contributions. In the end, while *The Chinese Economy Under Communism* brings together much useful information in a convenient format, it does not accomplish its task of providing "a balanced summary of the economic consequences of the Chinese path to development." Too many stones in the path are left unturned, and too many turned which are off the path.

CARL RISKIN

Chinese Communism in Crisis: Maoism and the Cultural Revolution. By JACK GRAY and PATRICK CAVENDISH. [New York: Frederick A. Praeger and London: The Pall Mall Press, 1968. 279 pp. 40s.]

THIS book is really a "three-in-one combination." Leaving aside the brief first chapter, which contains a summary account of Chinese history from 1840 to 1949, the elements in the combination are a pair of essays by Jack Gray (Chapter II "Problems and Policies, 1949–65" and Chapter III, "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung"); a long article on literature and the cinema by Patrick Cavendish (Chapter IV, "The Revolution in Culture"); and a final chapter by Jack Gray on the Cultural Revolution itself.

It would be in exceedingly bad taste for a reviewer who is two years late with his review to criticize in detail the account of the first year of the Cultural Revolution offered here in the light of all the information which has become available subsequently. Nevertheless, since the Cultural Revolution figures in the sub-title, it is after all necessary to say a few words about the authors' interpretation of this upheaval.

The chapter in question was written for the most part in July 1967; a concluding section of nine pages was added at the end of the same year. (See p. 141.) This being the case, it is impossible not to express some surprise that, even then, the authors were not in a position to make use of more adequate source material. Of the 25 footnotes to this chapter, 21 refer to the BBC *Summary of World Broadcasts*. Jack Gray explains this by the statement that until "the summer of 1967, when wall posters gave way to pamphleteering," our main source of information about events in China lay in the reports of Japanese and East European journalists (pp. 143, 263). Surely the author must have known when he wrote this at the end of 1967 that Red Guard newspapers had become the most important medium of expression by January 1967 at the latest. And if there were as yet none of these generally available in libraries, it is hard to believe that he had not seen an odd issue or two, sufficient to allow him to

appreciate the importance of such sources. Nor does Jack Gray appear to have spoken to even one of the British or European residents of China who returned home in late 1966 and in the course of 1967, nor made use of their published accounts. Most puzzling of all is the failure to take account of official materials. For example, Mao's vitally important directive of 16 May 1966, publicly released in May 1967, is not mentioned even in the final nine pages.

As for the substance of this chapter the main outlines of the story are traced with substantial accuracy and clarity. One is struck, however, by the fact that, having repudiated in the Foreword the "naive assumption" that the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party are primarily concerned with power rather than with real issues of national policy, Jack Gray should have gone on to write what is essentially a blow-by-blow account of the struggle between pro- and anti-Maoist forces in various parts of China. In the concluding section he does, however, step back and consider the general significance of the movement. The most striking and controversial judgment which emerges is that the information available by the end of 1967 had put it "beyond doubt" that "the fate of the Commune, and all it stands for, in economic, social, political and military terms, is the essential issue of the Cultural Revolution" (p. 145). But if one is to be fair to the author, one must read this statement in the light of his own idea of "the Commune and all its stands for," which is the main burden of Chapters II and III.

In writing of the Cultural Revolution, Jack Gray was dealing with a phenomenon which was then, as very justly remarked in the Foreword, "too recent to be fully studied," and of which the events had "not yet fallen into any meaningful perspective." All of those who have suffered the embarrassment of re-reading their own analyses published in 1966 and 1967 can sympathize with his plight, and we may assume that he would not wish this portion of the book to be scrutinized too closely today. The essays on policy choices down to 1965, and on Mao's thought, on the other hand, are obviously the fruit of much research and reflection. Although some details are called into question by the facts and texts which have become available in the past three years, these 50 pages still stand, in my opinion, as a contribution of enduring interest. Jack Gray's presentation has the singular merit of cutting through the mass of detail to present the really central issues in a manner which is illuminating and provocative even when one does not agree with him.

