# EECS 388 Introduction to Computer Security

Welcome; The Security Mindset Jan 7, 2015



## Today's Class

- Welcome!
- Goals for the course
- Security Mindset
  - Thinking like an attacker
  - Thinking as a defender
- Course mechanics
- Ethics

#### Who are we?

#### Z. Morley Mao

**CSE Professor** 

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Office: 4629 Beyster

**Eric Wustrow** 

CSE Ph.D. candidate


Web: ericw.us/trow

Email: ewust@umich

Office: 4828 Beyster


Hours: Mon 1-2PM, Wed 4-5PM

#### Who are we?




- Z. Morley Mao
- CSE Prof. in software lab
- UC Berkeley Ph.D.
- http://www.eecs.umich.edu/~zmao
- Office: 4629 Beyster
- Research interests: networks, mobile computing, network/system security.

#### Android security: UI State Hijacking




SocialWatch: Legitimate Users of Online Services are Socially-Connected, not for Malicious Ones

- Combating attackers are challenging for online services (e.g. email):
  - \* 682 million users and 5.745 billion edges.
  - \* Attackers evolve developing counter strategies
  - \* Existence of hijacked users (hard-to-detect spy!)




- What's fundamentally unique for legitimate?
  - \* Socially-connected (small-world theory) forming a big "island"
  - \* People they talk to may inter-connect
  - \* In the social graph, their contacts are close in distance

#### SocialWatch: Online Service Protection System with Social Graphs




- Robust social features to detect malicious / hijacked users
- Classify 101.1 million legitimate users, detect 1.1 million hijacked users & 11.9 million malicious users (previous unknown) with
  - < 1% false positive

- **GCC** (Giant Connected Component) users are mostly legitimate
- \* Good-user profile computation
- \* Good users talk to good users (legitimate user expansion)




## Discovered a New Stealthy Spamming Technique

 Hypothesis -- ISPs only block outgoing dest port 25, not incoming source port 25




 Can allow their IPs still be used in spamming (relay bot)






IP spoofing

#### Detecting One Directional Port 25 Blocking




 But, we can use IPID value (identifier in IP header) -- monotonically increasing




 Results: 97% of 688 studied prefixes indeed only blocked outgoing dest port 25


## My work: anticensorship



## My work - cyberphysical security








#### Who are we?



Alishah Chator alishahc@



**Dylan Hurd** drhurd@




Andrew Lee ajyl@




Luis Molina luismol@



Zane Salem zsalem@



**Brad Warren** bradmw@



Peter Xie xiep@

#### **Course Topics**

**The Security Mindset** Principles, threat modeling...

**Applied Cryptography** Public and private-key cryptography, digital signatures

and authentication, hash functions, secure channels...

**Internet Security** IP, TCP, routing, network protocols, web architecture,


web attacks, Firewalls, intrusion detection


**Application Security** Defensive programming, memory protection,

sandboxing, virtual machines, buffer overflows, malware

Culture, Law, and Politics Privacy, security and the law, digital rights management,

voting, ethics...





	The security mindset Threat models, vulnerabilities, attacks; how to think like an attacker and a defender	Python tutorial
Jan. 12  Message integrity, pseudorandom functions  Alice and Bob, crypto games, Kerckhoffs's principle, hashes and MACs	Jan. 14  Randomness and pseudorandomness  Generating randomness, PRGs, one-time pads	Introduce Crypto Project Python tutorial
Jan. 19 Martin Luther King, Jr. Day– No lecture	Jan. 21  Block ciphers  Simple ciphers, AES, block cipher modes  Homework 1 due 6pm	Review Homework 1 Introduce Homework 2
Jan. 26 <b>Key exchange and key management</b> Diffie-Hellman key exchange, man-in-the-middle attacks	Jan. 28  Public-key crypto  RSA encryption, digital signatures, secret sharing  Crypto Project due 6pm	Review Crypto Project Introduce Web Project

#### Goals for this Course

- Critical thinking
   How to think like an attacker
   How to reason about threats and risks
   How to balance security costs and benefits
- Technical skills
   How to protect yourself
   How to manage and defend systems
   How to design and program secure systems
- Learn to be a security-conscious citizen
- Learn to be a 1337 hax@r, but an ethical one!

## Getting to Know You

- 1. Meet two new people and learn their names.
- 2. Take your picture and email us:

To: eecs388-staff@umich.edu


Subject: <your\_uniqname>



- > What name should we call you?
- > What's your year and major?
- > Can you program?
- > In C? In Python? In x86 asm?
- > What would you like to learn in 388?

