RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Mao's "Cultural Revolution": Origin and Development

By PHILIP BRIDGHAM

> Recognising that men always make mistakes, what should be done with those comrades who go astray? Toward these, one should first carry out struggle and thoroughly wash away mistaken thoughts. Secondly, it is still necessary to help them. Proceeding from good intentions, help them correct their errors, enable them to have a way out.
>
> —Mao Tse-tung, Speech at Moscow Communist Party Conference, November 1957.[1]

MAO TSE-TUNG utilised the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution to lecture delegates attending the Moscow Communist Party Conference on the correct method for dealing with erring comrades. Mao appeared to be offering his formula "unity-criticism-unity" to other Bloc parties as a substitute for the violence and terror inherent in Stalin's periodic purging of the Soviet party. At the same time, Mao appeared to be giving assurances that Stalin's errors connected with the "cult of personality" could not possibly develop within the Chinese party.

Eight years later in the fall of 1965, Mao Tse-tung initiated the "great proletarian cultural revolution" featuring Stalinist techniques of violence and the public purge.[2] What has produced this sharp reversal of Maoist strategy in dealing with such long-time "comrades-in-arms" as Liu Shao-ch'i (Mao's heir-apparent for 20 years)? Why is it necessary to organise Red Guards to terrorise and maltreat all segments of Chinese society, including the once sacrosanct Chinese Communist Party?

These are large questions to which, lacking many of the relevant facts, one can only provide partial and tentative answers. Some must await the further unfolding of the "cultural revolution" which will undoubtedly shed more light on its purposes and objectives. Some are

[1] *Kung-tso T'ung-hsun* (*Bulletin of Activities*), No. 13 (March 20, 1961), p. 6.
[2] For a good discussion of this and other parallels between Mao and Stalin, see Arthur A. Cohen, "Mao: the Man and His Policies," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1966.

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to be found in a close scrutiny of the events of the past 15 months which, according to the official Chinese Communist version, comprise the history of the "great proletarian cultural revolution" proper. Other and equally important answers, however, can only be found by tracing Mao's "cultural revolution" back to its point of origin.

The main conclusions of this attempt to reconstruct the history of the "cultural revolution" are: (1) that its point of origin was the Lushan central committee plenum in mid-1959 when the whole range of Mao's radical domestic and foreign policies was subjected to attack by the then Minister of National Defence, P'eng Teh-huai; (2) that the events of the ensuing three-year period (featuring the Soviet withdrawal of technicians and the collapse of the Great Leap Forward and commune programmes) largely demonstrated that in this great debate P'eng had been right and Mao had been wrong; (3) that the resulting crisis of confidence in Mao's leadership, first reflected by China's intellectuals, permeated the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party up to and including the Politburo; (4) that the "socialist education" campaign initiated at the Tenth Plenum (September 1962) for the purposes of ferreting out opposition to and arousing mass support for, Mao's policies and programmes was adjudged a failure by Mao in the fall of 1965; and (5) that the "cultural revolution" is essentially a continuation of the "socialist education" campaign in pursuit of the same goals, but under new management (Lin Piao and the others on Mao's new team) and employing new methods (systematic terror and violence).

Mao is Attacked

> At the Lushan meeting of the party in 1959, a handful of ambitious bourgeois careerists and schemers . . . who had the support of the Khrushchev revisionist clique launched a ferocious attack on the party's Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.
>
> —*Jen-min Jih-pao* (*People's Daily*) Editorial, "Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought," July 1, 1966.

The Chinese Communist régime has confirmed what had already been credibly reported in the West—that P'eng Teh-huai mounted an across-the-board attack on Mao's radical domestic and foreign policies at the Lushan plenum in mid-1959, advancing instead programmes featuring Soviet military, economic and technical assistance.[3] The great significance of the P'eng Teh-huai affair for the "cultural revolution" lies in the fact that for the first time in the history of the Chinese Communist movement since 1935, Mao's personal leadership and programmes had

[3] See David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," *The China Quarterly*, No. 8 (October–December 1961).

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come under attack by a long-time, trusted "comrade-in-arms" who, moreover, had managed to muster support within the top leadership.[4]

The origin of the "cultural revolution" must be traced to the shock and sense of betrayal experienced by Mao Tse-tung at Lushan. It is here that seeds of doubt concerning other "close comrades-in-arms" must have been planted, producing an incipient distrust which in time would become the "sickly suspicion"—as Khrushchev said of Stalin—which recently has characterised Mao's attitude and behaviour toward his long-time comrades. As is now well documented, it was Mao's conviction that Wu Han's play *Hai Jui's Dismissal* constituted a defence of P'eng Teh-huai and therefore an attack on him personally which prompted the launching of the "cultural revolution" in November 1965.

Other elements of what would come to be known as the "great proletarian cultural revolution" also originated at this time, at least in rudimentary form. First, it is significant that Mao, at a time when he felt personally threatened, should have turned to Lin Piao for support and protection. In his first published article as the newly appointed Minister of National Defence, Lin Piao responded with a declaration of personal allegiance pledging "the unconditional loyalty of the People's Liberation Army to the party and Comrade Mao."[5]

Of equal importance was the appearance in the fall of 1959 of a nation-wide "cult of Mao Tse-tung." For the first time Mao was acclaimed publicly by a high-level party spokesman as "the most outstanding contemporary revolutionary, statesman and theoretician of Marxism-Leninism."[6] Also of interest was the appearance at this time of a tactic which would be central to the carrying out of the "great proletarian cultural revolution"—testing the loyalty of party leaders on the basis of their devotion to, and understanding of, Mao's thought. This tactic was implicit in the formulation: "The yardstick to judge whether any individual is a genuine Marxist is his comprehension of Mao Tse-tung's ideology."

The purposes of this nation-wide glorification of Mao Tse-tung in 1959–60 appear to have been threefold: (1) to repair Mao's self-esteem, which must have been badly scarred in the confrontation with P'eng Teh-huai at Lushan; (2) to restore confidence, badly shaken by the failure of the Great Leap Forward programme, in Mao's leadership; and

[4] The Kao Kang-Jao Shu-shih "anti-party alliance," it will be recalled, was directed at Mao's subordinates, Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai.

[5] Lin Piao, "March Ahead under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thought," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*People's Daily*), September 31, 1959.

[6] See Liu Lan-t'ao, "The Chinese Communist Party is the Supreme Commander in Building Socialism," *People's Daily*, September 28, 1959.

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(3) perhaps most important, to substitute " the ideology of Mao Tse-tung " for the false " revisionism " of Khrushchev as the true expression of contemporary Marxist-Leninism. These objectives remain important motivating factors in the " cultural revolution " today.

Mao Retreats

> We ought to expect more political troubles and incidents in 1961 . . . than in any previous year . . . [we must] ensure that the armed forces do not get out of hand.
>
> —Lin Piao, January 1961.[7]

Developments in the three-year period following the Lushan plenum (1959–62) demonstrated in important respects that, in the great debate over domestic and foreign policy staged at this historic meeting, P'eng Teh-huai had been right and Mao Tse-tung had been wrong. The combined effect of irrational economic policy, successive bad harvests and the Soviet withdrawal of technicians in the summer of 1960 dealt Mao's Great Leap Forward programme of economic development a shattering blow. Confronted with the threat of economic and political collapse, the Chinese Communist régime responded with a series of urgent corrective measures in the winter of 1960–61, and then, reluctantly and painfully, with even more drastic remedies in a period of further retreat from mid-1961 to mid-1962. The record of this period of protracted retreat is also of fundamental importance in assessing the origin and motivation of the current " cultural revolution."

Although the immediate Chinese response to Soviet withdrawal of technicians was one of defiant optimism, Peking's view of its domestic problems in the winter of 1960 suddenly changed to one of alarm. The basic cause of this alarm was, of course, the severe shortage of food, reaching famine proportions in the disaster areas of East and North China. There is abundant evidence of widespread outbreaks of malnutrition diseases and of a sharp jump in the mortality rate at this time. To cite but one graphic example from the *Bulletin of Activities*, the results of an investigation showed that 10 per cent. of China's First Army had experienced " unnatural deaths " in their families during the winter of 1960–61.[8] There was ample cause for Lin Piao's warning in January to expect " political troubles " and his call for extraordinary measures " to ensure that the armed forces do not get out of hand."

The successful execution of this mission—ensuring the loyalty of the People's Liberation Army during a time of national emergency—goes far to explain why five years later Mao Tse-tung would select Lin

[7] *Bulletin of Activities*, No. 1, January 1, 1961, p. 7.
[8] *Ibid.* No. 6, January 27, 1961, p. 15.

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Piao as his deputy to head up the "great proletarian cultural revolution." In part, Lin's success was due to initiating such corrective measures as increasing army rations, giving preferential treatment to the families of servicemen and halting all non-essential work programmes. But of greater significance in tracing the rise of Lin Piao to his present position of eminence in the Chinese leadership was the successful campaign of intensive political indoctrination carried out in the PLA at this critical period.

A major objective of this political indoctrination campaign was to extricate Mao Tse-tung from responsibility for the Great Leap Forward debacle. According to the propaganda strategy, Communist China's domestic crisis had been caused by the deliberate "sabotage" of "class enemies" and by unwitting distortion of "correct" party policies. Stated more bluntly, it was designed to show that "the party central committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung had all along made clear and correct directives" and that "the party central committee is not wrong, but rather the thinking of rural cadres is confused." [9] Above and beyond this strategy, however, it was the tactics devised by Lin Piao in successfully implementing this campaign which would make a lasting impression on Mao and provide important guide-lines for the "cultural revolution" five years hence.

