# Lightweight Hardware Accelerator for Post-Quantum Digital Signature CRYSTALS-Dilithium

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Abstract—The looming threat of an adversary with quantum computing capability led to a worldwide research effort towards identifying and standardizing novel post-quantum cryptographic primitives. Post-standardization, all existing security protocols will need to support efficient implementation of these primitives. In this work, we contribute to these efforts by reporting the smallest implementation of CRYSTALS-Dilithium, one of the chosen post-quantum digital signature scheme for NIST standardization process. By invoking multiple optimizations to leverage parallelism, pre-computation and memory access sharing, we obtain an implementation that could be fit into one of the smallest Zynq FPGA. On Zynq Ultrascale+, our design achieves an improvement of about 36.7%/35.4%/42.3% in Area×Time (LUTs×s) trade-off for KeyGen/Sign/Verify respectively over state-of-the-art implementation. We also evaluate our design as a co-processor on three different hardware platforms and compare the results with software implementation, thus presenting a detailed evaluation of CRYSTALS-Dilithium targeted for embedded applications. Further, on ASIC using TSMC 65nm technology, our design requires 0.227mm<sup>2</sup> area and can operate at a frequency of 1.176 GHz. As a result, it only requires 53.7 \( \mu s / 96.9 \( \mu s / 57.7 \( \mu s \) for KeyGen/Sign/Verify operation for the best-case scenario.

Index Terms—Post-quantum, cryptography, PQC, crystals-dilithium, FPGA, hardware, ASIC, hardware accelerator.

### I. INTRODUCTION

THE threat of an adversary with quantum computing capability is getting increasingly realistic [1], [2], with rapid growth in the capacity of quantum computers, as well as, optimized implementations of the current cryptographic primitives using quantum circuit simulators [3], [4]. It is predicted that current public-key primitives could be broken within hours [5], thus necessitating the search for alternative cryptographic primitives in the era of quantum computing. This is systematically undertaken by NIST through its

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Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) contest [6], which plans to roll out the winners of this contest as a standard. Naturally, there is a pressing need to study efficient hardware implementations of the PQC candidates, which not only plays an important role in the contest judgement process but also helps in the rapid adoption of the standard.

The third round finalists of the NIST POC contest consisted of 3 candidates in digital signature scheme, one of which has recently been attacked [7]. There have been several previous works as well compromising the security of this scheme [8], [9], [10]. Further, NIST recently selected three algorithms CRYSTALS-Dilithium, Falcon and SPHINCS+ to be standardized as post quantum digital signature scheme [11]. Naturally, it is of high importance to study efficient implementations of these schemes. In this work, we targeted CRYSTALS-Dilithium [12]. Digital signature being an integral part of numerous security protocols, the use-cases and the platform constraints range from high-speed servers to highly resource-constrained IoT platforms. As a result, there have been several efforts towards optimizing Dilithium for different security parameters and different platforms such as FPGAs and ASICs targeting pure-hardware based implementation [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], HLS based implementations [18], [19], [20] or as a software-hardware co-design [21]. Further, few works focused on integration in TLS protocol [22], accelerated on a GPU [23] and for developing a quantum secure blockchain [24].

From our studies on the existing Dilithium implementations, we found that there is a significant room for improvement in terms of area-efficiency, which sets the motivation for this work. The main contributions and results of this work can be summarized as:

- In this work, we designed a lightweight hardware accelerator for CRYSTALS-Dilithium. We used multiple optimization strategies such as resource and control logic sharing, fusion of modules, pre-computed LUTs etc.
- 2) By achieving a reduction of about 24% in Look-up Tables (LUTs) and Flip-Flops (FFs) than state-of-the-art implementation, this work presents the smallest hardware accelerator for Dilithium. As a result, it can now be fit into one of the smallest Zyng FPGA.
- 3) In our design, we have leveraged both pipelining as well as parallelism to achieve a good balance of performance and area. Thus, on Zynq Ultrascale+, our design achieves efficiency of more than 35% for Area×Time compared to existing implementation.

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- 4) To present a fair comparison with the existing implementations, we used two metrics - Area×Time and number of operations that can be performed per second per LUT on a particular platform. On Zynq Ultrascale+, our design outperforms the state-of-the-art. Whereas, on Artix-7, our design has better performance when considering the full design with packing/unpacking modules.
- 5) Using TSMC 65nm library, we also implemented the design on ASIC platform and report numbers for major modules as well as the overall design. On ASIC, our design can run at 1.176 GHz with 0.227 mm<sup>2</sup> area achieving a reduction of 1.4× in area and improvement of more than 1.7× in execution times for KeyGen, Sign and Verify.
- 6) Further, we performed hardware evaluation of the implemented design as an accelerator on three different hardware platforms and achieved a speedup of 6-15× for modern high performance CPUs and about 105-261× for Microblaze compared to software implementations for different operations.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II starts with the notations and presents a brief background about Dilithium. Section III shows the overall system architecture along with the design decisions. It is then followed by the different experimental results and performance comparison with the state-of-the-art implementations in Section IV. The performance evaluation as a hardware accelerator is presented in Section V and Section VI finally concludes the work.

