

This is not a primer for the would-be American negotiator. Rather it is a well thought out, somewhat controversial, certainly entertaining and stimulating analysis of Chinese thought and attitudes in a particular field.

A. E. I. RAE

*Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949–1977.* By DONALD H. McMILLEN. [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979. 373 pp. £12.00.]

As the reality of access to North-west China has been simplified by the open availability of individual travel visas in places like Hong Kong, ironically the task of trying to learn more of the recent history of the area, particularly Xinjiang, remains as frustrating as ever. Since 1980 China has published two volumes in the series *A Short History of Xinjiang* and reprinted *Historical Materials on the Uighur Nationality*, but each of these accounts concludes at the turn of the last century, about the time Sven Hedin began organizing caravans to explore the region. Similarly in western languages, very little has been written in the past generation comparable in scope and depth to the work of Lattimore, Teichman and certain Soviet scholars/explorers. It is in this context of relative scarcity that we must tip our hats to Donald McMillen for preparing a wide-ranging study of Xinjiang which covers almost 30 post-Liberation Years and touches insightfully on a wide variety of developmental problems peculiar to this arid borderland so far removed from the seat of political authority in Beijing.

Integration is the centre-piece around which the author carefully weighs and analyses the questions of Communist Party control, military-civilian relations, elite recruitment, Russian influence, internal migration, religion, minority nationality treatment and the ever-expanding economic infrastructure of the region. High marks are handed out to Wang Enmao, the longstanding First Party secretary, for his ability to mediate efficiently and effectively between the demands of Party Centre and the needs of the region, producing along the way many successful policy outcomes despite near overwhelming social and political complexity. Defending Wang Enmao against the charges of operating an “independent kingdom,” accusations which ultimately led to his political demise during the Cultural Revolution, this study concludes that the major goals of the Xinjiang Party organization under Wang basically were in tune with those of Beijing right up to 1966. From that point on, however, there apparently was no reconciling the radical cries for class struggle and for an ultra-Left definition to all economic activity in the region. This change of direction is seen as being particularly unfortunate because McMillen feels that Xinjiang at that juncture was very near to the elusive threshold of integration. This conclusion is perhaps one of the more controversial themes in the book.

Given the fact that a rehabilitated Wang Enmao was reposted in 1981 to Xinjiang with orders to put his former house back in order after more than a decade of chaos, many sections and chapters of this book take on an added significance. One cannot but marvel at the overall continuity of personal authority in the region. Wang Enmao aside, take, for example,

General Wang Zhen of the former First Field Army who probably was the most powerful and influential figure in Xinjiang right after it was liberated. Today, as a member of the Politburo, this same man wields almost godfather-like influence and great policy authority over not only Xinjiang but the entire North-west China. Then too there is General Tao Zhiyue, the former Nationalist commander of the Xinjiang Garrison who surrendered his tens of thousands of troops and stayed on to help rebuild and develop the region. His United Front role still commanded regional headlines this year as he ceremoniously was inducted into the Chinese Communist Party at the ripe old age of 90. These and many other names are highlighted for the reader in a series of useful charts and graphs depicting Field Army affiliations of the People's Liberation Army elite, extensive Party and Government namelists by period and general biographical data. Not coincidentally, there today also seems to be a welcome re-emergence of the once famous Production and Construction Corps which was pioneered in Xinjiang but which fell victim to military factionalism during the Cultural Revolution. Some of McMillen's most interesting and stimulating passages are concerned with the para-military developmental and security roles played by this hybrid, fish-nor-fowl creation of necessity.

Local nationalism among the Uighurs and Kazaks once found periodic expression in calls for some sort of ill-defined federalism and a fierce political allegiance to Islam. Frequent visits to Xinjiang in the last 18 months by top Beijing leaders suggest relations between the Han and the minority nationality population continue to smoulder and threaten. The sensitivity which Wang Enmao brought to this and related issues during the 1950s is detailed in full by the author and goes a long way towards providing a deeper and richer understanding of what is being attempted in Xinjiang today.

For some this detailed monograph may not constitute easy reading. It is organized around individual subjects requiring one to scurry back and forth with each topic change over the chronological landscape. On more than a few occasions, moreover, the author unwittingly detracts from the excitement of his narrative by failing to transform sufficiently the literary style of his official Chinese sources. These however are minor flaws compared to the wealth of welcome detail provided on Xinjiang's most recent three decades.

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*Contest for the South China Sea.* By MARWYN S. SAMUELS. [New York and London: Methuen, 1982. 203 pp. £17.50.]

China is, by nature, a land empire. Maritime traditions have been comparatively feeble – navigation rarely undertaken, in spite of the long coastline, save for short-term defence, and for hundreds of years forbidden by the Court altogether. Almost throughout history, China's external relations have concentrated on adjacent contacts and neglected contacts at a knight's move; even Chinese government interest in Taiwan – if truth dare be uttered on this matter – is of late origin, and Republican claims to a say over the archipelagos in the South China Sea