

The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study. By HONG YUNG LEE. [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978, paperback 1980. 369 pp. £4.25.]

China's Hundred Weeds: A Study of the Anti-Rightist Campaign in China (1957–58). By NARANARAYAN DAS. [Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi, 1979. 244 pp. \$15.00, Rs. 65.00.]

Anyone seeking perspective on the Beijing show trials of the “gang of four” and the six alleged co-conspirators of Lin Biao will find help in these two exceptional studies which dramatically demonstrate that the wellsprings of Chinese politics have long been political vendettas carried out behind the mask of feigned consensus.

Currently, when Deng Xiaoping is out to get “leftists” it is good that Professor Naranarayan Das reminds us that in the late 1950s the same man was out to get “rightists.” (Those who sense vertigo in trying to reconcile Deng’s leading role – along with Liu Shaoqi – in the Anti-rightist Campaign of 1957–58 with his current anti-“radical” passions may regain their sense of balance by reflecting that there is consistency in his pattern of first modestly championing liberalization and then vigorously clamping down: before enthusiastically opposing Mao’s One Hundred Flowers he voiced approval, and before his more recent ending of Democracy Wall and his elimination of the Four Big Freedoms he called for a relaxation of controls.) Similarly, when the show trials have caricatured the Cultural Revolution as a Chinese soap opera in which the defendants sought to influence Mao Zedong’s thinking (and/or kill him) and to deprive Mr Deng of his rightful power, it is good to have in paperback form Professor Hong Yung Lee’s detailed study of the complex inner dynamics of an explosive episode which had no heroes but which left untold scores that are yet to be settled.

These two books are not only excellent introductions to the inner Chinese politics of the late 1950s and 1960s but useful reference sources. Dr Das brings clarity and balance to the complex campaign which in paradoxical ways planted the seeds for the Cultural Revolution. Nowhere near as detailed or as rich as Roderick MacFarquhar’s *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, Das’ study has the virtue of systematic orderliness. At every juncture he lays out sequentially all the authoritative and popular interpretations of the events he is describing, and then with sharp critical judgments he evaluates each and arrives at generally sound conclusions. In the same disciplined fashion he reviews the positions and the statements of the conflicting participants. (In the process Das reminds us that it was Deng who drafted the “Report” which expelled the “rightists” from the Party, sent such distinguished writers as Ding Ling to nearly two decades of suffering in the countryside, and noted that while “the rightists were active chiefly in places where intellectuals are concentrated,” it was also true that “We must be aware that they are an important asset of the country, and their efforts are needed for socialist constructions in the field of economy and culture,” and therefore they need to be nurtured but controlled and ultimately disciplined.)

Hong Yung Lee’s study in its hardback version gained quick recognition as an exemplary analysis of the confusing ins and outs of the

Cultural Revolution. Other works have more vivid accounts of the violence and the tragedy of that turmoil, and as we learn more about what transpired it is likely that that time of political hatred will seem even more sordid and mindless than Professor Lee's somewhat mechanical account would suggest. Yet as of now his study ranks at the top with such exceptional analyses as Byung-joon Ahn's *Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution*. In this brief review it is impossible to commend Hong Yung Lee as fully as he deserves for the meticulous care with which he has untangled the complex interactions of all the elements involved in the struggles of the Cultural Revolution.

Although the Beijing show trials have provided no revelations to challenge the political interpretations of these two scholarly works, they do, however, raise a troublesome question for the scholarly tradition which Professors Das and Lee so admirably exemplify. This scholarly tradition, which paradoxically emerged during a quasi-cold war atmosphere, has treated Chinese elite politics as a highly cerebral activity, much like a chess game in which each move is carefully analysed as to purpose but no thought is given to what happens to the "pieces" that are "taken" or "removed" from the board. The Beijing show trials, much like the Moscow show trials, have legitimized awareness of the suffering and torture experienced by those who are "purged." It is the Chinese themselves, and not liberal academic scholarship, who have told the world how physically brutal Chinese politics can be. Is it going to be possible in the wake of the show trials to sustain a scholarly tradition in which we merely note when and for what presumed reasons various Chinese leaders and cadres are "removed from office," without asking questions about their fates? Are we not going to have to balance our traditional interest in the purposes of elite actions with greater concern for the "victims?"

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Chairman Hua: Leader of the Chinese Communists. By TING WANG.
[London: C. Hurst, 1980. 181 pp. £7.00.]

This biography of Hua Guofeng [Hua Kuo-feng] opens with a spicy chapter entitled "Said to Be An Illegitimate Child." After page one, the plot thickens. By pages four and five, we are told that, in 1938, Hua Guofeng's mother, Hua Yu, had an intimate relationship with Kang Sheng. "Shortly afterwards, her husband was murdered by secret agents under Kang's direction . . ." (p. 5). Ting Wang acknowledges that all this could be "a fabrication" but that, in the absence of more unimpeachable sources, "this material may serve as a useful point of reference" (p. 5). The subsequent chapters are comparatively tame, leading the reader through Hua's years in Shanxi, Hunan and his meteoric rise in the nation's capital during the 1970s. The concluding chapter, "Factions, Policies, Prospects," is replete with assertions about factional alignments, motivations, and stratagems that would be reliable only if the author had Zhongnanhai bugged.

This book adds little to what Oksenberg and Yeung provided readers of *The China Quarterly* in March 1977 (No. 69) and beyond what Beijing publicly released in the late 1976–78 period. What is most disturbing