


Design and Implementation of a Hardware Accelerator IP for Post-Quantum Cryptography ML-DSA Compatible with the AXI-4 Interface



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01


Introduction

►Background

- ✓ Shor's algorithm, combined with a powerful quantum computer, will possibly break RSA and ECC.
- ✓ Initiated by NIST in 2016, the post-quantum cryptography standardization process, , it finalized the selection of **ML-DSA** as one of the encryption methods.
- ✓ Previously known as CRYSTAL-DILITHIUM

►ML-DSA

- ✓ Defines method for generating digital signatures
- ✓ Based on the worst-case hardness of module lattice problems, it has potential resistance against both quantum and classical attacks.
- ✓ Advantages include fast arithmetic operations, efficient encryption, and compact signatures.
- ✓ Uses uniformly sampled high-entropy Gaussian-distributed secrets to generate random keys.
- ✓ The core security challenges of ML-DSA include MLWE problem and tMSIS problem



► Fiat-Shamir with Aborts

1. Commitment:

- The signer generates a random vector $y \in \mathbb{R}_q^\ell$
- The commitment value is $w = Ay$
- w is rounded to obtain w_1

2. Challenge:

- The challenge c is generated by hashing w_1 and the message representative μ

3. Response:

- The response $z = y + S_1 \cdot c$ (where S_1 is part of the private key)
- Use rejection sampling to check whether z meets specific coefficient bounds

4. Hint Calculation:

- To enable the verifier to reconstruct w_1 from z and the compressed public value t_1
- hint $h \in \mathbb{R}_q^k$

5. Signature Composition:

- The final signature consists of three parts: the rounded commitment w_1 , the response z , and the hint h

6. Second Stage of Rejection Sampling:

- To ensure the correctness of the signature, a second stage of rejection sampling must be performed

►MLWE (module learning with errors)

Setup:

1. Modulus $q=7$.
2. Matrix A is of size 2×2 , with elements selected randomly.
3. Secret vectors s_1 and s_2 are both of size 2×1 .
4. Values for A, s_1, s_2 :

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 4 \\ 1 & 5 \end{bmatrix}, \quad s_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ 3 \end{bmatrix}, \quad s_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix}$$

Calculation Steps:

1. Calculate As_1 :

$$As_1 = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 4 \\ 1 & 5 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ 3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 3 \cdot 2 + 4 \cdot 3 \\ 1 \cdot 2 + 5 \cdot 3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 6 + 12 \\ 2 + 15 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 18 \\ 17 \end{bmatrix}$$

2. Add the secret vector s_2 to the result and take modulus q :

$$t = As_1 + s_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 18 \\ 17 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 19 \\ 21 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$t = \begin{bmatrix} 19 \mod 7 \\ 21 \mod 7 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 5 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

3. The public data is the matrix A and the result vector t :

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 4 \\ 1 & 5 \end{bmatrix}, \quad t = \begin{bmatrix} 5 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

►MSIS (module shortest integer solution)

Setup:

1. Modulus $q = 7$
2. Matrix A is of size 3×2 , with elements selected randomly.
3. Values for A :

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 4 \\ 1 & 5 \\ 6 & 2 \end{bmatrix}$$

Goal:

Find vectors z and u such that $Az + u = 0 \pmod{q}$.

Attempt to Solve:

1. Assume a vector z, u :

$$z = \begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ -1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad u = \begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ 3 \\ -5 \end{bmatrix}$$

2. Calculate $Az + u$ and take modulus q :

$$Az = \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 4 \\ 1 & 5 \\ 6 & 2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ -1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 3 \cdot 2 + 4 \cdot (-1) \\ 1 \cdot 2 + 5 \cdot (-1) \\ 6 \cdot 2 + 2 \cdot (-1) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 6 - 4 \\ 2 - 5 \\ 12 - 2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ -3 \\ 10 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$Az + u = \begin{bmatrix} 2 \\ -3 \\ 10 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -1 \\ 3 \\ -5 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 2 + (-1) \\ -3 + 3 \\ 10 + (-5) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 5 \end{bmatrix}$$


$$Az + u \pmod{7} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \pmod{7} \\ 0 \pmod{7} \\ 5 \pmod{7} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 5 \end{bmatrix}$$

02


Algorithms

► Algorithm


1. Key generation (KeyGen)



2. Signature generation (Sign)



3. Signature verification (Verify)



Symbols

- ξ : random seed
- pk : public key
- sk : secret key
- M' : hash message
- rnd : random number
- σ : signature

► Key Generation

Algorithm 6 ML-DSA.KeyGen_internal(ξ)

Generates a public-private key pair from a seed.

Input: Seed $\xi \in \mathbb{B}^{32}$

Output: Public key $pk \in \mathbb{B}^{32+32k(\text{bitlen}(q-1)-d)}$

and private key $sk \in \mathbb{B}^{32+32+64+32 \cdot ((\ell+k) \cdot \text{bitlen}(2\eta)+dk)}$

- 1: $(\rho, \rho', K) \in \mathbb{B}^{32} \times \mathbb{B}^{64} \times \mathbb{B}^{32} \leftarrow H(\xi || \text{IntegerToBytes}(k, 1) || \text{IntegerToBytes}(\ell, 1), 128)$
- 2:
- 3: $\hat{\mathbf{A}} \leftarrow \text{ExpandA}(\rho)$ ▷ expand seed
- 4: $(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_2) \leftarrow \text{ExpandS}(\rho')$ ▷ \mathbf{A} is generated and stored in NTT representation as $\hat{\mathbf{A}}$
- 5: $\mathbf{t} \leftarrow \mathbf{NTT}^{-1}(\hat{\mathbf{A}} \circ \mathbf{NTT}(\mathbf{s}_1)) + \mathbf{s}_2$ ▷ compute $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{As}_1 + \mathbf{s}_2$
- 6: $(\mathbf{t}_1, \mathbf{t}_0) \leftarrow \text{Power2Round}(\mathbf{t})$ ▷ compress \mathbf{t} into $\mathbf{t}_1, \mathbf{t}_0$
- 7: ▷ Power2Round is applied componentwise (see explanatory text in Section 7)
- 8: $pk \leftarrow \text{pkEncode}(\rho, \mathbf{t}_1)$
- 9: $tr \leftarrow H(pk, 64)$
- 10: $sk \leftarrow \text{skEncode}(\rho, K, tr, \mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_2, \mathbf{t}_0)$ ▷ K and tr are for use in signing
- 11: **return** (pk, sk)

```

41  def KeyGen(xi):
42      H_xi = SHAKE_256(xi, 1024)
43      print(H_xi)
44      p = H_xi[:32]
45      p_prime = H_xi[32:96]
46      K = H_xi[96:128]
47      A_hat = ExpandA(p)
48      s1, s2 = ExpandS(p_prime)
49      s1Hat = [NTT(s) for s in s1]
50      s1Hat = np.array(s1Hat)
51      A_NTT_s1 = NTT_dot(A_hat, s1Hat)
52      aHat_mul_s1Hat = [NTT_inv(s) for s in A_NTT_s1]
53      t = []
54      for i in range(ML_DSA["k"]):
55          d = []
56          for k in range(256):
57              sum = aHat_mul_s1Hat[i][k] + s2[i][k]
58              d.append(sum)
59          t.append(d)
60      t1 = []
61      t0 = []
62      for ti in range(ML_DSA["k"]):
63          ta1 = []
64          ta0 = []
65          for tp in range(256):
66              t1_temp, t0_temp = Power2Round(t[ti][tp])
67              ta1.append(t1_temp)
68              ta0.append(t0_temp)
69          t1.append(ta1)
70          t0.append(ta0)
71      pk = pk_encode(p, t1)
72      tr = SHAKE_256(pk, 512)
73      sk = sk_encode(p, K, tr, s1, s2, t0)
74      return pk, sk

```

► Key Generation

```
seed: 6CAE2E9C2CF64D2686C31C2118E0F24A47DD46DB85590910AAC9DF4C1B854E44
rho: C8BEADEDC6DBA5BF3BEC52C67CEAFB4F3EBF84190B2CFA6BCA132883129A28B
rhoPrime: 11779B16A7054953860C14796F63018C9EFD3957CC53A12AF727A5AFC64507445D9EA5E19B6403B3DD3ABAD9B1DAD1146E9C64410E372E7A6D9973F0D04D9632
k: B149C045A55EADA0C519069A8EE0602FBEDA8D2EDFEA09CAE01D542D47DCBA1E
aHat: [[[4518441, 4610216, 2805006, 6522567, 958931, 2266298, 7298857, 6160680, 4376220, 5886423, 2456656, 7246256, 4825911, 4337879, 2286865, 4
[1518172, 2060152, 4749985, 6513620, 2245042, 7549147, 2532897, 6922184, 1547706, 7925910, 4641118, 6372818, 5442868, 3048857, 7986176, 21420, 5
[5580016, 7782159, 4916820, 3492846, 1528232, 8008932, 7778144, 980016, 3083229, 8050068, 4533047, 3121986, 1216278, 1788935, 5913428, 2162915,
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```

► Key Generation

```
s1: [[-2, -1, 1, 2, -2, -1, 2, 2, -1, 1, 1, 0, -2, 2, 0, 2, -2, 0, 2, 2, -1, 2, -1, 2, 0, -2, -2, 0, 0, -2, 2, -2, 2, -2, 1, 1  
[1, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 1, 1, 2, 0, -1, -1, 0, 0, -1, 1, 1, 0, 2, -1, -1, 0, 0, 2, 1, -2, 2, -2, -1, 1, -2, -1, 1, -1, 2,  
[0, -1, -2, 0, 2, -1, 1, -1, -2, -1, 1, -2, 2, 2, 0, 2, -1, -1, 1, -2, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 2, -2, 2, 2, -1, 2, 2, 0, 2, 0, -1, 1  
[0, -2, 2, 2, 2, -2, 2, 0, 1, 1, -2, 2, 2, -1, -2, 1, 1, -2, -2, 0, -2, -1, 1, -2, 1, -1, 2, -1, 0, -2, -2, 2,  
  
s2: [[1, 1, -1, 0, 1, -1, 2, -2, 1, 0, 0, 1, -2, -1, 2, -1, 2, 1, 1, 0, 2, 1, -1, -1, 0, 2, -2, 0, 2, 2, 2, -2, -2, -1, -2  
[2, 0, 1, 1, 2, -1, 0, 0, -1, 1, -1, 0, -2, 0, -1, 2, 2, 1, 0, -2, 2, -1, -1, 1, 2, -2, 1, -2, 1, 0, 2, -2, -2, 0, -2, 1, -  
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aHat * s1Hat: [[7173756, 4463163, 7813712, 8016531, 3997849, 5162484, 7557753, 5209556, 2455766, 1538558, 5954781, 7567856, 82  
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[7860225, 8258854, 8004522, 1814955, 6846388, 7533577, 2341537, 5866449, 3366727, 6720900, 7291455, 4012098, 6941796, 2314989,  
  
NTTInverse(aHat * s1Hat): [[4089385, 3243627, 2997576, 1860759, 7743501, 7853441, 1170077, 1195218, 7888106, 665458, 5751129,  
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[2744379, 6885345, 1807923, 6069656, 7723085, 1276462, 7935274, 1842025, 7671994, 1471837, 2361166, 5712830, 6416006, 4256155,
```

► Key Generation

