intend to take up the time of the House in referring to those features which are not the subject of contention. As to irrigation, as to financial arrangements, as to the division of the territory into one or more provinces—as to these, there seems to be but little dispute. With your permission, I will devote the time during which you may indulge me, to treating with the main question in dispute, the question of education, and incidentally, the control of the public lands. As to the question of education, section 16 preserves, in my opinion, what we Roman Catholics hold as part of our religious faith—religious instruction in the schools. I need not say that I am a believer in that doctrine, that I am in that respect, altogether at one with the church to which I belong. And it is a gratification to me to know, and I feel fortified to know, that there are many great men, not only in this country, but in the mother country and elsewhere, not professing the religion to which I am attached, who also believe in the necessity of religious instruction in the schools. I say that section 16 is altogether justified under the letter and spirit of our constitution. I say also, and I shall endeavour to demonstrate it, that, on grounds of highest public policy, the enactment of section 16 is altogether expedient and is rendered absolutely necessary. We know the rights which are preserved by section 16. If separate schools are allowed, I care not whether they are called denominational schools or whatever name may be given to them. To my mind there is nothing in the name, or very little—it is altogether in the principle, a principle which is sanctioned, admitted, and perpetuated by section 16, insisting on the right or privilege of the minority to give religious instruction in the schools of the Northwest Territories.

This privilege is recognized and in existence to-day by virtue of the statute of 1875 and by virtue of the ordinances of 1901 which have been passed pursuant to that statute. My hon. friend the leader of the opposition devoted a large portion of his speech to demonstrate as a legal proposition that the statute of 1875 could at any time have been repealed and that it could be repealed to-day. He cited the authority of Sir John Thompson and others in support of that contention. I do not think that any lawyer will dispute that. It is quite clear and must be clear to any lawyer that the Act of 1875 could have been repealed and that it could be repealed now at this very moment. But, Sir, it has not been repealed. It is in existence to-day. The ordinances which have been made in pursuance of that statute are in existence and they will be in existence on the 1st of July when these two provinces join the confederation. The effect of section 16 is to preserve and perpetuate that right upon the admission of the two new provinces. I say, that, under the letter of sections 93 and 146 of the British North America Act, that clause is not only justified, but it is necessary. The real question with me is to determine what is the right of the province at the moment it enters the union in the words of section 93. The whole question with me is determined by the fact that the right or privilege mentioned in the section exists concurrently with the creation or birth of the province as a province. The word 'province' in section 93 means the province, not before, but the province at the moment that it enters confederation and for ever thereafter. But before it does enter as a province it is not a province of the union and consequently if it has been admitted as a territory the provisions of section 93 have no application. The provisions contained in the British North America Act, 1867, are provisions which apply to and which regulate the relations of the provinces of the union which determine the rights, privileges and obligations of the provinces as provinces. In section 1 to section 146 of the British North America Act are contained the provisions, stipulations and agreements made between the original partners to the confederation, which are applicable to the provinces of the union and to the provinces of the union only. Surely it cannot be contended that the original British North America Act, 1867, section 1 to section 146, was intended to regulate and determine the relations of any part of British North America other than the provinces which agreed at that time to form part of the confederation or which later on were to be added thereto. I repeat, Sir, that the right to be preserved is the right concurrent with and co-existent with the creation of the province or existing at the time of its entering into the union. Take section 93 and what is its plain ordinary meaning? I say, referring to the words of the section, that the word province in the section—

—Any right or privilege with respect to denominational schools which any class of persons have by law in the province at the union.

——means nothing else than a province coming into the confederation as a province and not as a territory. My hon. friend the leader of the opposition, in order to make good his point, says that because the Territories had been admitted into the confederation in 1870 section 93 has no longer its application; in other words, that the provisions of section 93 must be applied as to the Territories in 1870, because, according to him, that is the date at which they came into the union. Well, I say that in order to come to that conclusion my learned and hon. friend has had to do what he charged the government with doing in this case, he has had to interpolate into section 93 a word which is not to be found in section 93. He has had to interpolate the word 'territory' into the section which is not to be found in the section. He has had, in fact, to substitute for the