In the charter of the military rectification campaign of 1960–61 ("The Resolution of the Enlarged Session of the Military Affairs Committee Concerning the Strengthening of Indoctrination Work in Troop Units," October 20, 1960),[10] Lin Piao set forth and expounded his famous concept of the "four firsts." Hailed as a "creative application of the thinking of Mao Tse-tung," these provided clear-cut directives in handling the relations between man and weapons (man comes first); between political work and other work (politics comes first); between ideological and routine work (ideological work comes first); and between ideas in books and living ideas currently in people's minds (living ideology comes first). Although each of these reflected long-standing Maoist maxims, it was the fourth (the need to get hold of living ideology) which most nearly qualified as a "creative contribution" and which has figured prominently in the unfolding of the "cultural revolution."

This was a restatement of Mao's famous "mass line," but with the responsibility for the success or failure of this mass line clearly assigned to party cadres in the middle. Under the slogan "grasp both ends," these cadres in the middle were directed, at one end, to transmit and properly implement the "instructions of the Central Committee, of Chairman

[9] *Ibid.* No. 19, May 13, 1961, pp. 12–13.
[10] *Ibid.* No. 3, January 7, 1961, pp. 1–33.

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Mao and of the Military Affairs Commission" and, at the other end, to grasp and properly interpret the "ideological condition" of the masses to the leadership at the centre. Failure of party policies, then, was the fault of party cadres who had "created a communication block by failing to relay in time instructions of the Party and their superiors on the one hand and failing to submit reports to their superiors on the other." [11] The utility of this formulation at a time of national disaster was obvious—it exculpated the party leadership from responsibility and provided a foolproof formula in defence of Mao Tse-tung's infallibility. At the time of the launching of the "cultural revolution," it would provide the rationale for a similar purge of defective party cadres, but with an important difference. At that time, Mao would hold the entire party apparatus as defective and therefore responsible for the failure of his policies.

The methods advanced by Lin Piao for carrying out "living ideological indoctrination" would also figure prominently in the "cultural revolution." Among the diverse forms of political education recommended for use were the shouting of slogans, the use of wall posters and the printing of large-character bulletins. Cadres were directed to employ extensively such struggle techniques as "big contention, big blooming, big debates and big character bulletins." And in a directive which would loom large in the early stages of the "cultural revolution," PLA political officers were adjured to carry out "continuous investigation" of those cadres charged with the special mission of transmitting Mao's ideology to the masses—"the workers in propaganda and cultural departments and school teachers." [12]

Intellectual dissidence, as the voluminous record of the "cultural revolution" has made clear, was rife in China during this time of troubles in 1961–62. It is important to recognise, however, that many of the ideas and suggestions now attacked as dissident were not so considered at the time of their utterance. Along with such other urgent and distasteful measures as the dismantling of the communes in 1961, the Chinese Communist régime felt impelled to inaugurate a policy of "liberalisation" (a kind of "second Hundred Flowers campaign") toward China's intellectuals, especially its scientists and technicians. With this caveat firmly in mind, the fact remains that a number of China's leading intellectuals (both inside and outside the party) utilised this new freedom to go well beyond the limits of permissible criticism of party policies. Disaffected by the widespread suffering caused by the disastrous Great Leap Forward programme, they committed the most unforgivable act of all—criticising Mao Tse-tung.

[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Ibid.*

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Well aware of the outcome of the earlier experiment with "liberalisation," Mao's critics in 1961–62 were careful to cloak their criticism by the use of historical allegory, of pseudonyms and of Aesopian language. Wu Han's play *Hai Jui's Dismissal*, the debate over which precipitated the "cultural revolution," has been adjudged (and, it is believed, rightly so) as an example of "using ancient things to satirise the present"—in this instance, likening the case of P'eng Teh-huai to that of a Ming Dynasty official who had been unjustly dismissed by the Emperor.

The criticism of Mao by Teng T'o, a secretary of the Peking municipal committee who was charged with overseeing the cultural life of the capital city, was much more comprehensive and damning. Writing under cover of a pseudonym in two literary columns in the Peking press, Teng T'o, together with Wu Han and a third Peking party functionary, (to quote an early broadside in the "cultural revolution") "in the guise of recounting historical anecdotes, imparting knowledge, telling stories and cracking jokes . . . launched an all-out and venomous attack on our great Party, using ancient things to satirise the present, reviling one thing while pointing at another, and making insinuations and oblique thrusts." [13] An examination of the contents of these literary columns, of which sizeable excerpts were reproduced in May 1966, leads to the conclusion that this charge is substantially correct.

In foreign policy, Teng ridiculed Mao's famous dictum "The East Wind Prevails over the West Wind" as "great empty talk" and advocated reconciliation with the Soviet Union—"learning from" and "uniting with countries stronger than our own." In domestic policy, Teng directed a number of jibes at the follies of the Great Leap Forward, characterising it at various times (indirectly, of course) as "boasting," "indulging in fantasy" and "substituting illusion for reality." Most incriminating of all, Teng insinuated that Mao himself was responsible for the tragic failures of China's domestic and foreign policies, alluding to him as "boastful and conceited" and as suffering from a type of "amnesia" which could be cured by "hitting the patient on the head with a specially made club." [14] What made these charges all the more self-incriminating was the fact, stressed subsequently by the protagonists of the "cultural revolution," that they echoed charges being made at the same time by Khrushchev against Mao and the Chinese party.

As Mao surveyed the ideological scene in Communist China in mid-

[13] See Kao Chu, "Open Fire at the Black Anti-Party and Anti-Socialist Line," *Kwang-ming Jih-pao* (*Kwang-ming Daily*), May 8, 1966.

[14] "Teng T'o's 'Evening Chats at Yenshan' is Anti-Party and Anti-Socialist Double-talk," *Kwang-ming Daily*, May 8, 1966. For a good discussion of intellectual dissidence in China at this time, see Harry Gelman, "Mao and the Permanent Purge," *Problems of Communism*, November–December 1966.

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1962, there was, on the one hand, order and discipline within the ranks of the military and, on the other hand, unrest and dissidence in much of the rest of Chinese society. The conclusion which Mao would derive from this state of affairs is, in retrospect, clear. It would be desirable to extend application of the more extreme methods and techniques of political indoctrination perfected within the People's Liberation Army to encompass all of Chinese society. The story of the development and ultimate surfacing of the " cultural revolution " in the ensuing four-year period would be one of the progressive application of these military thought-control techniques to all sectors of Chinese society.

Mao Counter-attacks

> Since September 1962 when Chairman Mao at the Tenth Plenum . . called upon the whole Party and the entire Chinese people never to forget classes and class struggle . . . the last three years have seen a new phase in the great socialist cultural revolution.
>
> —*Chieh-fang Chun-pao* (*Liberation Army Daily*) Editorial, " Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thinking," April 18, 1966.

At the time of the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee in September 1962, three years of privation and ignominious retreat from the original goals of the Great Leap Forward and commune programmes had bred apathy, disillusionment and dissatisfaction among large segments of Chinese society. Even more alarming, a large proportion of party cadres extending into the upper echelons had begun to display the same symptoms of cynicism toward Mao's programmes. It was in response to this crisis of confidence that Mao Tse-tung launched the " socialist education " campaign in the fall of 1962, a campaign with the ambitious objective (in the words of Chairman Mao) of " educating man anew and reorganising our revolutionary ranks." As indicated in the quotation cited above, the " socialist education "—" class struggle " campaign initiated at this time comprises an integral, if formative, phase of the " cultural revolution."

Although Mao's important speech to the Tenth Plenum has not been published, enough is known from extracts to identify the major problems addressed in this speech—problems which remain as central, motivating concerns of the " cultural revolution." First, Mao warned of the danger of intellectual dissidence by pointing out " that a number of people were making use of the writing of novels to carry out anti-party activities and were creating a climate in public opinion for the restoration of capitalism." [15] Next, Mao revealed his concern over the problem of China's

[15] New China News Agency (NCNA), July 30, 1966.

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youth—the generational problem of cultivating loyal successors to Mao's revolution—by emphasising that "class education for youth must be strengthened to ensure that our nation will remain revolutionary and incorruptible for generations and for ever." [16] Finally, Mao indicated his resolve to re-establish socialist, collective controls over the economy (especially the rural economy) when he "repudiated the trend of 'going it alone' [*i.e.*, the restoration of individual economy] which had been incited by the bourgeoisie and its exponents within the Party. . . ." [17]

Despite the fragmentary nature of the public record, the main thrust of this key address by Chairman Mao to the Tenth Plenum was clear. Since Mao's domestic and foreign policies had suffered obvious and severe defeats in the preceding three-year period, it was imperative that a rationale be advanced to explain past failures and silence future criticism. This rationale was to explain failures and criticism of party policies as largely the handiwork of "foreign and domestic class enemies" against whom it was now necessary to launch a nation-wide "class struggle" campaign.

