Party officials, CCP members responsible for Party control reported upward directly through the control commission organs running parallel to the regular Party hierarchy, rather than through the various Party secretaries[45]; they were particularly concerned with behaviour unbefitting a CCP member. Thus an independent check on members' activities was provided at all levels of the organisation, but it was a check by a duly constituted organ of the Party itself, operating according to carefully prescribed rules and procedures; disciplinary action could only be taken by regular Party organs at the next highest level. At the provincial level and above there was a close connection between the control commissions and the respective regular Party committees. Control was still exercised from the top down.

These attempts to keep the bureaucratic apparatus flexible were little more than palliatives; in fact the major emphasis in the early 1960s was not on the shortcomings but on the virtues of organisation and order, rules and routine. The importance of order and discipline was stressed again and again. These qualities were said to be at the very heart of the CCP.[46] Party officials were warned not to place organisational principles in opposition to ideological principles, but at least in one case it was clearly implied that organisation took precedence over ideology itself.[47] The letter of the law was paramount, and this specifically included state as well as Party regulations.[48]

These several tendencies found fullest expression in a propaganda

[43] *Nan-fang Daily*, November 26, 1960.
[44] Paul Cocks, "The Historical and Institutional Role of the Party Control Commission in the CCP," manuscript in Harvard East Asian Research Center Library, pp. 32–41.
[45] *Nan-fang Daily*, October 11, 1961 in *SCMP*, No. 2602, p. 5.
[46] *People's Daily*, November 15, 1961 in *SCMP*, No. 2630, p. 3.
[47] *Nan-fang Daily*, January 10, 1962 in *SCMP*, No. 2699, p. 1.
[48] *People's Daily*, February 6, 1962 in *SCMP*, No. 2680, p. 6.

campaign, running from the summer of 1961 to the autumn of 1962, calling on all CCP members to "learn from the Party constitution." In particular that part of the constitution pertaining to the Party's internal rules was stressed. It was repeatedly emphasised that the Party needed cohesive discipline, that the governing principle of the CCP was "subordination of the individual to the organisation, subordination of minority to the majority, subordination of the lower level to the higher level, and subordination of the whole Party to the Central Committee."[49] Members could protest a proposed decision before it was ratified, but after it had been approved they could formally protest only through prescribed channels, and in the interim would have to carry it out.[50] Individual initiative was clearly circumscribed. Indeed, the recent charges against Liu Shao-ch'i that in the early 1960s he insisted that the individual Party member should in all circumstances subordinate himself to the Party organisation is certainly true in the sense that this theme played a very large role in the Party propaganda of the period.

But the "democratic" side of democratic centralism was not totally ignored, although it received subordinate attention. It was in this connection that the theme of democratic discussion within the Party committee was raised. Still more interesting was the theme that on occasion the minority opinion might be the correct one and therefore could not be wholly ignored.[51] Almost certainly the reference here was to those "rightists" who had protested against the policies of the Great Leap period and were now seen to be at least partially correct. As we have seen, many persons in this category were asking that disciplinary charges against them be dropped and were asserting themselves in intra-Party discussions at this time. Statements that their views should not be ignored tended to encourage them at all levels of the Party.

This trend was of course reversed at the 10th Plenum, with its renewed stress on class struggle. The plenum decision called for greater interchange of senior personnel at the upper levels of both Party and state, as well as between the two hierarchies. Here once again the Party centre was grappling with the intractable issue of the increasing bureaucratic rigidity of both the Party and state organisations. This trend would have to be reversed if the new effort of revolutionisation of China that now can be seen to be foreshadowed by the plenum were to have any chance of success. The major effort

[49] *Nan-fang Daily*, April 4, 1962 in *SCMP*, No. 2770, p. 3.
[50] *Hung Ch'i* (*Red Flag*), July 16, 1962 in *Selections From the China Mainland Magazines* (*SCMM*) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 326, p. 11.
[51] *People's Daily*, September 20, 1961 in *SCMP*, No. 2591, p. 1.

in this direction, still more important than personnel changes which at best were carried out in only fragmentary fashion, was to be renewed emphasis on ideological indoctrination.[52]

But the intermediate levels of the Party hierarchy tended to accept the view that ideological renewal was not meant for them as relatively senior members of the Party, often with a long history of revolutionary activity—it was meant for the relatively uninitiated and often far junior Party members at the lower levels. Recent charges made in the course of the cultural revolution that personnel at the provincial and *hsien* levels often considered ideological study as a mere formality and that some important Party figures did not even possess the selected works of Chairman Mao[53] are no doubt exaggerated, but there can be little doubt that the accusations contain more than a grain of truth. The attempt by *hsien* and provincial cadres rigidly to control the rectification drive at the basic levels in the early phases of the socialist education and *ssu ch'ing* campaigns was clearly a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the rather generalised instructions contained in the "early 10 points." But the problem was not complacency. The need to deal with the problem of bureaucratic stultification was probably generally accepted, especially at the uppermost levels of the Party. The question was how this was to be done. The "early 10 points" called for arousing the masses and the basic-level cadres in the course of intensified class warfare; the aroused masses would then criticise officials in open meetings.[54] The Party bureaucrats were willing to allow a degree of criticism of the basic-level cadres; but they were unwilling to see this criticism extended to the higher levels. The Party would criticise and discipline its own personnel through the recognised channels and procedures it had so recently strengthened; it was not ready to open the door to unbridled criticism from outside its own ranks.

This was the general view adopted by the "later 10 points." As we have seen, the emphasis in the document was on organisation: detailed instructions were spelled out for all aspects of the struggle in the countryside. Not only were all important matters to be referred upward to the *hsien* committee for decision; the operation teams that were to bear the burden of the early organisational phases of the campaign were to be under careful Party control[55]; the new poor and lower middle peasants' organisations were specifically designated an "arm of the Party."[56] The "early 10 points" of course envisioned

[52] *CB*, No. 691, p. 1.
[53] *Hung Wei Pao* (Canton), October 4, 1966 in *SCMP*, No. 3804, p. 4.
[54] "Early 10 points," *op. cit.* note 29 above, sec. 7.
[55] "Later 10 points," *op. cit.* note 35 above, sec. 4.
[56] *Ibid.*

ultimate Party control of the mass movement in the countryside; there was no implication that the CCP was abdicating its central role in this, as in other aspects of life in China. But the aim was to achieve genuine mass enthusiasm and a degree of real criticism from outside the Party. In the latter respect a parallel with the Hundred Flowers campaign may be seen; but in this case the agent of criticism would be the "revolutionary" peasantry, rather than the unreliable intellectuals. In both instances the Party bureaucracy recognised a threat to its own position and privileges; in 1963 the "later 10 points" sought to meet this threat by dampening mass enthusiasm and severely limiting the parameters of permissible criticism.

