

on recommended reforms to its political system. The NAC had been Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's response to mass protests in Taipei demanding reform in the spring of 1990. Many of its recommendations have now been implemented, most notably with the retirement of elderly parliamentarians purporting to represent mainland constituencies, and what have been called Taiwan's first democratic general elections in December 1991 for the National Assembly and a year later for the Legislative Yuan.

The ambition of the project, and the value of this volume, is that the Columbia conference drew together some of the participants in the NAC itself. Ten out of 20 speakers had taken part in the NAC, including three members of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and four from the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The papers and transcripts of dialogues that make up the book hence provide a rare insight into the thinking of some of the protagonists at the NAC, and an admirable job has been done in editing the contributions into a relatively coherent series of analyses and debates on the constitution, the NAC itself, U.S.-Taiwan relations, the economy, international relations and the future. Inevitably, however, given the disparate nature of the contributions and the concern to reflect the debate through transcripts of conference question-and-answer sessions, the book cannot be read as a text-book on the key issue of Taiwan's constitutional reform.

In many ways the most interesting contributions for those interested in Taiwan come from the American participants. The concerns of the Taiwan politicians have become familiar through Taiwan's electoral process. But the editor, Harvey Feldman, a former State Department official, and David Dean, a former head of the American Institute in Taiwan, Washington's unofficial embassy in Taiwan, provide novel insights into the American position in Taiwan. Feldman argues that the United States has never had a "Taiwan" policy, rather a mainland policy to which Taiwan has been an adjunct. And Dean will give pause for thought to the DPP with his speculation on how Washington might react if Taiwan were to declare itself independent. He argues that China would have many weapons at its disposal short of military force to threaten an independent Taiwan, and that "other countries would think that Taiwan has brought this down on its own head."

SIMON LONG

*New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution.* Edited by WILLIAM A. JOSEPH, CHRISTINE P. W. WONG and DAVID ZWEIG. [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Contemporary China Series, No. 8, 1991. 351 pp. Hard cover \$35.00, ISBN 0 674 61757 6; paperback \$16.00, ISBN 0 674 61758 4.]

Whatever happened to the Cultural Revolution? Almost everyone would like to forget it, given all the terrible events and waste of time and human lives that took place between 1966 and 1976. But neither the Chinese people nor their rulers can do so, for its lingering effects have configured many aspects of the post-Mao era of reforms and of the attitudes of nearly all mainland Chinese. And while there are severe limits on Chinese scholarship concerning it (Mao still cannot be dealt with in a completely

honest manner and the full story of the activities of the top leadership, during the period and since, remain out of bounds), a plethora of memoirs, novels and even films has been produced in China since 1978. These have, in fact, become a principal set of sources on that era, rivalling the Red Guard and other literature published during the decade.

Western-language scholarship, in contrast, has tended to neglect the Cultural Revolution. The consequence has been a very small number of studies, to be counted on two hands at best, though many of these are quite perceptive. But by and large, the Cultural Revolution is fast becoming a forgotten era outside China. Particularly lacking are studies that attempt to inspect the whole of the decade historically or put various pieces (economics, society, literature, politics, etc.) together in a viable whole.

The Joseph *et al.* volume seeks to remedy this situation by drawing together a diversity of scholars, mostly from America but also from Australia and Canada, into a solidly edited volume of chapters originally tabled at a 1987 conference. The idea is to present “new perspectives” on political, economic and cultural aspects of the Cultural Revolution. In the political realm, Lowell Dittmer inspects the influence of Cultural Revolutionary sentiment, for and against, on four phases of the 1976–85 decade; Andrew Walder tries to understand the extremism of the period as “variations on a Stalinist theme” of mass liquidations, show trials and various kinds of radical extremism; David Zweig regards rural radicalism of the time as a variant of rural development strategy; Lynn T. White III sees the Cultural Revolution as the consequence of previous administrative measures undertaken by the Party that got out of hand once the Party itself could no longer control events, and seeks to explain the ensuing violence by interpersonal “popular ire” felt by every inhabitant and the desire to settle personal scores and grievances; and Keith Forster provides a case study of factional politics in Zhejiang in the mid-1970s stemming from the absence of control from above. These studies are all well researched, using a balanced mix of Chinese and Western materials and ideas. But by reducing the Cultural Revolution, in many regards, to a series of analytic categories, much of the realism and horror of the times has been shunted aside.