The first stage of this campaign, extending to mid-1964, was relatively moderate. In May 1963, a campaign to eliminate "harmful bourgeois influence and unhealthy phenomena" in literature and the arts was launched at a national conference of writers and artists. In December 1963, Chairman Mao issued another in the "series of extremely important instructions and stern criticisms of literary and art work" which the Chinese régime now characterises as important milestones on the road to the "cultural revolution." At a meeting of the All-China Federation of Literary Workers, Mao complained that "socialist transformation has by now achieved very little effect" in the various fields of literature and art and termed "absurd" the fact that "many communists are enthusiastic in promoting feudalist and capitalist art but are not enthusiastic in promoting socialist art." [18]

The task of coping with the disillusionment and cynicism of China's youth, especially its educated youth, was even more formidable than that posed by the intellectuals. Since educational and job opportunities were sharply curtailed following the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, the almost insurmountable problem faced by the party propagandists was to persuade these educated youth to sacrifice their careers and personal ambitions for the good of the revolution.

The solution advanced in the spring of 1963 was the full-blown propaganda campaign "to study the good example of Lei Feng."

[16] Hu Yao-pang, "Strive to Revolutionise the Youth of Our Country," *People's Daily*, July 7, 1964.
[17] See editorial in *Hung Ch'i* (*Red Flag*), No. 11 (August 21, 1966).
[18] NCNA, June 6, 1966.

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Intended to imbue China's youth with the "revolutionary spirit" and heroic self-sacrifice of the "extraordinary ordinary soldier" Lei Feng, a major objective of this campaign was to provide an ideological and moral substitute for material incentives in motivating China's youth.[19] In attributing all of Lei Feng's miraculous accomplishments "to earnest and repeated study of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's works," this campaign foreshadowed the recent phenomenon of Red Guards constantly carrying and consulting their red-bound "Quotations of Mao Tse-tung." In exhorting China's youth to emulate soldier Lei Feng, it anticipated Mao's call to all sectors of Chinese society "to learn from the People's Liberation Army." And the failure of this campaign to achieve its objectives (there were many reports at the time of students poking fun at Lei Feng as a paragon of virtue) would prompt Mao in time to abandon persuasion in favour of coercion (the violence and terror of the Red Guards) as the solution to China's youth problem.

The main focus of the "socialist education" campaign in the year following the Tenth Plenum, however, was in China's rural areas where the "spontaneous tendency to capitalism" had developed to an alarming degree. Rural cadres, who were held responsible for this resurgence of capitalism, were now subjected to a "five antis" campaign, charged with permitting "individual farming" and engaging in corruption. The appearance of a new "antis" campaign signified a shift from ideological to political struggle, from persuasion to coercion. Although the campaign was apparently conducted on an experimental, piecemeal basis in 1963, refugee reporting testified to its violent nature with accounts of struggle sessions, public trials and beatings of erring cadres.

Of greater interest in tracing the origins of the "cultural revolution," however, was the appearance at this time of Poor and Lower Middle Peasant Associations. Reviving the "peasant association" used during the land reform era (1950–52) to bully and suppress landlords and rich peasants, the régime began in early 1963 to form Poor and Lower Middle Peasant Associations for the express purpose of implementing, under party control, this new tough rural rectification campaign.[20] The parallels between this organisation and the organisations which would be created to carry out the "cultural revolution"—the cultural revolution teams, committees and congresses and their action arms the Red Guards—are both numerous and striking.

The first and obvious similarity is that membership is determined by class origin, since by definition the urban and rural proletariat are the

[19] See, for example, the article by Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Learn from Lei Feng," in *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* (*China Youth*), March 2, 1963.

[20] For a description of the role of the Poor and Lower Middle Peasant Associations, see Chang P'ing-hua, "We Must Rely on Poor and Lower Middle Peasants," *People's Daily*, November 2, 1964.

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most reliable supporters of Mao's revolution. Second, the authority of these organisations is limited in that neither is empowered to remove party or government leaders or (in theory) interfere in governmental functions. Third, and most important, the principal function of both organisations is to facilitate the purge and thought reform of erring party cadres. In effect, these organisations are intended to serve as a kind of popular jury in judging party cadres (who are summoned before them to engage in self-criticism), thus sparing the party itself from the necessity of performing this chore and at the same time serving as a pretence at local democracy. Finally, after subjecting the cadres to criticism and self-criticism, the members of these organisations are then supposed to engage in the same process themselves; this is regarded as the ultimate stage of the rectification campaign.

At the same time that the "socialist education" campaign in the countryside began to focus on iniquitous party cadres, a new campaign inaugurated in the urban, modern sector of Chinese society reflected the same distrust of the reliability and efficiency of party cadres in China's towns and cities. This was the campaign initiated by Mao's call in December 1963 to "learn from the PLA," with all political, economic and social organisations in China now directed to study and emulate the organisational, operational and ideological training methods of the People's Liberation Army. As subsequently revealed, Mao at this time ordered all departments of the national economy "to study the methods of the PLA, establish and strengthen political work and thus arouse the revolutionary spirit of the millions and tens of millions of cadres and masses on the economic front."[21] This injunction was followed literally, beginning in the spring of 1964, with the establishment in industrial, transportation, trade and finance and all government departments of a political commissar system modelled on that of the PLA.

Although it was difficult at the time to grasp the purpose of this new political network, that purpose is much clearer in retrospect. As an early, vivid expression of his distrust of the conventional party apparatus, it strongly suggests that Mao had already decided that his party was shot through with incompetents, at best, or dissidents, at worst, and required a thorough-going purge. As this new political network came to be staffed increasingly by political cadres recruited from the PLA in 1964 and 1965, the groundwork was being laid for the emergence of Lin Piao and the PLA as dominant forces in Mao's "cultural revolution."

[21] Quoted in Commentator article, "Political Work is the Lifeline of All Work," *Red Flag*, March 31, 1964.

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Mao Steps up the Attack

> Speaking frankly, there are quite a few problems in literary and artistic circles. . . . Therefore, it is necessary to launch a rectification campaign and a movement for socialist education . . . on the front of literature and art.
>
> —P'eng Chen, "Talk at the Festival of Peking Opera on Contemporary Themes," in *Red Flag*, July 31, 1964.

The "great proletarian cultural revolution" sweeping across China today was intimated by Mao Tse-tung over two years ago in the July 14, 1964 polemic "On Khrushchev's Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World."[22] Reflecting anxiety over the present status and future course of the Chinese revolution, Mao unveiled in this significant document a 15-point programme designed to root out revisionism and prevent a restoration of capitalism in China. This theoretical pronouncement purported to be an authoritative Marxist-Leninist explanation of such assaults on the dictatorship of the proletariat in recent years as the Hungarian counter-revolution in 1956 and the rise of Khrushchev revisionism in the Soviet Union. The message was clear—unless extraordinary measures were adopted, the same thing could and would happen in China too.

One of these extraordinary measures was to intensify the attack against China's intellectuals. The directive to escalate was provided by Mao at a June 1964 All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles meeting when he charged that China's "literary workers" (and the publications under their control) had since 1949 "in the main failed to carry out the party's policies"; had in recent years "fallen to the brink of revisionism"; and, failing earnest reform, "would inevitably become an organisation like the Petofi Club of Hungary."[23] The import of this remarkable statement was that the real threat of "revisionism" in China, as seen by Mao, came not from intellectuals outside the party (who were well known and easily dealt with) but from intellectual cadres within the party, some of whom were obviously highly placed.

Since the "cultural revolution" is a direct outgrowth of this decision in mid-1964 "to launch a rectification campaign . . . on the front of literature and art," it is ironic that the man selected by Mao at this time to lead the initial phase was P'eng Chen. P'eng was to purge the party of intellectual dissidents by screening their literary and artistic output in the preceding few years. He would find (if he did not already know) that the most flagrant examples of "anti-party and anti-socialist poisonous weeds" had appeared in publications of his own Peking party committee. And while he was charged to ferret out high-level intellectual

[22] Article by the editorial departments of *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, July 14, 1964.
[23] NCNA, June 6, 1966.

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cadres opposed to Mao, he himself would be the first prominent victim.

A second extraordinary measure was acceleration and intensification of the programme of "cultivating revolutionary successors" who could be trusted to carry on loyally after Mao had gone. Mao characterised this programme as "an extremely important question, a matter of life and death for our Party and our country," and laid down five criteria in "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism" to govern the selection and training of "revolutionary successors." Of these requirements, perhaps the most important was that they "come forward in mass struggles and are tempered in the great storms of revolution." When combined with the injunction that "they must especially watch out for careerists and conspirators like Khrushchev and prevent such bad elements from usurping the leadership of the Party and government at any level," these were the essential features of the Red Guard movement initiated two years later.

Mao's obsession with the problem of China's youth, especially educated youth, was further revealed in conversations with foreign visitors in the fall and winter of 1964–65. In talks with these visitors, Mao disclosed his distrust of educated youth in remarks about China's younger generation, a generation "which had never fought a war and never seen an imperialist or known capitalism in power" and which could in the future "negate the revolution."[24] The great weakness of China's youth, as Mao pointed out to these foreign visitors, was its lack of "combat experience." This "combat experience" would come in the largely contrived "class struggle," the terroristic attacks and the violent clashes of the Red Guard phase of the "cultural revolution."

Encompassing the first two, the third extraordinary measure was the decision taken in mid-1964 to transform the "socialist education" campaign into the "broadest, deepest socialist revolutionary movement since our Party came to power." Still focused primarily on rural areas, this new-style rural rectification campaign, called the "Four Clearances," was designed to uncover and punish cadre obstructionism and corruption in China's rural communes. A special feature was reliance on outside "task force cadres" or "work teams" to administer this campaign.

