

are not in the front line in China now; the CCP ignores them and a consumer culture displeases them. Some may consider Zhu's a quaint voice on the margins. "You withdraw from what is unreasonable," he responds. "In good times, the emperor lends you an ear. At other times, you perfect yourself."

All students of Chinese politics and culture will find these essays profitable to read. Through *Xian shu xian hua* there shines a love of literature and China's best values. Zhu the bookworm is bent on a quest for understanding the contradictions of society and the paradoxes of human existence.

He sees that in history fierce struggle can lead to the opposite of what people wanted. Sometimes today's success is tomorrow's failure; a mere "feather in the storm" (the title of Wu Yimao's memoir, p. 113) can ultimately be powerful by speaking the truth; idealism often fathers extremism.

He discovers 1940s essays on international affairs by Qiao Guanhua for Hong Kong and Chongqing newspapers (pp. 134–35). But the idealism about politics that made Qiao a red-hot influence on intellectual youth just before Liberation turns cold for Zhu Xiao Di decades later. No longer do righteous tides of history seem irresistible; no longer does people power seem a palpable progressive force. What price was paid for easy enthusiasm?

In "News From Nowhere" the English 19th-century democratic socialist, William Morris, wrote: "Men fight and lose the battle, and the thing they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it comes turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they meant under another name." For all their rejection of Mao's ideas, the post-Mao leaders have realized his goal of national strength for China. Not through the originally stated methods, however, and pursuing a revised definition of national strength.

Despite Zhu's idiosyncrasy, his writing career seems affected by the tide of rising China. His first two books were written in English; now this third is in Chinese, published in China. He feels and enjoys China's new power, but he also wonders if Globalization might give China a baleful influence. "One mouse's dropping in the rice can spoil the whole pot," he warns, contemplating the possibility that China will become Number One and make a mess of it.

ROSS TERRILL

*The Beijing Red Guard Movement: Fractured Rebellion*

ANDREW G. WALDER

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xii + 400 pp.

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Anyone who has ever done serious research on the early stages of the Cultural Revolution has probably tried to gain insights into the movement by reading the so-called Red Guard tabloids, newspapers edited by the manifold student organizations that came to appear all over China after mid-1966. And probably most researchers have experienced a certain amount of frustration over the inability to penetrate beneath the surface of the highly charged and aggressive discourse, with its intricate use of metaphors and local events, when trying to understand the evolving coalitions and factions. The most common explicatory model, propounded since the late 1970s, emphasized status inequalities and class interests as main reasons for splits within the Red Guard movement. Andrew Walder has started to

question these social explanations nearly a decade ago with a series of path-breaking case studies. He now has combined them into a larger framework to explain why the Red Guards developed into irreconcilable factions that did not follow clear lines of social background. The book masterfully combines historical case studies with sociological methodology and fundamentally changes our understanding of Red Guard factionalism.

The study is exclusively focused on Beijing's universities and high schools and provides a social and political history of the Red Guard movement between June 1966 and July 1968. It is a great strength of the book that the author always describes his working hypotheses and the reasons which made him reformulate his own presumptions, shaped by classic theories of networks and social constituencies, in the first place. Walder proceeds by analysing the role played by work teams in different units and their influence in instigating factional conflict. He relies on a sample of 27 universities representing 76 per cent of Beijing's students and demonstrates the necessity of in-depth historical research to explain the highly different outcomes that depended on the strategies of the work teams and the interventions of high-level political leaders. As the lucid analysis demonstrates, political conditions were too contingent to advance predetermined interests throughout. Instead students from the same social background found themselves on different sides of the divide. An unresolved question remains the growing militancy of the work teams which only in a few cases tried to protect the pre-existing party structures. But this phenomenon is ultimately tied to the larger question of why so many veteran CCP politicians took active part in destroying the foundations of the party-state, which they had fought for in endless battles, instead of mounting collective resistance to Mao's "hare-brained" schemes.

