

The Radical Students in Kwangtung during the Cultural Revolution

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The Cultural Revolution was a large-scale self-examination by the Chinese of their political system, involving all the ruling groups as well as the whole population. Not only specific policy issues but also social, economic and political institutions and their value premises were subjected to this examination. Hoping to reverse the trend towards social restratification based on Party bureaucratism, Mao sought to build a mass consensus on the future direction of the revolution. However, in the process of "freely mobilizing the masses," some social groups found that their interests called for a radical restructuring of the Chinese political system, while those of others lay in the status quo. As the Cultural Revolution (CR) unfolded, the masses and the elite further divided among themselves over the various issues: elite groupings took conservative or radical positions, and formed coalitions with corresponding sections of the masses. Consequently, the division between the radicals and the conservatives cut through both the elite and the masses and set in motion forces that gave the Cultural Revolution its distinctive character.

In the literature on the Cultural Revolution, two theoretical approaches stand out. One approach, influenced explicitly or implicitly by the model of "totalitarianism," conceives the Cultural Revolution as a power struggle within the elite (which had no real effect on the interests of the various social groups at the mass level).¹ By restricting the focus of research to elite behaviour, this approach fails to address itself to such crucial questions as why Mao mobilized the masses; how he mobilized them; why the Cultural Revolution lasted nearly two years, until September 1968, well after the official dismissal of Liu Shao-ch'i

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1. Most of the literature on the CR deals mainly with the conflict among the elite. For example, see Gene T. Hsiao, "The background and development of 'The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,'" *Asian Survey*, VII, No. 6 (June 1967), pp. 389-404; Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: the struggle to seize power," *The China Quarterly (CQ)*, No. 34 (1968), pp. 6-37; and Edward Rice, *Mao's Way* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

in August 1966; and why the Maoist elite further divided between, for instance, the Cultural Revolution Small Group (CRSG) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) (a split which culminated in Lin Piao's purge in 1971). Because it does not address such crucial questions, this approach ignores the historical and social complexity of the Cultural Revolution. Likewise, it fails to consider the significance of the Cultural Revolution for the subsequent direction of the Chinese political system in general, and the subsequent relationship between the elite and the masses in particular.

The other approach, theoretically more complicated than the first, conceives the basic issue in the Cultural Revolution as the clear-cut division between the elite and the masses, and thus views the movement in its proper historical and social context as a stage in the continuing Chinese revolution.² A rigorous application of and logical inference from this approach would take us beyond an examination of the divisions among the elite and lead us to focus our attention on the divisions among the masses over various political and socio-economic issues, including the issue of elite-mass relations itself. Such an investigation of the "horizontal" cleavage would require us to give proper weight to the impact of the "vertical" cleavage cutting through both the elite and the masses. As the Cultural Revolution unfolded along its unexpected course, it became clear that this complex relationship between the elite and the masses, as well as the sharp divisions among the masses themselves, were central dynamics of the Revolution.

On this assumption, that both vertical and horizontal cleavages (radical-conservative and elite-mass respectively) influenced the direction of the Cultural Revolution, I seek in this article to define the radicals of the Cultural Revolution in terms of their ideological underpinnings, political strength and posture towards various issues and their social characteristics. The wide but vague use of the term "radical" as an explanatory variable has led me to this examination of who the "radicals" were and how their social characteristics were related to their radical political behaviour. In the interests of economy, however, I shall focus this discussion on the radicalism of mass organizations, leaving elite radicalism for another occasion. I shall begin with an examination of the basic features of Cultural Revolution radicalism.

Radicalism Defined

Targets. In the Cultural Revolution, the basic difference between the radicals and the conservatives centred on who should be the main target of the movement. Generally, the radicals tended to concentrate their

2. For instance, see Tang Tsou's three articles, "Revolution, reintegration and crisis in Communist China," in Ho Ping-ti and Tang Tsou (eds.), *China in Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 277-347; "Western concepts and China's historical experience," *World Politics*, XXII, No. 4 (July 1969), pp. 655-91; and "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese political system," *CQ*, No. 38 (1969), pp. 63-91.

attention on the institutionalized power base in China, the Party organization, whereas the conservatives tended to personalize the targets by concentrating on individuals thus to limit the extent to which the attack on Party leaders spilt over to the Party organization itself. The conservatives also emphasized “monsters and freaks” – generally the intellectuals and the remnants of the bourgeois class – as the major targets, whereas the radicals directed their attention mainly to the “power holders taking the capitalist road within the Party.” Even in 1967 when the seizure of power from established leaders became irrefutable reality, the Kwangtung conservatives maintained that the main target of the Cultural Revolution was the “monsters and freaks.”³ These two different views were also reflected in the controversy over who constituted the “power holders.”

In order to clarify the conflict between the radicals and the conservatives over the identity of the power holders, I have collected data on 169 cadres whose official Party positions were known and who were criticized by either one faction (the conservatives or the radicals) or by both factions in Kwangtung province. These data are enumerated and analysed in Tables 1–8 in the text below.

Table 1:

Criticism of Cadres with Known Positions by One or by Both Factions

Criticized by Conservatives	Criticized by Radicals	Criticized by Both	Total
72	64	33	169

Source: I collected data on cadres from three levels – South-Central Regional Bureau, Kwangtung Provincial Party Committee and Canton Municipal Party Committee. My sources were the Kwangtung Red Guard newspapers collected by the Program on Contemporary China, University of Chicago.

Notes: ^a The fact that a particular cadre in the sample is criticized by one faction does not necessarily mean that he was supported by the other faction. But given the increasing conflict between the two factions over cadre issues, it would not be methodologically unreasonable to compare the characteristics of the groups criticized by each faction respectively. To avoid the fallacy of interpreting the unavailability of information on an individual as a denunciation by one faction, I have tried to define the category “criticized by one faction” very strictly. However, when I know that a person was an active member of a faction but was nevertheless denounced by his own group because of pressure from the Centre, I classified him as being criticized by one side only, disregarding his denunciation by his own faction. For example, K’o Feng was the most active member of the radical faction but, because of pressure from Chou En-lai, the radicals dropped their support of him. The time period covered ends in March 1968.

^b The reason for including the category “criticized by both factions” is that it might represent the official definition of “power holders,” and one can compare the characteristics of each cadre group criticized by one faction with those of the groups criticized by both factions.

3. The motto of the conservative organization was: “Were the T’i tung and Hung tung present, the monsters and freaks would cease to think of reversing the world.” *Jen-wu yii ssu-hsiang (Peoples and Ideas)*, 15 October 1968, pp. 30–32.

First, I calculated how many Party secretaries and members of standing committees were criticized by each faction:

Table 2

	Criticized by Conservatives	Criticized by Radicals	Criticized by Both
Secretaries and Standing Committee Members	3	18	15
Others	69	46	18

The conservatives denounced only three Party secretaries who cannot be identified as having been criticized by the radical faction (4.2 per cent of all those criticized by the conservatives), whereas the radicals criticized 18 secretaries (28 per cent of all those criticized by the radicals). Needless to say, Table 2 indicates that the radicals tended to attack the real locus of power in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), while the conservatives attacked cadres other than secretaries and members of standing committees. In fact, two of the three secretaries criticized by the conservatives appeared not to be real power holders.⁴

The contention that the conservatives concentrated their attack on low-ranking cadres while the radicals tended to attack high-ranking cadres is also substantiated in Table 3, which compares the number of persons criticized whose official positions were known to the number of those whose positions were unidentified.

Table 3

	Criticized by Conservatives	Criticized by Radicals	Criticized by Both
Positions Known	72	64	33
Positions Unknown	92	3	0
Total	164	67	33

Table 3 shows that the conservatives denounced 92 cadres whose positions were not identified, whereas there were only three such persons criticized by the radicals. If one assumes that the cadres whose positions were not identified were low-ranking, the data in Table 3 clearly reveal that the conservatives attacked more low-ranking cadres than the radicals. In fact, the conservatives charged that the radicals considered the "cadres at and below the department level to remain basic masses" and that "all 12th, 13th and 14th grade cadres belong to rebels."⁵

4. Two of the three high-ranking cadres criticized by the conservatives were Li Erh-chung, a member of the standing committee of the South-Central Bureau, and Po Hui-chi, a secretary of the Canton Municipal Party Committee. Both men appeared to be intellectuals rather than Party bureaucrats: Li was the director of the South-Central Branch of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Ho worked as a director of the Department of Higher Education in 1958 and was identified as a deputy director of the Propaganda Department of the South-Central Bureau.

5. *Chung-ta chan-pao* (Combat News of Chungshan University), 11 January 1968.

In the following table, I calculate how many chiefs and deputy chiefs of departments and bureaux were attacked by each faction. Standing committee members and Party secretaries are classified as chiefs.

Table 4

	Criticized by Conservatives	Criticized by Radicals	Criticized by Both	Total
Chiefs	23 (31.9%)	46 (71.9%)	24 (72.7%)	93
Deputy Chiefs	49 (68.1%)	18 (28.1%)	9 (27.3%)	76
Total	72	64	33	169

$X^2=27.02$
 $df=2$
 $p<.001$

Table 4 clearly indicates that the radicals tended to attack the chiefs, whereas the conservatives tended to attack deputy chiefs. Unlike in the schools or factories, where sometimes the chief is an expert and the deputy chief is a political leader, in the Party Committees the chief represents the formal organizational structure and the legitimacy of Party organization.

In the next table, I examine how the division between radicals and conservatives was related to attacks on cadres in political and functional fields. The "political" category includes Party secretaries at all levels (including secretaries of the Party factions in a given department), staff personnel (e.g. the chief of the secretariat) and cadres in political departments (e.g. the Political Department for Finance and Trade of the Canton Party Committee); others are classified as "functional."

Table 5

	Criticized by Conservatives	Criticized by Radicals	Criticized by Both	Total
Political	27 (37.5%)	38 (59.4%)	21 (63.6%)	86
Functional	45 (62.5%)	26 (40.6%)	12 (36.4%)	83
Total	72	64	33	

$X^2=9.2$
 $df=2$
 $p<.01$

Table 5 indicates that the radicals tended to attack cadres in the political field whereas the conservatives tended to attack cadres in the functional field. In a sense, this tendency is a continuation of the initial controversy among the students over the issue of "bourgeois academician" verses "power holders." The conservatives had maintained that those from bourgeois families were the main target of the Cultural Revolution, thus leaving the cadres with their real political power intact.

Besides the question of who was criticized by which side, I also attempted to examine why they were criticized. It is extremely difficult

to compile quantitative evidence on the types of criticism made by each side, although it is easy for a careful reader to grasp the qualitative differences between the criticisms of each faction. Among the cadres who were criticized by the conservatives, there were easily discernable sub-groups:

Table 6

Members of South-Central Liaison Hqs.	Signatories of 21 August Big Character Poster	Others
71 (43%)	61 (37%)	32 (20%)

Of the cadres criticized by the conservatives 43 per cent were identified as members of the "South-Central Liaison Headquarters," the "Cadre's Revolutionary Committee" or the "Red Garrison Command," three well-known radical cadre organizations in Kwangtung. 37 per cent of the cadres were identified as having signed the big character poster criticizing the PLA's handling of the armed conflict on 21 August 1967 and as having supported the radical faction.⁶ For only 20 per cent of those criticized by the conservatives was no organizational affiliation cited. In light of the fact that the criticism of the "South-Central Liaison Headquarters" centred on its anti-PLA activities,⁷ it can be concluded that the conservatives criticized cadres who failed to support the PLA. This is confirmed by the data in Table 7.

In drawing up the following table, I selected five factors that constituted major elements of the criticism by both factions. (1) Personal background, including class background, past affiliation with the Kuomintang and "historical problems." (2) A close relationship with leaders denounced by both sides or by one side. T'ao Chu and Wang Jen-chung were denounced by both, Lin Li-ming and Chao Lin-i were denounced by the radicals and Min I-fan was denounced by the conservatives. (3) "Provincialism" – the only major potential source of conflict in the Kwangtung Party leadership prior to the Cultural Revolution. Not surprisingly, those who were charged with being "provincialists" had revolted against the Party Committees at an early stage of the Cultural Revolution and supported the radicals. However, when the Centre officially denounced the "provincialists," the radicals dropped their support of them. (4) Anti-PLA activities. (5) A close connection with the "May 16 Group," the radical organization in Peking.

