ment to the Party, to the PLA, and to Mao's Revolution itself is called sharply into question:

> Nothing can describe the anger at the way the situation had developed in March. Those sons of bitches had thrown us all out the window. In January and February we had risked our lives. Several of my fellows had been injured. . . . We had been through all of that and now we were penned up in the school while the army, our former heroes and models, consorted with the conservative bastards. We had virtually succeeded in seizing power, in making a true revolution. Now the bastards had thrown it all away. . . . I was actually being attacked and suppressed by the very authorities to whom I had dedicated my life. It seemed they had used me and then cast me aside when I had ceased to be of value to them. My bitterness knew no bounds. . . .

It's a familiar story of bitterness and disillusionment – the God that failed. But it is told with unusual poignancy and compassion in the biography of Dai Hsiao-ai.

The book is not without flaws. There are recurrent problems of chronological discontinuity in the narration. Some Chinese terms are mistranslated (most notably *ta ch'uan-lien*, which is erroneously rendered as "exchanging experiences"). And there is an annoying quality of repetitiveness in Dai's lengthy accounts of the *ta ch'uan-lien*. But such shortcomings do not detract from the overall importance of the book. Alone among the *dramatis personae* of the Cultural Revolution, Dai Hsiao-ai *lives*.

Reflecting on his decision to leave his native China for Hong Kong in October 1967, Dai captures the existential essence of his plight:

> I could no longer build my life around conflict. I wanted peace, stability, and physical safety. . . . I wanted to try to find some new answers and to explore other alternatives. I thought I could start a new life. . . . Whether I was right or wrong, I still don't know. . . .

RICHARD BAUM

Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture. By RICHARD H. SOLOMON. [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. 604 pp. $16.75.]

One somehow imagines that Richard Solomon, promising young political scientist, has endeavoured to include in his first major work all the insights acquired through a decade of work. The result is a big book, filled with diverse threads, some of which are left dangling.

The book begins where Solomon's former teacher, Lucian Pye, left off in his *Spirit of Chinese Politics*. With unabashed boldness, Pye had sketched out what he regarded as the characteristic Chinese hang-up, ambivalence toward authority. Armed with several years of Chinese language and history, TAT's (Thematic Apperception Tests), Rorschach's, and a battery of questions, Solomon set out for Taiwan and

Hong Kong to refine and expand this approach. And as a result of studying the Confucian classics, of testing and interviewing a varied group of 91 subjects, and of reading the *People's Daily* and the relevant Western literature, Solomon has developed his own interpretation of Chinese socialization and adult perceptions with special reference to problems of authority.

Solomon begins by considering the common Chinese resolution of the Oedipal conflict. In the Western story (Oedipus Rex) the son kills the father, but in the comparable Chinese story (Hsúeh Jen-kuei) the father kills the son. In the West, the ambitious young go out to conquer their own worlds, but in China, in filial manner, the sons submit to their fathers and to their superiors.

Small Chinese children are indulged, but when they are old enough to attend school, parents become firm. They acknowledge the danger of "drowning a child with love" and teach the child to control his emotions, which are suppressed behind a mask of propriety (*li mao*). If children show more dissatisfaction they are given more discipline, and the child therefore learns to "stomach" his troubles. The school-child is anxious about authority, but through proper cultivation in content and pedagogical style, he strengthens his capacity for emotional control. In Solomon's view, the peasantry was also socialized by Confucian values.

Adults still have anxieties about confusion and chaos (*luan*) in which man can be eaten by man, and they therefore accept the necessity of some kind of authority. Anxious about authority and desirous of avoiding conflict, Chinese defer to those in superior positions. Some hope to escape the problems of authority by deep abiding friendships, but this search for idealized friendship usually turns out to be elusive.

Mao Tse-tung sensed the deep resentments of the Chinese people toward authority, and by conceiving revolution as an emotional storm was able to provide an outlet for the negative side of this ambivalence toward authority. The function of leadership as seen by Mao, was to focus the force of aggression on the appropriate target and to discipline the masses in this effort. Not only in the civil war but in the continuing revolution since then, the mobilization of the masses has rested on the capacity to focus their hostility, to unify the communist side and to split, isolate, and defeat its enemies.

Halfway through the book, after arguing for the importance of psychological analysis and presenting the results of his psychological studies, Solomon turns to look at high-level Chinese politics from 1957–69. In this second half of the book, Solomon almost forgets his own psychological analysis, zeroing in on high-level power politics, with a who-did-what-to-whom analysis in terms familiar to any China watcher.