5 minutes. Go!

## What is Computer Security?




Math?

Engineering?

Philosophy?

Natural Sciences?

#### What's the Difference?





## Meet the Adversary

"Computer security studies how systems behave in the presence of an *adversary*."

The adversary a.k.a. the attacker a.k.a. the bad guy

\* An *intelligence* that actively tries to cause the system to misbehave.




## "Know your enemy."

- Motives?
- Capabilities?
- Degrees of access?

## The Security Mindset

- Thinking like an attacker
  - Understand techniques for circumventing security.
  - Look for ways security can break, not reasons why it won't.
- Thinking like a defender
  - Know what you're defending, and against whom.
  - Weigh benefits vs. costs:
     No system is ever completely secure.
  - "Rational paranoia!"

## High-Level Approaches



## Why Study Attacks?

Identify vulnerabilities so they can be fixed. Create incentives for vendors to be careful. Learn about new classes of threats.

- Determine what we need to defend against.
- Help designers build stronger systems.
- Help users more accurately evaluate risk.

## "Insecurity"?

#### Hierarchy

#### "Attack"

Assault recipe, vulnerabilities are ingredients

#### Level-2 Problem: "Weakness"

Factors that predispose systems to vulnerability

#### Level-1 Problem: "Vulnerability"

Specific errors that could be exploited in an assault.

#### Level-o Problem: "Assault"

Actual malicious attempt to cause harm.

## Thinking Like an Attacker

Look for weakest links – easiest to attack.

- Identify assumptions that security depends on. Are they false?
- Think outside the box: Not constrained by system designer's worldview.

Practice thinking like an attacker: For every system you interact with, think about what it means for it to be secure, and image how it could be exploited by an attacker.



#### **Exercises**

Breaking into the CSE building?

#### Exercises

What are some security systems you interact with in everyday life?

## Thinking as a Defender

- Security policy
  - What are we trying to protect?
  - What properties are we trying to enforce?
- Threat model
  - Who are the attackers? Capabilities? Motivations?
  - What kind of attack are we trying to prevent?
- Risk assessment
  - What are the weaknesses of the system?
  - What will successful attacks cost us?
  - How likely?
- Countermeasures
  - Costs vs. benefits?
  - Technical vs. nontechnical?

Challenge is to think rationally and rigorously about risk.

Rational paranoia.

## **Security Policies**

- What assets are we trying to protect?
- What properties are we trying to enforce?
  - Confidentiality
  - Integrity
  - Availability
  - Privacy
  - Authenticity

:

#### **Threat Models**

- Who are our adversaries?
  - Motives?
  - Capabilities?
- What kinds of attacks do we need to prevent?
   (Think like the attacker!)



Limits: Kinds of attacks we should ignore?

## **Assessing Risk**

Remember: Controlled paranoia

- What would security breaches cost us?
  - Direct costs: Money, property, safety, ...
  - Indirect costs: Reputation, future business, well being, ...
- How likely are these costs?
  - Probability of attacks?
  - Probability of success?

#### Countermeasures

Technical countermeasures

Nontechnical countermeasures
 Law, policy (government, institutional),
 procedures, training, auditing, incentives, etc.

### **Security Costs**

- No security mechanism is free
  - Direct costs:
     Design, implementation, enforcement, false positives
  - Indirect costs:
     Lost productivity, added complexity
- Challenge is rationally weigh costs vs. risk
  - Human psychology makes reasoning about high cost/low probability events hard

#### Exercises

- Should you lock your door?
  - Assets?
  - Adversaries?
  - Risk assessment?
  - Countermeasures?
  - Costs/benefits?

#### **Exercises**

Should you lock your bike?

#### **Exercises**

Using a credit card safely?

### Secure Design

- Common mistake:
   Trying to convince yourself that the system is secure
- Better approach:
   Identify the weaknesses of your design and focus on correcting them

Secure design is a process
 Must be practiced continuously; can't be retrofitted

#### Where to Focus Defenses

- Trusted components
   Parts that must function correctly for the system to be secure.
- Attack surface
   Parts of the system exposed to the attacker
- Complexity vs. security?

# Other Principles

Defense-in-Depth

Diversity

Maintainability

. . .

#### **Exercises**

Preventing cheating on the final?

