# Application Security (apsi)

Lecture at FHNW

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# Prüfungsbesprechung

- Wir gehen die Prüfungsaufgaben gemeinsam durch
- Allgemeine Fragen im Plenum stellen
- Spezifische Fragen zur eigenen Prüfungsantworten bitte anschliessend persönlich

# Agenda

#### Second lesson

Zero Trust Security Model

#### Third lesson

- Secrets Management
- Hyperscaler Cloud Security

# How does a enterprise network look like?


Network?


Segmentation?


Access Control?


Monitoring?

# How does a enterprise network look like?









#### **Internet Firewall**

- Perimeter protection against Internet ......
- Minimal filtered traffic
  from inside to outside - -
- Internal zone can be attacked without restriction via the weakest "link

#### DMZ-Zone, North-South Protection

- (Web-) Services which should be available from the Internet are operated in the separate Trust Zone DMZ
- Segmentation into trust zones
- Access from Internal to DMZ often not very restricted
- Static segmentation

#### **East-West Protection**

- Static segmentation within a trust zone
- Traffic from inside to outside is filtered restrictively
- Segmentation often only by "type" (all web servers, all clients, ...) and not by data or service criticality
- Still rather static segmentation


?

# ZT – Why is something «new» needed?

### Traditional

- Perimeter security with huge defense lines
- Inside: Good & trusted
- Outside: Bad & untrusted

### Challenges



- Cloud, SaaS
- Homeoffice
- BYOD
- Where is the perimeter?



Pixabay.com

# ZT - Where is it coming from?

- Introduced 2010 by John Kindervag (Forrester Research)
- Never Trust, always verify
  - It's a data-centric world with shifting threats and perimeters
  - Network zones are not trustworthy simply because they are within an enterprise perimeter
- Several adoptions in last few years
  - Forrester ZTX Zero Trust eXtended
  - Gartner CARTA Continuous Adaptive Risk and Trust Assessment
  - Google BeyondCorp
  - Microsoft Zero Trust

# ZT – Key Principles

- Never Trust, Always Verify!
- Never Trust
  - Assume breach
  - No static defense of traditional network perimeter
  - No trust in networks
  - No trust in interfaces
  - No trust in users
  - No trust ...

# ZT – Key Principles

Never Trust, Always Verify!

### Always verify

- Authenticate, authoricate and encrypt EACH individual access request to a workload
- Least privilege (-> segmentation)
- Adaptive access control based on available context-information (subject, client, target, ...)

## ZT – Evolution Example


- Login
  - 1. Username is not enough
    - -> Password and nowadays 2nd factor needed
  - 2. Enterprise perimeter location is not enough
    - -> context-based access management needed
  - 3. Login once is not enough
    - -> Continuous monitoring and (re-) authentication based on the current risk level
- Information Points for access decision
  - Who, What, When, Where, Why, How, ...
  - Layer 7 information needed; Lower layer control useful (software defined X)

### ZT – Where to start?

- Access Management
  - Adaptive authentication & authorization based on risk levels determined by context information
- Segmentation
  - Segments getting smaller and closer to the workload
  - Dynamic micro-segmentation based on policies (workload, data)
  - Establish authenticate-before-access principles
- Security Operation
  - Identify, analyze and respond to suspicious activities and incidents
  - Provide context information for access decisions


### ZT – Architecture

- Based on the (old) XACML architecture
- XACML Wikipedia: "The standard defines a declarative fine-grained, attribute-based access control policy language, an architecture, and a processing model describing how to evaluate access requests according to the rules defined in policies."



### ZT – Architecture

Zero Trust Access Management with Kubernetes / Containers



# Agenda

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Zero Trust Security Model

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- Secrets Management
- Hyperscaler Cloud Security

# What is Secrets Management?

What are secrets?

Where do you need / use secrets?

Where are they stored? Good / bad examples?

# What is Secrets Management? 1/2

- Secrets Management
  - Managing digital secrets, including passwords, APIs keys and tokens
  - Used in/for services, applications, privileged accounts
  - $\rightarrow$  ok... so what?
- What impact has e.g. DevOps on secrets management?
- What impact has e.g. Zero Trust on secrets management?

# The world changed

### Yesterday

- Isolated, monolithical environments
- Few releases a year
- Separation of Dev & Ops
- Few ops admins with access to productive systems
- Apps have access to unencrypted, may be hard coded secrets

#### Now

- Microservices
- Continious integration& deployment
- DevOps
- Many persons (dev, ops, devops, ...) and apps (deployment pipelines, testing, ...) with access to productive systems

**Challenges?** 

# Challenges


### **Challenges**

- Too many secrets
- Too many persons and apps in absolute control of it
- Too much privileges for single persons
- Secret sprawl to config files, wiki, drop box, email, ... → many of them are not suited to store password securely
- Increased blast radius
- No control and audit trails
- ...

# What is (modern) Secrets Management? 2/2

- Management
  - Secrets management is automated in a central service and apply consistent access policies
- Usage
  - Secrets are generated dynamically and have a limited validity
  - All secrets are encrypted (at rest & in transit)
- Monitoring
  - Every person & app only gets access to the secrets they need (least privilege)
  - Usage-monitoring every usage of secrets is monitored
  - Security breaches (secrets) can be isolated and traced back

# Authentication example



Based on Vault by HashiCorp

# Global Hyperscaler Cloud Security


What is Cloud Security?

Who is responsible for what? Is it black / white?

Is it easier? How could the comparison with development / security framework help?

# Global Hyperscaler Cloud Security

- Cloud Provider: protecting the infrastructure as composed of the hardware, software, networking, and facilities
- Customer: The rest including secure configuration of all used services



**Shared Responsibility Model** 


Who is responsible for the customer-configured DMZ network zone for application X (laaS)?

# «Common» Cloud Security Services

- Physical Security: Protecting physical assets at a geographic location
- Infrastructure security: Segmentation, hardening, security patches etc.
- Data and Access Security: Authentication, Authorization, Encryption etc.

- Cloud providers have little control over the third aspect, data and access security
- Application-level security is typically the customers' responsibility
- Most of the breaches occur because this third part is not very well secured

### On-Premises, IaaS, PaaS







Source: cloudsecurityalliance.org

# «Common» Cloud Security Services

- Monitoring & Logging
- Identity & Access Management
- Compliance Detector & Manager

- It's complex...
- You must understand and configure it right!
- Otherwise it will cost you much
  - In sense of operation costs
  - In sense of security incidents

⟨⊕⟩ Amazon GuardDuty

ty Threat detection

ာ္ဆိုး AWS Security Hub

Security alerts and security situation