```
t: [[4089386, 3243628, 2997575, 1860759, 7743502, 7853440, 1170079, 1195216, 7888107, 665458, 5751129, 5154175, 7545299, 4808039, 4175100, 7293424697, 3851902, 7946664, 7319125, 3293288, 4224956, 4060028, 3286208, 60158, 2504817, 5758014, 5804699, 749984, 7462904, 5351145, 2632037, [1285947, 630928, 2012120, 7066226, 3129345, 6394751, 6593384, 4387909, 887463, 812690, 603021, 4377175, 4103484, 1156380, 5369497, 8071446, 2744380, 6885347, 1807924, 6069657, 7723086, 1276461, 7935272, 1842025, 7671996, 1471838, 2361165, 5712832, 6416005, 4256156, 2086655, 604191], [1578, -404, -697, 1175, 2062, -2688, -1377, -816, -789, 1906, 345, 1407, 467, -665, -2820, 3878, -2013, -413, -675, -103, -1522, -3652, [441, 1662, 424, 3669, 104, -2116, -3204, 1216, 2814, -1935, -962, -3429, -3680, -8, 1769, 2405, 2469, -3357, 330, 1151, 2380, -3509, 3340, -197, 144, -3112, -3470, 1, -3201, -1176, -3003, 2727, 1682, -3187, 2647, -708, 1308, 3737, 2326, 4077, -2508, -3615, 3899, 1482, 3316, -1004, [60, 4067, -2508, -615, -1970, -1491, -2776, -1175, -3908, -2722, 1869, 3008, 1669, -3684, -2305, -3718, 2776, 1940, -1385, -1043, -1351, 2956], [499, 396, 366, 227, 945, 959, 143, 146, 963, 81, 702, 629, 921, 587, 510, 885, 898, 534, 598, 982, 588, 490, 744, 917, 674, 991, 336, 729, [418, 470, 970, 893, 402, 516, 496, 401, 7, 306, 703, 709, 92, 911, 653, 321, 348, 75, 64, 856, 862, 617, 913, 204, 889, 0, 782, 232, 931, 178, [157, 77, 246, 863, 382, 781, 805, 536, 108, 99, 74, 534, 501, 141, 655, 985, 278, 516, 644, 224, 738, 406, 824, 666, 267, 674, 162, 664, 205, [335, 840, 221, 741, 943, 156, 969, 225, 937, 180, 288, 697, 783, 520, 255, 738, 958, 592, 923, 83, 807, 741, 144, 553, 864, 236, 361, 328, 517], [75A821E4FF2B52A3AB3DDD0C77C3A9F96FCC9BE360C2B75C97D7F9DEC97D1BDDE028D36C4FE18093AF6C5794AD19F9FA090C19A76F05A7F3B930B11792A13A7A], [C8BEADEDC6DBA5BF3BECA52C67CEAFB4F3EBF84190B2CFA6BCA132883129A28BF331E6D638B1FFF8824C347E16B9D992FE95FDD825B68A5F54CAA876EE5A27E0FD5B5A89], [C8BEADEDC6DBA5BF3BECA52C67CEAFB4F3EBF84190B2CFA6BCA132883129A28BB149C045A55EADA0C519069A8EE0602FBEDA8D2EDFEA09CAE01D542D47DCBA1E75A821E4F1]]
```

► Signing

Algorithm 7 ML-DSA.Sign_internal(sk, M', rnd)

Deterministic algorithm to generate a signature for a formatted message M' .

Input: Private key $sk \in \mathbb{B}^{32+32+64+32 \cdot ((\ell+k) \cdot \text{bitlen}(2\eta)+dk)}$, formatted message $M' \in \{0,1\}^*$, and per message randomness or dummy variable $rnd \in \mathbb{B}^{32}$.

Output: Signature $\sigma \in \mathbb{B}^{\lambda/4+\ell \cdot 32 \cdot (1+\text{bitlen}(\gamma_1-1))+\omega+k}$.

```

1:  $(\rho, K, tr, s_1, s_2, t_0) \leftarrow sk\text{Decode}(sk)$ 
2:  $\hat{s}_1 \leftarrow NTT(s_1)$ 
3:  $\hat{s}_2 \leftarrow NTT(s_2)$ 
4:  $\hat{t}_0 \leftarrow NTT(t_0)$ 
5:  $\hat{A} \leftarrow \text{ExpandA}(\rho)$   $\triangleright A$  is generated and stored in NTT representation as  $\hat{A}$ 
6:  $\mu \leftarrow H(\text{BytesToBits}(tr) || M', 64)$   $\triangleright$  message representative that may optionally be
   computed in a different cryptographic module
7:  $\rho'' \leftarrow H(K || rnd || \mu, 64)$   $\triangleright$  compute private random seed
8:  $\kappa \leftarrow 0$   $\triangleright$  initialize counter  $\kappa$ 
9:  $(z, h) \leftarrow \perp$ 
10: while  $(z, h) = \perp$  do  $\triangleright$  rejection sampling loop
11:    $y \in R_q^\ell \leftarrow \text{ExpandMask}(\rho'', \kappa)$ 
12:    $w \leftarrow NTT^{-1}(\hat{A} \circ NTT(y))$ 
13:    $w_1 \leftarrow \text{HighBits}(w)$   $\triangleright$  signer's commitment
14:    $\triangleright$  HighBits is applied componentwise (see explanatory text in Section 7.4)
15:    $\tilde{c} \leftarrow H(\mu || w_1\text{Encode}(w_1), \lambda/4)$   $\triangleright$  commitment hash
16:    $c \in R_q \leftarrow \text{SampleInBall}(\tilde{c})$   $\triangleright$  verifier's challenge
17:    $\hat{c} \leftarrow NTT(c)$ 
```

```

74  # 算法 2 ML-DSA.Sign(sk,M)
75  def Sign(sk,M,rnd):
76      (p,K,tr,s1,s2,t0) = sk_decode(sk)
77      s1_hat = [NTT(si) for si in s1]
78      s2_hat = [NTT(si) for si in s2]
79      t0_hat = [NTT(ti) for ti in t0]
80      A_hat = ExpandA(p)
81      u = tr + M
82      u = SHAKE_256(u,512)
83      p_prime = K + rnd + u
84      p_prime = SHAKE_256(p_prime,512)
85      ka = 0
86      z = None
87      h = None
88      while z == None and h == None:
89          y = ExpandMask(p_prime,ka)
90          y_hat = [NTT(yi) for yi in y]
91          w = NTT_dot(A_hat,y_hat)
92          w = [NTT_inv(wi) for wi in w]
93          w1 = [HighBits(w1i) for w1i in w]
94          w1 = w1Encode(w1)
95          c_tilde = u + w1
96          c_tilde = SHAKE_256(c_tilde,2*ML_DSA["lamda"])
97          c = SampleInBall(c_tilde)
98          print(c)
99          c_hat = NTT(c)
```

► Signing

► Signing

```
s1Hat: [[3780472, 8001483, 7484040, 4059895, 7647343, 3434819, 902292, 6727194, 2342222, 4671283, 2590107, 8356189, 3994258, 2362867, 101548  
[7490143, 2416677, 6018412, 4886851, 4661549, 951995, 1217523, 200620, 4047296, 5752223, 5204483, 629955, 7868040, 5657793, 2519186, 7379324  
[674988, 7034336, 4666570, 6284494, 4350353, 7495817, 2574693, 7634530, 6913604, 560773, 7663665, 2035513, 3454030, 33489, 5804374, 2874174,  
[4406566, 5954670, 7130704, 1917294, 3030143, 7617234, 1177455, 3376554, 5350376, 3264614, 7417136, 2215991, 224662, 7250601, 4335013, 67614  
  
s2Hat: [[3629686, 4323385, 1136763, 1892621, 396580, 4015673, 7506969, 413433, 3429836, 5013117, 5164433, 3162170, 3109721, 7122983, 2862134  
[1691622, 622196, 3664387, 1888517, 6954472, 1664504, 4698479, 6040992, 3462971, 8143638, 1775563, 4512773, 4656917, 1689760, 1077062, 87438  
[1613043, 4987276, 7287169, 6380375, 224343, 5098268, 1770771, 294873, 858281, 2279584, 6969794, 4732503, 6092736, 370529, 5329783, 1832892,  
[1302014, 5489441, 37061, 4413680, 1025518, 6704923, 6704959, 5549932, 2780863, 1049739, 364807, 716450, 5247856, 63141, 3739196, 7655028, 4  
  
t0Hat: [[610973, 5626726, 3451877, 7487350, 6292492, 6530640, 1903374, 7333475, 6327440, 7331451, 1406104, 1022202, 8154710, 6372860, 169334  
[6938612, 1405233, 2812565, 2424669, 85312, 2801824, 4388851, 4016848, 956731, 3276110, 1543239, 2157804, 7522223, 3984456, 673385, 3865973,  
[317716, 7952704, 5819693, 7775640, 6498344, 692925, 296983, 3947939, 2170031, 2731242, 991907, 4337667, 7009311, 5014777, 447037, 586519, 4  
[1570404, 3374127, 6203829, 3403877, 8157306, 6508111, 4782724, 2219282, 4184276, 4852824, 3605792, 1342862, 1287197, 8372404, 5693597, 3661  
  
rhoPrime: A9A9F85C9C20C2B207E25FDC800A2E59F41FB874B7A5DB2CA80C3CD2F6FD1DD6D8F945C176A75CCDEE86D21C830C4164C2386D38968EC0F58ECAA2E6C5193BC7
```

► Signing

► Signing

```

18:   ⟨⟨cs1⟩⟩ ← NTT-1( $\hat{c} \circ \hat{s}_1$ )
19:   ⟨⟨cs2⟩⟩ ← NTT-1( $\hat{c} \circ \hat{s}_2$ )
20:   z ← y + ⟨⟨cs1⟩⟩
21:   r0 ← LowBits(w - ⟨⟨cs2⟩⟩)
22:       ▷ LowBits is applied componentwise (see explanatory text in Section 7.4)
23:   if ||z||∞ ≥ γ1 - β or ||r0||∞ ≥ γ2 - β then (z, h) ← ⊥
24:   else
25:     ⟨⟨ct0⟩⟩ ← NTT-1( $\hat{c} \circ \hat{t}_0$ )
26:     h ← MakeHint(-⟨⟨ct0⟩⟩, w - ⟨⟨cs2⟩⟩ + ⟨⟨ct0⟩⟩)
27:         ▷ MakeHint is applied componentwise (see explanatory text in Section 7.4)
28:     if ||⟨⟨ct0⟩⟩||∞ ≥ γ2 or the number of 1's in h is greater than ω, then (z, h) ← ⊥
29:     end if
30:   end if
31:   κ ← κ + ℓ
32: end while
33: σ ← sigEncode( $\tilde{c}$ , z mod±q, h)
34: return σ

```

▷ increment counter

