Politics in Yunnan Province in the Decade of Disorder: Elite Factional Strategies and Central-local Relations, 1967–1980*

Dorothy J. Solinger

In the wake of the watershed events of 1967, most of the analysis of Chinese domestic politics has focused on the fallen " four," subsequent purges of Leftists and their replacement by " pragmatists," and the no longer guarded " reassessment " of the old Chairman's role in the Chinese revolution. This discussion has usually been directed at the personnel in the capital. This article will take a look at what has been happening in one part of the hinterland of late, as it elaborates a framework for interpreting central-local elite behaviour. It will develop this framework on the basis of a close reading of the events in one province, Yunnan, over the decade or so of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath.

Yunnan province is a particularly apt one for use in illustrating the politics of inter-echelon relations in this period, as its history then was characterized by much factionalism, shifting alliances, personnel changes and general upheaval. In fact, Western observers grouped this province with three others as " four of the most seriously factionalized and politically unstable provinces . . . [which were] cited officially by Beijing as members of a group of seven provinces whose industrial output was most seriously damaged by the Gang."[1]

The argument here will use as its data information about personnel changes; statements in the press attributed to various central and local politicians; and *ex post facto* attacks made on these politicians, in particular, charges of their having formed plots and of connections between individuals. These various sorts of material, of course, have varying degrees of reliability. There is no reason to think that personnel shifts reported in the Chinese press cannot be accepted as fact. It is possible, on the other hand, that statements attributed to political actors, especially actors under attack, may be distorted or taken out of context; and the activities they are said to have engaged in may have been exaggerated for purposes of heightening the criticism.

* Much of this paper has benefited from discussions with William Abnett, Parris Chang, Harry Harding, Richard C. Kraus, Hong Yung Lee and Robert Suettinger. The comments of several anonymous readers were also extremely useful in stimulating my revision. An earlier version was presented at the 1981 meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, held in Toronto.

1. Robert Michael Field, Kathleen M. McGlynn and William B. Abnett, " Political conflict and industrial growth in China: 1965–1977," *Chinese Economy Post-Mao: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. Volume I: Policy and Performance* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 250. See also Lucian Pye, *The Dynamics of Factions and Consensus in Chinese Politics: A Model and Some Propositions*, a Project Air Force report prepared for the United States Air Force (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1980), p. 193. Pye lists Yunnan, along with Sichuan, Liaoning, and Fujian, as provinces that " had great trouble " (meaning in recent years).

In order to take these very real possibilities into account, I have not presented these stories in the absolute terms used in the Chinese media, but I have chosen to accept as containing some measure of accuracy the accounts of links between actors. For, ironically, such tales often seem likely to be true precisely because the recounters of the liaisons have frequently avoided naming their targets, and have generally resorted to much innuendo in their presentation, innuendo which has often required a mix of research and informed conjecture to unravel. My conjectures have rested upon information about the careers of the individuals concerned, not all of which has made its way into this paper, and on general knowledge about the operation of the Cultural Revolution and the conduct of Chinese politics in its wake.

The analysis here draws upon, but diverges from, existing theories of elite factional strategies in China.[2] Other writers have either focused on the politics at the central level,[3] or else they have discussed local cadres simply to the extent of noting that they must " respond to whatever happens above " in their striving for protection by powerful figures.[4] This article considers the behaviour of both central-level and local-level figures. It assumes that they have interests which join them in patterns of mutual dependence, as one previous analyst has noted.[5] It also maintains that local politicians in particular have separate goals as well.

Specifically, this study of Yunnan over the years 1967–80 assumes that central leaders vie in a national arena to mould individual provinces into power bases for themselves. This they do largely through the placement and removal of provincial-level elites, whom they presume will exhibit loyalty to themselves. But these local-level leaders must balance at least two sometimes incompatible aims as they calculate their own best survival strategies.

On the one hand, local elites are naturally concerned about protecting and improving their own *careers*, a goal which generally dictates their showing allegiance to a given national leader with whom they are connected, at least while that national-level leader is in a position to help them. Attention to one's career, however, also entails judicious shifting of allegiance should one's patron lose power on a national scale.

In addition, local leaders have a second end, which causes them to direct some of their activity to their own arena of power, the province. Especially in times of instability and disunity within China as a whole, and particularly in provinces where factionalism is rampant such as was the case in Yunnan in this period, local leaders have had to be conscious of maintaining and constantly fighting for *their own power within the province*. Doing this involves using a variety of strategies, of which

2. In particular, Pye, *op. cit* and Andrew J. Nathan, " A factional model for CCP politics," *The China Quarterly*, No. 53 (1973), pp. 34–66.

3. Nathan, *op. cit.* p. 35.

4. Pye, *op. cit.* pp. 21, 171.

5. *Ibid.* p. vi, notes that there is an " intense attraction of mutual dependency in Chinese culture between superiors and subordinates, each of whom needs the other for his own protection and each of whom is vulnerable to the other." This point is also elaborated on pp. 20 and 171–72.

soliciting support from the central level is only one. These strategies may include creating new local alliances, building support at lower levels (in the counties), attempting to take over provincial mass organizations or political offices and befriending newcomers to the province.

Thus, shows of obedience and loyalty to patrons are only one aspect of local leaders' alliance-formation behaviour; self-serving manoeuvre within their own provinces is another.[6] In short, the degree of autonomy and manoeuvring practised by provincial-level politicians appears to be dependent on these factors: their patrons' standing in the national political arena at a given time; the extent of local factionalism in their home base; and the stability and unity in national politics as a whole.

Besides the somewhat sceptical approach to sources, the use of conjecture, and the interpretative framework outlined above, the conclusions in this paper rest on two additional sorts of assumptions about the Chinese political system. First of all, I assume that the behaviour of leaders at both levels as revealed in the press is active, not passive behaviour for the most part, i.e. that it generally involves purposive efforts to manipulate local political events. Obviously, not all such efforts are successful or attain the solutions sought. But the analysis here nevertheless still makes the assumption that, given the local context (a context I will sketch at each juncture), the actions of politicians were actions chosen to deal with that context.

A second assumption is that there are long-standing ties between central and local politicians, an assumption I am forced to make if I state that a certain central leader has deputed a " follower " to Yunnan, as he tries to shore up a power base for himself. I also need to make this assumption since I intend to note that some local official has shifted his support away from a former " patron " to whom he had been tied in the past.

In the main, Chinese sources will not openly indicate this sort of connection between individuals at different levels. Thus, I have relied upon some shorthand indicators of factional connections between local and national elites, such as Field Army affiliations; past working ties within the same geographical area; functional links (that is, that the individuals in question had at one time worked for the same office in Beijing or elsewhere or had been part of the same functional system); sameness of political beliefs (to the extent that this can be uncovered for these politicians, but often it cannot); and shared fate in the Cultural Revolution.

None of these clues to possible connections is foolproof. Members of the same Field Army can be as far apart politically as Xie Fuzhi and Deng Xiaoping, both of whom ranked high in the Second Field Army which has been tied to Yunnan. Enmities as well as loyalties could conceivably be spawned by working together in a region or in an office.

6. Of course, one *could* assume that every move made by every local leader was made in response to orders from central-level figures. However, the sources show such evidence of complicated rivalries and jockeyings for power within the province that it is difficult to believe that the local scene itself is not an important factor influencing local elite behaviour.

Often there are no data on political beliefs of politicians in the provinces, yet one is reluctant to assume that an individual sided with the radicals simply beause we know that he survived the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, some of the more prominent politicians in Yunnan in recent years seem to be competent administrators who were never radical, but who somehow continued to work in the early 1970s and somehow escaped becoming the focus of any serious radical attack in that period. Thus, all told, this assumption of liaisons between leaders and the grounds used for adducing evidence of these ties again contains a degree of speculation and informed inference. Where the argument relies principally on what I consider to be essentially good guesses, I will so indicate.

The paper will begin by setting the context, through sketching some features of the province that have had a bearing on political life there over the years. It will go on to describe the political events in Yunnan during three periods since 1967 (the Cultural Revolution, the early 1970s, and the first four years following Mao's death); and it will detail the factional strategies chosen by key leaders in each period. The conclusion will draw on the material on Yunnan to make observations about the behavioural aspects of central-local relations during this period in the People's Republic of China. Although the Yunnan case, for all its disorder, may be atypical, still for that very reason it may be especially useful in illuminating the sorts of activities probably resorted to elsewhere in China (if perhaps less frequently) whenever power is fluid.

The Setting: Yunnan as a Troubled Province

Yunnan province has been the site of more disorder over the past decade-and-a-half than most other provinces. This is evident first of all in the fact that, despite repeated pressure from Beijing (in part, at least, deriving from a fear that the unrest on that border was doing damage to the cause of the Vietnamese revolutionaries), Yunnan was quite late in setting up both its revolutionary committee and its new Party committee in the Cultural Revolution. In both cases, it was the 25th provincial-level unit to form these new organs, its revolutionary committee finally being created, after many central-level efforts at reconciliation of the factions, in August 1968; its Party committee was not rebuilt until June 1971. And, several years later, Yunnan was among the very earliest of the provinces to have its leadership purged in the wake of the arrest of the " gang," third only to Shanghai and Ningxia.

Besides this chaos caused by political problems, several other elements have made the province an object of worry for the central government over the years. These are its border location; its heavy concentration of minority nationalities; and vestigial pockets of Guomindang (GMD) loyalty, a function of the late liberation of this area. All of these factors have repeatedly cropped up as issues in Yunnan.

Initially the border was significant particularly because of the presence of mountainous walls flanking Burma on its west (which often rise more than a mile above almost parallel valleys), to which a remnant group of

defeated GMD soldiers fled in late 1949. There is some evidence that the GMD retained a secret service contingent on this border as late as 1977.[7] These mountains to the west have also served as a refuge and guerrilla base for dissidents. A recent example, cited in the Taiwan publication *Issues and Studies*, was a batch of " gang " supporters who, in the post-1976 purge period, armed with weapons, conducted sabotage and arms theft, and attacked military convoys in that region.[8]

A second strategic border issue, this one to the south, derives from the various wars in which Vietnam has been engaged. First, as the U.S. became more and more deeply involved in fighting in Vietnam in the mid- and especially the late-1960s and early 1970s, the PRC central government took a steady and seriously troubled interest in this particular section of the border. For example, Kang Sheng, then a top central-level leader, when meeting the Yunnanese representatives in February 1968, criticized their " aiding the enemy " by " constant seizure and counter-seizure of arms " bound for Vietnam. Zhou Enlai, also expressing his dissatisfaction, chastised the group thus: " Look at your manner of fighting in Yunnan. You have even killed Vietnamese immigrants. These things are very disquieting."[9]

In the past few years, of course, the Sino-Vietnamese War of early 1979 caused that boundary to shoot into prominence once again. In the months just preceding, during and following the confrontation, Kunming Radio blasted " armed provocations " from Vietnam, as it warned as well of the necessity for combat preparedness, along with numerous references to the importance of stability and unity on the border.[10]

Secondly, Yunnan is the residence of a large number of minority peoples. According to a 1980 PRC source, of the 31,350,000 people of Yunnan, 9,640,000 (or 30·75 per cent) belong to one of the 22 minority groups that inhabit the province.[11] No other province has such a large number of different groups. Ever since the 14th century, when the Han first began to migrate into Yunnan in numbers, friction and resentments have marked Han-minority interactions. For Han encroachment on and attempted domination of minority lands led to the displacement of minorities in many cases. At the extreme, the more hearty and resistant among them rose in rebellion, but more routinely these groups engaged in looting and raids on Han settlements and murder of the settlers.[12]

7. U.S. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (hereafter *FBIS*), 18 February 1977, pp. J9–10, speaks of a Tuan Liu-chang, " former secret agent of the Chiang Kai-shek gang" who had just "crossed over to the motherland," appearing in Yunnan province. According to the radio report, this man had been the head of the liaison centre of the Yunnan section of the " mainland work committee," which was termed " Chiang's secret service beyond the Chinese border of Yunnan."

