

them at that time into a course which is certainly much to be regretted, afterwards led them to countenance a movement of which I disapproved at the time, and which I opposed with all my might—the movement towards annexation. They favored that movement, because they thought they had been aggrieved and maltreated. But I may tell you now, that this feeling has completely vanished, and that their wish now is to place Canada on a footing in which, united with the Lower Provinces and in close connection with Great Britain, she may be thoroughly independent of her neighbors, and free from any need of looking again towards Washington. (Hear, hear.) In considering the project of Confederation, one of the principal subjects which has undergone discussion in this House has been the proposed Constitution of the Council, and the most prominent question connected with it has been the question of the elective *versus* the nominative principle. Although an elected member, I voted without the least hesitation against the elective principle, and I believe that in doing so I represented the views of my constituents as well as my own—I mean the great majority of my constituents, for there may be some exceptions with regard to this point, as there are no doubt with respect to the general question of Confederation. I based my vote on what is, I think, a true principle in politics, which is that if you wish a check to be established, such as I think this Council is intended to establish on the legislation of the other branch, you must not have the two Chambers returnable by the same constituents. If the constituents of both Houses are nearly the same, you lose the power of check, or at least you will not have it effectual, because you will have the same sentiments and feelings represented in this House as in the other. I am not singular in this opinion, but were I to cite the opinions of men who are of a conservative turn of mind, and who have always upheld the privileges of the aristocracy and the prerogative of the Crown, I should, perhaps, give you opinions which would carry less weight with the opponents of this measure than will that of a gentleman whose views I will cite, who has written a great deal, and very ably, and who belongs to the ranks of the advanced Liberal party in England—I mean Mr. JOHN STUART MILL. In his chapter on the Second Chamber (*Considerations on Representative Government*, page 212), he says:—

That there should be in every polity a centre of resistance to the predominant power in the Constitution—and in a democratic constitution, therefore, a nucleus of resistance to the democracy—I have already maintained, and I regard it as a fundamental maxim of government. If any people who possess a democratic representation are, from their historical antecedents, more willing to tolerate such a centre of resistance in the form of a Second Chamber or House of Lords than in any other shape, this constitutes a strong reason for having it in that shape.

Now, honorable gentlemen, I think a Second Chamber, constituted nearly in the same way as the Lower Chamber, would be wholly ineffectual to stop the current of legislation coming from that Chamber; the point, indeed, admits of very little question. (Hear, hear.) The objections which have been raised to nomination by the Crown or the Executive Government are of very little effect at this time of day. For myself I should have preferred to have the nomination of legislative councillors vested in the Crown independently of the recommendation of the Local Government, so as to have left the prerogative unfettered. There is no doubt that abuses formerly existed in Canada when the nominative system was in force—before responsible government was established and when the Colonial Office meddled a good deal with the affairs of the provinces; but now every honorable gentleman with any knowledge of historical events in Canada will say at once the case is altogether altered. So far from interfering in our internal matters, the Colonial Office now leaves us a great deal to ourselves and lets us do as we please. There never was a freer Constitution than ours. Under these altered circumstances, I should have preferred, I say, that in order to avoid all appearance of nominations for party purposes, the direct nomination of legislative councillors should have been left to the Crown or the Crown's representative in the Confederation. (Hear.) There was one remark made by the hon. member for Wellington in reference to Mr. CARDWELL's letter, which I think was made in error. He inferred from that despatch that Mr. CARDWELL was opposed to the nominative system. Now, the passage he alluded to was this:—

The second point which Her Majesty's Government desired should be reconsidered is the Constitution of the Legislative Council. They appreciate the considerations which have influenced the Conference in determining the mode in which this body, so important to the constitution of the Le-