This resistance on the part of the Party bureaucracy was recognised in the "23 articles" of January 1965, which, as we have seen, returned to the position adopted by the "early 10 points." Undue reliance on detailed and restrictive regulations was specifically condemned.[57] Moreover, elements in the Party organisation at the intermediate and upper levels as well as at the basic level were attacked. The rationale for this attack can unquestionably be traced in very large part to the continued resistance of the Party bureaucracy in 1963 and 1964 to the proposals for increased class warfare and above all to the plans for criticism of Party personnel by non-Party elements

It is worth repeating, however, that the "23 articles" did not lead to a decisive break on the part of the Party organisation with previous trends. In late September and early October Mao Tse-tung called a special meeting on propaganda work which undoubtedly discussed continued lagging in this and other fields.[58] Following the meeting, criticism of *hsien*-level Party committees began to appear in the press. A trickle at first, this criticism reached flood stage after the first of the year: a full-scale campaign was clearly under way. Criticism touched on many points, but central to the discussion was the charge that *hsien* Party committee members had frequently failed to "change their world outlook"—that despite lip-service, they still did not *act* upon the principles embodied in the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

Yet even after the campaign was fully under way, important elements within the Party continued to drag their feet. In January a number of articles in the *People's Daily* continued to present the conservative point of view, albeit in a muted and somewhat disguised form, on both the organisational question and that of the basic-level cadres. Was the real problem, an article on January 1 asks, "how to serve" or was it rather "whom to serve"? Was the issue a question

[57] "23 Articles," *op. cit.*, note 38 above, sec. 22.
[58] Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution," *op. cit.*, p. 16.

of reforming one's "world outlook," or was it really a matter of reaching a better understanding of the desires of the masses and then trying to meet them? [59] This issue was drawn even more sharply in an article on January 17 which suggested that the problem of revolutionising the countryside could best be met by a continued emphasis on *hsia fang* in the sense of on-the-spot inspection and supervision by higher-level cadres over an extended period of time: "Why don't we leap forward again? Is it a lack of enthusiasm and drive in 'leaping'? Or is it that we don't know how to leap'? This is worth pondering." [60] This put this issue between "rationalisation" and "revolutionary enthusiasm" baldly and in basic terms. Indeed, on February 13 the *People's Daily* was still reporting resistance on the part of *hsien* Party committees to the idea of mass criticism in open meetings.[61] This divergence in views was probably never resolved in the spring of 1966, although the campaign against the *hsien*-level committees was soon supplemented and then swallowed up by even more violent attacks on Party members in the educational, literary and artistic spheres.

The Campaigns

These attacks were directed above all at Party figures connected with the CCP propaganda apparatus who were accused of opposing the many campaigns initiated in the years following the 10th Plenum. The campaigns were a major hallmark of the stepped-up attack on revisionism inaugurated at the plenum. Important Party figures, and above all Mao himself, were convinced that this effort was crucial if the Chinese revolution was to recover its momentum. But apparently a very large section of the Party itself was less concerned with this issue than with the more mundane tasks of building and modernising China in the sense of acquiring wealth and power for the state. They were afraid that the campaigns, like the Great Leap Forward, would disrupt, rather than advance, this effort. With the conspicuous exception of the socialist education campaign all the campaigns in this period had a rather short life-span. All seemed to fade out without reaching a real climax and conclusion. None seems to have been very successful, nor was any campaign sharply focused or clearly defined in the classic pattern. The actual victims of these campaigns appear to have been relatively few.

Of the several campaigns, the socialist education campaign was the most important. It was a multi-faceted affair; three separate

[59] "Cadres Both Old and New Must Be Educated Anew," in *SCMP*, No. 3616, p. 4.
[60] "The 'Leap,' Something to be Learned," in *SCMP*, No. 3628, pp. 7–8.
[61] "Correctly Sum Up Historical Experience, Wipe Out Individualistic Thoughts," in *SCMP*, No. 3648, p. 8.

campaigns appear to have been conducted simultaneously under its general label. One was primarily an educational campaign directed at the broad non-Party masses in the countryside. A second, the *ssu ch'ing* campaign, was a rectification campaign directed against rural Party cadres. The third, the *wu fan* (five antis), apparently ran concurrently in the urban areas, and seems to have been directed at bourgeois attitudes and elements in the cities.[62] Under any label, these campaigns were, in contrast to the classic pattern, extremely leisurely affairs. The socialist education and *ssu ch'ing* efforts were meant to run for from seven to nine years[63]; as late as February 1966 the Central South Bureau of the Party implied that the campaigns were far from completed in that region.[64] It would appear that the slow pace was meant to ensure that production was not to be disrupted.

In practice the pace proved even slower than the Party central had anticipated. Although the basic outlines of the campaigns were spelled out in the "early 10 points" in May 1963 and elaborated in the "later 10 points" of September 1963, it was not until the summer of 1964 that operation teams actually were sent into the countryside.[65] After the "23 articles" were issued in January 1965, these teams were recalled and informed that they had been performing their work incorrectly, and would have to start over again.[66] In these circumstances, confusion and disorganisation could not be avoided.