#### II. PRELIMINARIES

#### A. Notations

Throughout this work, we use the following notation. Lower-case letters are used to represent vectors (e.g. **e**) and the polynomials in NTT domain are represented using a hat over the symbol ( $\hat{\mathbf{e}}$ ). Matrices are represented using bold upper-case letters (e.g. **A**).  $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n+1)$  denotes the ring of integer polynomials modulo  $(X^n+1)$ , where n is a power of 2.  $\mathcal{R}_q$  is the polynomial ring with coefficients modulo q. For dilithium, n=256 and modulus  $q=2^{23}-2^{13}+1=8380417$ .

# B. Protocol Description

The digital signature scheme CRYSTALS-Dilithium is based on the hardness of the Module Learning with Errors (MLWE) and the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problems. In this section, we briefly discuss about the hardness problems and the protocol. Interested readers are referred to [25] for more details. Let us consider a matrix  $\bf A$  of dimension  $k \times l$  and vectors  $\bf s_1$  and  $\bf s_2$  of dimensions l and k sampled uniformly. Then, the MLWE problem can be defined as: Given  $(\bf A, As_1 + s_2)$  and  $(\bf A, b)$  where  $\bf b \approx As_1 + s_2$  and is a uniformly sampled vector, the goal is to distinguish  $(\bf A, As_1 + s_2)$  from  $(\bf A, b)$ . One can note that they are approximately equal, but the unknown error vector  $(\bf s_2)$  makes it quite difficult to distinguish. The SIS problem can be defined as: Given  $\bf A$ , the goal is to find a vector  $\bf x$  such that  $\bf Ax = 0$  and the norm of  $\bf x$  is smaller than an integer value called norm bound  $\beta$ .




Fig. 1. Dilithium protocol.

The dilithium signature scheme consists of three algorithms key generation (KeyGen), signature generation (Sign) and verification (Verify) shown in Fig. 1.

- 1) KeyGen(): Key generation algorithm generates a keypair consisting of a public verification key (pk) and a private signing key (sk). It utilizes two random seeds public seed  $(\rho)$  and noise seed  $(\rho')$  and expands them using a variant of SHAKE-128 to generate the matrix **A** and two vectors  $\mathbf{s}_1$  and  $\mathbf{s}_2$ . It then computes  $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{s}_2$  to generate the final keypair.
- 2) Sign(sk, M): The purpose of this algorithm is to take the message M and the signing key sk and generate the signature sig. For this, first a masking vector y is generated using SHAKE-256 and then it is used to compute w = Ay. The high-order bits of w (denoted as w<sub>1</sub>) are then hashed with the message M to generate the challenge c. This challenge is used to generate the signature as z = cs<sub>1</sub> + y. Apart from generating z, the algorithm also generates some hints h for the verifier. If the signature passes all the correctness and security checks, then sig consisting of (c, z, h) is sent as the final signature to the verifier. Otherwise, the signature is re-computed again as shown in the rejection loop.
- 3) Verify(pk, sig, M): The verifier computes  $Az ct_1$  and set the high-order bits in  $w_1$ . It is then hashed with the message M to generate the challenge c. This challenge is compared with the one received in the signature. If the challenges match and also the norm of c is valid, then the signature is accepted and the algorithm returns  $valid\_sig$  as true, otherwise signature is rejected.




Fig. 2. High-level system architecture of dilithium.

#### III. ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN DECISIONS

Here, we present the overall system architecture and discuss various design decisions which led to the overall optimized modules.

#### A. System Architecture

The architecture for three algorithms KeyGen, Sign and Verify is combined together and the resources are extensively shared to keep the memory footprint as small as possible. A global input enable signal is used to start the required operation. The modules having similar control logic are also combined together to further reduce the resource utilization. Such modules are shown together in the overall design architecture shown in Fig. 2.

The hardware accelerator is designed using a dedicated FSM based control unit. All the modules have separate enable and done signals and are connected to the memory controller. The control logic and sequencer unit is responsible for enabling different modules depending on the required functionality. The memory controller consists of a dual-port switch matrix and is responsible to connect different modules with the RAMs depending on the input and the output for the operation.

The critical path in our implementation is between the control logic and the memory controller. This is because of two reasons: first, the individual modules are optimized separately to have good performance, second, the state machines control the extensive sharing of memories between multiple modules leading to increased levels of logic.

# B. Memory Requirements

The upper bound on the memory storage is decided based on the signature generation part. In the worst-case scenario for Level V parameters, one needs to store about 118 polynomials. This huge requirement is mainly because of matrix  $\bf A$  of size  $k \times l \times 256$ . In case of KeyGen and Verify, one can generate partial matrix of size  $l \times 256$ , perform the computation and store the final result. One can execute these steps k times separately to save resources and generate the final output of pointwise operation. But, in case of Sign operation,




Fig. 3. Detailed execution timeline for different operations.

due to multiple rejections, there is a trade-off between precomputing and storing the complete matrix A or re-computing partial matrix coefficients. The former approach requires more RAMs and less clock cycles whereas the latter results in less storage but more clock cycles. In our design we chose to compute it fully (56 polynomials) only once at the expense of RAM requirements. To balance this requirement, we analyzed the Sign algorithm to determine which variables are never accessed simultaneously (for instance, z and y) and utilized same RAMs for both the variables. Also, the internal buswidth for each polynomial is variable and optimized based on the coefficient size. For instance, the zetas are only of size 23-bit, hence the BRAM data width is set to 23-bit instead of 32-bit. Similarly, most of the coefficients for Dilithium can be fit into 26-bit resulting in a reduction of about 16.8% BRAM requirements compared to an implementation with a fixed buswidth of size 32-bit.

