*Taiwanese and Mainlanders on Taiwan: A Survey of Student Attitudes**

By SHELDON APPLETON

PERHAPS the most frequent questions about Taiwan asked by non-specialists are those concerning the relationship of "native" Taiwanese to those of recent mainland origin.[1] Are Taiwanese and Mainlanders one "people," or two? How similar or different are their attitudes on a multitude of matters, especially political matters? Do they associate with one another very much socially? And how do Taiwanese fare economically and socially as compared with the Mainlanders on Taiwan?

These questions are asked often, and their importance to the makers of foreign policy in the United States and other western nations is obvious. But there is precious little in the scholarly literature on Taiwan bearing on these questions—and most of what is available is close to journalistic in nature, the result primarily of conversations with a relatively small number of Mainlanders or Taiwanese, or both. Hard information relevant to these questions is not easily come by on Taiwan, for the subject is a sensitive one which residents of the island are likely to discuss frankly only in the company of those they know and have reason to trust. Nevertheless, there are ways of supplementing such conversations and gaining additional clues to the questions posed above.

One method is simply to make careful use of the statistics used and published by departments of the various units of government on Taiwan. There are few published records comparing Mainlanders and Taiwanese directly on various dimensions. But records are available

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[1] The term "Mainlanders" is used in this article to refer to Chinese who have emigrated to Taiwan from the Mainland since the end of the Second World War and to their children. The term "Taiwanese" is used to refer to Chinese whose ancestors emigrated to Taiwan prior to the Second World War—usually prior to Japanese administration of the island in 1895. Together, these two groupings comprise about 98 per cent. of Taiwan's population, the remainder being aborigines, living mainly on the mountainous east coast of the island. Virtually all of the students whose views are reported in this article were born on Taiwan or arrived there before reaching school age.

of the number of Mainlanders and Taiwanese residing in each urban district and city and in each rural district and county. Some rough comparisons can therefore be drawn by comparing districts with high and low percentages of Mainlander residents, or by rank ordering the districts on the basis of the percentage of Mainlanders in their populations and using statistical techniques to compare this rank ordering with a similar rank ordering of the same districts on other relevant dimensions.

Even the most cursory inspection of official figures, viewed from this standpoint, indicates clearly the extent to which the Taiwanese are predominantly based in the rural areas, the Mainlanders in the cities. Almost 60 per cent. of the Mainlanders live in the 11 municipalities (plus the Taipei suburb of Yangmingshan) alone, while three-quarters of the Taiwanese live outside these cities. Within each political unit down to the village, moreover, the situation is the same. The more urbanized the unit, the higher the proportion of Mainlanders living within it. When the island's five autonomously administered cities and 16 counties are ranked in order of percentage of Mainlander residents, and also in order of percentage of the labour force in agriculture and fishing, the Spearman rank order correlation (Rho) between these sets of rankings is ·87, indicating a highly significant association.[2] Looked at another way, only 12 per cent. of the adult male working force in the cities is in agriculture (or fishing), compared to about 53 per cent. in the counties with a relatively high percentage of Mainlanders in their populations, and 64 per cent. in the counties with relatively few Mainlander residents.

But even when urban-rural differences are taken into account, the areas with the highest percentage of Mainlanders appear to have the better of it on virtually every economic comparison which can be made with the figures available. Chart 1 compares urban districts and rural counties with relatively high and relatively low percentages of Mainlander residents on a number of economic indicators. In the case of the urban districts, at least, the differences in percentage of the labour force

[2] The Spearman Rho is a measure of the association between two sets of rankings, computed by adding together the squares of the differences between these two sets of rankings, and converting the result into a score ranging from +1·0 (perfect positive association—both sets of rankings identical) through 0 (no association) to −1·0 (perfect *negative* association—each set of rankings precisely inverse to the other). It is possible to estimate statistically the probability that associations of the size noted would occur by chance, given the number of ranks involved. With 21 ranks involved, for instance, there is less than one possibility in 1,000 that a Rho of ·87 would occur because of chance alone. Thus we can refer to this association as significant at the ·001 level. By convention, associations are normally referred to by social scientists as statistically significant only when there is no more than one possibility in 20 (·05 level) that they could have been due to chance alone.

CHART 1

Selected Characteristics of Urban and Rural Districts with High and Low Percentages of Mainlander Residents

Characteristic	13 high % Mainlander urban dists.[a]	24 low % Mainlander urban dists.[a]	6 high % Mainlander rural c'ties [b]	9 low % Mainlander rural c'ties [b]	Correlation (Rho) with % Mainlander ranking
Average % of population Mainlanders (1962)	42·5	17·0	13·3	4·9	..
Average % of local legislators Mainlanders (1963)	48·7 [c]	15·8 [c]	11·8	4·5	·92 [d]
Average % of adult males in agriculture and fishing (1965)	6·4	7·8	53·1	64·3	·87 [d]
Average % of males completed jr. high school or above (1965)	38·5	28·9	18·9	13·9	·91 [d]
Average % of females completed jr. high or above (1965)	21·3	14·3	7·9	5·7	·78 [d]
Average taxes collected *per capita* (in New Taiwan dollars—$40 N.T. = $1 U.S.) (1962)		711· [e]	315·	277·	·65 [d]
Average crude death rate (per 1,000) (1965)	4·3	4·8	5·9	5·7	·26 [d]
Average pop. density (per sq. km.) (1963)	8·8	20·9	·27	·37	—
Average infant mortality rate (per 1,000) (1961)	15·0 [c]	16·7 [c]	N.A.	N.A.	—
Average % of pop. "poor" by govt. definition (1964)	8·2 [c]	10·3 [c]	N.A.	N.A.	—

[a] Five districts within Taiwan's five autonomously-administered cities have been omitted from these calculations because the major part of their population is engaged in agriculture and fishing. Had these five districts been included, the trends shown in the figures presented would have been accentuated slightly.

[b] The islands comprising Penghu (the Pescadores) are administered as a county of Taiwan, but have been included neither among the six counties with above-average percentages of Mainlanders nor among the nine counties with below-average percentages of Mainlanders. In any case, Penghu's area and population are less than half that of any other county, and the percentage of Mainlanders living there falls between the percentages in the above- and below-average counties. Penghu *has* been included in computing the Spearman rank order correlations given.

[c] Taipei only (1964). Figures are for five districts with an average of 51 per cent. of their population Mainlanders and five districts with an average of 16 per cent. of their population Mainlanders, respectively.

[d] The first four rank order correlations (Rho) on this chart are significant at the ·001 level. That is, there is less than 1 possibility in 1,000 that they are due to chance alone The fifth is significant at the ·01 level. The last one given (·26) is positive but not significant statistically.