A major aspect of the socialist education campaign was, of course, its emphasis on ideological purity. This involved many spheres including literature and the arts and Party propaganda. Mao Tse-tung drew attention to shortcomings in these areas at the 10th Plenum[67]; and indeed a decrease in strident propaganda and a thaw in the cultural sphere had been a notable feature of the period of relaxation. This "little hundred flowers" episode had been welcomed and encouraged by important Party leaders.[68] The permissive attitude it engendered was less sweeping and open than the more famous Hundred Flowers period of 1956–57, but like the earlier period, it eventually emboldened critics to express rather basic disagreement with CCP policies and with the Party itself. But unlike the earlier period, some of the critics were either close to or actually within the bosom of the CCP itself: the famous left-wing writer Pa Chin called

62 "23 Articles," *op. cit.*, sec. 3.
63 *Ibid.* sec. 11.
64 *Yang-ch'eng Wan-pao*, Canton, February 1, 1966, in *SCMP*, No. 3635, p. 1.
65 Information from Mr. Morris Wills.
66 Information from Mr. Morris Wills.
67 Bridgham, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
68 See for example the speech by Ch'en Yi to the Peking Institute of Higher Learning in *Kuang-ming Daily*, September 3, 1961.

the Party's cultural overseers "men armed with hoops and clubs"[69]; Party literary czar Chou Yang in August 1962 presided over a conference at which numerous dissenting opinions were expressed[70]; Shao Ch'üan-lin, himself a lieutenant of Chou Yang, in calling for writing about "middle characters" who were not fully committed to communism, suggested that CCP ideology as yet represented no more than a thin veneer overlaying traditional Chinese attitudes and assumptions.[71]

Criticism of this sort was undoubtedly what Mao had in mind when he attacked the cultural trends of the early 1960s at the 10th Plenum. But in fact this blast did not entirely bring an end to "revisionist" practices. In November 1963 a conference on Confucianism praised the sage as an example to be followed by modern Chinese[72]; in both 1963 and 1964 K'ang Cho, another lieutenant of Chou Yang, attacked Party policies during the Great Leap Forward.[73] In fact Mao himself felt it necessary to strike out again at writers and intellectuals in December 1963.[74] Nevertheless, there was no serious criticism of those who had been most outspoken during the period of relaxation until the middle of 1964. Shao Ch'üan-lin was attacked for advocating the concept of "middle characters"; Peking opera was "reformed" by eliminating traditional themes and introducing "proletarian" subject matter; Yang Hsien-chen and Chou Ku-ch'eng were criticised for advocating such "revisionist" theories as "two combining into one"—a theory that had obvious implications with regard to class struggle and to China's quarrel with the Soviet Union.

Not only did it take a year and a half after the 10th Plenum's assault on revisionism for these attacks to develop, but the "one into two" campaign was an extraordinary academic and lifeless affair: it produced few results and did not spread to other vulnerable figures. Furthermore, Mao found it necessary to raise the problem of rot in the cultural sphere once again in September 1965[75]; yet when the attacks on Wu Han began in November 1965, there were still voices raised in Wu's defence.

The cultural revolution has thrown up a mass of detail about foot-dragging and outright resistance to the highly politicised atmosphere of the post-10th Plenum period. Unlike some charges relating

[69] Shanghai *Wen-hsüeh*, No. 5, 1962.
[70] *Yang-ch'eng Wan-pao*, Canton, July 17, 1966 in *SCMP*, No. 3750, p. 1.
[71] *Wen-yi Pao*, No. 8/9, 1964.
[72] *People's Daily*, January 10, 1967 in *SCMP*, No. 3863, p. 1.
[73] *Yang-ch'eng Wan-pao*, July 17, 1966.
[74] New China News Agency (NCNA), May 27, 1967 in *SCMP*, No. 3905, p. 1.
[75] Bridgham, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

to earlier periods, such as the attacks on Chou Yang for the policies he pursued in the 1930s,[76] these accusations of more recent "crimes" cannot be dismissed out of hand. In fact it would appear that Mao's rather querulous criticism of the state of cultural affairs was in large measure ignored, that Party officials did in fact "distort, revise and block" Chairman Mao's directives in this area.[77] Much of this resistance was concentrated in the Party's propaganda apparatus, which not only bore primary responsibility in this area, but also was charged more generally with making the new policies felt and understood. This resistance was largely passive, a mere slowing down of machinery, a diversion of pressure toward limited and relatively unimportant targets.[78]

It should be emphasised that this resistance was *within* the Party. There was no quarrel with the idea that the CCP should exert ultimate control over the cultural and intellectual sphere; the question was one of methods and degree. The old-line cultural commissars have been accused of advocating a "literature and art of the whole people."[79] This concept involved a dilution of the ideological content of artistic creations to make them more palatable to the general public. This approach implied a general feeling that the "masses" *remained unpoliticised and could not be considered a reservoir of "revolutionary enthusiasm." But it also implied contempt for a* kind of simplistic conformity, for a narrow-minded anti-intellectualism that grew out of the sweeping attacks on revisionism. And behind this attitude perhaps can be discerned the feeling that a reliance on slogans at the expense of real intellectual or artistic accomplishment would produce the conditions that had made the Great Leap Forward a failure.

This attitude was not confined to those concerned with culture and propaganda. It was also evident in the educational area, where in 1964 the "socialist successors" campaign, coupled with a series of educational reforms sought to root out all vestiges of revisionism in the schools and among the young. Here again we touch on a theme close to Mao Tse-tung's heart. That he frequently alluded to this subject in talks with foreign visitors and that concern with the next generation plays an important part in such Maoist-inspired documents as "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism" scarcely needs

[76] See Merle Goldman, "The Fall of Chou Yang," *The China Quarterly*, No. 27 (July-September 1966), p. 132.
[77] NCNA, May 27, 1967 in *SCMP*, No. 3950, p. 14.
[78] *Red Flag*, July 1964, treats the "reform" of the Peking opera as an event of major significance. That "victory" in this limited sphere should be regarded as a major achievement is in itself a measure of the resistance within the Party.
[79] *Red Flag*, May 1967.

emphasis.[80] The problem was real enough, and it was directly related to China's need to modernise. China needed an educated élite, but as this group was trained it started to *act* as an élite—a tendency reinforced by deep-seated Chinese traditions, but one that cut off the new experts from the "masses" they were expected to "serve." Moreover, those best qualified for extended higher education often came from bourgeois backgrounds.