# C. Parallel Processing

In order to reduce clock cycles, the data independent operations can be executed in parallel. One can perform finegrained parallel execution of operations such as in [14], but this leads to significant area overheads, mainly because of an increase in multiplexing, additional module instances, etc. Whereas, we implemented parallel execution of operations without using multiple instances of the modules to ensure low area. The parallel execution is achieved using a tightly-coupled scheduler implemented using a FSM. Fig. 3 shows the parallel processing timeline for all the operations. For Sign and Verify, partial timeline is shown as rest of the operations are executed sequentially. As sampling matrix A requires the most amount of time, it provides more opportunity for parallel execution of operations which is also evident from the figure. The rejection sampling for  $s_1/s_2$  along with SHAKE256 requires about 234-237 clock cycles for one polynomial. Similarly, generation of one polynomial for matrix A requires 502 clock cycles. A single pointwise polynomial multiplication is performed in 147 clock cycles. Our NTT implementation requires 606 clock cycles whereas the INTT requires 614 clock cycles. This time excludes the clock cycles required for copying data to and from the NTT unit.




Fig. 4. Unified SHAKE wrapper.

## D. SHAKE

Here, we describe the implemented architecture for the SHAKE module. Dilithium uses SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256 extendable-output functions (XOFs) of the SHA-3 [26] family which is based around the Keccak permutation [27] for different functionalities with minor variations. For instance, SHAKE-256 and its variations are used to generate random seeds from an initial seed, for the hashing (H) and also to generate the challenge (c). Whereas, to generate Matrix A, vectors  $s_1$ ,  $s_2$  and masking vector  $y_1$ , variants of SHAKE-128 are used.

As the XOFs are one of the most expensive and time consuming operations, it is important to design them carefully. Consequently, there can be multiple possible design choices. One can have multiple instances of the Keccak as in [16], cascade two rounds of Keccak [14] to increase performance or have a single shared instance to achieve all the functionalities to save resources at the expense of some performance. In our design, we chose the latter approach and created and implemented a unified wrapper around Keccak from the ground-up to support all the required variations. For the Keccak-f permutation shown in Fig. 4, we used the implementation provided by the designers [28]. As Dilithium is a digital signature scheme, the architecture should support variable input message length. Also, the requested output length from the XOFs is different depending on the operation being performed. Such variations with different input/output length, different padding logic, nonce support, etc. makes it quite challenging to have one module which is efficient in hardware as well as serve all the required functionalities. As a result, the overall logic for this module is quite complex. In order to provide support for variable input and output message length, the design has three configurable modes of operation - perform absorb followed by one squeeze (mode = 1), perform only squeeze (mode = 2) and read Keccak state (mode = 3). The modes are extremely useful when the number of executions for squeeze is unknown (for instance, in case of rejection sampling). Also, mode = 3 allows the Keccak state to be accessed from outer modules, as a result we do not need extra resources to store additional copies of the 1600-bit register elsewhere compared to the work in [14].

The internal state remains valid after each squeeze operation unless reset from outside. Fig. 4 shows the architecture for the implemented SHAKE wrapper module. The interface is used to set the corresponding mode using enable signal, provide necessary information such as number of bytes to absorb (input\_length), shake rate (shake\_rate), etc. and to communicate with the different outer modules.

The control logic for all the modes are for starting the corresponding operation. For example, for a SHAKE-128 operation, the outer module first sets the enable signal to mode = 1 along with the input\_length and shake\_rate. The operation control decodes the mode and transfers the control to absorb control logic. This starts the absorb phase by reading in the domain separator and input. The XORing of the input with the Keccak state and the generation of corresponding input addresses are handled by XOR Logic + Input Address Controller. In our design, we are absorbing data in chunks of 64-bits per clock cycle. The absorb control logic is responsible for monitoring the absorbed input length and starts the permutation if required (when the input message length is greater than the shake rate). Further, when the input is completely absorbed, it enables the padding logic to finalize the absorbed block. The absorb control logic then starts a squeeze operation by setting start\_sqz signal. The squeeze block starts the Keccak permutation and waits for it to finish execution using a dedicated counter (24 clock cycles as Keccak has 24 rounds). It then sends the done\_sqz signal to the absorb control logic which then triggers the done\_abs\_sqz signal to operation control. Once the outer module receives the done signal, it starts reading the Keccak state by setting mode = 3, and providing the corresponding state address. In a single clock cycle, 64-bit data can be fetched from the wrapper. The outer module processes this data first and if more data is required, it simply increments the address, otherwise it sends a read done signal to reset the internal Keccak state. If the required output length is more than the shake rate, then after reading enough data (= shake rate), the outer module sets mode = 2 to start another squeeze operation and then read the data using mode = 3. Such an approach allows us to call squeeze back and forth only when required and when we have exhausted all the available Keccak output. Thus, saving us clock cycles as well as area as we do not need to pre-compute and store extra output bytes for example, in case of rejection sampling.

# E. Sampling Modules

Dilithium requires four different types of sampling logic to generate matrix A, the vectors  $\mathbf{s}_1$ ,  $\mathbf{s}_2$ , challenge  $\mathbf{c}$  and the masking vector  $\mathbf{y}_1$ . Even though all of them have different sampling logic, but the coefficients are sampled based on the output of a variant of XOF function. Hence, the sampling modules in our design only contain the sampling and control logic to start and fetch coefficients from the Keccak wrapper as discussed in III-D.