```

100      cs1 = NTT_dot_l(s1_hat, c_hat)
101      cs1 = [NTT_inv(csi) for csi in cs1]
102      cs2 = NTT_dot_k(s2_hat, c_hat)
103      cs2 = [NTT_inv(csi) for csi in cs2]
104      z = array_plus_l(y, cs1)
105      temp = array_minus_k(w, cs2)
106      r0 = [LowBits(wli) for wli in temp]
107      if infinity_norm(z) >= ML_DSA["gamma_1"] - ML_DSA["beta"] or
108      infinity_norm(r0) >= ML_DSA["gamma_2"] - ML_DSA["beta"]:
109        z = None
110        h = None
111      else:
112        ct0 = NTT_dot_k(t0_hat, c_hat)
113        ct0 = [NTT_inv(cti) for cti in ct0]
114        zero_array = [[0]*256] * ML_DSA["k"]
115        w_minus_cs2 = array_minus_k(w, cs2)
116        w_minus_cs2_pluse_ct0 = array_plus_k(w_minus_cs2, ct0)
117        minus_ct0 = array_minus_k(zero_array, ct0)
118        h, true_num = MakeHint(minus_ct0, w_minus_cs2_pluse_ct0)
119        if infinity_norm(c_tilde) >= ML_DSA["gamma_2"] or
120        true_num > ML_DSA["omega"]:
121          z = None
122          h = None
123        ka = ka + ML_DSA["l"]
124        z_mod = []
125        for i in range(ML_DSA["l"]):
126          z_temp = []
127          for j in range(256):
128            z_temp.append(mod_pm(z[i][j]))
129          z_mod.append(z_temp)
130        Sigma = sigEncode(c_tilde, z_mod, h)
131        return Sigma

```

► Signing

```
cHat: [3919627, 1297980, 1398134, 6081972, 7171056, 414117, 5281780, 4348975, 7918931, 7431142, 1215943, 8115251, 2501891, 2979933, 1056051, 4629893, 4230848, 5517032, 50  
cs1: [[2, 8380399, 8380416, 8380402, 8380407, 0, 1, 8380415, 6, 8380415, 9, 8380408, 0, 24, 7, 4, 5, 2, 8380406, 8380412, 6, 8, 3, 8380414, 8, 8380408, 8380414, 13, 83804  
[8380407, 12, 8380404, 0, 8380416, 8380413, 1, 8380403, 20, 8380416, 9, 1, 4, 8380414, 20, 8, 8380406, 13, 8380413, 8, 8380402, 8380410, 3, 8380414, 8380403, 5, 8380410,  
[8, 8380413, 8380415, 3, 2, 2, 8380413, 8380403, 19, 8380400, 1, 10, 8380403, 8380410, 9, 6, 7, 8380408, 4, 27, 8380399, 5, 1, 8380406, 21, 8380410, 8380406, 9, 9, 838040  
[8380411, 18, 8380409, 8380408, 8380405, 8380410, 8380402, 8380406, 3, 8380408, 8380407, 0, 8380410, 3, 22, 8380407, 8, 10, 2, 4, 5, 9, 6, 13, 16, 0, 2, 10, 8380  
cs2: [[7, 13, 8380415, 8380414, 8380406, 8380415, 5, 8380415, 8380415, 18, 8380405, 8380409, 8380415, 8380392, 5, 0, 2, 8380410, 8380407, 8, 4, 1, 11, 12, 8380406, 10, 83  
[4, 0, 8380413, 1, 7, 1, 8380414, 1, 8380413, 8380404, 8380414, 3, 8380412, 1, 0, 8380407, 8, 2, 6, 4, 4, 8380407, 8380410, 8380411, 9, 6, 11, 0, 8380415, 8380405, 838040  
[8380401, 8380402, 8380411, 4, 4, 8380413, 5, 9, 0, 2, 8380413, 8380412, 8380415, 9, 3, 8380415, 8380394, 7, 3, 8380413, 8380406, 8380416, 6, 8380409, 8380414, 9, 13, 12,  
[8380416, 8380411, 8380408, 8, 10, 9, 8380413, 8380407, 8380406, 8380411, 0, 26, 9, 5, 8380414, 0, 11, 1, 8380406, 3, 8380406, 8380411, 8380413, 8380402, 8380415, 8380415  
z: [[8326403, 57133, 7318, 8379181, 8259040, 8372149, 75888, 8255636, 12226, 8283522, 110470, 8355778, 87493, 8378437, 23047, 73282, 103668, 8346364, 8340345, 11560, 1320  
[8351159, 56199, 8287451, 8375034, 29592, 10076, 8325295, 90630, 8289292, 8315599, 2379, 8288306, 22366, 55464, 61878, 104863, 8376710, 8348325, 8286412, 98250, 8347365,  
[8366734, 89923, 8279227, 8341526, 8375978, 8354711, 23839, 8283379, 13781, 25609, 127026, 116155, 89958, 8303465, 8252686, 72862, 8355626, 8278677, 120933, 8375869, 9739  
[122405, 8265866, 126088, 8364806, 60718, 8294431, 8287601, 8283814, 8290083, 39525, 9450, 48309, 8265501, 32784, 59971, 8291439, 124890, 35081, 8300057, 8307398, 24615,  
||z||: 130985, ||z|| check passed  
r0: [[16336, -43434, 81462, -22910, 8316, 11209, 42434, -4837, -27144, -82132, -3552, 7413, 4201, -69199, -23623, -591, 50423, 27202, -43436, -94230, 1484, -49886, -81705  
[11634, -88991, -38772, -58122, -58158, 71954, 6830, -89244, -49827, 7579, 53143, -7162, -79615, -11221, -6990, 51430, -10141, -33475, -22162, 60211, 49437, -7706, -15665  
[-10105, 77558, 52235, -41153, 82722, 22884, 2070, 67829, 91901, -28260, -88267, 22357, 67568, 4891, 16002, 61750, -60922, 8887, -57482, 50502, -44950, 61868, 67963, -880  
[27588, 68572, -9532, -125, 7794, 71219, -29811, -78270, -82130, 83340, 79573, -39653, -2270, 458, -40824, 59164, 4786, 4943, 22167, 77284, 21272, 9424, 75396, -65313, 26  
||r0||: 95002, ||r0|| check passed  
cHat * t0Hat: [[6685568, 3625903, 5012222, 7942920, 1902157, 4674810, 4210018, 6254152, 5621555, 4432127, 3161400, 2991916, 3326774, 463020, 6499212, 7545109, 1598396, 89  
[4777632, 90958, 8065217, 584878, 6688472, 5835341, 8057752, 7925126, 4307379, 1526365, 6347656, 5095628, 5273048, 3594180, 237683, 4235200, 2183933, 4287717, 2230703, 57  
[6626149, 6184842, 4559639, 3664809, 1188987, 6544145, 2698182, 8118771, 4144600, 140242, 1139078, 2045111, 6709581, 8048885, 8220443, 5311540, 2355211, 658576, 853096, 3  
[6774059, 2102179, 2377584, 6403672, 5836339, 2437038, 3875612, 1383305, 5749753, 439798, 4497464, 2573238, 8325184, 5985321, 5879206, 7991253, 3954615, 4532081, 7378153,
```

► Signing

► Verification

Algorithm 8 ML-DSA.Verify_internal(pk, M', σ)

Internal function to verify a signature σ for a formatted message M' .

Input: Public key $pk \in \mathbb{B}^{32+32k(\text{bitlen}(q)-1)-d}$ and message $M' \in \{0, 1\}^*$

Input: Signature $\sigma \in \mathbb{B}^{\lambda/4+\ell \cdot 32 \cdot (1+\text{bitlen}(\gamma_1-1))+\omega+k}$.

Output: Boolean

- 1: $(\rho, t_1) \leftarrow \text{pkDecode}(pk)$
- 2: $(\tilde{c}, z, h) \leftarrow \text{sigDecode}(\sigma)$ ▷ signer's commitment hash \tilde{c} , hint was z
- 3: **if** $h = \perp$ **then return false**
- 4: **end if**
- 5: $\hat{A} \leftarrow \text{ExpandA}(\rho)$ ▷ A is generated and stored in NTT
- 6: $tr \leftarrow H(pk, 64)$
- 7: $\mu \leftarrow (H(\text{BytesToBits}(tr) || M', 64))$ ▷ message representative computed in a different cryptographic module
- 8: $c \in R_q \leftarrow \text{SampleInBall}(\tilde{c})$ ▷ compute verification value c
- 9: $w'_\text{Approx} \leftarrow \text{NTT}^{-1}(\hat{A} \circ \text{NTT}(z) - \text{NTT}(c) \circ \text{NTT}(t_1 \cdot 2^d))$ ▷ w'_Approx is the difference between the verifier's A and the signer's \tilde{c}
- 10: $w'_1 \leftarrow \text{UseHint}(h, w'_\text{Approx})$ ▷ reconstruction of w'_1 from w'_Approx using the hint h
- 11: ▷ UseHint is applied componentwise (see explanation in the paper)
- 12: $\tilde{c}' \leftarrow H(\mu || w1Encode(w'_1), \lambda/4)$ ▷ hash of the reconstructed commitment w'_1
- 13: **return** $[[\|z\|_\infty < \gamma_1 - \beta]]$ **and** $[[\tilde{c} = \tilde{c}']]$

```

def Ver(pk,M,signature):
    rho,t1 = pk_decode(pk)
    c_tilde,z,h = sigDecode(signature)
    if h == None:
        return False
    A_hat = ExpandA(rho)
    tr = SHAKE_256(pk,512)
    mu = SHAKE_256(tr + M,512)
    c = SampleInBall(c_tilde)
    z_hat = [NTT(z_i) for z_i in z]
    Ah_d_zh = NTT_dot(A_hat,z_hat)
    c_hat = NTT(c)
    t1_hat = [NTT(t_i) for t_i in t1]
    for i in range(ML_DSA["k"]):
        for j in range(256):
            t1_hat[i][j] = (t1_hat[i][j] * (2**ML_DSA["d"])) % ML_DSA["q"]
    ch_d_t12d = NTT_dot_k(t1_hat,c_hat)
    w_prime_approx = array_minus_k(Ah_d_zh,ch_d_t12d)
    w_prime_approx = [NTT_inv(wi) for wi in w_prime_approx]
    w1_prime = []
    for i in range(ML_DSA["k"]):
        w1_prime_temp = []
        for j in range(256):
            w1_prime_temp.append(UseHint(h[i][j],w_prime_approx[i][j]))
        w1_prime.append(w1_prime_temp)
    w1En = w1Encode(w1_prime)
    c_prime_tilde = SHAKE_256(mu + w1En,2 * ML_DSA["lamda"])
    return ((infinity_norm(z) < (ML_DSA["gamma_1"] - ML_DSA["beta"])) and (c_prime_tilde == c_tilde))

```

► Verification

► Verification


► Verification

