

duties. Still, the objection made to this was very strong. It was said: "Suppose you appoint them for nine years, what will be the effect? For the last three or four years of their term they would be anticipating its expiry, and anxiously looking to the Administration of the day for re-appointment; and the consequence would be that a third of the members would be under the influence of the Executive." The desire was to render the Upper House a thoroughly independent body—one that would be in the best position to canvass dispassionately the measures of this House, and stand up for the public interests in opposition to hasty or partisan legislation. It was contended that there is no fear of a dead-lock. We were reminded how the system of appointing for life had worked in past years, since Responsible Government was introduced; we were told that the complaint was not then, that the Upper Chamber had been too obstructive a body—not that it had sought to restrain the popular will, but that it had too faithfully reflected the popular will. Undoubtedly that was the complaint formerly pressed upon us—(hear, hear,)—and I readily admit that if ever there was a body to whom we could safely entrust the power which by this measure we propose to confer on the members of the Upper Chamber, it is the body of gentlemen who at this moment compose the Legislative Council of Canada. The forty-eight Councillors for Canada are to be chosen from the present chamber. There are now thirty-four members from the one section, and thirty-five from the other. I believe that of the sixty-nine, some will not desire to make their appearance here again, others, unhappily, from years and infirmity, may not have strength to do so; and there may be others who will not desire to qualify under the Statute. It is quite clear that when twenty-four are selected for Upper Canada and twenty-four for Lower Canada, very few indeed of the present House will be excluded from the Federal Chamber; and I confess I am not without hope that there may be some way yet found of providing for all who desire it, an honorable position in the Legislature of the country. (Hear, hear.) And, after all, is it not an imaginary fear—that of a dead-lock? Is it at all probable that any body of gentlemen who may compose the Upper House, appointed as they will be for life, acting as they will do on personal and not party responsibility, possessing as they must, a deep stake in the welfare of the country, and desirous as they must be of

holding the esteem of their fellow-subjects—would take so unreasonable a course as to imperil the whole political fabric? The British House of Peers itself does not venture, *à l'outrance*, to resist the popular will, and can it be anticipated that our Upper Chamber would set itself rashly against the popular will? If any fear is to be entertained in the matter, is it not rather that the Councillors will be found too thoroughly in harmony with the popular feeling of the day? And we have this satisfaction at any rate, that, so far as its first formation is concerned—so far as the present question is concerned—we shall have a body of gentlemen in whom every confidence may be placed. (Hear, hear.) But it is objected that in the constitution of the Upper House, so far as Lower Canada is concerned, the existing electoral divisions are to be maintained, while, as regards Upper Canada, they are to be abolished—that the members from Lower Canada are to sit as representing the divisions in which they reside or have their property qualification; while in Upper Canada there is no such arrangement. Undoubtedly this is the fact; it has been so arranged to suit the peculiar position of this section of the province. Our Lower Canada friends felt that they had French Canadian interests and British interests to be protected, and they conceived that the existing system of electoral divisions would give protection to these separate interests. We, in Upper Canada, on the other hand, were quite content that they should settle that among themselves, and maintain their existing divisions if they chose. But, so far as we in the west were concerned, we had no such separate interests to protect—we had no diversities of origin or language to reconcile—and we felt that the true interest of Upper Canada was that her very best men should be sent to the Legislative Council, wherever they might happen to reside or wherever their property was located. (Hear, hear.) If there is one evil in the American system which in my mind stands out as preëminently its greatest defect, except universal suffrage, it is that under that Constitution the representatives of the people must reside in the constituencies for which they sit. (Hear, hear.) The result is that a public man,—no matter what his talent, or what his position—no matter how necessary it may be for the interest of the country that he should be in public life, unless he happens to belong to the political party popular for the time being in the constituency where he resides, cannot possibly find a se-