It was not until 1964 that the "socialist successors" campaign, aimed at intensively indoctrinating students with proper revolutionary attitudes, was initiated. But like the other campaigns, the "socialist successors" campaign never developed full momentum. Students in specialised fields, particularly in the sciences, were apparently exempted from much of the ideological pressure inherent in the campaign.[81] A "half-study, half-work" programme was instituted to emphasise to students the value of manual labour, and proper class credentials were demanded for admission to institutions of higher learning. But while the evidence is mixed it seems reasonably certain that students from bourgeois backgrounds continued to be admitted to major institutions of higher learning, particularly the more prestigious universities. And the administrators of major educational institutions—often Party officials of considerable importance—tended to react to pressures for ideological conformity much as their counterparts in the cultural field did.[82]

The "socialist successors" campaign was not restricted merely to the schools and universities. It also played an important part in the work of the Communist Youth League (CYL). Here also great emphasis was placed on ideological conformity in the years following the 10th Plenum, and here also considerable stress was placed on class background as a necessary prerequisite for membership in the CYL. But it is interesting to note that by 1965 emphasis on ideological training had distinctly fallen away; and in that year large numbers of new members were admitted without regard to class background.[83] Developments in the CYL are still in part a matter of conjecture,[84] but it does seem that some sort of struggle took place within the League at this time, and that in the process of anti-revisionist programmes of the previous several years were largely abandoned.

Still another kind of campaign was endemic in the years 1963–65. These were the emulation campaigns, of which the first, the Lei Feng movement, is the best known. The characteristic of these campaigns

[80] Bridgham, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[81] Maurice Kelly, "The Making of an Intellectual," *Current Scene*, IV, No. 19, p. 11.
[82] *Ibid.*
[83] *China News Analysis*, No. 633, p. 2.
[84] For one interpretation see *ibid.* pp. 1–7.

is their diffusiveness, their unfocused quality, and because of the exaggerations inherent in them, their lack of genuine appeal. They were not directed at any specific segment of society and generally emphasised the importance of altruism and self-abnegation. In this they bear a certain family resemblance to the campaigns we have already discussed; like them they do not appear to have developed much inner momentum, nor do they appear to have been particularly effective.

The figures selected for emulation in 1963–65 were all members of the PLA. This fact suggests the importance of perhaps the most interesting campaign of all, the "learn from the PLA" movement. The importance of this campaign has been enhanced in retrospect as a result of the new and dramatic role the PLA has come to play in the cultural revolution. Nevertheless, the expansion of the army's role in the cultural revolution has been rather gradual; and in the years 1964–65 it was more modest still. This is not to suggest that the PLA's role in that period was insignificant. On the contrary, as the title of the campaign itself suggests, the PLA in these years became the paradigm of the proper "communist work style." In this sense the "learn from the PLA" campaign was a gigantic emulation campaign. But the army was not merely a symbol, nor was it merely a kind of "pilot project" where political techniques were tried out before they were applied to society in general. The techniques spelled out in the *Kung-tso T'ung-hsun*, the PLA's secret "Bulletin of Activities," and in particular in the resolution of the enlarged session of the Military Affairs Committee of October 1960,[85] were not new, although it is true that they were emphasised in the army at the very moment that the Party was ushering in the period of relaxation in the civilian areas. Rather, the PLA was important to Mao, and became the ideal to emulate, precisely because the army made the techniques and methods advocated by the Chairman work, while the Party did not.

The "learn from the PLA" campaign was concerned primarily with inculcating ideological purity, uprooting self-seeking and corruption, and transforming people's "world outlook." In this respect the campaign did not differ greatly from those we have been discussing. But in asking that the country learn from the PLA, the implication was clear that the Party had not been doing its job properly. The implied rebuke was certainly not lost on the Party bureaucracy. Moreover, "learn from the PLA" was not merely an abstract slogan.

[85] J. Chester Cheng (ed.) *PLA Kung-tso T'ung-hsün: The Politics of the Chinese Red Army* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1966), p. 64.

In 1965 army officers, many probably recently retired, began to assume posts in the propaganda sphere—an area long specifically reserved for and jealously guarded by the Party bureaucracy.[86] Numbers of civilians in the industrial sector were sent to PLA schools for training[87] and, even more important, army officers began to assume positions normally held by civilians, particularly in the trade and finance system. This development was related to the establishment early in 1964 of a network of "political work departments" clearly modelled in the PLA's political commissar system, running parallel to the regular hierarchy of bureaus in nearly all areas of governmental activity. These networks had no administrative duties but were designed to revitalise political work within the governmental machinery and to eliminate corruption. Once again the implied rebuke to the Party bureaucrats was unmistakable.

Precisely for this reason, the new and expanded role of the army created resentment among Party functionaries. Here was another challenge to their prerogatives and privileges, and once again they engaged in passive resistance. As late as the autumn of 1965, the political work department network had been set up only at the highest levels within the trade and finance system which was the pilot project for this innovation; it was probably even less advanced elsewhere.[88] Party officials continued to complain of simplistic approaches to problems, of narrow-mindedness, and of anti-intellectualism, and by early 1966 these charges appeared related to demands by the PLA organ, *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* (*Liberation Army Daily*), that the Party apparatchiks "transform their world outlook" as the military was said to have done.[89] But this quite natural resentment of the new role of the PLA did not mean that the Party as a whole was united in opposition to the army. Most PLA officers and the entire senior level of the army hierarchy were of course themselves members of the CCP. Resentment was probably centred in those areas most threatened by the new state of affairs: entrenched middle-level officials and those Party functionaries at all levels concerned with propaganda, education, and Party organisation. Moreover, the PLA was not "usurping" state and Party functions. Its role was strictly political, not administrative, and its job was to supplement, rather than supplant, Party activity. And at all times the *Liberation Army Daily* made it clear that the PLA remained the "tool" of the Party.[90]

[86] John Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 256.
[87] *Ibid.* p. 257.
[88] *Ta Kung Pao*, March 27, 1965 in *SCMP*, No. 3436, p. 1.
[89] "Forever Bring Politics to the Fore," in *SCMP*, No. 3644, p. 4.
[90] "Politics Command Military Affairs, Politics Command Everything," in *SCMP*, No. 3644, p. 6.

