The distinction is also an epistemic one, being it a matter of *how* we get to know the meaning of the two different types of propositions. A tradition developed in Analytical Philosophy, located as a central stage between logical positivism prior to World War II (1939–45) and the post was phase of Linguistic Analysis [2]

Wittgenstein said that language represents the world by depicting it. Propositions, he says, are pictures of facts, and equally, proposition a vehicle of thought which are what we think with. Language is a mirror of the stats of affairs objects are engaged. Ethical judgements and aesthetical evaluations, he explains, are not part of language proper.because, he maintains, they do not deal with facts. He insists that the real function of language is the describing of facts and that is what language fundamentally is. Judgements of value are not a matter of describable fact, they are transcendental.

In psychophysics judgement is the ability of recognise the presence or relative magnitude of stimuli (i.e. any agent event or situation- internal or external- that elicits a response from an organism) including emotions of others and mental states. Judgements involve interpretation. This is, generally speaking, the capacity of recognise relationships draw conclusions from evidence and make critical evaluations of events and people.

Positivism. A philosophycal movement founded by Auguste Comte, enjoyed a wide diffusion across the second half of the nineteen century, eclipsed by *neopositivism* in the twentieth century. Positivism constructs a moral doctrine that own nothing to the supernatural

Facts and Normative Thinking Traditional opposition between *factual* and *normative*. Factual judgements assert or deny [judgement do not "express" x, maybe "rule on" or "utter"? no assert/deny] facts that *are the case* or a properly justified believe, while normative judgements assert or deny what *ought* to be the case weather or not it *actually* is the case. Examples of factual judgements are sentences such as "copper is a metal" or "$2 + 2 = 4$". They are *truth-apt* judgements because they are either true or false in there being some corresponding *fact* which settles the question of their truth value. We cannot have different opinions on "$2+2 = 4$" in that there exists a system of mathematical principles that if accepted makes us committed to the believe "$2 + 2 = 4$". there are corresponding *fact* that makes these locutions true or false. On the other hand, examples of normative judgements might be "innocents ought not to be punished". These are propositions that express something that ought to be the case but that does not have any corresponding fact that makes it true or false. This is in fact a social claim made true via consensus or social comparison. Dichotomy of descriptive and evaluative utterance.



This distinction presuppose a sufficient prior understanding of the relevant and contrasting uses of *is* and *ought* or *should* (for the time being I will not discuss in details the further distinction between the latter two terms). It is important to notice that, the presence of such marks as *is/should* or *ought* is neither a sufficient nor necessary criterion for the distinction. This is due to the striking variability of the relevant uses of *is* and *ought* in every day language. The sentence *copper should be a metal* is not intended to be normative, similarly to *murder is evil* which is not meant to be factual.
Some philosophical theories claim that *moral judgements* lack of some properties desirable property that factual statements attain such as *objectivity* or *truth-apt*.

The scope of Ethics To provide systems of general theories of reasons for action. It is in this very same domain that Ethics differs from the other *positive science*. Ethics is a *practical* science whose *end* is the direction of human actions. In the *Methods of Ethics* Sidgwick (1838-1900) explains that the Methods that Ethics seeks to build is made of *rational procedures* by which we can determine what *individual* humans (Aristotle's moral agents) *ought to do*, or try to bring about with *voluntary actions*. Ethics aims to build a systematic and precise general knowledge of what *ought to be* and in this sense its aim and methods can be called scientific [5]

Metaethics Of a different nature are questions about Ethics are there moral facts, if so how could we know them? Without such facts what else could make moral judgements true. Recall that to make a judgement is to *affirm the truth* of some claim or content. Judgements are mental states or attitudes in connection to a mental representation of existing objects. "The initial claim is that for propositions to be true is for them to stand in a special relation to things in the world; they must "fit" those things; or, as it is usually put, they must correspond to them" [4]. []go back to metaphysics and search for predicates link particulars and universal then go down to predicate and proposition this is for talking about the king of judgement which we define in the tree]. According to

Kant judgment (*Urteil*) is any conscious mental representation of.. [not finished 13/01/2020 went on judgment research]