The figures in the following table represent the number of persons attacked by each faction according to types of criticism. If a person was

6. "Drag out for public showing the scoundrels who signed August 21 big poisonous weed," *Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP)*, No. 4320 (17 December 1968), p. 7.

7. *Kwangchow hung wei ping (Kwangtung Red Guards)*, No. 2 (28 August 1968).

criticized several times for the same reason, he is counted only once; if a person was criticized several times for different reasons, each type of criticism is counted.

Table 7

	Criticized by Conservatives	Criticized by Radicals
Personal Background	22	8
Personal Relationships	22	62
Provincialism	23	11
Anti-PLA	81	0
May 16 Group	23	0
Total	171	83

Table 7 illustrates the differences in the sort of charges that were made by the conservatives and the radicals. The conservatives based nearly half of their charges on "anti-PLA activities"; the rest were distributed equally among the four other types of criticism. On the other hand, the radicals concentrated to a considerable extent on "personal relationships." Also it is interesting to note that the radicals never denounced any cadre on the ground that he had engaged in anti-PLA activities or was connected with the "May 16 Group." In contrast to the radicals' charges, which were generally based on the single factor of personal relationships, the conservatives criticized many of the individual cadres for several different reasons, which were sometimes inconsistent. For instance, one cadre was charged with being both T'ao Chu's man and a provincialist.

While the radicals did not criticize any cadres for their actual behaviour in the Cultural Revolution, the conservatives made more than half their charges on that basis. The conservatives seemed to denounce cadres only when the latter revolted against the Party organization and broke organizational norms and inhibitions. It would seem that such denunciations constituted defensive measures taken by the conservatives in response to the political challenge put forward by the cadres they criticized. As for the radicals, they would obviously have denounced those cadres who supported the conservatives. Nevertheless, since it was the radicals who made the initial attacks, their selection of targets amongst the cadres was less influenced by the latter's subsequent behaviour in the Cultural Revolution than were the choices made by the conservatives, who emerged as a group at a later stage. Interestingly, however, the positions of the radicals and the conservatives were reversed on the issue of how to identify the "masses," for the definition of whom the conservatives relied on social factors such as class background, whereas the radicals emphasized behavioural factors such as performance in the Cultural Revolution and attitude towards the power holders.

Finally, on the question of what factors contributed to the revolt of

the radical cadres, I examined the position and function of 45 cadres identified as members of the "South-Central Liaison Headquarters," referred to above as the backbone cadre organization of the radical faction.

Table 8

	Chief	Deputy Chief
Political	4	14
Functional	5	20

Without comparison with either the characteristics of the conservative cadre organization or the distribution of all the cadres in the Kwangtung Party organs according to these four variables, the table itself does not completely define the characteristics of the radical cadres. However, in light of the fact that the characteristics of the members of the "South-Central Liaison Headquarters" coincided with the characteristics of the cadres criticized by the conservatives (see Tables 4 and 5), it is possible to argue that "deputy chief" and "functional" were factors closely related to the cadres' radicalism. Furthermore, it was the deputy chiefs who were in a position to carry out the Maoists' call to attack the Party organization, for although the deputy chiefs were part of the Party organization, they were less likely to be power holders and were therefore less tied to maintaining the structural legitimacy of that organization. Whatever their particular motivations, however, they revolted against the Party organization and thus became targets for attack by the conservative mass organization.

The preceding discussion points to the fact that the radicals in the Cultural Revolution found that their interests lay in attacking the legitimacy of the Party organization and in changing the status quo, while the conservatives tried to conform to the official policy of power seizure without upsetting the status quo.

Ideology: The Cultural Revolution as "Class Struggle." The Maoist leaders justified the Cultural Revolution on the basis of the need for "class struggle"; but the major victim turned out to be none other than the Party organization. Furthermore, although the relevance of any particular ideological pronouncement to actual political processes is open to question, both the radicals and the conservatives readily subscribed to the doctrine of class struggle. There were, however, subtle differences in the definition of class by each faction.⁸ The first point in dispute was whether class was to be defined only in economic terms. The second point was whether members of a class must have a subjective awareness of their identity. In other words: "Is a class a

8. This discussion of class is indebted to Tang Tsou for his emphasis on "differential distribution of power" as the central issue in the CR. See Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese political system."

class because thinking [self-awareness] makes it so, or is a class a class purely on objective grounds?"

In the context of the Cultural Revolution, the different views on these two ambiguous points in Marxism yielded different answers to the question of who should be the targets of the movement. If class is defined only economically, as many social scientists have done,⁹ the logical targets of the class struggle would be the remnants of the bourgeois class. But if the term refers also to various social "groupings" according to a "wide variety of standards,"¹⁰ the targets of the class struggle could well include the Party organization itself, the locus of political power in China. This second view of class allowed those without political power to attack the power holders, while invoking the doctrine of class struggle to justify their attack. If political consciousness were to be emphasized, moreover, children of bourgeois families could lay claim to "proletarian class consciousness" obtained through the study of Mao Tse-tung's thought and thus be participants in rather than objects of the Cultural Revolution.

Although the interpretation of class had immediate consequences for the Chinese masses, Mao's view on the issue was somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, he exalted the class struggle and "continuing revolution," defining the Cultural Revolution as a class struggle. On the other hand, while emphasizing class consciousness and its derivative notions of "politics in command" and ideological transformation, he failed to define class.¹¹ Despite the lack of clarity, it seems that Mao expanded the term to include political inequality.¹²

This interpretation of Mao's notion of class makes sense in view of the otherwise ironical fact that he raised the slogan of "never forget the class struggle" during the 10th Plenum in 1962, when the means of production were already completely socialized. Moreover, this interpretation is in accord with the historical experience of the CCP which had necessarily relied on the peasants as a motive force instead of on

9. For instance, Dahrendorf defines Marx's notion of class purely in economic terms. See Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959).

10. For this interpretation of class, see Bertell Ollman, "Marx's use of 'class,'" *American Journal of Sociology*, March 1968, pp. 573–80. According to Ollman, the central determinant of class is not necessarily economic position, but any kind of relative inequality if it is serious enough to create a permanent social cleavage in a given society.

11. Donald Munro deals with the problem of class consciousness and class origin from the perspective of the malleability of man. See Donald Munro, "The malleability of man in Chinese Marxism," *CQ*, No. 48 (1971), pp. 609–40.

12. Benjamin Schwartz, "A personal view of some thought of Mao Tse-tung," in Chalmers Johnson (ed.), *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973), pp. 352–77. Also, for a similar interpretation, see Frederic Wakeman, *History and Will, Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung's Thought* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1973) and John Starr, "Conceptual foundations of Mao Tse-tung's theory of continuous revolution," *Asian Survey*, XI, No. 6 (June 1971), pp. 610–28.

the virtually non-existent industrial proletariat.¹³ Following the CCP's rise to power, particularly during the process of agricultural collectivization, Mao learned that some peasants were vulnerable to a "tendency toward capitalism [individualism]." By 1964 Mao had coined the terms "old and new bourgeois and old and new rich peasants."¹⁴ Besides these official pronouncements which indicate his political interpretation of class, Mao showed increasing concern with the cleavage between the privileged and underprivileged in spite of failing to mention class background as even one of the five requirements for revolutionary successors.¹⁵ By 1965 Mao had classified the bureaucrats as a class.

The bureaucratic class is a class sharply opposed to the working class and the poor and the lower-middle peasants. These people have become or are in the process of becoming bourgeois elements sucking the blood of workers.¹⁶

During the Cultural Revolution, the Maoists flatly declared: "Class is not only an economic concept; more important, it is a political concept."¹⁷

Mao, as a charismatic leader with an egalitarian vision, could afford to interpret class in such a way that it could justify his attack on the bureaucratization of the Party. The interests of the Party organization lay, on the contrary, with a definition of class in strictly economic terms that would not raise the perplexing question of "differential distribution of power" in a socialist country. It was probably in this context that Liu Shao-ch'i in 1958 declared the end of class struggle, saying that the "question of who will win in the struggle between socialism and capitalism in our country has now been decided."¹⁸ If this interpretation is correct, there may have been some truth in the radicals' charge that Liu

13. For the controversy regarding the different interpretations of Marxism and Mao's rise to power in the CCP, see Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

14. "On Khrushchev's phony communism," in A. D. Barnett (ed.), *China After Mao* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 127–29.

15. Mao revealed his worry about the widening gap between the elite and the masses in his interview with Malraux: "The truth is that if the contradictions due to victory are less painful than the old ones, luckily they are almost as deep. Humanity left to its own devices does not necessarily re-establish capitalism, but it does re-establish inequality. The forces tending toward the creation of new classes are powerful. Khrushchev seemed to think that a revolution is done when a communist party seized power—as if it were merely a question of national liberation." See André Malraux, *Anti Memoir* (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1968), pp. 69–70. For Mao's five requirements, see *China News Analysis*, 16 October 1964, p. 3.

16. "Comment on Comrade Ch'en Cheng-jen's Report on stay at a selected spot," *Current Background (CB)*, No. 891 (8 October 1969), p. 49.

17. "The dictatorship of the proletariat and that renegade—China's Khrushchov," *Peking Review*, No. 40 (29 September 1967), p. 10.

18. *The Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), Vol. 1, p. 37.

had emphasized class background as a necessary condition in his formula – sometimes consisting of three and sometimes of four requirements – for revolutionary successors.¹⁹ In the Cultural Revolution, the radicals followed Mao's interpretation of class, thus turning their attacks onto the power holders. The conservatives followed the economic interpretation of class, thus attempting to turn the whole movement against the remnants of the bourgeoisie.

The Behaviour of the Radicals

With the above somewhat tentative definition of radicalism, I shall now try to establish the pattern of behaviour of the radicals by examining their responses to the various issues affected by these two different views of class (see the appendix, p. 683).

1. *Educational Reform and the Campaign Against the "Four Olds": The Domination of the Conservatives in the Summer of 1966.* Educational reform and the campaign against the "Four Olds" – old thinking, old habits, old culture and old ideology – were the dominant issues at the earliest stage of the Cultural Revolution (June, July and August 1966) when the Party organization still maintained its control over the movement.²⁰ The Party organization displayed a positive but limited response to these issues. As an initial response to the campaign against Wu Han and "bourgeois academic authorities," the school Party Committees initiated educational reform, which dealt mainly, however, with minor problems such as the reform of teaching materials and the allocation of more school hours to the study of Mao's thought.²¹ On 13 July, the Party organization decided to change completely the old entrance examination to institutions of higher learning, and to postpone the enrolment for 1966 by half a year. By mid-July, the Ministry of Education prepared its "Circular on entrance examination," at the order of Liu Shao-ch'i.²²

Five days after the official announcement of the educational reforms, the first open demand by some students for educational changes appeared in the *People's Daily* on 18 July. The students charged that the existing

19. *Chung-hsueh wen-ko pao* (*Middle School Cultural Revolution News*), No. 6 (1 April 1967). Donald Munro suggests that Liu strictly adhered to class origin in his "Later revised Ten Articles" of *Ssu-ch'ing*, whereas Ch'en Po-ta and Kuan Feng, members of the CRSG, emphasized the malleability of man through education even before the CR. See Munro, "The malleability of man."

20. One may argue that the Party had lost much of its direct control over the CR by August (at least after the 11th Plenum) of 1966. But in my opinion, the Party still exercised its influence over the CR through the students which it had mobilized.

21. *Hsin kang-yuan* (*Steel Institute News*), 3 June 1967.