Nevertheless, many Party officials were undoubtedly aware of certain major difficulties in attempting to apply the methods of the military to the tasks of the Party. Until 1965 at least, Lin Piao's effort at revitalisation of the PLA had concerned itself primarily with the indoctrination of the great mass of troops—with the enlisted ranks rather than the officer corps of the army.[91] But to inculcate the thought of Mao Tse-tung in a common soldier and to lead him to apply the principles thus learned in the rather simple and disciplined routine of his daily life was one thing. It was a far different matter to apply the same system to a peasant caught up in a web of traditions and personal relationships, much less to a relatively sophisticated student or a cadre forced to make fairly complex decisions daily. The danger was oversimplification of complex problems, of a divorce from reality that could result in another disaster such as that of 1960–61.

The PLA leadership, like Chairman Mao himself, might reply that the thought of Mao Tse-tung was crucial only as it was applied to concrete actual problems. But Party functionaries were unwilling to assume that general slogans contained the solutions to all problems. Certainly Party officials at the higher levels were well aware that the Party needed rejuvenation and a degree of political galvanisation. Party officials were apparently searching for the proper forms to achieve these ends but many were unwilling to embrace fully the simplistic slogans of the campaigns or the methodology endorsed by the PLA. The result was a subtle sabotage of the campaigns themselves and continued stagnation within the Party.

Independent Kingdoms

We have examined several areas in which Party policy was opposed by important elements within the CCP over a considerable period of time. Policy debates of course have taken place within the CCP in earlier periods; in the period following the 10th Plenum, however, debate as such was relatively muted, but ostensible Party policy was in fact sabotaged—and not only by petty bureaucrats at some remove from the Party centre, but also by major Party figures.

CCP literature both before and after 1949 is replete with denunciations of individuals and unnamed "certain comrades" who have attempted to establish "independent kingdoms" capable of resisting the general will of the Party. The Kao Kang case is merely the most conspicuous example of a much wider tendency, but Kao was nevertheless something of an exception because he was a member of the top Party leadership—a leadership that has generally been united in implementing Party decisions despite occasionally vigorous debates

[91] Gittings, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

before the decision was actually taken. There is, however, some evidence that this cohesion began to show signs of strain in the summer of 1958.[92] And it was shortly after this that Mao Tse-tung, at the Wuhan Plenum of the Central Committee which endorsed the first retreat from the commune concept and halted urban communisation, resigned as chairman of the People's Republic of China. There is no evidence that Mao was forced to resign as the result of concerted pressure on the part of his colleagues in the Central Committee; rather, it seems likely that this was very largely a co-operative effort, in which Mao acquiesced, to disassociate the supreme leader from a set of policies that were already proving very difficult to apply in practice.

The post of chief of state is certainly a far less important position than that of chairman of the CCP. But it would be a mistake to dismiss the post as one of no real importance. It was apparently in his capacity as head of state that Liu Shao-ch'i regularly convened the Central Operations Council, which seems to make most basic decisions on the day-to-day running of China at that apex where state and Party meet.[93] As Liu's own "confession" and innumerable Red Guard attacks on him have made clear, he certainly played an immediate and vigorous role in this daily task of governing China[94]; and this role does not seem to have diminished his long and intimate connection with the administration of the Party itself. Moreover, Mao's resignation tended to formalise a distinction between "first line" and "second line" positions in the top leadership of the Party (with Mao in the "second line"), which the chairman now claims had long existed.[95]

We need not assume that this distinction was entirely real nor accept at face value Mao's explanation that it was designed to "season" men who had decades of experience at the topmost level of CCP leadership. But after the high tide of the Great Leap Mao did in fact play a less active and immediate role in the day-to-day affairs of Party and state, although his voice appears to have been decisive when he chose to intervene in policy debates. Indeed, the record presented by his present supporters seems to indicate that the Chairman very largely endorsed decisions made by others, especially during the period of relaxation, rather than actually participating in the discussions at which those decisions were reached.[96] At times it

[92] *Communist China 1955–1959: Policy Documents With Analysis* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 38–42.
[93] Liu Shao-ch'i, "Self-Criticism," *op. cit.*
[94] *Ibid.*
[95] For a report of Mao's speech to an October 1966 meeting of the Central Committee, see *Yomiuri*, January 7, 1967.
[96] See Liu, "Self-Criticism," *op. cit.*

would appear that he was largely unaware of the content of major decisions issued in the name of the Central Committee.[97] Is this a *post hoc* attempt to dissociate Mao from decisions that formerly seemed perfectly orthodox and now are no longer politically palatable? Such an explanation might appear more plausible if Mao had dissociated himself from the whole range of "revisionist" policies of the early 1960s; yet his name is still linked with such documents as the "60 articles" codifying the retreat in the countryside—a document that in fact appears to be largely the handiwork of Liu Shao-ch'i.[98] It seems more likely that Mao deliberately divorced himself from close supervision of a set of policies that he found personally repugnant, although he had been convinced that they were at least temporarily necessary.

Indeed, as it has been frequently remarked, the cult of Mao itself fell on hard times at the height of the period of relaxation. The name of the supreme leader was invoked far less often, and with less ecstasy, than during the Great Leap Forward or in the period following the 10th Plenum. Moreover, the chairman was not merely ignored; he was attacked. In October 1961 *Ta Kung Pao*, recalling with approval that Lenin had always acted with personal modesty and had never "single-handedly" taken arbitrary decisions, quoted Lydia Foteyva, whose book of reminiscences had played an important part in the Soviet anti-Stalinist campaign, as its authority for this characterisation.[99] The passage was not only a subtle attack on the cult of personality in China; it related directly to relatively widespread dissatisfaction with Mao's role in the Great Leap Forward experiment, and to a feeling that he was in a large degree personally responsible for the subsequent suffering endured by the Chinese people.

At the Lushan Plenum in August 1959 Marshal P'eng Teh-huai had attacked the Great Leap policies as well as China's deepening dispute with the Soviet Union as unwise and potentially disastrous; moreover, he directly excoriated Mao Tse-tung for his part in formulating and endorsing these policies.[100] P'eng was defeated in an acrimonious session; yet within a year P'eng's indictment had proved very largely correct. Not a few of those who had condemned him in 1959 by 1960 or 1961 came to feel that he had been right. P'eng had become a symbol, a martyr to the cause of reason and restraint. It

[97] The "later 10 points" would appear to be an example of this.