Listing 1 shows a small code snippet from the software reference implementation for rejection sampling. It is used to generate vectors  $\mathbf{s}_1$  and  $\mathbf{s}_2$  from the output of SHAKE-128.

```
t0 = buf[pos] & 0x0F;
if (t0 < 15) {
     t0 = t0 - (205 * t0 >> 10) * 5;
     a[ctr++] = 2 - t0;
}
```

Listing 1. Rejection eta.




Fig. 5. Power2Round and decompose module.

Initial value of t0 (and t1) comes from a 4-bit uniform random and can as well assume the value 15, in which case it's rejected. Thus, the possible output values for polynomial coefficient can be pre-computed and stored in a LUT. This resulted in saving a lot of resources. The same logic is used for another value t1. Similar optimizations are used for other sampling modules wherever possible along with pipelining for good performance.

#### F. Combined Power2Round and Decompose

Fig. 5 shows the combined module for Power2Round and Decompose modules. As can be seen from the figure, the controller unit is shared between both the modules, thus saving about 180 LUTs and 120 FFs. The controller unit is used to enable the operation depending on the mode and generate address and write enable signals after receiving done from the respective module. For simplicity we have not shown the individual enable and done signals in the diagram. The software reference implementation of decompose module for Dilithium-V requires two multiplication operations to realize high-order and low-order bits of the polynomial coefficient. One is (a1\*1025) and other one is (a1\*2\*GAMMA2) where GAMMA2 = 261888, resulting in an expensive implementation for Decompose. In order to prevent DSP usage for the two cases, we used two different strategies. We realized the first multiplication using an addition operation as (a1\*1025) is equivalent to (a1\*1024 + a1) and (a1\*1024) is very efficient in hardware and can be realized by shift logic. For the second multiplication, we used a small 4-bit lookup-table (LUT) as the input a1 can only have 16 possible values. We pre-computed the output of (a1\*2\*GAMMA2) for all 16 possible values and used the LUT whenever required. The rest of the operations are mostly either shift operations or addition/subtraction with a constant value. Because of the optimizations employed, the resource utilization of decompose is thus significantly reduced to only about 120 LUTs and 203 FFs. Power2Round is a very simple module requiring only one addition and subtraction operation. We have performed such control logic unification with multiple modules and benefited in terms of area.




Fig. 6. Efficient modular reduction module.

#### G. Modular Reductions

The work in [29] and [30] proposed an efficient method for modular reduction in hardware for NewHope-NIST and CRYSTALS-Kyber. In this work, we followed a similar approach for efficient modular reduction in Dilithium. In order to compute  $a \mod q$ , we used Dilithium modulus property  $2^{23} = 2^{13} - 1 \pmod{8380417}$  recursively. The corresponding equations are as shown below:

$$a = 2^{23}a[45:23] + a[22:0]$$

$$= 2^{13}a[45:23] - a[45:23] + a[22:0]$$

$$= 2^{23}a[45:33] + 2^{13}a[32:23] - a[45:23] + a[22:0]$$

$$= 2^{13}a[45:33] - a[45:33] + 2^{13}a[32:23]$$

$$- a[45:23] + a[22:0]$$

$$= 2^{23}a[45:43] + 2^{13}a[42:33] + 2^{13}a[32:23]$$

$$- (a[45:33] + a[45:23]) + a[22:0]$$

$$= 2^{13}(a[45:43] + a[45:23]) + a[22:0]$$

$$= 2^{13}(a[45:43] + a[45:33] + a[45:23]) + a[22:0]$$

$$= 2^{13}c - e + a[22:0] \pmod{q}$$

where c = (a[45:43] + a[42:33] + a[32:23]) and e = a[45:43] + a[45:33] + a[45:23]. Using the same modulus property again, c can be further reduced as:

$$2^{13}c = 2^{23}c[11:10] + 2^{13}c[9:0]$$

$$= 2^{13}(c[11:10] + c[9:0]) - c[11:10]$$

$$= 2^{13}f - c[11:10] \pmod{q}$$

Further reduction is possible for f as shown below:

$$2^{13}c = 2^{23}f[10:10] + 2^{13}f[9:0] - c[11:10]$$
  
=  $2^{13}(f[10] + f[9:0]) - (f[10] + c[11:10])$ 

Fig. 6 shows the implemented reduction module. The extra multiplication operation required before modular reduction operation is also integrated in this module. In order to reduce the input to 23-bit before multiplication, we first performed an initial reduction using the same recursive property. This helped in the reduction of 2 DSP resources per such module. The back-to-back flip flops correspond to the pipeline delays required for optimal DSP implementation. Two such modules are instantiated in hardware to speed up operations.

## H. NTT/INTT

The NTT/INTT is one of the most computationally expensive operations in Dilithium. Fig. 7 shows the basic architecture utilized in this implementation. As the NTT operations in Dilithium allows implementations with two simultaneous butterfly operations we have utilized two




Fig. 7. NTT/INTT architecture.

 $64 \times 256$  dual-port memories attached with a *dual butterfly* unit. This allows for two butterfly-operations to be performed per clock cycle. The *dual butterfly* unit internally utilizes two multiplication-reduction units as described in section III-G.

