served, Mr. SPEAKER, that I am only considering now the question of power and right; the question of what is fit and expedient is quite another matter. We might do well or we might do ill by taking this course, but as we act in our capacity of representatives of the people, it is for us to decide whether it is expedient or advantageous that an appeal should be had to the people under the circumstances. (Hear, hear.) As regards the sentiments of Great Britain in relation to us, the events which have taken place since the union show that they are altogether changed. In 1840 we had a Constitution imposed upon us against our will, and by so doing Great Britain was guilty of injustice towards us. Now they await our decision before they act. In past days England looked upon the colonies as her own special markets, and fortified them by prohibitory duties against foreign trade. Now they are open to the whole world. Formerly we were under a despotic and oligarchical government, and since 1841 we have had that British Parliamentary Government which the great economist TURGOT, more than sixty years before, had advised England to extend to her colonies. (Hear, hear.) Thus the Parliament of Great Britain, which had just proclaimed the union with Ireland, incorporated into its legislature the representation of the latter, and constituted itself, by its own authority, the first Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, without recourse to a dissolution and new elections. At the meeting of the Houses they proceeded to the election of a new Speaker for the Commons, precisely as after a general election, and all the other formalities were observed which, according to custom, accompanied the opening of new parliaments. You will find those details in the *Parliamentary History*, vol. 35, page 857. Here is another authority which the republican-annexation adversaries of Confederation will hardly care to doubt. I find it in pages 164, 165, and 166 of SEDGWICK *on Statutory and Constitutional Law*:—

> ..or are these merely speculative or abstract questions. We shall find them presenting themselves in a large class of cases which I am about to examine. The difficulty, generally, seems to have arisen from a want of accurate notions as to the boundary line which, under our system, divides the legislative and judicial powers. I now turn to a more detailed consideration of the cases in this country, where these questions have been considered and which, so far as they go, tend to give a practical definition to the term *law*, and to define the boundaries which separate the legislative from the judicial power. And first, of causes where the legislature has sought to divest itself of real powers. Efforts have been made, in several cases, by the state legislatures to relieve themselves of the responsibility of their functions, by submitting statutes to the will of the people, in their primary capacity. But these proceedings have been held, and very rightly, to be entirely unconstitutional and invalid. The duties of legislation are not to be exercised by the people at large. The majority governs, but only in the prescribed form; the introduction of practices of this kind would remove all checks on hasty and improvident legislation, and greatly diminish the benefits of representative government. So where an act to establish free schools was, by its terms, directed to be submitted to the electors of the state, to become a law only in case a majority of the votes were given in its favor, it was held, in New York, that the whole proceeding was entirely void. The Legislature, said the Court of Appeals, have no power to make such submission, nor had the people the power to bind each other by acting upon it. They voluntarily surrendered that power when they adopted the constitution. The government of this state is democratic; but it is a representative democracy, and in passing general laws, the people act only through their representatives in the Legislature. And in Pennsylvania, in the case of an excise statute, the same stern and salutary doctrine has been applied. In some of the more recent state constitutions this rule has been made a part of the fundamental law. So in Indiana, the principle is now framed into a constitutional provision which vests the legislative authority in a Senate and House of Representatives, and declares that no act "shall be passed, the taking effect of which shall be made to depend upon any authority except as provided in the Constitution." And under these provisions it has been held that so much of an act as relates to its submission to the popular vote, was null and void.

HON. MR. DORION—In England there are seven or eight acts of Parliament which were submitted to the popular vote before becoming law.

HON. MR. CAUCHON—In England it is admitted that Parliament may do anything and even change the sexes if necessary, according to the doctrine of the honorable member for Brome. (Laughter.) The honorable member for Hochelaga is an admirer of written constitutions; I am citing authorities to suit him, and which it is quite impossible for him to reject. (Hear, hear.) All these authorities establish, by incontestable evidence, the power of Parliament in regard to every question that may come before it. There only remains now the question of convenience and expediency, and that question can only be considered by Parliament. In 1717, 1800,