```
NTT(t1) * 2^d: [[2550590, 4021968, 1701631, 2390889, 5080211, 5209254, 230169, 959452, 5370255, 3609825, 380156, 5015114, 5671058, 7356781, 1667068, [315809, 5535877, 6043695, 91027, 8216044, 166520, 3359195, 5288668, 8281063, 1626068, 3577019, 8004444, 8155840, 533931, 1307082, 4312850, 7772849, [3042737, 1547123, 2215535, 6494293, 5770699, 2293067, 4711823, 5372853, 3390309, 6703485, 7425705, 8302339, 7620806, 6044215, 2523830, 7719061, 5198 [6689695, 7017377, 6017536, 1303367, 6112725, 5379817, 3865937, 2252606, 5625492, 44107, 2058460, 821741, 1433351, 6556245, 1395814, 6742118, 7891331 NTT(c): [6740534, 4045296, 2602173, 4057786, 3828614, 2205945, 8167143, 6593076, 3152783, 8270939, 5589630, 286975, 2981496, 6078868, 5695322, 482104 NTT(c) * (NTT(t1) * 2^d): [[5324147, 7803716, 2455124, 465449, 6859752, 7840043, 3419480, 72744, 7270387, 7283536, 1228177, 1426655, 7968572, 3683039 [3199419, 1831771, 7504950, 1206947, 6645593, 3523456, 4514483, 4681694, 1624444, 6525827, 4323945, 3017200, 3130274, 2468093, 3873057, 4396976, 6138 [1123697, 8024472, 6427826, 3687539, 7960317, 1884200, 3224802, 7766844, 5152293, 5746694, 3481117, 2801008, 5394943, 7829698, 328196, 6482414, 57723 [724829, 3485727, 3008317, 3761766, 3053529, 4855029, 3478807, 3537413, 1363367, 6754463, 2162978, 2569512, 3667282, 8314185, 5278827, 3359864, 29003 wPrimeApprox: [[7922246, 5265226, 5506507, 4646550, 2602037, 8056124, 4540058, 3683346, 947069, 5492323, 5072451, 2036902, 3275644, 360403, 1342966, [4250175, 1134865, 2368947, 127674, 6593998, 5500651, 3684706, 2949331, 3638645, 5847886, 6124713, 2457891, 7691497, 4701413, 5167273, 4131020, 68017 [5225532, 3184459, 3593619, 145438, 169419, 1461937, 7782223, 5828487, 8182468, 623885, 3445292, 1969565, 3946194, 4361076, 3330933, 8225361, 6162009 [2027829, 2889169, 1412751, 1398701, 4746044, 3334015, 7728514, 1145068, 2677181, 5837222, 1559867, 4891268, 1196552, 1846487, 7882602, 128082, 32647 w1Prime: [[42, 28, 29, 24, 14, 42, 24, 19, 5, 29, 27, 11, 17, 2, 7, 28, 40, 7, 12, 36, 2, 11, 11, 35, 6, 7, 43, 22, 13, 6, 19, 5, 34, 2, 31, 40, 38, [22, 6, 12, 1, 35, 29, 19, 16, 19, 31, 32, 13, 40, 25, 27, 22, 36, 41, 4, 30, 13, 30, 25, 18, 25, 41, 9, 13, 40, 14, 9, 9, 10, 29, 41, 36, 24, 29, 11 [28, 17, 19, 1, 1, 8, 41, 31, 43, 3, 18, 10, 21, 23, 17, 43, 32, 42, 8, 42, 9, 22, 27, 37, 21, 0, 42, 26, 0, 34, 9, 42, 22, 36, 18, 38, 23, 32, 35, 1 [11, 15, 7, 7, 25, 18, 41, 6, 14, 30, 8, 26, 6, 10, 41, 1, 17, 22, 33, 14, 4, 41, 12, 27, 6, 2, 25, 16, 20, 0, 13, 14, 12, 18, 22, 30, 1, 10, 7, 24, cTilde: E98901A3F79293983D935DCF3A4DC9BA8966F70CB2991E6E1E5942643D37A152 cTildePrime: E98901A3F79293983D935DCF3A4DC9BA8966F70CB2991E6E1E5942643D37A152 cTilde == cTildePrime, signature verified
```

03

Architecture

► Block Diagram



04

NTT

► NTT/INTT

- ✓ NTT is a variant of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) based on a finite field.
- ✓ It transforms polynomial multiplication into “pointwise multiplication,” accelerating polynomial multiplication operations.
- ✓ Cooley-Tukey decomposition is used for NTT and Gentleman-Sande decomposition for INTT in a butterfly architecture.
- ✓ It adopts a Radix-2 Multi-path Delay Commutator (MDC) FFT, using 8 Butterfly Units (BU) to process data with $N = 256$.

► NTT - Mathematical Derivation

- ✓ The Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) is defined as:

$$\hat{a}_j = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \psi^{2ij} a_i \mod q$$

Note:

$$\begin{aligned}\psi^{k+2n} &= \psi^k \\ \psi^{k+n} &= -\psi^k\end{aligned}$$

- ✓ Using the Cooley-Tukey decomposition:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{a}_j &= \sum_{i=0}^{n/2-1} \psi^{4ij+2i} a_{2i} + \sum_{i=0}^{n/2-1} \psi^{4ij+2j+2i+1} a_{2i+1} \mod q \\ &= \sum_{i=0}^{n/2-1} \psi^{4ij+2i} a_{2i} + \psi^{2j+1} \sum_{i=0}^{n/2-1} \psi^{4ij+2i} a_{2i+1} \mod q\end{aligned}$$

- ✓ Define :

$$A_j = \sum_{i=0}^{n/2-1} \psi^{4ij+2i} a_{2i}, \quad B_j = \sum_{i=0}^{n/2-1} \psi^{4ij+2i} a_{2i+1}$$

- ✓ Thus, the transformed coefficients are:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{a}_j &= A_j + \psi^{2j+1} B_j \mod q \\ \hat{a}_{j+n/2} &= A_j - \psi^{2j+1} B_j \mod q\end{aligned}$$

►INTT - Mathematical Derivation

- ✓ The Inverse Number Theoretic Transform (INTT) is given by:

$$\mathbf{a}_i = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \psi^{-(2i+1)j} \hat{a}_j \mod q$$

Note:

$$\psi^{k+2n} = \psi^k$$

$$\psi^{k+n} = -\psi^k$$

- ✓ Using the Gentleman-Sande decomposition:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{a}_i &= \left[\sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} \psi^{-(2i+1)j} \hat{a}_j + \sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} \psi^{-(2i+1)(j+n/2)} \hat{a}_{j+n/2} \right] \mod q \\ &= \psi^{-i} \left[\sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} \psi^{-2ij} \hat{a}_j + \sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} \psi^{-2i(j+n/2)} \hat{a}_{j+n/2} \right] \mod q \end{aligned}$$

- ✓ Define :

$$A_i = \sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} \hat{a}_j \psi^{-4ij}, \quad B_i = \sum_{j=0}^{n/2-1} \hat{a}_{j+n/2} \psi^{-4ij}$$

- ✓ Thus, the inverse transform coefficients are:

$$\mathbf{a}_{2i} = (A_i + B_i) \psi^{-2i} \mod q$$

$$\mathbf{a}_{2i+1} = (A_i - B_i) \psi^{-2i} \mod q$$

► NTT/INTT - Butterfly diagram

- ✓ Fundamental in FFT/NTT computations, is given by:



$$A = A + \psi^k B$$

$$B = A - \psi^k B$$


- ✓ Fundamental in FFT/NTT computations, is given by:

$$A = A + B$$

$$B = (A - B)\psi^{-k}$$



► NTT_INTT - Module Pin Function Definition




Pin name	I/O	Bit width	Function
clk	I	1	系統時脈
reset	I	1	系統同步重置信號
mode	I	1	0 : NTT mode / 1 : INTT mode
in_ready	I	1	由待轉換的MEM輸入資料準備好的指示信號
NTT_in_u	I	23	由待轉換的MEM輸入data
NTT_in_d	I	23	由待轉換的MEM輸入data
out_ready	O	1	轉換完成資料開始輸出的指示信號
NTT_out_u	O	23	轉換完成資料輸出data至指定MEM
NTT_out_d	O	23	轉換完成資料輸出data至指定MEM
NTT_addr	O	8	指定輸出的MEM位址

► NTT_INTT - Module Task Assignment Table

Pin name	I/ O	Bit length	Function
clk	I	1	系統時脈
reset	I	1	系統同步重置信號
mode	I	1	0 : NTT mode / 1 : INTT mode
in_ready	I	1	由待轉換的MEM輸入資料準備好的指示信號
NTT_in_u	I	23	由待轉換的MEM輸入data
NTT_in_d	I	23	由待轉換的MEM輸入data
out_ready	O	1	轉換完成資料開始輸出的指示信號
NTT_out_u	O	23	轉換完成資料輸出data至指定MEM
NTT_out_d	O	23	轉換完成資料輸出data至指定MEM
NTT_addr	O	8	指定輸出的MEM位址

►NTT_INTT – Block Diagram



► NTT – Timing Diagram



► NTT - – Timing Diagram

Timing Diagram showing the computation of NTT coefficients. The top part shows the initial inputs and the bottom part shows the final output.


Inputs:

> out_b[22:0]	0	3292360	5639478	5157967	1713881	3162035	7669833	6641394	4903989	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
> out_a[22:0]	0	6442904	5232688	8144313	8208803	5357188	3774935	5558247	1994723	4288883	5223614	6917442	534788	6170123	0	0
> out_b[22:0]	0	6189896	906783	5793821	3339230	5215824	832905	6436092	4288883	5223614	6917442	534788	6170123	0	0	0
> out_a[22:0]	0	6911461	1654786	5202208	2925445	1368896	2065634	3879842	7519296	7662194	3547934	7373421	1867066	0	0	0
> out_b[22:0]	0	958422	6629204	1153275	2424097	7067290	2409715	1575198	4222356	6608599	2905824	1439604	3095744	7483179	5524427	0
> out_a[22:0]	0	8031462	7824196	2846100	7769886	6755632	899857	476033	5823871	4509610	1225444	627207	2358723	7841209	1571441	0
> out_b[22:0]	0	5719810	7847079	3957586	614766	7118893	7254363	3656372	2956723	5031747	5940663	6967820	3793081	2168270	7132662	1797616
> out_a[22:0]	0	332082	2450182	3724921	1691784	695324	6880217	1474475	193673	4300736	7276535	2051400	7466544	7466561	7833696	5504385

Output:

5157967	8144313	5793821	5202208	1153275	2846100	3957586	3724921