The design choice of computing two coefficients per clock cycle is motivated by two reasons. Firstly, a  $2 \times 2$  NTT based design like [16] can yield twice the NTT performance but at significantly increased area both in terms of LUT as well as DSPs. Secondly, we are able to share the DSP based multiplications to perform polynomial multiplications as well. Duplicating arithmetic circuits would also be required to fully utilize the additional instantiated DSPs. This will result in significant increase in area.

The NTT operation is performed in three stages. First, the data from external memory is copied over to RAM-A. Second, the data in RAM-A is processed (128 butterfly operations) and written over to RAM-B and reverse, until all the layers have been processed. Finally the result is written back to the external RAM. The entire operation requires multiple addresses, write enables and zetas to be generated and provided to various modules. This is performed by the address generation and control state machine. At the end of INTT, the required scaling by 1/n is performed by the butterfly unit as well. So, no additional resources or clock cycles are utilized.

#### IV. RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

In this section, we present resource utilization and performance results for both FPGA and ASIC implementations. We also compare our results with the state-of-the-art implementations for Dilithium-V. The implemented design is realized in Verilog and the results are presented after synthesis and place and route using Vivado 2020.1 targeting two platforms Xilinx Artix-7 (XC7A200T-2) and Zynq UltraScale+ (XCZU9EG-2). The correctness of the implementation is verified using the KAT provided in the NIST package. From here on, Artix-7 is referred as A7 and Zynq UltraScale+ is referred as ZUS+. For ASIC, we synthesized the design for TSMC 65nm process technology. We used Synopsys Design Compiler version R-2020.09-SP5 for synthesis and Cadence Innovus version V19.10-P002 for place-and-route of the design. We used CCS-based standard cell library for accurate results. Synopsys DesignWare library components were used wherever applicable.

TABLE I
RESOURCE UTILIZATION FOR FPGA AND ASIC. THE ASIC RESOURCES
ARE REPORTED IN GATE EQUIVALENTS (GES)

| Sub-module |                 | FPGA            | ASIC Referenc |      |         |           |  |  |
|------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|------|---------|-----------|--|--|
|            | LUT             | F/F             | DSP           | BRAM | GEs     |           |  |  |
| MakeHint   | 2389            | 740             | 0             | 0    | -       | [16]      |  |  |
|            | 67              | 85              | -             | -    | 1423.7  | This Work |  |  |
| UseHint    | 6453            | 2808            | 0             | 0    | -       | [16]      |  |  |
|            | 186             | 279             | 0             | 0    | 4740    | This Work |  |  |
| Encode +   | 1626            | 461             | 0             | 0    | -       | [16]      |  |  |
| Pack       | 650             | 603             | 0             | 0    | 8884    | This Work |  |  |
| Decode +   | 2189            | 239             | 0             | 0    | -       | [16]      |  |  |
| Unpack     | 694             | 568             | 0             | 0    | 9458.3  | This Work |  |  |
| Decompose  | 1437            | 680             | 0             | 0    | -       | [16]      |  |  |
| 2000       | 120             | 203             | 0             | 0    | 3028.7  | This Work |  |  |
| NTT +      | $4509 \times 2$ | $3146 \times 2$ | 16            | 0    | -       | [16]      |  |  |
| PolyArith  | 5676            | 1218            | 41            | 1    | -       | [17]      |  |  |
|            | 2759            | 2037            | 4             | 7    | 40182   | This Work |  |  |
| SampleA +  | 3548            | 1015            | 0             | 0    | -       | [16]      |  |  |
| SampleS    | 1479            | 189             | -             | -    | -       | [17]      |  |  |
|            | 360             | 355             | 0             | 0    | 4710.3  | This Work |  |  |
|            | 2220            | 630             | 0             | 0    | -       | [16]      |  |  |
| SampleY    | 469             | 48              | -             | -    | -       | [17]      |  |  |
|            | 99              | 199             | 0             | 0    | 2353    | This Work |  |  |
| SampleC    | 1856            | 868             | 0             | 0    | -       | [16]      |  |  |
|            | 384             | 662             | -             | -    | -       | [17]      |  |  |
|            | 289             | 244             | 0             | 0    | 3782.7  | This Work |  |  |
|            | $5483 \times 3$ | $4451 \times 3$ | 0             | 0    | -       | [16]      |  |  |
| Keccak     | 3708            | 1623            | -             | -    | -       | [17]      |  |  |
|            | 4202            | 1800            | 0             | 0    | 42155.3 | This Work |  |  |
|            |                 |                 |               |      |         |           |  |  |

#### A. Resource Utilization

Table I shows resource utilization for the major components required in Dilithium. Through extensive resource sharing between the modules, we obtained a significant reduction in overall resource utilization. One can note that the resource utilization for Sampling is quite low compared to the other existing implementations. This is mainly because the different Sampling modules contain only the minimal arithmetic and control logic with the XOFs shared between them. The slice registers usage is somewhat higher in our case because of the deep pipelines needed for good performance on both FPGA and ASIC. The various modules were individually optimized for hardware using multiple strategies wherever applicable.


# B. FPGA Implementation

Table II presents detailed results for our implementation as well as existing implementations for Dilithium-V for the best-case scenario. In our case, the combined architecture (for KeyGen, Sign and Verify) requires about 13.9k LUTs, 6.8k Slice registers, 35 BRAMs and 4 DSPs. Due to a deeply pipelined architecture, our design can run at a maximum frequency of 163 MHz on Artix-7 and 391 MHz on Zynq Ultrascale+. As a result, we require  $387\mu s$ ,  $699\mu s$  and  $416\mu s$  for KeyGen, Sign and Verify operations on Artix-7. For


Zynq Ultrascale+, the respective operations can be finished in  $161\mu s$ ,  $291\mu s$  and  $173\mu s$ . We also report number of operations that can be performed per second (OP/s) for all the implementations. Further, we report the results for our implementation excluding packing/unpacking modules.

