

the Reform Bill in 1832, what would have happened if WILLIAM IV. had refused to overwhelm it by numerous nominations to the peerage? Does any one believe that it would have persisted to the last? No; after having long resisted, it would have bent before the storm which threatened to sweep it away. (Hear, hear.) In 1832 the struggle was between the great proprietors and the middle classes, who wished to make their way; for the English people, properly termed the populace, have no political privileges; they are of no account in the Constitution, they hold no political position, and have no energy for the struggle, which, moreover, would not be productive of any benefit to them. It resembles in no respect the populations of the great towns in France, which make and unmake governments by insurrections or revolutions. In England it is the middle classes who make revolutions or who threaten to make them. Growing richer daily, they advance slowly but surely towards the securing of political privileges and immunities. The Radical school of Manchester at bottom wishes for nothing more, although it asserts that it is desirous of obtaining privileges for the people. If the great nobility, in 1832, offered such determined opposition to the Reform Bill, it was because they feared that it would annihilate their influence and place them at the mercy of the will of the masses. But we have no *caste* here, and fortune, like political honors, is the property of every man who labors to attain it. Here every one, if he chooses, can almost without an effort become a proprietor and possess the right of having a deliberative voice in the discussion of national questions of the highest importance. To be a legislative councillor it will be sufficient to possess real estate of the value of four thousand dollars. The legislative councillors will form part of the people, will live with the people and by their opinions, and will know and appreciate their wants; the only difference that there will be between them and the members of the House of Commons will be, that being appointed for life, they will not be as directly brought under external influence; that they will have more freedom of action and of thought, and that they will be able to judge with greater calmness of the legislation which will be submitted to them. For what reason then would they provoke contests which would neither be conducive to their interests nor in accordance with their feelings; they

will not, like the House of Lords, have privileges to save from destruction. In the Constitution they will have but one part to play, that of maturing legislation in the interests of the people. The hon. member for Hochelaga said in his last manifesto, and repeated here, that if we applied to England to amend our Constitution, we should expose ourselves to having alterations, for which we do not ask, made by some mischievous hand. The thing is possible I admit. It is possible, as it is also possible for the Imperial Parliament to change our Constitution without even waiting for us to take the initiative, as it did in 1840, but if there is any harm now in asking Great Britain for the Confederation of all the provinces, because she may subject us to something which is not contained in the scheme, why did the member for Hochelaga wish for constitutional changes in 1858? Did he hope to change the Constitutional Act of 1840 without the concurrence of the Imperial Parliament? And will he be good enough to tell us by what supernatural proceeding he hoped to succeed in doing so? If there is danger in 1865, there must also have been danger in 1858. Why then should he, to day, impute to others as a crime that which he wished to do himself then? Has he forgotten all that? Does he wish to deny it? Differing slightly from the Bourbons, he has learned nothing and has forgotten everything. (Hear, and laughter.) To frighten us, he also spoke of direct taxation, to which we should have to submit, if we had Confederation. Now, in his constitutional scheme of 1858, with which we are all acquainted, he gave to the Federal Government the customs revenue. We should, therefore, have had to have recourse to direct taxation to meet the expenditure of the local governments. The plan of Constitution which is submitted to us treats us better than that, for it gives us enough, and more than we require, to ensure the easy working of the local organizations.

HON. MR. HOLTON—Hear! hear!

HON. ATTY. GEN. CARTIER—Yes, hear! hear! just so!

HON. MR. CAUCHON—The hon. member for Chateaugay, who cries "Hear, hear," ought to be satisfied if he thinks himself in the right; for when he was Minister of Finance he told us that in order to fill up the deficit left by his predecessors, he must necessarily have recourse to direct taxation. (Hear, hear.) The hon. member for Hochelaga has long wept over the mis-