[98] Franz Michael, "Struggle for Power," *Problems of Communism*, May–June 1967, p. 15.

[99] *Ta Kung Pao*, October 27, 1961 in *SCMP*, No. 2620, p. 5.

[100] David Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," *The China Quarterly*, No. 12 (October–December 1962), p. 63.

was precisely in this context that Wu Han, T'ien Han and Teng T'o published their attacks on Mao.

That these were in fact attacks on Mao cannot be questioned. The references to recent events—particularly the P'eng Teh-huai affair—and to Mao's style of leadership were unmistakable; and the form in which the attacks were cast—the retelling of an historic episode with contemporary implications, the satiric essay—fall squarely within the Chinese literary tradition. The charge that "Hai Jui," "Hsieh Yao-huan," and "Evening Talks at Yenshan" were politically motivated is not a *post hoc* distortion; it is a simple statement of fact. Nor can we assume that attacks of this sort were officially permitted under the more relaxed standards of the early 1960s. The "little hundred flowers" period made no allowance for *lèse majesté*. It is precisely in this regard—that these attacks were aimed at Mao himself—that the works of Wu, T'ien and Teng differ from the more generalised and therefore less serious criticism of Pa Chin which were made at roughly the same time. Such attacks could not pass unnoticed; they most certainly were brought to Mao's attention, and no doubt were on his mind when he denounced "revisionist" trends in literature at the 10th Plenum.

According to Mao's own account, the 10th Plenum saw the abandonment of the distinction between the "first line" and "second line" in the top Party leadership, thereby presumably bringing Mao directly into the mainstream of Party decision-making again. Moreover, as we have seen, he issued additional denunciations of the state of affairs in the literary sphere in 1963. In mid-1964, through the agency of his wife, Chiang Ch'ing, he once again attempted to "reform" this area [101]; this effort resulted in the Peking opera reforms and in the rather tame attacks on Shao Ch'üan-lin, Yang Hsien-chen and Chou Ku-ch'eng in the "one into two" campaign. Wu Han, T'ien Han and Teng T'o, however, remained immune from criticism. In September 1965 Mao felt compelled to raise this question once again; and it was only after this outburst, as we have seen, that the first attacks on Wu Han were instituted.

But the first criticism of Wu appeared in the Shanghai journal *Wen Hui Pao*, rather than in the authoritative *People's Daily*, and the attack did not quickly gather momentum; in fact, several figures came to Wu's defence and in turn attacked his critics. In February 1966 P'eng Chen, who since January 1965 had headed a small group charged with developing a new "cultural revolution," [102] proposed in a memorandum to the Central Committee that the new literary campaign in effect be diverted

[101] NCNA, May 27, 1967 in *SCMP*, No. 3950, p. 13.
[102] NCNA, May 16, 1967 in *SCMP*, No. 3942, p. 1.

out of political and into academic channels.[103] It was not until April that attacks on Wu Han became universal; attacks on the more important Teng T'o did not commence until May. How was it that Wu Han and Teng T'o remained immune from criticism for so long in the face of Mao's obvious displeasure? The only explanation possible is that the Chairman was unable to impose his will on important segments of the Party; that he was in fact " blocked and thwarted " at every turn.

In retreating from active participation in the daily formulation and implementation of policy after the Wuhan Plenum, Mao to a considerable degree lost control of the Party machine. Moreover, the Chairman's advanced age and failing health of itself was bound eventually to affect his capacity for sustained work. In any event, as Mao ceased to oversee carefully and intimately the daily tasks of governing China, power at the highest levels of the Party tended to fragment and to gravitate into hands other than his. One repository of this fragmented power was undoubtedly Liu Shao-ch'i, who as the heir apparent, senior vice-chairman of the Party, and head of state, could speak with very great authority on the widest range of issues. Another was, quite naturally, the Party secretariat, and in particular the secretary general, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, as well as those secretaries, such as P'eng Chen, Lo Jui-ch'ing and Lu Ting-yi, whose responsibilities gave them an enormous and commanding voice in specific areas or " systems " within the Party machine. To a degree this situation was always present, if only in embryo; it became a crucial factor as major differences appeared between Mao and his supporters and those who felt the Maoist policies to be unwise. Once these differences had solidified Mao found it impossible to reassert his dominance in areas controlled by his opponents, despite formal abolition of the distinction between the " first line " and " second line."

But this situation did not arise in full-blown form overnight; it developed gradually. Indeed, it seems possible that the participants in the tug-of-war at the top of the Party, including Mao himself, were themselves not fully aware how much their much varying approaches to problems had come to differ. For Mao's " opponents " did not oppose him directly. They mouthed the same slogans he advocated; they " waved the red flag to oppose the red flag." Where Mao called for arousing the masses, they proposed limits and controls; where Mao asked for criticism of the Party from without, they suggested criticism within prescribed Party channels; where Mao called for revolution in education they noted the importance of expertise—but always in terms very similar to those used by Mao and his supporters. Nor need we suppose that this " opposition " was united among itself, for some were undoubtedly concerned with limiting the Maoist policies in one area,

[103] *Ibid.*

while others were more concerned with another. In general, however, where Mao advocated boldness, these "opponents" suggested caution. But for Mao caution itself was revisionist. Since both sides said very nearly the same thing, it required a very careful examination of the actual implementation of policy to discover if the intent of that policy was in fact being thwarted. It was for this reason that from 1964 on—especially in PLA propaganda—emphasis was so heavily placed on the importance of the application of the thought of Mao Tse-tung "in practice." This in fact was the main theme of the campaign against the *hsien* Party committees in early 1966.

The summer of 1964 in fact might be considered a watershed in the post-10th Plenum period. As we have seen, anti-revisionist doctrines were intensified in a number of areas. But in many respects this "revolutionary surge" was "leftist in form, but rightist in content," as recent propaganda has so stridently insisted. Education was only partly reformed; culture only slightly proletarianised; peasants were "aroused" only under restrictive Party supervision. Mao could no longer be unaware of the seriousness of the situation: as the "23 articles" announced, revisionism had wormed its way into the Party Central itself. Mao's understanding of this situation might explain why no new Central Committee plenum was called at this time to deal with so serious a problem. In fact it seems likely that Mao simply did not have the votes to make his will prevail at such a plenum. Instead he resorted to a palliative: a small group was set up to oversee the implementation of the 1964 policies in the proper manner. This group was headed by P'eng Chen.

