The Cultural Revolution and China's Search for Political Order

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Since her traditional empire collapsed China has experimented with many political institutions. After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) imposed a revolutionary one-party regime, the pattern of political order has shifted from one form to another. Intra-Party conflicts preceded these shifts, of which the Cultural Revolution represented the culmination. But in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution another shift is taking place, so it too has raised a series of important questions about Chinese politics.

The Problem and its Context

The central problem is: how has the Cultural Revolution changed the Chinese political order and what new order, if any, is emerging? Why did Mao try to destroy the Party which he had founded and led? Why did he purge his chosen successor Lin Piao on whom he had relied in the Cultural Revolution, and why is he now restoring the Party and curtailing the Army's role?

These questions can be best understood in the context of China's search for political order. By political order I mean the overall pattern of subjection and subordination, and of relationships between leader and led; in concrete terms, it refers to patterns of leadership, political structures, policy-making processes, control and legitimacy.

A review of the current social science literature reveals various efforts to shed light on the political order in changing societies. In a 1961 article, Robert Tucker called all one-party systems "movement regimes" whether they are communist, fascist or nationalist. He distinguished, though, two different types: the Bolshevik Party in which the Party links a disciplined elite with the masses, and the führerist Party in which the Supreme Leader directly links himself with the masses. He found many similarities between Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini in that they all displayed a führerist Party tied to one Supreme Leader. Applying this observation to Mao's leadership during the Cultural Revolution, Schapiro and Lewis have suggested that like Stalin, Mao also sought to undermine the Party by using extraneous forces such as the Army and Red Guards once the Party had developed an independent power base

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which undermined the power of the Supreme Leader, and that Mao's führerist leadership also occurred after Liu Shao-ch'i had built the original Party which was Bolshevik.[1] This classificatory analysis does not sufficiently account for the sources of the regimes; Mao's personal rule did share some elements with the führerist Party, yet his source of legitimacy was quite different from that of the Duce or Führer. Fascism did not aim at the basic transformation of society based on a revolutionary ideology; as Richard Lowenthal has pointed out, it rose and fell with the Führer. But one-man rule in the communist system had more to do with the communist ideology itself.[2]

Harry Harding Jr has also distinguished two different conceptions of policy making and organization between Mao and Liu. By an exegesis of their writings, he has conceptualized two modes of mass line: "dogmatic mass line" holding that every problem has a single "correct solution" and "pragmatic mass line" holding that every problem has several solutions; for "questions of principle" both Mao and Liu adhere to the former but for "questions of purely practical matter" Liu advocates the latter.[3] One can discern these dichotomies in Mao's and Liu's works, but these writings were written for specific contexts. As Michel Oksenberg suggests, Mao's role in policy-making has changed according to the changing environment and issues.[4] Explaining the Maoist critique of bureaucracy, for example, Martin Whyte rejects both claims that China has found an organizational model without bureaucracy, and that the Maoist model is incompatible with modernization, for there is no Maoist ideal appropriate for all circumstances. Organizational theories often have more explanatory power when applied to specific settings.[5]

For the Maoist emphasis on mass participation, too, two opposite views have been offered. While Lucian Pye maintains that the cumulative consequences of mobilization may be a significant decline of mass

1. Robert C. Tucker, "Towards a comparative politics of movement regimes," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LV, No. 2 (June 1961), pp. 281–89. Leonard Schapiro and John Wilson Lewis, "The roles of the monolithic party under the totalitarian leader," in John W. Lewis (ed.), *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 114–45.

2. Richard Lowenthal, "Stalinism: One-man leadership vs. institutional control in communist one-party regimes," Columbia University Seminar on Communism, the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, 23 February 1972.

3. "Maoist theories of policy-making and organization," in Thomas W. Robinson (ed.), *The Cultural Revolution in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 123–31.

4. "Policy making under Mao, 1949–68: an overview," in John Lindbeck (ed.), *China, Management of a Revolutionary Society* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 79–115.

5. "Bureaucracy and modernization in China: the Maoist critique," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (April 1973), pp. 149–63; also see Edwin Winckler's review article: "Political management of the development process: assessing the Chinese development experience," *The China Quarterly*, No. 55 (July–September 1973), p. 562.

participation, Richard Pfeffer argues that it has been institutionalized in the form of community control at lower levels and of representation in formal governmental units at higher levels. James Townsend's study, however, shows that the degree of participation has fluctuated from one period to another. Chalmers Johnson also suggests that the locus of authority has changed from national revolution to building socialism and then to Mao's personality cult.[6] This means that different authority patterns have resulted from the deliberate choices the Chinese leadership has made to solve specific problems. It is also important to note that these patterns have evolved in sequence. For example, Skinner and Winckler have found a cyclical pattern of compliance in rural China; Tang Tsou has characterized the pre-Cultural Revolution regime as "one of the purest forms" in which a clear-cut separation between the elite and the masses existed.[7]

A proper perspective for understanding Chinese politics, then, should be contextual, clinical (problem-solving), and genetic.[8] The crucial question is what kind of approach can best reflect this. Richard Thornton contends that the "constant conflict school" can best explain the structure of leadership politics in the communist system.[9] William Riker's coalition theory is useful, in this sense, to explain the shifting political alignments.[10] But Chinese politics certainly is neither a rational game played in a zero-sum situation nor totally devoid of ideology and policy issues. Hence a dynamic approach should take note of all three vital variables in communist politics: ideology, policy and power.

The Dynamics of Chinese Communism

The responsibility of correctly knowing and changing the world has been placed by history upon the shoulders of the proletariat and its party (Mao Tse-tung, 1937).[11]

6. Lucian Pye, "Mass participation in communist China: its limitation and the continuity of culture," in Lindbeck (ed.), *China*, pp. 3–33; Richard M. Pfeffer, "Serving the people and continuing the revolution," *CQ*, No. 52 (October–December 1972), pp. 620–53; James R. Townsend, *Political Participation in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Chalmers Johnson, "The changing nature and locus of authority in communist China," in Lindbeck (ed.), *China*, pp. 34–78.

7. G. William Skinner and Edwin A. Winckler, "Compliance succession in rural communist China: a cyclical theory," in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), *A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations* (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 410–38; Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese political system," *CQ*, No. 38 (April–June 1969), p. 63.

8. For this methodological perspective, see Joseph Ben-David, "How to organize research in the social sciences," *Daedulus* (Spring 1973), pp. 39–52.

9. "The structure of communist politics," *World Politics*, No. 4 (July 1972), pp. 498–512.

10. *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

11. "On practice," in *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), p. 66.

In changing the world we cannot divorce ourselves from reality or disregard reality; nor can we escape from reality or surrender to the ugly reality; we must adapt ourselves to reality, understand reality, seek to live and develop in reality, struggle against the ugly reality and transform reality in order to realize our ideals (Liu Shao-ch'i, 1939).[12]

The distinctive feature of communist politics is a commitment to the Marxist-Leninist ideology or, as it is known in China "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought," as a guide for action. This commitment makes ideology, policy and power inseparable, particularly when revolutionary dynamism runs high. As circumstances change, the Party has to adjust its official ideology and in coping with these changes, alternative means and ends invariably arise, in turn creating new policy issues; yet the Party leaders must justify these differences in terms of ideological belief. The changing context of ideology, then, accounts for three aspects of communist politics: the interactions between ideology and reality (or practice), between revolution and development, and between one-man rule (mass movement) and Party rule (institutionalization).

I take first the conflict between ideology and reality. In any society there are gaps between theory and practice when perceived expectations do not measure up to actual capabilities. These gaps can often lead to violent social change,[13] and the official communist commitment to a particular ideology makes these conflicts more intense and sometimes violent. The Leninist legacy that the highest Party organ defines the "correct ideology" enables the Party's Supreme Leader to bestow legitimacy upon all actions he approves of and to brand as incorrect any actions he disapproves of. This creates built-in tendencies for polarization in communist political discourse, for whenever he finds it necessary, the Supreme Leader reduces all issues to two "roads": the socialist road and the capitalist road, and Mao has often explained major issues in terms of the so-called "struggle between the two roads"; thus far he has delineated ten such struggles including the latest case of Lin Piao.[14] This does not mean, however, that Mao has always insisted on his "correct" ideas regardless of the situation. He has often conceded to changing circumstances; in fact, he contends that "correct ideas" derive from repetitious practice. The "two road struggle" must be understood in the light of changing contexts.

Next come the tensions between revolution and development.[15] The communist ideology demands that the Party should carry out socialist

12. "How to be a good communist," in *Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch'i Before 1944* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969), p. 181.

13. See Barrington Moore, Jr, *Soviet Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950); Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

14. Chou En-lai, "Report to the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," *Peking Review*, No. 35–36 (7 September 1973), pp. 18–21.

15. Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist policy," in Chalmers Johnson (ed.), *Changes in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 33–116.

revolution and construction simultaneously, but building socialism and carrying out development do not go hand in hand. Quite often, revolution calls for equality but development calls for efficiency; the former requires a comprehensive development of all sectors to eliminate social disparities while the latter seeks an incremental or sequential development.[16] Mao has consistently advocated simultaneous development, but his associates in charge of Party operations have generally responded with sequential development.

Last we consider the tensions between one-man rule and Party rule, mass participation and institutionalization. The Party's Supreme Leader, as Mao has often done, seeks a direct link with the masses through mass movements. The Party, on the other hand, defends its unity and supremacy through its organizations and procedures. Thus, mass participation and institutionalization do not go hand in hand in rapidly changing societies.[17] Two Leninist legacies in particular exacerbate these tensions: first, that the highest Party authority defines the "correct" ideology; second, that the Party, as the highest form of the proletariat, must maintain its unity at all costs. More often than not, these two principles come into conflict. From the first principle derives the superiority of "correct" ideology over majority rule; in the name of the "correct" ideology the Supreme Leader can ignore the majority, even by splitting the Party when he perceives that ideological correctness is at issue. From the second principle derives the superiority of Party rule: since the Party rules through a majority, it does not tolerate any factions within its ranks which may jeopardize its unity. These mutually conflicting principles rule out any institutional framework for settling differences within the Party when its leaders cannot agree on vital issues; only through political struggles can such differences be resolved, and the crises resulting from them are overcome when the supreme leader resumes his uncontested authority. No one can dissent when the supreme leader invokes the "correct" ideology; even if the majority of the Party leaders disagree with him, they invariably yield in fear of what would happen to Party unity without him.[18]

The specific configuration of these relationships depends on the context within which they take place. First, the extent to which the leadership is committed to the communist ideology determines their overall tone Second, the leaders' style and personality, and their mode of coming to power, also make a difference. Third, some environmental factors condition the alignment of political forces: the age of revolution, the level of economic development, ecological and cultural conditions, and

16. For the "comprehensive" approach, see Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society, A Theory of Societal and Political Processes* (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 260–62; for the "incremental" approach, see David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 85–86.

17. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 13–15.