1713881	8208803	3339230	2925445	2424097	7769886	614766	1691784
3162035	5357188	5215824	1368896	7067290	6755632	7118893	6953724
7669833	3774935	832905	2065634	2409715	899857	7254363	6880217
6641394	5558247	6436092	3879842	1575198	476033	3656372	1474475
4903989	1994723	4288883	7519296	4222356	5823871	2956723	193673
0	0	5223614	7662194	6608599	4509610	5031747	4300736
0	0	6917442	3547934	2905824	1225444	5940663	7276535
0	0	534788	7373421	1439604	627207	6967820	2051400
0	0	6170123	1867066	3095744	2358723	3793081	7466544
0	0	0	0	7483179	7841209	2168270	7466561
0	0	0	0	5524427	1571441	7132662	7833696
0	0	0	0	0	0	1797616	5504385
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

►INTT – Timing Diagram



►INTT – Timing Diagram

> out_a[22:0]	256	X	8380161	256	512	256	8380161	512
> out_b[22:0]	8380161	X		8380161	0	8380161	512	8379905
> out_a[22:0]	3678519	1023635	3678263	3678519	256	1023891	3678519	7356654
> out_b[22:0]	128	4702154	0	3678647	8380161	0	3678647	4702282
> out_a[22:0]	8324729	2239637	6473191	206200	1438946	6029468	2557405	7356782
> out_b[22:0]	4066362	3416375	3678455	4978493	3954858	5711636	7744753	1121050
> out_a[22:0]	8356669	3270576	5145730	489870	719475	4704154	5279623	6665068
> out_b[22:0]	4780255	2701048	3968203	5510760	4949176	3521803	1797269	2351013
> out_a[22:0]	7753974	5677629	3844460	2458359	3173158	5853236	3957719	7744753
> out_b[22:0]	6213124	8187643	7190754	5830377	4953084	2136765	2050770	2557213
> out_a[22:0]	619085	7742068	5330631	1260730	8339836	6491585	7007505	1358765
> out_b[22:0]	1561671	2845650	5710244	955419	5058229	2563891	7577367	8138681

121	0	0	1023635	7356782	4258239	7992318	5864397	4518333
122	0	0	8380289	7356526	4010802	523968	607845	2328505
123	0	0	7356526	1023635	3940535	387971	3023220	4851779
124	0	0	1023763	256	8103694	7468350	2822564	2451780
125	0	0	1023635	4702154	2239637	3416375	3270576	2701048
126	0	0	1023763	0	6473191	3678455	5145730	3968203
127	8380161	8380161	3678263	3678647	206200	4978493	489870	5510760
128	256	8380161	3678519	8380161	1438946	3954858	719475	4949176
129	256	8380161	3678519	0	6029468	5711636	4704154	3521803
130	512	0	256	3678647	2557405	7744753	5279623	1797269
131	512	512	1023891	256	912259	5435169	6142372	4179009

► Modular Reduction

- ✓ For a 46-bit value s , modular reduction is performed recursively by exploiting the relation :


$$2^{23} \equiv 2^{13} - 1 \bmod q$$

- ✓ The reduction ensures that the result falls within the interval $(-q, 2q)$ allowing for adjustments by adding q if negative or subtracting q if positive.
- ✓ After performing necessary additions or subtractions with q of the reduced result, the final output is determined by selecting the non-negative value.
- ✓ Each BU module contains one, and there are eight BU modules, requiring a total of eight modular reduction modules.

► Modular Reduction - Mathematical Derivation

$$\begin{aligned}s[45 : 0] &\equiv 2^{23}s[45 : 23] + s[22 : 0] \equiv 2^{13}s[45 : 23] - s[45 : 23] + s[22 : 0] \\&\equiv 2^{23}s[45 : 33] + 2^{13}s[32 : 23] - s[45 : 23] + z \\&\equiv 2^{13}(s[45 : 33] + s[32 : 23]) - (s[45 : 33] + s[45 : 23]) + z \\&\equiv 2^{23}s[45 : 43] + 2^{13}(s[42 : 33] + s[32 : 23]) - (s[45 : 33] + s[45 : 23]) + z \\&\equiv 2^{13}(s[45 : 43] + s[42 : 33] + s[32 : 23]) - (s[45 : 43] + s[45 : 33] + s[45 : 23]) + z \\&\equiv 2^{13}x - y + z \equiv 2^{23}x[11 : 10] + 2^{13}x[9 : 0] - y + z \\&\equiv 2^{13}(x[11 : 10] + x[9 : 0]) - (y + x[11 : 10]) + z \pmod{q}\end{aligned}$$

► Modular Reduction – Block Diagram



► Modular Reduction – Timing Diagram

Name	Value	10.000 ns	15.000 ns	20.000 ns	25.000 ns	30.000 ns	35.000 ns	40.000 ns	45.000 ns	50.000 ns	55.000 ns
> in[45:0]	98765432	0		70368744177663		123456789		8380416		987654321	
> out[22:0]	7145532	0		49144		6130951		8380416		7145532	
> in[45:0]	00003ade	0000000000000000		3fffffff		0000075bcd15		0000007fe000		00003ade68b1	
> out[22:0]	6d083c	000000		00bff8		5d8d07		7fe000		6d083c	
> x[11:0]	075	000		805		00e		000		075	
> y[23:0]	000075	000000		802005		00000e		000000		000075	
> z[22:0]	5e68b1	000000		7ffff		5bcd15		7fe000		5e68b1	
> d[11:0]	075	000		007		00e		000		075	
> e[26:0]	05e683c	0000000		7ffdff8		05bcd07		07fe000		05e683c	
> f[23:0]	6d083c	000000		00bff8		5d8d07		7fe000		6d083c	
> adjust[23:0]	801fff					801fff					
> g[23:0]	ed283b	801fff		80dff7		ddad06		fffff		ed283b	


- ✓ The Butterfly Unit is formed based on the symmetry and parity properties in NTT and INTT computations.
- ✓ For a pair of input numbers a and b , together with a corresponding twiddle factor w , the butterfly operation in a finite field (modulo p) proceeds as follows:

$$x = (a + w \times b) \bmod q$$

$$y = (a - w \times b) \bmod q$$

- ✓ The structures of NTT and INTT are similar, but the twiddle factors used in INTT are the modular inverses of those in NTT. A normalization factor must also be applied at the end.
- ✓ Eight BU modules are used in the NTT/INTT of the thesis.

►BU – Block Diagram




- ✓ To match the butterfly structure, the output of each stage's BU is reordered accordingly.
- ✓ There are a total of 7 RUi, where $1 \leq i \leq 7$, in our implemented NTT and INTT.
- ✓ In NTT/INTT, the MEM depth of each RUi Stage is different:

$$\text{NTT : } \text{MEM_Depth}_i = 2 \times ((8-i)-1)$$

$$\text{INTT : } \text{MEM_Depth}_i = 2 \times (i-1)$$

►RUi – Block Diagram



05

SHA3

► Security strength of the SHA-3 function

- ✓ Characteristics of the hash function:





- ✓ Security strengths of the hash function:

Function	SHA3 Primitive	Output Size	Security Strengths in Bits		
			Collision	Preimage	2nd Preimage
Cryptographic Hash Function	SHA3-224	224	112	224	224
	SHA3-256	256	128	256	256
	SHA3-384	384	192	384	384
	SHA3-512	512	256	512	512
Extendable-Output Function	SHAKE128	d	$\min(d/2, 128)$	$\geq \min(d, 128)$	$\min(d, 128)$
	SHAKE256	d	$\min(d/2, 256)$	$\geq \min(d, 256)$	$\min(d, 256)$

► Sponge Construction

- ✓ Sponge Construction: This structure is composed of absorbing phases and squeezing phases
- ✓ Padding: The padding algorithm (pad10*1)
- ✓ Function: The internal function used to process each input block include θ , ρ , π , χ , and ι

Ex: SHAKE-256



►KECCAK-p


Ex: SHAKE-256

- ✓ For $b=1600$, the KECCAK family is referred to as KECCAK[c]:


$$\text{KECCAK}[c] = \text{SPONGE}[\text{KECCAK-p}[1600, 24], \text{pad10*1}, 1600-c]$$

- ✓ Given an input bit string N and an output length d:

$$\text{KECCAK}[c](M, d) = \text{SPONGE}[\text{KECCAK-p}[1600, 24], \text{pad10*1}, 1600-c](M, d)$$




b	25	50	100	200	400	800	1600
w	1	2	4	8	16	32	64
l	0	1	2	3	4	5	6




$\text{SHA3-224}(M) = \text{KECCAK}[448](M \parallel 01, 224);$
 $\text{SHA3-256}(M) = \text{KECCAK}[512](M \parallel 01, 256);$
 $\text{SHA3-384}(M) = \text{KECCAK}[768](M \parallel 01, 384);$
 $\text{SHA3-512}(M) = \text{KECCAK}[1024](M \parallel 01, 512).$
 $\text{SHAKE128}(M, d) = \text{KECCAK}[256](M \parallel 1111, d),$
 $\text{SHAKE256}(M, d) = \text{KECCAK}[512](M \parallel 1111, d).$

► Padding

- ✓ **Simple padding** : The filling method is to pad10(0*)
- ✓ **Multi-rate padding** : The filling method is to pad10(0*)1
- ✓ The padding rule for KECCAK uses **multi-rate padding**



Ex: SHAKE-256



Ex: SHAKE-256

$$r = 1088 \text{ bits}$$


$$n = 10496 \text{ bits}$$

$$k = \lceil 10496 / 1088 \rceil = 10$$

$$p = 10496 \bmod 1088 = 704$$


► Function

Function	Type
θ	Substitution
ρ	Permutation
π	Permutation
χ	Substitution
ι	Substitution



► Function - Theta θ



- ✓ $C[x] = A[x, 0] \oplus A[x, 1] \oplus A[x, 2] \oplus A[x, 3] \oplus A[x, 4] \quad \forall x \text{ in } 0..4$
- ✓ $D[x] = C[x - 1] \oplus \text{ROT}(C[x + 1], 1) \quad \forall x \text{ in } 0..4$
