

*The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on China's Economic Elite**

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CHINA's economic leadership was profoundly affected by the Cultural Revolution. As members of the governing bureaucracy and, all but a tiny group, members also of the Communist Party, economic officials were among the prime targets of Mao Tse-tung's drive to de-bureaucratize the Party and the entire Chinese administrative system. Almost half of them were attacked during the three years the revolution raged. Some of these men retained their positions, but most appear to have been purged.

Only a handful of the personnel changes carried out during the Cultural Revolution have been officially announced. These include four deaths,¹ one appointment in March 1966 before the purge really started (Wu Hao, Deputy Minister of the 6th Ministry of Machine-building), one identification of an acting minister (Lin Hai-yun, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, identified as acting minister since the death of Yeh Chi-chuang in 1967) and one transfer to Hong Kong (Li Cho-chih, Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade, appointed manager of the Bank of China in Hong Kong in September 1966). All the other changes which actually resulted from the Cultural Revolution can only be deduced by attempting to interpret all the evidence available. On the basis of the pattern of attacks and public appearances and the Central Committee membership lists issued after the Ninth Party Congress, the members of the economic elite have been divided into three categories: those presumed to have been purged; those presumed to have remained in office; and those whose status is unknown.

The pre-Cultural Revolution economic leadership can be calculated to consist of 316 people who held 337 positions at the assistant minister level or higher in 49 economic organs as of January 1966.² Forty-six of

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¹ Sun Chih-yuan, Minister of the 3rd Ministry of Machine-building, in October 1966; Chao Erh-lu, deputy director of the Staff Office of National Defence Industry and director of the Party Political Department of the same field, in February 1967; Yeh Chi-chuang, Minister of Foreign Trade and deputy director of the Staff Office of Finance and Trade, in June 1967; and Chiang Kuang-nai, Minister of the Textile Industry, in June 1967.

² Ch'en Yun is the only member of the elite who did not hold a specific job in 1966; he is included because of his presumed involvement in top-level planning. The

these jobs were directorships or ministerships in 46 economic units; 291 were deputy posts in 47 units. Excluding the officially announced changes, the economic elite numbered 312: 294 of them Party members and the other 18, non-Party people. The non-Party group lost only one member during the Cultural Revolution. But of the 294 Party economic leaders whose fate can be ascertained with any degree of certainty, 97, or one-third, are presumed to have been purged and only 71, or 24 per cent., are presumed to be still in office. Information is not available, however, on the status of almost half the elite and these 133 leaders who were never publicly attacked probably fall into the category of survivors.

The pattern of attacks on economic leaders reveals that the higher an official's rank, the more vulnerable he was to the purge. Party people suffered more than those who were not members of the Party; ministers suffered proportionately more than their deputies and the officials who were also Central Committee members suffered more than those who were not. Senior purge victims tended to bring their subordinates down with them, leaving certain units so denuded of top-level personnel that they must have been severely disordered and may well have ceased to function. Fifteen of the 49 major economic units lost at least half their known leaders, while 12 units have no top officials who are still appearing in public. The worst hit were the organs in the planning system whose head, Li Fu-ch'un, was expelled from the Politburo but kept his place in the Central Committee. The other system which lost almost half its leading personnel was that of agriculture and forestry headed by T'an Chen-lin who, it can be assumed, was purged in 1967.

The negligible impact of the cultural revolutionary purge on the non-Party officials might appear anomalous; these men were, all but one, solidly bourgeois in origin and might be assumed to be more conservative in thinking than their Party colleagues. But because they were not part of the Party apparatus and because, despite their prestigious jobs, they wielded little real political power, they were not classified as "power-holders taking the capitalist road." The one non-Party leader who seems to have been ousted was Ch'ien Chia-chu, deputy director of the Administrative Bureau of Commerce and Industry. Ten of the non-Party leaders, including the six non-Party ministers, are known to have kept their jobs and continue to appear in public as members of the economic elite: Hsu Te-heng, Minister of Aquatic Products, Sha Chien-li, Minister of Food, Li Wen-hui, Minister of Forestry, Li Chu-ch'en, Minister of 1st Ministry of Light Industry, Chu Hsueh-fan, Minister of Posts and

actual total of major economic organs is 52 but the leading personnel in three—the Staff Office of National Defence Industry, the Party Political Department for National Defence Industry and the Party Political Department for Capital Construction—have never been made public.

Telecommunications, and Fu Tso-yi, Minister of Water Conservancy and Electric Power.

For purposes of analysis, the economic leadership has been divided into five groups, the first four consisting of Party leaders ranked according to political status and the fifth consisting of the 18 non-Party members of the economic elite.

Group 1 represents the economic high command. The eight leaders in this group—Li Hsien-nien, Li Fu-ch'un, Nieh Jung-chen, Po Yi-po, Tan Chen-lin, Teng Tzu-hui, Ch'en Po-ta and Ch'en Yun—have been largely responsible for top-level policy-making, planning and supervising the operation of the economy. The designation of these eight people in Group 1 is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. It might have been logical to include the Prime Minister, Chou En-lai. It might have been neater to restrict the group to the five who held top positions in the economic bureaucracy as of 1966. But the additional three—Teng Tzu-hui, Ch'en Po-ta and Ch'en Yun—it can be argued, justify inclusion by their earlier economic activities and their presumed continued involvement in this sphere.³ These men have acted not only as political generalists co-ordinating a wide range of government activities, but also as specialists in particular fields of leadership.

Group 2 consists of 22 high-ranking Party members who, in addition to their economic posts as deputy minister or above, were full or alternate members of the Central Committee, the Party Control Commission or the National Defence Council. Group 2 is clearly outranked by Group 1 and consequently can be considered less influential in policy-making but it performs an important role in policy implementation.