22. *Jen-min jih-pao* (*People's Daily*) (*Jen-min*), 13 July 1966; "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: a record of major events," *Translations on Communist China* (TCC) (Washington, D.C.: Joint Publications Research Service), No. 420 (25 August 1967), p. 25.

educational system emphasized “academic achievements” and hence favoured students from bourgeois families. They demanded that more weight be given to “redness” in deciding admission and held the “bourgeois authorities” responsible for what they believed to be a wrong educational policy.²³ There was no reason for the Party organization to resist this demand, particularly at a time when Maoist leaders were beginning to press the Party for Cultural Revolution on a much larger scale.²⁴

The proletarian class (economically defined) found that its interests were in accord with the campaign against the “Four Olds,” which were mainly associated with the old feudal or bourgeois classes and not related to the Party organization in any way. The Party organization also realized that the campaign would not threaten its interests. In fact, there is good reason to believe that the Party used the “Four Olds” campaign to turn the thrust of the mass movement against harmless targets outside the Party. “Monsters and freaks” and “bourgeois authorities” were emphasized as if they were the only targets of the movement,²⁵ while student mobilization was restricted to the “five red categories.”

The selection of targets was made by the existing authorities and the decision-making structure of the Party organization and was based on the inner-Party regulations regarding the “management and evaluation

23. Instead of questioning the accountability of the Party for the criticized educational system, the students demanded that the Party’s authority in deciding who would be admitted into the schools be further strengthened. For instance, they said: “If [the Party] certainly wants to admit some students to the college, then [we] ask the Party itself to select [the students] directly from the high-school graduates. Everything of us belongs to the Party and people, and we will do whatever the Party instructs us to do without any discussion.” *Kuang-ming jih-pao* (*Kuang-ming Daily*), 18 June 1966. For the students’ criticism of the existing educational system, see also *News from Chinese Regional Radio Stations*, No. 162 (23 June 1966), pp. 14–15.

24. If this interpretation of the nature of the educational reforms is correct, then it is obvious that the students from bourgeois families were not in a position to participate in the movement. Though we do not have first-hand data on the radicals’ response to the issue, the response of the Cultural Revolution Small Group may well represent their view too. “Concerning the question of educational reform, the center is in the act of drawing up a scheme and for the time-being, the schools, instead of considering the question of educational reform, must seize power and dig out revisionism.” See “The wrong must be redressed,” *SCMP (Supplement) (S)*, No. 161 (17 July 1967), pp. 3–12.

25. Obviously, to limit the targets as narrowly as possible was in the interests of the Party organization which was always one step behind the Maoists in terms of targets: i.e. the Party organization moved to attack Wu Han’s academic position only when the Maoists began to attack his political errors and it attacked bourgeois authorities only when the Maoists began to attack “black gangs”; similarly, it moved to attack the “black gangs” only when the Maoists began to talk about the “power holders.” In the recent cultural campaigns the Peking regime has made two points clear: that the intellectuals *per se* are not the major targets and that the children of the high-ranking cadres are not going to be exempt from attack though they may not constitute the most important targets. See *New York Times*, 16 February 1974, and *Jen-min*, 29 January 1974.

of cadres,” which prohibited the intervention of the masses.²⁶ In selecting targets, the Party relied mainly on the criteria of “class background” and “historical problem,” and the cadres so selected tended to be lower ranking. In schools, most of the victims initially selected by the Party Committees and work teams for “struggle” by the students were teachers, many of whom came from bourgeois families.²⁷ The ironic result was that the masses rather than the Party organization bore the major brunt of the movement — a phenomenon that the Chinese aptly described as “aiming the spear downwards” (*mao-t'ou chih-hsia*) in contrast to “aiming the spear upwards” (*mao-t'ou chih-shang*).

During the work-team period, the Party organization actively mobilized members of the Party and the Communist Youth League, and students from the five red categories.²⁸ The children of cadres were particularly actively sought after as the most “reliable group.” In some schools, the work teams convened secret meetings of the children of cadres. In other schools, the work teams passed around among the children of cadres dossiers on students and teachers to determine their class origins.²⁹ The Cultural Revolution Small Group opposed this policy of restricting mobilization to groups selected on the basis of an economic definition of class. It emphasized political consciousness, taking the position that: “Whoever is revolutionary is to be relied upon. Nobody has made it a rule to rely on the Party or CYL branches. You do not know whether they are revolutionary or not revolutionary.”³⁰

When some students challenged the work teams on the ground that their actual operations deviated from Mao's thought, the Party organization changed the movement to the so-called “anti-interference” campaign designed to “sweep out all obstacles in the way of the Cultural Revolution” (that is to say, designed to consolidate the Party's control over the movement and to head off the intervention of the masses in the

26. *Chieh-fang pao* (Liberation News), March 1968.

27. Liu Shao-ch'i is reported to have said that “the primary task in promoting cultural revolution in middle schools is to examine the teachers and school staff members.” See “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: a record of major events,” *TCC*, No. 420, p. 21. Also for this point, see *Chieh-fang pao*, March 1968, *Pa-i feng pao* (August 1 Hurricane), March 1968, *Chung-ta hung-ch'i* (Red Flag of Chungshan University), 30 April 1967. For the official view, see *Kuang-ming jih-pao*, 7 April 1967.

28. “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” pp. 21 and 24. The five red categories refer to workers, middle peasants, cadres, armymen and martyrs.

29. *Hung-chün chan-pao* (Red Army Combat News), 8 March 1968.

30. “The wrong must be redressed,” pp. 3–12. When the conservative students from the five red categories argued that the revolt of the students with a bad family background, who were not very enthusiastic about the organized Party movement, but were enthusiastic about the CR, was “class revenge,” the Maoists replied: “Whatever their aim and origin, bold exposure of problems means response to the call for the Party and Chairman Mao. If the questionable person rises up and devotes himself to revolution, those whose origin is not good should be more than welcome to express problems and devote themselves to the revolution.”

leadership of the Party organization).³¹ Characterizing the Cultural Revolution as an “anti-rightist campaign,” the Party organization took the view that the criticism of the work teams actually represented a challenge by the bourgeois class to the proletarian class.³² This “anti-interference” campaign from 20 June to the middle of July 1966 further contributed to “aiming the spear downwards,” that is against low-ranking cadres, bourgeois authorities and bourgeois students. One month later, a Maoist cadre took a different view of the targets of criticism:

Who after all are the freaks and monsters and bourgeois authorities? Some Party committees accused professors of being freaks and monsters and bourgeois authorities. Some professors accused the Party committees of being bourgeois authorities. For the present, we should direct the spearhead of the movement against the Party committees.³³

The original groups of Red Guards who suddenly sprang to prominence around the 18 August mass rally and dominated the Cultural Revolution for the next two months appeared to be much the same groups that had been mobilized by the work teams.³⁴ They occupied leadership positions in the Cultural Revolution Preparatory Committees of the schools or in Red Guard organizations after the withdrawal of the work teams. Mem-

31. The “anti-interference campaign,” precipitated by the now famous “18 June incident” of Peking University, represented the Party organization’s attempt to maintain its control over the rising student movement by turning the whole CR on any students who criticized the way in which the work teams operated. For more detailed discussion, see Hong Yung Lee, “The Political Mobilization of the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels in the Cultural Revolution” (Chicago: University of Chicago Ph.D. Dissertation, 1973), pp. 83–89.

32. Li Hsueh-feng, the first secretary of the New Peking Party Committee reportedly said: “The backgrounds of anti-work teams are complicated: counterrevolutionaries, black gangs, conservative bourgeois authorities, their defenders and rightist students came out to seize the leadership power of the work teams, taking advantage of chaos.” See “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” p. 19. The campaign appeared to be a widespread official policy at that time. See Peking Geology Institute, *Tung-fang hung pao* (*East is Red News*), 14 October 1967; and Tsinghua University, *Ching-kang-shan* (*Ching-kang Mountain*), 1 January 1967.

33. “The wrong must be redressed,” pp. 3–12.

34. This point was admitted by the conservative as well as the radical Red Guards. The radicals denounced the initial groups of Red Guards as conservatives: “Generally speaking, the Red Guard organizations established earlier in the various schools followed the pattern of the old work teams and old Revolutionary Committees. Among them there are a handful of responsible persons who were deeply saturated with T’an’s characteristics and who implemented the bourgeois reactionary line.” See *Shou-tu hung-wei-ping chan-pao* (*Capital Red Guard Combat News*), 10 February 1967. The Red Guards themselves admitted this point. “Why? Why are we, the children of revolutionary cadres, revolutionary martyrs, those small generals who shook August, left behind by the Great January Revolution?” *Hsiang-chiang p’ing-lun* (*Hsiang-chiang Review*), February 1967. Besides these statements from the Red Guards there is ample evidence that the students who were mobilized by the work teams constituted the initial groups of Red Guards. For detailed discussion, see Lee, “The Political Mobilization of the Red Guards,” pp. 214–36.

bership to the Red Guards was so strictly limited to the five red categories that if a member was found to have a “rightist” or “bad element” in his family he was ousted from the group.³⁵

Under this strict rule of “class origin” (*ch’u sheng*), the advantage was given to the children of cadres. Liu Shao-ch’i’s daughter (Liu T’ao), Ho Lung’s son (Ho P’eng-fei), Li Ching-ch’uan’s daughter (Li Li-feng) and Liu Ning-i’s daughter (Liu Chü-fen) led the initial Red Guards of Tsinghua University’s Tsinghua Red Guard Headquarters, and Liu Shao-ch’i’s other daughter, Liu P’ing-p’ing, was the chairman of the Preparatory Committee of Peking Girls’ Middle School.³⁶ According to one Red Guard newspaper, positions in the Cultural Revolution Preparatory Committees were filled according to the father’s rank.³⁷ *Kuang-ming Daily* reported one extreme case in which all 21 members of a Preparatory Committee established on 18 June were the children of high-ranking officials or revolutionary cadres, none of whom came from worker-peasant backgrounds.³⁸

It was during this campaign that the initial groups of Red Guards surprised the world by such activities as changing street names, burning and destroying antiques, and forcing people in the street to change their clothes, shoes and hair-styles. Moreover, these initial groups of Red Guards directly attacked the “five black categories”³⁹ and so-called “social dregs” (*liu-mang*) for the purpose of strengthening “proletarian dictatorship”: handbills published by the Red Guards ordered that people in the five black categories be sent to labour camps, that those who had come from the rural areas (mainly contract workers and “educated youth” who had earlier been sent down to the rural areas) be sent back to the countryside,⁴⁰ and that the class backgrounds of incoming students be checked. They forced the people in the five black categories to carry signs on their chests designating their class backgrounds.⁴¹ Subsequently, the radicals bitterly denounced the activities of the original

35. Ch’u Ko, *Luan-shih hsün-yü* (*Travelling the Troubled World*) (Hong Kong: Tzu-kuo chou-kan, 1969), p. 5.

36. “Liu Shao-ch’i’s daughter writes to expose her father,” *CB*, No. 821 (16 March 1967), p. 25.

37. *Ping-tuan chan-pao* (*Combat News of Fighting Corps*), 27 April 1967; *Pei-ching p’ing-lun* (*Peking Review*), April 1967.

38. *Kuang-ming jih-pao*, 7 April 1967.

39. The five black categories refer to landlords, rightists, rich peasants, reactionaries and bad elements.

40. “Chin-chi hu-yueh” (“Urgent notice”) (handbill), 26 August 1966; “Tsui-hou t’ung tieh” (“Last notice”) (handbill), 23 August 1966.

41. “Order” in “Red Guard Handbills,” *SCMP(S)*, No. 157 (2 November 1966), pp. 28–31. Karnow reported that “seven kinds of blacks” were banned from riding buses, entering restaurants, attending the cinema, even strolling through the parks. Stanley Karnow, *Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 214. Also, an ex-Red Guard reported that the Peking railway station was crowded with people from the five black categories waiting for trains to the rural areas under the supervision of the Red Guards. See Ch’u Ko, *Luan-shih hsün-yü*, pp. 8–9.

groups of Red Guards. "They encircled and beat the revolutionary masses, and disturbed the civil order under the pretext of sweeping out the four olds and dragging out social dregs."⁴²

Later, these early groups of middle-school Red Guards, many of whom came from the elite schools, organized the United Action Committee, whose membership was restricted to the children of cadres above the 13th grade.⁴³ Given their class background, it is no surprise that these initial groups of Red Guards continued to lead the movement against the class enemy defined economically, while leaving the power holders intact.⁴⁴ However, their dominance did not last long: with the emergence of a new issue, the nature of which was in conflict with the interests of the children of cadres, the Red Guards turned out to be conservatives.