8. Wang Hsiao-hsien, " The turmoil in Yunnan: 1976–1977," *Issues and Studies* (hereafter *I & S*), Vol. 13, No. 12 (1977), pp. 41–52.

9. Quoted in Victor C. Falkenheim, " The Cultural Revolution in Kwangsi, Yunnan and Fukien," *Asian Survey* (hereafter *AS*), Vol. 9, No. 8 (1969), pp. 580–97.

10. See *FBIS*, 24 October 1978, pp. J1–2 and 9 February 1979, pp. J1–4, for example.

11. *Zhongguo baike nianjian* (*China Encyclopedia Yearbook*) (hereafter *ZGBKNJ*) (n.p.: Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe, 1980), p. 112.

12. For a brief discussion of this, see Dorothy J. Solinger, " Minority nationalities in China's Yunnan province," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1977), pp. 1–23.

Under the Communists, periodic uprisings continued, as the minorities have shown their discontent with regime policies of " socialist transformation " and Han immigration.[13] In more recent times, certain minority groups living in the west, notably the Yi and the Hui, reportedly rose in rebellion around the time of the fall of the " gang," the Yi, initially because of food shortages, the Hui, in an attempt to establish an independent Moslem country of their own.[14]

Besides the political sensitivity of the border around Yunnan and the disquiet of its native peoples, this province has also attracted central-level attention because of its being the home of many surrendered GMD troops and petty officials. This is the result of the timing of its takeover in December 1949. As the five liberating Field Armies moved across the Chinese continent in the closing months of the civil war, Yunnan was reached almost last. Since the doom of the GMD was clearly sealed by the time its armies stood to defend Yunnan, hordes of GMD troops chose this final battleground as the place to surrender.

Also, this area had served as the site of the last mainland stand of the Nationalist Government, and many old GMD minor officials, either unable or unwilling to chance flight, stayed behind. Moreover, according to Communist charges, as some departed, secret agents were intentionally left behind by the fleeing GMD.[15] Because of this, the military in Yunnan was faced with the task of indoctrinating and then integrating into its own armies these " turncoat " generals and troops. Also the liberation in Yunnan was a peaceful one. Simultaneously with two top GMD generals in Sichuan, the governor of Yunnan, Lu Han, switched his loyalty to the invading army. Then, once Lu had shifted his own allegiance to the Communist side, he went on to proclaim the peaceful liberation of the entire province.[16]

This peaceful takeover, along with the border and minority issues, has meant that Yunnan's leaders were faced from the start with problems of security internally as well as externally. The consequent high premium on surveillance and control in this province has had implications over the years for the placement of personnel there, in ways that have had a crucial impact on political life.

Two key features of the deployment of personnel to Yunnan are related to these concerns over control there. These are the long-term association between the Second Field Army (2 FA), initially deputed to achieve the takeover of the province in 1949 and then to remain as its governors; and the tie between Yunnan and officials involved in security work, notably Xie Fuzhi.

13. For reports of resistance by the minorities in mid-1955, spring 1956, and 1957 (religiously-motivated, against agricultural collectivization, and through escape, respectively), see *Renmin ribao* (*People's Daily*) (hereafter *RMRB*), 30 July 1955; *China News Analysis* (hereafter *CNA*), No. 159; and George V. H. Moseley, *The Consolidation of the South China Frontier* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 120.

14. Wang Hsiao-hsien, *op. cit.*

15. Dorothy J. Solinger, *Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 83–84.

16. *Ibid.* p. 88.

In that era, 2 FA General Liu Bocheng was considered the Communists' number-one field commander. Moreover, according to one source, as a native of Sichuan, Liu was quite popular in his native province, and was the wielder of a vast network of relationships built up when he fought in Sichuan's civil wars during the years after the 1911 Revolution. In fact, goes the account, many of Liu's old friends were local GMD generals.[17] Also, Liu's former political and social ties to the people in Sichuan, his friendship with the warlords there, and even his facility in dealing with the local minorities had already made him valuable during the Long March when the Red Army had to pass through that province, according to another source.[18] Deng Xiaoping, Liu's political commissar, is a native Sichuanese as well.

Since the time of takeover, officers of the 2 FA, Deng's special long-term comrades-in-arms, have dominated the military life and the top political leadership of Yunnan with a fair degree of continuity over three decades.[19] In the period up to the time of the Cultural Revolution, tight connections through pre-1949 2 FA ties, common posts and superior-subordinate relationships linked together the handful of top leaders in Yunnan.

In the course of and in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, however, the influence of most of the leading 2 FA men in Yunnan was severely cut back. This fact in itself may be used as a clue that their fate was somehow linked to that of Deng, who of course also suffered in those years. As they were removed from the scene of power, a new batch of men came to hold office in Yunnan in their stead, most of whom had scant if any previous connections with the 2 FA. It was not until 1975 that, with the appearance of Jia Qiyun, one of the old 2 FA hands once again reached the pinnacle of power in Yunnan, a development timed neatly (from my perspective as observer) with the increased influence of Deng himself at that time.[20] Jia's lack of success in quelling disorders in the province, besides his other failures in living up to what must have been expected of him, led to his removal in early 1977. Jia was replaced by An Pingsheng, a close and long-time subordinate of Wei Guoqing (of the Third Field Army), under whom he had served in Guangxi province previously. Rumours have credited Wei with helping to return Deng to power in early 1977, a fact which, if true, attests to Wei's power to place personnel on a national scale at that time.

When the post of governor was recreated in January 1980, Liu

17. Liu Jin, *Chuan Kang yishou chien hou* (*Before and After Sichuan and Xikang Changed Hands*) (Hong Kong: Freedom Press, 1956).

18. (Republic of China), Office of Military History, *Liu Po-ch'eng* (Taipei: n.p., 1971).

19. See Table 1. The personnel information in it (and elsewhere below) is drawn from Dorothy J. Solinger, "Yunnan," unpublished manuscript, 1977, prepared for Edwin A. Winckler (ed.), *Provincial Handbook of China,* forthcoming; and from various directories of Chinese communist officials, notably Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921–1965* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), and Union Research Institute (ed.), *Who's Who in Communist China,* rev. edition (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969).

20. *Peking Review*, No. 52 (1978), p. 13, notes that Deng was entrusted by Mao in 1975 with the responsibility of presiding over the work of the Central Committee.

Minghui, again a man of the 2 FA, was chosen to fill it. Liu had worked as acting governor in Yunnan in earlier decades (1956–58; 1964–65). Liu's prominence in recent years, and the reappearance in pre-eminent roles of others from the 2 FA who had worked beside him in Yunnan in the 1950s, suggests that the interludes of leadership by members of other FA's in that province may have been merely temporary deviations. I speculate here that such deviations could well have been occasioned by the lack of and later the uncertainty of Deng Xiaoping's own power during most of the decade of the 1970s. Thus, the initial delegation of the 2 FA to liberate Yunnan in 1949 very likely laid the foundation for a long-term (if not a completely continuous) link between Deng and many of the leaders of that province.

But ties to Deng have been only one side of the story of the factional interplay in Yunnan that grew from the 2 FA's deployment there. A second aspect is connected with the person of Xie Fuzhi. It is possible to surmise that the manifold security concerns here sharpened the ability of Xie (who already had years of experience in " political " work in the 2 FA dating back to the 1930s) to deal with police affairs. For in 1959 Xie rose to prominence in national-level security work after his stint in that province.

Xie had served in Yunnan as first Party secretary for six years in the 1950s and as Commander of the Kunming Military Region (KMR) for two years at that time, before moving from these Yunnan jobs directly to the head of the Ministry of Public Security in Beijing in 1959. Once at the acme of national power, Xie became a politician with significant strength in his own right. Thus, when he sided with Leftists nationally during the Cultural Revolution, his political activities and alignments came to play an important role in the polarization of the Yunnan political scene. Perhaps the subordinates he left behind also helped to create a core of local Leftism. Certainly the cohorts of the 2 FA split apart at this time, some attacked (as Deng was) for revisionism, some becoming leaders of competing factions among the Leftists.

Thus, the security concerns connected with this border province laid the seeds, at least indirectly, for factional conflict that was to follow, ironically enough by calling for leadership capable of quelling disorders there. The tale that follows traces the machinations that Deng, Xie, and central-level politicians competing with them on the one side, and their respective local allies on the other, have played out over the years in their efforts to jockey for power once the latent split within the 2 FA burst open in the Cultural Revolution.

Recent Yunnanese Politics: Three Periods

The Cultural Revolution and its Legacy. The Cultural Revolution in Yunnan was an especially embittered and drawn-out affair. Though much of the intrigue behind this disorder still remains shrouded in secrecy, it is clear that the factionalism that plagues the province to this day had its origins then. Inferences from innuendoes directed against

Table 1: **Important Politicians in Yunnan Province, 1949–80**

Name	*Field Army*	*Key Positions*	*Relevant Information*
Early 1950s			
Chen Geng	2	Commander, Yun. Mil. Distr.; Governor (1950–55)	
Song Renqiong	2	Party 1st Sec'ty (1951–53)	
Guo Yingqui	2	Vice-Governor (Gov., 1955–58)	
Xie Fuzhi	2	Party 1st Sec'ty (1953–59); Kun. Mil. Rgn Cmdr (1954–56)	Minister of Public Security; important national Leftist leader in the Cultural Revolution.
Late 1950s–1965			
Yu Yichuan	2	Governor (1958–64)	
Yan Hongyan	2	Party 1st Sec'ty (1959–66)	Purged in the Cultural Revolution; said to have committed suicide.
Qin Jiwei	2	Commander, Kun. Mil. Rgn (1958–73)	
Liu Minghui	2	Acting Governor (1956–58; 1964–65); also see below, 1975–80	
1965–75			
Zhou Xing	2	Party 1st Sec'ty (1971–75); Pol. Cmssr. Kun. Mil. Rgn; Chrmn, Yun. Prov. Rev. Cmte (1970–75)	Leader of the more moderate of the two Leftist factions that survived the Cultural Revolution; died in 1975.
Chen Kang	2 (?)	Vice-Chrmn, Yun. Prov. Rev. Cmte (1968–75)	Leader of the more Leftist faction that survived the Cultural Revolution; dismissed 1975.