Group 3 consists of 69 officials on the deputy-minister level or above whose only other known political distinction is membership in the National People's Congress. Its members are more likely to hold specialized jobs within their units than the members of Group 2 who, as higher-ranking Communists, tend to hold political supervisory positions. The fourth group of Party leaders consisted of 195 officials in 1966. Only two were assistant ministers, both in the Ministry of Foreign Trade since the other economic ministries had abolished this rank after the Great Leap Forward. The others, like Groups 2 and 3,

³ The most problematic member of this group, Ch'en Po-ta has been deputy director of the State Planning Commission since October 1962 and was deputy director of the Party Rural Work Department in the mid-1950s. Although he is not an economic specialist, his influence on economic decisions may have been much stronger than most of the full-time economic planners and administrators. For example, it was Ch'en who helped Mao push forward the agricultural collectivization movement in 1955. Although he was not yet a Politburo member, he delivered a Politburo report explaining the "Decision on the Question of Agricultural Collectivization" to the enlarged Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee. He may well have acted in such an *ad hoc* capacity at other times and may do so again in his higher position as a member of the Politburo standing committee.

were of deputy-minister level and above and did not hold any other significant political office. With few exceptions, the members of this group are second generation in Party seniority and age—that is, men who joined the Party after the Long March of 1934–35—and are considered junior in power and prestige to the other groups.

TABLE I
Impact of Purge by Groups

	Size of group*	Presumed purged		Presumed still in office		Status unknown	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Party members							
Group 1	8	2	25	6	75	—	—
Group 2	22	14	64	8	36	—	—
Group 3	69	26	38	29	42	14	20
Group 4	195	55	28	28	14	112	57
Non-Party							
Group 5	18	1	6	10	56	7	39
Total							
Party groups	294	97	33	71	24	126	43
Total of all groups	312	98	31	81	26	133	43

* Adjustment has been made for the changes officially announced after the start of the Cultural Revolution (see p. 65).

IMPACT BY GROUPS

Except for the small group of eight top-level Party leaders where each case is a special one, the purge hit the groups in order of rank—the highest the hardest. Almost 70 per cent. of Group 2 can be classified as “presumed to have been purged,” 40 per cent. of Group 3 and 30 per cent. of Group 4. The last figure may be inaccurate because of a high proportion of members whose status is unknown.

Group 1 lost only two men: Po Yi-po, director of the Staff Office of Industry and Communications, director of the State Economic Commission and deputy director of the State Planning Commission; and T'an Chen-lin, director of the Staff Office of Agriculture and Forestry and also deputy director of the State Planning Commission. Both were classed with Liu Shao-ch'i as top “capitalist roaders.” T'an was accused of master-minding the “February counter-current,” an attempt to reinstate ousted Party leaders in February 1967 after the first phase of the purge. Po was accused of advocating the whole range of rightist economic policies.

Three other members of Group 1, Ch'en Yun, Li Fu-ch'un and Nieh Jung-chen, were severely attacked and lost their Politburo membership but were re-elected to the Ninth Central Committee. Ch'en's survival

was particularly surprising since he had long been identified with the type of economic policies often under criticism in the Cultural Revolution and was closely associated with Liu Shao-ch'i. Liu admitted in his self-criticism of 23 November 1966 that he "had too much confidence in Comrade Ch'en Yun and thus listened to him alone. Ideologically, the two of us shared various common views."⁴ Two other members of Group 1 were also attacked in posters and the Red Guard press but managed to retain their pre-Cultural Revolution status: Li Hsien-nien, director of the Staff Office for Finance and Trade, kept his seat in the Politburo and Teng Tzu-hui, a deputy director of the Planning Commission, was re-elected to the Central Committee. Teng's survival is another surprise since it was he who advocated cutting back on collectivization in 1955, a non-Maoist deviation for which Liu Shao-ch'i was attacked. In fact, only one member of the top group escaped unscathed: Ch'en Po-ta, Mao's old political secretary who headed the Cultural Revolution Group and after the Ninth Congress was formally confirmed as a member of the Politburo standing committee.

The survival of the five members of Group 1 who were at various times denounced in the Red Guard press as rightists may well be due mainly to the intervention of Chou En-lai. Chou is known to have defended all of them, except Teng Tzu-hui, at Red Guard meetings in early 1967. The Prime Minister presumably felt that, as experienced economic planners and administrators, they were essential to keep the economy and the administration running and therefore gave them his personal support. It is also possible that Li Hsien-nien, Nieh Jung-chen and Teng Tzu-hui, as veterans of the Fourth Field Army, may have had some support from Lin Piao, their former commander.

Group 2 has the highest percentage of purge victims among the four categories of Party leaders. 14 people or 64 per cent. of this group seem to have been removed from office and only eight or 36 per cent. still appear in public. Of the 14 purged, 12 were dropped from the new Central Committee. These include 2 full members who were also members of the National Defence Council (Ch'eng Tzu-hua, deputy director of the State Planning Commission and Lü Cheng-ts'ao, Minister of Railways), and 10 alternate members: Chang Ching-fu, deputy director, Scientific and Technological Commission; Chang Lin-chih, Minister, Coal Industry; Ch'en Cheng-jen, Minister, 8th Ministry of Machine-building and deputy director, Staff Office of Agriculture and Forestry; Ch'en Man-yuan, Deputy Minister, State Farms and Land Reclamation; Han Kuang, deputy director, Scientific and Technological

⁴ *Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch'i, 1958-1967* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), p. 361.

Commission; Liao Lu-yen, Minister, Agriculture and deputy director, Staff Office of Agriculture and Forestry; Liu Lan-po, Deputy Minister, Water Conservancy and Electric Power; Ma Wen-jui, Minister, Labour; T'ao Lu-chia, deputy director, State Economic Commission; and Yao Yi-lin, Minister, Commerce, deputy director, Staff Office of Finance and Trade and director of the Party Political Department. The other two purged were Chou Chung-ying, deputy director of the State Economic Commission and an alternate member of the Control Committee of the Eighth Central Committee, and Sun Ta-kuang, Minister, Communications and a member of the National Defence Council.

The eight who presumably remain in office include two full members of the Eighth Central Committee who are concurrently members of the National Defence Council, Wang Chen, Minister, State Farms and Land Reclamation, and Hsiao K'e, his Deputy Minister; one alternate member of the Eighth Central Committee, Fang Yi, director of the Economic Relations Commission and deputy director of the State Planning Commission; one member of the Control Committee of the Eighth Central Committee, Kao Yang, Minister, Chemical Industry; and another four members of the National Defence Council, Wang Cheng, Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng, Fang Ch'iang and Wang Ping-chang, Ministers of the 4th, 5th, 6th and the 7th Ministries of Machine-building. Wang Chen and Fang Yi were re-elected full and alternate members of the new Central Committee; two of the four Ministers of Machine-building, Ch'iu of the 5th and Wang of the 7th, were newly promoted to full members.