One problem which underlies much of his discussion is that of Mao's "voluntarism." Jack Gray rejects the view that Mao's approach to politics and economic development can properly be characterized in such terms:

> It is often said that Mao is a romantic, who exaggerates the power of the human will, and discounts natural and economic obstacles to change; and that perhaps he discounts the obstacles which human nature itself presents to the sorts of changes he seeks. But Mao has nothing to say about "will." What he talks about is "consciousness" which is rather different. He believes (and his belief in the possibilities of initiative and enterprise among the mass of ordinary people is a reflection of this) that when human beings become conscious of "the direction of history" their energies are liberated, and that these energies are enormously powerful (p. 65).

It is worth pointing out in passing that Mao most certainly does have a great deal to say, not only about "consciousness," but about "will." In his poems, which are perhaps the truest mirror of his inward thoughts, the term "will" (*chih*) appears more than once, most notably in "Return to Shaoshan," which contains the often-quoted line officially translated: "Bitter sacrifice strengthens bold resolve." Apart from such explicit use of the term, the notion that courage and determination in the face of adversity are some of the most indispensable attributes of revolutionaries, especially in difficult times, figures in nearly all the others, and in many of the maxims in the *Quotations from Chairman Mao* (to which Jack Gray refers constantly in his analysis of Mao's thought), the most famous example being the sentence from "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains": "Be resolute, fear no sacrifice, and surmount every difficulty to win victory." The concern with will in fact goes back to Mao's youth, when he wrote in his first published article: "Physical education not only harmonizes the emotions, it also strengthens the will. The great utility of physical education lies precisely in this. The principal aim of physical education is military heroism. Such objects of military heroism as courage, dauntlessness, audacity and perseverance are all matters of will. . . . The will is the antecedent of a man's career."

Though this question regarding Mao's use of language is not without importance, the real point at issue is how he sees the role of men in shaping their own history. The concept of voluntarism, as it has long been used to characterize Lenin's variant of Marxism, designates an approach which stresses, not "will" in any narrow sense, but the "conscious action" of man rather than the determinism of impersonal historical forces, the role of the "superstructure" rather than that of the "basis". Such a bending of Marxism in a less determinist direction obviously did characterize the thought and action of both Lenin and Stalin, and indeed had to do so if they were to carry out what they regarded as a socialist revolution (or, to be more precise, a democratic revolution under proletarian leadership with the vocation of growing into a socialist revolution) in a country where capitalism was not

yet fully developed. Still less could such a revolution be carried out in China without an element of voluntarism.

Directly linked to this question is, as Jack Gray suggests, that of Mao's "romanticism." This term, like that of "will" to which the author also objects, is in fact employed by the Chinese. Indeed, we now know that "revolutionary romanticism" was advocated by Mao himself in his Chengtu speech of March 1958. Jack Gray could not, of course, have been aware of this fact in 1967, but presumably he did read Patrick Cavendish's account of the subject on pp. 78–80, where the exponents of this school are described as seeking "to perceive and write about those newly forming phenomena which will change the present and usher in the new society," and to "evoke feelings of optimism and resolve."

This much said, it must be admitted that those who have written of Mao's voluntarism and romanticism have indeed been guilty of a certain over-simplification of the problem, to which Jack Gray is reacting by over-simplifying in the opposite direction. Speaking as one of those at whom the passage quoted above is presumably aimed, I would recognize that I have sometimes blurred the issues by failing to make sufficiently clear that the "rationality" to which I was opposing Mao's "voluntarist" approach to economic problems from 1955 or 1958 onwards was above all technical rationality, the logic of modern industrial production. I have held, and continue to hold, that there are aspects of Mao's policies in recent years which cannot be described as rational in whatever sense one may care to use the term, but this conviction has perhaps at times been expressed so sweepingly that it appeared to represent a condemnation as irrational of everything that was done during certain periods. Mao has been and is concerned to bend reality to his will, but he has always started with a perception (however distorted at times) of reality, and some notion that there were limits to the transformation of human nature and the environment at any given moment.

It can hardly be denied, on the other hand, that Jack Gray forces Mao far too much into the opposite mould, that of a down-to-earth, sensible, pragmatic leader. This no doubt results in part from his own methodological approach, which he formulates as follows:

> In dealing with the politics of a Communist country, we have tried to maintain wherever possible in our method of analysis the principle that we should not accept an ideological explanation for events (even when such an explanation is explicitly given by the Chinese) until we have exhausted all possibilities of explanation in terms of practical responses to practical problems. (p. vii).