2. *The Work Teams and Class Origin: The Rise of the Radicals in Autumn 1966.* If educational reform and the campaign against the "Four Olds" gave the upper hand to the children of cadres, the issue of the work teams reversed this trend. On this issue the Cultural Revolution Small Group found common cause with the radicals, many of whom had been struggled by the work teams. By attacking the work teams, the Small Group could mobilize powerful social forces against the Party organization and so turn the Cultural Revolution against the power holders. By attacking the work teams, the radicals could prove not only that the work teams were wrong in making them the targets of the movement, but also that they themselves were "revolutionary rebels." The radicals now displayed a "daring to revolt spirit," insisting that attitude towards the work teams was a dividing line between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary.

42. *Ch'un lai (Spring Coming)*, 6 May 1967.

43. For the United Action Committee, see "What the commotion of the United Action Committee has explained," *SCMP(S)*, No. 183 (16 May 1967), pp. 14–24; *Chiao-kung chan-pao (Combat News of Educational Workers)*, 11 February 1967; and Peking Geology Institute, *Tung-fang hung pao*, 3 March 1967.

44. There is ample evidence that the initial Red Guards continued to attack the bourgeois class defined economically. For instance, in the Kwangtung Pearl River Film Studio the conservatives struggled 21 persons, only one of whom was a Party member and all of whom could be considered to be intellectuals, whereas the radicals concentrated their attack on 14 persons, 13 of whom were Party secretaries or standing committee members. See Wang Chao, *Kwangchow t'ien-ying-chieh te tsao-fan-che (The Rebels of the Kwangtung Pearl River Film Studio)* (Hong Kong: Chung-pao chou-kan, 1969), pp. 33–34 and 41–44. Also see *Hung-chün pao (Red Army News)*, 8 March 1968. Some members of the initial Red Guards cut the hair of teachers with bad class backgrounds so that they could be easily distinguished from the others. In another case the initial Red Guards stipulated that students with good family backgrounds should enter the class room through the front door, while students with bad family backgrounds should enter through the back door. See *Chung-hsueh wen-ko pao*, 2 February 1967. At one point an urgent notice was posted by Bethune Blood Donation Station declaring that the "seven bad elements" would not be allowed to donate blood, because their blood had lost revolutionary character. See *Current Scene*, Vol. V, No. 9 (31 May 1967), p. 2.

The initial groups of Red Guards found themselves in a dilemma between their group interest which required the protection of the work teams and official policy which attacked the work teams. Consequently, the Red Guards devised a tactic that criticized the work teams (with their prior consent) very briefly and turned the movement against the original targets such as the black gangs and the bourgeois authorities.⁴⁵ In some schools the initial Red Guards openly defied the official policy of criticizing the work teams, even in one case preparing a farewell party for them.⁴⁶

The real core of the work team issue was in fact who should be the main target of the Cultural Revolution. The Small Group and the radicals insisted on a thorough criticism of the work teams, which would inevitably trace their "bourgeois reactionary line" to the power holders in the Party organization. In contrast, the conservatives led by the children of cadres tried to avoid the issue of power holders, persisting in their view that the Cultural Revolution was only directed against the old bourgeois exploiting class and the "Four Olds." The radicals satirized the dilemma of the conservatives in the now changed context of the Cultural Revolution: "They [the conservatives] are afraid that the revolutionary masses will drag out old cadres" because "they do not want to make their parents into black gangs and do not want to become children of power holders taking the capitalist road in the Party."⁴⁷

The other issue that revealed the basic conflict between the conservatives and the radicals centred on their attitudes towards the theory of "natural redness." The conservative view was succinctly expressed in the phrase: "If the father is reactionary, his son is a bad egg." This slogan, together with the notion of the five red categories, laid down the basic ideological justification for the existence of the first groups of Red Guards and their programmes. If we look carefully at each component of the five red categories, the first two (workers, and poor and lower-middle peasants) are defined according to their class status; but the other three (children of cadres, of the army men and of revolutionary martyrs) are obviously defined according to their position of power rather than class status. Many from the first two groups stood outside the locus of political power, despite the proclaimed proletarian dictatorship. So the actual beneficiaries of the slogan and the idea of the five red categories were the children of cadres.

The radicals opposed the slogan from the beginning, denouncing it as the theory of natural redness, for it obviously excluded students outside the five red categories from the movement. This meant that these excluded social groups, which had some real grievances against the Party organization, could not be mobilized in a campaign against it. The Cultural Revolution Small Group immediately stated its opposition to

45. Peking Aviation Institute, *Hung-ch'i (Red Flag)*, 7 January 1967; Peking Geology Institute, *Tung-fang hung pao*, 24 October 1967.

46. *Tung-fang hung pao*, 24 October 1967.

47. *Chih pa ch'un lai pao (Only Report the [Coming] Spring)*, 22 March 1967.

the notion of natural redness expressed in the slogan. On 6 August, Chiang Ch'ing suggested that the phrase be changed to: "When parents are revolutionaries, the sons should be their successors, when parents are reactionaries, their children should rebel."⁴⁸ By changing the slogan in this way, the right to revolt both against the "Four Olds" and against the power holders in the Party could be granted to students from unfavourable class origins.

The debate involved several different interpretations of Mao's three criteria for class line: (1) "consider class background" (*ch'eng fen*), (2) "not solely class background," (3) "but emphasis on performance."⁴⁹ The Red Guard newspapers varied, according to the class origin of their publishers, in interpreting the *ch'eng fen* of an individual, especially in whether it referred to parental status, individual status or occupational role.⁵⁰ The conservatives, who came from good families, argued that *ch'eng fen* referred to class origin (*ch'u-sheng*), i.e. the class status of the parents.⁵¹ They also tended to think that the criteria of good class and good political performance were closely related. In contrast to this, the radicals insisted that *ch'eng fen* referred to individual status, which in their case was that of students, regardless of parental class origins.⁵² They also argued that, since even children of parents outside the five red categories were brought up in a socialist country and exposed to proletarian education, the connection between class origin and political performance was very weak.

The Cultural Revolution Small Group denounced the slogan as a self-protective distortion of Mao's class line by the Party organization, and it specifically demanded that the children of cadres relinquish their positions of leadership in the Red Guards. When they responded to this demand by replacing themselves with "those with the firmest class background," the Small Group enlarged the scope of its criticism to include not only the leadership of the Red Guards but the whole organization. Ch'en Po-ta warned them:

Among you Red Guards there are genuine Red Guards and revisionist Red Guards. . . . If you want to become Red Guards you must become genuine Red Guards of Mao's Thought and not revisionist ones following the bourgeois counterrevolutionary line. . . . The Red Guards following the counterrevolutionary revisionist line are spurious.⁵³

48. "A talk by Comrade Chiang Ch'ing to the Red Guard fighters on August 6, 1966," *CB*, No. 830 (26 June 1967), pp. 24–26.

49. *Chih pa ch'un lai pao*, 22 March 1967.

50. For the conservatives' view, see *Tung-feng pao* (East Wind News), 26 December 1967, and for the radicals' view, see *Chih pa ch'un lai pao*, 22 March 1967.

51. *Tung-feng pao*, 26 December 1967.

52. In one extreme case, the radicals attempted to distinguish *ch'eng-fen* from *chih-wu* (job description) in order to protect those who had served the KMT in the past but joined the radicals during the CR.

53. "Ch'en Po-ta's speech at political consultative auditorium," *TCC*, No. 394 (10 May 1967), pp. 9–13.

At the beginning of October 1966, the radicals challenged the supremacy of the Red Guards, who organized themselves to form the First Headquarters and the Second Headquarters, while the radicals established the Third Headquarters in Peking. The editorial in issue Number 13 (1966) of *Hung-ch'i* and Lin Piao's speech of 1 October both clearly defined the target of the Cultural Revolution as "the power holders taking the capitalist road within the Party."⁵⁴ The Military Affairs Commission on 5 October ordered the rehabilitation of students who had been branded as rightist in the initial stage of the Cultural Revolution.⁵⁵ Following these events, the Third Headquarters organized a large rally to denounce the power holders, in which they declared the rehabilitation of all students who had been left outside the movement.⁵⁶ The original groups of Red Guards disintegrated gradually in October, November and December 1966. The revolt in the First Headquarters in October and in the Second Headquarters in November replaced the children of cadres with radicals in the leadership, thus paving the way for the latter's seizure of power in January 1967.⁵⁷

3. *The January Power Seizure.* This period⁵⁸ saw the heyday of the radicals. As soon as the seizure of power became official policy, the Kwangtung radicals were instructed by the Cultural Revolution Small Group to proceed immediately to carry it out.⁵⁹ On 22 January, the radicals declared that power had been taken from the Kwangtung Provincial Party Committee. Nevertheless, the problems attendant on the "22 January power seizure" were so serious that even the Small Group which had instigated the action could not now openly support it.

First, the units participating in the power seizure were so few (only 10 mass organizations in Kwangtung) that it could not by any criteria be legitimized.⁶⁰ The error became more apparent when in February 1967 the official policy for power seizures changed from the "Paris

54. *Peking Review*, No. 41 (7 October 1966), pp. 15–18.

55. *CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966–1967* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), p. 89.

56. It was the first rally organized by the radical minority of students struggled by the Party Committee. See "Chiang Ch'un-chiao's speech to the revolutionary students from Fukien," *TCC*, No. 394 (10 May 1967), p. 26.

57. For the revolt in the First Headquarters, see *Hung-wei-ping*, 26 October and 8 November 1966. For the revolt in the Second Headquarters, see *Tung-fang hung* (*East is Red*), 6 December and 9 December 1966.

58. The description of the radicals' behaviour hereafter is mostly based on data from Kwangtung. The reason for this is that, because of the disintegration of the initial conservative Red Guards in Peking in December 1966, we do not have much data on the conflict there between the radicals and conservatives in 1967, whereas in Kwangtung the initial conservative Red Guards survived and challenged the radicals in 1967. Moreover, in Kwangtung the cleavage between the radicals and the conservatives was clear-cut. In my opinion the Kwangtung CR was typical of the nature of the movement in the regions.

59. *Kuang-chou hung-wei-ping* (*Kwangtung Red Guards*), 28 August 1968.

60. *Kuang-tung chan-pao* (*Kwangtung Combat News*), 22 February 1967.

Commune" to the "Revolutionary Committee" formula. Despite the change of official policy, the radicals persisted in defending the power seizure and organized themselves into the Kwangtung Provincial Provisional Joint Revolutionary Committee.⁶¹

Secondly, the 22 January power seizure was peaceful. When the radicals expressed their intention to seize power to Chao Tzu-yang, the first secretary of the Kwangtung Provincial Party Committee, he was all but ready to comply with the radicals' demands.⁶² Whatever the reason for the co-operation of the Party Committee, the peaceful transfer of power spoiled Mao's conception of what power seizure should entail. Thirdly, since one of the most important factors for successful power seizure was the availability of an alternative leadership among the Party Committee members, the radicals, as a minority without the support of cadres within the Party organization, had no choice but to rely on the former Party Committee in order to exercise power, once they had obtained it, as effectively as possible. Consequently all the members of the Party Committee, including Chao Tzu-yang, continued to perform their functions, though under the supervision of the radicals.⁶³ Thus, the only change made by the power seizure was that "one additional procedure [approval by the Red Guards of Party Committee actions] is required."⁶⁴

It was over this ill-prepared and poorly executed manoeuvre that a heated controversy emerged, which was eventually to split the Kwangtung mass organizations into two factions. The first consisted of conservatives who opposed the power seizure because they had not taken part in it and did not share political ascendancy afterwards. The second was composed of radicals who supported it because they had staged it and acquired authority as a result of it.

4. *The Involvement of the PLA.* As soon as the PLA was ordered into action in the Cultural Revolution, and the January Power Seizure gave way to a more moderate policy, the radicals ran into trouble. Several reasons may account for the PLA's opposition to the radicals.

First, the PLA was under pressure from the Centre to carry out conflicting tasks: maintaining law and order and safeguarding production, while at the same time supporting the Left in the power seizures. In discharging these conflicting duties, it tended to emphasize the safeguarding of production. To do this it relied on both the conservative workers, who were the "backbone of production," and the Party cadres at various levels. Secondly, the PLA's suppression of radicals within the army itself and its prohibition of their exchange of experiences with civilian radical organizations angered the latter, who derived their strength from the

61. "Comment on 'January 22 Power Seizure Struggle,'" *SCMP*, No. 3921 (18 April 1967), pp. 9–17.