Was this in fact an attempt to "smoke out" P'eng, to "test" him in the expectation that he would be found wanting? There is no evidence for such a conclusion, which presupposes that Mao was at this time in a position to bring down P'eng once he showed his "revisionist" colours. In fact it seems likely that Mao was attempting to win P'eng over to his side, and thereby strengthen his position among the constellation of "power-holders" at the apex of the Party. Marks of consideration and approbation accrued to the Peking Party chief in late 1964 and 1965: he became a "close comrade-in-arms" of the Chairman and had clearly joined the standing committee of the Politburo in fact if not formally. But this tactic proved unsuccessful. P'eng Chen proved unwilling to "raise the lid" for the kind of revolutionary upsurge that Mao had been advocating for three years.

Under these circumstances at a Central Committee meeting in September Mao once again renewed the attack,[104] concentrating on the

[104] Bridgham, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

cultural sphere The aim now was the "exposure" of Wu Han and Teng T'o, which meant that the issue of Mao's own position in the Party had been raised directly. From this departure we can date the real beginning of the cultural revolution. Both Wu and Teng were subordinates of P'eng Chen; their "exposure" would reflect on him. Both Mao and P'eng must have realised this, but it does not necessarily follow that had he sacrificed Wu and Teng, P'eng himself would have fallen from power. Rather, his independent position would have been weakened, the tightly-knit Peking Party organisation "into which you could not drive a pin"[105] would have been less cohesive, and in consequence P'eng himself would be more dependent on the favour and approval of Mao. P'eng chose to fight.

The decision to fight brought P'eng into tacit alliance with Chou Yang, whose fate was in part bound to that of Teng T'o, and with Lu Ting-yi, Chou's superior. We may assume that Lu was ranked among the "opposition," since he, together with P'eng, had defended the conservative position at a political work conference held in September 1965.[106] The *People's Daily* which Lu controlled was cautiously supporting the conservative position on the problems of basic-level cadres and Party organisation in January 1966. This was a strong alliance, but in the event P'eng overplayed his hand. His memorandum of February 1966 was a masterpiece of subtle evasion, designed to divert the attack on Wu Han from the political question, that is, the dismissal of P'eng Teh-huai and the issue of Mao's responsibility for the suffering of 1960–61 to the academic, that is, whether Wu's representation of Hai Jui was historically accurate.[107] Furthermore, P'eng not only allowed a partial defence of Wu Han in the Peking press but also authorised a counter-attack on Yao Wen-yuan, Wu's principal accuser.[108] This counter-attack left P'eng in an exposed position and made it more difficult for him to rally allies to his side. In May, a Central Committee circular strongly attacked P'eng's February memorandum and in effect signalled his fall from power.[109] The fall of Lu Ting-yi and a host of figures in the cultural and propaganda sphere quickly followed.

Why had P'eng's position changed so drastically between September 1965 and May 1966? Peng's overconfidence was surely a factor. Moreover, Mao's allies showed exceptional vigour during this period, particularly after the first of the year Chiang Ch'ing presided over a PLA cultural work conference in February that clearly spelled out the

[105] Mao, *Yomiuri*, *op. cit.*
[106] Bridgham, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
[107] *Nihon Keizai*, May 8, 1967.
[108] Stephen Uhalley, Jr., "The Cultural Revolution and the Attack on the 'Three Family Village,'" *The China Quarterly*, No. 27 (July-September 1966), p. 150.
[109] NCNA, May 16, 1967 in *SCMP*, No. 3942, p. 1.

Maoist position on literary matters [110]; the *Liberation Army Daily*, in a series of editorials that began the day after P'eng's memorandum was issued, attacked P'eng by implication if not by name, for deliberately thwarting the will of the Chairman.[111] But this alone seems insufficient to have carried the day against P'eng. It is likely that Mao won to his side in this period important persons either previously uncommitted or in the opposition.

The fall of P'eng Chen ushered in a new phase of the cultural revolution. In June and July a sweeping purge took place in the propaganda, cultural and educational fields. The object of this purge was not so much individual non-Party writers, artists and educators as the Party officials assigned to oversee these individuals—the "men with clubs and hoops" whom Pa Chin had criticised in 1961. Since these men, as we have seen, had "blocked and distorted" Chairman Mao's directives in 1964 and 1965, and since most were members of the Party "system" headed by Lu Ting-yi, this was hardly a surprising development. But this phase, which has since become known as the period of "white terror," was not so simple as it appeared on the surface. The purge was conducted by "operation teams" similar to those prescribed by the "later 10 points" for work in the countryside; these teams were responsible through Party channels to the Central Committee [112]; and within the Central Committee—or rather the Politburo, which was acting for it—Liu Shao-ch'i. The operation teams acted to brake, limit, damp down and at times brutally suppress manifestations of mass revolutionary enthusiasm and mass criticism of officials that were being encouraged by *Red Flag*, the *Liberation Army Daily* and the *People's Daily* which were now under the control of T'ao Chu in the wake of the fall of P'eng Chen and Lu Ting-yi.

Once again the question of control from above or spontaneity from below was at issue. A widespread purge in the cultural and educational areas could not be avoided once the May Central Committee circular had undermined P'eng Chen and discredited his and Lu Ting-yi's approach to this problem. But P'eng's fall had further unsettled power relationships at the apex of the Party, and in this fluid situation new coalitions formed. The dominant faction felt that if a purge could not be avoided it would nevertheless have to be controlled from above, with the purge victims carefully selected by higher Party leaders. At issue was who precisely was to be removed and how this was to come about. In attempting to control and rein in the new movement Liu Shao-ch'i had