Currently, to the best of our knowledge, there are four known hardware implementations which report results for Dilithium Security Level V. Hence, we compare our results with only these implementations.

- 1) Comparison With [17]: The authors in [17] target to reduce area in terms of LUTs and FFs by utilizing more DSP resources in their architecture. Further, the modules related to packing and unpacking operations were not implemented as part of the hardware architecture. Their design requires 3.8×, 2.44× and 11.25× the LUTs, FFs and DSP resources and 4 less BRAMs compared to our design. Even though, our implementation has slightly more latency for the three operations, the overall improvement in terms of efficiency (Area×Time) is quite high. Compared to ours, their design has a lower Area×Time trade-off efficiency by 280%, 192% and 287% for KeyGen, Sign and Verify operations respectively.
- 2) Comparison With [14]: Zhao et. al. proposed a compact and high-performance hardware design. They did several optimizations such as segmented pipeline processing to achieve a high-performance architecture. The authors also did not implement the packing and unpacking modules in their architecture. Further, as the clock cycles reported in Section 5.1, Table 4 [14] either do not account for pre-calculation cycles or are provided for the average case. As a result, in order to accurately calculate clock cycles for the best-case sign operation, we used  $(Sign_{avg}^{b} - Sign_{avg}^{a} + Sign_{min}^{a})$ . Similarly, for verify operation, we combined Verify<sub>avq</sub> with the time execution for computing NTT( $t_1$ ) using (256×k) + 296 clock cycles). The final numbers are shown in Table II. Their design can perform KeyGen/Sign/Verify in  $90\mu s/228\mu s/117\mu s$  which is  $4.05\times/2.87\times/3.15\times$  faster than our design. Even though their design offers high-performance, it comes at an expense of consuming large amounts of resources. Compared to our design, their implementation requires 155% and 82.5% more LUTs and FFs. As a result, the Area×Time trade-off is comparable in case of Sign and Verify operation whereas it is better in [14] for KeyGen.
- 3) Comparison With [16]: The work by Beckwith et. al. present results for multiple platforms as well as for all the security levels. For a fair comparison, we compare our results with the similar FPGA plaform. The authors in [16] targeted a high-performance implementation. As a result, they can perform Keygen, Sign and Verify in  $121\mu s$ ,  $210\mu s$ and  $126\mu$ s achieving a reduction of about  $3.2\times$ ,  $3.33\times$  and 3.30× compared to our implementation. Even though the performance achieved is better, their design requires 3.81×,  $4.14\times$  and  $4\times$  the LUTs, FFs and DSPs compared to our design. This is because their architecture utilizes multiple cores to perform expensive operations such as NTT, Keccak whereas we are using only one core for almost all the modules. Thus, the high latency in our design is compensated by low area utilization as well as higher achievable frequency. As a result, their design has a higher Area×Time trade-off metric



# (a) Complete design including packing/unpacking modules



# (b) Excluding packing/unpacking modules

Fig. 8. Area×Time (LUTs×s) trade-off: When comparing the results from (a), our design shows better Area×Time trade-off for both Artix-7 and Ultrascale+. When excluding packing / unpacking modules (b), the implementation by Zhao et. al. [14] has better trade-off for KeyGen, whereas our design is comparable for Sign and Verify operations. One interesting thing to note is that our result on Zynq Ultrascale+ is best across all platforms.

of 18.8%, 14.3% and 15.3% for KeyGen, Sign and Verify operations respectively.

4) Comparison With [15]: The design by Mert et. al. presents a unified architecture for Dilithium and Saber. The authors in [15] target a low area implementation. Hence, the Keccak core and the polynomial multiplier are shared between the two algorithms. But, there are many specialized modules required just for Dilithium, similarly for Saber. As a result, their implementation requires 31.7% and 36.2% more LUTs and FFs compared to our design but the BRAM utilization is comparatively low in their implementation. One interesting thing to note is our design can run at about twice the speed of their design. As a result, we are able to achieve an improvement of 17%, 14.9% and 24.5% in the execution time of KeyGen, Sign and Verify operations. Further, the Area×Time trade-off efficiency is lower by 57.9%, 54.8% and 73.3% compared to ours for the respective operations.

Efficiency metrics: In order to collate all the results, we compare our work with the existing implementations using two metrics - Area×Time (LUTs×s) trade-off (shown in Fig. 8) and Number of operations (KeyGen/Sign/Verify) that can be performed per second per LUT (shown in Fig. 9).

Both metrics are used to quantify the efficiency of an implementation. In the former case, a lower value denotes a better design, whereas for the latter, a higher value is considered to be good.