Walder describes the various turns of the movement, the establishment of city-wide associations such as the three Red Guard headquarters, and summarizes his findings wherever possible in charts. This is very convenient to understand the situation in a particular school or to compare the constituencies of the cross-city Heaven and Earth factions, the formation of which is explained here for the first time in satisfactory detail. The book offers glimpses into the behaviour of important actors, and especially the characterizations of Nie Yuanzi and Kuai Dafu are of great interest to understand why the creation of a unified Red Guard organization in the capital ultimately failed (a classic is Kuai's first meeting with party economist Bo Yibo while reading big-character posters, whom he failed to recognize and referred to as "this old fat guy," p. 71). But of equal interest is the portrayal of Red Guards such as Zhu Chengzhao, leader of the radical "East is Red" faction at Beijing Geology Institute, who dared to mount resistance against the interventions of the Central Cultural Revolution Committee around Mao's wife Jiang Qing and offered highly perceptive assessments of the situation. Zhu in January 1967 already characterized the Cultural Revolution as "not a mass movement, but mass manipulation" (p. 201). For Walder the Red Guard phase is best described as "extensive mass participation in a tumultuous episode of bureaucratic politics" (p. 259).

The general lessons to be drawn from this book can aptly be summarized by the author's argument that a "social interpretation of politics does not end with an accurate description of social structure" (p. 251). Political contexts are of enormous importance since repeated interactions changed the status and identities of Red Guard groups irrespective of their social background and kept them wary not to come out at the losing end once political power was re-established. It remains to be seen how far Walder's assumptions can be transferred to other parts of the country

where political intervention by the central leadership was less frequent, and the recently published 60-volume set of Red Guard tabloids in the provinces might provide a viable starting point. The book is without doubt one of the greatest breakthroughs in research on the Cultural Revolution published during the past three decades and should be read by anyone interested in the history of mass movements and modern Chinese history in general.

DANIEL LEESE

*Wu Han, Historian: Son of China's Times*

MARY G. MAZUR

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*Wu Han, Historian*, is the result of many years of dedicated and meticulous study of a key figure in the intellectual history of modern China. Not only does this important book examine the personal, social and historical contexts that produced a man with complex legacies, but it also skilfully maps out some of the key issues in the lives of 20th-century Chinese intellectuals, who navigated between their personal beliefs, family duties, societal expectations, relationships to traditional and modern cultures, and commitments to their political alliances. In the case of Wu Han, these issues resulted in his devotion to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and caused his tragic death during the Cultural Revolution.

This book, however, is not just another “victim” tale of Maoist persecution. It successfully moves beyond one man’s biography to offer multi-faceted historical accounts that will appeal to a broad audience. For example, the book adeptly contextualizes Wu Han’s personal journey in the early history of Tsinghua University, including its wartime merger with the Southwest United University, its spirited student movements and dedicated professors such as Wen Yiduo and Zheng Zhenduo. Mazur also explores the history of mentorships between important leaders of the intelligentsia, such as Hu Shi, and their talented students, including Wu Han, and their eventual break-up due to differences in political beliefs and scholarly orientations.

This study also provides a miniature history of the Democratic League, its break away from the KMT nationalist government in 1948, and Wu Han’s significant role in leading it to participate in the founding of the PRC. In explaining the CCP’s subsequent persecutions of Luo Longji and Zhang Bojun during the Anti-Rightist movement of 1957, Mazur traces fundamental differences between Wu, Luo and Zhang back to 1949. Before agreeing to join the CCP-led coalitions, Luo and Zhang had requested in vain that the Democratic League be granted an option to withdraw from the coalition government, in order to protect its own third-party status. Mazur thus clarifies, more convincingly than her predecessors, that it was this fundamental difference with his cohorts that led to Wu’s open denunciations of Luo and Zhang in 1957; it was not simply a cowardly act of Wu to break ranks with his former peers to support the CCP campaign.

Most importantly, this learned study emphasizes the crucial, inevitable and often fatal link between the study of history in modern Chinese society and its political culture. Wu Han’s aspiration to be a responsible historian to explore history for contemporary use stemmed from his undergraduate student days, when he planned to