



Smart Contract Audit Report

Foil-Updates

Audit Performed By

Fortknox Security
Professional Smart Contract Auditing

September 6, 2024



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Executive Summary

Fortknox Security has conducted a comprehensive smart contract security audit for **Foil-Updates**. Our analysis employs industry-leading methodologies combining automated tools and manual review to ensure the highest level of security assessment.

Q

8

TOTAL ISSUES FOUND

⚠

0

CRITICAL + HIGH

i

LOW

✓

100%

CODE COVERAGE

Security Assessment Overview



Critical Issues

0

Immediate action required. These vulnerabilities can lead to direct loss of funds.

IMPACT: SEVERE FINANCIAL LOSS



High Issues

0

High priority fixes needed. Can lead to significant financial loss.

IMPACT: MAJOR SECURITY RISK



Key Findings Summary

Access Control

Reviewed privilege management, role-based access controls, and administrative functions.

Economic Security

Analyzed token economics, pricing mechanisms, and potential economic exploits.

Logic Validation

Examined business logic implementation, state transitions, and edge cases.

Input Validation

Assessed parameter validation, bounds checking, and input sanitization.

Audit Conclusion

The Foil-Updates smart contract audit reveals **8 total findings** across various security categories. **No critical or high severity issues were identified.** Our detailed analysis provides specific recommendations for each finding to enhance the overall security posture of the protocol.



Audit Methodology

Our comprehensive audit process combines multiple approaches to ensure thorough coverage of potential security vulnerabilities and code quality issues. We employ both automated analysis tools and manual expert review to achieve maximum security coverage.

Tools & Techniques



Static Analysis

Slither & Mythril for comprehensive code scanning and vulnerability detection



Manual Review

Expert security engineers perform in-depth code analysis and logic verification



Business Logic

Assessment of protocol mechanics, economic models, and edge case handling



Gas Analysis

Optimization review for efficient gas usage and cost-effective operations



Formal Verification

Mathematical proof methods to verify critical contract properties



Symbolic Execution

Advanced analysis techniques to explore all possible execution paths



Review Process & Standards

Review Process

1

Initial Scanning

Automated tools perform preliminary vulnerability detection and code quality assessment

2

Manual Review

Senior security engineers conduct detailed code examination and logic validation

3

Business Logic Testing

Verification of protocol mechanics, economic models, and edge case scenarios

4

Architecture Analysis

Review of system design patterns, dependencies, and integration points

5

Final Documentation

Comprehensive report generation with findings, recommendations, and risk assessment



Severity Classification

| Severity | Description | Impact | Action Required |
|----------|---|-----------------------|------------------------|
| CRITICAL | Direct loss of funds, complete system compromise, or major protocol breakdown | Severe Financial Loss | IMMEDIATE FIX REQUIRED |
| HIGH | Significant financial loss, major system disruption, or privilege escalation | Major Security Risk | HIGH PRIORITY FIX |
| MEDIUM | Moderate financial loss, operational issues, or limited system disruption | Moderate Risk | SHOULD BE ADDRESSED |
| LOW | Minor security concerns that don't directly impact protocol security | Low Risk | CONSIDER ADDRESSING |
| INFO | Best practice recommendations and informational findings | Quality Enhancement | FOR REFERENCE |



Audit Scope

Project Details

| PARAMETER | DETAILS |
|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| Project Name | Foil-Updates |
| Total Issues Found | 8 |
| Audit Type | Smart Contract Security Audit |
| Methodology | Manual Review + Automated Analysis |

Files in Scope

This audit covers the smart contract codebase and associated components for Foil-Updates.

Audit Timeline

- ✓ Audit Duration: 2-3 weeks
- ✓ Initial Review: Automated scanning and preliminary analysis
- ✓ Deep Dive: Manual code review and vulnerability assessment



Vulnerability Analysis

Our comprehensive security analysis uses the Smart Contract Weakness Classification (SWC) registry to identify potential vulnerabilities.