[e] Average for five major cities with an average of 26 per cent. of their population Mainlanders, 12 per cent. of the adult male labour force in agriculture, and 30 per cent. of their municipal councillors Mainlanders.

Sources: The figures shown in this chart were taken or computed from the following sources:

Department of Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government, *T'ai-wan-sheng jen-k'ou t'ung-chi, 1965* (*Taiwan Population Statistics, 1965*) (Taichung, 1966).

Directorate-General of Budgets, Accounts and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Government of the Republic of China, *Chung-hua min-kuo T'ung-chi t'i-yao, 1963* (*Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China, 1963*) (Taipei, 1963).

Bureau of Accounting and Statistics, Taiwan Provincial Government, *T'ai-wan-sheng t'ung-chi yao-lan, No. 22* (*Taiwan Statistical Abstract, No. 22*) (Taichung, 1963).

Department of Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government, *T'ai-wan-sheng min-cheng t'ung-chi, 1964* (*Taiwan Civil Administration Statistics, 1964*) (Taichung, 1964).

Office of Accounting and Statistics, Taipei Municipal Government, *T'ai-pei-shih t'ung-chi yao-lan, No. 18* (*Taipei Statistical Abstract, No. 18*) (Taipei, 1965).

Department of Sociology, National Taiwan University, *T'ai-pei-shih she-hui chi-t'u* (*Social Base Maps of Taipei City*) (Taipei, 1965).

employed in agriculture are much too small to account for the differences noted, while the high-percentage Mainlander districts have two-and-a-half times as great a proportion of Mainlander residents in their populations as the low-percentage Mainlander districts. The chart shows clearly that as the percentage of Mainlander residents per administrative unit rises, the educational level of the population, the taxes collected *per capita* and the percentage of Mainlanders elected to local legislative units rise also, while population densities, crude death rates, infant mortality rates and the percentage of the population categorized as "poor" by the Government fall.[3] The close correspondence between the percentage of Mainlander residents and the percentage of elected

[3] Two partial exceptions to this general statement appear in Chart 1. The population density of the cities is naturally higher than that in the countryside despite the greater concentration of Mainlanders in the cities. But both urban and rural districts with relatively high proportions of Mainlander residents have lower population densities than urban and rural districts with low proportions of Mainlanders. The death rate for the high-percentage-Mainlander counties is slightly higher than that for low-percentage-Mainlander counties, but this is due to the greater number of aborigines—whose death rate is considerably higher—living in the small high-percentage-Mainlander counties of Hualien and T'aitung on the east coast.

officials who are Mainlanders (Spearman Rho = ·92) is probably indicative of the high saliency of the Mainlander-Taiwanese distinction in the minds of voters on Taiwan.[4]

The educational advantage which Mainlanders hold—and will continue to hold for at least a generation—is indicated most conclusively by noting the percentage of Mainlanders enrolled at various levels of schooling in Taiwan's highly competitive educational system. (Access to secondary- and university-level institutions is controlled by the administration of rigorous nation-wide entrance examinations.) Mainlanders constitute only 13 per cent. of the island's civilian population, but 22 per cent. of enrolled secondary school students, 29 per cent. of the college and university students and 39 per cent. of the students enrolled in the prestigious national universities.[5]

In the civil service, traditionally the most desirable occupation for Chinese, the Mainlanders enjoy at least a comparable advantage. Not only are most of the national government personnel (awaiting the opportunity to restore their administration to their homeland) Mainlanders, but almost 40 per cent. of Taiwan provincial, county and city government employees as well, including school officials and employees of government-operated business enterprises.

The trends revealed in these official statistics are reinforced by the results of a survey questionnaire administered in the spring of 1967 to about 700 college and 150 senior high school students on Taiwan. These students did not constitute a random sample of the student population on the island, though both public and private universities are represented, and the distribution of the college students by major field is reasonably close to that for the college population as a whole.[6] There was a substantially higher proportion of Mainlanders in the national than in the provincial and private institutions concerned. Mainlander students' families were more likely to reside in cities, Taiwanese students' families in the countryside. The Taiwanese students surveyed

[4] This Spearman rank order correlation is significant at the ·001 level. That is, there is less than one possibility in 1,000 that the degree of association shown by these two sets of rankings is due merely to chance.

Allan Cole reports that when the Taiwanese Kao Yu-shu was re-elected mayor of Taipei in 1964, "according to one estimate, four out of five Taiwanese and one out of seven mainlander voters cast ballots for Kao". "Political Roles of Taiwanese Entrepreneurs," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, Calif.), Vol. 7, No. 9 (September 1967), pp. 645–654. The quotation is from p. 651. Since then, Taipei has been made a special municipality, and though Kao remains its mayor, he is responsible to the Central Government rather than to the voters.

Cole also notes the important role in the island's economy played by a group of prosperous Taiwanese businessmen. But this is not inconsistent with the hypotheses advanced here concerning the relative wealth of the *masses* of Mainlanders and Taiwanese.

[5] Ministry of Education, Taiwan Provincial Government, *T'ai-wan-sheng chiao-yu t'ung-chi, 1965–66* (*Taiwan Educational Statistics, 1965–66 Academic Year*) (Taichung, 1966), pp. 18–19.

[6] *Ibid.* pp. 28–33.

reported themselves as having larger families than the Mainlanders—there were six living children in the average Taiwanese family to five in the average Mainlander family. But the homes of these Taiwanese students were less likely to have television sets, telephones, phonographs or servants. If we combine responses to these last four questions to form a crude index of family wealth, we find that the Mainlander students averaged 1·9 positive response to 1·6 for the Taiwanese—even though Taiwanese who get as far as college obviously constitute a relatively more "elite" sample of the (Taiwanese) population from which they were drawn. In the vocational high school surveyed, Taiwanese scored higher on this crude index of family wealth, presumably an indication that Mainlanders with comparable family wealth and status are likely to progress further up Taiwan's educational ladder than their Taiwanese counterparts. (Government figures show only 15 per cent. of the students enrolled in vocational high schools to be Mainlanders, compared with 22 per cent. enrolled in secondary schools in general.[7]) We also find about twice as many of the fathers of Mainlander college students employed in civil service occupations (38 per cent. of the Mainlander fathers, 17 per cent. of the Taiwanese) and teaching (9 per cent. of the Mainlander fathers, 4 per cent. of the Taiwanese).