The fourth extraordinary measure, although initiated before the publication of "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism," was Mao's plan to revitalise the propaganda apparatus in party and government with political officers recruited from the People's Liberation Army. A definitive statement of the purpose and functions of the newly established political network in the economy and government was provided by

[24] Interview with Edgar Snow, January 1965: *Washington Post*, February 14, 1965.

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Yang Shu-ken in February 1965 at a national conference for political cadres in trade and finance work.[25] Taking as his text Lin Piao's exposition of the "four firsts" at the October 1960 PLA political work conference (characterised as a "general summation of our Party's experience in conducting politico-ideological work over the past few years"), Yang stressed that the principal function of the new political network was "grasping both ends well"—that is, "to keep a firm grip on both the upper end, the thought of Mao Tse-tung and the policies and directives of the Party centre, and the lower end, the ideological state of the broad masses of workers." With this formulation, the intended role for the new political network throughout government and the economy—as the transmission belt for Maoist thought and party policies—was made clear. And with the disclosure that most of the some 200,000 ex-PLA officers and men at work in the trade and finance sector were staffing this new political network,[26] it appears in retrospect that the process of militarisation of the Chinese Communist Party, a salient feature of the current "cultural revolution," was well under way in early 1965.

The events of the spring and summer of 1965 in Communist China are also believed to provide an important clue to understanding the motivation and character of today's "cultural revolution." The sharp escalation of the attack against domestic class enemies in the last six months of 1964 was followed by a noticeable lull. Indeed, there was an unmistakable shift at this time away from militant emphasis on "class struggle" and frugal living toward a softer, more conciliatory line. This was revealed first of all in semi-official approval for people to spend more money on better clothes, food and other consumer goods and, even more strikingly, in a series of directives in mid-summer designed to ensure workers, peasants and students adequate rest and leisure time by reducing overtime schedules and spare-time political meetings.[27]

In seeking an explanation for this about-face, it seems clear that a major factor was concern over the rapid escalation of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam during the winter and spring of 1965, especially the decision in February to initiate large-scale bombing of North Vietnam on a regular basis. Since this was not playing the game of revolutionary war according to Mao's rules (*i.e.*, it violated Mao's thesis of the sanctuary of revolutionary bases), it must have been an unexpected and worrisome development. The reaction, then, was de-emphasis of "class

[25] Yang Shu-ken, "Give a Prominent Place to Politics and Pay Close Attention to Upholding the 'Four Firsts,'" *Ta Kung Pao*, March 27, 1965.
[26] *People's Daily*, May 18, 1965.
[27] See, for example, the editorial "Link Labour and Leisure," in *People's Daily*, June 21, 1965.

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struggle" in order to conciliate and unite the population in the face of a possible war situation. And, in fact, the dominant theme of Communist China's domestic propaganda-political indoctrination campaign in the spring and summer of 1965 was that of "war preparations."

An important clue for understanding the motivation of the "cultural revolution" arises at this point. For, as recent Red Guard wall posters have revealed, Communist China's top leaders apparently reacted differently in the winter of 1965 in evaluating the gravity of the threat of war posed by U.S. escalation in Vietnam and especially the extent to which the domestic "class struggle" programme should be soft-pedalled to meet that threat. Indicating that its authors had access to unpublished party documents, a major 20-page wall poster issued in late November 1966 accused both Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsaio-p'ing of "not giving sufficient support to the Maoist line after the opening of the rectification campaign, called the socialist education movement, at the end of 1964."

There are indications in the public record, moreover, that Mao was displeased with the performance of some of his top lieutenants at a national work conference called by the Politburo in January 1965 at which a major party document ("Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas") was drawn up under Mao's personal guidance. In the cryptic and somewhat obscure language of the August 21, 1966 *Red Flag* editorial, this document was designed to overcome "mistakes" in the implementation of the "socialist education" campaign in 1964, "mistakes which looked like 'Leftist' but were actually 'Rightist.'. . ." These "mistakes," as the *Red Flag* editorial went on to point out, constituted "opposition" to Mao's thought.

These disclosures provide valuable insight into one of the puzzling aspects of the "cultural revolution"—why it was considered necessary to extend the purge into the very highest echelons of the Chinese leadership to encompass such notorious hard-line "leftists" as Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsaio-p'ing. Whether described as "not giving sufficient support" or as "opposition," whether labelled as "Leftist" or "Rightist" and after making due allowance for *ex post facto* exaggeration and distortion, it appears that Mao had already begun in the winter and spring of 1965 to entertain doubts about the loyalty of his top lieutenants in charge of party affairs. When these doubts were strengthened by new signs of resistance at a crucial meeting of the party centre in September 1965, the "great proletarian cultural revolution" would begin.

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The Revolution Begins

> One's attitude towards Mao Tse-tung's thought should be the yardstick identifying the genuine from the sham revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary, the Marxist-Leninist from the revisionist.
>
> —*People's Daily* Editorial, "Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought," July 1, 1966.

According to the authoritative Chinese reconstruction, the "great proletarian cultural revolution" originated at a Central Committee meeting in September 1965 when Chairman Mao issued the call "to criticise bourgeois reactionary thinking."[28] The surprisingly mild character of this instruction, so at variance with earlier strident calls to struggle against "class enemies," requires explanation. As recent evidence suggests, the explanation probably is that Mao Tse-tung found top party leaders at this meeting questioning the desirability of pursuing a harsh, divisive domestic "class struggle" campaign at a time of national isolation and danger.

When this display of resistance strengthened his earlier suspicions of disloyalty, Mao apparently temporised and then decided not long after to initiate a rectification-purge campaign of a new type—directed at "old comrades" and "high-ranking cadres" holding positions of authority—designed to make the Chinese Communist Party once more responsive to his will. It is in this sense, then, as a final test of the loyalty and trustworthiness of his old "comrades-in-arms," that Mao's "cultural revolution" can best be understood. Since it was directed at powerful party leaders, Mao turned to his long-trusted military leader Lin Piao and the People's Liberation Army for necessary support in administering this test. As the quotation cited above indicates, the most important single criterion governing this loyalty test would be "one's attitude toward Mao Tse-tung's thought."

Although fragmentary in form, the revelations contained in recent Red Guard wall posters point to the significance of this September Central Committee meeting as the precipitant of the "cultural revolution." It was at this meeting, according to the 20-page poster indictment of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, that "Teng Hsiao-p'ing coldly dissociated himself from Mao Tse-tung" and "made a speech in which he declared he was against any cultural change and against any changes in the schools." Despite the obvious distortion of this charge, there is evidence in Chinese publications at the time suggesting opposition at this plenum to Mao's views on the need for rapid "cultural change."

In retrospect, the October 1, 1965 *Red Flag* editorial "Adopt the Proletarian World Outlook to Create Our New World" appears clearly

[28] NCNA, June 6, 1966.

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to reflect the Central Committee discussion of China's cultural-ideological problems. This editorial was defensive, almost apologetic in tone, focusing on the tenacity of old ideas and customs in the new revolutionary society. Whereas a major objective of the "cultural revolution" would be to accelerate transformation of these ideas and customs, the "four olds" (old thinking, old concepts, old habits and old traditions) were characterised in this editorial as being "extremely obstinate" and the struggle against them necessarily a "protracted one." Further, the process of criticising these old ideas and customs was to be "carried out correctly," using the "democratic method . . . of maximum reasoning" and not "rejecting our legacy and negating everything." This injunction to employ relatively restrained methods was underlined in a curious passage in the companion National Day *People's Daily* editorial calling for "correct understanding of the present class struggle in our country We should neither exaggerate nor underestimate this struggle, let alone ignore it."

Additional evidence of what Mao considered dissidence and disaffection in the Politburo at this time has been provided by a Chinese embassy defector who had access to secret party documents explaining the "cultural revolution." According to these documents, P'eng Chen declared at a national conference of provincial party propaganda cadres in September "that everyone in the face of truth was equal, that everyone should be given freedom to speak, and that even if the Chairman [Mao] is wrong, then he too must be criticised." At the same conference, Lu Ting-i (then Director of the Central Committee Propaganda Department) was reported as delivering a speech in which he made critical remarks directed at Stalin but actually intended for Mao.[29] Again, allowing for distortion, the central charge—that these two Chinese Communist leaders were advocating more freedom for China's intellectuals than Mao was willing to tolerate—is believed to be true.

With this evidence of disaffection among his top "old guard" advisers, Mao then turned to his long-trusted military leader Lin Piao for advice and support in cleansing the party of intellectual dissidence and dissidents. Others to whom he turned at this time (or not long after) in planning this greatest of all Chinese Communist rectification-purge campaigns probably included Ch'en Po-ta (his former Political Secretary), Chou En-lai, K'ang Sheng (a long-time intelligence specialist), T'ao Chu (the powerful Central-South Regional Bureau First Secretary) and, last but not least, his wife, Chiang Ching. Mao was forced to plan and run the campaign outside normal party channels; apparently he created his own extra-party organisation and channels of communication

[29] *The Washington Star*, August 31, 1966.

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at an early stage of the "cultural revolution," with those performing leading roles destined to replace the purge victims.