# C. Post-Layout ASIC Implementation

Table II shows the results for the ASIC implementation. Our design requires an area of about 0.227  $mm^2$  ( $\approx$  157k GEs) after place-and-route excluding on-chip


TABLE II

PERFORMANCE AND COMPARISON FOR DILITHIUM-V FOR BEST-CASE SCENARIO (SIGNATURE IS VALID AFTER THE FIRST ITERATION) ON FPGA AND ASIC. THE AREA FOR ASIC IS EXCLUDING ON-CHIP MEMORY AND IS REPORTED IN mm<sup>2</sup> AND GATE EQUIVALENTS (GES)

| Reference   | Freq.   Area       |       |        |        | KeyGen |     |                            | Sign      |       |                            | Verify    |       |                            |           |       |
|---|--------------------|-------|--------|--------|--------|-----|----------------------------|-----------|-------|----------------------------|-----------|-------|----------------------------|-----------|-------|
|   |                    | (MHz) | LUT    | FF     | RAM    | DSP | Cycles (×10 <sup>3</sup> ) | Time (µS) | OP/s  | Cycles (×10 <sup>3</sup> ) | Time (μS) | OP/s  | Cycles (×10 <sup>3</sup> ) | Time (μS) | OP/s  |
| FPGA Results (Including packing/unpacking modules)  |                    |       |        |        |        |     |                            |           |       |                            |           |       |                            |           |       |
| This Work   | Artix-7            | 163   | 13,975 | 6,845  | 35     | 4   | 63.2                       | 387       | 2580  | 113.9                      | 699       | 1430  | 67.9                       | 416       | 2401  |
| Beckwith et. al. [16]   | Artix-7            | 116   | 53,187 | 28,318 | 29     | 16  | 14.0                       | 121       | 8263  | 24.4                       | 210       | 4762  | 14.6                       | 126       | 7922  |
| Beckwith et. al. [16]   | Kintex-7           | 173   | 54,468 | 28,639 | 29     | 16  | 14.0                       | 81        | 12324 | 24.4                       | 141       | 7102  | 14.6                       | 85        | 11815 |
| This Work   | Zynq Ultrascale+   | 391   | 13,975 | 6,845  | 35     | 4   | 63.2                       | 161       | 6189  | 113.9                      | 291       | 3431  | 67.9                       | 173       | 5759  |
| Aikata et. al. [15]   | Zynq Ultrascale+   | 200   | 18,406 | 9,323  | 24     | 4   | 38.8                       | 194       | 5149  | 68.5                       | 342       | 2920  | 45.8                       | 229       | 4368  |
| Beckwith et. al. [16]   | Virtex Ultrascale+ | 256   | 53,907 | 28,435 | 29     | 16  | 14.0                       | 55        | 18238 | 24.4                       | 95        | 10509 | 14.7                       | 57        | 17483 |
| FPGA Results (Excluding packing/unpacking modules)  |                    |       |        |        |        |     |                            |           |       |                            |           |       |                            |           |       |
| This Work   Artix-7   168   11.744   5.661   35   4   61.3   365   2742   109.9   655   1527   62.1   3 |                    |       |        |        |        |     |                            |           |       | 369                        | 2707      |       |                            |           |       |
| Land et. al. [17]   | Artix-7            | 140   | 44,653 | 13,814 | 31     | 45  | 51.0                       | 364       | 2746  | 70.4                       | 503       | 1989  | 52.7                       | 377       | 2656  |
| Zhao et. al. [14]   | Artix-7            | 96.9  | 29,998 | 10,336 | 11     | 10  | 8.8                        | 90        | 11055 | 22.1                       | 228       | 4382  | 11.4                       | 117       | 8513  |
| ASIC Results  |                    |       |        |        |        |     |                            |           |       |                            |           |       |                            |           |       |
| This Work   | TSMC 65nm          | 1176  | 0.227  | $mm^2$ | 157    | kGE | 63.2                       | 53.7      | 18614 | 113.9                      | 96.9      | 10320 | 67.9                       | 57.7      | 17322 |
| Aikata et. al. [15]   | UMC 65nm           | 400   | 0.317  | $mm^2$ | 220    | kGE | 38.8                       | 97.1      | 10298 | 68.5                       | 171.3     | 5839  | 45.8                       | 114.5     | 8735  |



# (a) Complete design including packing/unpacking modules



# (b) Excluding packing/unpacking modules

Fig. 9. Operations/second/LUT: In case of Zynq Ultrascale+, we are able to achieve an improvement of about 58.78%, 54.72% and 73.84% for KeyGen, Sign and Verify operations over the best known state-of-the-art implementation [15]. Whereas, comparing our design on Artix-7 when including pack/unpack modules, we achieved an improvement of 19.4%, 13.33% and 15.43% respectively. While excluding packing/unpacking modules, our design has competitive performance for sign and verify. The improvement in ZUS+ is quite high for all the operations because our design is better in terms of both area as well as performance than the existing implementation.

memory. Because of the highly pipelined architecture, the design can run at 1.176 GHz. As a result, the Key-Gen/Sign/Verify takes only  $53.7\mu$ s/96.9 $\mu$ s/57.7 $\mu$ s. Compared to state-of-the-art implementation, we achieve a reduction of  $1.4\times$  in area and improve the runtime of KeyGen/Sign/Verify by  $1.81\times/1.77\times/1.98\times$ .

The physical layout of the implemented design after placeand-route is shown in Fig. 10. We have highlighted the regions for individual modules in Dilithium. One can see that majority of the area in the design is consumed by Keccak, Sampling, Reduction and NTT modules with Keccak being the largest. In our design, we are using 2 instantiations of




Fig. 10. Physical layout of the Dilithium-V Core after place-and-route.

reduction modules (marked as Reduction-1 and Reduction-2). The remainder of the space is utilized by the multiplexers connecting the various modules and the FSM based control logic.