#### **Exercises**


Preventing you from stealing my password?

# **Security Testing**

- Testing against requirements
  - What are the right requirements?
- Adversarial testing
  - Black box testing
  - White box testing
- Example: Voting

# Learning from Failures


- Time-honored engineering practice, emerging in security
- Identifying causes of failures
- What can failure teach us?



#### Recall Goals for this Course

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   How to balance security costs and benefits
- Technical skills
   How to protect yourself
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# Grading



### Class Participation (5%)

Attendance
Alertness
Asking questions
Taking part in discussions
Making intellectual contributions

Get points for speaking up and contributing substantial ideas.

Lose for being completely silent, frequently missing class, browsing the web, etc.

# Class Participation (5%)

C.B. Fried | Computers & Education 50 (2008) 906–914

Table 2
Degree to which students felt aspects of the class interfered with their ability to learn lecture material

Item	Mean	SD	n
Other students' computer use <sup>a</sup>	3.65	2.35	120
Own computer use <sup>ab</sup>	3.55	2.13	78
Other students talking <sup>bc</sup>	3.16	1.95	119
Length of class <sup>c</sup>	2.98	1.96	120
Other students coming, going, and fidgeting <sup>c</sup>	2.75	1.60	121
Style of class (primarily lecture) <sup>d</sup>	2.26	1.96	119
Time of day <sup>e</sup>	1.96	1.57	120
Classroom environment <sup>e</sup>	1.88	1.35	120
Instructor's use of PowerPoint <sup>f</sup>	1.37	.79	120


Higher numbers indicate greater reported levels of interference.

*Note:* Items that share a superscript do not differ at the .02 level, based on pairwise comparisons.

911

# Class Participation (5%)

### Is there a correlation between use of cell phones during lecture and student grades?



- 75% of students surveyed use a phone during lecture.
- Their frequency of use averaged 7x per hour
- Their class grades averaged 0.36 ± 0.08 lower. (A=4.0, B=3.0... scale)

Research by D. Duncan, A. Hoekstra, B. Wilcox, Univ. of Colorado, 2012

#### Homework Exercises (25%)

Five sets of exercises, done individually. Problems or short written analysis. Will be posted on course site. Can discuss problems approaches, but complete and turn in own work. Submit everything via CTools.

Homework 1 available today.
 Due Wednesday, Jan 21 at 6 p.m.

# Programming Projects (40%)

#### Five programming projects, working in pairs:

- 1. Cryptography
- 2. Web security
- 3. Network security
- 4. Application security
- 5. Computer forensics

Will be posted on course site. Start early! Go to discussions!

Crypto Project available next Monday.
 Due Wednesday, Jan 28 at 6 p.m.

### **Lateness Policy**

#### Our constraints:

Return graded work promptly. Go over solutions in the following week's discussion.

#### Strict lateness policy:

- 10% penalty for being late.
- Lose additional 10% every 5 hours.
- One penalty-free late exception
- Can't accept work after 20 hours.
- Extensions in extraordinary circumstances only.

#### Please start early!

# **Collaboration Policy**

- Encourage you to help each other learn. You may give or receive help on concepts. However, all written work/code must be done by you/your team.
- Cheating is when you give/receive an unfair advantage on assigned work.
- Questions? See us.
- No cheating!
   (If we catch you cheating, we won't tell you until after the exam.)

#### Final Exam (30%)

During exam period.

Covers the entire course.

Similar format to homework questions.

#### Lectures

Come to lecture.

Take notes! Works best if hand written.

Interrupt, ask questions, share stories.

### Lab/Discussion Sections

 Learn secure programming techniques, vital information for completing projects, detailed reviews of completed assignments.

Discussions start today!

#### Communication

Piazza ......... questions, discussion, announcements

Ctools .......... homework/project submission

eecs388-staff@umich.edu .... administrative issues

#### Law and Ethics

#### Don't be evil!

- Ethics requires you to refrain from doing harm
- Always respect privacy and property rights
- Otherwise you will fail the course
- Federal and state laws criminalize computer intrusion and wiretapping
  - e.g. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
  - You can be sued or go to jail
- University policies prohibit tampering with campus systems
  - You can be disciplined, even expelled

# **Coming Up**

Monday's lecture...

Alice and Bob Kerckhoffs's principle

Hashes and MACs

Next two weeks...

Applied Crypto
Randomness, Encryption
Key Exchange, Secure Channels