Through our survey, we were able to gain also some indications of the patterns of association among our student respondents. A series of questions concerning movie-going habits asked each student to note the age, sex, ancestral home and father's occupation of any friend or fellow student who had accompanied him the last time he went to the movies.[8] It is an interesting reflection upon the importance placed upon people's ancestral home on Taiwan that almost 90 per cent. of the students were able to write in the home of their movie companion—in most cases giving city and county of the family's origin, as well as the province. For Mainlander students, the percentage remembering was above 90 per cent. Similar questions were asked concerning the identity of friends or fellow students from whom the respondents learned that the movie they saw was playing, whom the respondent felt "usually knows something about the movies and can tell what's a good picture to see," or who had recently asked the respondent for *his* opinion about what picture to see.

In a school and residence environment of about 60 per cent. Taiwanese and 40 per cent. Mainlanders, 85 per cent. of the Taiwanese students

[7] *Ibid.* pp. 76–77.

[8] These questions were adapted from a series used to study the phenomenon of opinion leadership in Decatur, Illinois, in 1945. See Elihu Katz and Paul S. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955).

reported that their movie companion was a Taiwanese, and about 70 per cent. of the Mainlanders reported theirs to be a Mainlander. Responses to the other three questions cited were almost identical. Thus, though there is substantial social interaction between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders, the preference for social contact with members of one's own grouping is clear and strong. Taiwanese who did report a Mainlander movie companion scored *higher* than other Taiwanese on the crude measure of family wealth utilized, while Mainlanders who reported Taiwanese movie companions scored well *below* other Mainlanders. The social interaction that does take place between Taiwanese and Mainlander students, then, seems to involve disproportionately a mixing of relatively well-to-do Taiwanese with Mainlanders of below average wealth. Perhaps this helps to reduce the apparent status difference in favour of the Mainlanders.

The questionnaire administered also included a considerable number of questions, most of them adapted from studies done in other countries, inquiring into the values and social and political attitudes of these students. Responses to these questions need to be looked at more carefully than responses to straightforward information questions. Because there was some concern over the reliability of responses to questions dealing with values and attitudes, a number of special precautions were taken. Two translations were prepared independently for 15 of the items used. Six more items were presented in both positive and negative form, by means of a split-ballot technique, to see whether positive responses might simply reflect a tendency to say " yes " regardless of the content of the item. And 12 forms of one page of the questionnaire were prepared—and administered randomly—arraying alternative responses to three sets of items in different positions on the page to test whether respondents were merely checking the first alternative presented, or the last, or the one on the right or left, without regard to content. The questionnaire was administered to students during regular class sessions, in some cases by an American, in others by a Chinese; in the presence of their instructor in some cases, in his absence in others; and with a promise of anonymity in all cases—no names were called for on the questionnaires. Finally, to provide helpful points of comparison, the same questionnaire was administered to small groups of students at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (209) and at Oakland University in Michigan (121), and to 73 Overseas Chinese attending college on Taiwan. The results were processed, with careful attention to the variations noted, by IBM 1620 and 360 computers.

Except for problems in the translation of some items, the results appear to be comparable in most respects to those obtained from student samples in western countries. Non-response rates average less

than 3 per cent., and obvious inconsistencies are few. The Chinese students did choose positive responses more often than negative ones on the reversed items presented, but the American students displayed an equal bias—in the opposite (negative) direction. There was also a slight tendency to select alternatives presented in certain positions on the page (towards the top and left, in general); but these were shared by the American students as well. Where or by whom the questionnaire was administered did not appear to affect the responses unduly. Problems incurred in translation need concern us, for the most part, only when comparisons are made between Americans and Chinese. But the use of two translations of a number of items helps to alert us to nuances of meaning in the Chinese versions of the items used.

One important difference between the Taiwanese and Mainlander college student samples lies in the fact that two-thirds of the former, but only half of the latter, are males. (Apparently Mainlander families are more often able and willing to provide higher education for their daughters, a fact attested to by official educational statistics as well as by the present survey.) In reporting results, we have generally attempted to compensate for this discrepancy by weighting the responses of Taiwanese women so that they count proportionately as much as those of Mainlander women. Results based on such calculations are referred to here as "adjusted."

These qualifications noted, the most remarkable aspect of the responses to the wide range of items presented concerning opinions, attitudes and values is the strikingly close correspondence on almost every item of the responses of the 375 Taiwanese and the 304 Mainlander college students in our sample.

On the sets of "terminal" and "instrumental" values they were asked to rank, the Spearman rank order correlations between the responses of Mainlanders and Taiwanese (adjusted) were ·97 and ·89, respectively. These were higher than similar correlations for any other pair of sub-groups in our sample, except for the grouping of students by urban or rural family residence (which overlaps the Mainlander/Taiwanese division substantially). The correlations (Rho) of the rankings of male and female college students on Taiwan, for instance, were much lower (·81 and ·77, respectively), as were the relationships between the rankings of Taiwan college and Hong Kong college students (·91 and ·65), Taiwan high school students and Taiwan college juniors and seniors (·67 and ·78), and, of course, between Chinese and American students (·59 and ·23).[9] On some 35 additional items of

[9] All but the last (·23) of the Spearman rank order correlations given in this paragraph indicate relationships significant beyond the 0·5 level (that is, there is less than one possibility in 20 that the extent of association shown could be due to chance alone).

various types which can be scored in percentage form, the average difference between Mainlanders and Taiwanese—both over-all and for each type—was again lower than that between any other pair cited above, except, again (in some cases), urban/rural family residence. The number of items for which the difference between Mainlanders and Taiwanese is large enough to qualify as significant at the ·05 level totals no more than a handful—and one such difference should be expected to appear about every 20 items by chance alone. While some of the marginal differences which appear are worth noting briefly, then, it should be borne in mind that what is most significant about this comparison of the responses of Taiwanese and Mainlander college students is not the differences which show up, but the similarities.

The students surveyed were asked to indicate where they felt they stood on a diagrammatic "ladder of life" by means of a "self-anchoring striving" scale devised by Hadley Cantril.[10] Presented with a picture of a ladder with rungs numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top, they were told to think of the top of the ladder as representing the best possible life for themselves, and the bottom as representing the worst. They were then asked to indicate where on this ladder they thought they stood at the present time, where they had stood five years ago, and where they thought they would stand five years in the future. They were then asked to indicate the standing of their families at the same three points in time. Chart 2 shows the results for Mainlander and Taiwanese college students.

CHART 2

Mean Ladder Ratings for Mainlanders and Taiwanese

Ratings of Own Position	Mainlanders	Taiwanese (adjusted)
(0 low, 10 high)	(304)	(375)
Five years ago	4·5	4·5
Today	5·2	5·1
Five years from today	7·8	7·4
Ratings of family position		
Five years ago	5·3	5·0
Today	6·1	6·1
Five years from today	8·1	8·0

Those higher than ·71 are significant at the ·01 level. The correlation between the Chinese and American students' rankings of "instrumental" values is not significant. The specific content of these sets of values, and the rankings assigned them by Taiwanese and Mainlander students, are discussed below.

