The volume itself is divided into five self-contained essay chapters. The first presents the case for political culture as an analytical paradigm. Here, Pye responds to critics of his previous work and sets forth his case for the utility of the political culture approach. Next, Pye lays out his argument of Confucianist Leninism and its inherent psychological ambivalences cast in a series of polarities. This is followed by a chapter on Chinese pragmatism that readers of *The China Quarterly* will recognize from No. 106. In this chapter Pye tries to account for the extraordinary Chinese propensity easily to accommodate wrenching change in their personal lives and radical change in the political and socio-economic life of the nation without feeling that previous policies had been compromised or abandoned.

The fourth essay-chapter is a stimulating psychological reassessment of the Cultural Revolution. After taking note of the persistent failure of Chinese to analyse the psychological or sociological roots of the movement (which he writes off to the Chinese incapacity for critical introspection – a trait the author mentions no fewer than a dozen times in the book), Pye engages other Western Sinologists (notably Lynn White, Anne Thurston and Merle Goldman) in scholarly dialogue. Pye ascribes the Cultural Revolution violence to the "transformation in the foundations in public morality . . . Morality becomes less a response to narcissistic feelings, in which a person wanted passionately to be seen by others as good and deserving of respect, and more a response to the feelings of aggression by the stern, uncompromising repressions of the superego" (p. 120).

Finally, Pye engages in a discussion of political leadership and followership in China. Among other observations, Pye particularly notes the normative practice of "feigned compliance" on the part of officials at all levels – which leads to the perpetuation of fictions in most aspects of economic and political life. Pye concludes on a note of cultural continuity, stressing that national politics have marginal effect on local reality in China.

In sum, reading *The Mandarin and the Cadre* is time well spent for both the China specialist and the comparativist. It is written in the lively and witty style characteristic of the author. Like Pye's previous work, it will stimulate even if it does not persuade the unrepentant behaviouralist.

DAVID SHAMBAUGH

The Ten-Year History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. By YEN CHIA-CHI and KAO KAO. [Taibei: Institute of Current China Studies, 1988. 617 pp. +69 pp. of photographs. US$30·00.]

Kao Kao's (Gao Gao) and Yen Chia-ch'i's (Yan Jiaqi) pathbreaking study of the Cultural Revolution decade (1966–76) has been roughly translated into English by the Institute of Current China Studies in Taipei. Both the original text and the translation may be less than

scholars of modern China should expect, but both are very much worth reading.

Zhongguo "wenge" shinian shi made waves in China when it was originally published in 1986 by Tianjin People's Press. It was one of the first open (but non-official) accounts of the Cultural Revolution to be published in China. In fact, it was quickly withdrawn and given an "internal circulation" (*neibu*) classification. Not surprisingly, the text was picked up by a Hong Kong publisher and appeared in a slightly revised form in two volumes (with scores of relevant photographs) in December 1986 (same title, Hong Kong Da Gong Bao She). The present translation is based on the Hong Kong version.

Written by Kao Kao on the basis of Yen Chia-ch'i's notes, the *Ten-Year History* is essentially a personalized history of the key elite figures of the Cultural Revolution. The book's three sections focus on: I. Mao Tsetung (Mao Zedong) and Liu Shao-ch'i' (Liu Shaoqi), II. Lin Piao (Lin Biao) and the generals he crushed, and III. Chiang Ch'ing (Jiang Qing) and the intellectuals she crushed. This book is very much in line with traditional Chinese historiographical norms of "good man—bad man" explanations of political history. Where social groups, such as the Red Guards, are considered, they are passive tools "excited" by such leaders. The book also reflects the gossipy tone and lurid stories favoured in many Chinese non-official writings of the past decade on the Cultural Revolution. Personal ambition, depravity, and debauchery are the main analytical explanations offered by Kao and Yen, along with a broad condemnation of China's "feudal culture."

Kao Kao states clearly in her introduction that she intends the book to serve as a popular history, not a scholarly monograph. There are no citations or bibliography (and no index in any edition, though the table of contents is quite detailed). Still, she assesses her three major sources – official periodicals of the time, Red Guard materials, and interviews/memoirs – in a sensible and critical fashion (p. iv). The book's real strength is the detail it presents. Researchers will want to compare Kao's and Yen's version of key events with their own research, though the sources on which it is based in general do not exceed those available to Western researchers (readers should avail themselves of Dr. Michael Schoenhals' detailed review of the Tianjin edition of this book and several other related Chinese language studies in *The Journal of Asian Studies*. Vol. 48, no. 3 [1988], pp. 563–72). Teachers may find excerpts from the *Ten-Year History* useful to bring colour to their courses, as for example, the section on the early Red Guard movement (pp. 42–86). The book also serves as an important example of what the Cultural Revolution meant to leading reformist intellectuals in the PRC establishment at the height of the 1980s reforms. The purpose of this study, write Kao Kao, is "to prevent another Cultural Revolution or similar movement from ever happening again" (p. iii).

The current translation of the *Ten-Year History* is less than a book

of this significance deserves. It has every appearance of a rush job. Aside from the Taiwan publisher's annoying habit of adding "mainland China" for *Zhongguo* in the original text, the Wade-Giles romanization is neither complete (for example apostrophes are omitted, so pronunciation is uncertain for obscure names) nor accurate (the Peking suburb, Hai-tien, is rendered "Haiting"). The translation is awkward and ungainly, major institutions are translated in forms which obscure their identity (the "Northern Bureau" is rendered "Northern Agency"), and there are one or two typos or misspellings on *every* page. The translators provide no preface or introduction as to the nature of the text or identity of the authors. Research scholars will want to keep the Chinese edition by their side for careful comparison. Nonetheless, the Institute of Current China Studies is to be commended for making this long and significant text available quickly in English. The need remains, however, for a scholarly translation.

TIMOTHY CHEEK

A Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in China, 1976–1986. By KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL and BRUCE J. DICKSON. [Armonk, N.Y. and London: M. E. SHARPE, 1989. 339 pp. $50·00.]

Tracking the evolution of policies and politicians is central to an informed understanding of the political process in China. In a country where elite decision-making affects the lives of so many, it is imperative to know who decided what, when, and where. Only with such basic data can one then come to grips with questions of *how* policies are made and implemented – the very issues which lie at the heart of the political process.

Lieberthal and Dickson have provided the field of contemporary China studies with an indispensable research tool in their revised and updated *Research Guide* (first edition published in 1976). It should be the starting point for many a research project. Students of Chinese politics will no doubt benefit most from the *Guide*, but no doubt those in other social science and humanities disciplines related to China will also find it of use.

Through prodigious effort the authors have catalogued 513 central meetings during these 37 years. The fora include ad hoc working groups, issue-specific conferences (e.g. propaganda, culture, education, industry, agriculture, foreign affairs, etc.), central work conferences, Politburo and Secretariat meetings, formal party congresses and plenary sessions, Military Commission meetings, and so on.

What emerges is a sense of the increasing complexity of the policy process. Bureaucratic and individual actors proliferate over time. As policies become more complex as a result of economic development and specialization, one sees an increased tendency to convene issue-specific meetings rather than the multiple-issue agendas of the pre-