

lying positions. In terms of defence this means that the continent as a whole must think in naval terms and must advance its defence far off from shore to prevent threat of invasion or of serious damage to the island citadel.

We are concerned here with one aspect of the entire Atlantic effort — the thrust northeastward, particularly as it impinges on Newfoundland. This thrust is readily divisible into two arms, that along the coast and that coming out of the St. Lawrence valley. The Maritime Provinces of Canada and Newfoundland are the area in which the two thrusts meet. The area of meeting has not been stationary but constantly moving. In the 17th century, French (or St. Lawrence) influence extended well into the present State of Maine. In the 18th the Gut of Canso was its extreme southwestern limit. In the first half of the 19th, St. Lawrence influence was still further curtailed and was hardly visible beyond Gaspé. Then with modern communications came its rapid recovery. Confederation extended it throughout the three Maritime Provinces, and note the absorption of all local banking institutions by the large Canadian banks, and the Bank of Nova Scotia's conversion of itself into a Montreal organisation — and the economic forces of which Confederation was a counterpart worked over the political boundary into Maine, once more tying a good part of that state into the structure.

A similar extension went on to the north-eastward; with the railway built to Port-aux-Basques, the way was open for an assault on the last stronghold of maritism, Newfoundland. This assault was delayed, but when it came, the main manoeuvre in it was the establishment of the steamer route from Sydney to Port-aux-Basques, and the building of the Newfoundland railway across the island to St. John's. This of course was not the only means by which St. Lawrence influences came in, but it immensely facilitated their ingress. The Canadianisation of island finance was a subsidiary movement based on this St. Lawrence system of communication, as was the Canadianisation of two of our major denominations within recent years. Other evidences of the St. Lawrence impact will suggest themselves. In a mechanical age, the St. Lawrence holds the trump cards of transportation — steamship, rail and air. Its most serious disability is its winter closing, which forces it back to its second

line through Sydney or Halifax.

Since the summer of 1940 political events have given renewed vitality to the other arm of the thrust. American influence has been vastly strengthened by the grant of the bases which has been characterised as "moving the American boundary 700 miles eastward". The American flag now flies in Newfoundland, American sailors and soldiers are to be seen on the streets and American ships in the harbour. American civilians are following, most of them as tourists and out of curiosity, some on the outlook for business. Behind this renewed Atlantic push lies the gigantic wealth and power of the United States....

If the Maritime Provinces are the continental termination of the Appalachian Barrier, Newfoundland is in its extreme end, severed from the rest of the formation by the sea. It thus affords the clearest illustration of the marginal nature of the maritime region, set as it is squarely at the intersection of the two lines of force. To put the point another way, it is within the overlapping fields of those two great metropolitan magnets which have been battling each other for three centuries past, Montreal and New York. Like other Atlantic lands, it is of course also within the magnetic field of another metropolitan area, Great Britain. The pulls of the three, as its history indicates, have never been constant or equal upon it. Newfoundland may be likened to a buoy fast to a long mooring chain in water where strong currents run; the buoy streams out from its mooring first this way and then that, dependent upon the direction of the current.

Newfoundland lies across the sea entrance to the Dominion of Canada, and may well be described as Canada's front door. If the door were closed by the island's coming into unfriendly possession, it would menace Canada's main highway with the outside world. The ports of the Maritime Provinces would remain, but their use involves an additional rail-haul of 500 to 1,000 miles. If the door were locked, as by hostile occupation, it would be difficult to keep communication going even through the ports of the Maritimes. This becomes obvious when the narrowness and difficulty of the passages north and south of Newfoundland are realised....

The situation works just as well in reverse. Given effective defence of Newfoundland by