18. Lowenthal, "Stalinism."

the external situation. Lastly, the political process of shifting coalitions determines the actual course of the relationships.[19]

According to Samuel Huntington, the evolution of a revolutionary one-party system into an established one-party system goes through three phases: transformation, consolidation and adaptation.[20] In China the first two phases have taken turns thus far and the last phase is yet to come. Approximately two models of ideology, policy and power have alternated between the transformation phase and the consolidation phase, thus providing the dynamics of Chinese communism (shown in Table 1). In comparative terms, Mao was in charge of the transformation phase, emphasizing ideology, permanent revolution and mass participation, whereas Liu and other operational associates were in charge of the consolidation phase stressing practical problems, development and institutionalization. The contentions between the two approaches accumulated, and finally culminated in the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution.

Table 1. **Two Models of Ideology, Policy and Power**

	Transformation	*Consolidation*
Ideology	Ideology Comprehensive ideology	Practice Operational ideology
Policy	Revolution Equality	Development Efficiency
Power	The Supreme Leader Mass Movements	The Party Institutionalization

Three points must be made about this observation. First, the comparison made here is a configurative phenomenon. It should be clearly understood that it is a comparison of degree rather than kind, i.e., *more or less,* not *either or*. Second, the Chinese leaders' view of a given situation is no less important than the situation itself. More often than not, as Robert Merton persuasively argues, men's actions are determined by their perception of reality.[21] Problems are not problems unless they are seen as such and we should try to see the problems as the Chinese themselves see them. Third, the swing back and forth between the two phases does not represent a cycle but shifts in emphasis, for each swing

19. For a general statement of these factors, see Chalmers Johnson, "Comparing communist nations," in Johnson (ed.), *Changes in Communist Systems*, pp. 28–32.

20. "Social and institutional dynamics of one-party systems," in Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore (eds.), *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 24.

21. *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 675–76.

has its specific context which differs considerably from the previous one.

With these caveats, it is still possible to say that ideology is more stressed in the transformation phase. Comprehensive ideology has occurred in rapidly changing societies, serving as a critique of and an alternative to the old political order. The communist ideology aims at total social transformation in order to build a classless society. When the Party's Supreme Leader calls upon the populace to uphold this ideology, it becomes almost a religion; it is not merely the justification of the political system but a way of achieving consensus. If anything goes wrong under these conditions, the common assumption is that something must be wrong with the practice, not the ideology.[22] Mao stresses human spirit over material resources, activism over technology, virtue over merit, and ideology over organization. When he does these intensely, the ideology he defines as such becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

But this prophecy has to go through a process of "reality testing," and then begins the consolidation phase in which practice is more stressed than ideology.[23] Now that ideology can no longer serve as the means of achieving consensus, information becomes the basis for reaching decisions. The Party revises its original programmes on the basis of information and consensus, and promotes an operational ideology as a compromise between its official ideology and its actual policy when it comes to grips with urgent problems.

Because of different leadership styles and experiences, certain leaders are better suited for one phase than the other, and a crucial element in the shaping of Chinese communism has been Mao's leadership. The fact that he has been the Supreme Leader of the CCP since 1935 as a result of his experience in peasant and guerrilla movements in the "liberated areas" has given him a unique position within the Party which no one else can emulate. This has enabled him to reign above the Party, often disregarding its institutional mechanism; his style has been to retreat from the operational realm of policy and to concern himself more with broad theories and policies. When he found things different from what he had expected, he often vetoed them and tried to change them by rallying the support of the masses. He has been brilliant in inspiring and agitating the people (his leadership has been best in *ad hoc* political movements) and shrewd in political judgment and in the judicious use of his own assets including the personality cult. Thus, Mao's leadership has been more "affect-oriented" and educational.[24]

22. Giovani Sartori, "Politics, ideology, and belief systems," *American Political Science Review*, No. 2 (June 1969), p. 402.

23. For "reality testing" of Marxism-Leninism, see Merton, *Social Theory*, pp. 475–90.

24. For a general statement of leadership style, see Cecil A. Gibb, "Leadership," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 248–65.

By contrast, Liu's style and experience produced opposite attributes. Liu built up his reputation for his work in the "white areas" before 1949, mostly in the workers' and underground movements, for which Mao once called him "the model of the white areas"; as a result, he was number two man after 1942. These experiences enabled Liu to become a good organization man, always operating within the Party, enforcing Party discipline and organizations. When he found deviations, he sought to remedy them through organizational measures, thus strengthening the Party's central control over its cadres. He was best in building organization and getting practical problems solved, and his leadership was more task-oriented and instrumental.

These respective styles and experiences explain, at least in part, why Mao has taken command of the transformation phase and Liu the consolidation phase. An interesting comparison in this respect is Chou En-lai whose role has been equally demanding in both phases. Chou secures his political position before facing the issues confronting him, always moving with the political tide and mediating among feuding factions.[25] When the chips are down after violent struggles, therefore, Chou may prove to be the best in picking up the pieces.

With regard to the age of revolution, it can be said that so long as the first generation of revolutionaries retains the leadership, the intensity of revolutionary dynamism remains high: the younger the age of revolution, the higher the intensity of dynamism. As for the level of economic development, the leadership shares an acute sense of backwardness when the economy is primarily agricultural; the more backward a society is, the more likely it is to undertake a revolutionary approach to modernization.

Culturally, Confucianism has been a unifying national myth and an internalized code of ethics in traditional China, as the concept of *li* indicates. In addition to this internal control, there has been an external form of control as manifested in the concept of *fa*.[26] Mao has preferred the internal to the external method. According to Richard Solomon, the Chinese have been culturally oriented to be subservient to and dependent on authority. Mao has been deliberately breaking this deference to authority by liberating the aggressive emotions which were hitherto denied legitimate expression in Chinese political culture; hence he has always stressed mass mobilization and struggle.[27] Externally, Sino-Soviet polemics since 1956 have strengthened Mao's position as he has regarded the Soviet Union as a negative example of everything he advocated. This has made it difficult for his associates to challenge his internal policies.

25. Thomas Robinson, "Chou En-lai and the Cultural Revolution in China," in Robinson (ed.), *The Cultural Revolution*, pp. 165–312.

26. James Chieh Hsiung, *Ideology and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 21–24; see also Victor Li, "The role of law in communist China," *CQ*, No. 44 (1970), pp. 66–111.

27. Richard Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 510–26; see also Lucian W. Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968).

Changes in these variables create the vital issues of intra-Party conflicts. Ralf Dahrendorf has suggested that the intensity and violence of conflict are actually higher in communist systems than in pluralist ones because there the distribution of power and that of wealth are closely associated.[28] If the Party leaders are unable to resolve their differences among themselves, the conflicts spill outside the Party, often resulting in a major political crisis. If this happens a new ruling coalition has to emerge through power struggle. According to Riker, all coalition makers seek only a "minimum winning coalition" to minimize "sidepayments" – the so-called "size principle"; hence grand coalitions do not last.[29] Although it is by no means easy to specify the alignment of coalition makers in China, a shift of political line occurs whenever a new coalition assumes power within the CCP.

All these factors have been at work in the shift between the transformation and consolidation phases shown in Table 2.

Table 2
Stages of Chinese Political Development

Phase	*Period*	*Major Development*
Transformation I	1949–53	Rehabilitation, Land Reform, Three and Five Anti Campaigns
Consolidation I	1953–55	Nation-building, First Five-Year Plan
Transformation II	1955–60	Collectivization, Hundred Flowers Campaign, Great Leap Forward
Consolidation II	1960–66	Adjustments and consolidation, Socialist Education Movement, PLA Emulation Campaigns, cultural reforms
Transformation III	1966–69	Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
Consolidation III	1969–	Party and State Rebuilding

These shifts have been produced by the dynamic interactions of ideology, policy and power within the CCP. For example, the more intensely Mao committed himself to ideological revitalization, the more sharply he resented any interference with his efforts and the greater his urge to eliminate the interference. This widening dissonance between Maoist ideology and Party practice in 1962–66 led to the Cultural Revolution.[30] In policy areas as well, after 1962 Mao called for comprehensive and revolutionary programmes in education, health services and culture, but

28. *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 204–14.

29. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, pp. 231–42.

30. For a theoretical statement of this relationship, see Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, pp. 70–71; Ted Gurr, "Psychological factors in civil violence," *World Politics*, No. 2 (January 1968), p. 355.

the Party responded with incremental reforms; as a result, Mao's demands and the Party's responses clashed. In a larger perspective these clashes represent the equality-inequality tensions inherent in the modernization process.[31] In the institutional realm, too, Mao held up the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a national model for his ideological campaigns, for the Army had closely followed his directives. But the Party apparatus continued to frustrate his efforts at mass movements through its institutional mechanism. Mao's quest for mass movement and the Party's institutional responses finally collided in the Cultural Revolution, and Mao then sought to destroy the Party apparatus under Liu by making a minimum winning coalition with Lin Piao and his associates in the Army.

The evolution of the Cultural Revolution in this sense dramatized three perennial dilemmas of modernization. First, it raised the dilemma of means and ends inherent in a political system committed to the historical mission of building a classless society, in China requiring the CCP both to adhere to the ideology of uninterrupted revolution and yet to cope with the changes constantly arising in its application to current events. Second, it raised the dilemma faced by the Party in attempting to carry out revolution and development simultaneously, while the implementation of these twin goals required an order of priorities. Lastly, it pointed up the dilemma of power and institutions, for the CCP invariably came to be concerned with its vested interests as it became institutionalized.

A modernizing political system must be capable of maintaining a "sustained growth" in adapting to rising changes or it will be liable to disintegration.[32] To achieve this, the political system needs both legitimacy and effectiveness in problem-solving; but the extent to which it can achieve these simultaneously varies according to the degree to which it can sustain both adaptation and integration. Putting our analysis of the Cultural Revolution in this perspective, we can see that adaptation is a process of synchronization between ideology (societal values) and practice (institutional capabilities), between revolution (comprehensive policies) and development (incremental policies), and between one-man rule (mass participation) and Party rule (institutionalization).[33] It follows that when these variables do not mesh with each other, a drastic change is likely which may lead to political disintegration. The Cultural Revolution represents the clash of these two forces.

During the Cultural Revolution, Mao attempted again to heal these divisions by the introduction of many radical programmes. One example

31. David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 72–73.

32. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Modernization and conditions of sustained growth," *World Politics*, No. 4 (July 1964), p. 29; Samuel Huntington, "Political development and political decay," *ibid.* No. 3 (April 1965), pp. 389–430.

33. These themes are fully developed in Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*; Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*; Etzioni, *The Active Society*; Huntington, *Political Order*.

of these was the educational reform which abolished, among other things, the entrance examination to colleges. Yet, by no means was the Cultural Revolution the end of the dynamics, for its aftermath ushered in another consolidation phase in which another set of gaps have been reappearing as the new leadership stresses more practical problems, developmental projects and the Party's institutional machinery. A good example of this retreat is the resumption of the examinations to colleges. Thus, the dynamics of Chinese communism still goes on as the most important determinant of China's political order.