IMPACT ACCORDING TO MINISTERIAL RANK

The economic leaders can be divided into two types of officials, according to their positions and responsibilities: chief executives who head at least one economic organ, and deputies.⁵ The 312 living leaders include 40 persons of the first type: 5 in Group 1, 14 in Group 2, 12 in Group 3, 3 in Group 4, and 6 non-Party members in Group 5. Together they head 44 offices and hold 12 additional deputy posts. The other 272 leaders are, with the exception of Ch'en Yun, officials of the second type, serving only as deputies or assistants in one or two units. They hold 281 posts with 10 Party members serving simultaneously as deputies for two organs.

At least 17 or 43 per cent. of the 40 chief executives have been purged, as compared to 81 or 30 per cent. of the 271 deputies. The

⁵ All posts are cited as of January 1966. Neither those who had headed an economic organ before that date nor those who serve as acting heads, such as Lin Hai-yun in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Hu Li-ch'iao in the People's Bank, are counted as chief executives.

distribution of purged chief executives is two in Group 1, seven in Group 2, seven in Group 3, one in Group 4, and none in Group 5; seven of the purged deputies belong to Group 2, 20 to Group 3, 53 to Group 4, and one to Group 5. Once the head of a given unit was branded an anti-Maoist, his deputies often became the targets for similar accusations, and vice versa.

Of the 49 units whose leaders are known, the heads of 20 have been purged. These include two staff offices, three commissions, 11 ministries, two special government agencies, and two Party political departments. Together with the three units whose top positions were already vacant—3rd Ministry of Machine-building, Ministry of Textile Industry and the Political Department of Agriculture and Forestry—this leaves 23 units without a chief executive. 12 out of these 23 units have not a single leader remaining in office. At least 15 units, including three staff offices, three commissions, six ministries, one special agency and two Party political departments, have lost at least half their leading officials. Five out of these 15 units, the Staff Office of Industry and Communications, the 3rd Ministry of Machine-building, the Administrative Bureau of Industry and Commerce, the Party Political Department of Agriculture and Forestry, and the Party Political Department of Industry and Communications appear to have lost all of their known leading figures.

Only nine units (six ministries, including four out of the five military-oriented Ministries of Machine-building, the 2nd, 4th, 6th and the 7th, plus three special agencies, the Agricultural Bank, the People's Bank and the Bureau for Scientific and Technological Cadres) have no known victims. The category of those presumed still in office is probably underestimated because of the lack of information on many leaders. But there are only six units, one commission and five ministries (including two headed by non-Party ministers) which are known to have at least half of their leaders still operative.

Because the fates of leaders serving together were often linked, some economic units and groups of units were much more seriously affected by the Cultural Revolution than others. Usually the chief executive determined the status of his unit. But not always. For example, the economic units which were hardest hit were those in the planning system, headed by Li Fu-ch'un, one of the members of the top group who survived. But the other two systems which sustained great losses were headed by prominent victims of the purge: Agriculture and Forestry under T'an Chen-lin and Industry and Communications under Po Yi-po. The remaining systems, Finance and Trade and National Defence Industry, appear to have done better; Finance and Trade is headed by

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TABLE II

Impact on Individual Economic Units

	System	Number of known leaders	Pre- sumed purged	Pre- sumed still in office	Status un- known	Chief execu- tive purged
Staff Offices of State Council:		18	11	2	5	2
Agriculture and Forestry	A & F	11	7	—	4	✓
T'an Chen-lin, Oct. 62—						
Finance and Trade	F & T	6	3	2	1	
Li Hsien-nien, Oct. 54—						
Industry and Communications	I & C	1	1	—	—	✓
Po I-po, April 61—						
National Defence Industry	NDI	—	—	—	—	
Head not known						
6 Commissions:		59	29	16	14	3
Capital Construction	P & S ^a	9	4	1	4	✓
Ku Mu, March 65—						
Economic	P & S	12	9	2	1	✓
Po I-po, May 56—						
Economic Relations ^b	n.k.	7	1	4	2	
Fang Yi, June 64—						
Planning	P & S	18	8	6	4	
Li Fu-ch'un, Oct. 54—						
Price Control	P & S	3	2	—	1	✓
Hsueh Mu-ch'iao, Sept. 63—						
Scientific and Technological	NDI	10	5	3	2	
Nieh Jung-chen, Nov. 58—						
32 Ministries:		232	63	67	102	11
Agriculture	A & F	9	6	1	2	✓
Liao Lu-yen, Sept. 54—						
Allocation of Materials	I & C	6	2	2	2	
Yuan Pao-hua, Nov. 64—						
Aquatic Products	F & T	6	1	2	3	
*Hsu Te-heng, May 56—						
Building	I & C	5	1	1	3	✓
Liu Yu-min, March 65—						
Building Materials	I & C	4	—	1	3	
Lai Chi-fa, March 65—						
Chemical Industry	I & C	9	1	3	5	
Kao Yang, July 62—						
Coal Industry	I & C	7	4	1	2	✓
Chang Lin-chih, Sept. 57—						

^a Unlike the other systems, that for Planning and Statistics does not have a Staff Office of the State Council. It is controlled by the Planning Commission.

^b The Bureau of Industry and Commerce may have come under the dual leadership of both the Staff Office of Industry and Communications and the Staff Office of Finance and Trade. The Economic Relations Commission may have been under the supervision of the Staff Office of Foreign Affairs, since it deals with foreign countries rather than domestic matters. It is not known to which system the Bureau of Scientific and Technological Cadres belongs.

* Non-Party minister.