Solomon's interpretation of the Hundred Flowers draws heavily on the accusations made against Lu Ting-yi, P'eng Chen, Liu Shao-ch'i and others during the Cultural Revolution. In Solomon's view, these Party leaders were trying to shield the intellectuals and to allow "rightist conservative" views within the Party. Yet paradoxically they were

unwilling to let people of these persuasions criticize the Party from the outside. Mao wanted to carry out a thorough-going campaign, in which outsiders criticized the Party, but he was forced to compromise with his opponents by agreeing not to resort to serious disciplinary measures against Party members, providing they were willing to correct their mistakes. In Solomon's view, in late May 1957 the Party allowed increasingly serious criticisms to be published against it in order to mobilize its own counter-attack.

Solomon considers that the debate over the Great Leap Forward centred around the question of how to increase agricultural productivity. Although Solomon points out the many debates over policy within the Party, in his view Liu Shao-ch'i was one of Mao's most vocal supporters during the Great Leap Forward.

In his analysis of the Cultural Revolution, Solomon traces the disagreements which gave rise to it, from the Great Leap, through socialist education, to the Vietnam War debates, the attack on the "four olds," and the onslaught against Party leaders. In his view, Mao resisted the trend toward reconsolidation of China's domestic political order for fear that the momentum of social change would die. Solomon concludes this chapter with a question mark, for it is not clear whether Mao will succeed in what Solomon sees as the central issue. Will Mao be able to "institutionalize limited and disciplined political conflict in a society where for centuries interpersonal 'harmony' has been stressed as a basic social value?"

The psychological portion of the book will be criticized by some who are not psychologists for explaining too much by psychology, and criticized by some who are for reflecting the author's inadequate training in psychology. It will be praised by others for its effort to deal with basic questions about the Chinese tradition and in doing so by means of carefully specified empirical research.

In my opinion, the value of this portion of the book lies in Solomon's ability to pick up issues that are considered important by the Chinese. To use a psychologist's term, he follows the "affect"; he calls attention to phrases and concepts that Chinese themselves are concerned about. But the problem is that the argument slips so quickly from Confucian classics and Emperors to Mao, from peasants (in all times, periods and places) to fishermen, from Taiwanese to mainlanders, as if they were all essentially the same and as if one explained the other, without setting out the major lines of variation. To describe the resolution of Oedipal problems in terms of the old Hsüeh Jen-kuei solution ignores the dominant thrust of the literature of the post-May 4th period which was bitterly critical of submission to traditional authority and romantic about youth leaving the traditional family. It would be difficult to argue as Solomon seems to imply that Mao and the populace he led were more influenced by the spirit of Hsüeh Jen-kuei than of May 4th. In a footnote, Solomon acknowledges that family situations in which basic attitudes are formed have fundamentally changed under communism, yet he never attempts

to explain how and in what ways, a point that should be fundamental to a psychological interpretation of the Chinese people under Mao. Many of the conclusions about Chinese character (the freedom of childhood, the later disciplining, ambivalence toward authority, the effort to control expressions of hostility) are stated at such a general level that some readers might be left wondering if Solomon is describing Chinese or humans in general.

In the latter half of the book, one can find many points at which alternative explanations could be suggested, but Solomon is always thoughtful and most of his explanations are plausible. However we should not be led by the extensive footnoting, the careful citations, the size and scope of the work to lose sight of the fact that at the level Solomon is talking about – the nature of politics at its very highest level – we are operating with very little solid information. This work is welcome for its many fresh interpretations, but at best we Westerners are relying on indirect and inadequate information. In his concluding chapter, Solomon talks of the role of the post-1969 leaders: Mao and Lin. Chou En-lai's name is not mentioned. In this era when so many people are seeking out the opinion of the China watchers, we must take special care that our analyses do not jell prematurely into dogma.

EZRA VOGEL

Contemporary Chinese Law: Research Problems and Perspectives. Edited by JEROME ALAN COHEN (Harvard Studies in East Asian Law No. 4). [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. xii + 380 pp., including index. $10.00. £4·75.]

In May 1967 the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies held a conference in Bermuda to bring together scholars from various countries who were working on modern Chinese law. Since it was the first of a series of such meetings, it was thought appropriate to take the somewhat unappetizing subject of "research tools and methods" as the focal point for all the papers, a straitjacket from which some of the writers might have been glad to escape. Despite this shortcoming, the conference served a most useful purpose and was much appreciated by the participants (including myself), for many had never met and there was much to discuss. What is questionable, however, is the wisdom, after a gap of nearly four years, and obviously at the cost of great editorial effort, of publishing the papers, or a selection of them, in this handsome but expensive book.

Most of the readers of *The China Quarterly* will find something of interest among the papers, several of which are of high quality. They may be divided into two main groups. One deals with the technicalities of research into Chinese law – the sources of information and their translation – while the other raises more basic problems of interpretation and analysis. In the first group, Dr T. T. Hsia's survey of Chinese legal