Tan Furen	4	Chairman, Yun. Prov. Rev. Cmte (1968–70)	Originally associated with Lin Biao's army, but rumoured to have been assassinated by Lin in 1970; allied with Chen Kang and charged with having introduced disharmony into the Yunnan armed forces.
Wang Bicheng	3	Cmdr, Kun. Mil. Regn (1973–78); Vice-Chrmn, Yun. Prov. Rev. Cmte (1973–78)	Allied with Zhou Xing on the more moderate side during the 1970s; dismissed on the eve of the war on the Yunnan–Vietnam border, 1978.
Zhu Kejia	None	Achieved several national-level positions, and was possibly head of the Yun. public security; Vice-Chrmn, Yun. Prov. Rev. Cmte (exact dates unknown)	Rusticated educated youth, associated with the " gang of four."
1975–80			
Jia Qiyun	2	Chairman, Yun. Prov. Rev. Cmte (1975–77); Party 1st Sec'ty (1975–77)	Brought into Yunnan in 1975; dismissed early in 1977 for siding with Leftists instead of helping to reduce their power.
An Pingsheng	3	Party 1st Sec'ty (1977–); Pol. Cmssr, Kun. Mil. Rgn (1977–)	Replaced Jia; only gradually fell into line behind Deng, preferring to support Hua Guofeng initially.
Liu Minghui	2	Governor (1980–)	Old-time Yunnan administrator, rising to new prominence in the wake of Deng's consolidation of national power in the late 1970s.
Liu Zhijian	2	Pol. Cmssr, Kun. Mil. Rgn (1975–)	Protector of Deng in the Cultural Revolution, gaining in power in Yunnan in the late 1970s.
Zhang Zhixiu	Unknown, but not 2	Deputy Cmdr, Kun. Mil. Rgn (1975–80); Cmdr, Kun. Mil. Rgn (1980–)	Brought into Yunnan in 1975; increased his power as he took the lead in the battle against the followers of the " gang of four " in the late 1970s.

individual leaders and information on personnel shifts help to reconstruct the events of that period.

Three personnel issues that arose during the Cultural Revolution were crucial in terms of their effect on politics in the years that followed, and each illustrates a different principle in central-local factional relations. The first concerned rivalry between two provincial leaders (Chen Kang and Zhou Xing), in which the weaker sought to buttress his position through alliance with an outsider (Tan Furen) newly posted to the province, and with lower-level organs. The second involved the dilemma of a central leader, Xie Fuzhi, whose ties to local leaders (through past working relationships) were too numerous to permit him to deal with the local scene decisively, it seems. And the third was the case of the outsider, Tan, mentioned above, who was sent to Yunnan to shore up the position of a central-level politician (Lin Biao), and who, upon arriving, stirred up friction in the province as he attempted to build up his own local power.

The first issue, then, is that of the rivalry between the two provincial leaders, Chen Kang and Zhou Xing. Chen had been in Yunnan since the early 1950s, serving as deputy commander of the South Yunnan garrison in 1951 and deputy commander of the Kunming Military Region (KMR) from 1956. It appears from available sources that he was a member of the 2 FA. Zhou, also from the 2 FA, did not join that army until about 1948, when he became director of the army's intelligence department. Thereafter, he worked as the head of public security and chief procurator in the South-west government during the early 1950s. Next he was transferred to Beijing, where he acted as vice-minister of public security in the mid-1950s (just before Xie Fuzhi became Minister), and deputy procurator in Beijing to 1962. Then Zhou returned to the South-west, after a stint in Shandong, to become governor of Yunnan in 1965.

Not only did both of these men manage to survive throughout the entire Cultural Revolution, but both were also sufficiently Leftist that, at the centrally-mandated " conclusion " of the Cultural Revolution in Yunnan, Tan Furen (about whom more later), sent in to form the revolutionary committee, was instructed in Beijing to " arrange conditions " so that Zhou could be " liberated " and brought into a three-way alliance as a leading " revolutionary cadre," while Chen was to be treated as an important " revolutionary military cadre."[21] Thus, a legacy was bequeathed to Yunnan – two once warring factions, both of which were Leftist-leaning, were forced to co-exist without either having been decisively capped victor over the other. Unfortunately, the sources consulted offer no clue as to the root of this rivalry, either in ideological or organizational terms.

However, it seems likely that a cause for continuing conflict between the two may have derived from Chen's displeasure at the division of posts between them at the close of the Cultural Revolution. For Chen had been made subordinate to Zhou in every possible capacity – he was a

21. Falkenheim, *op. cit.* p. 591.

vice-chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee, while Zhou was first vice-chairman, and, with the death of Tan Furen in 1970, chairman; Chen was third secretary of the Party where Zhou was first, and was only first deputy commander of the KMR (while Zhou was named Political Commissar).

An important effect of this rivalry has emerged in public sources only within the last few years. In November 1978 the Party Central Committee and its Military Affairs Commission gave approval to the 1978 Yunnan provincial leadership to expose and criticize by name a certain " backstage boss " who had been " the root of the trouble that caused instability in the Yunnan and Kunming PLA over a long period." However, that name was not broadcast on any subsequent radio broadcasts that were monitored and translated into English in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. It appears, however, from the nature of the charges made and the dates listed for his activities that the attack was directed at Chen Kang.

Among other things, these charges reveal that Chen had befriended Tan Furen, and also that he colluded with " principal responsible people " of revolutionary committees at lower levels throughout the province to persecute cadres and masses both inside and outside the army.[22] Conceivably the rivalry felt by Chen fuelled his effort to form an alliance with the newcomer Tan. This same broadcast also indicates that Chen attacked Wang Bicheng (referred to in the newscast only as " the principal leadership comrade of the Kunming PLA "), who had been named commander of the KMR in 1973 (deputy in 1970), and who was also given the posts of first vice-chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee (when Zhou became chairman) and second secretary of the Party. Thus, Chen, bested at home on his own level, strove to protect and maintain his standing by seeking an ally in a newcomer and by building a coalition from among those at the lower levels, but not by engaging in any behaviour directed toward officials working in Beijing.

The second issue, connected with Xie Fuzhi, may help to explain why the rivalry between Zhou and Chen was never properly resolved in the heyday of the Cultural Revolution. By the time this movement began Xie was among the handful of most powerful Leftist leaders who then ran the country. Not only had Xie served in top posts in Yunnan in both the military and the Party in the 1950s (as Party first secretary from 1953 to 1959; as political commissar of the KMR from 1954 to 1959 and as commander of the KMR from 1954 to 1956), but those who were administering Yunnan during the late 1960s were all either former subordinates of his (this is true of Chen Kang, who had worked under Xie in the Yunnan Military District and the KMR in the mid- and late-1950s, and of the purged Yan Hongyan (Party first secretary, 1959–66, also from the 2 FA), who had served under Xie in East Sichuan in the early 1950s) or had a functional link with him (this was the case for Zhou Xing, who, as noted above, was vice-minister of public security just

22. *FBIS*, 24 November 1978, pp. J3–6.

before Xie came to that ministry as its chief[23]). Like all of the principal politicians in Yunnan up to this time, Xie had also been an officer in the 2 FA, having worked as political commissar of its Fourth Army Group for 12 years before Liberation. Even if Xie had not actively maintained these various ties after he left Yunnan in 1959, they may still have exerted a pull on him.

At the time of the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, Xie held four key posts in national-level public security work, and was the most important person in that very sensitive field. During the Cultural Revolution itself, he was named vice-head of the All-PLA Cultural Revolution Group and head of the Support-in-the-Left Group of the Military Affairs Commission of the Party Central Committee.

According to one analyst, the most outstanding feature of Beijing's intervention in Yunnan's difficulties during the Cultural Revolution occurred during the visit of a trouble-shooting team dispatched there by Beijing in July 1967 with Xie at its head.[24] This outstanding feature was Xie's statement of non-intervention: " We have brought with us very important tasks for the Yunnan proletarian revolutionaries and the PLA. That is, the Yunnan problem is completely handed over to the Yunnan revolutionary comrades to solve themselves."[25]

If this remark is interpreted in the light of Xie's own past ties to every one of the factions involved in the strife (at least one source claims that there were Red Guard factions backing Zhou Xing, while their rivals supported Chen Kang; probably Yan, even after his death in late 1966–early 1967,[26] still had his followers as well), it makes much sense to conjecture that Xie was personally in quite an awkward position on this mission. It could well have been this awkwardness that kept Xie from intervening. Alternatively, it could also have been the case that Xie believed he could best keep the province as a whole loyal to himself by not choosing sides. In the case of either interpretation, it appears that local politics and politicians acted as a constraint on the efforts of a central-level leader with ties there to use the locality for his own purposes.

Seen this way, the relations of Yunnan's politicians with a key Beijing leader, one who refrained from imposing order on the local scene (or, put another way, was unable to do so for various reasons, both personal and political), contributed to prolonging the discord and unrest there.

23. I have found no evidence to indicate that Xie and Zhou's work at the top echelons of the same ministry at roughly the same, but not at coterminous, periods meant they had personal connections with each other. However, they must have shared colleagues and subordinates, and worked through the same network below them, all of which could certainly have laid the foundation for a co-operative tie between them in later years.

24. See Falkenheim, *op. cit.* Probably Xie was chosen to lead the team precisely because he knew Yunnan so well.

25. Quoted *ibid.* p. 589.

26. See *Current Scene* (hereafter *CS*), Vol. 9, No. 12, on Chen and Zhou. Some sources claim that Yan, having undergone heavy criticism, committed suicide once his plot to wage guerrilla warfare in the mountains was foiled. See Tokyo Radio, 21 January 1967; *China Record,* March 1977, p. 4.

This unrest was never completely quelled, and continued to obstruct unity in Yunnan throughout the period under study.

The case of Tan Furen is the third personnel issue to emerge from the Cultural Revolution in Yunnan, and here again politics in Beijing influenced the course of events. Tan was a veteran of Lin Biao's 4 FA, and so one possible interpretation is that, as the Cultural Revolutionary left began to split into two at least somewhat antagonistic camps (Lin's versus Jiang Qing's) by mid-1968, Lin Biao might have opposed Xie's (a member of Jiang Qing's group) earlier wishes for non-intervention in Yunnan. Thus, when no great improvement had occurred in the chaos in Yunnan, Lin Biao, whose power was then on the rise, may have decided by 1968 that it was time to insert a military man of his own camp into the situation. In this case, the facts that Xie was part of Jiang Qing's faction; that Lin and Jiang were growing antagonistic around this time; that Lin's power was on the rise[27]; and that Tan, like Lin, belonged to the 4 FA, provide the foundation for this explanation of mine.

Tan's arrival had at least two adverse effects on the province, both of which aggravated the factionalism already present. First of all, according to a 1978 press article, " After arriving in Yunnan to take up his post, he lost no time in translating Lin Biao's instructions into ' drawing lines ' . . . throughout the spring of 1969 drawing lines rolled forward throughout the province."[28] Apparently Lin hoped, through Tan's scheming, to build a power base loyal to himself in Yunnan, and, if I rightly understand the term " drawing lines," he was to do this by creating or expanding cracks in the relations among local cadres in order to form a coalition around himself.

Secondly, in the process, Tan's presence intensified friction between the provincial-level political organs and the revolutionary committees at lower levels.[29] A possible explanation for this is the fact that the local committees were the products of local initiatives and had been formed during more radical times (perhaps under the inspiration provided by Jiang Qing's cohorts), sometimes as much as a year before the provincial committee was built, and before the entrance of Tan into the province. Thus, their members were likely to be individuals who would have resented the intrusion of an outsider military man into the Yunnanese political scene. For whatever reason, press complaints about the lower levels were rife in the months after Tan's arrival. Charges centred around the basic-level groups' lip-service to, but actual blockage of and resistance to, the orders of Tan, rampant factionalism, and independent kingdoms.