Operating on his own, Mao instructed the Shanghai Party Committee in November 1965 to launch a political attack (in an article by Yao Wen-yuan appearing in the November 10 issue of the *Wen Hui Pao*) on Wu Han (a deputy mayor of Peking) and, by extension, on Wu Han's boss P'eng Chen. That this was construed in Peking as a potentially dangerous attack on P'eng Chen was indicated by the immediate telephone call of inquiry to the Shanghai committee: "What is your background for publishing Yao Wen-yuan's article? Why have you not notified us in advance? Where is your party character?" [30]

P'eng's sense of political danger must have intensified sharply when on November 29 the attack by the Shanghai committee was endorsed by the *Liberation Army Daily*, the organ of the People's Liberation Army and of its commander, Lin Piao. To add to his uncertainty and insecurity, P'eng was probably unable to gain access to Mao, who, no doubt intentionally, had just left Peking for an extended five-month sojourn in East and Central-South China. P'eng's conduct at this point is susceptible of two, possibly related, explanations. First, he may already have sought out Mao following the initial attack of November 10, at which time he received limited, if ambiguous, assurances of support. On the other hand, he may have felt, along with the other principal figures in charge of party cultural and propaganda work, that he had no alternative but to fight back in self-defence.

In either event, P'eng Chen and his supporters did resist and succeeded, moreover, in temporarily warding off the attack. Even in late December after Wu Han published a self-criticism (admitting historical error but not political culpability), there were still a number of intellectuals bold enough to speak out publicly in his defence. Then, for a period of nearly three months, the political attacks against Wu Han (and his defenders) ceased.

To understand the reason for this hiatus it is necessary to identify and discuss the second component of Mao's strategy in launching the "cultural revolution" in November 1965. This second component appeared in a five-point directive on the work of the People's Liberation Army for 1966 issued by Lin Piao on November 15, 1965.[31]

The significance of this directive, seemingly restricted in application to China's armed forces, for the unfolding of the "cultural revolution" was not at first apparent. Beginning in January and becoming more

[30] Chi Pen-yu, "On the Bourgeois Stand of *Frontline* and the *Peking Daily*," *Red Flag*, No. 7, May 11, 1966.
[31] NCNA, November 26, 1965.

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evident in February and March, however, Chinese Communist publications disclosed that this directive was being used to carry out a nationwide rectification-purge campaign of a new type encompassing not only the PLA but the Chinese Communist Party as well. The first novel feature of this campaign was that it was directed at leading cadres (party secretaries), beginning at the county level and extending through the provinces and municipalities up to and including the powerful regional bureaus of the party. Another was that the criterion for testing the loyalty and fitness of party officials at all levels was their attitude toward "the thought of Mao Tse-tung"—whether (to cite the first of Lin Piao's five points) they "regarded the works of Mao Tse-tung as the highest instructions" in all aspects of their work. A third feature was the surprisingly candid admission that there were large numbers of senior party officials who questioned the value of Mao's works in providing solutions to their problems. A common complaint was that these "leadership cadres have erroneous ideas of attaching much importance to professional matters and little to politics" (*i.e.*, the study of Mao's thought). More specifically, their attitude toward placing Mao's thought in command was described as "outwardly complaisant and inwardly disobedient." The remedy offered to "old comrades" and "high-ranking cadres" was that they must "study Mao Tse-tung's thought in the spirit of rectification" and carry out "criticism and self-criticism . . . fearing neither shame nor suffering." Failing to do so would mean "disqualification from leadership duties." [32]

Most unusual of all, however, was the fact that this high-level party rectification-purge campaign apparently was being carried out under the auspices of Lin Piao's five-point directive. The prominent role of the PLA and Lin Piao in this campaign was revealed in an important February 12 speech (subsequently published in the April 5 issue of *Red Flag*) by Wang Jen-chung, the first secretary of Hupeh Province. Entitled "Give Prominence to Politics and Put Mao Tse-tung's Thinking in Command of Everything," this speech contained a lengthy exposition of "Chairman Mao's call on the whole party to learn from the PLA." Specifically, party cadres were "to learn from the PLA how to give prominence to politics, how to carry out political and ideological work properly, and how to creatively study and apply Chairman Mao's works." In an indirect but unmistakable allusion to Lin Piao's five-point directive, Wang then stated: "Comrade Lin Piao has called upon us to study Chairman Mao's writings and creatively apply the advice from these writings to solve our problems. . . . Comrade Lin Piao's instruction has shown us how to study and apply Chairman Mao's writings."

[32] See, for example, the Central-South Bureau directive for this campaign in *Yang-cheng Wan-pao* (*Canton Evening News*), February 1, 1966.

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A letter sent by Lin Piao on March 11 to national conferences in the industrial and communications field, although it was not publicised at the time, provided additional evidence of Lin's increased stature.[33] This letter was significant for several reasons. As the first message addressed by the Minister of National Defence to a purely civilian audience, it made clear to those within the party that Lin was now playing a leading political role. Both the style and content of Lin's letter, moreover, were reminiscent of Mao—the former concise and authoritative and the latter reaffirming the central tenet of Maoism that " the forces of the spirit can be transformed into tremendous material strength." What was new was Lin's assertion that China urgently needed " unified thinking, revolutionary thinking, correct thinking. That is, Mao Tse-tung's thinking." There was in this message the implication that Mao had already assigned Lin Piao, backed by the power and authority of the PLA, an important role in the mission of eliminating dissident thought in order to achieve " unified thinking " throughout China.

In short, there were clear signs by the end of March that Mao's " cultural revolution " was designed to test the loyalty not only of P'eng Chen and other leaders in Peking but the entire party apparatus as well. Mao was dissatisfied with the results obtained in the high-level rectification-purge campaign and was now turning openly to a new leader (Lin Piao) and a new organisational weapon (the PLA) in an effort to impose his will on an apathetic party and society.

Shortly thereafter on April 18, Lin Piao's organ, the *Liberation Army Daily*, publicly launched the " cultural revolution " in a major editorial entitled " Hold Aloft the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thinking and Take an Active Part in the Great Socialist Cultural Revolution " and followed this up with an equally important editorial on May 4, " Never Forget Class Struggle." Setting forth authoritative guide-lines, these editorials forecast a number of the major developments in what might be called the first stage of Mao's " cultural revolution," which would last until the convening of the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee in early August.

First, these editorials made clear that Mao had conferred a leading role on the PLA (" the most loyal tool of the Party and the people, and the mainstay of our proletarian dictatorship ") in implementing the " cultural revolution " (" It has always played an important role in the revolutionary cause of the proletariat, and it should continue to do so in this great socialist cultural revolution "). Next was the revelation that there would be a thorough-going rectification-purge of China's literary and art circles (" We must re-educate the cadres in charge of literature

[33] This letter was featured prominently in *People's Daily*, June 19, 1966.

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and art and reorganise the ranks of writers and artists"). The editorials revealed, moreover, that the purge would encompass the entire "superstructure" or "ideological sphere" and would be directed with special force at "'scholars,' 'specialists' and 'professors' who oppose the party and socialism" in the realm of ideology. Finally, it is clear in retrospect that these editorials intimated the purge of highly placed party leaders depicted as "right-opportunist elements within the party" whose collaboration with "anti-party, anti-socialist elements" had "posed a serious danger." The shrill and vindictive tone of the second editorial clearly foreshadowed the ensuing violence of the "cultural revolution" with the ominous prediction of a "life and death struggle" against these class enemies.

In fact, the first group of leading "right-opportunist elements within the party" had already been seized preparatory to launching the public phase of the "cultural revolution." Although subsequently branded (in the important July 1, 1966, *People's Daily* editorial "Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought") as members of a "counter-revolutionary clique" which aimed at "usurping the leadership of the party, army and government so as to restore capitalism," it seems more probable that their alleged crimes were individual rather than conspiratorial in nature. The common bond uniting these leaders appears to have been not an organisational connection, but one of passive resistance to the application of Mao's increasingly simplistic and narrow-minded ideas within their respective spheres of responsibility. The same July 1, 1966 *People's Daily* editorial provides evidence for this view in a subsequent passage describing the behaviour of this "anti-party gang": "Where there is any mention of Mao Tse-tung's ideas, they get upset, start swearing and cursing and even get quite hysterical, just like the imperialists and Khrushchev revisionists."

The purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing, Communist China's second-ranking military leader who disappeared in late November 1965, is a case in point. One clue to the mystery of Lo's dismissal is to be found in the admission (appearing in the April 18 *Liberation Army Daily* editorial) that there were those who opposed implementing the "cultural revolution" in the armed forces ("Some claim that the problem of the direction of literature and art in our armed forces is already solved"). In a similar vein, the explanation advanced subsequently in an August 1 *Liberation Army Daily* editorial characterised the "big struggle" which took place "not long ago" as directed against important military leaders who "had given first consideration to military affairs, technique and specialised work." This charge, that Lo and others only recently identified had sought to minimise the disruptive impact of Mao's thought

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on army building (featuring political indoctrination and productive labour) and on the combat-preparedness of the PLA at a time of national danger, is credible.