- ✓ $A[x, y] = A[x, y] \oplus D[x] \quad \forall (x, y) \text{ in } (0..4, 0..4)$



► Function - Rho ρ and Pi π

✓ $B[y, 2x + 3y] = \text{ROT}(A[x, y], r[x, y])$


$\forall (x, y) \text{ in } (0 \dots 4, 0 \dots 4)$



	$x = 3$	$x = 4$	$x = 0$	$x = 1$	$x = 2$
$y = 2$	25	39	3	10	43
$y = 1$	55	20	36	44	6
$y = 0$	28	27	0	1	62
$y = 4$	56	14	18	2	61
$y = 3$	21	8	41	45	15


► Function - Chi χ

✓ $A[x, y] = B[x, y] \oplus ((\text{NOT } B[x + 1, y]) \text{ AND } B[x + 2, y]), \quad \forall (x, y) \text{ in } (0 \dots 4, 0 \dots 4)$



► Function - Iota ι

- ✓ The round constant for each round is generated by a linear feedback shift register (LFSR)
- ✓ $A[0, 0] = A[0, 0] \oplus RC$
- ✓ The bits corresponding to 63, 31, 15, 7, 3, 1, and 0 are extracted




Round	Constant	Round	Constant
0	0000_0000_0000_0001	12	0000_0000_8000_808B
1	0000_0000_0000_8082	13	8000_0000_0000_008B
2	8000_0000_0000_808A	14	8000_0000_0000_8089
3	8000_0000_8000_0000	15	8000_0000_0000_8003
4	0000_0000_0000_808B	16	8000_0000_0000_8002
5	0000_0000_8000_0001	17	8000_0000_0000_0080
6	8000_0000_8000_8081	18	0000_0000_0000_800A
7	8000_0000_0000_8009	19	8000_0000_8000_000A
8	0000_0000_0000_008A	20	8000_0000_8000_8081
9	0000_0000_0000_0088	21	8000_0000_0000_8080
10	0000_0000_8000_8009	22	0000_0000_8000_0001
11	0000_0000_8000_000A	23	8000_0000_8000_8008

Ex.


$$rc[0] = i[0] | i[4] | i[5] | i[6] | i[7] | i[10] | i[12] | i[13] | i[14] | i[15] | i[20] | i[22];$$

►KECCAK-p PERMUTATIONS


SHA3 primitives	MLDSA primitives	Padding	Size in bits		
			r	c	output length
SHAKE128	G	M 0x1f 0x00 ... 0x80	1344	256	unlimited
SHAKE256	H	M 0x1f 0x00 ... 0x80	1088	512	unlimited




►KeyGen



► Sign



► Verify



►MLDSA SHA3

Main algorithm	SHA3 primitives	Input Size	Output Size
KeyGen	H_SeedGen	$(32 + 2)*8 = 272$	$128*8 = 1024$
	G_ExapndA	$34*8 = 272$	$894*8 = 7152$
	H_ExpandS	$(64 + 2) * 8 = 528$	$481 * 8 = 3848$
	H_tr	$1312 * 8 = 10496$	$64 * 8 = 512$
Sign	G_ExapndA	$34*8 = 272$	$894*8 = 7152$
	H_μ	$(64 +(2+n+m))*8$	$64 * 8 = 512$
	H_ρ''	$(32 + 32 + 64) * 8 = 1024$	$64 * 8 = 512$
	H_ExpandMask	$(64 + 2)*8 = 528$	$32 * 18 * 8 = 4608$
	H_C_tilde	$(64 + 768)*8 = 6656$	$128 / 4 * 8 = 256$
	H_SampleInball	$128 / 4 * 8 = 256$	$221 * 8 = 1768$
Verify	G_ExapndA	$34*8 = 272$	$894*8 = 7152$
	H_tr	$1312 * 8 = 10496$	$64 * 8 = 512$
	H_μ	$(64 + 283)*8 = 2776$	$64 * 8 = 512$
	H_SampleInball	$128 / 4 * 8 = 256$	$221 * 8 = 1768$

►MLDSA SHA3

SHA3 primitives	Input Size	Output Size	mode	is_last cycle [Input Size/64] + 1	byte_num $\frac{\text{Input Size mod } 64}{8}$	Squeeze time $\left\lceil \frac{\text{Output Size}}{\text{mode size}} \right\rceil - 1$
H_SeedGen	272	1024	1	5	2	0
G_ExapndA	272	7152	0	5	2	6
H_ExpandS	528	3848	1	9	2	4
H_tr	10496	512	1	164	0	0
H_μ	2776	512	1	44	3	0
H_ρ''	1024	512	1	17	0	0
H_ExpandMask	528	4608	1	9	2	4
H_C_tilde	6656	256	1	105	0	0
H_SampleInball	256	1768	0	5	0	1

►MLDSA SHA3

SHA3 primitives	Primitives sign	MLDSA_mode	Stage	mode	Input side		Output side		
H($\xi+x04+x04$)	0	KeyGen	1	H	MLDSA_in_1	seed_gen_index	Rho MEM	Rho_prime MEM	Kata MEM
Gen(s1)	1	KeyGen	2	H	Rho_prime MEM	s1_gen_index	s1 MEM		
Gen(s2)	2	KeyGen	3	H	Rho_prime MEM	s2_gen_index	s2 MEM		
Gen(A)	3	KeyGen	4	G	Rho MEM	A_gen_index	A MEM		
H($\rho \parallel t1$) = tr	4	KeyGen	7	H	Rho MEM	t1 MEM	tr MEM		
H($tr \parallel M'$)_1	5	SignGen	1	H	MLDSA_in_1		u MEM		
H($K \parallel rnd \parallel u$)	6	SignGen	2	H	MLDSA_in_1		p" MEM		
Gen(y)	7	SignGen	3	H	p" MEM	y_gen_index	y MEM		
Gen(A)	3	SignGen	4,5	G	Rho MEM		A MEM		
H($\mu \parallel w1$)	8	SignGen	9	H	u MEM	w MEM	c_tilde MEM		
Gen(c)_1	9	SignGen	10	H	c_tilde MEM		c MEM		
Gen(y)	7	SignGen	15	H	p" MEM	y_gen_index	y MEM		
Gen(c)_2	10	SignVer	1	H	MLDSA_in_1		c MEM		
Gen(A)	3	SignVer	2,3	G	Rho MEM	A_gen_index	A MEM		
H(pk)	11	SignVer	4	H	MLDSA_in_1		tr MEM		
H($tr \parallel M'$)_2	12	SignVer	5	H	tr MEM	MLDSA_in_1	u MEM		
H($\mu \parallel w1$)	8	SignVer	8	H	u MEM	w MEM	c_tilde MEM		

►MLDSA SHA3

SHA3 primitives	Primitives sign	mode	Input side		Output side			sha_byte_num	i_last cycle times
H($\xi+x04+x04$)	0	H	MLDSA_in_1	seed_gen_index	Rho MEM	Rho_prime MEM	Kata MEM	010	5
Gen(s1)	1	H	Rho_prime MEM	s1_gen_index	s1 MEM			010	9
Gen(s2)	2	H	Rho_prime MEM	s2_gen_index	s2 MEM			010	9
Gen(A)	3	G	Rho MEM	A_gen_index	A MEM			010	5
H(pk)_1	4	H	Rho MEM	t1 MEM	tr MEM			000	165
H($tr \parallel M'$)_1	5	H	MLDSA_in_1		u MEM			$(64+2+n+m) \mod 8$	$\lceil \frac{64 + 2 + n + m}{8} \rceil$
H($K \parallel rnd \parallel u$)	6	H	MLDSA_in_1		p" MEM			000	17
Gen(y)	7	H	p" MEM	y_gen_index	y MEM			010	9
H($\mu \parallel w1$)	8	H	u MEM	w1 MEM	c_tilde MEM			000	105
Gen(c)_1	9	H	c_tilde MEM		c MEM			000	5
Gen(c)_2	10	H	MLDSA_in_1		c MEM			000	5
H(pk)_2	11	H	MLDSA_in_1		tr MEM			000	165
H($tr \parallel M'$)_2	12	H	tr MEM	MLDSA_in_1	u MEM			011	44

►MLDSA SHA3

SHA3 primitives	Primitives sign	mode	Input side		Output side			sha_byte_num	i_last cycle times
H($\xi+x04+x04$)	0	H	MLDSA_in_1	seed_gen_index	Rho MEM	Rho_prime MEM	Kata MEM	010	5
Gen(A)	1	G	Rho MEM	A_gen_index	A MEM			010	5
Gen(s1)	2	H	Rho_prime MEM	s1_gen_index	s1 MEM			010	9
Gen(s2)	3	H	Rho_prime MEM	s2_gen_index	s2 MEM			010	9
Gen(y)	4	H	p" MEM	y_gen_index	y MEM			010	9
H($\mu \parallel w1$)	5	H	u MEM	w MEM	c_tilde MEM			000	105
H(pk)_1	6	H	Rho MEM	t1 MEM	tr MEM			000	165
H(pk)_2	7	H	MLDSA_in_1		tr MEM			000	165
Gen(c)_1	8	H	c_tilde MEM		c MEM			000	5
Gen(c)_2	9	H	MLDSA_in_1		c MEM			000	5
H($K \parallel rnd \parallel u$)	10	H	MLDSA_in_1		p" MEM			000	17
H($tr \parallel M'$)_1	11	H	MLDSA_in_1		u MEM			$(64+2+n+m) \mod 8$	$\left\lceil \frac{64 + 2 + n + m}{8} \right\rceil$
H($tr \parallel M'$)_2	12	H	tr MEM	MLDSA_in_1	u MEM			$(64+2+n+m) \mod 8$	$\left\lceil \frac{64 + 2 + n + m}{8} \right\rceil$

►MLDSA SHA3

SHA3 primitives	Primitives sign	mode	Input side		Output side			sha_byte_num	i_last cycle times
Gen_Seed	0	H	MLDSA_in_1	seed_gen_index	Rho MEM	Rho_prime MEM	Kata MEM	010	5
Gen_A	1	G	Rho MEM	A_gen_index	A MEM			010	5
Gen_s1	2	H	Rho_prime MEM	s1_gen_index	s1 MEM			010	9
Gen_s2	3	H	Rho_prime MEM	s2_gen_index	s2 MEM			010	9
Gen_y	4	H	p" MEM	y_gen_index	y MEM			010	9
H_u_w1	5	H	u MEM	w MEM	c_tilde MEM			000	105
H_pk_1	6	H	Rho MEM	t1 MEM	tr MEM			000	165
H_pk_2	7	H	MLDSA_in_1		tr MEM			000	165
Gen_c_1	8	H	c_tilde MEM		c MEM			000	5
Gen_c_2	9	H	MLDSA_in_1		c MEM			000	5
H_K_rnd_u	10	H	MLDSA_in_1		p" MEM			000	17
H_tr_M_1	11	H	MLDSA_in_1		u MEM			(64+2+n+m) mod 8	$\lceil \frac{64 + 2 + n + m}{8} \rceil$
H_tr_M_2	12	H	tr MEM	MLDSA_in_1	u MEM			(64+2+n+m) mod 8	$\lceil \frac{64 + 2 + n + m}{8} \rceil$

►MLDSA SHA3

Data source	keccak_in_sel	mem_sel_1	mem_sel_2	index_sel	in_seed_sel
Rho MEM	0	0	X	X	X
Rho_prime MEM	0	1	X	X	X
Rho_prime_prime MEM	0	2	X	X	X
u MEM	0	3	x	X	X
w MEM	1	X	0	X	X
t1 MEM	1	X	1	X	X
c_tilde MEM	1	X	2	X	X
tr MEM	1	X	3	X	X
A_gen_index	2	X	X	0	X
s1_gen_index	2	X	X	1	X
s2_gen_index	2	X	X	2	X
y_gen_index	2	X	X	3	X
MLDSA_in_1	3	X	X	X	0
seed_gen_index	3	X	X	X	1


►MLDSA SHA3

Data source	keccak_in_sel	mem_sel_1	mem_sel_2	index_sel	in_seed_sel
Seed MEM	0	0	X	X	X
u MEM	0	1	x	X	X
w MEM	1	X	0	X	X
t1 MEM	1	X	1	X	X
c_tilde MEM	1	X	2	X	X
tr MEM	1	X	3	X	X
A_gen_index	2	X	X	0	X
s1_gen_index	2	X	X	1	X
s2_gen_index	2	X	X	2	X
y_gen_index	2	X	X	3	X
MLDSA_in_1	3	X	X	X	0
seed_gen_index	3	X	X	X	1


►MLDSA SHA3

Data source	keccak_in_sel	kk_sub_sel_1	kk_sub_sel_2	kk_sub_sel_3
Seed MEM	0	0	X	X
u MEM	0	1	x	X
w MEM	0	2	X	X
t1 MEM	0	3	X	X
c_tilde MEM	1	X	0	X
tr MEM	1	X	1	X
zero_index	1	X	2	X
seed_gen_index	1	X	3	X
A_gen_index	2	X	X	0
s1_gen_index	2	X	X	1
s2_gen_index	2	X	X	2
y_gen_index	2	X	X	3
MLDSA_in_1	3	X	X	X


►MLDSA SHA3 Module



►MLDSA SHA3 Block Diagram



► MLDSA SHA3 Block Diagram