In December 1970, Tan Furen was assassinated, and, according to rumours, this was the work of Lin Biao.[30] Unfortunately, however, no open sources offer any concrete details about this supposition. One story

27. See Hong Yung Lee, *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), for background on these politics.
28. *Yunnan ribao* (*Yunnan Daily*), 14 October 1978, in *FBIS*, 17 October 1978, pp. J1–3.
29. *CS*, Vol. 6, No. 21.
30. *China Record*, March 1977, p. 4.

holds that Lin had Tan killed for failing to shoot down a plane carrying Zhou Enlai across Yunnan in 1970, which, if true, says something about the limits on central-level politicians in their efforts to control those they have deputed to serve them at lower echelons. But it says something as well about the limits of local officials' resistance.

Although by 1972 Xie Fuzhi had died in Beijing, though Chen Kang was posted away from Yunnan in 1975 (as the following section will reveal), and Tan Furen was already dead as early as 1970, the power-building efforts of these three different Leftists each left their stamp on the factionalism of this troubled region for years to come. For Xie's indecisiveness permitted rival Leftists to remain in place; Chen manoeuvred to build support for himself among his peers and at lower levels, and so increased the hostility between himself and other key provincial leaders; and Tan, on Lin Biao's orders, widened splits within the province generally and drew local opposition.

The Early 1970s. In the early 1970s, after the Cultural Revolution had been formally brought to a conclusion (for the first time) at the Ninth Party Congress of April 1969, but before the time of the purge of the " gang of four " in late 1976, Yunnan was the site of intense factional infighting. These battles, though overlapping, can be distinguished temporally: in the first few years after the Ninth Congress, conflict continued to centre around the Chen Kang versus Zhou Xing/Wang Bicheng rivalry, as these local leaders utilized nationally-initiated political campaigns to their own ends. Then, beginning in 1975, hostilities were clearly the result of competing efforts by Deng Xiaoping and his associates on the one hand, and the " gang of four " on the other, to gain a base there, each by inserting followers of their own into the province. During these years large numbers of " sent-down " youth from the big cities in the east and restive minorities[31] added to the tumult in the province.

Although both Zhou Xing and Chen Kang had survived the Cultural Revolution and emerged from it as " revolutionaries " (though the sources consulted give no indication why, nor do they provide clues upon which I can attempt to build a speculative argument), Zhou, along with the newly arrived Wang Bicheng, clearly had the upper hand organizationally, since each outranked Chen in every line of power.[32] With the death of his ally Tan Furen, and the elevation to chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee of the already well-titled Zhou

31. See *FBIS*, 14 November 1978, pp. J2–3, and 12 September 1979, p. Q7; and Wang Hsiao-hsien, *op. cit.* p. 50 for discussion of the disorder caused by minorities. Also, see Raphael Israeli, " The Muslim minority in the People's Republic of China," *AS*, Vol. 21, No. 8 (1981), pp. 910–11. In the Shadian uprising of the mid-1970s (placed in mid-1975 by the PRC sources and in September 1976 by the Taiwan source), the Hui rose in rebellion, in an effort to establish an independent Moslem country of their own, but were finally quelled under heavy artillery fire, after a desperate battle of several weeks' duration that caused heavy losses to PLA troops.

32. For a comparison of Chen and Zhou's positions, see text, *supra*. Wang became commander of the KMR in 1973, after acting as first deputy commander from 1970. He was also the vice-chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee. Wang, an officer of the 3 FA, had served under Hsu Shiyu in East China for nearly 20 years.

Xing, Chen apparently seized the opportunity of the presence of radical sent-down youth in the province in his continuing effort to form an alliance for himself.[33]

Chen may have been aided in this effort by the arrival in Yunnan of the mysterious Zhu Kejia, the educated youth who, at 17, volunteered to go from Shanghai to Yunnan, where he rose nimbly to great heights of power. By the time of the purge of the " gang," he was secretary of the Youth League in Yunnan, an alternate member of the 10th Central Committee (being the only educated youth to have attained such high status), and a member of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress.[34] And besides serving as a vice-chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee, one radio broadcast from April 1976 identified Zhu as being the director of the provincial public security bureau,[35] which, if accurate, would have given him a very considerable degree of power in that security-sensitive province. According to rumours circulating in Shanghai, Zhu's spectacular rise was linked to his being the nephew of Zhang Chunqiao, one member of the " gang of four."[36]

Later sources charge that there as elsewhere the " gang's " followers attempted to establish a foothold for their faction by training an armed militia, forming alliances within the trade unions[37] and using the propaganda and cultural systems for the promotion of their political activities and their philosophy. But it seems that in this province the " gang's " adherents concentrated a large part of their attention on the

33. Several explanations have been given to account for the fact that urban youths from the eastern parts of China were sent to the border provinces in the rustification campaign of 1968 to 1976. Among them is that the motherland may have the greatest need for these educated young people in the poorest, most backward regions of the country; that the population in such areas is sparser than elsewhere and so that labour, as well as technical knowledge, is in demand there; and, that since many of the border areas are peopled by minority groups, sending the high school graduates there to work among the non-Han may serve as a modern version of the centuries-old practice of colonizing areas poorly integrated into the Chinese state. See Thomas P. Bernstein, *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 63, 67, 69, 70.

For whatever reason, as of the mid-1970s, Yunnan, with its 800,000 reported urban youth settlers, was surpassed in numbers of sent-down youth only by five other provinces–Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Hubei and Sichuan. And of these five, only Heilongjiang had more settlers from outside the province than Yunnan did (*ibid.* pp. 26–27, 29) Yunnan had 300,000 youths from Shanghai, Beijing, Chengdu and Chongqing, while Heilongjiang had some 500,000 from cities outside that province. Unfortunately, there are no data available for three other provinces which also have large numbers of minority peoples residing within them–Ningxia, Qinghai and Guizhou. Also, it is not known how many of Jilin's 800,000 youths were from outside the province, if any. Still, the evidence at hand does indicate that Yunnan clearly had a disproportionate number of outside urban youth. Most of these youths had been Red Guards in the early Cultural Revolution, and many of these had been adherents of radical ideology.

34. Zhu's career is traced in *ibid.* p. 176.

35. *FBIS*, 4 May 1976, p. J2.

36. Shanghai sources. (The individual who learned this from gossip while in Shanghai requested that the citation be written in this way.)

37. *Dong Xiang* (*Trend*), No. 17 (1980), p. 47, lists Peng Guiho as a principal " gang " element and as the head of the Yunnan provincial trade union federation. See also *FBIS*, 3 January 1977, pp. J1–2; 4 January 1977, pp. J2–5; 6 June 1977, pp. J5–6; 15 April 1977, p. J3.

public security apparatus, according to one report, regarding " public security, the railways and the courts as their points of breakthrough for usurping Party and state power." Their method was to " reshuffle " and " transform " the public security organs, inciting their personnel to focus on ferreting out " bourgeois elements " within the Party.[38] Control of the police undoubtedly had special significance, and brought with it particular power in this province where security issues had always been paramount.

Besides the rivalry between Chen and Zhou/Wang (which, I am surmising, led Chen to link his fate to the " gang " and its local followers), there was another basis in Yunnan for factional animosity. This was the continuing presence in the province of a group of old leaders from the 1950s who had long-standing ties with Deng Xiaoping (and probably with Yan Hongyan, who had taken his own life while under Red Guard attack in the late 1960s).[39] These men were members, like Deng, of the 2 FA, and had worked with him in the South-west in the early 1950s.

Those of this group who continued in office throughout the Cultural Revolution had a representative at the top in Yunnan in the person of Liu Minghui, who had been acting governor in the 1950s and mid-1960s. Liu had been made a member of the provincial revolutionary committee at the time of its formation in 1968, and so presumably was never a victim of the Cultural Revolution (though the sources do not provide details of his career at this stage). He was named second secretary of the provincial Party committee some time before the " gang's " fall in 1976. Others among them who had been rehabilitated since the Cultural Revolution could look for leadership to Wu Zuomin, a 2 FA officer active in Yunnan's financial and economic affairs in the 1950s and by March 1975 a " responsible person " of the provincial Party committee (whether or not Wu was a victim is not revealed in the sources, but he held no significant post in the late 1960s or early 1970s). Presumably this group of cadres was part of the " revisionist " faction which was attacked by the Left as a whole in Yunnan along with its attack on Yan Hongyan.

Even as early as 1971, old Party cadres were already made a mainstay of the new local-level Party committees, after they had been " reformed " at the May 7 cadre schools, which had enrolled some 30,000 cadres in Yunnan by May 1971.[40] In the spring of 1972, it was acknowledged that the localities were employing veteran cadres and helping them to heighten their awareness of the " class and line struggle."[41] That these older, more conservative cadres later took the brunt of Leftist attack during the time of " gang " power is revealed in this broadcast from after the fall of the " gang ":

38 *FBIS*, 30 March 1977, p. J1; 16 June 1977, pp. J1–3; and 7 December 1977, p. J2.

39. These two layers of conflict may parallel the waning of infighting among Leftists in Beijing as the heyday of the Cultural Revolution ebbed in the early 1970s. It was followed in the capital by a prominence of Left-Right conflict, as rehabilitations of Rightists began then.

40. Kunming Radio (hereafter KR), 7 May 1971.

41. *KR*, 25 March and 9 April 1972.

Many leading Party and government cadres and responsible persons of basic-level organs were forced to admit that they were capitalist roaders and restorationists . . . they couldn't work properly . . . organs were entered and occupied, Party committees existed in name only. They struck blows at the veteran cadres who had undergone long tests.[42]

This period was one of great instability and conflict nationally as well as within Yunnan. But the particular forms that various nationally-initiated campaigns took in Yunnan can be viewed as having received their shape from the factional alignments outlined above. For example, it is possible to read the implementation of the various campaigns of these years – the campaigns against Lin Biao (1971–74), the movement for the dictatorship of the proletariat (1975), and the late-1975 to early-1976 jostling between Deng and the " gang " – all of which had their impetus at the national level, as having had their distinctive repercussions in the fights between moderate/veteran cadres and Leftists within Yunnan.

To begin with, Yunnan was a leader in the verbal battle against Lin Biao that began in 1971. In the Number 7/8 issue of *Red Flag* that year, an article signed by the Yunnan Party committee (which at the time was headed by Zhou Xing, with Wang Bicheng as its second secretary) appeared, carrying accusations against Liu Shaoqi and " other political swindlers," one of the initial veiled attacks on Lin. At this time Yunnan was one of a very few provinces which had begun to participate in this campaign. Then, on May Day 1972, Yunnan alone of all the provinces made reference to this campaign, by mentioning " Liu-type swindlers," and " true and sham Marxism " at a rally held by the KMR (then headed by Wang, with Zhou as political commissar).

But, in its criticism of Lin a bit later, Yunnan's media took a Leftist position. This time too, it was early in labelling Lin as " ultra-Rightist," as opposed to calling him a Leftist, as he had been designated in the first stages of the campaign: on 16 February 1973 Kunming Radio already revealed Lin's " true nature " as being ultra-Right, while it was not until the March issue of *Red Flag* that Lin was nationally proclaimed a " Rightist."

