to us, such a concession must be special. It would not be of very much value to Newfoundland if the United States lowered her customs tariff on fish or fish products going in there from Canada and Iceland and Norway and other countries. It would not serve our purpose very much if the United States abolished those duties altogether on fishery products and did the same thing for all our powerful competitors. No, any concession to us along these lines must be given especially to us, else we will realise very little in the way of advantage from it. The question is, just what practical chance is there of Newfoundland persuading the United States to give her such special, such preferential treatment? The argument used by those who say they see such a possibility is what I might call the bases argument. Nobody has yet suggested that out of the goodness of their hearts the Americans are likely, at our request, to give us such specially favourable treatment. Those who tell us of these possibilities of getting preferential treatment for our fish always use this bases argument. This is the *quid pro quo* argument. The British government and the Newfoundland government in 1941 signed agreements with the Americans giving them 99-year leases of certain small areas of our territories on which to construct defence bases. Newfoundland got nothing in return — save, I suppose, what all those who are engaged on our side of the late war got, the advantage of the defence construction that was actually placed here by the Americans. But that is the argument, sir, Newfoundland got nothing in return and so now we should go to the Government of the United States and ask for something that we should have had in 1941; and the Government of the United States is likely to agree to our request, so we are told. That is the argument.

Sir, the first hard fact that faces us when we consider this matter is that we are proposing to lock the stable door after the horse is gone. The lease agreements were signed in 1941. This is 1947, nearly 1948. The lawful government signed the leases, not under any compulsion from the United States of America, but gladly, and with the feeling that they were doing something to help in time of dire peril, and with the feeling also that they had the people of Newfoundland with them in their action. The leases are signed, the deal is closed. The bases are here. There has not been the slightest scrap of evidence to hint that the Americans would even consider opening up that deal again.

But suppose that in spite of these facts, the Government of the United States, who are not woolly-minded sentimentalists remember, but hard-headed men of affairs, suppose that they went so far as to agree that we had a good case in equity. Would they then give us that for which we ask? Certainly the high permanent officials of the State Department and of the Department of Commerce, and of the United States Treasury, as well as the members of the Cabinet, would give careful consideration to all aspects of the matter before granting our request. And just as certainly as they would take those special aspects into careful account, so it is wise and prudent that we should consider them in this Convention. One aspect which the Government of the United States would be bound to weigh is the fact that they have defence bases in other places besides Newfoundland. Those bases were acquired by the United States at about the same time as those in Newfoundland. If they give Newfoundland special trade concessions because they have bases here, must they not in consistency and justice give similar concessions to those other countries? That is something for us to consider. Another aspect which the United States government would take into account is their policy of never mixing trade concessions with military, naval, and air concessions. That is a definite policy of the United States of America. To do so in Newfoundland would be quite a novelty and would be to create a precedent which, as they would be quick to note, might be fraught with all kinds of possibilities for the future.

Still another aspect which the Government of the United States would undoubtedly consider carefully is the effect that special trade concessions to Newfoundland might have upon the greatest cash customer the United States has in the world. I refer to Canada, which buys many hundreds of millions of dollars worth of goods from her each year. The United States and Canada are each other's greatest customer. The trade, financial, political, and defence relations between them are probably closer than any other two countries in the world. Each of these two great countries is represented by an ambassador in the capital of the other, and the relationship