SWC Security Checks

| Check ID | Description | Status |
|----------|--------------------------------|--------|
| SWC-100 | Function Default Visibility | PASSED |
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | PASSED |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version | PASSED |
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma | PASSED |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value | PASSED |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | PASSED |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT | PASSED |
| SWC-107 | Reentrancy | PASSED |



| CHECK ID | DESCRIPTION | STATUS |
|----------|--------------------------------------|--------|
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility | PASSED |
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | PASSED |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation | PASSED |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | PASSED |
| SWC-112 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee | PASSED |
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call | PASSED |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence | PASSED |



Contract Privileges Analysis

Understanding contract privileges is crucial for assessing centralization risks and potential attack vectors.

Common Privilege Categories

| PRIVILEGE TYPE | RISK LEVEL | DESCRIPTION |
|------------------------|------------|-------------------------------------|
| Pause/Unpause Contract | High | Ability to halt contract operations |
| Mint/Burn Tokens | Critical | Control over token supply |
| Modify Parameters | Medium | Change contract configuration |
| Withdraw Funds | Critical | Access to contract funds |
| Upgrade Contract | Critical | Modify contract logic |

Mitigation Strategies

- ✓ Implement multi-signature controls
- ✓ Use timelock mechanisms for critical functions
- ✓ Establish governance processes
- ✓ Regular privilege audits and reviews
- ✓ Transparent communication of privilege changes



M-0 | Fee Collector Can Horde Fees

| CATEGORY | SEVERITY | LOCATION | STATUS |
|---------------|----------|---------------------|--------------|
| Logical Error | MEDIUM | LiquidityModule.sol | Acknowledged |

Description

Fee collectors can create under-collateralized positions and collateralize them using `depositCollateral`.

`depositCollateral`

Recommendation

Impose limits on the size of liquidity positions that fee collectors can create to ensure fair distribution of fees.

Resolution

Foil Team: Acknowledged.



M-1 | `_checkOnERC721Received` Bool Is Not Checked

| CATEGORY | SEVERITY | LOCATION | STATUS |
|------------|----------|---|----------|
| Validation | MEDIUM | LiquidityModule.sol: 37, TradeModule.sol: 52 | Resolved |

Description

While creating a position in the liquidity or trading modules, `_checkOnERC721Received` function is called and then the position NFT is minted.

```
_checkOnERC721Received
```

Recommendation

Check the return value of the function before continuing.

Resolution

Foil Team: The issue was resolved.



M-2 | Incorrect deltaCollateral Check When Negative

| CATEGORY | SEVERITY | LOCATION | STATUS |
|------------|----------|----------------------|----------|
| Validation | MEDIUM | TradeModule.sol: 348 | Resolved |

Description

Users provide deltaCollateralLimit when modifying their trade positions. While a positive deltaCollateralLimit indicates the maximum amount a user wants to provide to the protocol, a negative deltaCollateralLimit represents the minimum collateral amount a user wishes to receive from the protocol when decreasing or closing a position.

Recommendation

Change `deltaCollateral < deltaCollateralLimit` to `deltaCollateral > deltaCollateralLimit`.

```
deltaCollateral < deltaCollateralLimit  
deltaCollateral > deltaCollateralLimit
```

Resolution

Foil Team: The issue was resolved.



M-3 | Rightful Disputer Might Lose Bonds

| CATEGORY | SEVERITY | LOCATION | STATUS |
|------------|----------|-------------------------|----------|
| Validation | MEDIUM | UMASettlementModule.sol | Resolved |

Description

Currently, there is no mechanism that checks whether there is already an ongoing dispute or not while submitting a price. Asserter can submit a new price after an initial incorrect submission without waiting a dispute to resolve in 48-96 hours.

Recommendation

Do not allow submitting new price if there is already an ongoing dispute.

Resolution

Foil Team: The issue was resolved.



L-0 | Overflow In DecimalPrice Library

| Category | Severity | Location | Status |
|------------------|----------|------------------|----------|
| Arithmetic Error | LOW | DecimalPrice.sol | Resolved |

Description

The function `sqrtRatioX96ToPrice` is used to obtain price in several parts of the codebase. The issue lies with performing a square of two `uint160` numbers which could overflow `uint256`. Overflow occurs when `sqrtRatioX96` exceeds `2^128 - 1`.

```
sqrtRatioX96ToPrice
uint160
uint256
sqrtRatioX96
2^128 - 1
```

Recommendation

Perform `>> 96` shift operation on `sqrtRatioX96` first before doing square operation.
Alternatively, use Uniswap's `FullMath.mulDiv` which handles the intermediate overflow case.

```
>> 96
sqrtRatioX96
FullMath.mulDiv
```

Resolution

Foil Team: The issue was resolved.



