

Petitions were sent in from all parts, praying for the upholding of the Ministry, and for a new creation of peers; reform associations were formed, and serious disturbances took place at London, Bristol, Nottingham, &c. Parliament was prorogued, and at its re-assembling the Reform Bill was again presented with some alterations. The Commons accepted it; it passed a first and a second reading in the House of Lords, but the third reading was adjourned, and WELLINGTON and seventy-four peers protested. Agitation became almost universal; societies met, petitions took a threatening character; everything was tending towards armed insurrection. England never before presented such a spectacle. Meantime the Ministry had demanded of the king a new creation of peers to change the majority of the Upper Chamber. It was refused,—they immediately resigned on the 9th May, 1832. The Duke of WELLINGTON and his friends were then called in to form a Ministry; he tried it several days in vain. The nation was astir; whole armies were being created; riots broke out everywhere; the lives of the principal Tories were threatened, and the House of Commons seemed disposed to support a measure which would have overturned both the Government and the aristocracy. The King called back the GRAY Ministry, and the Bill was presented to the House of Lords for a third reading, on which the Tories, knowing that the Cabinet had decided to create an unlimited number of peers, so as to obtain a majority, abstained from attending the discussion, and the Bill passed by 106 votes against 22. The Parliament was immediately dissolved, and new elections took place according to the new electoral law, and on the 5th of February, 1833, the first Reformed Parliament was opened.

It must then have been a real revolution, this nomination of one hundred new peers, a revolution as real as that which menaced the Throne; and do we not feel persuaded that if one day our Federal Legislative Council were to place itself obstinately and systematically in opposition to popular will, matured and strengthened by ordeals, it would not be swept away by a revolutionary torrent such as threatened to sweep away the House of Lords in 1832? This Council, limited as to numbers, because the provinces insist on maintaining in it an equilibrium without which they would never have consented to a union, this Council, sprung from the people—having the same wants, hopes and even passions, would resist less the popular will in America, where it is so prompt and active, than could the House of Lords in England, where the masses are inert because they have not political rights; reason tells us thus because they would be a less powerful body socially or politically. The honorable member for Hochelaga has

spoken to us of the elected senate of Belgium, which he says works admirably. But let us examine the manner of its construction and the reasons of its organization. We find in a note under the 53rd article of the Belgian Constitution, section 2 of the Senate in *HAVARD'S Public and Administrative Law*, vol. I:—

89. *Elected by the People*.—Three principal opinions divided the Congress on the question of the senate. One wanted no kind of senate. Another wished the senate named with or without conditions, by the head of the state; and another wished for the senate but elected by the people. These two last opinions carried the existence of the Chamber to be admitted, but it was difficult to fix the majority on the mode of nominating the senators. Among the members who desire a senate, the greater number sustained nomination by the king, as being more in harmony with the nature of the institution; but those who wished only one Chamber directly elected being in despair, and in order to popularize an institution which they accused of not being sufficiently so, joined with those favoring senators elected, named without the intervention of the royal power, so that this opinion prevailed. The senate and its mode of existence was not, therefore, the result, either of the same opinion or of the same majority. The central section proposed, with a majority of sixteen against four, nomination by the king without presentation and in unlimited number. The question was discussed at the sitting of the 15th, 16th and 17th December. Nomination by the king was rejected by 96 against 77. Two leading opinions still divided the partisans of election. One would confide it to the ordinary electoral colleges, and others to the Provincial Council or States. "We desire," said M. BLARONIES in proposing the last mode of election "a neutral power which can resist the dangers which might result from the preponderance of the head of the state or from an elective Chamber. It is, therefore, necessary that this power should emanate neither from the same elements as the elective Chamber, nor from the chief of the state." To confide election to a particular class, was said on the other side, is to create privileged electors with a double vote, and to introduce into our country all the inconveniences of the division of electors which has just been abolished in France. Provincial Councils should, moreover, be administrative bodies. The system of article 53 was adopted by 136 votes against 40. The opinion which was in favor of only one Chamber, and consequently only one mode of election, determined the majority.

Thus we find that the constitution of this senate is a compromise similar to that of the Federal Government of the United States. But let us go on a little further:—

In order to be elected and to continue to be a senator, one qualification, among others, is to