```
### TEST "MLDSA FSM" ###
xi = 'FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF'
xi = bytes.fromhex(xi) + b'\x04\x04'
result = SHAKE_256(xi,1088)
print(Verilog_trans(result))
Rho_seed = result[0:32]
Rho_Prime_seed = result[32:96]
Kata_seed = result[96:128]
```

```
PS C:\Users\fossu\Desktop\ML_DSA_Syn\SHA3\python> python -u "c:\Users\fossu\Desktop\ML_DSA_Syn\SHA3\python\SHA_3.py"
```

ACC0939DFAAE297E681F5698CB063B05315B2B374AF88EFD9C089FE793FC67E2420B4DD30138F14FA4970FD23A3BB9400920BCE83750376E81F8ABABF200C27668AA7AE7D3F52FDDCCF36C0E578001F3667B89B30401F98FBB5B52697C268809D4AC993D6FA5D4EB20869B196B33729E0724C632EC0EA29E4C2F93A312620C25DE72ACB56BF0434

06

Data Mem

	資料存入
	資料送出

►MLDSA Data Mem - SignGen

記憶體	寬度,深度	1	2	3	4-1	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
temp0	23, 1024	s1	s1	y													y	ct0	ct0	
temp1	23, 1024		s2	s2		A0		A0					c^ 0-255				c^ 0-255			
temp2	23, 1024					A1		A1							z			z		
temp3	23, 1024					A2		A2							cs2^	cs2^		ct0^	ct0^	
temp4	23, 1024					A3		A3	w									w		
temp5	23, 1024		t0		t0	y^	y^					c 0-255	c 0-255	cs1^	cs1^	cs2		cs2		
temp6	23, 1024	s1^												s1^	cs1	cs1		w -cs2	w -cs2	
temp7	23, 1024		s2^												s2^					
temp8	23, 1024				t0^												t0^			
temp9	23, 1024						w^	w^												
seed	64, 16	u 8-15	u 8-15									u 8-15								
		P'' 0-7	P'' 0-7	P 0-3	P 0-3							c~ 0-3	c~ 0-3							
w1_pack	64, 96	改由encode 完成鮮直送，不存入MEM																		
r0	18, 1024	產生r0的同時計算用於判斷拒絕採樣的條件 r0 ，即可部存入MEM																		

	資料存入
	資料送出

►MLDSA Data Mem - SignGen

記憶體	寬度,深度	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
temp0	23, 1024	s1	s1	y															y	
temp1	23, 1024		s2	s2			y_hat	y_hat	w							w	ct0_hat	ct0_hat		
temp2	23, 1024		t0		t0		w_hat	w_hat						cs1_hat	cs1_hat	cs2	cs2	ct0	ct0	
temp3	23, 1024										c (0-255)	c (0-255)		cs1	cs1	w_cs2			w_cs2	
temp4	23, 1024													cs2_hat	cs2_hat	HB(_w_cs2)			HB(_w_cs2)	
temp5	23, 1024															z			z	
temp6	23, 1024										c_hat (0-255)						c_hat (0-255)			
temp7	23, 1024				A														A	
temp8	23, 1024		s1_hat																s1_hat	
temp9	23, 1024			s2_hat															s2_hat	
temp10	23, 1024				t0_hat														t0_hat	
seed	64, 16	u 8-15	u 8-15								u 8-15									
		p'' 0-7	p'' 0-7	p 0-3	p 0-3					c~ 0-3	c~ 0-3									
w1_pack	64, 96	改由encode 完成鮮直送，不存入MEM																		
r0	18, 1024	產生r0的同時計算用於判斷拒絕採樣的條件 r0 ，即可部存入MEM																		

	資料存入
	資料送出

►MLDSA Data Mem - SignGen

記憶體	寬度,深度	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
temp0	23, 1024	s1	s1	y			y								y	y			y	
temp1	23, 1024		s2	s2			y_hat	y_hat	w	w					w	ct0_hat	ct0_hat			
temp2	23, 1024			t0		t0		w_hat	w_hat					cs1_hat	cs1_hat	cs2	cs2	ct0	ct0	
temp3	23, 1024										c (0-255)	c (0-255)		cs1	cs1	w_cs2			w_cs2	
temp4	23, 1024													cs2_hat	cs2_hat	HB(_w_cs2)			HB(_w_cs2)	
temp5	23, 1024															z			z	
temp6	23, 1024										c_hat (0-255)					c_hat (0-255)				
temp7	23, 4096				A		A													
temp8	23, 1024		s1_hat											s1_hat						
temp9	23, 1024			s2_hat											s2_hat					
temp10	23, 1024				t0_hat												t0_hat			
seed	64, 16	u 8-15	u 8-15								u 8-15									
		p'' 0-7	p'' 0-7	p 0-3	p 0-3					c~ 0-3	c~ 0-3									
w1_pack	64, 96	改由encode 完成鮮直送，不存入MEM																		
r0	18, 1024	產生r0的同時計算用於判斷拒絕採樣的條件 r0 ，即可部存入MEM																		

	資料存入
	資料送出

►MLDSA Data Mem - KeyGen

記憶體	寬度,深度	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
tempA	23, 4096				A	A				
temp0	23, 1024		s1		s1	As1_hat	As1_hat	t	t	
temp1	23, 1024			s2				s2		
temp2	23, 1024			s1_hat		s1_hat	As1	As1		
seed_temp	64, 16	p,p',K (0-15)	p' (4-11)	p' (4-11)	p (0-3)					

	資料存入
	資料送出

►MLDSA Data Mem - SignGen

記憶體	寬度,深度	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
tempA	23, 4096					A		A												
temp0	23, 1024	s1	s1	y			y								y	y			y	
temp1	23, 1024		s2	s2			y_hat	y_hat	w	w					w	ct0_hat	ct0_hat			
temp2	23, 1024			t0		t0		w_hat	w_hat					cs1_hat	cs1_hat	cs2	cs2	ct0	ct0	
temp3	23, 1024										c (0-255)	c (0-255)		cs1	cs1	w_cs2			w_cs2	
temp4	23, 1024													cs2_hat	cs2_hat	HB(_w_cs2)			HB(_w_cs2)	
temp5	23, 1024															z			z	
temp6	23, 1024											c_hat (0-255)					c_hat (0-255)			
temp7	23, 1024		s1_hat											s1_hat						
temp8	23, 1024			s2_hat											s2_hat					
temp9	23, 1024				t0_hat												t0_hat			
seed_temp	64, 16	u 8-15	u 8-15								u 8-15									
		p'' 0-7	p'' 0-7	p 0-3	p 0-3					c~ 0-3	c~ 0-3									
pack_temp																				
w1_pack	64, 96																			

改由encode 完生鮮直送，不存入MEM


06

AXI4

► AXI (Advanced eXtensible Interface)


- ✓ AXI4 interface is divided into three types:

1. AXI4-Full
2. AXI4-Lite
3. AXI4-Stream




- ✓ XILINX Application

1. AXI Interconnect
2. AXI SmartConnect



► Channel




Signal	VALID	READY	LAST
Channel			
Read Address (AR)	V	V	X
Read Data (R)	V	V	V
Write Address (AW)	V	V	X
Write Data (W)	V	V	V
Write Response (R)	V	V	X

► Read transfer transactions

Read Address Channel Signals	AR	ARADDR	ARREADY	ARVALID	ARBURST	ARLEN	ARSIZE
------------------------------	----	--------	---------	---------	---------	-------	--------


Read Data Channel Signals	R	RDATA	RREADY	RVALID	RRESP	RLAST
---------------------------	---	-------	--------	--------	-------	-------



► Write transfer transactions


Write Address Channel Signals	AW	AWADDR	AWREADY	AWVALID	AWBURST	AWLEN	AWSIZE
--	----	--------	---------	---------	---------	-------	--------

Write Data Channel Signals	W	WDATA	WREADY	WVALID	WSTRB	WLAST
---------------------------------------	---	-------	--------	--------	-------	-------





► Handshake

Transaction channel	Handshake pair	
Write address channel	AWVALID	AWREADY
Write data channel	WVALID	WREADY
Write response channel	BVALID	BREADY
Read address channel	ARVALID	ARREADY
Read data channel	RVALID	RREADY



► Dependence


- ✓ Write responses must occur after the completion of the last write data of the corresponding transfer
- ✓ Read data must be generated after receiving the read address signal
- ✓ Handshakes between channels must satisfy the handshake dependencies between channels
 1. The sender's VALID signal cannot rely on the READY signal to be set
 2. The receiver's READY signal can be set after detecting the VALID signal is set




† Dependencies on the assertion of **WVALID** also require the assertion of **WLAST**

►Burst

Write Burst



Read Burst



Source: ARM AMBA AXI Protocol v1.0: Specification

Source: ARM AMBA AXI Protocol v1.0: Specification

► Burst

AxSIZE[2:0]	Bytes in transfer
0b000	1
0b001	2
0b010	4
0b011	8
0b100	16
0b101	32
0b110	64
0b111	128


AxBURST[1:0]	Burst type
0b00	FIXED
0b01	INCR
0b10	WRAP
0b11	Reserved

05


Sampler

► ExpandS

- ✓ Sample the required private keys s1 and s2 from the equation $t = A * s1 + s2$
- ✓ The mode selection in the Sampler module is set to S_mode (0)
- ✓ The input sampled data is obtained through the H_mode (SHAKE256) in the Keccak module
- ✓ The output sampled data is stored in the s0 or s1 memory of Data_Mem, controlled by mem_sel and s_sel



►ExpandS – Block Diagram



► ExpandS - Module Pin Function Definition


Pin name	I/O	Bit length	Function
clk	I	1	系統時脈
reset	I	1	系統同步重置信號
sampler_in_ready	I	1	Keack模組資料準備好的指示信號
sampler_in	I	1344	Keack模組的輸入資料
sampler_squeeze	O	1	和Keack模組要求squeeze一組新的輸入資料
next_element	O	1	該element取樣完畢的指示信號 (j[8])
z0	O	23	z0取樣的資料輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中s0/s1 Mem)
z1	O	23	z1取樣的資料輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中s0/s1 Mem)
addr_z0	O	8	z0取樣的位址輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中s0/s1 Mem)
addr_z1	O	8	z1取樣的位址輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中s0/s1 Mem)
en_z0	O	1	z0取樣的致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中s0/s1 Mem)
we_z0	O	1	z0取樣的寫入致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中s0/s1 Mem)
en_z1	O	1	z1取樣的致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中s0/s1 Mem)
we_z1	O	1	z1取樣的寫入致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中s0/s1 Mem)

► ExpandS – Timing Diagram




►ExpandA

- ✓ Sample the required public keys A from the equation $t = A * s1 + s2$
- ✓ The mode selection in the Sampler module is set to A_mode (1)
- ✓ The input sampled data is obtained through the G_mode (SHAKE128) in the Keccak module
- ✓ The output sampled data is stored in the A memory of Data_Mem, controlled by mem_sel




►ExpandA – Block Diagram



► ExpandA - Module Pin Function Definition


Pin name	I/O	Bit length	Function
clk	I	1	系統時脈
reset	I	1	系統同步重置信號
sampler_in_ready	I	1	Keack模組資料準備好的指示信號
sampler_in	I	1344	Keack模組的輸入資料
sampler_squeeze	O	1	和Keack模組要求squeeze一組新的輸入資料
next_element	O	1	該element取樣完畢的指示信號 (j[8])
A0	O	23	A0取樣的資料輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中A Mem)
A1	O	23	A1取樣的資料輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中A Mem)
addr_A0	O	8	A0取樣的位址輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中A Mem)
addr_A1	O	8	A1取樣的位址輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中A Mem)
en_A0	O	1	A0取樣的致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中A Mem)
we_A0	O	1	A0取樣的寫入致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中A Mem)
en_A1	O	1	A1取樣的致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中A Mem)
we_A1	O	1	A1取樣的寫入致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中A Mem)

► ExpandA – Timing Diagram



►ExpandMASK

- ✓ Sample random vector y for computing the commitment value $w = A * y$
- ✓ The mode selection in the Sampler module is set to A_mode (2)
- ✓ The input sampled data is obtained through the H_mode (SHAKE256) in the Keccak module
- ✓ The output sampled data is stored in the y memory of Data_Mem, controlled by mem_sel



►ExpandMASK – Block Diagram

Sign :

s_round_0_in :
sampler_in[1079:0]

s_round_1_in :
{sampler_in[1079 - round_0:0], sampler_temp[8-1:0]}

s_round_2_in :
{sampler_in[1079 - round_1:0], sampler_temp[16-1:0]}

s_round_3_in :
{sampler_in[1079 - round_2:0], sampler_temp[24-1:0]}


s_round_4_in :
{792'd0, sampler_in[255:0], sampler_temp[32-1:0]}:

st_round_0_in :
{(32 - 8){1'b0}, sampler_in[1088 - 1: 1088 - 8]}

st_round_1_in :
{(32 - 16){1'b0}, sampler_in[1088 - 1: 1088 - 16]}

st_round_2_in :
{(32 - 24){1'b0}, sampler_in[1088 - 1: 1088 - 24]}

st_round_3_in :
{(32 - 32){1'b0}, sampler_in[1088 - 1: 1088 - 32]}



►ExpandMASK - Module Pin Function Definition


Pin name	I/O	Bit length	Function
clk	I	1	系統時脈
reset	I	1	系統同步重置信號
sampler_in_ready	I	1	Keack模組資料準備好的指示信號
sampler_in	I	1344	Keack模組的輸入資料
sampler_squeeze	O	1	和Keack模組要求squeeze一組新的輸入資料
next_element	O	1	該element取樣完畢的指示信號 (j[8])
y0	O	23	y0取樣的資料輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中y Mem)
y1	O	23	y1取樣的資料輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中y Mem)
addr_y0	O	8	y0取樣的位址輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中y Mem)
addr_y1	O	8	y1取樣的位址輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中y Mem)
en_y0	O	1	y0取樣的致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中y Mem)
we_y0	O	1	y0取樣的寫入致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中y Mem)
en_y1	O	1	y1取樣的致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中y Mem)
we_y1	O	1	y1取樣的寫入致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中y Mem)

► ExpandMASK – Timing Diagram



► SampleInBall

- ✓ Sample challenge cc based on the commitment $w1$ and the message to be signed, represented by μ
- ✓ The mode selection in the Sampler module is set to SIB_mode (3)
- ✓ The input sampled data is obtained through the H_mode (SHAKE256) in the Keccak module
- ✓ The output sampled data is stored in the c memory of Data_Mem, controlled by mem_sel



► SampleInBall

Algorithm 29 SampleInBall(ρ)

Samples a polynomial $c \in R$ with coefficients from $\{-1, 0, 1\}$ and Hamming weight $\tau \leq 64$.

Input: A seed $\rho \in \mathbb{B}^{\lambda/4}$

Output: A polynomial c in R .