Furthermore, Yunnan was once again a pathbreaker on a third occasion, in linking the continuing criticism of Lin Biao to subsequent attacks made on Confucius, as it became the first province to report on the *Pilin Pikong* campaign. Whereas the new movement was first heralded in the national news in the *People's Daily* on 2 February 1974, in Yunnan criticism of the two was announced on 27 January, having first occurred in a local middle school.

There is no hard evidence to prove that local politicians were using these various stages of the campaign to fight out their own local struggles. Obviously, it is possible that central-level officials had for some reason chosen Yunnan as the arena for waging battles of their own. But the course that the several phases of this campaign took in this

42. *FBIS*, 15 December 1976, p. J3. Some concrete manifestations of the effects on policy of this factionalism can be found in *CNA*, No. 1023 (1975), pp. 5–7.

province *can* be neatly meshed with the wranglings that other sources allege were taking place there then.

Thus, the initial criticism, directed by the local Party, may have been aimed in fact not just at Lin Biao, but at Chen Kang, since the two top leaders of the Yunnan Party – Zhou and Wang – were Chen's competitors. As the narrative has indicated above, in 1978 Chen was accused of having been allied with Tan Furen in the late 1960s. Since Tan, as a member of the 4 FA, was sent into Yunnan at a time when Lin's power was at a peak nationally, I have concluded that Tan was sent there at Lin's direction, and so any criticism of Lin could have been actually aimed at Tan and those who had colluded with him. I rest this admittedly convoluted reasoning on my feel for the Chinese habit of " pointing at the mulberry to revile the ash." If I am right, this could account for the Yunnan Party leadership's enthusiasm for starting this campaign early, and for bringing it up when other provinces did not.

Later, the labelling of Lin as an ultra-Rightist indicates that Leftists (either in Beijing or in Yunnan) were behind this phase of the campaign in this province. This step could conceivably have been the work of Chen and other " gang " adherents beginning to take a foothold in Yunnan, who were anxious to dissociate their own brand of Leftism from that of Lin. And by terming Lin a Rightist, they managed to preserve the sanctity of the word " Left."

Then, in January 1974, when the criticism of Lin was linked with that of Confucius, both Zhou Xing and Wang Bicheng were present at the inauguration of that stage of the movement.[43] This new aspect of the campaign was actually an expansion of a drive, beginning in summer 1973, to attack Confucius alone (read Zhou Enlai). By tying the attacks on Confucius/Zhou to the assaults on Lin Biao, this effort managed to deflect a bit the head-on attack that the Left was then waging. The Yunnanese leaders' aims in doing so could certainly have been both to turn aside the charges against veteran cadres that the earlier anti-Confucius campaign had mounted; and at the same time to reintroduce the anti-Lin theme that pointed the spearhead at Chen Kang locally. In this way they could at once signal support to patrons at the centre while also pressuring a local rival.

If this first set of movements centred around the residual Zhou Xing/Chen Kang conflict from the early Cultural Revolution days, two subsequent campaigns reflected the second sort of split mentioned above – the one between the " gang " and the old 2 FA veterans, who were probably still loyal to Deng. For instance, there is some evidence of 2 FA veterans' efforts throughout 1975 to redirect the radical movements that the " gang " instigated then. One case was a March 1975 meeting in Yunnan to study the dictatorship of the proletariat. There Liu Minghui of the 2 FA called for combining that " gang "-initiated campaign with the earlier movement to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius (which, in line with my interpretation of *Pilin Pikong*, was a way of expressing support for the central-level veterans). Liu then focused the attention of the

43. *CNA*, No. 1023 (1975), p. 5.

meeting on Lin's crimes in splitting the Party and sabotaging revolutionary unity (later, the refrain of the attacks on Chen Kang and Tan Furen in Yunnan), problems that had nothing to do with the nationwide dictatorship campaign's Leftist themes.[44]

Then, in April, and again in the summer of 1975, various provincial industrial meetings alternately stressed " gang " themes and slogans on the one hand, and slogans drawn from Deng's famous three " poisonous weeds " of 1975 on developing the economy, on the other.[45] Thus, lifting phrases directly from these documents, one meeting in April demanded " put[ting] on a sound basis the necessary rules and regulations . . . reform[ing] irrational rules and regulations under leadership and in a planned way,"[46] in support of Deng's position, while another meeting held in the very same week mandated that its participants must " persist in putting proletarian politics in command and build a revolutionized contingent of workers . . . the fundamental thing is to arm the workers with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought," thereby placing the emphasis on politics, revolution and ideology, but saying nothing of rules and regulations, leadership or planning. That this second meeting was a forum run by radicals is clear both from what was stressed and from what was omitted – for the " regulations " that Deng sponsored were the very sorts of strangulation of the workers that made his three documents on the economy anathema to the radicals.

In the same vein, in late July one local broadcast told of a construction district that was studying the theme that " the state's socialist construction develops in a planned and proportionate manner " (" planned, proportionate development " is the approach of the moderates, and has been referred to repeatedly in the years after the fall of the " gang "). Meanwhile, within a few weeks a Party conference on industry and communications in Yunnan ordered implementation of the radical Anshan Iron and Steel Works Constitution, made famous at the height of the Cultural Revolution half-a-decade earlier, and ordered " put[ting] on a sound basis necessary rules and regulations " – not, however, for sounder productive labour, but " for grasping revolution well and mobilizing the masses."

It is obvious from these juxtaposed quotations that each of two groups was trying to influence the atmosphere in the industrial sector in Yunnan in line with its own proclivities. On the one hand, then, local politicians were engaged in a symbolic manipulation of national movements and slogans, perhaps as a means of signalling their support to those above in order to obtain backing from specific superiors. Or perhaps they did so directly at the behest of certain central personages. In any event as these

44. *FBIS*, 25 March 1975, pp. J1–3.

45. *FBIS*, 10 April 1975, J1–3 versus 10 April 1975, pp. J3–5 and 21 July 1975, pp. J4–5 versus 6 August 1975, pp. J2–4. The three documents (on the economy as a whole, industrial development and science policy, respectively) by Deng, termed " poisonous weeds " by the Leftists, presented " pragmatic " approaches to modernizing industry and science.

46. See " Some problems in speeding up industrial development," *I & S*, Vol. 13, No. 7 (1977), pp. 90–113, for its emphasis on " rules and regulations."

local cadres participated in national campaigns, they battled local rivals at the same time.

Simultaneously, Deng and the " gang " resorted to active efforts to place followers at various levels within the province, presumably as a means of bolstering their own power nationally. In October 1975, Deng, his power at a high point,[47] was able to reorganize the Yunnan provincial leadership in a way that, it seemed at the time, would seriously undercut the radical faction.[48] The death of Zhou Xing (who had been both Party first secretary and political commissar of the KMR) at that time provided the occasion for the return to power in Yunnan of a member of the 2 FA who had been purged in the Cultural Revolution. That is, Jia Qiyun, an old 2 FA hand who had ruled Yunnan's neighbour, Guizhou province, just before the Cultural Revolution, was now rehabilitated. Jia had been removed for heavy-handedness in dealing with Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution and for ties to Li Jingquan, the former Party boss of the South-west. Along with Jia's reinstatement, the radical Chen Kang was now removed from the provincial leadership.

At the same time, several new leaders were brought into the province, including Liu Zhijian, also of the 2 FA, who became political commissar of the KMR. Liu had been accused specifically of protecting Deng himself in the Cultural Revolution. Wang Bicheng (of the 3 FA), who remained as KMR commander, was now the only one of the four previous top leaders of the Cultural Revolution era who stayed on (Tan and Zhou were dead; Chen was sent away); but Liu's presence must have undercut Wang's power somewhat.

Jia, anxious to earn his trust, immediately showed his loyalty to Deng's veteran faction on the national level by calling, within the first week of his new appointment, for fulfilling the " difficult task of building an independent and comparatively complete industrial and national economic system before 1980 and realizing in full the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology within this century." This particular slogan was one that Zhou Enlai had proclaimed earlier in the year at the Fourth National People's Congress (January 1975). But, notably, these phrases were altogether absent from the national media from the time of Zhou's enunciation of them until a month after Mao's death in October 1976. The total absence of this slogan in that period in the national-level media indicates that the " gang " managed to keep it out of the central propaganda networks for nearly two years, in the midst of which Jia signalled his support for it. The same October 1975 broadcast from Yunnan asked for the rectification and strengthening of enterprise management, for organizational discipline, and for necessary rules and regulations, all catchwords from Deng's " poisonous weeds," all the object of radical attacks as being various sorts of strangulation of the workers.[49]

47. See note 20, *supra.*
48. *CNA*, No. 1023 (1975).
49. *FBIS*, 10 October 1975, pp. J3–5.

Also, several post-1976 broadcasts refer to a reorganization of the provincial government in 1975, and to the implementation of an " important document of the provincial Party committee," which, these accounts claim, had been approved by Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee. This document, a product of the veteran faction, had been aimed at eliminating " factionalism " (no doubt a reference to " gang " influence), and involved " readjusting " the province organizationally, by shifting a group of cadres, especially some younger ones (probably followers of the " gang ").

Unfortunately for Jia, however, despite these early efforts to align himself with the moderates, it seems that he soon found himself overtaken by the factionalism of the Yunnan political scene and, despite his long-term Field Army connections with Deng and the other members of the 2 FA, succumbed to a temptation to curry favour with the " gang's " local followers.[50] At the time of the critical Tiananmen incident in Beijing in April 1976, where Deng was a principal target of assault, Jia came under attack at home in Yunnan, along with Deng and Liu Minghui, presumably because of his long-standing ties to these other veterans.[51] Thereafter, to judge from his own words as relayed over the air at the time, Jia was apparently quite confused as to what form of action would best ensure his personal safety.

For at various rallies during April and May 1976 Jia alternately spoke against Deng; refrained from attending a rally in Kunming held to denounce Deng; dealt with him indirectly (" So long as there are such capitalist roaders in the Party as Deng Xiaoping, monsters and freaks in society will fan the flames of disorder, and imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries will co-ordinate with them," was all he had to say against Deng at one rally); and criticized him directly and viciously, as below:

> Deng Xiaoping, the biggest unrepentant capitalist roader, represented the desires of the bourgeoisie inside and outside the party and the international imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries in vainly attempting to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat and restore capitalism. He was the general representative of the bourgeoisie in our Party and the boss of a handful of counter-revolutionary elements and the backstage figure of the counter-revolutionary political incident in Tiananmen Square.

In that rally thus attacking Deng, Jia also praised the Cultural Revolution, and paid homage to the concept of class struggle, thereby trying to please the radicals.[52] In the end, the verdict on Jia was that he was a " gang " element, because, so the story goes, he had brought charges against Deng before the " gang " in April 1976 and had been reluctant to liquidate the remnants of the " gang " in Yunnan after

50. *RMRB*, 23 July 1978, p. 1, states that the " former provincial committee's principal responsible person [that is, Jia Qiyun] bartered away his honour to the ' gang of four ' to obtain its patronage." See Pye, *op. cit.* pp. 186–87, for a recounting of the similar behaviour of Anhui's first Party secretary Song Peizhang at the same time.