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TABLE II—*continued*

	System	Number of known leaders	Pre- sumed purged	Pre- sumed still in office	Status un- known	Chief execu- tive purged
Commerce	F & T	9	7	1	1	✓
Yao Yi-lin, Feb. 60–						
Communications	I & C	10	3	—	7	✓
Sun Ta-kuang, July 64–						
Finance	F & T	5	1	2	2	
Li Hsien-nien, June 54–						
Food	F & T	6	1	3	2	
*Sha Ch'ien-li, Feb. 58–						
Foreign Trade	F & T	11	6	4	1	
Lin Hai-yun (Acting), 1965–						
Forestry	A & F	11	1	4	6	
*Liu Wen-hui, April 59–						
Geology	I & C	8	3	2	3	
Li Szu-kuang, Aug. 52–						
Labour	I & C	4	2	1	1	✓
Ma Wen-jui, Oct. 54–						
1st Light Industry	I & C	7	1	4	2	
*Li Chu-ch'en, Feb. 58–						
2nd Light Industry	I & C	6	2	2	2	✓
Hsu Yun-pei, Jan. 65–						
1st Machine-building	I & C	11	2	2	1	✓
Tuan Chün-yi, Sept. 60–						
2nd Machine-building	NDI	3	—	2	1	
Liu Chieh, Sept. 60–						
3rd Machine-building	NDI	4	4	—	—	
Head vacant						
4th Machine-building	NDI	7	—	2	5	
Wang Cheng, May 63–						
5th Machine-building	NDI	7	1	2	4	
Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng, Sept. 63–						
6th Machine-building	NDI	5	—	3	2	
Fang Ch'iang, Sept. 63–						
7th Machine-building	NDI	1	—	1	—	
Wang Ping-chang, Jan. 65–						
8th Machine-building	I & C	6	2	1	3	✓
Ch'en Cheng-jen, Aug. 59–						
Metallurgical Industry	I & C	10	2	4	4	✓
Lu Tung, July 64–						
Petroleum Industry	I & C	10	2	3	5	
Yü Ch'iu-li, Feb. 58–						
Posts and Telecommunications	I & C	8	1	2	5	
*Chu Hsueh-fan, Oct. 49–						
Railways	I & C	9	3	1	5	✓
Lü Cheng-ts'ao, Jan. 65–						
State Farms and Land Reclamation	A & F	8	3	2	3	
Wang Chen, May 56–						
Textile Industry	I & C	8	—	3	5	
Head vacant						
Water Conservancy and Electric						
Power	I & C	12	1	5	6	
*Fu Tso-yi, Oct. 49–						

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TABLE II—*continued*

	System	Number of known leaders	Pre- sumed purged	Pre- sumed still in office	Status un- known	Chief execu- tive purged
5 Special Agencies:		22	5	3	14	2
Agricultural Bank	A & F	3	—	1	2	
Hu Ching-yun, Nov. 63–						
People's Bank	F & T	6	—	1	5	
Hu Li-ch'iao (acting), Oct. 66–						
Bureau, Industry and Commerce ^b	n.k.	4	4	—	—	✓
Hsu Ti-hsin, Nov. 54–						
Bureau, Scientific and						
Technological Cadres ^b	n.k.	3	—	1	2	
Yueh Chih-chien, Oct. 64–						
Bureau, Statistics	P & S	6	1	—	5	✓
Wang Szu-hua, July 61–						
5 Party Political Departments:		6	4	—	2	2
Agriculture and Forestry	F & T	1	1	—	—	
Head not known						
Finance and Trade	F & T	3	1	—	2	✓
Yao Yi-lin, May 64–						
Industry and Communications	I & C	2	2	—	—	✓
Ku Mu, April 64–						
National Defence Industry	NDI	—	—	—	—	
Head not known						
Capital Construction ^c		—	—	—	—	
Head not known						
All 52 Organs		337	112	88	137	20
(incl. overlapping in offices)						

^c A parallel staff office never appears to have been set up nor have any personnel been listed for the political department.

top-ranking survivor, Li Hsien-nien, while the head of National Defence Industry is still unknown. Among the individual ministries, the least affected were the six organs headed by non-Party officials and five out of the six military-oriented Ministries of Machine-building.

Planning and Statistics

The system of planning is directed not by a staff office of the State Council like the other four major systems but by a commission which is equivalent in power and importance. Besides this directing body, the State Planning Commission, the system consists of the State Economic Commission, the State Bureau of Statistics, the National Price Control Commission, the State Capital Construction Commission and the parallel political department of the Party. It includes 48 leading posts assumed by 45 leaders, three of whom hold two offices within the system.

TABLE III

Impact on Functional Systems

	Number of con- stituent organs	Number of known leaders	Pre- sumed purged	Pre- sumed still in office	Status un- known	Organs with purged head	System head purged
Planning and Statistics Head: Li Fu-ch'un	6	45 (100%)	21 (47%)	9 (20%)	15 (33%)	4	
Agriculture and Forestry Head: T'an Chen-lin	5	39 (100%)	17 (44%)	7 (18%)	15 (38%)	2	✓
Industry and Communications Head: Po I-po	20	143 (100%)	35 (25%)	38 (27%)	70 (50%)	11	✓
Finance and Trade Head: Li Hsien-nien	9	51 (100%)	18 (35%)	15 (29%)	18 (35%)	2	
National Defence Industry Head: unknown	9	37 (100%)	10 (27%)	13 (35%)	14 (38%)	0	

Almost half the known leaders of this system—21 out of 45—are presumed to have been purged. On the purge list are the heads of four out of six of the constituent units. Eight out of the 17 deputy directors of the State Planning Commission were purged including Po Yi-po, concurrently director of the State Economic Commission; eight out of eleven of Po's deputy directors were also purged, including Ch'ai Shu-fan, also a deputy director of the State Planning Commission. Four out of the nine top officials of the State Capital Construction Commission are out of action including its director, Ku Mu, concurrently director of the Party's Industry and Communications Political Department, as are two out of the three leading officials of the National Price Control Commission, including its director, Hsueh Mu-ch'iao, and the director of the State Statistics Bureau, Wang Szu-hua.

While the fortunes of some 15 leaders of this system remain unknown, the number of leaders who continue to appear in public is very small. They include only five out of 17 deputy directors of the State Planning Commission: Ch'en Po-ta, Li Hsien-nien, Teng Tzu-hui, Fang Yi, director of the Economic Relations Commission and Yü Ch'iu-li, Minister of the Petroleum Industry (a surprising survivor in view of the virulence of the attack to which he was subjected in posters and Red Guard papers), two deputy directors of the State Economic Commission, Kao Yang-wen and Yuan Pao-hua, who also survived attack and one deputy director of the State Capital Construction Commission, Hsieh Pei-yi. Because of the severe impact of the Cultural Revolution on planning personnel, there is some doubt whether any of the organs in this system are still functioning.