China's Search for Political Order

The Cultural Revolution brought the problems of a revolutionary political order into sharp focus. Since 1949 China had experienced the swing back and forth between a movement regime under the Supreme Leader and an institutionalizing regime under the Party. The Cultural Revolution marked the prevalence of the movement regime, but in its later stages a third order – the military regime – appeared, and since the Revolution a fourth type of regime having some features of all three previous types seems to be taking place.

Originally, the Chinese one-party system emerged from a revolutionary movement in a nation faced with simultaneous crises of legitimacy and participation; it was the result of a "bifurcation" of political and social forces.[34] During the initial consolidation period, 1953–55, the Party built up an incipient Soviet-type regime with a collective leadership and a hierarchy of centralized and specialized State and Party organizations as manifested in the 1954 State Constitution and the 1956 Party Constitution. This regime invariably undercut Mao's personal authority and the mass line. In 1955–59, Mao launched a programme of transformation through which he sought to set up a mass movement regime so that he could directly relate to the masses. This authority structure, however, did not last long because the Great Leap Forward itself floundered.

In the consolidation period, 1960–62, the Party began to restore its institutional apparatus. At the Party Centre Mao withdrew from the first line of policy making, thus making way for the collective leadership under Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing to assume the first line. Centralization and specialization were two key features of the apparatus; the Centre convened both a general type of the "Central Work Conference" to reconcile differences between itself and the local authorities, and a special type of conference between the authorities and the practitioners. Through these processes, the Centre produced several comprehensive directives regarding the economy, education and culture. Only under the Party's direction were these directives com-

34. Clement Moore, "The single party as a source of legitimacy," in Huntington and Moore (eds.), *Authoritarian Politics*, p. 49; also see *ibid.* pp. 9–17.

municated and implemented; as a result bureaucracies again intruded between Mao and the masses.[35]

In 1963–65, the Party apparatus became firmly entrenched. This regime approximated the Bolshevik type in many aspects and became the "ancien regime" preceding the Cultural Revolution. Since this regime tied Mao's hands, he endeavoured to regain his lost authority by invoking his ideological correctness and the mass line. But the Party tried to restrain his efforts by all the means at its disposal, and the resulting conflict gradually escalated into the Cultural Revolution. The best illustration of this was revealed in the policy processes regarding the Socialist Education Movement. The so-called "rule of anticipated reaction" typical of bureaucratic politics operated between Mao and his associates at the Party Centre.[36] In May 1963, Mao formulated the so-called *Former Ten Points*, setting forth the "correct line" of rural work, i.e. mass campaign. Four months later the Party Secretariat drafted the *Later Ten Points* to include more effective and organizational measures which it found lacking in the previous document. Mao, in turn, thought that the Secretariat's document was devoid of any ideological campaign and asked Liu to revise it. In September 1964, Liu amended it into the *Revised Later Ten Points*. Alas, Mao again found out that Liu's directive replaced his goal of ideological campaign with an organizational control through work teams; therefore, in December he formulated the *Twenty-three Points* rescinding the earlier two directives. Through these interactions, Mao formed the concept of "those Party persons in authority (*tang-ch'uan p'ai*, meaning the Party Establishment) taking the capitalist road," a phrase he first used in the *Twenty-three Points* and repeated later in the *Sixteen-Point Decision* for the Cultural Revolution in August 1966. In the Socialist Education Movement Mao had already lost his confidence in Liu; like Djilas, he regarded the Party Establishment as a new class. At a decisive meeting in January 1965 he called for the Cultural Revolution.[37]

In carrying out the Revolution, however, the Party Centre again sent out work teams to assume leadership; these teams suppressed the Maoist Red Guards seeking the overthrow of Party Committees. But Mao justified the Red Guard rebellion and, with Lin Piao's help, persuaded the Central Committee's 11th Plenum in August 1966 to pass the *Sixteen-Point Decision*. The intensity and violence of the subsequent mass movements Mao personally led gradually brought the institu-

35. For this period, see Byung-joon Ahn, "Adjustments in the Great Leap Forward and their ideological legacy, 1959–60," in Chalmers Johnson (ed.), *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973), pp. 257–300.

36. Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 199–215; for a case in American politics, see Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963), pp. 64–97.

37. See Edgar Snow's report in *New Republic*, 10 April 1971, p. 19.

tionalizing Party to heel, and a movement regime took hold under his direction.

But the active intervention of the PLA in the Cultural Revolution produced another type of military regime. However unintended it may have been, the Army's involvement conformed neither with the mass line nor with Party supremacy but represented a military dictatorship, resulting in another Establishment under Lin Piao.

Mao decided to arrest this trend by rebuilding the Party, and the new struggle between Mao and Lin Piao apparently led to the Lin Piao incident in August 1971. The subsequent anti-Lin campaigns and the 10th Party Congress of August 1973 have cast some light on the new regime emerging in the wake of the Lin Piao Affair.

Thus, China's search for political order since 1949 reveals four salient types: the three which have demonstrated their major characteristics in one way or another and the one now emerging and uncertain. We can classify these according to their level of institutionalization and mass participation, and their kind of leadership as shown in Table 3.

Table 3
Patterns of political order in China

Type of Regime	*Period*	*Level of Institutionalization*	*Level of Mass Participation*	*Kinds of Leadership*
Institutionalizing regime under the Party	1962–66	high	low	the Party
Movement regime under the Supreme Leader	1966–67	low	high	the Supreme Leader
Praetorian regime under the military	1967–71	medium	medium	the military
Institutionalizing regime under the Party?	1971–	medium?	medium?	the Party, the Supreme Leader, the military

The first type, which I call "institutionalizing regime under the Party," is a "civic" polity in which the elite and the masses are linked through the elaborate organizations and processes of the Party. This polity displays recognizable and stable patterns of authority with adaptability, complexity, cohesion and autonomy. The level of institutionalization is higher than that of mass participation as the Party channels all political demands into its own institutional apparatus by exercising cohesive leadership.[38] Whether "pluralist" or "totalitarian,"

38. For this polity, see Huntington, *Political Order*, pp. 12–32.

this type represents most mature political systems, of which there are over 30 in the world. The overall trend of Chinese politics in 1962–66 had most of these features.

The second type, which I call "movement regime under the Supreme Leader," is a mass polity in which the elite and the masses are directly linked through mass movements. This type displays unstable patterns of authority whereby the level of mass participation is higher than that of institutionalization. In the absence of institutions the elite is accessible to the masses and the masses are available for mobilization by the elite; depending on the whim of the Supreme Leader, the patterns of political life violently oscillate between one form and another. This comes closer to Kornhauser's model of the "mass polity" where all individuals become regimented, or to Tucker's "movement regime."[39] In varying degrees, similar regimes have appeared in the movements led by such charismatic figures as Sukarno, Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, Nyerere, and Bourguiba. In China the first year of the Cultural Revolution, 1966–67, resembled this type.

The third type, which I call "praetorian regime under the military," is a regime in which the military serves as the only viable link between the elite and the masses. This usually happens when a mass movement overthrows a civilian regime and yet there is no other counterforce to the military. The word "praetorian" comes from the Praetorian Guard of Rome who took over the government whenever the Roman Senate collapsed. This type of regime comes into being as a sign of "political decay," to use Huntington's words, when social forces are highly politicized. Unlike the ancient Praetorians, a modern praetorian polity is one in which the military dominates the political system as the core group and tends to persist.[40] This is the most common form of regime in the Third World, numbering over 40, of which the two most recent examples are Uruguay and Chile. In China the involvement of the PLA in 1967–71 represented this type, notwithstanding many differences between the Chinese Army and the armies of developing countries.

The fourth type, emerging since the Lin Piao Affair, is a mixture of the previous three types. Although the emphasis now is on rebuilding the Party apparatus while reducing the role of the military, it is not yet clear where this transitional phase will lead. But the situation is not without precedent in China; in many ways the current shape of Chinese politics seems similar to that of 1949–54 when the CCP was asserting its supremacy by expanding its own apparatus while building the State structures over the five Field Armies which were exercising political and administrative control over China.

39. See *ibid.*; Tucker, "Toward a comparative politics of movement regimes"; William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York: Free Press, 1959).

40. See Huntington, *Political Order*, pp. 78–82; Amos Perlmutter, "The praetorian state and the praetorian army, toward a taxonomy of civil-military relations in developing polities," *Comparative Politics*, No. 3 (April 1969), pp. 382–404.

Now we can go on to examine the salient features of each regime in more detail.

The "Ancien Regime": An Institutionalizing Regime under the Party, 1962–66

Leading the mass movement must take place within the framework of the communist Party and must not be left to the hands of bad elements (Liu Shao-ch'i, September 1964).[41]

The "ancien regime" which preceded the Cultural Revolution probably showed all the indications of an established one-Party system. At the Centre a collective leadership directed the apparatus; the ruling coalition consisted of such former "White Area" cadres as Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Chen, Po I-po, Liu Lan-t'ao and An Tzu-wen; other former political commissars such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing, T'an Chen-lin, and T'ao Chu; and the intellectuals. Between the Centre and the localities loomed a mass of bureaucracies including various mass organizations. This institutionalizing apparatus had entrapped Mao, frustrating his efforts for mass movement.

Actually, the aggregate of collective leadership, centralized and differentiated structures, routine policy processes, organizational control and the Party supremacy facilitated such institutionalization. The central concept here was the dominance of Party supremacy rather than the Supreme Leader's "correct ideas": whoever opposed the Party's authority was counter-revolutionary. The Party could do no wrong; only in the implementation of its policies could it occasionally err. The cadres who scrupulously observed the rules and procedures implicit and explicit in this concept were commended for their good "Party spirit" (*tang-hsing, partinost* in Russian) and those who violated them were disciplined.

This institutionalizing Party rule had certain key features. First, the Centre set the basic tone of political life by making authoritative decisions, so the extent to which conflict or consensus existed at this level affected the whole political system. The political process here revolved around Mao and his associates: Mao defining broad lines and policies and his associates directing policy implementation. Mao intermittently interfered in the policy process, mostly by exercising veto power, and the Party's central machinery – the Politburo Standing Committee and Secretariat – supervised the Party bureaucracy. Only in the realm of military and foreign policy did Mao have a dominant role. The Centre controlled local units through its network of official media and organizations.

The political structures linking the Centre and the basic level were highly hierarchical. The Party maintained a unified leadership through its committees: immediately below the Centre were six Regional Party

41. *Pa I-san Hung-wei-pao* (Tientsin: 13 August, Red Guard Paper), 13 May 1967, p. 6.

Bureaux; then, 29 Provincial or Municipal Committees; about 170 Special District Committees; 2,000 *hsien* Committees; 74,000 Commune Committees; three million brigade branches; and five million team cells. In addition to these territorial units, Party Committees also functioned in all government and mass organizations, including the military. And all of these units made up the "transmission belt" for the Centre.

