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**Computer-Assisted Analysis of the anderson-Hájek ontological controversy**

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The axioms in Gödel’s ontological proof (Scott, 2004) entail what is called *modal collapse* (Sobel, 1987, 2004): the formula holds for any formula and not just for as intended. This fact has led to strong criticism of the argument and stimulated attempts to remedy the problem. One of those attempts (Anderson, 1990) sparked a controversy between Hájek and Anderson regarding the redundancy of some axioms in Anderson’s theory.

Although Hájek (1994, 1996) rightfully claimed the redundancy of two axioms in Anderson’s (1990) theory, he still seems to have accepted Anderson’s rebuttal (Anderson & Gettings, 1996) and proposed three new emendations (Hájek, 2002) which contain the axioms in question. Surprisingly, our analysis shows that the two axioms are still independent in one of the emendations, and superfluous in all of them.

The controversy over the superfluousness of the two axioms indicates a trend to reduce the ontological argument to its bare essentials. In this regard, Anderson (1990) introduces another variant of the argument in which many of the axioms become derivable. A high level of minimality is also achieved by Bjørdal (1998) by taking the property of being God-like as a primitive.

Many of the properties of those variants depend on the exact modal system being used and whether *constant* or *varying domain semantics* are employed. In this paper, we aim to provide a thorough computer assisted analysis of the mentioned theories which takes those conditions into account.

**References**

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