Soviet Congress, it seems clear that he has misinterpreted his source. (A different interpretation is contained in my own book on Chinese communism 1931–34, now in the press.)

The shortcomings of Dr Waller's book do not deny its usefulness. He conveys valuable information on the two Soviet Congresses and on the events leading up to them, and he introduces a number of important sources.

TRYGVE LÖTVEIT

Radicals and Radical Ideology in China's Cultural Revolution. By PARRIS H. CHANG. [New York: Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University, 1973. 103 pp. $1.00.]

It already seems such a long time ago. The January Storm . . . the Military Backlash . . . the Leftist Upsurge . . . the Decline of the Radicals. Who can rehearse the precise arguments involved in the debate over bourgeois versus proletarian factionalism? Or recall when it was right to rebel, and when it was only right to rebel against reactionaries?

After a succession of recent heavy books on the Cultural Revolution, Parris Chang's concise introduction is something of a relief. Without wishing to decry the effort of compression, I must admit that it contains no particular insight which could not have been offered four years ago. The Lin Piao-Ch'en Po-ta demise is noted without any perceptible effect upon the general line of analysis. But it is a neat blow-by-blow account of the struggle between two, and sometimes more, lines, and can safely be recommended to students looking for a handy guide. Its usefulness is enhanced by the accompanying profiles of the radical leaders of the Cultural Revolution Group, from Chiang Ch'ing to Kuan Feng. As the title indicates, it is upon the " radicals " that Parris Chang has focussed his attention, but they were after all the stars of the Cultural Revolution, and it is a legitimate slant.

Where did the " radicals " come from? Parris Chang's interpretation of the sources of radicalism, like his whole account of the Cultural Revolution, has for me the familiar ring of what one might call the 1969 vintage of analysis. (Since his story effectively ends in the autumn of 1968, this is not so surprising.) The radicals were, in a word, the have-nots or those who exploited their discontent. " There are many injustices, inequalities and socio-economic grievances in Chinese society," Chang writes, and the radicals " astutely exploited the tensions and popular discontent." And he concludes that the potential for a radical revival will exist unless the Chinese leadership can " reduce the grievances and . . . accommodate the aspirations of the youth and the large under-privileged segments of the Chinese population. . . ." This may be part of the truth but surely not the whole of it.

For although the Cultural Revolution came to involve groups of what might be called the " underprivileged " – contract workers, junior cadres, hsia-fang-ed students and the like – its activists were to a large extent

relatively privileged workers and students who had, at the beginning, almost to rack their brains for a target worthy of " struggle." (This is brought out very clearly in the early chapters of Bennett and Montaperto's *Red Guard*.) And the achievements of the Cultural Revolution – what are now called " the good things of the Cultural Revolution " – in education, health, cadre management, and in human relations generally, can hardly be interpreted either as favourable or unfavourable to the " dispossessed." They suggest a whole range of social values, genuinely held and still defended by a lot of radicals, which cannot be explained just in terms of a particular sectional interest.

" One should not lightly write off the radicals' possible future political role," says Parris Chang in his last sentence. Agreed, but not just because they have Shanghai behind them, or because they are ideological pundits, or because Chiang Ching's " special relationship " will score high points after Mao's death. All these factors deserve our consideration, but so does the actual radical content of the radical philosophy.

JOHN GITTINGS

To Phoenix Seat. By LESLIE R. MARCHANT. [Sydney: Angus Robertson, 1973. 269 pp. A$7.95.]

Mr Marchant's book falls into three main sections. In the first he argues his case that China's Communists are dogmatic utopians. He discusses the development of utopian thinking in Europe from early times to the advent of Communist visions of the future. He then goes on to define what he calls " modern world revolutionary chiliastic movements " and their incarnation as Maoism in China. In the second part, Mr Marchant analyses domestic developments in China since 1949 in the light of his view of Maoism. As might be expected, he finds failure after failure and mistake after mistake all implemented by doctrinaire totalitarians at great human cost. In the third part he gives a similar treatment to China's foreign relations over the same period. In view of the argued irrationality and unscientific nature of China's rulers, it comes as somewhat of a surprise to find that the country still exists at the end of the book and to realise that it has managed a rate of economic growth roughly the same as that of India as well as some improvement in the distribution of social wealth and services.

On the whole, Mr Marchant's arguments are simplistic and unconvincing. They differ little from the kind of analysis of Chinese theory and practice put forward in Taipei or, for that matter, in Moscow. Furthermore, his cavalier and selective treatment of facts and his assertive way of telling us what the Maoists are thinking and why inspire little confidence in the reliability of his interpretation and can only mislead the general reader. The book is littered with such shortcomings, of which only a few can be mentioned here. Mr Marchant assures us that Mao's views have changed little since his youth, " the ideas that he presents in his recently published works such as *The Thoughts of Chairman Mao*