Agriculture and Forestry

The Agriculture and Forestry system contains, in addition to its commanding Staff Office and Political Department, the three Ministries of Agriculture, Forestry and State Farms and Land Reclamation. Its 40 leading offices consist of four chief executive positions and 36 deputy posts, held by 39 leaders, with Liao Lu-yen serving as the Minister of Agriculture and a deputy director in the commanding Staff Office. Altogether, 17 leaders, or 44 per cent. have been purged. The purge victims include not only the two most prominent figures, T'an Chen-lin and Liao Lu-yen, but also five out of the other nine deputy directors of the commanding Staff Office, five out of the eight Deputy Ministers of Agriculture, three out of the seven Deputy Ministers of State Farms and Land Reclamation, plus one Deputy Minister of Forestry and the only known official of the Party Political Department, a deputy director. While no information is available about 15 deputies, including two non-Party people, only seven ministers or deputies seem to remain in office, four in the Ministry of Forestry, including its non-Party Minister and a non-Party Deputy Minister, a deputy Minister of Agriculture and General Wang Chen, the Minister of State Farms and Land Reclamation who was attacked but survived along with his Deputy Minister Hsiao K'e.

Industry and Communications

The Industry and Communications system, which remained the largest system even after National Defence Industry split off from it in 1965, consists of 18 ministries. Its 143 leading positions are held by 143 leaders none of whom holds overlapping office within the system. At least 35, including the head of this system Po Yi-po, the Director of the Party Political Department, Ku Mu, and nine Ministers (Liu Yü-min, Chang Lin-chih, Sun Ta-kuang, Ma Wen-jui, Hsu Yun-pei, Tuan Chün-yi, Ch'en Cheng-jen, Lu Tung, and Lü Cheng-ts'ao) are believed to have been purged. Although the percentage of purged officials in this system is lower than in Agriculture and Forestry—25 per cent. compared to 44 per cent.—in terms of the purge victims and the number of organs involved, this system has been hit equally severely.

Finance and Trade

The Finance and Trade system consists of five ministries, Aquatic Products, Commerce, Finance, Food, and Foreign Trade, plus two special agencies, the Agricultural Bank and the People's Bank. 18 or 35 per cent. of the 51 known leading officials who hold a total of 55 posts are believed to have lost their positions. But none of the purged

leaders in this system is a chief executive except Yao Yi-lin, a deputy director of the Staff Office and concurrently director of the Party Political Department and Minister of Commerce. The other purged leaders include two other deputy directors of the Staff Office, six Deputy Ministers of Commerce, five Deputy Ministers and one Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade, and a Deputy Minister of Aquatic Products, another of Finance, and another of Food. The head of this system and Minister of Finance, Li Hsien-nien, has clearly survived the campaign as have the heads or acting heads of five other units—the Ministries of Aquatic Products, Food and Foreign Trade, the Agricultural Bank and the People's Bank. As the only top economic administrator in the new Politburo, Li's importance in the economic leadership can be said to have advanced as a result of the Cultural Revolution. He is also thought to be acting as Foreign Minister in place of the demoted Ch'en Yi. The fact that Li has survived and even been promoted may be connected with the relatively slight effect of the Cultural Revolution on the Finance and Trade system.

National Defence Industry

The formation of the system of National Defence Industry was not publicly acknowledged until February 1967 when Chao Erh-lu died and was identified as deputy director of a Staff Office of National Defence Industry and concurrently director of the corresponding Party Political Department. The system was probably established sometime in 1964–65 when the expansion of military ministries warranted an independent functional system.

Although the exact scope of this important system is not known, it is believed to include at least the six military-oriented Ministries of Machine-building numbered two to seven which are presumably responsible for the production of military equipment and weapons. It may also include some of the heavy industrial ministries listed under the Industry and Communications system as well as the State Scientific and Technological Commission which is believed to supervise the nuclear programme. Since no confirmation can be obtained, we will define this system to include seven organs besides the Staff Office and Party Political Department—the six Ministries of Machine-building and the State Scientific and Technological Commission.

These seven units have 37 leading posts held by 37 Party leaders, most of whom have military backgrounds and some of whom still hold office in the People's Liberation Army. Only 10 people or 27 per cent. are presumed to have been ousted. No officials are known to have been purged in the Machine-building Ministries except for the 3rd which lost

all its four known deputy ministers: Liu Ting, Liu Ping-yen, Wu Jung-feng and Tuan Tzu-chun and the 5th which lost a deputy minister who had earlier been in the 3rd. Even the deceased Minister of the 3rd, Sun Chih-yuan, an alternate member of the Central Committee and member of the National Defence Council, was branded as an anti-Maoist element in Red Guard newspapers after his death in October 1966.⁶ The State Scientific and Technological Commission is also assumed to have lost five out of its nine known deputy directors including two alternate members of the Central Committee, Han Kuang and Chang Ching-fu. This purge pattern suggests that Mao's control over these two organs and hence over the nuclear programme may have been insecure and that he swept them clean in order to establish firm Maoist command in this vital field.

The director of the Scientific and Technological Commission, Nieh Jung-chen, survived the campaign as a member of the Central Committee although he was dropped from the Politburo. In his appearances after the Ninth Congress he was identified only as a vice-chairman of the Party's Military Affairs Committee, thereby raising the possibility that he may have been removed from his directorship of the Commission. In contrast to Nieh, two of the remaining Ministers of Machine-building, Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng of the 5th and Wang Ping-chang of the 7th, were promoted to full membership of the Central Committee. Three other Ministers—Liu Chieh of the 2nd, Wang Cheng of the 4th and Fang Ch'iang of the 6th also survived as did a deputy director of the Scientific and Technological Commission and a deputy minister each of the 2nd, 5th and 6th Ministries of Machine-building. Because of its classified nature, this system may have maintained closer ties with the Party's Military Affairs Committee than with the State Council. Red Guard publications suggested that before the Cultural Revolution it had been under the leadership of Ho Lung and Lo Jui-ching, the purged Deputy Chairman and Secretary-General of the Military Affairs Committee. Another possible head is Nieh Jung-chen.

BACKGROUNDS OF VICTIMS AND SURVIVORS

No single factor in the backgrounds of the Party economic leaders seems to have been decisive or even instrumental in placing them in the category of victims or survivors. But it is still possible to differentiate between the typical purge victim and the typical survivor. The victim would be more likely to be from a bourgeois family; he would tend to be better educated and of greater seniority within the economic

⁶ Chao Erh-lu was also criticized by Red Guards after his death in 1967.

elite than the survivors. He would also tend to come from the north of China while the survivors are predominantly from the south.

