

tion should be made as to the appointment of the Lieutenant-Governors. But I would invite the attention of the house to the character of that alteration. What was proposed? That the people of each province should elect their governor? No. Whatever favor that view might have met from some parties, it was not the principle laid down by the conference at Quebec. It will be found that the same means by which the governor is appointed to-day would exist under the scheme of the conference. Who appoints the Governor-General and the Lieutenant-Governors at this day? If there is a portion of imperial patronage which is more than another placed within the personal control of the individual who exercises it, it is the appointment of Colonial Governors. In case of a vacancy in any one of these dependencies, the man who fills it up is the Right Hon. Mr. Cardwell sitting in the Colonial office. I would ask, whether under this scheme, when it has been plainly stated by the British government that it would become necessary that they should supply from the ablest British statesmen a Governor or Viceroy, whether the Crown and the people would not have the same guarantee for that influence and control over the appointment of local governors that is exercised now. The difference would be this: Instead of a Colonial Secretary appointing the Lieutenant Governor the Queen's representative sitting at the head of the government of United British America, himself as responsible as a minister of the Crown, would be called upon to discharge that duty, and, at the same time, harmony would be maintained between the local and general government, and the influence of the crown would be as effective as it exists at the present moment. The people of British North America would be in a position to exercise an amount of influence in the selection of the local governors which the, of course, cannot do under existing circumstances.

POWERS OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT.

It was proposed, as I stated before, that all the questions of leading general importance should be entrusted to the general government. There are some thirty-seven in number, but I will only at present draw the attention of the house to some of the more important points:

"The regulation of trade and commerce; the Imposition and Regulation of Excise Duties; the Postal Service; Militia, Military, and Naval Service; Currency and Coinage; Criminal Law; appointment of Judges of the Supreme Courts.

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

To the local governments were reserved powers of an important character, though of a local interest, which could be exercised without any interference whatever with the unity and strength of the central government. The construction of the local governments was to be left to the local legislatures themselves.

The establishment and tenure of Local Offices, and appointment and payment of Local Officers; Education; Sale and Management of Public Lands; Local Works; The Administration of Justice, Property and Civil Rights.

I have only referred to some of the more im-

portant powers that would be given to the local and general governments respectively. The local governments would not interfere with the powers of the general government, or weaken its strength and unity of action, but would be able to deal with such questions as touch the local interests of the country—the construction of roads and bridges, public works, civil jurisdiction, &c.

THE DEBT.

As I stated before the debt of each province was settled upon a principle that I think will commend itself to the approval of every man in British North America, and that is that each province should enter the confederation with precisely the same debt, and if any section was in the position that the construction of local public works did not necessitate the raising of the debt to the same proportionate extent as that of Canada, she should receive from the public revenue the difference. I need not detain the House upon that branch of the subject, for, in the first case it gave to New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia a margin to raise their debt to that point which was required to complete their public works, and at the same time left them in the position that if the money was not expended it should be credited to them.

THE QUESTION OF THE SUBSIDY.

There is another question that has occupied a great deal of attention, and that is the subsidy. It has been stated that the subsidy was insufficient, and that a great mistake was made by the delegates who placed the amount at 80 cents a head, and based it on the census of 1861, instead of making it a larger sum in the first instance, and allowing it to increase according as the population increased. If the delegates from the maritime provinces did not secure sufficiently good terms, I may say frankly, if we came back not having obtained that fair consideration and justice to the provinces which we had a right to demand at the hands of the conference, the fault was our own. The business of that conference was carried on by vote by provinces, and the maritime colonies, instead of standing in a position to allow Canada to dictate her own terms, and being compelled to accept them, they held a position which gave them a great advantage. The vote upon every question, as I have said, was taken by provinces. Every member of that Conference had it in his power to advocate his individual opinions to the best of his ability; but when it came to a vote, the majority of the delegates from each province decided what its vote should be; and therefore, when it is seen that Canada had only two votes, and that the Maritime Provinces had four, it is evident that if the latter—whose interests were identical—did not receive a fair amount of consideration it was not because they did not stand in a position to obtain it. I have no hesitation, however, in going further and saying, if there is any fault to be found with the subsidy to carry on the local governments—the amount necessary to supplement the local funds that