3. The policy process took place within these institutional arrangements. Communication flowed under the direction of the Party Committees: the Centre pushing down often vague plans for action and the localities shoving up problems for authoritative approval. The Centre "transmitted" a policy directive and all the local units "studied" it. Since the Centre was the source of action, the local units were always concerned with the way the political winds blew at the Centre. As for policy implementation, however, many localities acted on their own because of their different local conditions and resources, "flexibly applying policy to suit local conditions"; in practice this meant making policy. Differential resources often created tension between the Centre and provincial authorities over their allocation.[42]

There were several formal instruments of communication. The Centre frequently convened the Central Work Conference for central and regional leaders; those cadres above the Special District level (usually grade 14) received the *Internal References* (*Nei-pu ts'an-k'ao*), a review of internal and external news, and the *Intra-Party Bulletin* (*Tang-nei t'ung-hsün*), a gazette of classified documents; whereas the comparable cadres of the PLA received the *Work Bulletin* (*Kung-tso t'ung-hsün*). The provincial level convened the three-level conference of the province, the special districts, and the *hsien*. The middle level cadres at *hsien* and communes (usually above grade 19) received the *Reference News* (*Ts'an-k'ao hsiao-hsi*). In addition, they often relied on what they called the "little broadcast" (*hsiao-kuang-po*), an unofficial medium for oral communication; they also convened the three-level conference of the *hsien*, the communes and the brigades. Finally, the basic-level cadres (grades 20–28) in the brigades and the teams also operated in similar ways.

One common phenomenon running through this hierarchy was that cadres of each level were concerned most about their immediate superior's actions. Reinforcing this tendency were several organizational rules applied to all cadres. Their immediate superiors were not only best informed about these low-level cadres but also kept the confidential dossiers (*tang-an*) on which their careers depended. The distinction of "line" and "staff" was another example: cadres had to respond first to the documents coming through the "main line" (*chu-sung*) from their immediate superiors and then to those coming through the "copy line" (*ch'ao-sung*) from other related staff. The principle of "horizontal

42. Frederick C. Teiwes, "Provincial politics in China: themes and variations," in Lindbeck (ed.), *China*, pp. 125–30.

and vertical leadership" (*k'uai-k'uai, t'iao-t'iao ling-tao*) further supported this trend.[43] According to the principle, cadres had to comply with both their higher levels and their immediately superior Party Committees; but when a directive from the Committee was in conflict with the one from other higher levels, they still had to comply with the Party Committee while asking the higher levels for clarification. Liu maintained – allegedly – that even if the immediate superior's decision were wrong, the cadres should still obey it; otherwise disorder would ensue. During the Cultural Revolution Mao's supporters labelled this stand "Liu's theory of docile tools."[44]

Lastly, the "petition and report" system supplemented this rule. When cadres were unclear about their superior's intention, they petitioned for clarification (*ch'ing-shih*) by reporting back what they did not understand (*pao-kao*); and then the superior gave them his view and approval (*p'i-chun*). In this bureaucratic milieu, the cadres' perception of their superior's intention often determined their behaviour. As Michel Oksenberg points out, the career path of these cadres also became institutionalized within these relationships.[45]

Communication flowed through these intricate relationships. What moved down was that which the Centre wanted done and what moved up was that which the lower levels perceived most feasible. Because of local variations and the cadres' different perceptions, there existed a built-in tendency for the downward communication to be distorted and for the upward communication to be fabricated. Policy implementation involved constant interplays between the Centre's demands and the localities' evasions. The basic-level cadres in particular had to make compromises between their superior's demands and the peasants' wishes in order to adapt to prevailing circumstances and protect themselves from outside intervention. Under these circumstances, policy performance depended as much on communication and implementation as on content. For this reason, the Party always sought effective devices to control and evaluate the actual policy implementation by local cadres.

For evaluation and control, the Party primarily relied on organizational devices. To be sure, it also utilized other methods, such as sending down cadres (*hsia-fang*) to the basic levels, making them participate in labour, requiring them to "squat at selected spots" (*tun-tien*) for a longer period, and asking them to study Mao's writings. But the final check was always made either by the regular Party Committees or by work teams. Since most cadres had learned how to survive the Party's campaigns directed at them, Liu preferred establishing a counter-hierarchy of work teams directed by higher Party authorities

43. A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 73.

44. *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*People's Daily*) (henceforward *Jen-min*), 7 April 1967.

45. "Getting ahead and along in communist China: the ladder of success on the eve of the Cultural Revolution," in Lewis (ed.), *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*, pp. 304–50.

so that they could check the behaviour of local cadres and reshuffle their ranks by "squatting at selected spots." Unlike Mao who preferred ideological rectification, Liu resorted to the method of check and balance within the Party's organizational frameworks; for by so doing, the Party could co-opt competent cadres and assure their compliance with Party policies.

The Party legitimized this overall authority structure. Directly involved in all aspects of the problem-solving process, the Party enhanced its authority by demonstrating its capabilities in development rather than relying on one leader's charisma. Since this Party authority effectively obstructed Mao's personal authority, he accused it of being "left in form but right in essence," or "waving the red flag to oppose the red flag" and of "obeying in the light but sabotaging in the dark."[46] To replace this perverted political order with a new one which was more amenable to his ideas, Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution.

The First Phase of the Cultural Revolution: A Movement Regime Under the Supreme Leader, 1966–67

In the final analysis, all truths of Marxism can be summed up in one sentence: Rebellion is justified (Mao Tse-tung, August 1966).[47]

During the first year of the Revolution, a mass polity under the Supreme Leader appeared in China. At the Centre Mao was laying down the "correct ideas and policies"; the official and unofficial press transmitted Mao's "supreme directives"; various mass movements sprang up to implement them. Through these movements, Mao sought to emulate the Paris Commune of 1871 as his ideal type.

Before building this ideal polity, Mao had to topple the "ancien regime" first; hence, he justified "destruction before construction." He succeeded in eliciting the support of Lin Piao and his lieutenants within the PLA leadership and of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and other young radicals in Shanghai, thus forming a minimum coalition for his goal; he then relied heavily upon the Army instruments in the struggle against the Party leadership. In overcoming the organizational resistance of the Party apparatus, however, he also mobilized a non-Party force, the Red Guards. The Red Guard movements, in turn, forced the collapse of Party Committees. The Revolutionary Rebels, made up of workers and peasants, also joined these movements which eventually brought about the collapse of the institutionalized political authority, and in its place, a mass polity bordering on anarchy developed.

Such mass politics was tied to Chairman Mao who justified the Cultural Revolution in the name of his "correct ideology." As the "supreme leader, the great teacher, the helmsman and the red sun," Mao and his ideas became supreme, and the cadres and masses had to comply with them. Those who displayed activism in upholding Maoist

46. *Jen-min*, 16 May and 23 November 1967.
47. "It is fine," *ibid.* 23 August 1966, editorial.

virtue were commended as "good pupils of Chairman Mao" and those who opposed Mao's ideas were labelled "revisionists." The "reign of virtue" indeed replaced the Party rule as Mao spoke for the masses, articulating their "general will." [48] When the Party Committees countered the Red Guard attack by claiming that whoever rebelled against the Party was counter-revolutionary, the Red Guard retorted that whoever opposed Chairman Mao was counter-revolutionary. Thus, the Cultural Revolution represented the confrontation between the leader and the Party, and between mass participation and institutionalization.

One-man leadership was clearly a feature of the Cultural Revolution. At the Centre Mao resumed direct leadership; the Cultural Revolution Group acting as his operational agent. After Mao had authorized the Red Guards to ostracize Liu, Teng, P'eng and T'ao Chu, the old Politburo Standing Committee and Secretariat ceased to function. Central directives were issued in the joint name of the Central Committee, Cultural Revolution Group, the State Council, and the Military Affairs Committee; but the Centre actually comprised no more than Mao and a handful of his supporters such as Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng and Chiang Ch'ing. In this way, the whole country was subordinate to the Chairman.

This charismatic leadership sought to replace the hierarchial Party bureaucracy with decentralized and diffused mass organizations. Deprived of their legitimacy, the Party Committees just "stood aside" (*k'ao-pien chan*) in the face of Red Guard attacks. The January Storm of 1967 spelled the end of all the Provincial Committees. The first prototype of the Paris Commune was set up in Shanghai when the rebel forces took over the old Party; but soon this was replaced by the Revolutionary Committee, another prototype for Maoist authority. Actually, the rebel forces first seized power in Shansi but Mao suppressed this to make the Shanghai commune a national model. He then encountered serious setbacks in sustaining such a commune, for not only did the old power-holders put up strenuous resistance but even the rebel forces themselves fought each other. To prevent the "comeback" of the old power holders and to quell the factional infights among the rising rebel groups, Mao reluctantly ordered the Army to intervene in the power seizure struggles, asking it to support the left. As a provisional measure, he then authorized the format of setting up the "Revolutionary Committee" in Heilungkiang so that representatives of the Army, the revolutionary cadres, and the masses could participate in the "three-way-alliance" (*san-chieh-ho*). Between January and September 1967, six Provincial Revolutionary Committees were set up: Heilungkiang, Shanghai, Shantung, Kweichow, Shansi, Peking and Tsinghai; in all of these Mao's supporters became chairmen: P'an Fu-sheng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Li Tsai-han, Liu Ke-p'ing, Hsieh Fu-

48. Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The reign of virtue: some broad perspectives on leader and party in the Cultural Revolution," in Lewis (ed.), *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*, pp. 149–69.

chih and Liu Hsien-ch'uan. At places where no Revolutionary Committees had been set up, either the rebel supervisory committees or the Military Control Commission took over. Through these organizations, Mao was able to forge a direct relationship with the populace.

The policy process turned into a series of *ad hoc* movements. The Cultural Revolutionary Group issued very general directives in the form of Mao's "supreme instructions," and all the media carried these instructions; the Red Guards and Rebels responded with almost instantaneous movements.[49] Lacking regular communication channels, these groups often acted on their own understanding of Mao's directives, each claiming its allegiance to Mao's Thought; as a result, they did different things under the same banner, airing their private discontents in the guise of public causes. The Rebels-Party Establishment confrontation was the basic pattern of these conflicts, in which the accumulated hostilities within the first-generation elite flared up and so did some latent social tensions. The Cultural Revolution Group maintained only erratic and often intermittent communication with the rebel groups. The only institutional channel which was not disrupted was that of the Army. Accordingly, the Army gradually took charge of policy implementation.