62. *Hung-se pao tung (Red Riot)*, 27 February 1967.

63. Chao Tzu-yang was suspended from the post in March 1967. See "Important activities of political pick pocket Chang Ken-sheng," *SCMP*, No. 4126 (27 February 1968), pp. 1–13.

64. *Kuang-chou hung-wei-ping*, 10 February 1967.

radical coalitions that cut across functional lines (*hsi-t'ung*).⁶⁵ Thirdly, the conflict between the PLA and the Small Group was extended to a struggle between the PLA and the Kwangtung radicals. It appeared that the 8 February raid on the PLA by the radicals was made at either the instigation, or at least acquiescence, of the Small Group.⁶⁶

Fourthly, shortly after the PLA was ordered to intervene in the Cultural Revolution, there was a policy shift towards moderation, later to be called the "February Adverse Current." During this period the Military Affairs Commission disbanded radical organizations like the Red Flag Army and Hsiang Chiang Feng Lai of Hunan and officially approved the suppression of the radicals by local military commanders.⁶⁷ Fifthly, the class background of the radicals irritated the PLA. Besides the obvious fact that the PLA constituted one component of the five red categories, many children of Kwangtung PLA officers were active in the leadership of the Ism Red Guards (the Kwangtung counterpart of Peking's United Action Committee).⁶⁸

When the focus of power shifted to the Military Control Commission, it reorganized the conservative forces. On 26 February, the Kwangtung Provincial Production Headquarters, drawn exclusively from conservative organizations and intended to "direct the province's industrial and

65. For the Military Affairs Commission's order banning the exchange of experiences between the PLA units and civilian radicals, see "Notification by the Military Commission of the Central Committee," *Selections from Chinese Mainland Magazines (SCMM) Supplement (S)*, No. 17 (15 January 1968), p. 42. Under this order, the Kwangtung PLA disbanded the *chien chün feng*, the radical organization of the PLA.

66. A Red Guard newspaper revealed that when the Kwangtung radicals asked Ch'en Po-ta: "We want to seize military power. Is it possible?" Ch'en said: "Welcome." *T'i-yü chan-pao (Physical Science Combat News)*, 18 March 1968.

67. *Tung-fang hung*, 11 February 1967. The Military Affairs Commission (MAC) endorsed the suppression of the radicals by the Fukien PLA. See *The Collection of Important Documents of the Chinese Communist Cultural Revolution* (Taipei: Studies on Chinese Communism, 1973), p. 67. The Centre (*Chung-kung chung-yang*) criticized the Fukien PLA (*ibid.* p. 156) and finally the Fukien PLA underwent a self-criticism, admitting that it was wrong to disband the radical organization in April 1968 (*ibid.* p. 159).

68. For the list of children of PLA leaders active in the Ism Red Guards, see *Hsin nan-fang (New South)*, 28 July 1967, and "Who led the Ism Guards astray?" *Union Research Service (URS)*, Vol. 48, No. 24 (23 September 1967), pp. 337–50. In addition to these facts, there are various indications that the children of cadres were active in conservative organizations. For instance, the MAC warned the PLA leaders to supervise their children properly. "Order of the Military Affairs Commission of the Central Committee," *SCMM(S)*, No. 17 (15 January 1968), pp. 34–35. Chiang Ch'ing was compelled to explain the CRSG's view on class backgrounds to the PLA leaders. See "To make a new contribution for the people," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. VI, No. 10 (July 1970), pp. 82–91. Also, after the Wuhan incident, Lin Piao specifically warned the PLA leaders not to take class background as a criterion for judging the revolutionary and conservative. *Lin Piao chuan-chih (Special Collection on Lin Piao)* (Hong Kong: Tzu Lien, 1970), pp. 106–107.

agricultural production during the revolutionary period," was officially inaugurated.⁶⁹ The conservatives were thus unified under that umbrella-type organization and the radicals under the Kwangtung Provincial Provisional Joint Revolutionary Committee. In addition to the conservative workers, the PLA eagerly mobilized the cadres, by organizing "three-level cadre-conferences" and actively encouraging the cadres to get rid of "fearing, complaining, shrinking and pushing aside responsibility."⁷⁰

Not only did the PLA assist the renewed mobilization of the conservatives, but it also actively suppressed the radicals, disbanding two nuclear organizations of radical workers (the 1 August Combat Corps and the East is Red of Kwangtung Pearl Film Studio) on the ground that both were composed of "class enemies."⁷¹ At the school level, the PLA covertly suppressed the Red Flag faction and supported the East Wind faction.⁷² Furthermore, the PLA openly and categorically denounced the radical cadres who had participated in the January power seizure.⁷³

The radicals, who later labelled this period of 1967 as the "Black March," demanded the rehabilitation of the two disbanded organizations. The conservatives opposed their rehabilitation, citing March 1967 as the time when the "East wind prevails over the West wind."⁷⁴ The radicals' demand for the rehabilitation of the two groups worsened their already tense relationship with the PLA, creating an explosive atmosphere in the summer of 1967. After the Wuhan incident, the radicals readily responded to the slogan, "Drag out a handful of power holders in the Army." They organized the Canton Garrison Headquarters, which was intended to take over the authority of the Kwangtung Military Control Commission.⁷⁵

69. *News Items from Chinese Provincial Radio Stations*, No. 197 (9 March 1967), pp. M1-M22.

70. *Ibid.*

71. "The counterrevolutionary crimes of the 'August 1 Fighting Corps,'" *SCMP*, No. 3905 (23 March 1967). The MAC order reads: "They openly agitated all those who have been criticized to rise together to seize power and reverse the verdict." "They also enlisted into their organization the landlord, rich peasant, counterrevolutionary, bad element and rightist . . . with vain attempt at counterrevolutionary restoration. . . ." ". . . in places where they had power, they spread the words that they would strike down all Party members, CYL members and activists in studying Chairman Mao's work and openly changed the verdict on the puppet army officers and five categories elements."

72. Gordon A. Bennett and Ronald M. Montaperto, *Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai* (New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 166-80; "Who led the Ism Guards astray?"

73. *China News Summary*, 16 March 1967.

74. "Ten major differences," *URS*, Vol. 50, Nos. 11 and 12 (2 February 1968), pp. 166-80.

75. The leaders of the Red Garrison Command reportedly said: "At present, the Red Garrison Command will replace the Bureau of Public Security and in future will replace the Military Control Commission." *San-chün lien-wei chan-pao* (*Combat News of Army Three Branches Joint Committee*), 13 September 1968. For the radicals' response to the slogan, see also *Chung-ta hung-ch'i*, 7 August 1967.

5. *The Issues of Educational Reform and Rehabilitation.* The re-emphasis on the issue of educational reform was a part of the retrenchment policy initiated in September 1967, and paralleled the shift in focus from power seizure to "ideological transformation," the latter being the trademark of the PLA.⁷⁶ When the issue of educational reform became of primary importance, the radicals found themselves in an awkward position and the conservatives again gained the upper hand. As they had done in the first stage of the Cultural Revolution, the conservatives responded enthusiastically to the issue of educational reform by widely publicizing that students from the five red categories had been discriminated against by the old system.⁷⁷ On one hand, again attributing the responsibility for discrimination to the teachers, they insisted that even middle-school teachers belonged to the category of bourgeois authorities. On the other hand, they minimized the responsibility of the power holders for the mistaken educational line:

The major mistake in our leadership was the policy of surrendering and conceding to the bourgeois intellectuals, allowing them to control the authority in functional affairs [in general] and the big power in schools [in particular].⁷⁸

The radicals initially resisted the renewed movement for educational reform on the ground that "reopening class suppresses revolution."⁷⁹ When the educational reform became firmly established official policy, the radicals interpreted it in their own way to correspond with their interests. First, they insisted on combining the educational reform with "struggle, criticism, and reform of each unit," so that they could continue the attack on the power holders.⁸⁰ Secondly, they considered criticism of the elite schools to be the major task of educational reform.⁸¹ Thirdly, they demanded as a precondition of successful educational reform a "thorough liberation" of the teachers, who had been stigmatized as "rightists" by the Party organization at the first stage of the Cultural Revolution.⁸² Fourthly, and most importantly, the radicals regarded the power holders as responsible for the wrong educational policy, and minimized the responsibility of the bourgeois authorities on the ground that the power holders, by imposing on the intellectuals the

76. For the official order for educational reform and the "reopening of class," see *The Collection of Important Documents of the Chinese Communist Cultural Revolution*, p. 125.

77. *Chiao-yü hao chiao (Educational Bugle)*, December 1967. For the conservatives' response to the educational reform, see *Hsiao ping (Small Soldier)*, 9 November and 24 December 1967.

78. *Hung-ch'i p'ing-lun (Red Flag Review)* and *Kang pa-i chan-pao (Steel August 1 Combat News)* (combined issue), February 1968.

79. *Hsiao ping*, 9 and 24 December 1967.

80. *Kang pa-i chan-pao*, January 1968.

81. *Pa-i feng pao*, January and March 1968, *Kuang-ya* 8. 31, March 1968, *T'iao chan (Challenge)*, March 1968.

82. *Hung-ch'i p'ing-lun* and *Kang pa-i chan-pao* (combined issue), February 1968.

principle of “follow me and live, oppose me and die,” actually left them no alternative but to obey.⁸³ Some radicals were more straightforward in defending intellectuals: “Even some teachers from the old society also belong to the masses,” and “the teachers who have not reformed the old bourgeois world view are still revolutionary teachers.”⁸⁴

In the school Party Committees, the radicals directed their attack against high-ranking officials. In one report on “power holders,” the radicals opposed high-ranking cadres: five out of seven were secretaries or principals, one was a deputy secretary and one was a vice-principal. On the other hand those who were approved by the radicals included only one secretary, one deputy secretary and three low-ranking cadres.⁸⁵ In contrast to the radicals’ stand, the conservatives concentrated their attack on professors and teachers even in the later stage of the Cultural Revolution, leaving members of the Party Committee alone. For example, the conservatives attacked a second deputy-secretary and eight professors as “backstage bosses” of the Red Flag group of Chungshan University.⁸⁶

In the schools, the conflict between power holders (“reds”) and bourgeois authorities (“experts”), wherein each one passed the buck to the other, was aggravated by several factors. First, prior to the Cultural Revolution the reds and experts had been in the process of assimilation. Secondly, as I have noted above, to protect themselves the power holders pre-empted Mao’s Cultural Revolution by purging the bourgeois authorities, an action which was later officially denounced as a “bourgeois reactionary line.” Thirdly, the educational reform which the Party had originally emphasized and which the radicals downgraded, re-emerged after one turbulent year with official sanction as a crucial feature of the Cultural Revolution, thus providing each side with a partial justification of its position.

Related to the conflict between the power holders and bourgeois authorities was the controversy over “17 years” versus “50 days of work teams and white terror” which, in simple terms, debated whether the personal record over the past 17 years should be stressed in evaluating the performance of a cadre. The power holders tended to have a good performance record for the 17 years and a bad record for the 50 days. The bourgeois authorities tended to have good records for the 50 days – mainly because they were the object of the Party’s suppression – and bad records for the “17 years” – largely because they had been critical of the Party and of official policies prior to the Cultural Revolution. Needless to say, the radicals emphasized the importance of 50 days, whereas the conservatives stressed that of 17 years, denouncing the

83. *Ibid.*

84. *Hung-ch’i p’ing-lun*, 1 January 1968.

85. *Hung-se tsao-fan-che (Red Rebel)*, June 1968.