[10] These items were adapted from Hadley Cantril, *The Pattern of Human Concerns* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1965).

As our previous discussion suggested, the responses of the two groupings were very close, though those of the Mainlanders were marginally higher, particularly in the case of their estimates of their own future success in reaching their life goals. The Mainlanders' estimates of their own standing were also more closely related to their estimates of their families' standing at each of the three points in time. Members of both groupings saw themselves as close to the very middle of this ladder of life. They displayed a sense of some progress achieved over the five years just past and indicated that they expected to be

CHART 3

Mainlander and Taiwanese Rankings of "Terminal" and "Instrumental" Values [a]

(Figures in Parentheses are Mean Rankings)

	Mainlanders (304)		Taiwanese (adjusted) (375)	
	"Terminal" values [b]			
1.	National security	(4·4)	Freedom	(4·2)
2.	A meaningful life	(4·5)	A meaningful life	(4·4)
3.	Freedom	(4·6)	National security	(4·8)
4.	Wisdom	(4·9)	Wisdom	(4·9)
5.	A world at peace	(5·0)	True friendship	(5·1)
6.	True friendship	(5·1)	A world at peace	(5·4)
7.	Equality	(6·2)	Equality	(5·5)
8.	Respect *from* others	(6·4)	Respect *from* others	(7·0)
9.	Respect *for* others	(7·7)	Respect *for* others	(7·5)
10.	A comfortable life	(7·9)	A comfortable life	(7·8)
11.	Salvation	(10·3)	Salvation	(10·3)
12.	Maturity	(11·0)	Maturity	(10·9)
	"Instrumental" Values [b]			
1.	Responsible	(3·8)	Responsible	(4·1)
2.	Honourable	(4·4)	Trustful	(4·9)
3.	Trustful	(5·1)	Honourable	(5·0)
4.	Clean	(6·2)	Clean	(6·2)
5.	Tender	(6·5)	Forgiving	(6·4)
6.	Forgiving	(6·7)	Polite	(6·7)
7.	Polite	(6·9)	Tender	(6·9)
8.	Co-operative	(7·1)	Broad-minded	(7·1)
9.	Self-disciplined	(7·1)	Self-disciplined	(7·2)
10.	Courageous	(7·9)	Co-operative	(7·2)
11.	Intellectual	(7·9)	Intellectual	(8·0)
12.	Broad-minded	(8·2)	Courageous	(8·1)

[a] For the Chinese text of the questions asked, see p. 61.

[b] The Spearman rank order correlation between the two sets of "terminal" values rankings is ·97, between the two sets of "instrumental" values rankings, ·89. Both of these correlations indicate an association between these sets of rankings significant well beyond the ·01 level.

able to move considerably closer to their life goals in the five years to come.

What are these life goals? The students were presented with lists of twelve "terminal" and twelve "instrumental" values, designed by Milton Rokeach, and instructed to rank each set from 1 (high) to 12 (low) in order of the importance these values had for them. The resulting rankings assigned by Mainlanders and Taiwanese, which are highly similar, are given in Chart 3.[11] Care must be exercised in looking at these results. Some of the Chinese terms used appear to have connotations not present in their English counterparts. Thus the low rankings of "maturity" and "intellectual" (compare "wisdom") are probably due in large part to somewhat unfavourable connotations attached to the Chinese terms used, and the relatively high rankings of "clean" and "tender" may be due to overtones of moral purity and uprightness (also present, to a lesser extent, in the English usage of "clean") in the first case, and of intimacy in the second.

The Mainlanders give slightly higher rankings to "respect *from* others," "a world at peace" and "national security" among the terminal values, and to "honourable," "tender" and "responsible" among the instrumental ones. The Taiwanese rank "equality" and "freedom" higher among the terminal values, and "broad-minded" and "forgiving" among the instrumental values.[12] This pattern seems to suggest more national- or world-mindedness, and perhaps a slightly more rigid and status-conscious cast of mind, among the Mainlanders. Inspection of intercorrelations among these items, and between these and other items on the questionnaire, tends to reinforce this impression. But the operative word is "slightly." And such inspection also warns against interpreting the higher rankings given to "equality" and "freedom" by the Taiwanese as expressions of latent hostility towards the (Mainlander-dominated) Nationalist Government. On the contrary, those ranking these values highest give relatively idealistic responses to other items, and seem to have some hope that the Government may act to remedy existing defects in the economic or social system. As we shall see, it is the students who rank *personal* goals highest, and who avoid responses calling for governmental action or expressing idealized social goals, who are most disillusioned and alienated.

[11] See Milton Rokeach, "Attitudes, Values and Political Behavior," paper presented at the 62nd annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 9 September 1966. Rokeach defines a "terminal value" as "an idealized goal or end-state of existence," and an "instrumental value" as "an idealized mode of conduct." *Ibid.* p. 11. See also Rokeach's book *Beliefs, Attitudes and Values—A Theory of Organizational Change* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968).

[12] Only differences averaging one-quarter of a ranking or more are mentioned here, and these are given in order of the size of the differences.

The Mainlanders' somewhat greater orientation to national and political affairs is also reflected in responses to a number of items adapted from Almond and Verba's five-country study, *The Civic*

CHART 4

Mainlander and Taiwanese Responses to Questions Concerning Involvement in Public Affairs and Interpersonal Trust [a]

	Mainlanders (304)	Taiwanese (adjusted) (375)
1. How often do you follow public affairs in newspapers and magazines, or on radio and television? (Per cent. responding "about once a week" or more)	44	39
2. What about talking public affairs with other people? How often do you do that? (Per cent. responding "once a week" or more)	17	16
3. About how much effect do you think the Government's activities have on your day-to-day life? (Per cent. responding "a relatively great effect")	40	37
4. About how much influence do you believe you had in the making of decisions by your family when you were about 15 years old? [b] (Per cent. responding "a relatively great influence")	30	27
5. When family decisions were made that you did not like, when you were about 15 years old, would you say that you did or did not feel free to complain about such decisions? [b] (Per cent. who did feel free)	64	58
6. If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you. (Per cent. responding "agree strongly" or "agree")	82	84
7. Most people can't be trusted. (R) [c] (Per cent. responding "agree strongly" or "agree")	48	49
8. No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it. (Per cent. responding "agree strongly" or "agree")	27	27

[a] For the Chinese text of the questions asked, see p. 62. "Neither agree nor disagree" responses and "no answers" were omitted in computing percentages.
[b] In Chinese, these questions referred to age *16*, which is roughly equivalent to age 15 in the west, due to the differences in calculating ages.
[c] This item was presented in both positive and negative form via a split-ballot technique, and the responses were averaged. The per cent. given for Taiwanese was not adjusted to compensate for the smaller proportion of women in the Taiwanese grouping because the number of Taiwanese women responding on each half of the split ballot (about 50) was too small to permit weighting their responses without risking serious distortion of the results.