The second part of the volume deals with economics. Carl Riskin provides an excellent overview of Maoist economic thought and activity – “neither plan nor market”; Barry Naughton convincingly argues his well-known thesis of the importance of the near-disastrous “Third Front” economic policy of locating new industry in the interior of the country where, Mao opined, neither the Russians nor the Americans could easily get at it; Christine Wong revises conventional wisdom concerning financial sources of rural industrialization during the Cultural Revolution, arguing on the basis of diverse sources that state financing, not local self-reliance, was the basis both of the large growth in rural industrialization and of that programme’s poor performance and many subsequent problems; and Penelope Prime also revises previous outlooks by presenting a case study of comparative Centre–provincial sources of investment and finance in Jiangsu – although decentralization and locally-funded industrialization did occur, most of the financing, and hence control, stemmed from the Centre, which did not lose economic power to the region during the Cultural Revolution. These chapters are

all well done, and show how much can be accomplished in terms of detailed accounting and of challenging or sharpening previous thinking about the economy prior to the reform era. Would that there were more of it.

The final portion concerns culture, particularly literature. Richard Kraus illustrates Cultural Revolutionary cultural policy through the policies and personality of Cultural Minister Yu Huiyong (more famous under his pen name, Chu Lan – “First Wave”) and the some 165 articles, most attacking European classical music, written under his name, and indicates his fate for moving too close to Jiang Ching; Richard King analyses three Cultural Revolution novels on rusticated youths – *The Journey*, *The Dividing Line*, and *The Path of Life* – each sketching (in proper Maoist ideological terms) the struggle between voluntarily rusticated heroes and misfit anti-heroes (or, as it turned out, tragic heroines) whose only desire was to get out of the countryside; and Ellen Judd nicely compares heroism in nine Cultural Revolution model operas, whose characteristics are suffering hardships, vanquishing enemies and leading the people. It has long been the case that culture of a nation, particularly literature, is a high quality and efficient means of understanding the ethos of an era. The culture of the Cultural Revolution is an excellent illustration, demonstrating both the central tenets and massive absurdities of the period. As in the economic chapters, one wishes for more and, as with the politics chapters, greater synthesis.

This volume will become an essential possession of the specialist on contemporary China. It is hoped it will be regarded as the first work in a lengthening list of such studies that will eventually provide the base for the grand synthesis works of this important, if tragic, era of Chinese history.

THOMAS W. ROBINSON

*The Red Guards' Path to Violence: Political, Educational, and Psychological Factors.* By JING LIN. [New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991. 187 pp. £35.95. ISBN 0 275 93872 7.]

It is difficult not to sympathize with the intentions of the author of this study, currently an assistant professor of education at a Canadian university. Jing Lin was born and raised in China, arriving in the United States in 1985 to do her graduate work. Her study differs from most previous work on the Red Guard movement, which tends to fall into one of two categories. Western scholars have generally sought to analyse the movement dispassionately through a close reading of documentary material and, if fortunate, by interviewing participants. There is also a substantial literature by the participants themselves, primarily by former Red Guards but also by their victims. Jing Lin brings the passion of the participants, having “personally seen the Red Guards torturing, insulting, and killing people” (p. 1), but seeks a more “objective” understanding of such abhorrent behaviour by using insights from Western philosophical and psychological theories. Concluding that the destructive behaviour of the Red Guards can be traced to their “noncritical, categorical thinking,” she contrasts “Red Guards’ Thinking” with “Democratic Thinking,” noting that only with the establishment of the latter will it be possible to avoid a repetition of this terrible tragedy.