51. *FBIS*, 22 April 1976, pp. J4–6. This incident, put simply, involved the routing by Leftists of a show of support for Zhou Enlai and Zhou's moderate positions.

52. The attack is in *FBIS*, 18 May 1976, p. J10. See also *FBIS*, 16 April p. J16; 23 April pp. J10; and 4 May pp. J1–3.

October 1976.[53] Jia lost his job in February 1977, being the third provincial-level Party first secretary to do so after Mao's death.

Jia's vacillation is quite understandable, in light of the activism of the " gang " in Yunnan during Jia's period in office. According to broadcasts after the fall of the " gang," Jia was clearly under a great deal of pressure both within Yunnan from the " gang's " local followers, and also in a larger arena, from the alliance between these followers and those " gang " leaders in Beijing who encouraged and supported them.[54]

Some of this activity was initiated by those that later accounts termed provincial-level " schemers." For instance, according to various broadcasts, beginning in April 1976 a Yunnan follower of the " gang " sent some people from the provincial propaganda, culture and educational units to Beijing to make " black accusations," who then brought back " black instructions " saying, " It's necessary to seize power." Another radio report notes that at a conference of the central-level authorities in February 1976, a Yunnan confidant received other " black instructions " from the " gang," including an order to " drag out agents at all levels." Then, at a May 1976 provincial conference to discuss theory, this " gang " confidently called for the seizure of power and " babbled that some places in our province are controlled by the returning legion and restorationists."

But other action was clearly instigated by the Beijing-based patrons of these conspirators. Central-level " gang " member Wang Hongwen was said to have supported factional activities in Yunnan, and at one point the " gang " itself sent some " so-called representatives " to Yunnan to collect intelligence and information on the Party, government and the army there, which information they then reported back to the " gang " in the capital.

Post-Mao accounts lament that the " excellent situation " that resulted from the 1975 provincial leadership reorganization saw a " great reversal " in 1976, as local " gang " followers and their " factional backbones " in the organization departments at various levels throughout the province frequently attacked this reorganization and transfer of cadres. For the " gang " had claimed that this readjustment amounted to a " revisionist line," and to " whipping up a Rightist wind," Yunnan's own version of a national-level wind that had blown the same way. The " gang " elements' tactic was to reverse these organizational changes, thereby permitting the purged local-level younger cadres, their own followers, to return to their posts, in this way creating lower-level alliances to entrench their own provincial power base.

Thus, in the years of the " gang's " power, Yunnan's political life

53. Wang Hsiao-hsien, *op. cit.* p. 47.

54. For information on this theme, see *FBIS*, 2 March 1977, pp. J2–6; 4 March 1977, pp. J4–5; 30 March 1977, pp. J1–3; 6 April 1977, pp. J1–3; 18 April 1977, pp. J4–7; 27 January 1978, pp. J3–5; and 18 July 1978, p. J2. The 1975 purges are discussed in *CNA*, No. 1023 (1975).

continued to be characterized by factional conflicts, in which both sides appealed at times to superiors in Beijing, whether by sloganeering or by directly seeking instructions. At the same time, top leaders at the centre competed for control there, generally by rearranging the power structure at and below the provincial level. Dominance by Leftists had its origins in leftover issues from the Cultural Revolution, and in the rise to power of a group of " gang " adherents whose ranks may well have been bolstered by some from the large batches of sent-down youth from the east. At least one member of Deng's old network, Jia Qiyun, was unable to stem the Leftist tide locally at that time, when Deng's own position at the national level was quite unstable.

After the Fall of the " gang " through 1980. During the first four years after the fall of the " gang of four," various actors connected with Yunnan displayed different forms of behaviour in response to the structure of the changed factional environment in which they then found themselves. The key actors were An Pingsheng, picked as the new Party first secretary to replace the purged Jia Qiyun in February 1977; residual " gang " elements in Yunnan; Deng Xiaoping; and local veteran cadres of whom the most important was Liu Minghui, named governor in late 1980.

Simply put, for each actor certain features of the post-Mao political world were most salient, and the behaviour of each, respectively, can be shown to reflect those features. For An, as provincial first secretary, there was uncertainty at first as to the power position of key central leaders, as well as ambiguity in the relationship of his own patrons (Xu Shiyu, Wei Guoqing) to those leaders. Residual " gang " elements opposed the current and emerging leadership in the capital, but had no national-level patron with whom they could establish links and on whose support they could rely. And for Deng the crucial factor was the steady growth of his power and backing throughout the system, a growth he himself must have worked to cultivate, in part by promoting the local veterans in Yunnan and elsewhere whose ties with him stretched back over the years.[55] The following account shows how the actions in Yunnan of each of these actors were shaped by these considerations.

The speedy purge of the Yunnan leadership after the defeat of the " gang " makes an interesting contrast with the relative central-level non-interference (or impotence?) some years before. At that earlier time (1967), there was such instability and fractionalization of elites at the centre that Yunnan's trouble-making factions were left to fight out their quarrels far longer than most other provinces (a situation that I have related too to the surfeit of ties between Xie Fuzhi and leaders of contending local groups).

This time, however, because of Jia's ultimate decision to side with the " gang," and because of the rather thorough penetration of Yunnan by

55. There is no direct evidence that Deng himself tried to direct events in Yunnan. But the rise with Deng in the late 1970s of men of the 2 FA who had served in the civil war with him, worked in the South-west in the early 1950s with him, and fallen with him in the late 1960s certainly suggests some sort of linkage between their careers and his.

the " gang," the leadership there was eliminated quite readily when its national-level patrons were purged. An received, along with the first Party secretaryship, three military posts that had not belonged to Jia Qiyun – first commissar of the Yunnan military district, first commissar of the KMR, and first secretary of the army units' Party committee.

Along with An, three other members of the reorganized provincial Party committee were newcomers or relative newcomers to the province. Of these, Zhang Zhixiu, made deputy Party secretary, had first been transferred to Yunnan in October 1975 from the Jinan PLA units to act as deputy commander of the KMR. He was to become even more important later on.[56]

This period in early 1977, prior to Deng's re-emergence from his second disgrace, was a time when men to whom An Pingsheng was tied held a measure of power nationally, according to rumours current in China then.[57] Allegedly a so-called " Southern " political group, led by 3 FA chief Xu Shiyou and his ally from the 3 FA Wei Quoqing, was consolidating a sort of " kingdom " in the south of China. As of March that year, they already had achieved influence through placing former subordinates in some 10 provinces and in four of the 11 military regions. Wang Bicheng, who had been stationed in Yunnan since 1970 and had been commander of the KMR since 1973, the official in Yunnan with the most seniority in terms of local tenure, was also a man of the 3 FA.

An's connections to this 3 FA group rested on his service with Wei in Guangxi province from the time of the Cultural Revolution. Like Wei, An had survived the Cultural Revolution, despite having had to undergo the criticism of some Red Guards. Together they were exonerated in a Red Guard tabloid of December 1967, which relayed the Party centre's " Decision Concerning the Question of Guangxi."[58] That decision admitted that An, along with Wei, had committed mistakes in the course of the movement, but also noted that they had made self-examinations that revealed their willingness to rectify their errors. Thus, although Wei and Xu have been credited with helping Deng Xiaoping to return to power in July 1977, there was clearly a potential for discord between Deng, as a leading victim of the Cultural Revolution, and this group. An, then, owed his new position not to Deng (still on the sidelines at this point), but to men whose relationship with Deng was at least somewhat uncertain.

Indeed, among An's early speeches there are indications that his own attitude may not have been altogether kindly toward Deng, or, at a

56. The other two were Chen Pixian, who was given the post of Party secretary, but mysteriously departed for service in Hubei within only a few months, never to return, and Zhang Xitang, who had also come to Yunnan in 1975 to serve as a member of the Party standing committee, and was named commander of the Yunnan military district, having held a military district commandship in Liaoning just previous to his Yunnan assignment. See *China Record*, March 1977, pp. 2–3. The broadcast on the reorganization is in *FBIS*, 14 February 1977, pp. J1–8.

57. *New York Times*, 7 March 1977. See also Pye, *op. cit.* p. 112. According to Pye, wallposters in Beijing denounced Wei and Xu for seeking to advance the South over the North.

58. *China News Summary*, No. 597 (1976), p. 1.

minimum, that he preferred to hesitate to give him his support. For instance, when Deng was restored to power at the Third Plenum of the 10th Central Committee in July 1977, An delivered a speech at a local rally held to greet that Party meeting. While An praised Hua Guofeng (who had been confirmed as Party chairman and chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the Party at that plenum), he offered not a word in regard to the decision to restore Deng to Party posts.[59] The next day, however, the provincial radio did mention this decision about Deng, but in rather an off-hand way. After praise of Hua, the broadcast simply reported the information that the resolutions reinstating Deng had countered the " gang's " slanders and libel, and that those resolutions " fully reflect the wishes of the Party members and masses."[60]

A few months later, in September 1977, An delivered a fairly warm speech on the occasion of the anniversary of Mao Zedong's death, in which he took the trouble to praise Hua too. This was a move that Zhao Ziyang, An's old colleague from Guangdong and his then fellow Party head in a South-west province (Zhao being head of Sichuan then) declined to take.[61] It makes sense to conjecture that this decision of An's to pay homage to the dead leader at this time could have signalled distance from Deng, who in the years since has certainly evinced his animosity toward Mao and his memory.

An's sympathy for Hua and Hua's causes at this point appeared at several junctures thereafter. One example is An's promotion of an agricultural model unit from Hunan, a province closely identified with Hua. In late July 1978, after Hua's power was already fading from the national scene, An spoke at a rally devoted to acclaiming this Xiangxing experience, drawing attention to its mobilization of the enthusiasm of the peasants, and its speedy development of " socialist agriculture."[62]

Then, a whole year later, An still continued to pay deference to Hua, mentioning in a work report to a preparatory meeting of the provincial *Party a report by Hua on the class situation and class struggle in China.*[63] By this time few besides Hua would have dared allude to this Maoist theme. It was not until September 1979 that An Pingsheng seems to have fallen into line with the slogans of Deng and his camp, finally admitting at a meeting of the standing committee of the provincial Party that " we must further solve the problems associated with having ossified or semi-ossified minds," the code words then for those who still adhered to Mao's thought.[64]

An must have been brought into Yunnan, in the wake of the purge of Jia and the " gang," at least in part to oversee the cleanup of the " gang " followers still present there. For he had earned a reputation for

59. *FBIS*, 26 July 1977, pp. J3–5.
60. *FBIS*, 27 July 1977, pp. J6–8.
61. *FBIS*, 15 September 1977, pp. J1–4. Zhao's speech is in *FBIS*, 14 September 1977, p. J2.
62. *FBIS*, 4 August 1978, pp. J2–6.
63. *FBIS*, 25 August 1979, pp. Q4–6.
64. *FBIS*, 19 September, pp. Q2–4.

toughness toward Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. To judge from radio broadcasts, however, it seems that much of this task was soon turned over to Zhang Zhixiu, who rose to deputy Party secretary when An came to Yunnan. At any number of rallies held to denounce the " gang " in Yunnan, it was Zhang and not An who delivered the major speech.[65] It is interesting to note that the number of An's appearances in the first few years after his assignment to Yunnan declined (as did those of Wang Bicheng), while those of Zhang and of 2 FA man Liu Minghui increased.[66]

No doubt because of the vast extent of the " gang's " activities and the leverage of its elaborate network in Yunnan, the purge of its supporters there has been quite a protracted affair, meeting much resistance. The provincial radio on many occasions referred to " our province " as " a major disaster area, strongly controlled and seriously sabotaged by the ' gang.' "[67] And yet the remaining partisans of the " four " have had to seek refuge without any help or encouragement from above. This absence of a patron may well be the reason behind the often passive form of resistance in which they have had to engage.