In coping with this situation and rectifying deviations, Mao called for ideological campaigns. He charged that the work teams sent out by the Party imposed a "white terror" on the masses.[50] By launching the campaign to "repudiate revisionism and selfishness," and vilifying Liu as "China's Khrushchev," he sought to eradicate Liu's supporters and their influences. After the "February 1967 Reversal Winds" led by such old cadres as T'an Chen-lin, Mao's supporters decisively stepped up the attacks on Liu, calling him the "top capitalist roader," a negative example of all that stood against Mao's policies. Mao expected that new "revolutionary successors" would be trained through these criticisms and self-criticisms. He wanted to fight bureaucracy and cadre deviation through these "moralizing" campaigns rather than through organizational control.[51]

Mao personally approved of these features. His authority derived not so much from his capability in problem-solving as from his prerogative to define the correct ideology embodied in the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" and his personality cult. His cult in particular served to "stimulate the masses to dismantle the anti-Mao Party bureaucracy" as he once intimated to Edgar Snow.[52] This charismatic authority commanded an intensive attack on the Party's institutional authority. As Huntington sug-

49. For a collection of these instructions, see Nishijima Atsuyoshi, *Mō Takutō Saikō Shishi* (*Mao Tse-tung's Supreme Instructions*) (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1970).

50. "Bombard the headquarters – my first big-character poster," in *Current Background* (henceforward *CB*) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 891, p. 63.

51. Benjamin I. Schwartz, "A personal view of some thoughts of Mao Tse-tung," in Johnson (ed.), *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China*, pp. 352–70.

52. *Life*, 30 April 1971, p. 46.

gested, political instability often derives from an excessive mass participation at the expense of institutionalization.[53] With the Cultural Revolution, the intensity and violence of mass participation forced the Party authority to collapse.

The excessive mobilization of the Cultural Revolution brought China to the brink of an internal war in the summer of 1967. This possibility became real when some ultra-leftists went so far as to rebel against the Army. The Army then rebuffed these provocations by suppressing some of them. A case in point was the Wuhan Incident in July in which Ch'en Tsai-tao, commander of the Wuhan Military Region, and his associates kidnapped and assaulted Wang Li and Hsieh Fu-chih, two representatives of the Cultural Revolution Group, who came down to support the leftist faction in Wuhan after Ch'en's troops had supported the One Million Warriors, a conservative group of workers. In the wake of this incident, many leftist Red Guards, particularly the so-called "May 16 Corps" under Ch'i Pen-yü, Wang Li, and Kuan Feng called for "dragging out a handful of capitalist roaders within the Army."[54] This virulent attack on the Army actually enhanced the role of the Army in the politics of the Revolution.

The Second Phase of the Cultural Revolution and the Lin Piao Affair: A Praetorian Regime Under the Military, 1967–71

We must use a violent, revolutionary coup to block this peacefully evolving counter-revolutionary gradual development (Project 571, approved by Lin Piao, March 1971).[55]

During the second period of the Cultural Revolution from September 1967 to April 1969, and until the Lin Piao incident in August 1971, a praetorian regime under the military emerged as the only viable organizational link between the elite and the populace. The military was forced into this position after Mao charged it with the task of "three supports and two militaries": support of the left, of agriculture and of industry, and military control and training.[56]

In many ways the PLA's role in Chinese politics resembled that of the military regimes in developing countries (although, as Ellis Joffe aptly explains, there are differences as well).[57] First, the conditions under which the Army was involved were similar: the breakdown of institutional processes, the lack of social cohesion and the polarization of groups. Second, like most other praetorian regimes, the PLA initially played the role of an arbiter and enforcer of public order, but gradually assumed that of an

53. Huntington, *Political Order*, pp. 13–14.

54. Robinson, "Chou En-lai and the Cultural Revolution," pp. 238–59; also see his "The Wuhan Incident: local strife and provincial rebellion in the Cultural Revolution," *CQ*, No. 47 (1971), pp. 413–38.

55. "Outline of 'Project 51,'" *Chinese Law and Government*, Autumn-Winter 1972–73. p. 47.

56. *Jen-min*, 19 and 29 March and 7 April 1967.

57. "The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: the effect of intervention," *CQ*, No. 55 (1973), p. 452.

institution-builder and ruler. Third, as these roles shifted, apparently some elements of the Army attempted to perpetuate their influence and when this was thwarted, they resorted to a coup, that common device used by all other military take-overs. Lastly and most importantly, the PLA's institutional position was to fill the leadership vacuum created by the Cultural Revolution.

The rationale for military rule was that the Army was founded and led by Chairman Mao and his comrade-in-arms, Lin Piao; as such it defended Mao's proletarian dictatorship. Political expediency, however, made the Army's role even more important. Immediately after the Wuhan Incident, when the ultra-leftist "May 16 Corps" aimed to "drag out a handful of capitalist roaders within the Army," most regional military leaders rallied together to defend the integrity of the Army. An enlarged Military Affairs Committee meeting was called in August 1967 to put a halt to the Red Guard assault on the Army. After this meeting, the Centre issued the September 5 directive which gave the Army the authority to use force in dealing with the armed Red Guards; the same day Chiang Ch'ing publicly declared that the slogan for dragging out a handful of military leaders was counter-revolutionary. This 5 September directive became a watershed of the Cultural Revolution in that it accorded the military the power to pacify local conflicts. Mao also endorsed this measure by issuing a directive to "protect the Army and cherish the people." [58] This being the case, whoever opposed the Army ran the risk of acting against Chairman Mao.

In 1967–69 the military provided the real leadership for the Revolution. Initially, Lin Piao and his associates such as Yang Ch'eng-wu, acting chief-of-staff, and Liu Chih-chien, member of the Cultural Revolution Group, collaborated with Chiang Ch'ing in leading the Revolution. After the Wuhan Incident, however, the Military Affairs Committee apparently directed regional military leaders in the formation of Revolutionary Committees. This new development gave rise to the inevitable tensions between the Cultural Revolutionary Group and military leaders. At about this time, Chou En-lai's influence rapidly rose in mediating the conflicts.[59] The 5 September 1967 directive marked a triumph of the regional military leaders over Chiang Ch'ing's radical supporters in the Cultural Revolution Group. Among the five Field Armies still remaining in their original bases, Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army gradually rose to prominence. Of the three armed services of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, the latter two were more responsive to Mao and Lin perhaps for budgetary support; the Navy and Air Force were instrumental in quashing the Wuhan mutiny.[60]

58. *Summary of the Chinese Mainland Press* (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), No. 4036, pp. 1–6; *ibid.* No. 4026, pp. 1–2; *ibid.* No. 4069, pp. 1–6; *Jen-min*, 8 September 1967.

59. Robinson, "Chou En-lai," pp. 272–73.

60. See William Whitson, "The Field Army in Chinese communist military politics," *CQ*, No. 37 (1969), pp. 1–30.

A new alignment of military leaders took shape in 1968. After the 5 September 1967 directive was issued, the "May 16 Corps," probably the most leftist supporter of Chiang Ch'ing, was purged; subsequently, those military leaders who had some connections with the Corps were also purged; Yang Ch'eng-wu, Fu Ch'ung-pi (commander of the Peking Garrison), and Yü Li-chin (Political Commissar of the Air Force). In their place, Huang Yung-sheng (Commander of the Canton Military Region) replaced Yang, Wen Yü-ch'eng (Huang's deputy in Canton) replaced Fu; and Wu Fa-hsien (Commander of the Air Force) became increasingly prominent. All these new figures at the Centre were Lin Piao's closest lieutenants, together with Li Tso-feng (Political Commissar of the Navy), Ch'iu Hui-tso (Director of the PLA Logistic Department), and Yeh Ch'ün (Lin Piao's wife). They assumed the operational leadership of the policy process, as evidenced by the fact that all of them except Wen Yü-ch'eng later became members of the Politburo at the 9th Party Congress in April 1969. The central leadership, then, consisted of a coalition of the Cultural Revolution Group and the military leaders; in fact, a fourteen-man directorate emerged in 1968: Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, Hsieh Fu-chih, Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Yeh Ch'ün, Wang Tung-hsing, and Li Tso-feng, all of whom later became Politburo members. At the provincial level, too, the military dominated the Revolutionary Committees: of the 29 Revolutionary Committees completed in September 1968, the military assumed 20 chairmanships. When the new Central Committee was elected by the 9th Party Congress, the military took 12 of the 25 Politburo members and 44·1 per cent. of the Central Committee members. It is fair to say that the military became a new *tang-ch'uan-p'ai.*

The Army was also the only national structure left intact with its centralized network of Party Committees and commands. Mao continued to reign over the Army; but in practice the Military Affairs Committee and the General Staff acted as the central executive bodies while the influence of the Cultural Revolution Group declined after several re-shuffles. Increasingly, Lin Piao's faction dominated the top apparatus of the military: Lin Piao overseeing its operation with Yeh Ch'ün carrying out the routine chore of the Military Affairs Committee as the head of its Administrative Office, and Huang Yung-sheng and others taking charge of the General Staff. Ten Great Military Regions except Peking assumed the function of the former six Regional Party Bureaux, co-ordinating provincial activities; the Army's Commissars and Commanders took up the core duties of the Provincial Revolutionary Committees. Beginning in the autumn of 1968 the PLA also sent its propaganda teams to all functional organizations; they performed tasks of the former Party and government units. As a result of this military involvement, regional power began to grow so far as local affairs were concerned.

The policy process involved constant interactions between Mao's group and the military or among the military itself, and military-Red Guard

confrontations became the major pattern of political conflicts in this period. The formation of most Revolutionary Committees, for example, resulted from the intensive consultation between central leaders and regional military leaders; only after their rosters were completed did the provinces make them public as a symbolic victory for Mao. But this was a recognition of the reality emerging from the "three-way-alliance" of contending factions. The progress of the Provincial Revolutionary Committees in 1967–68 attested to this fact. In the summer of 1967 the formation of Revolutionary Committees was stalled; only two were set up. But between 5 September 1967 and February 1968, eight committees were set up and in six of them the military became chairmen. Between the purge of Yang Ch'eng-wu in March 1968 and September 1968, 14 committees were set up within five months and in 12 of them the military became chairmen. Most of these latter committees were faction-ridden; the last five in particular – Yunnan, Fukien, Kwangsi, Sinkiang and Tibet – were not set up until August-September 1968. For Sinkiang and Tibet, which border with the Soviet Union, there were some indications that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia accelerated this phase. Twenty of the 29 committees were set up after September 1967, and about 69 per cent of the top posts were taken by the military. In proportion to the rising military, however, the Red Guard movement rapidly declined. In August 1968, Mao himself approved the plans to send the Red Guards down to the countryside and to have the Army propaganda teams re-educate them.

The Army used both ideological indoctrination and organizational control in dealing with deviant actions. The newly formed Army propaganda teams were supposed to marshal the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. The purged old cadres were sent to the "May 7 Cadre Schools" so that they could labour and study Mao's writings. Organizationally, the Army propaganda teams functioned just as the former Party-dispatched work teams, providing leadership and mediating local disputes. If propaganda proved ineffective, the military cadres employed coercive measures to stem armed clashes among Red Guards and Rebels; by so doing they elicited compliance for central directives.

Thus, the military authority derived both from Mao's blessing and its own organizational capabilities. The combination of Mao's charisma and the military kept China from slipping into chaos; the political authority resulting from this combination was a military dictatorship. But such a military praetorianism inevitably ran counter to the principle of Party rule.