Age appears to have had no clear correlation with the leaders' fortunes in the Cultural Revolution. When the four groups are viewed together, the purged leaders are on average about two years younger than the surviving leaders. But when each group is taken separately, there is no obvious pattern: in Groups 1 and 3, the purged leaders are younger while in groups 2 and 4 they are older.

TABLE IV

	<i>Age</i>						
	Presumed purged		Presumed still in office				
	Average age as of 1966	No. of persons	Ages known	Average age as of 1966	No. of persons	Ages known	Average age as of 1966
Group 1	64.1 yrs.	2	2	62.0	6	6	65.0 yrs.
Group 2	58.4 *	14	13	58.0	8	8	57.4
Group 3	58.2	26	21	56.6	29	22	57.6
Group 4	53.8	55	31	55.6	28	6	54.0
Total Party groups	56.6 *	97	67	56.7	71	42	58.1

* The average age of Group 2 would drop from 58.4 years to 57.8, and hence the over-all average for all four CCP groups from 56.6 to 56.4 years, if adjustment is made to exclude the three deceased leaders of Group 2, *i.e.*, Chao Erh-lu, Sun Chih-yuan and Yeh Chi-chuang who were, respectively, 61, 55, and 73 as of 1966.

Although the data on social origin are far from complete, they indicate that leaders of bourgeois or landlord origin were more vulnerable to the purge than peasants and workers. Three-quarters of the purge victims whose backgrounds are known are bourgeois, while over half of the survivors are from worker or peasant families. However, bourgeois background was not an independent variable since the altogether bourgeois non-Party leaders were almost untouched by the purge. What the Cultural Revolution confirmed is that while social origin might be irrelevant for top-ranking leaders in normal times, their non-proletarian backgrounds count against them when they fall out of political favour.⁷

A similar point could be made about the importance of education. Although intellectuals were a prime target of the purge and the purged

⁷ A number of leading officials who had formerly been credited with favourable class backgrounds were suddenly labelled bourgeois. Liu Shao-chi, for example, had been classed as a middle peasant and T'an Chen-lin, whose father worked as a clerk in a mine, as a poor worker; after being attacked as revisionists, both were reclassified as landlords. It seems that the most easily interchangeable backgrounds for Chinese officials are middle and rich peasants, and rich peasants and landlords, since the definition of these "classes" is largely a matter of the Party's interpretation.

TABLE V

Social Origin

	Presumed purged			Presumed still in office		
	Peasant or worker	Bourgeois or landlord	Unknown	Peasant or worker	Bourgeois or landlord	Unknown
Group 1	—	2	—	2	2	2
Group 2	2	4	8	4	1	3
Group 3	3	11	12	6	9	14
Group 4	4	13	38	1	1	26
Total Party groups	9	30	58	13	13	45

leaders as a group were better educated than the survivors, they were not purged simply because they had had a higher education. 45 out of the 50 purged persons whose education backgrounds are known had attended universities as compared to only 22 out of the 34 survivors. Of these 22, 12 studied abroad, seven of them in the Soviet Union: Ch'en Po-ta of Group 1; Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng, Fang Ch'iang and Wang Ping-chang of Group 2; and Chang Chin-ch'iu, Hsia Chih-hsu and Li-Ch'iang of Group 4. Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng, Wang Ping-chang and Li Ch'iang were newly elevated to the Central Committee. Soviet training was clearly not held to be a negative factor.

TABLE VI

Education

	Presumed purged			Presumed still in office		
	No higher education	Higher education	Education unknown	No higher education	Higher education	Education unknown
Group 1	1	1	—	2	4	—
Group 2	2	7	5	3	4	1
Group 3	1	14	11	5	13	11
Group 4	1	23	31	2	1	25
Total Party groups	5	45	47	12	22	37

Northerners appear to have been more vulnerable to the attacks of the Cultural Revolution than southerners, but there is no immediately apparent explanation. 23 natives of the four northern provinces of Shansi, Hopei, Shantung and Shensi, or about 55 per cent. of their total of 41 are believed to have been ousted, and only four persons thus far are known to remain in office. Shansi alone lost 10 out of its 14 economic leaders, including the most prominent figure, Vice-Premier Po Yi-po—the heaviest casualties from a single province. The fall of at least five persons of Shansi origin—K'ung Hsiang-ch'en, Deputy Minister of the 1st Ministry of Light Industry; Liu Tai-fang, deputy director of the National Price Control Commission; Liu Yü-min, Minister of

Building and deputy director of the State Capital Construction Commission; Niu P'ei-tung, deputy director of the Staff Office of Finance and Trade; and Sung Shao-wen, deputy director of the State Planning Commission, may have resulted from their personal relationship with Po Yi-po.⁸ Hopei and Shantung each lost half their leaders, and another northern province, Shensi, lost three out of seven. Thus the Cultural Revolution leaves the economic leadership dominated by southerners by a wider margin than before.

TABLE VII

Native Provinces

Total of Party economic leaders per province				Presumed purged	Presumed still in office
Hunan (S)	16	5	10
Shansi (N)	14	10	1
Kiangsu (S)	11	4	4
Hopei (N)	10	5	—
Shantung (N)	10	5	2
Shensi (N)	7	3	1
Hupei (S)	7	3	4
Szechwan (S)	6	1	4
Anhwei (S)	6	2	3
Liaoning (N)	4	2	1
Chekiang (S)	4	1	3
Fukien (S)	4	—	4
Honan (S)	4	1	1
Kwangsi (S)	4	3	1
Kiangsi (S)	3	3	—
Kwangtung (S)	2	1	1
Kirin (N)	2	1	1
Heilungkiang (N)	1	—	1
Kweichow (S)	1	1	1
Total ...				50	43
Northerners				26	7
Southerners				24	36

The numbers of the purged and of those presumed still in office do not add up to the total of 116 because of the exclusion of those whose fortunes in the Cultural Revolution are unknown.