Culture.[13] The Mainlander students are slightly more likely to follow public affairs in the media, to feel that government has a relatively greater impact on their lives, and to recall a greater degree of participation in the making of family decisions (see Chart 4). Almond and Verba associate greater interpersonal trust with a sense of citizen competence, but the differences between the two groupings on three items concerned with trust, designed by Morris Rosenberg, average only 11 per cent. In one case, there is none. The differences in Mainlander and Taiwanese responses to the items shown on Chart 4 are all small, but in every case they are in the direction of indicating a greater inclination towards or capacity for civic involvement on the part of the Mainlanders. (A similar tendency is evident in the responses of the small groups of 57 Mainlander and 94 Taiwanese high school students surveyed.) And most of these differences cannot be accounted for by urban/rural differences between Mainlanders and Taiwanese. In Almond and Verba's terms, this pattern suggests a slightly greater "participant" (or "citizen") orientation—as opposed to a "subject" orientation—on the part of the Mainlander students.[14]

Both groups of college students on Taiwan are much less involved with public affairs than students in our small American and Hong Kong samples. A majority of the Taiwan students report that they do not follow public affairs in the media even *weekly*, and less than a fifth discuss them that often. In contrast, half of the Hong Kong students and two-thirds of the Americans reported that they followed public affairs in the media *daily*, and half of the Americans and a quarter of the Hong Kong students that they discussed public affairs *daily*. Both American and Hong Kong students also were more likely than the Taiwan students to recall a greater degree of participation in family decisions.

As might be expected, students on Taiwan were substantially more likely than the American students surveyed to give conservative or non-democratic responses to a series of items adapted from those used on American samples by Herbert McClosky.[15] But none of the differences between Mainlanders and Taiwanese on these items was statistically

[13] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[14] *Ibid.* "The competent citizen has a role in the formation of general policy. . . . The competence of the subject is more a matter of being aware of his rights under the rules than of participating in the making of the rules. And though the subject may attempt to make the government official responsive, he appeals rather than demands" (p. 214). See also pp. 12–26 and pp. 380–382.

[15] See Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," *The American Political Science Review* (Baltimore), Vol. LI, No. 1 (March 1958), pp. 27–45; and the same author's "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVIII, No. 2 (June 1964), pp. 361–382.

CHART 5

Mainlander and Taiwanese Responses to Items Relating to "Conservatism," "Rules of the Game" and Political and Economic Equality [a]

Statement	*Per cent. agreeing* [b] Mainlanders (304)	Taiwanese (adjusted) (375)
1. If you start trying to change things very much you usually make them worse ..	57	51
2. You can usually depend on a man more if he owns property than if he does not ..	25	20
3. I prefer the practical man anytime to the man of ideas	67	67 [c]
4. The world is too complicated to be understood by anyone but the experts	27	23
5. You can't change human nature. (R) ..	27	22 [c]
6. The heart is as good a guide as the head. (R)	58	60 [c]
7. A man ought not to be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he's talking about ..	70	66
8. Any person who hides behind the laws when he is questioned about his activities doesn't deserve much consideration ..	50	44 [c]
9. It's all right to get around the law if you don't actually break it	32	34
10. Freedom of conscience should mean freedom to be an atheist as well as freedom to worship in the church of one's choice ..	73	77
11. The majority has the right to outlaw minorities if it wants to	35	33 [c]
12. We might as well make up our minds that in order to make the world better, a lot of innocent people will have to suffer ..	38	41
13. Few people really know what is in their own best interests in the long run. (R) ..	79	80 [c]
14. There will always be poverty, so people might as well get used to the idea	51	51
15. I think the Government should give a person work if he can't find another job ..	91	92
16. The Government ought to make sure that everyone has a good standard of living. (R)	91	94 [c]
17. Security is a much more important thing to consider in choosing a job than high pay. (R)	89	91 [c]
Acquiescence Score [d]	+9·0	+5·5
Intensity Score [d]	17·3	16·8

[a] For the Chinese text of these statements, see p. 63.
[b] Five alternative responses were presented following each statement: "agree strongly," "agree," "neither agree nor disagree," "disagree" and "disagree strongly." "Neither agree nor disagree" responses were omitted in computing percentages.
[c] These percentages were not adjusted to compensate for the smaller proportion of women in the Taiwanese grouping because these percentages are drawn from reversed items or other items presented on only one form of a split ballot. As a result the number of respondents is halved, and the number of Taiwanese women responding (about 50) is too small to permit weighting their responses without risking serious distortion of the results.

(R) indicates reversed items, presented in both positive and negative form via a split-ballot technique. Acquiescence and Intensity scores are based on responses to the five items on this table marked "(R)" plus the item "Most people can't be trusted," from Chart 4.
[d] Acquiescence scores were computed by subtracting the percentage of "disagree strongly" and "disagree" responses to the six reversed items from the percentage of "agree strongly" and "agree" responses. A positive score indicates a tendency to agree with statements presented regardless of their content. Intensity scores were computed by adding "agree strongly" and "disagree strongly" responses to the six reversed items.

significant, and the average difference for the 17 items shown on Chart 5 was less than 3 per cent. Inspection of the over-all pattern of responses shows the Mainlanders marginally more likely to agree with statements expressing "conservative" views, such as "If you start trying to change things very much, you usually make them worse," and "You can usually depend on a man more if he owns property than if he does not."