```
1:  $c \leftarrow 0$ 
2:  $\text{ctx} \leftarrow \text{H.Init}()$ 
3:  $\text{ctx} \leftarrow \text{H.Absorb}(\text{ctx}, \rho)$ 
4:  $(\text{ctx}, s) \leftarrow \text{H.Squeeze}(\text{ctx}, 8)$ 
5:  $h \leftarrow \text{BytesToBits}(s)$                                 ▷  $h$  is a bit string of length 64
6: for  $i$  from  $256 - \tau$  to 255 do
7:    $(\text{ctx}, j) \leftarrow \text{H.Squeeze}(\text{ctx}, 1)$ 
8:   while  $j > i$  do                                     ▷ rejection sampling in  $\{0, \dots, i\}$ 
9:      $(\text{ctx}, j) \leftarrow \text{H.Squeeze}(\text{ctx}, 1)$ 
10:    end while                                         ▷  $j$  is a pseudorandom byte that is  $\leq i$ 
11:     $c_i \leftarrow c_j$ 
12:     $c_j \leftarrow (-1)^{h[i+\tau-256]}$ 
13: end for
14: return  $c$ 
```

► SampleInBall


```
always @ (posedge clk) begin
    if (reset)
        addr_cj <= 8'd0;
    else
        addr_cj <= j;
end

always @ (posedge clk) begin
    if (reset)
        en_cj <= 1'b0;
    else
        en_cj <= en_ci;
end


assign we_cj = en_cj;
```



► SampleInBall




► SampleInBall – Block Diagram



► SampleInBall - Module Pin Function Definition

Pin name	I/O	Bit length	Function
clk	I	1	系統時脈
reset	I	1	系統同步重置信號
sampler_in_ready	I	1	Keack模組資料準備好的指示信號
sampler_in	I	1344	Keack模組的輸入資料
sampler_squeeze	O	1	和Keack模組要求squeeze一組新的輸入資料
next_element	O	1	該element取樣完畢的指示信號 (j[8])
ci	O	23	ci取樣的資料輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中c Mem)
addr_ci	O	8	ci取樣的位址輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中c Mem)
addr_cj	O	8	cj取樣的位址輸出通道 (連接Data_Mem中c Mem)
en_ci	O	1	ci取樣的致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中c Mem)
we_cj	O	1	ci取樣的寫入致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中c Mem)
en_ci	O	1	cj取樣的致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中c Mem)
we_cj	O	1	cj取樣的寫入致能信號 (連接Data_Mem中c Mem)

► SampleInBall – Timing Diagram



► How to Use a Testing Platform

- ✓ Folder Structure :

ML_DSA_syn → Module_Test_py → module_name (ex. ExpandA, SampleInBall)

- ✓ File :

1. module_name_golden.txt → Generate test data from ML_DSA_44_excellent_final_clean.py
2. module_name_testbench_golden.txt → Compare with the Memory storage results in the TestBench.
3. module_name_testbench_test_code.txt → Generate Verilog for TestBench testing from module_name.py
4. module_name.py → Main test Python file

```
ExpandA > ExpandA.golden.txt
1 p = bytearray(b'4\x04\xfd\xb5\xacr\xde%\x0cb\x12\xab\x93\x93\x9e\xab\x0e\xec\xc6\x07\x9er\x19\x9b\x86 ')
2
3 A = [list([1446389, 3582979, 4819664, 3738918, 1526959, 1860970, 3729351, 1101493, 7664992, 2262762, 322992
4 5870581, 371290, 2174948, 7114513, 5889978, 1475643, 4935184, 545110, 1257438, 1296180, 1451901, 4765498, 6
5 3563076, 2123106, 2586010, 7539212, 5096512, 5537375, 7488197, 4838012, 1570029, 4362897, 646847, 5026561,
6 | list([5904261, 7524882, 3841115, 3294537, 7233516, 3425306, 5401846, 7630658, 7849337, 601666, 223122, 82
7 122515, 3245484, 6970063, 4691100, 6301555, 8208488, 4559545, 2388308, 4781502, 4160249, 6626431, 728018, 2
8 137175, 2934387, 6516218, 2641527, 1329659, 4227653, 2144000, 5161949, 2749773, 5298600, 1173371, 5068900,
9 808973, 3198881, 6606702, 7957769, 4974664, 5806334, 5201472, 6995895, 3595668, 7709015, 2790284, 2966508,
10 | list([3511722, 4595808, 232952, 6365853, 6115491, 7384854, 337208, 7671334, 1228355, 311919, 119
11 4157791, 7728400, 3402069, 7899354, 333848, 5293844, 134789, 4785796, 7603551, 3449458, 5223071, 458127, 31
12 8190818, 6748168, 5247864, 7448918, 2798713, 5244335, 1849483, 5066621, 1914931, 62543, 5109705, 528379, 26
13 7673811, 1474916, 3209775, 5931767, 1349167, 4145141, 864088, 5972662, 5049159, 3885556, 586621, 7920471, 4
14 | list([7016456, 6102333, 2819982, 2557978, 819549, 3183455, 4601777, 2020619, 3050175, 2617769, 6730888, 7
15 1823064, 4856646, 1864992, 3669470, 5898274, 331695, 3398951, 24022, 1350728, 2385708, 3288972, 6753848, 83
16 7429594, 3580826, 1902799, 1764251, 3762022, 7961380, 7272042, 7373490, 979941, 7371243, 161561, 1792182, 63]
```

```
ExpandA > ExpandA.testbench_golden.txt
1 /***A_0_0***/
2 a[0] = 1446389
3 a[1] = 3582979
4 a[2] = 4819664
5 a[3] = 3738918
6 a[4] = 1526959
7 a[5] = 1860970
8 a[6] = 3729351
9 a[7] = 1101493
10 a[8] = 7664992
11 a[9] = 2262762
12 a[10] = 3229924
13 a[11] = 6198351
14 a[12] = 1107003
```


```
ExpandA > ExpandA.testbench_test_code.txt
1 mode = 1;
2 /***A_0_0***/
3 mem sel = 0;
4 #170; //padder
5 #240; //f_p
6 #10 send_input(1344'h55C338A5B40BCACA9B2E76B1FFC1EA
7
8 wait(sampler_squeeze);
9 #170; //padder
10 #240; //f_p
11 #10 send_input(1344'h5AD2B1B8A3919B3B92F29290349D47
12
13 wait(sampler_squeeze);
14 #170; //padder
15 #240; //f_p
16 #10 send_input(1344'h905F06F9319A0AF575C8A36668B7FE
```

```
ExpandA > ExpandA.py ...
38
39 # 算法 7: BytesToBits(y)
40 > def BytesToBits(z): ...
41
42 > def Verilog_trans(a): ...
43
44 > def RejNTTPoly(p,r,s): ...
45
46 > def CoeffFromThreeBytes(b0,b1,b2): ...
47
48 > def ExpandA(p):
49
50     mode = 1;
51     # ***A_0_0***
52     mem sel = 0;
53     #170; //padder
54     #240; //f_p
55     #10 send_input(1344'h55C338A5B40BCACA9B2E76B1FFC1EA
56
57     wait(sampler_squeeze);
58     #170; //padder
59     #240; //f_p
60     #10 send_input(1344'h5AD2B1B8A3919B3B92F29290349D47
61
62     wait(sampler_squeeze);
63     #170; //padder
64     #240; //f_p
65     #10 send_input(1344'h905F06F9319A0AF575C8A36668B7FE
```

07

Current progress

► Current progress



08

References

► References

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