The Party rebuilding process following the 9th Party Congress and the subsequent political development leading to the Lin Piao Affair must be understood in this context. Although Mao overthrew the old Party Establishment in the Cultural Revolution he did not aim to abolish the Party itself; he wanted to build a new Party which was more responsive to his authority without developing an independent power. From the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Mao planned to hold the 9th

Party Congress the next year; in November 1967, he issued a directive on preparing for the Congress.[61] As the internecine conflicts of the Cultural Revolution delayed this plan, Mao concentrated his efforts on completing the Provincial Revolutionary Committees. Soon after these committees were completed, he called the 12th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee in October 1968, which adopted the new Party Constitution, and formally indicted Liu for being "traitor, renegade and scab"; then he called the 9th Party Congress in April 1969, which ratified the new Party Constitution. The Party rebuilding process, however, raised the same old dilemma between one-man rule and the Party rule, though this time the tension took a different form: that of a conflict between the entrenched military and the newly emerging Party under Mao.

The 1969 Party Constitution and the draft of the State Constitution of 1970 attempted to solve these problems by making provisions for a direct mass participation under Mao's personal leadership, but the problems still persisted and eventually precipitated the Lin Piao Affair in August 1971. The 1969 Party Constitution clearly stated that the CCP was the "political party of the proletariat" taking "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought" as its theoretical basis. Now that the Party was restored to its original position of supremacy, basic organizational principles such as democratic centralism, collective leadership and discipline raised their heads once more. The Party constitution had provisions to institutionalize Maoist political order: it made Lin Piao Mao's official successor; as an attempt to facilitate a direct relationship between Mao and the masses, it simplified the Party's organizations. It mentioned neither the Secretariat nor the Control Commission except for "a number of necessary organs, which are compact and efficient"; any local units could directly report to the Central Committee and the Chairman without going through the interlocking organizations. The newly drafted State Constitution of August 1970 also had similar provisions.[62]

The politics of leadership in 1969–71 was in a state of flux, yet some broad trends were discernible. The Cultural Revolution purged over 80 per cent. of the old central leaders, mostly those who had been associated with Liu Shao-ch'i and P'eng Chen; in their place a group of new leaders evolved around Mao, Lin and Chou. The 9th Party Congress ratified the new coalition emerging from the Cultural Revolution, consisting of Mao's close supporters, military leaders, and some old cadres; of these the military overwhelmed the others. The new Politburo Standing Committee was composed of Mao, Lin, Chou, Ch'en Po-ta and K'ang Sheng; of the Central Committee some 44 per cent came from the military, 27 per cent from the old cadres, and 29 per cent from the

61. Chu Wen-lin, "An analysis of the 29 New CCP Committees at the provincial level," *Issues and Studies*, No. 11 (November 1971), p. 47.

62. "The constitution of the Communist Party of China," *Peking Review*, No. 18 (30 April 1969), pp. 36–39; also see "Text of the 1970 Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China," in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, No. 1 (January 1971), pp. 100–106.

masses. The representation of regional military leaders in the Committee rose from 2 per cent in the 8th Committee to 26 per cent; the central military command under such men as Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien and Li Tso-feng may have assumed the role of the old Party Secretariat. The military's power had been steadily growing until the fall of Lin Piao in 1971. In addition to the Revolutionary Committees, the military also dominated the new Provincial Party Committees. Of the 29 Provincial Party Committees completed between December 1970 and August 1971, the military took 20 first secretaries; of 158 of the leading cadres 95 were military; except in Peking and Shanghai the military dominated all other Provincial Party Committees. As shown in Table 4, the military continued to grow in the balance of the "three-way-alliance" elements while the cadres were trailing and the masses rapidly disappearing.[63]

Table 4
The Balance of Power, 1967–70

Date / *Power Organs*	*No. of Leading Cadres*	*Military* No.	%	*Cadres* No.	%	*Masses* No.	%
Jan. 1967—							
Sept 1968 Prov. R. Committee	232	80	34·5	64	27·6	88	37·9
April 1969 Ninth C. Committee	279	123	44·1	75	26·9	81	29·0
April 1969 Ninth Politburo	21[a]	11	55·0	5	25·0	4	20·0
Dec 1970-Aug 1971 Prov. P. Committee	158	95	60·0	53	33·6	10	6·4

[a] Mao was included among the 21 members of the 9th Politburo, but not in the percentage, and only full members excluding four alternates were classified.

The increasing tensions between the military and the new Party culminated in the Lin Piao Affair. At stake was the allocation of power in the new Party-State structures. Widening gaps had apparently existed between Mao's conception of Party-building and its implementation by Lin Piao. According to Chou En-lai's political report to the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta had prepared a draft political report for the 9th Party Congress in which they opposed a continued revolution, contending that the main task was to develop production.[64] Ch'en once accused Liu of having advocated this line at the 8th Congress; hence Chou's charge is hardly credible, but it does reveal that there were differences between Mao and Lin even in 1969. As early as the 1st Plenum in April 1969, Mao made it clear that "every

63 Ch'i P'eng, "Party affairs in communist China during 1971," *Chung-kung yen-chiu*, No. 1 (January 1972), p. 6.

64. *Peking Review*, No. 35–36 (7 September 1973), p. 17.

branch needs reorganization by the masses," commenting on the factional struggles between military leaders and radical leaders in such provinces as Shantung, Kweichou, Shensi and Yunnan.[65] In 1970 several leftist chairmen of the Revolutionary Committees in these provinces were replaced by military leaders. Due to these tensions, the rebuilding of the Provincial Party Committees had been delayed since the formation of the first leading group of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee in October 1968; not until August 1971 were they completed. Despite the 1969 Party Constitution's provision that the Party Committees should exercise leadership over all other organizations, no such committee functioned at local level before 1971.

One result of the Cultural Revolution was the decentralization of power. About 70 per cent. of the 9th Central Committee members operated at the provincial level in contrast to the 8th Committee where the same percentage was at the Centre. The Party had to be rebuilt from the top down but the provincial authorities were held by the military. Important decisions resulted from conflicts and compromises between the Centre and the regional military leaders. Most Provincial Party Committees evolved out of these repeated " consultations "; the fact that the number of the new Provincial Party Committee members was double that of the old ones may have been due to such intense bargaining. Given that factionalism continued to plague local units, it was natural that the military establishment should often act arbitrarily over the newly constituted Party Committees. In this sense one passage of Mao's talk in August 1971 is revealing: " Local Party Committees had already been established, and they should have exercised unified leadership. Wasn't it just confusing if matters already decided upon by local Party Committees were still taken up to Army Party Committees for discussion? "[66]

These overall tensions between the military and the Party at local levels reflected the split between Lin Piao and Mao at the Centre. The relationship between Mao and Lin Piao in 1969–71 resembled the Mao-Liu relationship before the Cultural Revolution with one major difference – Lin seemed more conspiratorial. Like Liu, Lin and his associates in the Military Affairs Committee and the Army's General Staff had not consulted Mao sufficiently over their work. This estrangement, it would seem, had also been created by changing circumstances. During the Cultural Revolution Lin joined Chiang Ch'ing's radicals in overthrowing the old Party Establishment. When this task was almost achieved, the ultra-leftist wing of the coalition sought to overthrow the Army Establishment. Then, Lin's initial support for the radicals caused considerable resentment among regional military leaders; their protests made it pos-

65. " Mao Tse-tung's speech to the first plenary session of the CCP's 9th Central Committee," *Issues and Studies*, No. 3 (March 1970), p. 7.

66. " Summary of Chairman Mao's talk to responsible local comrades during his tour of inspection " (Mid-August to 12 September 1971), *Chinese Law and Government*, p. 40.

sible for Mao to purge the "516 Corps." Somewhat isolated from both Chiang Ch'ing's group and the regional military commanders, Lin consolidated his own power base at the Centre; for this purpose he may have recruited Ch'en Po-ta. But to expand further, Lin needed more strategic posts in the top organs of the State; in particular he had to outstrip Chou, whose power base, the State Council, emerged largely intact from the Cultural Revolution. While preparations were being made for the 4th National People's Congress which would adopt the new State Constitution, Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta as two members of the drafting committee of the Constitution conspired to make Lin chairman of the People's Republic.

Having experienced the formation of Liu's Establishment after the Great Leap which eventually necessitated the Cultural Revolution, Mao could not allow another "independent kingdom" to be formed. Perhaps for this reason he opposed the post of state chairman. But at the Second Plenum held at Lushan in August 1970, Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta launched a "surprise attack" by proposing a State chairman without informing three other members of the Politburo Standing Committee while such "big generals" as Huang Yung-sheng, Wu Fa-hsien, Yeh Ch'ün, Li Tso-p'eng, Ch'iu Hui-tso, and also Li Hsueh-feng and Cheng Wei-shan knew the plan but maintained "air-tight" secrecy; they did so by advancing a theory of "genius" for Mao. Mao explains why they acted in this way: "A certain person was very anxious to become state chairman, to split the Party, and to seize power." To meet this challenge Mao adopted three methods, using his power of appointment and removal as chairman of both the Party and the Military Affairs Committee. First, he criticized a report made by Ch'en; second, he added his followers to the Military Affairs Committee; third, he reshuffled the Peking Military Region [67]; and subsequently, he sought to purge Lin, the man he had chosen as his successor. Riker's coalition theory makes good sense of this abrupt change. Although Mao made a minimum winning coalition with Lin, when Lin demanded too many side-payments, Mao no longer needed him.[68] Lin's coup plan against Mao characterized this method of Mao's of dividing and ruling "social feudalism." [69]

Lin clearly understood Mao's intentions and techniques. A passage in his coup plan called "571" (the code number has the same pronunciation, although slightly different tones, as the characters for "armed uprising") expresses them as follows:

> Today he uses this force to attack that force; tomorrow he uses that force to attack this force. Today he uses sweet words and honeyed talk to those whom he entices, and tomorrow he puts them to death for some fabricated crimes. Those who are his greatest friends today will be his prisoners tomorrow.
>
> Looking back at the history of the past few decades, [do you see] anyone

67. *Ibid.* p. 36, and p. 39. 68. Riker, *Theory of Political Coalitions*, p. 231.
69. "Outline of 'Project 571,'" *Chinese Law and Government*, p. 52.

whom he had supported initially who has not finally been handed a political death sentence? [70]

In March 1971, Lin's faction worked out the coup plan to assassinate Mao. The train carrying Mao to Peking from Shanghai on 12 September was to have been blown up, but Lin's own daughter Tou-tou's information enabled the train to halt before it reached the detonation point. Lin and his wife fled by a Trident Jet to the Soviet Union but the plane crashed in Mongolia the next day.[71] For our purposes this represents not only the culmination of the power struggle between Mao and Lin but also a clash of institutionalism and praetorianism.