The Mainlanders also tend to be more likely to support authority against the individual. They agreed slightly more often than the Taiwanese that "Any person who hides behind the laws when he is questioned about his activities doesn't deserve much consideration," and that "A man ought not to be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he's talking about." Yet they also more often *dis*agreed with such statements as "It's all right to get around the law if you don't actually break it," and "Freedom of conscience should mean freedom to be an atheist as well as freedom to worship in the church of one's choice." In addition, Mainlanders were more likely to respond positively to both forms of six items presented in positive and negative form via a split-ballot technique. (These reversed items are marked "(R)" on Chart 5.) This generalized tendency towards acquiescence has been reported by McClosky to be closely related to conservatism, status-consciousness and authoritarianism.[16] The marginal differences observed in Chart 5, therefore, tend to reinforce the impression gleaned from inspection of the values rankings reported above that the Mainlander students may be a little more rigid, status-conscious and positively oriented towards

[16] "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *The American Political Science Review*, p. 380. Our small sample of Mainlander high school students also had a slightly higher acquiescence score than their Taiwanese counterparts.

authority. Perhaps this has something to do with the fact that Mainlanders constitute the principal political authority on Taiwan.[17]

The Taiwanese students, on the other hand, may be rather more concerned about economic security, probably because they tend to come from somewhat poorer families. They were slightly more likely to agree with each of the three items expressing such concern: "Security is a much more important thing to consider in choosing a job than high pay," "The Government ought to make sure that everyone has a good standard of living," and "I think the Government should give a person work if he can't find another job." Some 24 per cent. of the Taiwanese agreed strongly with the last of these items, to 17 per cent. of the Mainlanders. But it is more important to note that about 90 per cent. of the students in *both* groupings agreed with *all* of these items, and a fifth to a quarter agreed strongly, while each of these statements was agreed to by only modest pluralities of the American students. This is a good indication of the Taiwan students' deep concern about their own future economic security.

Finally, the students were requested to check, on a list provided, the three things they were most proud of about their country. The choices "Other" and "Don't know" were explicitly included in this question adapted from one used by Almond and Verba. The results are given in Chart 6.

The Taiwan students were much less likely to indicate pride in their governmental or political system than were even American students surveyed in 1968 (35 per cent. of whom chose this option, to 15 per cent. of the Taiwan college students). Nor was there any difference between Mainlanders and Taiwanese in frequency of checking this alternative. The Hong Kong students were still less likely to choose this option. Only 8 per cent. did so.

The Mainlanders were more likely to express pride in the physical (scenic) attributes of their country and in its contributions to the arts. The Taiwanese students were more likely simply to fail to respond to this question—29 per cent. were unable to think of as many as three things they were proud of about their country. The difference between the percentages of blank and "Don't know" responses by Taiwanese and Mainlander students to this question is significant beyond the ·01 level of confidence—that is, there is less than one possibility in 100

[17] Richard W. Wilson's forthcoming study of political socialization in three elementary schools in the Taipei area indicates that Mainlander students at each of these three schools felt a greater degree of identification with President Chiang K'ai-shek than did their Taiwanese fellow students. "Rural-Urban Differences in Childhood Political Socialization on Taiwan," paper presented to the Research Conference on Urban Society and Political Development in Modern China" (St. Croix, Virgin Islands, 28 December 1968–3 January 1969), p. 42.

CHART 6

Characteristics of Their Country which Mainlanders and Taiwanese Are Most Proud Of

"Speaking generally, what are the characteristics of our country that you are most proud of? Please select three of the characteristics listed below and put a check in front of each of the ones that you have selected. (*Do not check more than three.*)" [a]

	Per cent. checking	
	Mainlanders	Taiwanese (adjusted)
	(304)	(375)
Governmental or political institutions	15	15
Position in international affairs	22	23
Social welfare legislation	20	22
Physical attributes	57	47
Contributions to science	20	16
Contributions to the arts	42	34
Characteristics of the people	71	68
Religious or spiritual contributions	13	14
Other	15	19
Don't know	5	9
Checked less than three [b]	13	22

[a] For the Chinese text of this item, see p. 65. 8 different versions of the item were used with the ordering of the various characteristics systematically rotated.

[b] Many of those who checked less than three of the options presented checked none or one. The total percentage of non-responses, counting each check omitted as a failure to respond, was 21 per cent. for the Mainlanders, 35 per cent. for the Taiwanese.

that the Taiwanese students' greater reluctance to respond is due merely to chance.

A look at the responses to other parts of the questionnaire by the 110 Taiwanese who could not think of three aspects of their country that they were proud of tends to confirm our suspicion that they are more alienated from their Government and society than their fellows. An average of almost 95 per cent. of them *did* respond to the other items on the questionnaire. Only 3 per cent. chose "governmental and political institutions" as an aspect of their country they were proud of, and a full 70 per cent. of their positive responses to this item involved checking "characteristics of the people," "other" or "physical attributes." Less than 10 per cent. cited either "social welfare legislation" or "position in international affairs." Although three-quarters of these "alienated" Taiwanese students were men, this group was less likely than other Taiwanese to follow public affairs regularly in the mass media or to discuss public affairs as often as weekly with other people. They were more likely than others to estimate the Government's impact

on their own lives as being relatively small, and reported themselves as having had less influence in the making of family decisions, and as feeling less free to complain about these decisions when they did not like them. They rated themselves as standing lower on the "ladder of life"—past, present and future—than the other Taiwanese students, though they stood, if anything, a bit higher on our crude index of family wealth. They valued "a comfortable life" and "tender" more highly, and "responsible" and "self-disciplined" lower than their fellow Taiwanese students, and a third of them—compared with a fifth of their Taiwanese fellows—agreed that "No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it." These data give us an important hint that disapproval of the established order of things on Taiwan is more likely to take the form of *withdrawal* than dissent.

If this hypothesis is correct, it helps us to understand somewhat better what tends to happen to both Mainlander and Taiwanese students as they ascend the educational ladder on Taiwan. Unlike the students in our American and Hong Kong samples, the Taiwan students' estimate of the Government's impact on their lives goes down, and their interest in public affairs wanes, as their years of schooling increase. They become progressively more acquiescent and more, not less, likely to agree with conservative and non-democratic statements. And gradually they come to assign higher rankings to such self-oriented "terminal" values as "a meaningful life," "a comfortable life," "wisdom" and "respect *from* others," and lower rankings to such community- and other-oriented values as "national security," "a world at peace," "equality" and "respect *for* others." For the Taiwanese, also, the percentage indicating pride in "governmental and political institutions" falls, and the percentage failing to find three things about their country to be proud of rises, as they move from high school towards college graduation.[18] This withdrawal from involvement in their own society, this "inner migration," becomes in many cases a real migration in the form of graduate study abroad. It has been estimated that the students who leave constitute, by and large, the top 15 per cent. to 20 per cent. of their graduating classes, and that less than 5 per cent. of these ever return to live on Taiwan.[19] Many more would

[18] The differences between Taiwanese high school and college students on these two items are significant at the ·05 and ·01 levels, respectively, despite the relatively small number (94) of Taiwanese high school students in the sample.

On the differences in values and attitudes between high school and college students on Taiwan, see Sheldon Appleton, "The Political Socialization of College Students on Taiwan," paper presented at the 65th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 6 September 1969.

[19] The *New York Times*, 14 July 1968, p. 7. See also Ministry of Education, Government of the Republic of China, *Chung-hua, min-kuo chiao-yu t'ung-chi, 1966 (Educational Statistics of the Republic of China, 1966)* (Taipei, 1966), pp. 84–93.

undertake such a migration if they could, as the enormous number of applicants for study abroad and the occasionally long lines at the American consulate in Taipei attest.