86. “Another batch of high-ranking black advisors including Wu Ch’uan-ping and Ch’en Chia-pao is thoroughly finished,” *SCMP*. No. 4340 (17 January 1969), pp. 13–16.

bourgeois class for exploiting the mistakes of 50 days to reverse the achievements of the CCP over the past 17 years.⁸⁷

These two different views were again reflected in the controversy over the rehabilitation of the victims of the 50 days. The official policy was that only those who had been wrongly branded as “rightists” by the power holders should be rehabilitated. The radicals tended to expand the categories of those to be rehabilitated to include even those persons disciplined before the Cultural Revolution.⁸⁸ The conservatives tended to resist the rehabilitation policy, denouncing it as “class revenge” against the “proletarian dictatorship.”⁸⁹ The radicals’ emphasis on rehabilitation as a central issue was supported by the Cultural Revolution Small Group. Ch’en Po-ta is reported to have said: “Without rehabilitation, the masses still would not dare to rise, to revolt against the power holders taking the capitalist road, and cannot lead the Cultural Revolution to the end.”⁹⁰ With the support of the Small Group, the Kwangtung radicals managed to obtain from the Kwangtung Military Control Commission an order to rehabilitate those who, because of their challenge to the Party Committees, their class backgrounds or “historical problems,” had been branded as “three antis” or rightists.⁹¹ But the radicals were well aware that unless they had political power in their hands, the mere issue of instructions by the Kwangtung Military Control Commission under pressure from the Centre would not be effective.

6. *The Formation of Kwangtung Revolutionary Committee.* After the Wuhan incident, the Centre adopted a strategy aimed at solving the Kwangtung problem by means of direct negotiations between the two factions under the guidance of Chou En-lai.⁹² Chou’s approach included three crucial points. One was to use the PLA, following its self-criticism, as a main instrument in bringing about a “great alliance” among the

87. For the radicals’ view on this issue, see *Kang pa-i chan-pao*, February 1968; *Ko-ming wen-i chan-pao* (*Combat News of Revolutionary Literature*), 15 May 1967; and for the conservatives’ view, *Wen-i hung-ch’i* (*Red Flag of Literature*), 15 April 1967.

88. For instance, the radicals wanted to rehabilitate those who were disciplined in the “anti-rightist campaign” of 1957 and in Ssu-ch’ing, those who were disciplined by the Party organization for various reasons such as for being “provincialists,” and those who were correctly branded as “monsters and freaks” by the Party Committees at the first stage of the CR.

89. Among the 47 newspapers selected as samples from each faction (“East Wind” and “Red Flag”) I found 17 articles dealing with rehabilitation in the newspapers published by the Red Flag, but none in the newspapers published by the East Wind.

90. *Chieh-fang pao*, March 1968.

91. For the order for the rehabilitation by the Kwangtung Military Control Commission, see *SCMP*, No. 4151 (2 August 1968), p. 6 and for the complaints of the radicals, see *SCMP*, No. 4119 (5 February 1968), pp. 1–5.

92. Though Chou En-lai imposed the official policy which favoured the conservatives, his personal sympathy seemed to lie with the radicals rather than with the conservatives who had less direct contact with the central leaders. He arranged the ratio of representatives of the factions in favour of the Red Flag,

mass organizations.⁹³ The major task of the PLA was redefined so that "supporting the left" was extended to "supporting the left but not a particular faction." Obviously, the slogan meant that support should be given to any organization that was willing to co-operate in the formation of the Revolutionary Committee.⁹⁴ The second point of Chou's strategy was to grant *de facto* recognition to both radicals and conservatives as mass organizations entitled to participation in the Revolutionary Committee.⁹⁵ Thirdly, Chou imposed three PLA leaders (Huang Yung-sheng, Ch'en Yu and Kung Shih-ch'uan) and two cadres (Wang Shou-tao and Ch'en Teh) on the Preparatory Revolutionary Committee to direct it.⁹⁶

This strategy, reflecting the changed mood of the Peking leadership, was bound to hurt the radicals, who had derived their strength and legitimacy from the official line of advocating "power seizure." Now the radicals had to share power not only with the PLA, which they had previously attacked, but also with the conservatives; moreover, the cadres imposed on the Committee by Chou were men whom the radicals had also previously criticized. Not surprisingly, the radicals were reluctant to follow the official policy. Their hesitance provided the PLA and the conservatives with a good excuse to attack the radicals, and in so doing to cement their ties with one another.⁹⁷

When the Kwangtung Revolutionary Committee was established in February 1968, the radicals found themselves overwhelmed by the conservatives and the PLA: of 39 positions on the standing committee, the PLA occupied nine (23 per cent), the cadres, 10 (26 per cent) and mass organization leaders, 18 (46 per cent). In the distribution of the leaders of mass organizations and cadres, an appropriate balance was maintained between conservatives and radicals. Of 18 representatives of mass organizations, eight were definitely members of the Red Flag faction and seven of the East Wind faction.⁹⁸ The other three are thought to have belonged to a pro-East Wind faction.

Conservatives were even more dominant in sub-provincial level Revolutionary Committees because their organization was carried out under the sole leadership of the Kwangtung Revolutionary Committee, without the interference of Peking. The Canton Municipal Revolutionary Committee was composed of 12 military leaders, 11 cadres and 10 leaders of mass

which he allowed to sign its name before the East Wind in the negotiated agreement, and sent his personal investigation teams to observe the implementation of the negotiated terms. Later it was the East Wind that attacked these investigation teams and Chou En-lai himself.

93. For the self-criticism of the Kwangtung PLA, see Hai Feng, *A Brief Account of the Cultural Revolution of Kwangtung* (Hong Kong: Yu Lien Yen Chiu, 1971), pp. 241–44.

94. Bennett and Montaperto, *Red Guard*, pp. 167–80.

95. Hai Feng, *A Brief Account of the Cultural Revolution of Kwangtung*, p. 350.

96. *Ibid.* pp. 296–97.

97. Bennett and Montaperto, *Red Guard*, p. 208.

98. This figure is drawn from the various Red Guard newspapers.

organizations. Eight of the 11 cadres were identified as pro-East Wind with only two definitely known to be pro-Red Flag.⁹⁹ Through the legitimate exercise of its power, the Canton Municipal Revolutionary Committee also created conservative-dominated Revolutionary Committees at the school level, excluding radicals from membership. Another extreme case of conservative domination was the organization of the Workers' Inspection Teams,¹⁰⁰ in which most of the working-staff positions were taken by pro-conservative cadres.¹⁰¹ Hence, the radicals had little choice but to continue their campaign against the Revolutionary Committees, thereby providing the PLA with further excuse for suppressing them.¹⁰²

As the Cultural Revolution approached its end, the political situation became even more favourable to the conservatives. In addition to educational reform and the campaign of "struggling against selfishness and criticizing revisionism" which were both to the advantage of the conservatives, they and the PLA now institutionalized their power through the Revolutionary Committees and, more importantly, there was official indication that the campaign of "purifying class rank" would soon be launched. All these developments prompted the conservatives to reassert again their view of class defined economically although they did not do so in the guise of a simple slogan such as "the theory of natural redness," which had been subjected to a year of struggle and official denunciation. The conservatives now conceded that the radicals had displayed a rebel spirit in attacking the power holders, but now it was called a petty bourgeois rather than a proletarian one.

When they were suppressed, they possessed a certain amount of rebel spirit (*fan-k'ang hsing*) in order to liberate themselves and objectively there was a certain amount of revolutionary spirit. Nevertheless, they revolted out of private interest (even from the interest of their own class). They started from the interest of the individual or his own faction (even from the standpoint of the reactionary class); they observed the situations, estimated the gain and loss, and decided shrewdly.¹⁰³

In the eyes of the radicals, the conservatives were surely reviving the "reactionary theory of natural redness" in order to suppress the real rebels, to reverse the verdict on the power holders and to protect the interests of "privileged students" and the "workers' aristocracy." While the conservatives attacked the radicals for their "complicated and im-

99. This figure is based on the list of standing committee members given in Hai Feng, *A Brief Account of the Cultural Revolution of Kwangtung*, p. 350.

100. *Hung-se tsao-fan-che*, January 1968; *Kuang-chou kung-jen* (*Kwangtung Workers*), No. 34, in *SCMP*, No. 4208 (28 June 1968), p. 13.

101. *Ibid.*

102. The radicals' attack on the conservative forces was implicit. For example, they argued that "most dangerous enemies at present are not those dogs in the water but those dogs who have not fallen into the water and who are still holding power and biting people ..." and that "the old order and the old system which were smashed in the movement have been revived." *SCMM*, No. 626 (9 September 1968), pp. 13–23.

103. *Hsiao-ping*, 9 December 1967.

pure" class background, the radicals concentrated on the conservatives' close connection with the power holders.

The general faction [conservatives] is a power-holder sponsored organization formed with Kuang T'an's support on the momentum of the black March wind, by the conservative and right wing forces which collapsed in the January storm. This is the social foundation of the handful of capitalist factions in the Party and Army and the bourgeois reactionary line is its political line. It serves as the able henchman of the handful of capitalist factions in the Party and the Army against the revolutionaries and the great cultural revolution as cannon fodder of Kuang T'an's military coup.¹⁰⁴

7. *The Campaign against the "Four Rightist Trends."* The radicals did not wait long to launch their last attack on the conservatives and the PLA, though it was short-lived and unsuccessful. In April 1968, after the purge of Yang Ch'eng-wu, the Cultural Revolution Small Group reasserted its radical ideology, and thus provided the radicals with new ammunition with which to attack the conservative forces. On 15 March 1968, Chiang Ch'ing had issued a warning that the major danger of the Cultural Revolution at that moment was the "four rightist trends": rightist reversal of the verdicts (presumably those made by the radicals on the power holders), rightist separatism, rightist capitulationism (presumably to the conservative forces), and rightist opportunism.¹⁰⁵ It was a warning surely directed against the conservative forces.

Another component of radical ideology was a new interpretation of factionalism first advanced by the joint editorial of the *People's Daily* and *Liberation Army Daily* on 20 April 1968. The gist of the argument was that factionalism, if it encourages proletarian headquarters, could be a good thing and should not be condemned. Chiang Ch'ing enthusiastically elaborated the meaning of this new idea, arguing that the attack on "factionalism" had been exploited by the "power holders, monsters and freaks."¹⁰⁶ Undoubtedly, this criticism was directed against the PLA which had suppressed the radicals for their refusal to compromise with the conservatives.

Paralleling the reinterpretation of factionalism and the campaign against the "four rightist trends," the Small Group re-emphasized political performance as a major determinant of "class." *Red Flag*, in its first issue after resuming publication, carried an article which emphasized that anyone who stood on the side of Mao's line was "a proletarian revolutionary" and that anyone who failed to do so was a "bourgeois

104. "Whither, the general faction?" *TCC*, No. 430 (16 November 1967), pp. 1-6.

105. "Central leaders on opposition to rightist deviation," *SCMP*, No. 4187 (28 May 1968), pp. 1-4.

106. *China News Summary*, No. 215 (11 April 1968), pp. 4-7. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao also said: "It is a mistake to discuss only alliance and not the question of right and wrong. A mistake is a mistake, and a conservative organization is a conservative organization." *SCMP*, No. 4220 (18 July 1968), p. 4.

reactionary," regardless of his actual class origin. "If the people coming from labouring families are not armed with Mao's thought, they cannot reflect the basic interest of the labouring people, and will likely violate Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line."¹⁰⁷ The article again legitimized the rebellion of the radicals, many of whom had bad class backgrounds and for that reason were under attack by the PLA and the conservatives.

Encouraged by the radicalization at the Centre, the Kwangtung radicals launched their last attacks on the conservatives and the PLA, both now entrenched in the Revolutionary Committees. The PLA and the conservatives strenuously resisted the new campaign.¹⁰⁸ Instead of heeding the warning of the Small Group, they continued their attack on the radicals, publishing much information on how the latter, as a part of their "sinister scheme" to seize the power from the "proletarian class," had conspired to attack the PLA and Revolutionary Committees. The radicals for their part published copious information on how the PLA and the conservatives had suppressed them under the slogan of "encirclement and eradication of factionalism" and "purification of class ranks." The confrontation between the two sides developed again into a widespread armed struggle in May and June 1968.

Despite the desperate effort of the radicals, the last radical phase of the Cultural Revolution came to an end when the Centre strengthened the authority of the PLA by granting it the right to disband and to take "self-defensive measures" against any mass organization that defied the authority of the PLA.¹⁰⁹ Soon, the leaders of the Kwangtung radicals such as Wu Chuan-ping (leader of the Chung-ta hung-ch'i) and Mou Ching-wei (leader of the 1 August Combat Corps) were subjected to mass criticism.¹¹⁰ Thus, the hopes of the radicals were completely shattered, while the conservatives and the PLA consolidated their domination unchallenged.