The Aftermath of the Lin Piao Affair and the 10th Party Congress 1971–74: Another Institutionalizing Regime under the Party?

We must practice Marxism and not revisionism; unite and don't split; be open and aboveboard and don't intrigue and conspire (Mao Tse-tung, September 1971).[72]

Between the Lin Piao Affair and the 10th Party Congress, the Chinese leadership made a concerted effort towards the restoration of the Party apparatus while reducing the Army's role in politics. After the Lin Piao Affair was known, Mao made his warning on the "three musts and must nots" cited above.[73] To popularize these themes he also asked the Party to promote two songs: the *Internationale* and the *Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention.* As for the cadres, the Party embarked upon a campaign to fight "complacency and arrogance." In this campaign Lin and his followers were accused of being "Liu-type swindlers" though they were not named; Lin's previous statements regarding "four first" and "four good company" were under oblique attacks. Unlike the 1960s when the PLA had been a national model, the PLA was now asked to learn from the people.[74]

Through these campaigns Mao strengthened Party supremacy over all other organizations to bring the Army under the Party's control. In contrast to the Cultural Revolution in which he had justified rebellion, Mao now confined the anti-Lin Piao campaign within the regular Party apparatus; he did not allow any mass campaign on the scale of the Red Guard movements. Nothing can better illustrate this trend than the resuscitation of the "Party spirit" concept which Mao had deplored when P'eng Chen used it to discipline the Shanghai Committee in 1966. The Party now

70. *Ibid.* p. 54.

71. *New York Times*, 2 September 1973; for a background of this incident, see Philip Bridgham, "The fall of Lin Piao," *CQ*, No. 55 (1973), pp. 427–99.

72. "Summary of Chairman Mao's talk," p. 32.

73. *Ibid.* p. 33.

74. *Ibid.* p. 40; Peking University Party Committee Writing Group, "People's real struggle advances in history," *Hung-ch'i*, No. 11 (1 October 1971), pp. 52–60; *Jen-min*, 1 December 1971 and 22 January 1972.

urged all cadres to adhere to this concept: everyone must be subordinate to the Party Committees; the minority to the majority, the lower level to the higher, and the entire populace to the Central Committee.[75]

The central leadership also restored "unified and collective leadership," using the anti-Lin campaign as a means of building a new coalition of leaders. Of some ten Politburo members who survived the purge, three distinctive groups have appeared: Chiang Ch'ing's group (K'ang Sheng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, and Yao Wen-yuan), Chou's associates (Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien and Chi Teng-k'uei), and other military leaders (Li Teh-sheng, Wang Tung-hsing, Hsu Shih-yu, and Ch'en Hsi-lien). A number of the old power-holders were rehabilitated in 1971–73: Teng Hsiao-p'ing, T'an Chen-lin, and Li Ching-ch'üan; at the provincial level Chao Tzu-yang returned to Kwangtung as vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Committee; T'an Ch'i-lung of Shantung appeared in Chekiang; as for the military, such generals as Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Li Ta and Yang Yung came back and even Ch'en Tsai-tao and Chung Han-hua, two culprits of the 1967 Wuhan Mutiny, reappeared.[76] As Mao mixed these military leaders with each other, the lines of the old Field Armies and their regional bases have become blurred.

The hierarchy of the Party-State organizations reappeared after the Party resumed its central departments and the State Council reactivated its ministries and commissions. The State Council has been reduced from 80 units in the old system to 41: some 21 ministerial units and 20 agencies. A line of specialization is discernible at the top: Chou in charge of overall Party and foreign affairs, Yeh Chien-ying military affairs, Li Hsien-nien economic affairs, and Chiang Ch'ing cultural-educational affairs. Once again the policy process has become institutionalized since the formal channels of communication such as the work conference and internal documents including *Reference Materials* and *Reference News* have been resumed. "Provincial Revolutionary Committee Writing Groups" have often presented the Centre's thinking on policy matters in the *People's Daily* in collaboration with the paper's staff.[77] The direct involvement of societal forces in politics is no longer allowed; hence political conflicts have to be fought within the formal organizations.

In checking deviant cadres, too, the Centre has shifted its emphasis to organizational control. Since 1970 the May 7 Cadre Schools have adopted a rotation system whereby cadres receive political education in turn.[78] The Party not only emphasizes the "three must nots," of the Cultural Revolution but also tries to correct the excesses the Revolution

75. "Consolidate the proletarian party spirit," *Hung-ch'i*, No. 12 (1 November 1971), pp. 19–23.

76. See Parris Chang, "Political rehabilitation of cadres in China: a traveller's view," *CQ*, No. 54 (1973), pp. 331–40.

77. See Roderick MacFarquhar, "A visit to the Chinese press," *ibid.* No. 53 (1973), pp. 144–52.

78. See Alexander Casella, "Report from China: The Nanniwan May 7th Cadre School," *ibid.* pp. 153–57.

created. Now, Party propaganda maintains that it is erroneous to say: "As long as the line is correct, going beyond policy is all right," or "Being left is always safer than being right."[79] As with the consolidation phase after the Great Leap, the Centre is introducing more and more regulations.

With the Party control restored, Mao's cult has been de-emphasized so as to revitalize the Party's institutional authority. Propaganda still repeats Mao Tse-tung Thought but its intensity is greatly reduced. Instead, the Party is enhancing its legitimacy by publicizing its capabilities in development at home and China's national prestige abroad. For the first time since the Great Leap, in 1971 the Party made public some statistics of its major production records for grain, steel, and oil; in 1972 it made great play of China's admission to the U.N. and President Nixon's visit to Peking.[80] And in particular, the Party has begun to regain its supremacy over the military.

The 10th Party Congress in August 1973 formally ratified these trends by making a renewed commitment to the restoration of the Party apparatus and also by endorsing the principle of mass participation while still reducing the role of the Army. The first two trends look contradictory but aim at the same goal of curtailing the Army's influence. The new Party Constitution adopted at the Congress clearly stated these three themes. First, it emphasized that all other organizations including the Army "must all accept the *centralized* leadership of the Party"[81] (note that the italicized word has been newly added); another new provision stated that the Party Committee may be set up in all State and popular organizations. According to Wang Hung-wen's report on the revision of the Constitution, the Party is supreme above all other sectors; hence a Party Committee's leadership must not be replaced by a "joint conference" of several sectors, an allusion to Revolutionary Committees in which the military have been predominant.[82] Second, the Constitution made mass criticism one of the Party's on-going institutions. The Preamble of the Constitution included Mao's dictum: "Revolution like this [the Cultural Revolution] will have to be carried out many times in the future"; it also encouraged "the revolutionary spirit of daring to go against the tide." Article 5 stated: "It is absolutely impermissible to suppress criticism and to retaliate." The reason why these new provisions are necessary, explained Wang, is that "some leading cadres" still "suppress if unable to persuade, and arrest if unable to suppress."[83] In the context of the Lin Piao Affair, this emphasis on mass criticism is directed

79. *Jen-min*, 27 January 1972; *Radio Heilungkiang*, 3 January 1972.

80. *Jen-min*, 1 January, 22 February, 2 March and 5 April 1972; 1 January and 1 May 1973.

81. "Constitution of the Communist Party of China," in *Peking Review*, Nos. 35–36 (7 September 1973), p. 28. For a discussion of the 10th Congress see pp. 1–00 of this issue of *The China Quarterly*.

82. *Ibid.* No. 35–36 (7 September 1973), p. 32.

83. *Ibid.* pp. 26, 28, 33.

at the arbitrary behaviour of the military; but later on, others also can use it for their benefit. Third, the three major documents of the Congress – the Constitution, Wang's report, and Chou's political report – all made a clear break from Lin Piao. The Constitution not only included Mao's call for the "three must nots" but also deleted all of Lin's slogans written into the 1969 Constitution. Claiming that Lin wanted to "have everything under his command," Chou's report named Lin for the first time and declared: "The Lin Piao anti-Party clique has been smashed."[84]

With these broad themes, the 10th Party Congress confirmed the new alignment of central leaders. An outstanding departure from the 9th Central Committee was the restoration of collective leadership. The Party Constitution deleted the old provision: "Comrade Lin Piao is Comrade Mao Tse-tung's close comrade-in-arms and successor." Wang's report elaborated further by saying that those to be trained as successors "are not just one or two persons, but millions."[85] Failing twice with a designated successor, Mao left this problem to the contenders themselves. Instead, he returned to the practice of the 8th Party Congress by choosing five vice-chairmen: Chou En-lai, Wang Hung-wen, Yeh Chien-ying, K'ang Sheng and Li Teh-sheng. The 10th Central Committee elected by the Congress also increased the number of the Politburo Standing Committee from 4 to 9 and the number of its own members by 40. As shown in Table 5, the structure of this Committee resembles that of the 8th Committee.

Table 5
Comparison of Central Committee Compositions

	Date	*Central Committee*		*Politburo*		*Standing Cttee*	*Vice-chairman*
		Regular	*Alternate*	*Regular*	*Alternate*		
8th	25 May 1958	97	96	20	8	7	5
9th	28 Apr 1969	170	109	21	4	5	1[a]
10th	30 Aug 1973	195	124	21	4	9	5

[a] Although there was no vice-chairman, Lin Piao was its equivalent. The 8th Congress above refers to its second session in 1958.

For training a successor, the Constitution advocated the new principle of combining the old, the middle-aged and the young. This is another kind of "three-way alliance" to bridge the generation gap and to do away with the sectional cleavages resulting from the previous "three-way alliance." Perhaps it is an attempt to facilitate crosscutting cleavages for national integration. A surprising example of this effort was the sudden rise of Wang Hung-wen in his thirties as the third ranking man at the top.

84. *Ibid.* pp. 17, 21.

85. *Ibid.* p. 32.

Despite this deliberate effort, the top echelon is still dominated by aging cadres. A random classification of their age categories shows the following ratio: 3:1:1 for vice-chairmen; 6:2:1 for the Standing Committee; and 10:9:2 for the Politburo. There were additional efforts to represent occupational, female and minority leaders at the top. In the Politburo Wang Hung-wen is a Shanghai worker, and Ni Chih-fu, an alternate, is a union leader in Peking, both of whom have risen in power through the urban militia movement [86]; Ch'en Yung-kuei, a new member, chairman of the famous Tachai Brigade; Wu Kuei-hsin, a new alternate, a woman; both Wei Kuo-ch'ing, a new member, and Saifudin, a new alternate, are minority leaders.

In terms of sectional representation, the 10th Central Committee clearly indicated the rise of masses and cadres, and the decline of military leaders in a sharp contrast to the 9th Committee as shown by Table 6.[87]

Table 6
Balance of Power in 1969 and 1973

Power Organ	*Date*	*No. of Leaders*	*Masses*		*Cadres*		*Military*	
			No.	%	*No.*	%	*No.*	%
9th Central Committee	4/69	R170(5)	34	20	57	33	74	43
		A109(14)	26	24	20	18	49	45
Politburo		21	4	20	5	25	11	55
10th Central Committee	8/73	R195(3)	58	29·7	71	36·4	63	32·3
		A124(18)	49	39·5	20	16·2	37	30
Politburo		21	8	42·86	6	28·57	6	28·57

Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate unknown status.