Hunan, the home of Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, still ranks first as the supplier of the largest number of economic leaders, with 10 of its 16 persons presumably remaining in office. All three leaders

⁸ While I have no hard evidence to support the argument that Shansi people fell because of Po Yi-po, my experience in the Ministry of Finance supports this assumption. The Shansi people in the Ministry were a group with a strong sense of provincial identity and close ties to Po Yi-po, who was Minister of Finance before 1954. Even after Po was transferred to the State Council's Economic Commission, these ties continued. I know that Po maintained good relations with some of the Shansi people in other government agencies including the five purge victims listed above.

known to be from Kiangsi are believed to have been purged: Ch'en Cheng-jen, Minister of the 8th Ministry of Machine-building; Yao Yi-lin, Minister of Commerce; and K'uang Fu-chao, a Vice-Minister of Geology. In contrast, all four persons known to be from Fukien still remain in leadership posts: Ch'en Po-ta, Teng Tzu-hui, Fang Yi and Lin Hai-yun.

The longer a leader's seniority in the economic leadership, the greater the likelihood that he would have been a purge victim. Almost all the members of the 1966 leadership had been in economic posts continuously since their first appointments. When the years of the major governmental reshuffles after National People's Congresses are taken as a dividing line, the most senior group of leaders—those appointed before October 1954—is shown to have the highest percentage of purge victims: 47 per cent., while the least senior group—those appointed after September 1959—has the lowest percentage: 30 per cent. Similarly, the most senior group has the highest proportion of leaders presumed to have remained in office: 41 as compared to 20 for the least senior group.

TABLE VIII

		<i>Seniority</i>					
Appointed before	Total	Presumed purged		Presumed still in office		Status unknown	
Oct. 1954 ...	51	24	47%	21	41%	6	12%
Appointed Oct. 1954–							
Sept. 1959 ...	114	35	31%	25	22%	54	47%
Appointed after							
Sept. 1959 ...	129	38	30%	25	20%	66	51%
Total ...	294	97	33%	71	24%	126	43%

Most of the economic elite had records of service with the Red Army before they took economic jobs. Among these veterans, a slightly disproportionate number had served under Lin Piao in the Fourth Field Army. It might be expected that these links with Lin Piao would have helped the Fourth Army veterans to survive the Cultural Revolution. The data do not show a decisive pattern but they do indicate that Fourth Army veterans fared slightly better than the other economic leaders. There were six victims and nine survivors among Fourth Field Army veterans, whereas among the other veterans, 36 were purged and only 23 still appear as economic leaders.

The six purge victims who once served with the Fourth Field Army include four men in Group 2; Ch'en Man-yuan, Deputy Minister of State Farms and Land Reclamation; Ch'eng Tzu-hua, deputy director of the State Planning Commission; Lü Cheng-ts'ao, Minister of Railways; and Sun Ta-kuang, Minister of Communications; one from Group 3:

Chung Tzu-yun, Deputy Minister of Coal Industry; and one from Group 4, Wei Chin-fei, deputy director of the Staff Office of Finance and Trade. Except for Sun Ta-kung, the other three from Group 2 were Central Committee members who were dropped at the recent Ninth Party Congress. At least two of them, Lü Cheng-ts'ao and Ch'eng Tzu-hua, must be suspected of strong links to military leaders other than Lin Piao even though they shared some fighting experience with him. Both were accused of being members of Ho Lung's "counter-revolutionary clique." Lü was acting commander of Ho's 120th Division in 1939 and Ch'eng, a former political commissar under Lü Cheng-ts'ao, as a native of Shansi was also very close to Po Yi-po.

The nine survivors from the Fourth Field Army group include three in Group 1: Li Hsien-nien, Nieh Jung-chen and Teng Tzu-hui; two in Group 2: Fang Ch'iang, Minister of the 6th Ministry of Machine-building and Hsiao K'e, Deputy Minister of State Farms and Land Reclamation; two in Group 3: Feng Chung-yun, Deputy Minister of Water Conservancy and Electric Power; and Chung Fu-hsiang, Deputy Minister of Posts and Telecommunications and two in Group 4: Chou Chih-p'ing, Deputy Minister of Metallurgical Industry, who became a full member of the Ninth Central Committee, and Tu Hsing-yuan, Deputy Minister of Water Conservancy and Electric Power.

The survival of the three top leaders from Group 1 may have been partly due to their connexion and relationship with Lin Piao, although both Li Hsien-nien and Nieh Jung-chen are considered by many observers to have been under Premier Chou En-lai's protection. Li is not only a fellow-provincial of Lin's from Hupei, but was his vice-commander in the Fourth Field Army; Nieh was Lin's political commissar in the 1st Army Corps during the Long March and later became his vice-commander in the 115th Division in Yen-an, even though he did not follow Lin through the Civil War. Teng Tzu-hui, as Lin's former political commissar in the Fourth Field Army and as a fellow-provincial

TABLE IX

Military Background

	Presumed purged			Presumed still in office		
	Number of leaders	4th Field Army veterans	Veterans of other forces	Number of leaders	4th Field Army veterans	Veterans of other forces
Group 1	2	—	2	6	3	1
Group 2	14	4	4	8	2	5
Group 3	26	1	13	29	2	12
Group 4	55	1	17	28	2	5
All four Party groups	97	6	36	71	9	23

of Ch'en Po-ta from Fukien, may have been able to use his personal relationship with both these two prominent Maoists to help him survive heated attack.

THE NEW ECONOMIC ELITE

Although no successors to the purged leaders have been announced, a new inner core of economic leaders can be seen as having emerged since the Ninth Party Congress. This group consists of the members of the 1966 economic leadership who are members of the new Ninth Central Committee. There were 26 economic leaders on the Eighth Central Committee as of 1966: 14 full members and 12 alternates with seven of the full members serving on the Politburo. By the Ninth Congress, three of these 26 people had died. Another 15 were dropped from the Central Committee, all apparently purge victims except Hsiao K'e, who reappeared on National Day, 1969. Only eight were re-elected to the new Central Committee. Since three of the eight who were re-elected were dropped from the Politburo, only five members of the top economic elite can be said to have survived the Cultural Revolution without any loss of status. 10 other members of the economic leadership were elevated to the Central Committee for the first time at the Ninth Congress. Together with the eight retained leaders, this makes a total of 18 economic officials on the current committee as compared to 17 other members of the government, 127 members of the PLA and 56 non-military members of local revolutionary committees. Thus the economic elite lost eight votes in spite of the enlargement of the committee by some 100 seats. Only two economic leaders are on the Politburo now as compared to seven before, and one of them, Ch'en Po-ta, is much less concerned with the economy than with general political matters.