The Social Characteristics of the Student Radicals

In sum, the radicals interpreted class politically so that they could concentrate their attack on the Party organization itself; thus they displayed a strong desire to seize political power and maintained close ties with the Cultural Revolution Small Group. Are there any discernable

107. *China News Summary*, No. 219 (9 May 1968), pp. 1-8; No. 220 (16 May 1968), pp. 1-5.

108. In order to compare the response of each faction to the radical call of the CRSG, I have examined 21 Red Guard newspapers from the East Wind and 18 newspapers from the Red Flag published after April 1968. The Red Flag carried 12 articles, whereas the East Wind did not carry even one article in response to the campaign against the "four rightist trends."

109. *The Collection of Important Documents of the Chinese Communist Cultural Revolution*, pp. 77-82.

110. For Wu, see *Chung-ta chan-pao*, 4 August 1968. For Mou, see *Kuang-chou hung-tai-hui* (Kwangtung Red Guard Congress), 11 August 1968, and *Chan chung-nan* (Combat South), No. 23 (August 1968).

social groups that would be expected to behave in this way because of their position in society?

Obviously, students from bourgeois families would have done so. Although this assertion is not based on a rigorous analysis of the social backgrounds of the members of any radical organization, it does rest on ample circumstantial evidence. For obvious political reasons, the radicals and the Small Group were not willing to admit directly that many radicals came from bourgeois families. For instance, when Ch'en Po-ta was asked how to purify the class ranks, he bluntly replied: "You don't have to accept only the very pure. In clean water there are not big fish [big revolutionaries]." ¹¹¹ On another occasion, when he was asked why there were so many radicals with bourgeois backgrounds, he simply refused to answer the question. ¹¹² On the other hand, criticism of the radicals by the conservatives always hinted at the "impure and complicated" class backgrounds of radicals and characterized their opponents' radicalism as "petty bourgeois revolutionary spirit."

At first glance it seems paradoxical that the students from the bourgeois families were radicals, particularly in light of the fact that Mao consistently charged that the Chinese educational system had favoured the students from bourgeois families. Nevertheless, this apparent irony disappears if one examines the actual social position of the students with bourgeois backgrounds in the broad context of Chinese society in general and of the Cultural Revolution in particular. First, in comparison with such fully radical issues as power seizure, educational reform *per se* was a moderate and secondary issue. As I noted, the conservative students attempted to define the Cultural Revolution as basically a "revolution in the educational field," whereas the radical students tended to sidetrack that problem. Secondly, the Party organization's defensive manoeuvre of turning the Cultural Revolution against the economically defined "bourgeois class" further antagonized the "bourgeois" students, thus contributing to their radicalism. Thirdly, a close examination of educational policy prior to the Cultural Revolution reveals that it was not only students from bourgeois families but also the children of cadres who had benefited most from the educational policy of stressing "redness" and "expertise" simultaneously. In the same way that there was a merger of power holders and bourgeois authorities in school administrations, there was also an over-representation in the student body of children from bourgeois and from cadre families. Though available data are scanty, one can come to this conclusion by examining the materials on the relative educational opportunities of the children of the proletariat (including as a sub-group the children of cadres), and the children of the bourgeois.

The data in Table 9 suggest that retrenchment in the educational field – characterized by the closing down of many irregular schools, the shift of

111. *Hung-se tsao-fan pao*, 9 February 1967.

112. "Gist of forum Comrade Ch'en Po-ta had with the revolutionary faculties and students of middle school," *TCC*, No. 401 (19 June 1967), pp. 38–51.

Table 9: Students from the Proletarian Class (Including Cadres) as a Percentage of the Total University Enrolment

	Total University Enrolment	% of Students from the Proletariat
1951–52	153,000	19
1952–53	191,000	20
1953–54	212,000	22
1954–55	253,000	—
1955–56	288,000	29
1956–57	403,000	34
1957–58	441,000	36
1958–59	660,000	48
1959–60	810,000	50
1960–61 ^a	955,000	—
1961–62 ^a	819,000	—
1962–63		67

Source: *Chukyo sogo yoran (Comprehensive Guide to China)* (Tokyo: Naikaku Chosashitsu, 1967), p. 717.

Note: ^a The only information available on the percentage of student enrolment from the proletariat for these years is from *Current Scene* (Vol. IV, No. 19, p. 11), which states that 61% of the 1960 class entering the Geophysics Department of Peking University came from the proletariat class, but only 40% of the 1962 class was from the proletariat. Another Japanese source reports that, in 1966, 52% of the total student population of Peking University were children of proletarian origin (Suganuma Masahisa, *Chugaku Bunka-Daikakume (Chinese Great Cultural Revolution)* (Tokyo: Sanich shobo, 1967), p. 41). Although the data are too incomplete to show a conclusive trend, the figures we do have, and the simple fact that official figures are not available for the 1960–62 period, seem to indicate that, for a brief period immediately after the Great Leap Forward, the government encountered obstacles in its efforts to improve educational opportunities for the students from the proletarian class.

emphasis to quality education, and the subsequent curtailment of total student enrolment – narrowed educational opportunity until 1962 mainly for proletarian students. However, the change would not have drastically affected educational opportunity for an individual member of the proletariat because of the absolute limitation of educational opportunity (estimated at from 1.75 per cent to 1.50 per cent of the university-age cohort) and the large size of the proletarian population of university age.

In 1962–63, however, if the figure of 67 per cent in Table 9 is reliable, a new downward trend for bourgeois students appeared. The increase of proletarian students (from 50 per cent to 67 per cent) would have meant a drastic reduction in the educational opportunity of the individual bourgeois student, due to the small size of the bourgeois population of university age, in relation to the large size of the non-bourgeois population of university age. In other words, because of the difference in the size of the two groups, the small change in the total percentage of representation from both groups tended to affect educational opportunity for the smaller group, i.e. the students from the bourgeois class, more seriously.

The only way to improve educational opportunities for both groups at the same time was to increase the total enrolment. But, as various sources report, total college enrolment failed to register any significant increase after 1960.

Even though the students from bourgeois families enjoyed some advantages (as a consequence of the policy emphasizing academic achievements) over the proletarian students, this policy benefited only a small proportion of bourgeois youths of university age (estimated at from 3 per cent to 7 per cent of the bourgeois cohort of university age). In addition, there were other types of discrimination that might outweigh their small advantage in education. Students from bourgeois families claimed that they were discriminated against in job opportunity and were denied admission to the PLA, to some important positions and to some institutes of higher learning; generally, they felt that they were treated as "born criminals."¹¹³ According to a refugee report, discrimination against students from bourgeois families permeated ordinary life.¹¹⁴ For instance, if a student of bourgeois background made a mistake in school life, it was treated as a serious political issue. The Cultural Revolution gave these students the opportunity to express their diffuse discontents, and to hold the Party organization responsible for their hardship. One way to overcome the discrimination and prejudice against them was to become ultra-active or ideologically correct in the Cultural Revolution, following the prudent rule of "better to be on the left rather than to be right."

While bourgeois and proletarian students were competing for limited educational opportunities at institutes of higher learning, with each group's fortune rising and falling with the change of the Centre's policy, there was a sub-group of proletarian students that appeared steadily to improve its lot.

This sub-group consisted of the children of cadres and army men. As shown in the following Tables 10–12, the offspring of cadres constituted a majority in all of the three different types of elite schools.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, they were steadily improving their lot as shown in Table 11. The large proportion of students from cadre and from bourgeois families was probably the result of the Party policy that emphasized redness and

113. *Chung-hsueh wen-ko pao*, 21 February 1967.

114. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29 April 1972, p. 29.

115. By elite school I refer here to three different types of school. One type is the boarding schools for the children of cadres, of which there were around 30 in Peking at the time of the CR. This kind of school was initiated before 1949 to take care of the education of the cadres' children at the time when the Party cadres were not paid salaries. However, such schools expanded in spite of the government instruction of 1959 to abolish them. One Red Guard newspaper claimed that two thirds of the 30 boarding schools were established after 1955, the year when a salary system was established for the cadres (*Ch'un lai*, 13 April 1967). The second type of the elite school consisted of middle schools attached to various universities. The third type of elite school was made up of the schools selected as models for the special educational experiments. The Party concentrated its financial and manpower support on these experimental schools which started in 1961.

expertise simultaneously. Students from bourgeois families owed their educational advantages to their academic achievements in spite of their bad class backgrounds, whereas children of cadres owed it as much to their redness as to their academic achievements. However, in the boarding school for the children of cadres (Table 12), students from cadre families occupied the absolute majority, while the children from bourgeois families were thoroughly discriminated against.

While there were some negative factors (e.g. downward mobility and political discrimination) that counterbalanced whatever advantages the bourgeois students enjoyed in the educational field, there were no such negative factors for the students from cadre families. Instead they were the

Table 10:

The Class Backgrounds of Senior-Middle Graduates in the Middle School No. 101 ^a

	Worker Family	Peasant Family	Cadres and Army Men	Others ^b
1961 ^c	5.74 %	6.89 %	45.10 %	45.42 %
1962	3.57 %	8.21 %	42.80 %	45.42 %

Source: "Whom are such schools meant for?" in *SCMP(S)*, No. 200 (31 August 1967), p. 30.

Notes: ^a Middle School No. 101 is considered to be an experimental school.

^b This information was revealed by a radical who used the term "others" instead of "bourgeois family background."

^c The total of this row exceeds 100%.

Table 11:

The Class Backgrounds of Students in the Middle School Attached to Peking University

	Worker Family	Cadre Family	Others	Total
1957	145 ^a (27.6 %)	2 ^a (0.5 %)	(71.9 %)	400 (100 %)
1965	9 % ^a	33 % ^a	68 % ^a	(100 %)

Source: This table is constructed from facts given in "United Action Committee is necessary product of revisionist educational line," in *SCMP(S)*, No. 200 (31 August 1967), p. 24.

Note: ^a These numbers were given in the source.

Table 12:

The Class Backgrounds of a First-Year Class in Kwang-ya Boarding School, Kwangtung

Workers	Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants	Cadres	Office Workers	Landlords
44 (16.3 %)	10 (3.7 %)	202 (73.3 %)	19 (6.7 %)	0

Source: *Kuang-ya* 8.31, March 1968.

single most privileged group in all China prior to the Cultural Revolution. Early in the Cultural Revolution, this privileged group of Chinese students rose to denounce an educational policy that in their view still favoured bourgeois students, and demanded that more weight be placed on redness. In making this attack, their ideological orientation coincided with their actual interests, since they were the ones who benefited most from the policy of emphasizing redness and had nothing to lose by further emphasizing it. However, students from bourgeois families saw some irony in this charge. The special group, which had already benefited most from the Party's interpretation of "redness," at the expense of the children from worker and peasant families, was now demanding that even more weight be given to "redness." As the Cultural Revolution unfolded, students from bourgeois families counter-attacked the children of cadres by charging that the latter formed a privileged group in China and a "social base of the revisionist power holders."¹¹⁶ When the Maoist leaders denounced the Party organization's attempt to turn the Cultural Revolution against the bourgeoisie defined economically as a "bourgeois reactionary line," the students from bourgeois families found a good opportunity to redress their grievances.

The second group that emerged as radicals in the Cultural Revolution was of those students who were sent to rural areas (*hsia-fang*) prior to the Cultural Revolution. The role of this group, estimated to number around 40 million, was so prominent during the Cultural Revolution that one scholar has viewed the whole movement as the revolt of this particular group.¹¹⁷

Originally, the ideological goal implied in Mao's instruction of *hsia-fang* was to reduce the "three major differences"; the differences between "town and countryside," "mental and manual labour," and "workers and peasants." But in the process of implementing policy, practical considerations such as the alleviation of unemployment and population congestion in the urban areas outweighed the ideological goal, resulting in a shift of the criteria for determining who should be sent to the rural areas. According to the original goal, competent and able individuals in various fields were to be sent to the countryside. Since, in reality, nobody would go voluntarily, the Party organization sent to the rural areas those who did not do well at school or in other social areas, those known as "social dregs."¹¹⁸

Several groups were likely to be sent. One included urban residents of peasant background.¹¹⁹ A second category included demobilized soldiers

116. *Chih pa ch'un lai pao*, 26 February 1967.