The main political target of the first phase of the "cultural revolution," however, was P'eng Chen. Since he was both powerful and prestigious, it had been necessary for Mao to move cautiously in planning and executing his downfall. By late March, the time had come to spring the trap set the preceding November with the initial attack on Wu Han. In seeking to defend his governmental and party apparatus against attack, P'eng and his deputies exposed, in the words of an authoritative Chinese recapitulation of the P'eng affair, "their revisionist nature." The Chinese account disclosed Mao's strategy of entrapment and went on to say:

> But the full exposure of their revisionist nature required a certain course of time and certain "soil and weather" conditions. Even a poisonous snake comes out of its hole under certain weather conditions. The moment these poisonous snakes came out of their holes, they were captured by Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee and immediately set upon by the broad masses of party cadres and people.[34]

With the principals out of the way, the time had come to transform Mao's "cultural revolution" from a secret behind-the-scenes stratagem designed to test the loyalty of high-ranking party leaders into a massively publicised nation-wide campaign. In keeping with this new phase, P'eng Chen's dismissal was publicly revealed in a June 3 announcement that the Peking municipal committee had been reorganised and was now headed by a new first secretary, Li Hsueh-feng.

In a series of important editorials beginning on June 1, the *People's Daily* proclaimed the objectives of the new public phase of the "cultural revolution" and the methods necessary to achieve them. The ultimate goal (as outlined in the June 2 editorial entitled "A Great Revolution That Touches People to Their Very Souls") was presented as positive and constructive—"to arouse the enthusiasm of the people and broaden their horizon about the future by means of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung and our great just cause, so that they will unswervingly march ahead." Before this could happen, however, it was necessary to "Wipe Out All Monsters and Freaks" (the title of the June 1 editorial), to purge all those in Chinese society who had been opposed to Maoist policy and thought. That the first stage of the "cultural revolution" would be both destructive and violent, however, was revealed in the

[34] Editorial entitled "Thoroughly Criticise and Repudiate the Revisionist Line of Some of the Principal Leading Members of the Former Peking Municipal Party Committee" in *Red Flag*, No. 9, July 3, 1966.

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following passage in the June 4 editorial: "Without destruction, there will be no construction. . . . Messrs. bourgeois 'authorities' describe us as 'men of dynamite' and 'clubs.' That's right. . . . We shall smash anyone who tries to oppose the party and socialism . . . and oppose Mao Tse-tung's thought."

The first task, as indicated in the title of another editorial, was to "Take Over the Cultural Front Controlled by the Bourgeoisie." This was the signal for a massive purge of educators, journalists, writers, artists, composers, publishers and the entire party propaganda apparatus from top to bottom—all held responsible for the disease of "bourgeois ideology" which had infected the mind of China.

The main thrust of the campaign at this stage, however, was directed at China's educational system, especially the universities, which Mao considered a major breeding ground of dissident thought in China. In order to cleanse thoroughly these Augean stables, a six-month vacation was decreed for all students and new criteria for the selection of students were announced which stressed class background and political reliability. The time had come to provide China's youth with the "combat experience" which Mao had previously termed essential for "cultivating revolutionary successors." The ensuing struggle was waged not only against university administrators and professors but against "bourgeois" students as well.

If Mao envisaged the "cultural revolution" as a crucible for testing and selecting trustworthy "revolutionary successors," it is now apparent that he also planned to use it as a final test of the loyalty and reliability of his party apparatus, including a large number of senior party leaders both in Peking and in the provinces. As suggested earlier, some of these (notably Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing) had probably already incurred Mao's distrust. Few were aware of Mao's scheme, least of all the members of party "work teams" now sent to administer the "cultural revolution" in China's educational system.

With information from published reports, wall posters and the recent confessions of some of the principals involved, it is possible to reconstruct the development of the "cultural revolution" at China's universities (especially those in Peking) during June and July. It seems clear, for example, that the sending of party "work teams" to administer the "cultural revolution" was an accepted practice, one which had been employed extensively in the earlier "socialist education" campaign. This being the case, the subsequent foisting of responsibility for this decision on Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing as a fundamental policy error can only be construed as part of a larger design to discredit and blacken their reputations.

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The fact that 90 per cent. of the "work teams" committed fundamental errors of "direction and line" (as Mao, according to a wall poster, would subsequently assert) was unmistakable evidence that they had not received clear guidance on how to conduct the revolution. Lacking these directives, they employed the customary techniques of China's rectification-purge campaigns, particularly (as Madame Liu Shao-ch'i's confession points out) those used in the preceding "socialist education" campaign. Although violence had always been an integral part of past campaigns, it had been controlled and confined to pre-selected targets. One of the errors of the "work teams," then, was an attempt to restrict the scope and degree of violence with which the "proletarian left" attacked defenceless educators and teachers in China's schools and universities. Despite this effort, there is abundant evidence of widespread, systematic terrorisation of China's intellectuals at this time, with students forcing their professors to kneel, beating them, and in one eye-witness account, "painting their faces with chalk and ink, taunting them and spitting at them, all in the name of Chairman Mao." [35]

A far more serious error committed by many "work teams" was the confusion of "friends" and "enemies." At a time of near anarchy on many university campuses, the "work teams" apparently sided with the majority of students to suppress the "revolutionary left." The best known example of this phenomenon occurred at Tsinghua University in Peking, where Madame Liu Shao-ch'i was a prominent member of the party "work team." In her confession, Madame Liu discloses how her team first labelled its critics as "troublesome schemers" and "false leftists" and then, after a period of "students struggling against students," "resorted to strong political repression." [36]

It was at this juncture of events in a middle school attached to Tsinghua University that China's Red Guard organisation was born. Organised as a fighting force of the "revolutionary minority," this first Red Guard unit in its first wall poster proclaimed its "right to rebel . . . in order to oppose a revisionist leadership." When Mao Tse-tung wrote a letter shortly thereafter (as reported in another wall poster) conferring his blessing on the revolutionary action taken by this Red Guard unit at Tsinghua ("We warmly support all who stand in your position in the cultural revolutionary movement both in Peking and throughout the country"), the stage was set for inaugurating the most recent, higher-level phase of the "cultural revolution." The great significance of the events at Tsinghua University in July is that they provided a pattern soon to be extended to encompass the entire country, with Red Guards

[35] *The Washington Post*, September 25, 1966.
[36] For a lengthy summary of Madame Liu Shao-ch'i's confession, see *The Washington Post*, December 28, 1966.

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issuing forth from the campus "to rebel" against a new and more formidable type of "revisionist leadership"—the Chinese Communist Party apparatus itself.

The Red Guards

> The main target of the present movement is those within the Party who are in authority and taking the capitalist road.
>
> —"Decision of CCP Central Committee Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," August 8, 1966.

The Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in Peking from August 1 to 12, 1966. In a series of historic decisions, this plenum ratified Mao's choice of a new successor leadership headed by Lin Piao, adopted a 16-point decision concerning the "great proletarian cultural revolution" and issued a communiqué approving all of Mao's domestic and foreign policies in the four-year interval since the Tenth Plenum. Six days later, on August 18, Chairman Mao publicly revealed the new heir-apparent, Lin Piao, and the new organisation created to carry out his "cultural revolution"—the Red Guards. These developments, together with the Chinese editorial commentary accompanying them, are clearly of fundamental importance in understanding the most recent phase of the "cultural revolution." The main feature of the present phase is a rectification-purge of the Chinese Communist Party, a purge more extensive and violent than any since the founding of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949.

After 17 years in power, why does Mao Tse-tung feel compelled to undertake such a drastic purge? The answer to this question comes through clearly in the keynote speech made by Lin Piao at the Eleventh Plenum. As reported subsequently on a Red Guard wall poster, Lin Piao demanded "a general examination, a general alignment and a general reorganisation of the ranks of party cadres" directed at (1) "those who oppose the thought of Mao Tse-tung"; (2) "those who upset political-ideological work"; and (3) "those who have no revolutionary zeal." In addition to these (Rightists) who were "to be dismissed from their posts," there were those in an "intermediate state" (the centre) who, through fear or incompetence, had made mistakes but who, "provided they accept education and resolutely repent," would be retained in their posts. The third category (the Leftists), those who eagerly studied Mao, attached great importance to political-ideological work and were filled with revolutionary zeal, were to be "promoted." This "general organisational adjustment" was necessary in order to "break the situation of stalemate."

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As Lin revealed in his speech, Mao had declared a general purge of the party in order to overcome widespread resistance to his policies and programmes, opposition which had produced a "situation of stalemate" in the "cultural revolution." Since by definition Mao's policies and programmes were correct, the failure of these programmes to achieve the desired results could only, in Mao's eyes, be the result of disloyalty or incompetence on the part of those whom he had entrusted to carry them out. The party had been ordered in January 1966 to carry out a high-level rectification-purge campaign directed at leadership cadres who were "outwardly complaisant and inwardly disobedient" in their attitude towards Mao's thought. Mao was obviously dissatisfied with the outcome of this effort to purge the party from above, and apparently then decided to forge a new weapon designed to rectify and purge the party from below—the Red Guards.

Although the Red Guards were not mentioned by name, their purpose and functions were clearly spelled out in the August 8 Central Committee decision. They were referred to as "large numbers of revolutionary young people, previously unknown, who have become courageous and daring pathbreakers," and were identified as the vanguard in carrying out the threefold objective of Mao's "cultural revolution": (1) "to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road"; (2) "to criticise and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic 'authorities' and the ideology of the bourgeoisie"; and (3) "to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base. . . ." Red Guards were recruited primarily on the basis of militancy and revolutionary zeal (membership was restricted to representatives of the "five red classes" of workers, poor and lower-middle peasants, revolutionary cadres and revolutionary martyrs). In certain respects they were well suited to discharge the most important task assigned them, that of serving as a combat force, as the "army" of Mao's "cultural revolution." But the very same qualities of pugnacity, naïvete and fanaticism of its youthful members would soon split the Red Guard organisation, gravely impairing its effectiveness as an instrument to assist in purging the party.