Judgements. Not easy to define. Some of the interesting points of [3] are that knowledge could be achieved by judgement if we know what is to be judge. But if we see judgements as being beliefs, than judgments can only be a tool to knowledge not knowledge themselves. Agent is hard to define, but surely it has some properties that we can recognise. Judgement is an activity of cognitive agents. To judge is *to do* something, to interpret, to asses evidence and facts, trough which a conclusion can be reached. When we judge we reach a conclusion in response to evidence [3]. An *intention* is a judgement to act. Martin explains that judgement shows three different *faces*. A *psychological face* as it figures in the explanation of the behaviour of intelligent organisms whether one is investigating voluntary actions, capacities for perceptual discrimination, and so on. A second face of judgement is *logical*. A judgement is an activity of rational agents guided by inferential structures and therefore governed by logical principles. The third is a *phenomenological face*. What is it like to judge? How do judgements manifest as such in our experience? Phenomenology is the study of the *structures of experience*, particularly the way in which entities, objects, actions, events numbers, ideas and so on manifest themselves in experience *for subjects* that experience them. It is beyond my purpose here to enter into debate with this other concept of judgement. *The problem of the copula.* What is the difference between "Socrates, wisdom" (p) and "Socrates *is* wise (q)? "q" is a judgement, p simply named a person and a property [not the best example...].Again, q is a truth-evaluable object but p is something like a list, and, of it, we cannot say to be true or false. *Problem of affirmation.* If we recall what we said above, that judgement affirms the truth about a claim, it is necessary to explain the difference between the mere occurrence of some psychological or semantic content and, *the affirmation of that content to be true.Problem of negation.* If q above seems to unify a person with the idea of wisdom in a way that somehow it reflect the unity of the person and the property, what are negative judgements? Are they acts of separation? There are other problem that I will not consider here. In any case, all problems open up on a set of problems about *truth and intentionally*, a judgement is after all a judgement about *something*, and it is evaluable as true or false. [p and q are predicates] There is no agreement on how judgments should be defined [3]. Teological judgements are kinds of factual judgements even though they are also evaluative. in [1] consequentialism would claim that all ethical judgements are ultimately judgements about the way in which actions produce things of *intrinsic value*

Also in connection to computing science. *Classification* is a pervasively important component of human life. We sort things by colour, shape, by kind and so on, very little (if anything) that counts as *experience* is not grouped and classified into some category that reflects some classification interests. In

so being subjectively functional, some classification is not immune from bias, need, or affected by given goals and values. Even so, very few would be ready to deny the existence of classifying criteria that are fixed by the classified object. It would be wrong to say that "this triangle" looks like a triangle to me, but might not be so for someone else looking at the same object. A triangle is just a triangle because it is a triangular object which is not just a mere consequence of human liking (thought or language), the fact that triangles are triangular objects is an antecedently given fact about them (i.e. existing before I classify it as a triangle) accounting for an *objective similarity* among things (triangles)[4]. Such objective similarities are called attributes (features, or characteristics) that are not only one of the cutting edge technology behind Machine Learning, but also an hold *philosophical truism* that, starting way back from Plato, have given rise to significant philosophical discussion. [say how it is connected to this]. *attribute agreement schema:*

Definition 1 (*Attribute agreement*) *Where a number of objects* $a, ..., n$ *agree in attributes, there is a thing* φ*, and a relation* R*, such that for each* $a, ..., n$ *bears* $R \xrightarrow{to} \varphi$ *and it is in virtue of standing in* $Rto\varphi$ *that* $a, ..., n$ *have the same attribute-* $\forall x \in \Phi, (x \in \Phi \Longleftrightarrow xR\varphi)$*.[formalism has to be reviewed. bear in mind that* R *is already a relation.] All* $x \in \Phi$ *instantiate (if the term gives troubles substitute it with exhibit) the property* φ*.*

Hence, it is important to catch that it is in in virtue of the instantiation of a property that an object have been classified (as being an object in Φ). Philosophers who shared Plato's schema have been called *metaphysical realists* or simply realists. A realistic ontology presuppose a distinction between two types or categories. The category of what is being instantiated called *universals* and what instantiates called *particulars.* Particulars are the xs we saw above or any of the $a, ..., n$ objects- they are things. Universals are any of the φ an object exhibit. This characterisation might seem circular. In [4] we read that particulars are things such as familiar concrete objects. What is peculiar to the is that at a given time only one particular can occupy the same region/portion of space. With the peculiarity of in contrast universals are constructed as *repetitive* entities: "at the same time, numerically one and the same universal can be exemplified by numerically different, spatially discontinuos particulars [...]" in such a way that different people can be wise at the same time, and apples be red and so on. Hence *non-repeatable* entities stand in a special relation with repeatable entities