Despite the sometimes sharp economic and political inequalities noted between Mainlanders and Taiwanese, and a substantial tendency for students to mix socially within each of these groupings more often than across them, the students on Taiwan responded to the battery of questions put to them essentially as members of a single (unified, not fragmented) political culture. The differences between the Mainlander and Taiwanese groupings were in almost every respect amazingly small, even at the high school level. Richard Wilson's recent study of elementary school children on Taiwan suggests, moreover, that this striking similarity of responses is probably due more to the persistence through several generations of Chinese political-cultural norms than merely to common school experience. Wilson concludes:

> . . . the general overall similarity [in responses] between Mainlander and Taiwanese children, with regard to both politically relevant and specifically political attitudes, is quite marked and of sufficient strength to suggest that Mainlander and Taiwanese groups both have continued to adhere closely to similar political cultural norms despite their separation during the first half of this century.[20]

These findings provide some support for the contention of Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan strait that, except perhaps for the small aboriginal population, the people of Taiwan are essentially Chinese in their social and political outlooks as well as in their ancestry. The fairly close correspondence among the responses of the Hong Kong, Overseas Chinese and Taiwan college students to our survey are also consistent with this hypothesis. (A conclusive demonstration of the proposition would, of course, require access to a representative sample of the adult population of Taiwan.) Without having had the opportunity to test it empirically, I would be glad to place a substantial wager that much greater differences would appear between black and white American college students, or between Overseas Chinese and non-Chinese students attending the same university in, say, Singapore, Manila or Bangkok.[21]

[20] Richard W. Wilson, "A Comparison of Political Attitudes of Taiwanese Children and Mainlander Children on Taiwan," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 8, No. 12 (December 1968), pp. 98–1000. The quotation is from p. 998.

[21] Since the first draft of this article was prepared, a study which tends to support this surmise has come to my attention. A survey of 1,500 elementary and junior high school students in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh shows significant differences between black and white students on a number of political dimensions. The black children show greater alienation from the political system than white children, and differences between the two groupings increase with age. Edward S. Greenberg, "Black Children and the Political System: A Study of Socialization to Support," paper presented at the 65th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 4 September 1969.

The few important Mainlander-Taiwanese differences that do show up seem readily traceable to the difficult situation created by the sudden migration of close to two million Mainland refugees to Taiwan as a result of the Chinese Civil War. As claimants to rule all of China, of course, these refugees have exercised most of the political power on Taiwan for upwards of 20 years, pending their anticipated return to the Mainland. Considering this fact, the preceding 50 years of Japanese occupation and administration of Taiwan, and the rural/urban division and economic inequalities cited above, what is remarkable is that differences and feelings of hostility between Mainlanders and Taiwanese are not greater than, in our student sample at least, they appear to be. No doubt this has something to do with the steady economic progress Taiwan has made over the past generation, as well as with the fact that, by its very nature, our sample includes primarily those who have been academic-oriented and successful in advancing along established lines in Taiwan's educational system. Most likely, also, this phenomenon reflects the traditional capacity of the Chinese people to by-pass political differences and respond to one another as fellow human beings.

The data presented suggest further that at least some of the values crucial to the development of a more democratic political system already have considerable support among at least the younger and better-educated segments of the population—Taiwanese and Mainlander alike. A plurality of the students surveyed was unwilling to permit innocents to suffer in order to make the world better, or to have those who "hide behind the law" given little consideration. Fully two-thirds objected to letting the majority outlaw minorities if it wanted to. This is fairly impressive for students in a country without a deeply rooted tradition of representative democracy or government by due process of law. The Taiwan students were just as likely to object to these non-democratic statements, in fact, as the students in our Hong Kong sample, who have successfully made their way through the British-oriented educational system of that Crown colony. (The Hong Kong students, moreover, are an even more select group than the Taiwan students surveyed, since the opportunities for higher education in Hong Kong are relatively fewer than those on Taiwan.)

But there remains a long way to go before a broad consensus—even an elite consensus—in support of democratic procedures and values is reached. Two-thirds of the Taiwan students were willing to agree that "A man ought not to be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he's talking about," and from a third to nearly a half agreed with each of the other non-democratic statements cited in the preceding paragraph. (No more than a quarter of the American students agreed with any of these items.)

In addition to these encouraging beginnings of support for democratic values, the Taiwan students' responses to the "ladder of life" items indicate a feeling of progress made towards life goals in the past and an even greater hope of further progress to come. The story of Taiwan's economic growth is well known. And there is some evidence, too, of movement towards greater governmental responsiveness to the needs of the people. The practice of having village mayors elected by village councils, for instance, was abandoned in 1959 in favour of direct popular election of mayors by the villagers. Other electoral reforms, adopted subsequently, require candidates for office to run in larger constituencies than previously, reducing the possibility of depending entirely on family connexions to win local office. Though these reforms have encouraged such practices as vote-buying, they have also made local elections much more competitive and meaningful, and have involved much larger numbers of villagers in local politics. One observer has commented:

> Until very recently, local leaders had needed only the backing of the other influential families of the area to win selection or election. They normally had little direct relationship with those they "governed," who, because of their isolated and poor condition, complied with the system. With the advent of competitive elections and the penetration of [political] factions, however, the peasants have begun to assume a new and different role and are finding new significance within the local political system. Perhaps for the first time, local leaders must work directly with them in a reciprocal relationship in order to gain their support and votes.[22]

Again, in 1967, Taiwan's children were promised the opportunity to continue their educations for at least nine years without having to pass a highly competitive series of examinations after the sixth grade, and the following autumn this reform was duly implemented. Probably nothing the Government could have done could have brought more joy—or at least alleviated more sorrow—for the island's 11- and 12-year-olds and many of their parents.[23] (It is not that they love school

[22] Bernard Gallin, "Political Factionalism and Its Impact on Chinese Village Social Organization on Taiwan," in Marc J. Swartz (ed.), *Local-Level Politics* (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p. 398.

[23] Support for such a measure was expressed by 89 per cent. of a quota sample of adult residents of Taipei surveyed two years before the measure was adopted. Among those with children currently enrolled in elementary school, an even higher proportion (93 per cent.) approved. See Shu Ch'ien and Ch'i Ching-yao, *Ta-chung ch'uan-po tsai cheng-fu kung-kung kuan-hsi chung ti kung-neng* (*The Role of Mass Communications in Government Public Relations*) (Taipei: National Cheng-chih University School of Public Administration and Business Management Educational Centre, 1965), pp. 40–41.