The Red Guards were ideally suited to carry out their first assignment (conveyed by Chairman Mao during his symbolic meeting with the revolutionary masses on August 10 in Peking): "to pay attention to state affairs and carry out the great proletarian cultural revolution to the end." This was the launching of a reign of terror in China's cities in the last 10 days of August directed, in the terminology of the August 8 decision, at "open representatives of the bourgeoisie." Mao was invoked

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on the need for revolutionary violence ("Revolution is an uprising . . . a violent act whereby one class overthrows another"). Bands of teenage Red Guards set about systematically attacking individuals and institutions symbolising bourgeois, feudal or foreign influence and ransacking homes in search of incriminating evidence. The same acts of violence, brutality and degradation previously directed at educators in China's schools and universities were now committed publicly against defenceless victims.

This extraordinary phenomenon deserves further comment. The resort to gratuitous terror—the persecution of powerless and harmless victims designated as "enemies" so that they may be destroyed—has been characterised as the essence of modern totalitarian rule. Closely linked to this phenomenon is a compulsion to repeat the past, an attempt to re-create the heroic, formative period of the revolution when there was a powerful enemy to contend with. Although derived from an examination of earlier forms of Stalinist and Hitlerian rule, this analysis provides valuable insight into the nature of Mao's "cultural revolution."[37] In the violence and terror of Red Guard street attacks, Mao seeks to provide the "combat experience" deemed necessary for "cultivating revolutionary successors." The patent falsity of this synthetic revolution was revealed at the outset in the defenceless nature of the first "enemy" selected for attack.

The second enemy selected for attack—"those within the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road"—was much more formidable. An additional cause of difficulty was a defective strategy of attack. This strategy was an attempt to apply on a nation-wide basis the experience gained in implementing the "cultural revolution" in July and August at the universities in Peking. A special feature of this pattern of events had been the testing of the performance of party "work teams" in administering the "cultural revolution" and, by extension, testing their superiors in the Peking and Central Committee apparatus of the party. Although the results of this test had not yet been made public, they presumably were communicated to mass meetings of Red Guards assembled in Peking in mid-August. Not only had many of the "work teams" failed the test but also a number of illustrious senior party leaders, starting with the first secretary of the new Peking municipal committee, Li Hsueh-feng, and extending up to Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing and senior party Vice-Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i. This was the "revisionist leadership"—"those who are in authority within the Party and taking the capitalist road"—which the

[37] This analysis, a development of Hannah Arendt's concept of "gratuitous terror," is taken from an unpublished manuscript by Paul Kecskemeti entitled "The Future of Totalitarianism," March 1964.

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first contingents of Red Guards in Peking were credited with exposing and subjecting to criticism. To seek out, identify and criticise the counterparts of Li, Teng and Liu in the provinces was the task which China's Red Guards were now exhorted to accomplish.

The main force of the "cultural revolution" was now directed squarely at the party apparatus. Whereas all previous rectification-purge campaigns had been carried out against largely pre-selected targets under the control of a highly centralised, disciplined party machine, the present campaign was for the purpose of "exposing and criticising thoroughly" largely unknown "hidden representatives of the bourgeoisie" (the terminology of the August 8 decision) and entrusted to a newly formed, loosely organised group of youthful zealots, the Red Guards. It was one thing to stage this drama in Peking where Mao, Lin and the new "cultural revolution group" of the Central Committee could provide direct guidance and limit disorder. It was quite another thing, however, to dispatch these youthful fanatics to investigate and test on their own the loyalty of party leaders at the local level.

An additional cause of difficulty in the Red Guard movement was defective organisation. In order to understand the chaotic nature of Mao's "cultural revolution" in the closing months of 1966, it is necessary to realise that imposition of control from above has been expressly prohibited. As stipulated in the August 8 decision, "the only method" was "for the masses to liberate themselves, and any method of doing things in their behalf must not be used." This meant "the right to parade and demonstrate in the streets, the right to assemble and to form associations, and the right of speech and publication." In this emphasis on "rights" and prohibition against controls, there was an invitation to anarchy.

Although rudimentary in form, the loosely organised, decentralised system devised to supervise the "cultural revolution" was already in existence by the time of the first rally of Red Guards on August 18. At the basic level there were "cultural revolutionary groups, committees and congresses" to be organised, according to the August 8 decision, in "colleges, schools and government and other organisations . . . [and] generally also in factories, mines, other enterprises, urban districts and villages." The members of these groups (the new revolutionary elite among students, workers and peasants) were to be selected and subject to recall by the "revolutionary masses" in accordance with "a system of general elections like that of the Paris Commune." Although clearly limited in authority, these "cultural revolution committees" were depicted as providing "general guidance" to Red Guard units when they first appeared in China's schools and universities.

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Guidance at the top has been provided by Mao, his new team of leaders, and especially the "cultural revolution group" of the Central Committee. An unusual and continuing feature of this control system at the top is that, once policy guide-lines are determined, they are then communicated directly and in person by high-ranking leaders to periodic mass meetings of Red Guards in Peking. In this series of meetings (most of which, except for the million-strong rallies, are known only from wall posters), Chou En-lai has been most prominent, followed by T'ao Chu, Madame Mao and Ch'en Po-ta. By conveying leadership directives directly to the Red Guards, it has been possible to by-pass the conventional party apparatus, itself the object of attack.

Guidance at the intermediate level is provided by a network of "cultural revolution groups" within the regional bureau, provincial and municipal party committees. These "groups" constitute an extra-ordinary *ad hoc* party apparatus at the local level and presumably receive their directives from and are responsible to the "cultural revolution group" of the Central Committee. Lacking clear-cut directives and limited in authority, the "groups" have apparently experienced great difficulty in discharging their assignment of supervising the activities of the "cultural revolution" at the local level.

The charter of the "cultural revolution" was, of course, the August 8 decision of the Central Committee. The ambiguous, contradictory language of the 16 points in this document has proved a basic source of confusion, especially the contradictory provisions identifying those within the party apparatus to be subjected to attack. In Point Two, the responsibility for initiating the attack is assigned (implicitly) to Red Guards—"the large numbers of revolutionary young people . . . [who] . . . expose and criticise thoroughly, and launch resolute attacks on the open and hidden representatives of the bourgeoisie." In Point Three, however, where party leaders at different levels are directed to encourage Red Guard criticism of their performance, the authority to determine whether a given party leader should be dismissed is clearly retained by the party itself.

A more glaring contradiction was contained in the discussion of methods to be employed in conducting the rectification-purge campaign. In Point Six, the "debate" is to be "conducted by reasoning, not by coercion or force"; but in Point Eight, the prescription for handling "anti-Party, anti-socialist Rightists" is that they "must be fully exposed, hit hard, pulled down and completely discredited and their influence eliminated." Although this contradiction could be reconciled in theory (the first applied to "revolutionary comrades," the second "class enemies"), the practical difficulty of distinguishing between "friend"

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and "enemy" remained. For this, the most crucial single issue in any rectification-purge campaign, there was no clear, authoritative guidance.

With this background in mind, the puzzling events of the closing months of 1966 in Communist China become more intelligible. These events, all of which centre about the Red Guards, fall into several well-defined phases.

The first phase, extending from the first Red Guard rally of August 18 to mid-September, was one of unrestrained violence. Following a short course in the strategy and tactics of "cultural revolution," contingents of Red Guards were sent out to all provinces and major cities to transmit and apply the advanced revolutionary experience of Peking. At this point, the defects of strategy and organisation of the Red Guard movement combined to produce a nation-wide explosion of violence.

Instead of rebellion on the Peking model, a new pattern of large-scale violence featuring bloody clashes appeared in nearly all the major cities of China. As spelled out in numerous wall posters subsequently, the precipitating factor in nearly all cases was the peremptory demand by Red Guards from Peking on arrival that local party committees engage in "self-criticism" for their conduct in the initial stages of the "cultural revolution." When this demand was not met, Red Guard leaders then ordered their detachments to "bombard the headquarters," launching a violent attack against both the premises and leaders of the local party committees. To defend themselves, local committees then mobilised their own Red Guards, together with workers, peasants and soldiers. The result was a rash of violent "incidents" throughout most of China, in some cases involving thousands of combatants and producing hundreds of casualties, including many dead.

Although the August 8 decision had predicted "relatively great resistance" once the Red Guards were unleashed to attack the party, the extent and effectiveness of this opposition was clearly beyond expectation. The response of Mao and Lin and the new team of leaders to this crisis was a shift in tactics, a regrouping of forces which would extend throughout September and October. In a series of measures designed to limit the excesses of the Red Guard movement, the first was an explicit and reiterated prohibition against the use of force. Coupled with a demand for greater discipline, this prohibition was now held applicable (in the August 28 *People's Daily* editorial entitled "Revolutionary Young People Should Learn from the People's Liberation Army") even to "those in authority who are taking the capitalist road" (*i.e.*, Mao's opponents in the party apparatus). Moreover, authoritative editorials (*e.g.*, the September 7 *People's Daily* editorial) warned Red Guards not to interfere with production in industry and agriculture, both to

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safeguard production and remove a major source of friction between Red Guards and workers and peasants.