It is surely obvious that the "practical problems" of a given country

at a given time, and the "practical responses" to these problems cannot be defined except with reference to a given ideology—save in terms so general as to be meaningless. Everyone will agree that China suffers from the "practical problem" of being a poor country, and that the "practical response" to this problem is economic development. But it is absurd to suggest that when it comes to setting the pattern of such development—for example, as regards the balance between industry and agriculture—China's leaders approach these "practical problems" without reference to ideology, both in the narrow sense of doctrine, and in the broader meaning of a mind-set which determines the way they formulate issues and weigh alternatives. Or, to take an example related to one of the central themes of the book under review, namely Mao's concern to prevent the emergence of a new privileged elite, it is quite obvious that many Party leaders did not, in 1965, perceive bureaucracy as a "problem" at all, in the sense of a matter requiring urgent attention.

As for the importance of ideological factors in Mao's own motivation, Jack Gray deals with the matter by discounting or interpreting away any evidence which does not fit in with his own view of Mao as essentially a pragmatist. Thus, to return to his judgment quoted above according to which the fate of the commune is the "essential issue" of the Cultural Revolution, he defines the new commune system which Mao intends shall emerge from the crisis as one which will minimise the "three great differences" (p. 68). But lest we should conclude from this that Mao is concerned with moral or ideological issues for their own sake, he hastens to add that Mao rightly sees the "three great differences" as "the most inhibiting discontinuities in Chinese society." In other words, Mao is merely seeking a practical solution to practical problems. Thus he reconciles the view that the communes are the chief issue of the Cultural Revolution with his statement a few pages earlier that the end is "to liberate the productive forces" (p. 64). Vast and decisive events such as "the crudities of the land-reform campaigns in some areas," and "the harsh and indiscriminate campaign against counter-revolutionaries" are dismissed as "inconsistent with Communist conduct since the rise of Mao Tse-tung to the leadership of the party," and hence perhaps mere "makeshifts" of no general significance (p. 18). The "apparently sinister slogan" of "politics in command" is explained away as meaning simply that "administrators must not forget policy" (p. 56). It is hard to see how Jack Gray can seriously put forward such a view in the light of Mao's eloquent comments to the *High Tide* collection, which he here once more accuses everyone else of neglecting (pp. 62–63).

Although many of Jack Gray's observations (pp. 60, 66) regarding

the backwardness, ignorance and selfishness of the Chinese people are excessively harsh, one can only agree with his conclusion that "in a society in which social conscience and public spirit were in many important ways underdeveloped, and in which the collapse of traditional values through revolution, civil war and foreign invasion had all but destroyed such public spirit as had existed, any revolution had to be a moral revival, whatever else it was" (p. 49). His view of Mao's policy as directed above all at fostering grassroots initiative and creating the social context for economic progress is also a fundamentally correct one. We shall be looking forward to future works in which it is spelled out in a less impressionistic and somewhat more balanced fashion.

STUART R. SCHRAM

Power Industry in Communist China. By ROBERT CARIN. [Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969. 163 pp. $5.00.]

DURING the past few years, despite scanty economic information from Mainland China, the Union Research Institute in Hong Kong has made a commendable effort in publishing several useful monographs on the Chinese economy. Robert Carin's recent work on the power industry in Communist China is a new addition to this series.

A survey of the development of the Chinese power industry since 1949, the work provides adequate background materials on the conditions of the power industry in pre-war China. The author describes five major motive power resources—coal, water power, petroleum, natural gas and atomic energy—in China and traces the progress in capital construction, power generation and power transmission. The problems of power consumption and rural electrification are also discussed. In the concluding chapter, the achievements and the shortcomings in these areas are briefly assessed.

According to Carin, Communist China's growth in the power industry was impressive, with an average growth rate of 21·6 per cent. between 1953 and 1957. The construction of many new power plants in the North-west and South-west has balanced the irrational distribution of the power industry. But the Chinese power industry still suffers from many shortcomings. First, there is the lack of a well-conceived development policy, revealed by the frequent changes in the development emphasis between the hydro and the thermal power stations, and in planning and designing. One major obstacle in the development of the hydro power station, which once received high priority in development, is the insufficiency of hydrological data resulting from inadequate geological surveys. The basic drawback, however, is the absence of an integrated power system on a nationwide scale.