The continuing presence of " gang " supporters in Yunnan in the late 1970s is evident in a number of broadcasts that speak of slowness in the campaign against them, and of their various forms of subtle opposition. For instance, one report in the *Yunnan Daily* complained that, " some comrades are worried that the target of attack is too big, and thus do not go all out to deal blows at enemies, so that the activism of the masses has been suppressed."[68] This was no doubt a tale of Leftists trying to limit the target of attack, and thereby to protect themselves and their allies. In another case, a broadcast castigated other comrades who

> believe that the job [of the purge of the " gang "] is almost completed after a few criticism meetings. Some only talk about other units, not about their own,

65. See, for example, *FBIS*, 30 November 1977, pp. J9–11; 11 January 1978, pp. J1–2; 3 February 1978, pp. J2–3; 16 March 1978, p. J1.

66. An appeared 59 times in 1977, 45 in 1978 and 39 in 1979. In 1977 he appeared far more than any other provincial leader, but in 1978 he appeared less than at least one other. Comparative data are not available for 1979.

Appearances of Leading Yunnan Officials

	1977	*1978*	*1979*
An Pingsheng	59	45	39
Liu Minghui	18	26	
Wang Bicheng	32	19	
Zhang Zhixiu	20	51	

Source:

U.S. CIA, *Appearances and Activities of Leading Officials of the PRC* for 1977 and 1978. The volume for 1979 lists only the first Party secretary. Dorothy Fontana, in her Ph.D. dissertation, " Background to the fall of Hua Guofeng: a study of factional struggle in contemporary People's Republic of China " (M.I.T., 1981), has traced a falling out between Deng on the one hand and Xu and Wei on the other to early 1979. This too, besides An's lack of enthusiasm for Deng, could account for any slippage in An's position that may have occurred with time.

67. One example of such a broadcast is in *FBIS*, 14 February 1978, p. J4. But there are numerous similar ones.

68. *FBIS*, 14 November 1977, pp. J2–3.

and only talk about other people, not about themselves. Why is it that certain fallacies which have already been criticized still find a market in some units and among some comrades? Why are the gang's atmosphere and theories still very much in evidence?[69]

Moreover, a number of accounts claimed that supporters and remnants of the " gang " managed still to be commanding leadership posts in the province, even as late as May 1978, more than a year-and-a-half after the arrest of the " four."[70] In Chenxiung county, probably a typical example, the county Party secretary who had colluded with the " gang " bided his time after their downfall, hoping to save his own skin, it appears:

After the " gang " was smashed, he delayed making his attitude clear . . . he suppressed the masses, tried to suppress revolutionary dictatorship and to suppress those who exposed and criticized the " gang." The great struggle to expose and criticize the " gang " remained lukewarm in this county.[71]

Probably the " questioning of the decisions of the Third Plenum " (of the 11th Central Committee) was centred in such districts and among such persons as were criticized above. For this was a Plenum which decisively turned the course of state and Party policy against everything that the " gang " and its allies on the Left had ever stood for. As one announcement on the air put it,

Are there people in Yunnan who oppose the principles of the Third Plenum? Though we cannot say there are none, we can say that such people are few. They are far from eradicating the pernicious influence of the ultra-Leftist line . . . we should help and educate them to overcome their muddled minds.[72]

In addition to the more subtle, passive, and ideologically-orientated opposition to Deng's new order that was the target of this propaganda, other, more active forms of resistance have plagued Yunnan over the past few years as well. The desperation behind these activities may again signify the lack of a patron. According to Taiwan sources, these include the formation of anti-regime organizations, sabotage activities in the border areas, guerrilla warfare by armed militia in the mountains, attacks on military convoys, disruption of transportation and even pitched battles.[73] Thus, resistance to the new order continued in Yunnan long after the demise of the resisters' support at higher levels, but (as opposed to the forms such Leftist resistance took in its heyday in the mid-1970s, when Leftists were able to rearrange personnel within the province) the resisters had to find new forms of expressing their opposition, as they floundered on the local level, without any backing from above.

Besides the initial uncertainty as to which central-level leader would emerge victorious that may have kept An from supporting Deng at first –

69. *FBIS*, 22 March 1978, pp. J6–8.
70. *FBIS*, 22 November 1977, pp. J3–4; 16 March 1978, pp. J1–3; and 24 May 1978, pp. J2–3.
71. *FBIS*, 23 February 1978, pp. J5–8.
72. *FBIS*, 19 September 1979, pp. Q2–4. Also see 29 August 1979, pp. Q6–8.
73. See *I&S*, Vol. 13, No. 7 (1977), pp. 90–113.

and it seems clear that An did hesitate there – and the purge of the " gang " that occasioned a separation of " gang " followers from their benefactors, with time a third element in national politics shaped the configuration of the leadership in Yunnan. This was the growing power across the country of Deng and those allied with him. This process had several effects in Yunnan.

First of all, although An Pingsheng remained in place, the dismissal of 3 FA man Wang Bicheng from his command of the KMR may have been an early sign of Deng's intrusion into the province, as it followed on the increase in Deng's power nationally in the second half of 1977. The timing of the move seems to indicate that the imminent war with Vietnam gave Deng the occasion to oust Wang.

As we have seen above, even before the " gang " had established a stronghold in Yunnan, factionalism existed there, centring around the rivalry between Zhou Xing and Chen Kang. As the foregoing has also pointed out, Tan Furen attempted to exploit this dissension by choosing one side of this power struggle in aligning himself with Chen Kang. This particular split apparently did not entirely heal either with the death of Tan in 1970 or with the exit of Chen in 1975. That the enmity persisted into the late 1970s was revealed by a set of broadcasts on the eve of the war against Vietnam that mentioned this old hostility for the first time. Curiously, the antagonism had never been exposed before, despite the fact that Chen's removal had occurred some three years earlier. These announcements quite belatedly berated Tan for " drawing lines " in the army, allegedly thereby disobeying central orders to treat both of the two Yunnanese factions as revolutionary. As one newscast put it, " The victims have not yet been able to clear themselves from false accusations and the bad elements have not been punished."[74]

One likely explanation for the timing of these attacks – attacks on conditions in the military that derived from events some eight years before – lies in the fact that, in the autumn of 1978 when the attacks appeared in the press, preparations for the war against Vietnam were just getting under way. My guess here is that at this point it was crucial to try to create unity within the Yunnan army's ranks, and to make an effort to undo the bad feelings already prevalent there for a decade. This attempt apparently met with difficulty, to judge from the many calls from the radio to " concentrate hatred on Lin Biao."[75] The drive to induce harmony in the ranks included personal visits to the troops by commander Wang Bicheng and his political commissar Liu Zhijian, where they conducted education for comrades who had been persecuted by Lin. Such comrades were urged to " look at the future out of consideration for the general interest " and to focus their hostility on Lin and the " gang."[76]

74. *FBIS*, 22 August 1978, p. J4. See also 31 August 1978, pp. J4–5; 12 September 1978, p. J3; 17 October 1978, pp. J1–3.

75. *FBIS*, 12 September 1978, p. J6, for example.

76. *FBIS*, 2 November 1978, p. J2. Apparently, forcing all soldiers to focus hatred on the dead Lin would, it was hoped, create the unity lacking in the ranks.

When the war began, Yang Dezhi, who had been chief-of-staff in the Korean war, was transferred to Yunnan to take over as commander of the KMR at the same time that he took on the job of deputy head of staff of the forces in this war.[77] It is certainly plausible to argue that Deng and his supporters in Beijing took this as an opportunity to remove from power Wang Bicheng, a man who by that time had at least two negative factors that could be held against him.

In the first place, Wang was already working in Yunnan from mid-1970, and so could not have escaped some taint from the manoeuvrings and factionalism instigated then by Tan Furen and Chen Kang. In fact, as indicated above, it seems that he sided with Zhou Xing against the two of them. This made him an unlikely leader at a time when utmost unity was demanded from the Kunming troops as war approached on their border.[78]

And secondly, at the time of the Tiananmen incident Wang had spoken at several rallies in Yunnan in decidedly anti-Deng, pro-Mao tones, behaviour which may have been difficult to avoid in the climate of that time, but which could not have failed to catch Deng's attention altogether.[79]

Thus, the war against Vietnam produced a sense of crisis concerning the factionalism that had infected the army in Yunnan since the days of the Cultural Revolution. Probably the simple removal of Wang Bicheng which the war permitted did not eradicate the problems once and for all. But the subsequent instatement into the KMR command of the anti-" gang " fighter Zhang Zhixiu in early 1980[80] appears to have been done as a similar effort in the same direction.

Yet a clearer indication of the steady accretion of Deng's power in Yunnan in the past several years has been the gradual increase in ascendancy of men long ago affiliated with him and with the 2FA, who had worked in the Yunnan and/or the South-west governments in the early 1950s. There have been several signs that this process was under way, beginning as early as December 1977 with the election of the fourth provincial committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the 16 vice-chairmanships all of which were filled by 1950s liberals and minority representatives.[81]

Then, in September 1978, even before the mass rehabilitations that followed December's Third Party plenum, the two top local leaders who had been purged in the Cultural Revolution were exonerated.[82] These were Yan Hongyan and Zhao Jianmin, both old 2 FA men who had worked in the South-west from the time of the takeover in 1949. At the

77. *FBIS*, 16 February 1979, p. J2.
78. See note 66, *supra*, for an indication of the decline in Wang's power in 1978.
79. *FBIS*, 21 April 1976, pp. J7–8, and 18 May 1976, p. J11. At the time of the Tiananmen incident in April 1976, Wang may have been resenting Deng for the latter's late 1975 placement of Liu Zhijian, the 2 FA man criticized in the Cultural Revolution, as Wang's political commissar.
80. *FBIS*, 6 February 1980, p. Q1.
81. *FBIS*, 29 December 1977, p. J1.
82. *FBIS*, 12 September 1978, pp. J1–2.

same time a large number of " veteran revolutionary cadres falsely accused and attacked " were rehabilitated.

