

influences have been strongest. Yu's careful analysis of how the Chinese Communist Party's experience from 1921 to 1949 contributed to the current policies and techniques of ideological persuasion is distinctly original. One only wishes that he had similarly analysed the role of what he calls "the accumulated political and cultural experience of the Chinese" as another source upon which the Chinese leaders have drawn.

What is totally new, however, apart from the content of today's orthodoxy and the modern machinery available for its diffusion, is, as Mr. Yu notes in his conclusions, that "the Communists have succeeded in bringing more people into direct and close contact with the central Government than ever before in Chinese history" (p. 155). He is equally right in seeing mass persuasion not as a short-term measure in China but as a permanent institution of social control, backed of course by the ultimate sanction of force. That the system is nevertheless far from being totally effective is clear, as Mr. Yu points out, from the complaints about the mass media which arose during the brief period when criticism was encouraged in 1957. In his final assessment of the Chinese Communist Party's success in mass persuasion, Mr. Yu is therefore right to steer a course between, on the one hand, those who are sceptical of this vast propaganda effort and, on the other, those who regard the Chinese Communists as "master persuaders" (p. 154).

The effort at persuasion—particularly in relation to the young—has increased in tempo since Mr. Yu's book was written; both for this reason and because he handles the subject so well, one hopes that he will take his exploratory study further at some future date.

HUGH HOWSE.

TIBET

Communist China and Tibet, The First Dozen Years. By GEORGE GINSBURGS and MICHAEL MATHOS. [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. 218 pp. guilders 23.50.]

APPRECIATION of a difference in outlook "literally amounting to that dividing two strange worlds," as the authors write on p. 173, must underlie any realistic approach to relations between Communist China and Tibet. But Tibet is equally strange to the West; and without personal experience, its essence is hard to capture. The authors' description of Tibet, as it was, is careful and perceptive but misses much of the atmosphere by exaggerating the rigidity, the factionalism and antipathies in a world where explosions of anger or energy, though spectacular, were rare and where, generally, a minimal exercise of administration, flexibility, tolerance and calm consorted unexpectedly with unmistakable

distinctions between high and low, monk and lay. To see "feudals and civil servants," for example, as "counterparts" of the monasteries seems to confuse the peculiar position of the monk officials. Again, the vexed question of Chinese suzerainty is seen purely, and not very consistently or satisfactorily, through Western eyes.

Similar difficulties mar the account of events after 1949. There is little sense of the stunning impact of the new force which swiftly destroyed Tibet's effective army and seemed a terrifyingly overwhelming threat. The clash, which fatally exposed weaknesses which had survived other less ruthless invaders and might have survived any but a fanatically ideological adversary, was like one between a knight in armour and an armoured car. The occupation of Lhasa in 1951 by some 20,000 well armed troops continued the numbing effect which was an element in the comparatively easy passage the Chinese had from 1951 to 1954. Another Tibetan characteristic reappearing when the daze had worn off, was a confidence born of long experience but concealed behind protestations of simplicity, that they had only to hold on in order to wear down the enthusiasm and resources of an invader. In the villages which are thinly dispersed over a wide expanse there was an ingrained readiness to bend before any storm. This combination of mental and geographical causes helps to explain why the populace did not "flock in droves" to the defence of church and state. In thirteen centuries the populace had never formed a united front or risen for or against any cause. The capital was always the key and although the Chinese suffered reverses away from Lhasa, I doubt whether they ever were or felt themselves in a precarious position there as the authors suggest. Two other questionable points are the false assertion that the British promised military support to Tibet and the failure to mention the 70,000 Tibetans who fled for refuge to India and Nepal. Their social and local origins might throw light on Central Tibetan feeling in 1959.

But such disagreements do not detract from the many good things in the book, especially where it deals with results rather than motivation. The background is the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951, a document drawn in such vague terms that advantage inevitably lay with the party having power to determine its interpretation. There is a clear, well-documented account of Chinese methods at different stages in pursuit of their aim of assimilating Tibet: the dismemberment of the country, allowing the parts to be played against the whole; the erosion of Tibetan leadership while preserving a façade of Tibetan institutions; initial cautious probing followed by increasing pressure when their hold seemed stronger (enough weight is not given perhaps to the effect of the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954); then temporary withdrawal when pressure bred opposition, and finally the big flare-up in 1959 which made

possible the abolition of all Tibetan elements and institutions, religious and civil, which had opposed Chinese initiatives and afterwards the confiscation of private property, the injection of class war, and Communist indoctrination in schools. There are balanced assessments of the real content of Chinese claims to social and economic progress, the possible betterment of the lot of the poorer people, and the extent to which all improvements were necessitated by and subordinated to the aim of military domination.

The conclusion that, for the present and barring unexpected accidents, Tibet is completely under Chinese control, and is scheduled for total assimilation, can hardly be disputed; but the authors do not speculate what might happen when the new peasants find their recent private ownership turned into a collectivised illusion; nor do they consider whether a Tibetan way of life and thought can, in some form, survive the threat of integration, much as an indigenous ethos has survived in Outer Mongolia. The continuance of guerrilla resistance in Tibet is relevant here, and the recent dismissal of the Panchen Lama, which the authors did not expect, shows how wide and strong a feeling of Tibetan-ness and religious faith lie submerged. Even the most emphatic public protestations of Communist ideology must now be seen to have no meaning to the Tibetans to whom they are attributed.

The warning that possession of Tibet might be the key to the domination of Asia cannot be dismissed lightly; but the authors hardly glance at the cost and difficulty, both financial and human, in developing it as a base for expansion, problems which could yet give force to Professor Lattimore's description of Tibet as a zone of diminishing returns for imperialism. At all events, the book provides a systematic and stimulating text for study of the past twelve years and of future developments there.

H. E. RICHARDSON.

The Timely Rain, Travels in New Tibet. By STUART and ROMA GELDER. [London: Hutchinson, 1964. 248 pp. 50s.]

Tibetan Sourcebook. By LING NAI-MIN. [Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1964. 485 pp. H.K. \$30.00. U.S. \$5.00.]

THESE two books are quite different. The first is an account of a journey in Tibet in 1962 while the second is a collection of Chinese Communist statements and documents on Tibet from the period 1950-1962. *The Timely Rain* is a generally favourable treatment of Chinese Communist policies in Tibet and of general conditions there. A reading of the *Tibetan Sourcebook*, even though it presents excerpts from Chinese Communist broadcasts and publications, shows that the Chinese and their ways are not acceptable to most Tibetans.