In addition, a number of organisational measures were taken at this time in an effort to strengthen co-ordination and control. First was the organisation of Joint Commands or General Headquarters of Red Guards in the major cities of China, with the aim of co-ordinating Red Guard activities in a given locality. A special feature of these new Red Guard Corps was the employment of high-ranking PLA officials (military district commanders and political commissars) as "instructors," with the announced objective of turning the Red Guards into a highly organised, disciplined battle force and "strong reserve of the People's Liberation Army." Next was the establishment of Red Guard Control Squads with a limited grant of authority to investigate and punish infractions of the new discipline. Finally, an extensive effort was undertaken at this time to "link up" the local Red Guard Corps on a nation-wide basis, achieving co-ordination by sending delegations to "exchange experience." The focal point was Peking, to which in ensuing months literally millions of Red Guards would travel in an unending stream, there to have the psychedelic experience of seeing Chairman Mao and there to receive authoritative instructions on the next phase of the "cultural revolution."

One of the most significant and revealing of these instructions was contained in a mid-September speech by Chou En-lai to a Red Guard group from Harbin. After admonishing the Harbin Red Guards for publicising their attack on the Heilungkiang Provincial Party Committee in newspapers and radio broadcasts (a violation of the August 8 directive), Chou then proceeded, according to a wall-poster account, to a general critique of their conduct which applied equally to other Red Guard groups during the initial violent phase of the "cultural revolution." The basic mistake had been to attack the entire provincial party leadership, to attach the "black gang" label to the provincial committee as a whole. But, said Chou, "some of the provincial committee comrades are good," and, moreover, "not all Party organisations at all levels are bad." The August 8 decision had clearly specified that "individuals," not "groups," were the main target, and, moreover, "careful investigation" was necessary to determine the identity of these individuals ("You cannot put caps on people at the start"). They had exceeded their authority, moreover, when they "arrested" members of the provincial committee, an action which only the Standing Committee of the Central Committee was empowered to authorise.

The above suggests the calling of a temporary truce in September and October in the battle between the Red Guards and the provincial party apparatus. It was at least tacitly admitted that the Red Guards

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had gone too far too fast, the classic definition of "leftist" error. At the same time, and this was a vitally important proviso, it was made abundantly clear that the provincial and municipal party committees had also erred in resisting the Red Guard attacks. Citing the provision of the August 8 decision that "it is not permitted, whatever the pretext, to incite the masses to struggle against each other," a September 11 *People's Daily* editorial pointed out that "responsible persons in some localities and units openly defied this decision . . . created various pretexts to suppress the mass movement . . . [and] even incited a number of workers and peasants . . . to oppose and antagonise the revolutionary students."

The implications of this editorial were ominous. At the appropriate time, once the Red Guards had been organised into a more effective fighting force, the truce would be lifted and the onslaught against the party apparatus in the provinces renewed. At that time, the pretext would be at hand for attacking and ultimately purging nearly any leader at the regional bureau, provincial or municipal level whom the Maoists in Peking might select.

The focus now shifted to Peking where, during the months of October and November, Chairman Mao and the new team of leaders would stage bi-weekly rallies until a total of some 11 million Red Guards had passed in review. Photographs of these occasions depict wave upon wave of Red Guards, eyes lifted to Chairman Mao, brandishing their books of Mao's quotations and shouting in unison. A scene of mass hysteria, these rallies were clearly intended to mobilise and motivate the Red Guards to go forth into battle against the "monsters and demons" who continued to oppose Mao's thought. An additional purpose of these rallies, televised and filmed for widespread distribution, may well have been to intimidate these opponents, demonstrating the futility of resistance against such a revered and powerful leader.

There was a marked shift in the strategy of the "cultural revolution" throughout October and November, a shift away from violence and physical coercion toward political pressure and persuasion. The principal weapon employed by the Red Guards during this period was that of political denunciation by means of wall posters. Characterising the posting of wall posters as a form of "extensive democracy," Lin Piao outlined (in a November 3 Red Guard rally speech) the purpose and scope of this practice as "fearlessly permitting the broad masses to use the media of free airing of views, big character posters, great debates and extensive contacts, to criticise and supervise the party and government leading institutions and leaders at all levels." [88] Red Guards, authorised, even encouraged, to criticise, responded by launching wall-poster attacks

[88] NCNA, November 3, 1966.

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at one time or another against nearly all of China's top leaders, both in Peking and in the provinces. There were, according to a wall-poster reporting a statement by T'ao Chu in late September, only two exceptions to the application of this rule of "extensive democracy"—Chairman Mao and Lin Piao. Although this wall-poster campaign served diverse purposes, a basic objective was to intimidate the apparently large proportion of party and government officials who had not yet passed the test of the "cultural revolution."

Another use of the wall posters was to gradually reveal the fate of those top leaders, principally Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who, to all intents and purposes, had already been purged. As recent wall-poster reporting has made clear, the downfall of Liu and Teng occurred at the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee in early August. But preparation and revelation of the case against these prestigious veteran "comrades-in-arms" of Chairman Mao was a delicate and time-consuming process, involving the drawing up of a lengthy indictment and the extraction of confessions. What is more, these two were assigned a leading role in the campaign of intimidation waged against those in the party apparatus who continued to waver or resist. This role was to serve as "negative examples" of "those within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road," as a warning that a similar fate of total disgrace and purge awaited those who refused to submit.

The strategy of this new plan of attack was spelled out clearly in a major October 31 *Red Flag* editorial entitled "The Victory of the Proletarian Revolutionary Line Represented by Chairman Mao." The victory, which remained to be won, was of course over the "bourgeois reactionary line" which had attempted "to suppress the masses" during the course of the "cultural revolution." The strategy was to draw a series of distinctions between the "various people who have committed this error of line." On the one hand, there were the small number ("one or two or just a few") who had "put forward the wrong line" (clearly a reference to Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing), together with an indeterminate number who had "consciously" implemented it and "persisted in error." On the other hand, there were the "large number" who had "unconsciously" put the wrong line into effect and who were "willing to correct" their error. As opposed to the first group of incorrigibles, the second much larger group of party leaders could be rehabilitated.

The means whereby these erring party leaders could redeem themselves was stated explicitly in the *Red Flag* editorial as follows: "A communist who has made an error of line should have the courage to

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admit and examine his error and, alongside the masses, criticise what he has done wrong." By engaging in self-criticism before the Red Guards and apologising for previous resistance to Red Guard attacks, party leaders at the regional bureau, provincial and municipal levels might yet save themselves. Having successfully beaten off the physical attacks launched by Red Guards in late August, local party leaders were now given the opportunity to surrender peacefully.

The disclosure (by Chou En-lai in an October 31 speech to Red Guards) that China's schools would remain closed " another 10 months " was a good indication that the party purge was far from over. It is likely, moreover, that the next stage of Mao's " cultural revolution " in 1967 will focus on China's provinces, where, if the pattern resembles that already set in Peking, a number of party leaders of regional bureaus, provinces and municipalities will be removed. Then and only then will Mao's grand design to rely on the masses (the Red Guards) to beat down, intimidate and purge opposition within his party be complete.

Prospects

Probably the most distinctive element of Mao's thought is reliance on political indoctrination to motivate and control human thought and behaviour. Although variously labelled, Communist China's mass political campaigns in the 1950s and early 1960s all served the same purposes of ferreting out opposition to, and arousing mass support for, Mao's policies and programmes. The ultimate expression of this political indoctrination, " mass-line " approach to economic development was the Great Leap Forward. In a very real sense, China's " cultural revolution " today is an attempt to apply the same " mass line " approach to achieve a " leap forward " in politics and ideology.

But in order to achieve (to quote the October 1, 1966, *Red Flag* editorial) a " forward leap in the mental outlook of the masses," it was first necessary to reorganise and revitalise the party apparatus held responsible by Mao for the past failure of his policies and programmes. Despite opposition and setbacks, Mao is determined to carry through this new type of purge from below, employing the Red Guards as a task force to expose, criticise and intimidate his opponents within the party. Hailed by Lin Piao as " a new contribution by Chairman Mao to Marxist-Leninist theory on proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat," this practice of " extensive democracy " will continue at a minimum until the Red Guards return to school in the fall of 1967.

The prospect for the " cultural revolution," in the short term, then, is for continued turmoil and disorder. It is important to remember, however, that this disorder has been decreed by Mao as essential for

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the success of the revolution and that there are limits (as demonstrated by the remedial measures taken following the initial outbreak of violence in late August) to the disorder beyond which even Mao will not go. At the very least, it is premature to conclude that the party and state system in Communist China has been irreparably damaged.

But what are the prospects for success in achieving Mao's ultimate goal of arousing the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses (the "forward leap in mental outlook") preparatory to a new "leap forward" in economic development? It is extremely doubtful that the "cultural revolution" will succeed any better than previous political indoctrination campaigns in solving the perennial problem confronting the Chinese leadership—how to persuade the long-suffering Chinese people to produce more and consume less in order to accelerate economic development. The underlying premise of the "cultural revolution"—that it is possible to cultivate a new "socialist" or "communist" man who voluntarily subordinates individual to collective goals and enthusiastically participates in collective production—appears to be based on a utopian view of human nature. When methods of persuasion fail to achieve the utopian objective, it becomes necessary to rely increasingly on methods of coercion and suppression. If this analysis is correct, then the outlook in Communist China in the years ahead is for the unfolding of a programme of economic and social development featuring increased tension and conflict and patterned increasingly on the Stalinist model of forced-draft economic development of a generation ago.

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