Two other sorts of data document the rise in Yunnan since late 1978 of Deng's old comrades. The first is the increasing prominence of Liu Minghui, who, despite never having lost his job in Yunnan over the years, was attacked at the time of the April 1976 Tiananmen incident, as noted above, and was little in evidence as compared with other top-level provincial leaders in the first year or two after the " gang " fell.[83] Throughout 1979 and 1980, however, he appeared more and more frequently, and in successively more important capacities.[84]

By May 1979, when Liu presided at a rally to command members of the local public security who had aided the frontier forces in the attack against Vietnam, he used the opportunity to urge these heroes to " take concrete action in implementing the four basic principles " that Deng had enunciated in that month as a part of his ideological propaganda battle against Hua Guofeng.[85] Liu's introducing this slogan into a forum not at all orientated toward this theme signalled his stance on the side of Deng Xiaoping. Interestingly, he thus showed his allegiance to Deng some four-and-a-half months earlier than did his local colleague An Pingsheng.[86]

By September of that year, Liu had been named second Party secretary, after An Pingsheng, at the Third Party Congress in Yunnan, a piece of information that was rather surprisingly reported on the front page of the *People's Daily*, along with the news of the congress as a whole.[87] And finally, perhaps the cap on his career, this two-time acting governor (in the 1950s and in the 1960s) became provincial governor in January 1980 at the second session of the fifth provincial people's congress.[88] This appointment seems to signify conclusively the importance attached by then to the role of Deng's former work colleagues in Yunnan.

Along with the election of Liu as governor, that meeting selected a standing committee for the congress, headed by An Pingsheng. Of its members whose backgrounds could be traced (four of 12 could be traced; of the remaining untraced eight, two are listed as members of minority nationalities), three had worked in the South-west (under Deng) from the early days just after the takeover. Moreover, as of mid-1980, of the six men serving under first Party secretary An Pingsheng on the provincial

83. See appearance data, note 66, *supra*.

84. For instance, it was Liu who warned of the threat of Soviet revisionism on the eve of the Vietnam war as the shift in the Yunnan military command took place (*FBIS*, 29 September 1978, pp. J3–4); and he was the one to announce the instructions of the Party Central Committee on the conviction and the handling of the " gang's " principal followers in Yunnan, Zhu Kejia and Huang Zhaoqi, at a broadcast rally to dispose of their cases and of the cases of eight other " backbone elements " who had participated in the conspiratorial activities of the " gang " in Yunnan (*FBIS*, 23 February 1979, pp. J2–5).

85. *FBIS*, 3 May 1979, p. Q2.

86. See note 64, *supra*.

87. *RMRB*, 28 September 1979, p. 1.

88. *FBIS*, 8 January 1980, pp. Q3–4.

Party committee, four had old South-west/2 FA backgrounds.[89] Many broadcasts of provincial activities in 1980 indicated the active participation of these old hands in the practical affairs of government.[90] These sorts of data support the suggestion made at the opening of this paper that the province of Yunnan is essentially a base for the 2 FA, the periods when this has not been the case being times marked nationally by the lack of or the uncertainty of the power of Deng Xiaoping.

Furthermore, to complete the control of Yunnan by men who have been closely tied to Deng in the past, Liu Zhijian of the 2 FA[91] remains in the post of first political commissar of the KMR,[92] a job he has held since the provincial reorganization that put in Jia Qiyun in October 1975. His continued presence ensures the representation of 2 FA interests within the Kunming forces.[93]

Thus, the story of the late 1970s in Yunnan parallels closely the progress of Deng's own accumulation of power nationally during those years. Although Yunnan's chief is still at the time of this writing Wei Quoqing's former subordinate An Pingsheng, An himself began to bend in Deng's direction at last in autumn 1979. And the purge there of " gang " followers, if halting, as well as attempts to quell dissidence in the army, continue, as Deng's old guard from 30 years back once again takes over the helm.

Conclusion

This paper on politics in Yunnan province, and on alliances between provincial and national elites from 1967 to 1980 builds on but also branches out from earlier treatments of political factionalism in the PRC. Neither of the two other writers consulted in this research explicitly describes or accounts for the actual strategic moves taken by sub-national elites in factional conflict. The present study draws on the insights of these analysts – about mutual dependency among leaders at different levels, and on the defensive nature of factional fighting in China[94] – to chart and interpret the behaviour of the Yunnan elite over

89. See *ibid.* and *ZGBKNJ*, pp. 112, 113 for the namelists of these powerholders.

90. For example, Gao Zhiguo headed a provincial education conference (*FBIS*, 4 April 1980, p. Q2–3); Sun Yuting spoke at a forum on personnel work (*FBIS*, 14 April 1980, p. Q2); Sun presided over the third session of the Fifth People's Congress (*FBIS*, 28 May 1980, pp. Q6–7); Gao spoke at an education conference (*FBIS*, 8 August 1980, p. Q5); and Sun presided over the full session of the fifth session of the Fifth People's Congress Standing Committee meeting (*FBIS*, 13 November 1980, pp. Q6–7).

91. See *supra*, text stating that Liu had been accused of protecting Deng during the Cultural Revolution. I have come across nothing that indicates that he (unlike Jia Qiyun) ever criticized or otherwise betrayed Deng. The same holds true for Liu Minghui.

92. *FBIS*, 7 February, 1980, p. Q1.

93. Liu had been deputy political commissar and concurrently director of the political department of the Fourth Army Group in the 2 FA under Deng before 1949. He also acted as the deputy for the PLA Kunming forces to the Third National People's Congress in September 1964.

94. Nathan, *op. cit.* states on p. 46 that: " For any given faction, the most important and usually most immediate concern is to protect its own base of power while opposing accretions of power to rival factions, while initiatives to increase its own power and position are of secondary importance. Defensive political strategies therefore predominate over political initiatives in frequency and importance."

these years. It has done so largely through the use of reported attacks on their plotting and news of changes in their job assignments.

What, then, can we learn from this investigation of one province over a 13-year period? For one thing, the repeated simultaneous rises and falls of leaders at different levels who are part of the same Field Army system seems to indicate the salience of this factor in vertical alliances (between central and provincial elites). Similarly, the synchronous reappearance of those with long-term working connections (which took place in the late 1970s when Yunnan veterans from the 1950s came back into prominence along with Deng) appears to lend some weight to this kind of tie as well as being an element in such alliances. Links deriving from shared political persuasion must have a role too, as the verbal battles joined in the media between local " gang " elements and veterans in the mid-1970s echoed splits between the "four" and Deng that were occurring then in Beijing. My conjectured bond between Xie Fuzhi and Zhou Xing raises the issue of the importance of cadres having belonged to the same functional system, even if at slightly different times. And, finally, the connection between Wei Guoqing and An Pingsheng rests in part on the fact of their both having been survivors of the Cultural Revolution. The Yunnan story, then, illustrates many of the possible foundations for relationships between local and national elites.

The most general conclusion that can be drawn about the interchange between central- and local-level politicians is that when under challenge they each need, for their own power-creation and survival, to make use of their allies (allies formed through such ties as those just noted) at the other level. Thus, central leaders' strength on the national plane has often depended in part on having a power base in the provinces. The importance of this appeared in the battles between Deng and the Leftists in 1975 and 1976, and between Deng and the 3 FA leaders (Wei Guoqing and Xu Shiyou) after 1976, to try to control Yunnan through the placement of their own subordinates (and, within Yunnan, it seems that An Pingsheng and Liu Minghui may have retained separate loyalties up until September 1979). Apparently Lin Biao played this game against Jiang Qing's ally, Xie Fuzhi, in the Cultural Revolution as well. Local turmoil has been highest in those years when central leaders as a group have failed to settle decisively on one local leader or faction, either intentionally (a surmise I have ventured about the case of Xie in the Cultural Revolution) or because the central government itself has been severely divided (as in the mid-1970s).

Central leaders have used a variety of strategies in their efforts to shore up local power bases for themselves. One method has been to choose a particular faction to promote (as in the case of Deng's support for the 2 FA group in Yunnan), or a certain individual to ally with (as, the " gang " with Chen Kang); or to refuse to favour any one among a batch of contending local groups with the hope of gaining the support of them all (as in the case of Xie Fuzhi in the Cultural Revolution). Central leaders have also sent in their partisans to create a base for themselves, perhaps in the process instructing their partisan to stir up contention

locally. Here instances detailed in this paper are the cases of Lin Biao sending in Tan Furen in 1968; Zhang Chunqiao sending in the famous youth, Zhu Kejia; and Wei Guoqing and Xu Shiyou deputing An Pingsheng in 1977. Through this tactic, central leaders can manage, when they so desire, to destablize affairs at the provincial level with fairly serious and long-term repercussions, while gaining a foothold for themselves there in the process.

A last lesson on this theme from this study is that central leaders may take hold of occasions presented by events somewhat beyond their control to make changes in local leadership. One such case here occurred when the death of Zhou Xing in 1975 permitted Deng's faction to install a new leader, thereby putting a seal on the leftover politics of the Chen-Zhou rivalry from the Cultural Revolution (or so they hoped). Another such outside event was the Vietnam border war. This instance gave Deng, probably displeased with the local military leader Wang Bicheng, an opportunity to remove him.

All of these tactics, of course, can only succeed so long as the central leader drawing upon them retains some measure of leverage within the central government itself. For once a central leader or faction falls, local followers will be certain to disappear from the scene of power within a short time, either shifting to another patron by their own choice (as Jia Qiyun attempted, unhappily, to do when Deng seemed out of favour), or losing their own local standing through a general national purge engineered by the incoming central faction (Jia's fate in the end).

And aside from the limits that a central politician finds placed on his actions by his standing nationally, he may be checked as well by occasional autonomous behaviour from subordinate allies in the provinces. Examples noted in this paper include the obstruction met by Xie Fuzhi in 1967 in dealing with Yunnan, because of his surfeit of ties there; the apparent refusal of Tan Furen to accommodate the wishes of Lin Biao in 1970; and, again, Jia Qiyun's verbal attacks on Deng in mid-1976.

This study has also addressed the behaviour of local politicians. It has shown that these elites can make use of central events and personalities to increase their own power locally, a separate game in which they are engaged in addition to their courting of influential central-level patrons. It appears that they are prone to play this local game most vigorously when disunity characterizes the political arena nationally, when the local scene is particularly factionalized, or when their patrons have lost favour in Beijing.

Again, several strategies have been described in this account of Yunnan's history in this 13-year period. In the early and mid-1970s, when an array of campaigns was being touted from Beijing, local leaders manipulated national movements, slogans and causes to fight their local opponents, as well as to signal their support for their own patrons in the capital. Local officials have also linked up with newcomers sent into the province by central elites in order to fashion alliances for themselves locally (even across Field Army lines) that might help them to increase

their own strength at home. One instance shown above was the case of Chen Kang, who so drew on the appearance in Yunnan of Tan Furen in 1968, and probably of Zhu Kejia and other rusticated youth in the early 1970s, in an effort to best his local rivals, Wang Bicheng and Zhou Xing. Thus, envoys of central leaders tend to become drawn into local contests for power.

Moreover, sometimes one local faction may seek central support largely in order to expand its weight in local politics. Here Jia Qiyun was certainly overwhelmed when his opponents first obtained central support, and then went on to dominate many provincial offices. It may well have been the force of this pressure, as much as Jia's careerist doubts about continuing to support Deng, that caused Jia to choose to abandon his former patron. But once that patron began to regain a modicum of central power in the winter of 1976–77, Jia lost his post. Perhaps because of this lesson in the importance of supporting the top wielders of power in Beijing, An Pingsheng finally threw his support behind Deng in early autumn 1979, when it was clear that Deng had become the principal purveyor of national power and patronage.

This article has outlined the shiftings and shufflings of personnel in and out of only one of China's 29 provinces in a turbulent 13-year period. But this one case, so rich in intrigue, yields pregnant insights about the workings of central-local factional politics in China, insights which must apply throughout the system.