

is now struggling in the horrors of civil war. (Hear, hear.) Honorable gentlemen do not desire Confederation, because there must be an outlay for its defence. But are those, who argue thus, logical? If two and two did not make more than four a moment ago, why would they make five now? If each province, standing in an isolated position, would be obliged to expend money to organize the defence of its territory, why would the combination of all these various outlays in Confederation amount to more than the total of these same expenses otherwise added up? Would this be the case because a single organization ought to be, necessarily, less expensive than six distinct commands? The honorable member for Hochelaga has exaggerated the expenses of the Confederation, as he has everything else; as he exaggerated and perverted, the other day, the words of the Hon. President of the Council.

MR. GEOFFRION—And besides this, the Maritime Provinces have to be paid to come into the Confederation.

HON. MR. CAUCHON—That question will naturally come up in its turn. But it is not the less true that all the provinces come into the Confederation on an equal footing, as their debt is placed in equilibrium; and as, for the purposes of the union, the arrangement is strictly based on the total population of each of them. On a previous occasion, as I have elsewhere quoted, the honorable member for Hochelaga stated that the Maritime Provinces did not choose our alliance, because our debt was too great. Now he does not choose their alliance, because he is afraid we shall have to pay for them. Now that the debt is perfectly equal, in proportion to the total population, and the Conference has so equalized it in order to found Confederation on justice, the Atlantic Provinces consent to the union.

HON. MR. DORION—What provinces are those?

HON. MR. CAUCHON—I allude to New Brunswick and Newfoundland, and I am convinced that the decision of those two provinces will sufficiently influence Nova Scotia to cause her to resolve to come into the Confederation. The Nova Scotian newspapers, even those of them which are most hostile to the scheme, acknowledge that that province cannot remain isolated; and accordingly she awaits the result of the elections in New Brunswick before taking action. In the meantime the journals in question are making incredible exertions to prevail upon

New Brunswick to refuse the great Confederation, because they wish for another and a smaller one, that of the Maritime Provinces alone. Another motive which will induce Nova Scotia to accept the scheme of the Quebec Conference, if New Brunswick should declare herself in favor of it, is that the terminus of the Intercolonial Railway would be fixed at St. John instead of at Halifax; and what would become of Nova Scotia so isolated? She would not consent to it; her writers and her statesmen positively assert it. For our part, we require an outlet upon the Atlantic seaboard, and that we can only have by means of Confederation. (Hear, hear.) To those who cherish different ideas, I can conceive that this matter is not one of equal importance, for they wish to fix their terminus at another point on the Atlantic seaboard. (Hear, hear.) I feel that I have already spoken at length, and I have yet some important points of the scheme to examine. I will not, then, enter into calculations of figures to prove the extravagance and absurdity of those of the hon. member for Hochelaga, preferring, moreover, to leave them in the more skilful and powerful hands of the Hon. Minister of Finance. I shall content myself with telling the hon. member for Hochelaga—and that will suffice for myself as well as for the House and the country—that I prefer Confederation with its prospects of expense, to annexation to the United States with an actual debt of close upon three thousand millions, and with an annual tax of five hundred millions of dollars. The 34th paragraph of the 29th clause of the scheme reads thus: "The establishment of a General Court of Appeal for the Federated Provinces." What is the object—what will be the character of the tribunal? These two questions will naturally present themselves to those who have given any attention to that part of the scheme which refers to the civil and criminal law, and the working of the judiciary. The whole of the clauses which refer to the latter are as complete as the most ardent supporters of union could desire, tempered by the few exceptions by means of which the provinces have wished to shelter their local institutions from attack. (Cheers.) To convince the House of this, I need but read the following:—

31. The General Parliament may also, from time to time, establish additional courts, and the General Government may appoint judges and officers thereof, when the same shall appear