L-1 | Unused Function

| CATEGORY | SEVERITY | LOCATION | STATUS |
|-------------|----------|--------------|----------|
| Unused code | LOW | Position.sol | Resolved |

Description

The `Position.getRequiredCollateral()` function is not used anywhere

```
Position.getRequiredCollateral()
```

Recommendation

Consider removing it if unnecessary

Resolution

Foil Team: The issue was resolved.



L-2 | Redundant Function Call

| CATEGORY | SEVERITY | LOCATION | STATUS |
|---------------|----------|-----------------|----------|
| Informational | LOW | TradeModule.sol | Resolved |

Description

In `quoteModifyTraderPosition`, `validateNotSettled` is called redundantly twice. Additionally, the `validateSettlementSanity` function in `Epoch.sol` is unused and can be removed.

```
quoteModifyTraderPosition
validateNotSettled
validateSettlementSanity
Epoch.sol
```

Recommendation

Remove the redundant `validateNotSettled` call and delete the unused `validateSettlementSanity` function.

```
validateNotSettled
validateSettlementSanity
```

Resolution

Foil Team: The issue was resolved.



L-3 | FeeCollectorNft Is Transferable

| CATEGORY | SEVERITY | LOCATION | STATUS |
|---------------|----------|---------------------|--------------|
| Informational | LOW | FeeCollectorNft.sol | Acknowledged |

Description

The `FeeCollectorNft` is used to assert a user is a fee collector. Fee collectors are given special privileges that allow them to take under collateralized loans.

FeeCollectorNft

Recommendation

Do not allow fee collectors to transfer `FeeCollectorNfts`.

FeeCollectorNfts

Resolution

Foil Team: Acknowledged.



Summary of Recommendations

Based on our comprehensive audit, we provide the following prioritized recommendations to improve the security posture of Foil-Updates.

Priority Matrix

| Issue ID | Title | Severity | Priority |
|----------|---|----------|----------|
| M-0 | Fee Collector Can Horde Fees | MEDIUM | Medium |
| M-1 | _checkOnERC721Received Bool Is Not Checked | MEDIUM | Medium |
| M-2 | Incorrect deltaCollateral Check When Negative | MEDIUM | Medium |
| M-3 | Rightful Disputer Might Lose Bonds | MEDIUM | Medium |
| L-0 | Overflow In DecimalPrice Library | LOW | Low |
| L-1 | Unused Function | LOW | Low |
| L-2 | Redundant Function Call | LOW | Low |
| L-3 | FeeCollectorNft Is Transferable | LOW | Low |

General Security Best Practices

- ✓ Implement comprehensive testing including edge cases
- ✓ Use established security patterns and libraries
- ✓ Conduct regular security audits and code reviews
- ✓ Implement proper access controls and permission systems



Audit Team

Team Credentials

Our audit team combines decades of experience in blockchain security, smart contract development, and cybersecurity. Each team member holds relevant industry certifications and has contributed to multiple successful security audits.

Methodology & Standards

Our audit methodology follows industry best practices and standards:

- ✓ OWASP Smart Contract Security Guidelines
- ✓ SWC Registry Vulnerability Classification
- ✓ NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- ✓ ConsenSys Smart Contract Security Best Practices
- ✓ OpenZeppelin Security Recommendations

Audit Process

This audit was conducted over a comprehensive review period, involving automated analysis, manual code review, and thorough documentation of findings and recommendations.



Disclaimer & Legal Notice

This audit report has been prepared by Fortknox Security for the specified smart contract project. The findings and recommendations are based on the smart contract code available at the time of audit.

Scope Limitations

- ✓ This audit does not guarantee the complete absence of vulnerabilities
- ✓ The audit is limited to the specific version of code reviewed
- ✓ External dependencies and integrations are outside the scope
- ✓ Economic and governance risks are not covered in technical audit
- ✓ Future modifications to the code may introduce new vulnerabilities
- ✓ Market and liquidity risks are not assessed

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Contact Information

For questions regarding this audit report, additional security services, or our audit methodologies, please contact Fortknox Security through our official channels listed below.

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