The new core group, all full members of the Central Committee except two alternates, Hsu Ch'ih and Fang Yi, are: (Veteran members are identified with asterisk)

- Group 1 *Ch'en Po-ta, promoted to Politburo Standing Committee
- *Li Hsien-nien, re-elected to Politburo
- *Ch'en Yun, dropped from Politburo
- *Li Fu-ch'un, dropped from Politburo
- *Nieh Jung-chen, dropped from Politburo
- *Teng Tzu-hui, re-elected member of Central Committee
- Group 2 *Wang Chen (Minister, State Farms and Land Reclamation, member, National Defence Council)
- *Fang Yi (director, Economic Relations Commission, deputy director, State Planning Commission)

Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng (Minister, 5th Machine-building, member, National Defence Council)

Wang Ping-chang (Minister, 7th Machine-building, member, National Defence Council)

Group 3 Ch'ien Chih-kuang (Deputy Minister, Textile Industry)

Lai Chi-fa (Minister, Building Materials)

Li Ch'iang (Deputy Minister, Foreign Trade)

Li Szu-kuang (Minister, Geology)

Yu Ch'iu-li (Minister, Petroleum Industry)

Group 4 Chou Chih-p'ing (Deputy Minister, Metallurgical Industry)

Hsu Ch'ih (Deputy Minister, Metallurgical Industry)

Liu Wei (Deputy Minister, 2nd Machine-building)

The new top economic elite is the same average age as the previous group, 63. Three persons were over 70: Li Szu-kuang, 80; Teng Tzu-hui, 76; and Nieh Jung-chen, 70. Seven persons were between 60 and 69: Ch'en Po-ta, 65; Ch'en Yun and Li Hsien-nien, 64; Ch'ien Chih-kuang, 62; and Li Ch'iang and Wang Chen, both 60. Six persons were under 60: Fang Yi and Lai Chi-fa, 59; Wang Ping-chang, 58; Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng, 57; Yü Ch'iu-li, 54. The youngest, Chou Chih-p'ing was 53.

The newly elevated leaders average 60 years old, as compared to 66 years for the retained and 62 for the demoted leaders. If 80-year-old Li Szu-kuang is excluded, the new leaders would average 58 years, or eight years younger than that of the retained leaders and four years younger than the demoted ones. But although the new leaders are younger, they by no means represent the younger generation of the revolution. Except for the special case of Li Szu-kuang, who became a Communist in 1958, the promoted leaders all joined the Party before the Sino-Japanese war. All but three military men who were given economic posts after 1962 (Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng, Political Commissar of the Artillery Force since 1957; Chou Chih-p'ing, ranking officer of the Air Force; and Wang Ping-chang, Vice-Commander of the Air Force since 1954) are long-established members of the economic elite.

The purge narrowed down the geographical distribution of the economic core group from 13 to seven provinces, Hunan with five leaders (it lost three and gained three), Szechwan and Fukien with three each, Hupei with two and one each from Shantung, Kiangsu and Anhwei. Except for one person from Shantung who was newly elevated to prominence, all members of the new core group are from the southern part of China.

Six members of the core group are known to be from peasant families, two from worker families and four have landlord or bourgeois

backgrounds. All the newly elevated leaders whose origins are known, except Li Szu-kuang, came from peasant backgrounds: Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng, Chou Chih-p'ing, Lai Chi-fa, Wang Ping-chang and Yü Ch'iu-li. In contrast, of the eight purged leaders whose origins are known, six are classified as landlords or bourgeois: Chang Ching-fu, Ch'en Man-yuan, Han Kuang, Po Yi-po, T'an Chen-lin and Yao Yi-lin. Of the 15 leaders whose educational backgrounds are known, eight persons (five retained and three elevated) had college educations as against seven (three retained and four elevated) who had an education below this level. As a group, the newly elevated leaders are less educated than the former leadership. Of the seven new leaders, three attended institutions of higher learning as compared to nine out of 12 of the purge victims. Besides the western-educated scholar, Li Szu-kuang, the new college-educated leaders are two Soviet-trained military men: Li Ch'iang, deputy director of the Economic Relations Commission and Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, who reportedly studied in the Soviet Union for more than 10 years, and Wang Ping-chang, Minister of the 7th Ministry of Machine-building, who graduated from the Soviet Red Army College in Moscow.

All the newly elevated leaders (except Li Szu-kuang and three whose backgrounds are unknown) emerged from the PLA. At least two of them still hold important military offices: Ch'iu Ch'uang-ch'eng, a member of the National Defence Council, and Wang Ping-chang, Vice-Commander of the Air Force. These two and Chou Chih-p'ing are veterans of the Fourth Field Army. Other veterans of Lin's force in the new top elite are Li Hsien-nien, Teng Tzu-hui and Nieh Jung-chen.

China's economic elite as constituted in 1966 has clearly suffered considerably as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Not only have over a third of the leaders apparently lost their jobs; the remaining group has lost influence as measured by their reduced share of seats on the Central Committee. The new leadership can be said to conform more closely to the Maoist ideal in the sense that it is less dominated by intellectuals (as defined by a college-level education) and contains a higher proportion of workers and peasants. But there is no reason to assume that the known members of the new elite, all of them experienced bureaucrats, will carry out their responsibilities any differently from the previous leadership. The big question mark is the successors to the 98 leaders believed to have been purged.

If these jobs are filled by promotions from within the administration, then the economic elite could be expected to function much as before. The leadership might choose to leave a number of the posts vacant in accordance with Mao's strictures on simplifying administration and

decentralizing economic decision-making. A reduction in the number of the top-level personnel would not necessarily impair the operation of the administration so long as all the key posts in the major units were filled. But the opportunity might also be taken to introduce large numbers of new cadres whose principal qualifications are their proletarian backgrounds and Maoist fervour. The absence of experienced administrators in the central ministries might prove particularly damaging at the time when inexperienced local officials are being given greater responsibility for managing economic enterprises.

At the time of the twentieth anniversary of the Communist regime, six months after the Ninth Party Congress had signalled the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Government began to show a renewed interest in the economy. But there was still no indication that any decisions had been taken about rebuilding the economic administration. China effectively did without an economic leadership for the three years of the Cultural Revolution when the economy was allowed to run down to part steam. But if Mao and his colleagues are truly intent on economic development, they cannot do without a functioning administration much longer.

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R. F. PRICE

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