110 NCNA, May 28, 1967 in *SCMP*, No. 3751, p. 10.
111 The first of these editorials was reprinted in *People's Daily* on February 4. See *SCMP*, No. 3644, p. 4.
112 Liu, "Self-Criticism," *op. cit.*

the active and enthusiastic support of many provincial Party leaders as well as that of the Party secretary general, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who now saw a threat to the Party's organisational life if the purge proceeded unchecked. For not only Party procedures but the Party organisational structure itself was in danger of a massive shake-up if criticism at the grass roots got out of hand. Those who had most to lose were anxious to gain control over the new movement before it could threaten their own positions. Universities across the country were the scenes of pitched battles as the operational teams sought to discredit and disband less well-organised groups who, taking the statements in the official press at face value, attempted indiscriminately to vilify, "drag out" and condemn "persons in authority" who had overseen the Party's educational work.[113]

Under these circumstances, the "revolutionary" opponents of the operation teams—who were in fact the immediate predecessors of the Red Guards—were at a distinct disadvantage. They were clearly less well organised than the operation teams and they lacked definite lines of communication to important leaders in the Maoist camp, for Liu Shao-ch'i himself dominated the Central Committee organ designated to run the cultural revolution. Indeed, the very fact that Liu Shao-ch'i was able to dominate this period in the manner described is in itself rather startling. How was he able to achieve this in the wake of the Maoist victory over P'eng Chen? In the first place it is quite possible that Liu was not directly involved in the obstructionist activities of P'eng and Lu Ting-yi in the cultural sphere; the "opposition," as has already been suggested, was united in feeling that the millennial Maoist policies were unwise, but their areas of concern in this regard were not necessarily coincident Nevertheless, Liu had probably been under something of a cloud so far as Mao was concerned, since it had become clear that in practice the rules and regulations of the "later 10 points" would frustrate, rather than advance, revolutionisation in the countryside. Despite his disavowal of authorship, there seems little reason to doubt that Liu had a major hand in drawing up this document.[114] When he returned from a trip to South Asia in April 1966, just as the P'eng Chen affair was coming to a head, the normal airport welcome ceremonies were not held—a sure sign that Liu was in disfavour, whatever his actual relationship to P'eng Chen had been.

But Liu still held a number of very high cards. His influence in the Party machine was enormous; his prestige, acquired through many years

[113] Kelly, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[114] "The Early 10 Points and the 23 Articles are Sharp Weapons for Criticizing the Rightist Line of Liu Shao-ch'i," *Chao-fan Yu-li Pao, (There is Logic in Rebellion News)* February 12, 1967.

of revolutionary activity, was very great; and his official positions gave him great power. The job of general overseer of the cultural revolution fell naturally to him, and Mao was evidently in no position to deny it to him arbitrarily, and apparently did not have sufficient grounds to engage in an open intra-Party dispute on the issue.

But Liu, like P'eng Chen before him, apparently overplayed his hand. The strong-arm tactics of the operation teams probably aroused resentment among fence-sitters committed to neither camp; Chou En-lai, who may have had reason to resent arbitrary actions taken by Liu and Teng Hsiao-p'ing over the years, probably falls into this category. Moreover, as the clashes between the operation teams and the Maoist "revolutionaries" institutionalised the dispute and brought it into the open, Mao was able to utilise to greater advantage his own enormous prestige and charisma Liu's standing among Party members, great as it was, was no match for Mao's, and now they were being forced to choose between the two. By the end of July Mao felt himself strong enough to call a Central Committee plenum, the first since 1962. It is doubtful that at this time the Chairman could count on a true majority in the Central Committee to support him, but it was obvious that Mao would have to make a formal attempt to undercut Liu and Teng Hsiao-p'ing or resign himself to a role as an ineffectual figurehead. Several important provincial Party leaders evidently did not attend the plenum; the hall was packed with enthusiastic "revolutionary" supporters of the Maoist position; voting may have been irregular.[115]

The result was the demotion of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing and the catapulting of Lin Piao into the role of heir apparent. But even more important, the plenum publicly endorsed Mao's charge, made a year and a half previously in the "23 articles," that a "handful of persons in authority in the Party" were "following the capitalist road" and stated clearly that the cultural revolution was to be directed against the Party itself. Liu and other "rationalisers" had used the Party machinery to thwart Mao's own desires; now the Party organisation itself was to be chief target and major victim of the revolution the Chairman had unleashed.

Conclusion

A discussion of the situation within the CCP necessarily ignores other factors operating in the 1960s that tended to give rise to the acrimony and wrangling that finally surfaced in the cultural revolution. Foreign policy and economic policy are two obvious areas of great

[115] *The New York Times*, December 27, 1966.

importance that have been slighted in this presentation. But the major foreign policy issue in China in the 1960s has been the problem of relations with the Soviet Union. Even the abortive thrust into Africa and Latin America can be seen as a function of Peking's competition with Moscow,[116] while the debate on the very important question of Vietnam in no small part has turned on the issue of whether or not co-operation with the Russians in aid of Hanoi was possible.[117] And the problem of the Soviet Union directly involves the issue of "revisionism" once again. Nor can economic issues such as the question of management in the factories or the proper approach to the peasant problem be divorced from the all-embracing problem of revisionism. But "revisionism" in the context we have examined it owes nothing to Bernstein and little enough to Khrushchev. Mao's opponents are revisionist only in the sense that they have been sceptical of the possibility of achieving national goals through the questionable policies of "permanent revolution." In this of course they are nationalists first and ideologues second. Nevertheless, they can hardly be said to have abandoned the standard Marxist categories for some sort of pragmatism. In fact, in the course of the cultural revolution they have frequently been criticised for their devotion to the classic Marxist-Leninist texts rather than to the thought of Mao Tse-tung. And as we have seen, their approach to the organisation question and their general distrust of mass spontaneity is far more Leninist in concept than is the Maoist position. Nevertheless, in China in the mid-1960s such attitudes must be considered revisionist. This appears to be the central question, and Party attitudes towards it are the key to the present upheaval. In the 1960s divergent attitudes towards this subject led less to policy debates than to covert sabotage of ostensible CCP policies. This state of affairs cannot be divorced from considerations of personal power. And Mao's attempt to root out areas of potential and actual opposition to his own authority in the name of a rekindled Chinese revolution has created the greatest crisis in that revolution since the CCP took control of the mainland.

[116] See Benjamin Schwartz, "Chinese Ambitions and American Policy," *Commentary*, April 1966.

[117] This appears to be a major issue in the fall of Lo Jui-ch'ing.