

this subject and on China's policies towards the acquisition of foreign technology generally.

Finally, readers who might want to risk the pain of paying for this book should know that the embossing on the spine designates its authors as Lalkaka and Mingyu. The publisher has not taken the trouble to identify the surnames of any of the Chinese contributors or, apparently, to proofread the volume, which is riddled with errors.

JAMES REARDON-ANDERSON

Building Democracy in the Republic of China. Edited by YU-MING SHAW. [Taipei: The Asia and World Institute, 1984. 53 pp. \$8.00.]

Taiwan's Elections: Political Development and Democratization in the Republic of China. BY JOHN F. COPPER with GEORGE P. CHEN. [Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1984. 179 pp. Hardcover \$10.00; paperback \$5.00.]

The first pamphlet contains three lectures first delivered at the Asia and World Institute in Taipei by visiting American scholars in 1983, and later edited by the Institute's then director Yu-ming Shaw. Shaw's preface claims that since democracy has not yet been fully realized in any country, no matter how unfully realized it may be on Taiwan, Taiwan is as much a democracy (even if not as democratic) as any other country. Sidney Hook in a general lecture on democracy in developing countries that does not discuss Taiwan, agrees that democracy is a matter of degree, but stipulates that "for practical purposes the presence or absence of a democratic government is determined by whether or not there is a legally recognized political opposition which has the opportunity peacefully to come to power by persuading fellow citizens to support its programs." Penn Kemble, also without discussing Taiwan, deplores the involvement of churches in what he regards as secular-radical, and ultimately totalitarian-communist political causes. John Copper does discuss Taiwan, arguing that the existence of elections for local, and recently also national, posts makes Taiwan more democratic than most foreign scholars acknowledge.

In a monograph on Taiwan's recent elections, Copper, with George Chen, further develops the argument that Taiwan is becoming more democratic. Among the stronger points of this book is its account of the interaction between the government and its critics over campaign regulations, including an informal agreement that the government would allow relatively free speech if the Opposition would avoid relatively unpleasant issues. Copper's discussion does show some familiarity with the idiosyncracies of Taiwan's politics and gives some thought on how to evaluate them in comparative and normative perspective.

Nevertheless, there is much to dispute in Copper's account, which involves many debatable judgments. Evidently he disagrees with those who contend that elections per se do not create democracy, and that "elections without choice" can provide a pillar for authoritarianism, not democracy. However, his own treatment sidesteps too many issues to be persuasive. In order to regard Taiwan as already an incipient democracy he has to give much weight to local elections, claim that elections for national representative constitute significant democratization of the central government, and regard the would-be Opposition as already a de

facto political party that gives voters a choice. However, the conservatives dominant within the Nationalist leadership will not allow the government to be reconstituted through elections, local or otherwise, and deny the Opposition the rights to party organization and media access that Hook rightly stipulates as essential to any democracy, incipient or otherwise. Copper's argument is often difficult to follow, much less accept, both because he does not adequately elaborate it and its relation to the existing literature, and because he ties few of his assertions about opinions or outcomes on Taiwan to specific people and specific sources.

Copper and Chen provide the useful beginning that they modestly hoped; Taiwan's elections will repay further analysis.

EDWIN A. WINCKLER

The First Vietnam War. By PETER M. DUNN. [London: Hurst, 1985: 392 pp. £17-50.]

The reoccupation of southern Indo-China by British forces under Mountbatten in 1945, and the disarming of the Japanese Southern Command located at Dalat, have given rise to a lot of historical criticism, especially among American writers, of the commanding general, Douglas Gracey, and his largely Indian forces. The point of departure of such criticism tends to be that the Allies had no business working for the reassertion of French sovereignty over colonial territories, and that the opportunity of Japanese enemy occupation ought to have been taken to repatriate French nationals (allies) and turn the government of their colony over to the first native aspirants who came forward – as the American “advisers” who entered northern Indo-China and Hanoi in the name of Chiang Kai-shek helped ensure transfer of Tonkin to Ho Chi Minh. Even though Gracey received no instructions to do that, he was all-powerful and, if he had been right-minded (and not “colonialist” by either disposition or nationality), he would have exercised his power to the same end as Americans did a thousand miles north of him. This line of argument is inconsistent with the international law on such matters, but that there even exists a relevant law is generally ignored by writers on the period. Critics of Gracey also derive support from incautious remarks by Mountbatten, quickly made public, that Gracey's actions had exceeded his instructions in some way; actually, Mountbatten's complaint referred to the extent of the southern Indo-China territory Gracey tried to control more than to how he did it. In any case, Gracey was ruled in order by the chiefs of staff in London.

Colonel Dunn (a U.S. officer of British extraction) has written this thesis with the rehabilitation of Gracey in mind. The sources he uses are the War and Foreign Office files at the Public Record Office, supplemented by U.S. published documents and a great wealth of private memoirs and papers, as well as personal interviews with participants. He is not so strong on French or Vietnamese sources, but the mass of detail brought to light for the first time is impressive. Happily, a number of misled and misleading secondary sources noted in the bibliography have been disregarded when it came to the writing. What perhaps is not quite so satisfactory is the author's tendency to summarize the documents he has unearthed as they stand, without topical rearrangement of matters which their drafters lumped together for convenience when reporting to superiors. It is as if the book has been conceived outside the framework of