117. *Jen-min*, 12 December 1965. See also Lynn T. White, "Shanghai polity in the Cultural Revolution," in John W. Lewis (ed.), *The City in Communist China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press), pp. 325–70.

118. John Gardner, "Educated youth and urban-rural inequalities, 1958–66," in Lewis, *The City in Communist China*, pp. 235–86.

119. John Philip Emerson, "Manpower training and use of cadres," in Lewis, *The City in Communist China*, pp. 183–214.

who had not been able to secure permanent urban jobs. Thirdly, there were those students who had come from the countryside to the urban areas for their education and had graduated. And fourthly, there were urban youths who had failed to enter higher education and to find urban jobs. Although it is difficult to establish the class backgrounds of those categorized into the above four categories, it is known that the urban residents with rural backgrounds tended to be former landlords and rich peasants who had moved to the city during collectivization¹²⁰; students of proletarian origin were sent to the countryside if they failed either to get a job or to enter an institute of higher education; and bourgeois youths were sent to the countryside when they failed to gain admission to institutions of higher learning.¹²¹ There was only one discernible group that was exempt from this policy – the children of cadres and army men, who obtained preferential treatment in education as well as in job assignment.¹²² In fact, the original groups of Red Guards from the five red categories forced the bourgeois and “undesirable elements” at the initial stage of the Cultural Revolution to leave the urban areas for the rural areas.¹²³

When *hsia-fang* policy had changed from a lofty attempt to create a new socialist peasantry and reduce the three differences into a programme for eliminating the “undesirable elements” and the “social dregs” from the urban areas, the peasants understandably resented the policy for putting financial burden on the already strained rural economy, and for demeaning their districts by making them the “dumping ground for the social dregs” of urban society. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, the educated youths who had been sent to the rural areas were politically discriminated against as a potentially explosive group. With the excuse of making revolution, they returned to the urban areas and augmented the radical forces.¹²⁴

If common objective interests mobilized each of the above two groups, rusticated youth and children of cadres, there was a third group which was probably mobilized by the ideological appeals of the Maoist leaders. During the work-team period, there was an easily recognizable gap between the ideology of the Cultural Revolution, pronounced by the editorials of the major news media, and actual policy as implemented

120. *Ibid.*

121. Though we do not have definitive evidence, it is highly likely that bourgeois students were more probably being sent to the rural areas. Gardner seems to imply this point too (in “Educated youth and urban-rural inequalities”).

122. *Ch'un lai*, 16 May 1967. It is interesting to note that even after the CR the cadres could still use their position to give their children preferential treatment in this matter. See *Jen-min*, 29 January 1974.

123. “Chin-chi t'ung-chih” (“Urgent notice”) of the Peking Second Middle School, 26 August 1966.

124. For the activities of this group in the CR, see *Chih-nung hung-ch'i* (*Red Flag Supporting Agriculture*), 7 October 1967 and 6 January 1968; *Ko-ming ch'ing-nien*, 10 November 1967; 32111 *Chan pao* (32111 *Combat News*), 31 October 1967.

by the Party organization.¹²⁵ On the one hand, the communications reaching the students through the Party machine (i.e. Party Committees and the work teams) tended to designate bourgeois authorities and “monsters and freaks” as the main targets, and stressed the control of the Party leadership over the Cultural Revolution and restricted the spontaneity of the student movement. On the other hand, the major editorials of the news media, which reached the students directly without the mediation of the Party machine, tended to describe the Cultural Revolution as spontaneous and unrestrained mass mobilization and elevated Mao’s thought, as it was understood by students through their own political consciousness and judgement, to provide the sole criteria of right and wrong.¹²⁶ Moreover, these editorials implicitly raised the possibility that the Party organization itself might be a target of the Cultural Revolution by arguing that “any persons who oppose Mao’s Thought, regardless of their ranks and positions” would be chief targets, and by specifying that these anti-Mao elements were using “the excuse of organizational discipline to suppress the people who do not obey [their] order.”¹²⁷ When some students pointed out that the policy actually implemented by the work teams departed considerably from that of the Cultural Revolution described by the editorials, the work teams argued: “To whom will you listen, the Party Committee or the newspaper?”¹²⁸

The work teams treated harshly any student who questioned the correctness of the operations of the work teams, branding him as a “political ambitionist” if he came from a good family, and as a “rightist” if he came from a bad family. At Tsinghua University, 800 persons, and in the Peking College of Mining, 829 persons, were reportedly branded as rightists.¹²⁹ In Canton, so the radicals claimed, 220,000 persons were selected by the Party organization as targets of the Cultural Revolution.¹³⁰ Probably the well-known leaders of the radical group, Kuai Ta-fu, T’an Hou-lan and Wang Ta-pin in Peking, and Wu Chuan-ping and Kao Hsiang in Canton, fell into this category. However, their political sense enabled them at an early stage to see the widening gap between communications coming directly from the major news media and those propagated by the Party organization which clearly exposed the conflict between the lines of Mao and Liu, and to

125. For detailed discussion on the widening gap between official ideology and the actual operation of the Party organization, see Lee, “The Political Mobilization of the Red Guards,” pp. 97–118.

126. For instance, see *Jen-min*, 19 June and 1 July 1966; *Peking Review*, No. 28 (8 July 1966), pp. 28–30.

127. *Jen-min*, 5 and 15 June and 1 July 1966; *Peking Review*, No. 28 (8 July 1966). Also see *JCMM(S)*, No. 20 (18 March 1968), for the radicals’ challenge to the work teams on the basis of official ideology.

128. *Hung-wei-ping* (Peking: Foreign Languages Institute), 24 October 1966.

129. *Studies on Chinese Communism*, Vol. II, No. 5 (May 1968), pp. 78–93; *Hung-wei-ping*, 25 November 1966.

130. *Chieh-fang pao*, March 1968.

challenge the work teams. Moreover, the Maoist leaders developed new kinds of communication channels – mass rallies, interviews with Maoist leaders, big character posters – which bypassed Party channels and linked the masses directly to the Maoist leaders, thereby contributing to the rise of the radicals.¹³¹

Conclusion

The preceding discussion reveals highly utilitarian and independent dimensions to Cultural Revolution radicalism.¹³² In summary, I shall compare this characteristic with the theory of radicalism generally accepted by western social sciences. For although the former is a product of the, in many ways unique, Chinese political system and of the interaction of various political forces in China, which might arguably be historical contingencies, whereas the latter is based on western experiences, their comparison will perhaps shed some light on both.

Contrary to the generally held view that attributes radicalism to dogmatic obsession with a particular ideology and hence brands it as irrational behaviour, the performance of the radicals in the Cultural Revolution appears to have been calculated and goal-oriented, resembling that of an “interest group.” But unlike interest groups in the ordinary sense, the Cultural Revolution radicals tried to redress their grievances rather than actively to promote their group interests. Though the sources of radical grievance might vary (e.g. class background or suppression by the Party organization), the various components of the radical faction had found that their common interest lay in changing the status quo and directing the struggle against the Party organization, the locus of political power. The radicals readily subscribed to an ideology which justified their goals and which came mainly from the radical interpretation of Mao’s thought by the Cultural Revolution Small Group. For this reason, they interpreted class politically, which enabled them to direct the attack against the power holders while justifying

131. The clearest example of the two mediums of communication and the radicals’ reliance on direct contact with the Centre as well as their own judgement was the incident of the “Letter from Peking.” Kao Hsiang, who became the leader of Canton Third Headquarters, wrote a letter to his friends in Canton in June 1966. In this letter, he specified the Party Committees as the main targets of the CR. Not surprisingly, the Party organization suppressed the letter, denouncing those students involved as “political ambitionists” who wanted to seize political power from the Party. *Hung-ch’i pao* (Red Flag News), 24 June 1967.

132. The characteristics of the radical workers were similar to those of the radical students, with the probable exception that the grievances of the workers were more concerned with economics and more easily recognizable than those of the students. Generally speaking, contract workers, temporary workers, unskilled workers, labourers, apprentice workers, workers (or students) in the half-study half-work programmes, and workers in small factories such as those for handicrafts constituted the backbone of the worker radicals.

it as class struggle. Some extreme radicals publicly demanded the "redistribution of power and wealth," and denounced the power holders as "red capitalists."¹³³

In contrast to Lipset's and Bittner's view that radicals tend to be more submissive to their leaders and to organizational authority,¹³⁴ in the Cultural Revolution it was the conservatives who were more submissive, disregarding individual judgement and relying on communications from the Party organization. The radicals charged:

In organization and politics, it [the conservative faction] is controlled by a handful of capitalist factions in the Party and army and their chiefs. It submits to the pressure and dances to the baton. Therefore, it does not have its own political standpoint or take independent action.¹³⁵

Since the members of the radical organizations shared a real personal interest in changing the status quo, they were more spontaneous in their actions and departed to a greater extent from what has been called the "organizational mentality." In contrast to the radicals, the conservatives displayed greater "organizational mentality" since they shared with the Party organization an interest in the status quo.

Again, contrary to Bittner's and Lipset's view that radicalism needs to maintain its ideological purity through strictly organizational controls, such as isolating the members from the outside environment and drawing information or ideology from outside the realm of everyday life,¹³⁶ the radicals in the Cultural Revolution drew their information from their daily experiences, particularly from the darker side of the Chinese political system, in order to dramatize their hardship and justify their revolt. Moreover, instead of isolating themselves from society, the radicals actively engaged in propaganda work to draw the uncommitted masses to their side.

In addition to the basic interest of the radicals in changing the status quo, the relative power position of the radicals vis-à-vis the conservatives contributed to the former's behaviour. Being a minority in each unit and deriving strength and legitimacy from the Maoist elite, particularly from the Small Group, the radicals opposed the unconditional "great alliance" along functional lines. They insisted on the alliance among those of the Left on the basis of principle, and considered it as a means to power seizure rather than as an end in itself. The radicals denounced the three-in-one combination as a "great mixing," not because they were preoccupied with the ideological formula of the "Paris Commune"

133. For the ideology of the "ultra-leftists," see *China News Summary*, No. 189 (28 September 1967), pp. 1–5.

134. Egon Bittner, "Radicalism and the organization of radical movement," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 28, No. 6 (December 1963); and "Radicals," *International Social Science Encyclopedia*; Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics* (New York: Doubleday, 1963).

135. "Whither, the general faction?" *TCC*, No. 430, pp. 1–6.

136. Bittner, "Radicalism" and Lipset, *Political Man*, pp. 92 and 101.

but because that formula promised to provide them with an opportunity to exercise real political power.

The conservatives for their part did not much concern themselves with the issue of access to power because their interests coincided with those of the PLA which had taken over the Party's ascendancy at the local levels. The radicals, however, as challengers of the status quo, under which they had been discriminated against before the Cultural Revolution, were strongly motivated towards seizing a role for themselves in the decision-making process and personally exercising a share of power. But, just as the radicals had feared, when the Cultural Revolution entered into the consolidation stage, they were again subjected to suppression by none other than the new Revolutionary Committees which, like their predecessors, were controlled by the PLA.

Appendix: Major Issues and the Responses of the Conservatives and the Radicals

<i>Issues</i>	<i>Conservatives</i>	<i>Radicals</i>	<i>Initiators of the issues</i>
Educational Reform (May–July 1966)	+	–	Mao and Party
Campaign against the “Four Olds” (August–September 1966)	+	–	Party
Work Teams (August – December 1966)	–	+	CRSG
Class Origin (August–December 1966)	+	–	Party
Power Seizure (January 1967)	–	+	CRSG and Mao
Involvement of the PLA	+	–	Mao
Power Holders	–	+	CRSG
Educational Reform (September–December 1967)	+	–	Mao
Rehabilitation	–	+	CRSG
Formation of the Revolutionary Committee (February 1968)	+	–	Chou and Mao
Campaign against the “Four Rightist Trends”	–	+	CRSG