

Eisenhower, and others. He documents his point while explicitly noting that its contribution to specific decisions cannot be demonstrated on the available evidence. He suggests that the Truman–Acheson disregard for Beijing’s warning against crossing the 38th parallel in September–October 1950 reflected contempt for “Mao and his comrades.” Similarly racism helps to explain Kennedy’s repeatedly expressed concern over the prospects of a Chinese nuclear capability.

Mistakes are few. Dr Chang misstates that “Soviet personnel did not become directly involved in the fighting” in Korea: Soviet pilots played an active role in 1950–52. W. W. Rostow’s prediction of “the greatest human disaster” in China *did* materialize, if Beijing’s official estimate of 20 deaths from the Great Leap Forward can be accepted. But these minor points in no way distract from this major contribution to understanding the American China policy during the critical decades of Sino-Soviet alliance and confrontation.

ALLEN S. WHITING

A Unique Relationship – The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act. Edited by RAMON H. MYERS. [Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1989. 166 pp. \$15.95.]

This book is the result of a conference which took place in September 1988 at the Hoover Institution. Divided into five chapters and introduced by Ramon Myers, it gives quite a comprehensive overview of U.S.–ROC relations in the last 10 years (1979–88). Although it is inevitable that the issues analysed in these chapters overlap to some extent, there are only a few repetitions, since the approach of each contributor – all Americans except one – is different.

First, as indicated in the title, the U.S.–ROC relationship is unique, because, as Ramon Myers puts it very convincingly, “Perhaps for the first time in the history of modern foreign affairs, a state had to break relations with another, only to create a new legal arrangement so as to maintain virtually all the relationships that had existed before” (p. 13). That was the purpose of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Harvey Feldman, director of Republic of China Affairs in the State Department during the period of normalization of relations with the PRC, was probably the most appropriate person to recall the drafting process of the 1 January 1979 TRA and its implementation over the last decade. This first study gives many interesting details – sometimes very technical but always useful – on the operation of the American Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, and the non-diplomatic representations of the United States and the ROC in Taipei and Washington respectively, such as the stringent and possibly useless rules imposed on the officials of both bureaus so as not to provoke Chinese communists’ ire. It is true that the U.S.–ROC relationship is almost as “emotional” as the U.S.–Israel one (p. 42). However, a longer development on the roots of this attitude – which would have helped to explain the deep

emotional dimension of the U.S.–PRC relationship – would have been welcome. Moreover, most observers would agree with the idea that the TRA formula was a success, but Harvey Feldman seems to minimize the impact of the trade issue on the future U.S.–ROC relationship.

Written by Robert Sutter, the second chapter views the influence of the TRA on America's China policy. It explains in a very qualified manner the divisions – which were not as clear-cut as one might suppose – between the Carter administration and Congress over the issue. The controversy continued during the Reagan administration. Nevertheless, a new consensus emerged in the United States over China policy in the late 1980s which has been the constant and consistent American attitude on the Chinese issue since the Truman presidency: to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. This point should probably have been emphasized more strongly. The question which remains to be answered is why the American government signed the 17 August 1982 communiqué with Beijing on the reduction of arms sales to Taiwan. As Robert Sutter clearly shows, the United States had at this stage reassessed its view of China's importance to its global deterrence strategy.

Richard Bush then expounds the methods the United States adopted to help the ROC defend itself. In his view, the signing of the 1982 communiqué did not diminish the commitment of the United States to guarantee the security of Formosa. However, one can question the confidence of the ROC that it can defend itself against the PRC in the long term. Within 20 years, the weight of both economies if not both armies will be potentially so unbalanced that the United States, and perhaps the west as a whole, should already be thinking about alternative solutions to maintain the security of Taiwan.

In the following chapter, Ralph Clough analyses the PRC's attitude towards the TRA. Although Beijing continues to consider the TRA as an impediment to asserting its sovereignty over Taiwan, it has modified its tactics since the signing of the 1982 communiqué. It has adopted a more conciliatory policy towards both the United States – very seldom raising the TRA issue – and Taiwan which has been encouraged, with some recent success, to develop trade and investment on the mainland. However, one of the reasons for a return to a more aggressive policy, which has not been stated, is the corrosive influence in the PRC of the dramatic development of economic and human relations between the two shores of the Taiwan Strait.

The last contribution is the opinion of a Taiwanese scholar on the TRA. David Chou, vice-director of the Institute of International Relations in Taipei, explains how the ROC authorities reacted to the U.S.–PRC normalization and how they have viewed the enforcement of the TRA. His assessment that in signing the 1982 communiqué, the Reagan administration “greatly damaged Taiwan's security” (p. 159) is probably somewhat exaggerated. Nevertheless, one can but assume that the United States is now bound to an international agreement it may have to violate in the future, if it wants to maintain a balance of power between the two Chinese states.

Finally, two regrets, or wishes. The first one could easily have been fulfilled: the text at least of the TRA and the 1982 communiqué

should have been included in an appendix. The second could not: this book closes when a fascinating era in PRC–ROC relations opens.

JEAN-PIERRE CABESTAN

Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Reform. Edited by GERALD SEGAL.
[London: Kegan Paul International, 1990. 281 pp. £35.00.]

This is an impressive collection of contributors who hewed to the line set by the editor. The result is an unusually coherent symposium that covers the spectrum of topics relevant to the interaction between Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy up to mid-1989. It will service sinologist and generalist alike for insightful analysis of policy-making in Beijing as well as of China's major foreign relationships.

Gerald Segal offers a lucid and illuminating introduction that judiciously balances domestic politics and the international system as prime determinants of Chinese foreign policy while summarizing the other 12 authors' findings. His analysis stands up well a year later. Jean-Luc Domenach documents the decline of ideology in foreign policy despite its partial revival after Tiananmen. Simon Long notes the impact of domestic politics on foreign relations rather than on foreign policy. Barabara Krug makes the parallel point for economic reform.

Yitzhak Shichor makes a more direct linkage between economic reform and foreign policy through defence reforms that downgraded foreign threat, reduced military expenditures, and pushed arms sales abroad, particularly in the Middle East. David Shambaugh delineates elite politics and perceptions while Shaun Breslin skilfully threads through the foreign policy bureaucracy to reveal the dichotomy between individual decision-making at the top and institutionalized implementation with vested interests that are both vertical and horizontal.

Peter Ferdinand offers a most suggestive analysis of how provincial and regional inputs to foreign economic relations can affect decisions in Beijing through their expanding role in trade and investment. Segal's handling of Sino-Soviet relations is forward-looking and sound, although he errs in claiming "China successfully seized islands in the Spratly group" in March 1988. No islands changed hands at that point. Michael Yahuda limns Sino-American relations in the larger international context, putting Tiananmen in perspective against the previously growing estrangement over Tibet, missile sales, and Fang Lizhi. Laura Newby offers a superbly subtle and succinct analysis of Sino-Japanese relations while Jean-Pierre Cabestan usefully differentiates the varied aspects of Sino-European relations.

Michele Ledic's factual survey of foreign economic relations is both comprehensive and clear, with an impressive updating of post-Tiananmen data. Lillian Craig Harris closes the volume with the difficult assignment of forecasting across the foregoing spectrum of interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy. Her analysis accurately reflects the temper of 1989, much of which had ameliorated a year later in terms of the domestic media's fading xenophobia as well as the easing of foreign economic sanctions.

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