This table shows only an approximation of the distribution but one thing stands out: the rapid rise of the masses sector representing Chiang Ch'ing's supporters; it grew a little over 10 per cent while the military declined by about the same ratio. Of the 45 regular members of the 9th Central Committee who were dropped from the 10th Committee, including 10 members who had died, 30 were military leaders belonging to the Lin Piao faction, 13 cadres, 2 masses; of 28 alternates who were dropped, 22 military, 4 cadres and 2 masses. On the other hand, of the 55 newly elected members to the 10th Committee, 15 were military, 25 cadres, 12 masses and 3 unknown; of the 58 new alternates, 13 military, 11 cadres, 16 masses and 18 unknown.

This brief survey indicates that the new ruling coalition resulted from a

86. See Joseph Lelyveld's report from Hong Kong in the *New York Times*, 28 October 1973.

87. This table is adapted from *Fei-ch'ing yen-chiu*, No. 5 (May 1969), pp. 22–24, and *Chung-kung yen-chiu*, No. 9 (September 1973), pp. 28–29.

delicate balance among Chiang Ch'ing's supporters, Chou's associates, and the non-Lin Piao portion of the military leaders; at least in number it tilted slightly towards Chiang Ch'ing over Chou, suggesting a possibility of struggle between the two groups. Another characteristic of this lineup is the importance of regional leaders. Except for Peking, Tsinan, Chengtu and Sinkiang, the commanders and political commissars of all other Military Regions were elected to the Central Committee; so were 27 of the 29 chairmen of the provincial-municipal Revolutionary Committees. In particular the Peking-Mukden-Nanking-Shanghai belt had, by far, more representation in the Politburo: Wu Teh, chairman of the Peking Revolutionary Committee; Ch'en Hsi-lien, commander of the Mukden Military Region; Hsü Shih-yu, commander of the Nanking Military Region; and Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan, all from the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee. This eastern coast is China's "core region," having over 70 per cent of her military and industrial resources. We surmise from these that the ideological factor became less important in the coalition-making process than such factors as regional resources, personal relationships, experiences and talents. This reflects the reality of power struggle; if so, there must have been considerable bargaining and compromise.

The 10th Party Congress also authorized the existing trend towards regularization. All chairmen of the reorganized mass organizations such as the Young Communist League, the All-China Trade Union and the All-China Women's Federation were elected to the Central Committee. The Party Constitution provided for a regular convening of Party Committees at the primary level. Chou's report called upon the Party to strengthen its centralized leadership "ideologically, and organizationally as well as through rules and regulations." [88] The fact that the Party made public the number of its members as 28 million for the first time since 1961 (a 40 per cent increase from 17 million) suggests the leadership's confidence in restoring regular Party life.

The policy process has become less polemical and more routine. The process of revising the Constitution attests to this: Mao's specific proposal for revision served as the guideline; then, the Party Centre convened a Work Conference in May 1973 to discuss the matter; the Party Committees above the provincial level, in turn, set up discussion groups and later submitted 41 drafts to the Centre; finally, the Centre drafted the revised version in August.[89] The 10th Party Congress itself was held in complete secrecy and lasted only five days in contrast to the three weeks of publicized discussions of the 9th Congress. Unlike Lin Piao's report to the 9th Congress, both Chou's and Wang's reports were shorter, enumerating only the major themes of the new policy lines. Lastly, Chou's report promised to convene the 4th National People's Congress soon.

These measures were justified in the name of Party supremacy. A clear victim of the anti-Lin Piao campaign was the Mao cult. The key docu-

88. *Peking Review*, Nos. 35–36 (7 September 1973), p. 25. 89. *Ibid.* p. 29.

ments of the 10th Congress all excised Lin's hortatory statements about Mao as a genius and a great leader. Chou characterized Lin Piao and his followers in these words: those "who never showed up without a copy of *Quotations* in hand and never opened their mouths without shouting 'Long Live' and who spoke nice things to your face but stabbed you in the back." He specifically urged Party members to pay more attention to "questions of economic policy, concern themselves with the well-being of the masses" to fulfil the state plan for development. As for foreign policy, the Party Constitution stated that the CCP opposes "great-power chauvinism." Chou first charged that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were colluding with each other, and then distinguished "necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries" from such collusion; but he also made this point: "It is most important for us to run China's affairs well." [90] Thus, the current leadership is consolidating its legitimacy by promoting national development and power.

Conclusion

China has travelled a long zig-zag path in search of a viable political order. After the Cultural Revolution and the Lin Piao Affair there has emerged a mixture of the institutionalizing regime under the Party, the movement regime under the Supreme Leader, and the praetorian regime under the military. This turn of events reminds us of Robert Michel's comment: "The conductor changes, but the music remains always the same," [91] for it raises the same old questions: will the current trend lead to another rigid Party apparatus tying Mao's hands? If so, will it not result in another swing of the pendulum? Then, whither China?

The answers to these questions, again, depend on many variables, the most important of which is the intensity and violence of revolutionary dynamism. So long as China maintains a high degree of dynamism, another swing is likely. To Mao who calls for several Cultural Revolutions in the future, such a swing is not bad but all the more necessary, for the death of ideological dynamism means nothing but revisionism. But after Mao, while ideology will certainly remain the source of legitimacy and inspiration, its dynamism will decline. There are already some signs of ideological erosion. To lump, for example, Liu, Ch'en and Lin together and criticize them in the same language is likely to cause more scepticism and cynicism among the population. Besides, all possible constituencies for ideological campaigns have been tried already; these include the peasants, the Party, the Army, and the Red Guard and Rebels. Consequently, another large turmoil like the Cultural Revolution seems highly unlikely. In the absence of ideological dynamism, struggles and campaigns will have to be carried out among contending personalities and groups within the elite.

90. *Ibid.* pp. 19, 25, 26 and 23.
91. *Political Parties* (New York: Dover, 1959), p. 391.

Environmental factors will also condition China's future. Time is a first crucial factor because sooner or later a generational change will come. For this reason, Mao insists on "training" his successors in his own image; this "adaptive" recruitment of elite in the ideal of "red and expert" is a hallmark of Chinese experience, in comparison to the "co-optative" recruitment of skilled specialists in the Soviet Union.[92] With the progress of industrialization, China, too, will need the skills of more experts in policy making. Much of the eccentric features in Maoist ideology and leadership style will lose their force after Mao, for the new leaders, though equally nationalistic and dedicated, will hardly replicate Mao's inimitable style. The development of the Chinese economy needs more efficiency and rational planning. The more the economy develops, the more it will influence the political sphere. The traditional political culture, if any, will also change as the new generation who received socialization through the Cultural Revolution will become more hesitant and calculating. As for China's ecology, Mao once told Edgar Snow that China should learn from the way America developed by decentralizing and spreading responsibility and wealth among the 50 states.[93] The sheer size of China's territory and population demands a centralized control but their diversity calls for decentralization. Externally the concentration of the Soviet troops on Chinese borders and any Soviet attempt to intervene in China's internal politics will remain the primary threat, whereas the U.S. withdrawal from and Japan's rising influence in Asia pose new opportunities. The combination of these complex factors will shape up the future political order. But in the final analysis, the political struggle which will ensue after Mao will determine its actual course.

Yet, it seems reasonably certain that the overall shape of China's future political order will be an institutionalizing regime under the Party. But in the short run, the mixture of the three types will continue as long as the legacies of the Cultural Revolution remain. Each type of political order China has tried has demonstrated strength as well as weakness. The institutionalizing regime could have been instrumental in rectifying incremental wrongs, enhancing consensus and solving practical problems, but its weakness is the development of inertia which mitigated any radical change. The movement regime was effective in overthrowing an established authority, thus relieving accumulated tensions and redressing gross inequality, but the basic dilemma was the uncertain threshold of necessary mobilization: if it was too much, it got out of control; if it was too little, it would have no result. The praetorian regime, in turn, was effective in arbitrating conflict and maintaining order, but the danger was the Army's attempts to perpetuate its position, thus challenging the

92. Frederic J. Fleron, Jr, "Towards a reconceptualization of political change in the Soviet Union: the political leadership system," *Comparative Politics*, No. 2 (January 1969), pp. 228–44; Robert E. Blackwell, Jr, "The Soviet political elite: alternative recruitment policies at the Obkon level," *ibid.* No. 1 (October 1973), pp. 99–121.

93. *Life*, 30 April 1971, p. 49.

legitimacy of civilian rule. And the common weakness of the last two regimes was that they could hardly be institutionalized on a long basis. At least in theory, China can only benefit from the strengths of these regimes. Mao's ideal polity, in fact, comes closer to what Etzioni calls "the Active Society," a projection of the post-industrial society, in which the masses actively participate in politics and bureaucracies become not only efficient but responsive so that mobilization and institutionalization do not conflict but mutually reinforce each other.[94] Short of this ideal, any combination of the three types is possible in reality, depending on the particular problem China faces.

The most imminent problem for China now is still reintegration. The Cultural Revolution unleashed all sorts of divisive elements among the elite and in the society at large, turning all latent strains and tensions into manifest conflicts, which tore apart the organizations and rules that had bound them.[95] To reintegrate this fractured polity, Mao had to restore the Party-State apparatus as quickly as possible. In so doing, he regarded the integration of the elite as his first priority. Now that the Party elite has been formed, a next step will be the convening of the National People's Congress to adopt a new State Constitution; and then, more of the old cadres and military leaders will be absorbed into the State structures. As of 1974, Mao still reigns at the Centre but apparently he is not in full control. While Mao's charisma is being "routinized," there is an unsettled balance of power between Chou's aging associates who are pulling things together, and Chiang Ch'ing's supporters. After Mao a succession struggle may explode; in this case, Chou's group and military leaders may make a minimum winning coalition. Thus, the current leadership is likely to be transitional before a new coalition with uncertain qualities arises. If and when this new coalition politics can weather the succession crisis, the CCP apparatus will institutionalize itself on a firmer basis.

Huntington has suggested that a one-Party system tends to institutionalize when it *succeeds,* and then enter the adaptation phase. Such a process requires four stages: (1) the emergence of technical classes; (2) the development of complex group structures; (3) the re-emergence of a critical intelligentsia; and (4) the demand by local and popular groups for participation.[96] Most of these have already been taking place in the Soviet Union and other East European countries but not as yet in China. Perhaps, when they eventually occur in China, the Chinese system, too, will become another established one-Party; but even then, China will be substantially different as a result of her own political experiences.

94. See Etzioni, *The Active Society*, passim; also see Whyte, "Bureaucracy."

95. For "latent" and "manifest" interests, see Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict*, pp. 173–79.

96. Huntington, "Social and institutional dynamics of one-party systems," p. 33.