#### V. HARDWARE EVALUATION AS AN ACCELERATOR

To demonstrate the effectiveness of the developed hardware accelerator, we evaluated our design on three test platforms: Artix-7 (XC7A75T-2) with Microblaze@100MHz processor, Zynq-7000 (XC7Z010-1) with ARM Cortex-A9@667MHz and Zynq Ultrascale+ (XCZU3EG-1) with ARM Cortex-A53@1200MHz. For software implementation, we used the reference implementation available in the NIST Round 3 package of Dilithium [31] and compiled it using Xilinx Vitis 2020.1 with default settings. It is important to quantify the real practical benefits of a hardware accelerator in a complete system as in many situations the full potential of an accelerator might not be achieved. Fig. 11 shows setup for the Zynq Ultrascale+ platform using the Ultra96 board.

Fig. 12 shows the block diagram of the accelerator connected as an AXI Peripheral applicable for both the Zynq Platforms. A very similar block design is used for the Microblaze setup as well. We created an AXI4-lite memory mapped register based peripheral and implemented support for control and data logic to connect with the designed

#### TABLE III

Performance as an Accelerator for Best-Case Scenario: Signature Is Valid in the First Iteration and in the Worst-Case Scenario: Rejection Loop Is Executed 17 Times Before a Valid Signature Is Generated. The Numbers Are CPU Clock Cycles ( $\times$  10<sup>3</sup>) Elapsed When the Operation Is Executed on Hardware Versus on Software

| FPGA      | Processor      | KeyGen |         |         | Sign: Best-case |         |         | Siç    | n: Worst- | case    | Verify |         |         |
|-----------|----------------|--------|---------|---------|-----------------|---------|---------|--------|-----------|---------|--------|---------|---------|
|           |                | HW     | SW      | Speedup | HW              | SW      | Speedup | HW     | SW        | Speedup | HW     | SW      | Speedup |
| XC7A75T-2 | Microblaze     | 48.2   | 12613.3 | 261.7   | 85.9            | 16210.8 | 188.7   | 796.7  | 84363.9   | 105.9   | 51.4   | 12857.7 | 250.1   |
| XC7Z010-1 | ARM Cortex-A9  | 337.5  | 5079.6  | 15.05   | 607.9           | 6907.6  | 11.36   | 5661.3 | 39156.1   | 6.92    | 362.2  | 5248.9  | 14.49   |
| XCZU3EG-1 | ARM Cortex-A53 | 254.1  | 2134.5  | 8.4     | 456.3           | 3747.8  | 8.21    | 4245.9 | 27240.7   | 6.42    | 271.7  | 2347.7  | 8.64    |



Fig. 11. Setup with Ultra96-v2 (XCZU3EG-1) as one of the hardware evaluation board.




Fig. 12. Dilithium as an accelerator on Xilinx Zynq. The same AXI peripheral IP was used for the Microblaze processor as well. Due to connectivity using AXI4-lite bus, the accelerator can easily be connected with other processors as well such as RISC-V.

Dilithium core. The AXI packet handler is responsible for receiving and sending AXI commands from CPU core and decoding them. Based on the received command, it sends the corresponding operation request to the state handler. It also communicates with the data handler for address and data read/write operations. Both the state and data handler act as a bridge between the AXI packet handler and the Dilithium accelerator. Since, the accelerator is designed to be configurable from outside, one can also use it to only accelerate individual operations like KeyGen, Sign or Verify.

In Table III, we report results for the hardware accelerator. For comparison, we chose one best-case scenario where a valid signature is generated after the first iteration itself and a worst-case scenario where the valid signature is generated after the rejection loop is executed for 17 times. It is clear from the figure that the speedup obtained is inversely proportional to the performance of the associated CPU. In case of a modern high performance CPUs like ARM cortex A53 and A9 we obtain speedups of about 6.42 to 15.05×. Whereas, for Microblaze the speedup is significantly higher at 105-261×.

#### VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

By utilizing multiple optimization strategies such as resource and control logic sharing, pre-computed LUTs, fusion of modules etc. we achieved a reduction of 24% in LUTs and FFs in area compared to the best known implementation. As a result, our design requires only 13.9k LUTs, 6.8k FFs, 4 DSPs and 35 BRAMs. To the best of our knowledge, this work presents the smallest hardware accelerator for CRYSTALS-Dilthium which can now be fit into the smallest Zynq FPGA. We also present detailed comparison with existing implementations and show that our design achieves more than 35% efficiency for Area×Time product on Zynq UltraScale+ for all the operations.

We also implemented our design on ASIC and report numbers for major components of Dilithium as well as the overall design. Compared to the state-of-the-art implementation, our design requires about 157 kGE with  $0.227 \ mm^2$  area, achieving a reduction of about  $1.4\times$ . In terms of performance, the implemented design can run at  $1.176 \ \text{GHz}$  achieving an improvement of about  $1.7\times$ .

Further, this work presents the first hardware evaluation for complete Dilithium-V as an accelerator on three different platforms and demonstrate that achieved speedup is significantly high, about  $105\text{-}261\times$  for Microblaze and about  $6.42\text{-}15.05\times$  for ARM Cortex compared to the software implementations on these platforms.

In the future, we plan to integrate low-cost side-channel countermeasures in the design.

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