Recently, in addition, a decision has been announced to reduce the size of the army and to streamline its operations.

more, but that they hated the pressures of examinations and endless after-school sessions cramming for them.)

My own personal experiences on Taiwan testify to these tendencies towards responsiveness as well. First there is the simple and surprising fact that the administration of my extensive questionnaires to high school and college students was permitted at all. None of the persons from whom permission was asked, in fact, refused; and several agreed on the spot, without reference to higher authority.

I recall, also, visiting in 1967 a small village, populated largely by aboriginals, on the east coast of the island, where living conditions are most primitive. (It was not a "model" village, recommended by the Government. I selected it, and made arrangements to visit it, on my own.) I had visited the same village, and talked with its leader, nine years before. Then I had asked him what he wanted most for the people of his village. He said he wanted, and had requested, a water-pump, since there was no source of unpolluted water within convenient distance for the 400 people of the village. Nine years later, the village had obtained not merely a village water-pump, but taps from which running water could readily be drawn in most of the huts of the village. Again I asked the (new) village leader what he wanted most for the now 800 people of his village, whose living conditions were visibly so much improved. He said they wanted a road (it required a 20-minute walk over dirt paths to reach the village) and an amphitheatre in which their ceremonial dances could be performed, and that he had already spoken to a local assemblyman about the road. Some months later my wife visited this village to view performances of their ceremonial dances on an appropriate festival, and reported that the road was already under construction. I have no doubt I will find a modest amphitheatre there on my next visit. Additional incidents gleaned from a tour of the island could also be given.

Taiwan, then, seems to have the potential to remain a viable political entity for a good period of time if external events permit, and if the island's emerging leaders prove willing to accord the Taiwanese an increasing share in Taiwan's growing prosperity and in making the decisions which affect their lives. Western nations can play at least a marginal role in helping this potential become a reality. For all of the evident hazards and difficulties of their situation, the people who live on Taiwan have something important going for them. They say it themselves. In every grouping and sub-grouping of our Taiwan sample—men and women, city-bred and country-bred, richer and poorer, high school students and collegians, Taiwanese and Mainlanders alike—by far the largest number of students reported as one of the things in which they took most pride: "characteristics of the people." Many westerners

who have had the opportunity to live even briefly on Taiwan, or in Mainland China, are inclined to agree. It is on the special qualities of the Chinese people that the greatness of the Chinese tradition was built, and it is on these same special qualities—of persistence, endurance, humanity and cheerfulness in adversity—that Chinese, on Taiwan and everywhere, must rest their hopes for a future worthy of their past.

(a) *The Chinese text of the questions referred to in Chart 3 on p. 47*

1. 將下列人生追求之最終目標，依其對你之重要性而排列之，將〔1〕填入空格內，代表對你為最重要，〔2〕代表次重要----直至〔12〕，數目12則代表對你極微重要。（數目字1至12只能使用一次，不可重複使用。）

——舒適的生活　——有意義的生活　——和平的世界

——平等　——自由　——老成

——國家安全　——尊敬別人　——受人尊敬

——得救　——真誠的友誼　——智慧

2. 將下列處事之道，依其對你的重要性而排列之。將〔1〕填入空格內，代表對你為最重要，〔2〕代表次重要...直至〔12〕，數目12代表對你極微重要。（數目字1至12只能使用一次，不可重複使用）。

——思想開通　——廉潔　——合作

——勇敢　——寬恕　——正直

——知識活動　——有禮　——負責任

——自律　——親切　——信任

(b) *Questions referred to in Chart 4 on p. 49*

1. 你注意在報紙、雜誌或收音機及電視機上所呼籲之公共事宜之次數如何？

將近每日　　大概一星期一次　　偶而　　從不注意

2. 你與別人談論公共事宜之次數如何？

將近每日談　　一星期一次　　偶而　　從不談論

3. 政府的措施，對於你們日常生活的影響如何？

比較有效　　效果比較小　　沒有效果

4. 當你大約在十六歲時，你對於家裡所作之決定，大概有多少影響力？

比較有影響力　　影響力比較小　　沒有影響力

5. 當你大約在十六歲時，當家裡所作之決定你不喜歡時，你是否認為能抱怨？

認為能抱怨　　不認為

6. 如果你不注意自己，別人將會利用你。

非常同意　　同意　　不是同意也不是不同意

不同意　　非常反對

7. 大多數人都可信任。

非常同意　　等等

8. 當你真正面臨問題時，沒有人會關心你所發生的事情。

非常同意　　等等

(c) *Questions referred to in Chart 5 on p. 51*

你是否同意以下各項之說法，請在適當答案前之方格內填入〔✓〕符號。

〔 〕非常同意　〔 〕同意　〔 〕不是同意也不是不同意　〔 〕不同意　〔 〕非常反對

1. 如你將事情變動得很多時，你常常會將它們弄得更糟。

〔 〕非常同意　〔 〕同意　〔 〕不是同意也不是不同意　〔 〕不同意　〔 〕非常反對

2. 你能常常依靠有財產的人而不大依靠沒有財產的人。

3. 我比較喜歡實行家而不大喜歡富於理想的人。

4.世界過於複雜，所以除了專家們外，沒有人會瞭解。

5.人性不能改變。

6.感情與理智同是一個好嚮導。

7.一個人如對於問題沒有深刻瞭解時，則他不應獲得發言權。

8.任何人當他在被審問到關於他的行為時而以法律作藉口則不值得重視。

9.如你沒有實際的違反法律，鑽法律的空隙是合適的。

10.良心的自由，其意能自由在自己所選擇的教堂裏做禮拜同時也能自由做一個無神論者。

11. 多數有權使少數失去法律上的效力。如多數想這樣做的話。

12. 我們立決心，為了要改善世界，使許多無辜的人受苦也是無可奈何的。

13. 極少的人知道他們長久的真正利益何在。

14. 因永遠是貧窮，所以人們最好習慣其環境。

15. 我認為如一個人不能找到工作時，政府應給他一個工作。

16. 我認為政府應使每一個人都能有好的生活標準。

17. 在選擇工作時，工作保障要比高薪重要得多。

(d) *Questions referred to in Chart 6 on p. 54*

一般來說，對於我們的國家那些事情你可引為得意？請在下列幾項特性中選出三個，選出之項目請在其前面之方格內填上〔✓〕符號。（以三個為限）

〔 〕國家之山川景物　　〔 〕科學方面之貢獻

〔 〕藝術方面之貢獻　　〔 〕民族之特性

〔 〕宗教方面　　〔 〕政府或政治機構

〔 〕在國際上之地位　　〔 〕社會福利法制

〔 〕其他　　〔 〕不知道