

ation of which we so stand in need. But there is no provision of that kind in the system here proposed; there is no apparent contemplation of a step of that kind in connection with this step. On the contrary, this step is all in the wrong direction. We are here proposing to create in this part of the Queen's dominions a mere sub-federation, so to speak, tending, so far as it tends to anything, towards the exclusion of this kind of provision. This other machinery to which I have been alluding, Mr. SPEAKER, if we had had it a few years ago, would have been of extreme usefulness. Suppose we had had something of that kind when the Rebellion Losses Bill was passed, when so much excitement was thereby created in the country. Suppose that then when the indignation of a large class was concentrating itself against Lord ELGIN for his supposed purpose of assenting to that bill, he could have said—"It is idle for you, as you must see, to require me to listen to you against the advice of my constitutional advisers; but you know there is a tribunal at home, to which you may appeal from that advice, where you will be heard and they, and from which you may be sure of justice if you have been aggrieved or injured here." Sir, if it had been possible for the Governor General to have given such an answer at that time to the angry remonstrances of those who opposed that measure, the Parliament House would not have been burnt, nor would we have had to deplore the long train of consequent disturbances and troubles which then and ever since have brought so much discredit and mischief to the country. Take another case. If such machinery had existed when the fishery treaty with France was entered into by the Imperial Government, conditioned upon the consent of Newfoundland, no such anomalous proceeding could have taken place. For the representatives of Newfoundland and of the rest of these provinces would at once have shown the Imperial Government that it would not meet approval in that colony, nor indeed for that matter, anywhere else in British America. Great Britain would have been saved from entering into a treaty that—as matters went—had to be disallowed, with some discredit to the Empire, and some risk of a rupture of its friendly relations with a foreign power.

Mr. SCOBLE—Does not the House of Commons afford that machinery?

Mr. DUNKIN—The House of Commons knows very little, and cares much less, about our local affairs. (Hear, hear.) I say, if there had then been a Colonial Council at

home, where representatives of the different provincial administrations might have met and advised with any of Her Majesty's ministers, there would have been no difficulty. It would have disposed of any number of other questions more satisfactorily than they have been disposed of. The north-eastern boundary question with the States, for instance, would never have been settled in a way so little accordant with our views and interests; and the question of the western boundary would have been settled sooner and better, also. Take another illustration. When the difficulty arose between this country and England about our tariff, when the Sheffield manufacturers sought to create a feeling at home against us, because we, mainly to raise revenue, placed duties higher than they liked on importations of manufactured goods, if any such machinery had been in operation, no such wide-spread and mischievous misapprehension as to our acts and purposes could have arisen, as ever since has been prevalent in England, and even on the floor of the House of Commons. In fact, I repeat that without some such system, I do not see how our relations with the Empire can be maintained on a satisfactory footing. It is just the want of it that is leading so many at home now to think us in a transition state towards separation and independence, when, in truth, we have such need to prove to them that we are in a transition state towards a something very different indeed—the precise antipodes of separation. (Hear, hear.) Sir, I was saying that in this scheme there is no such conservative tendency as this—nothing indicative of a set purpose to develop, strengthen and perpetuate our connection with the Empire. That end we might indeed better gain without than with this extra machinery of local federation; for disguise it how you may, the idea that underlies this plan is this, and nothing else—that we are to create here a something—kingdom, viceroyalty, or principality—something that will soon stand in the same position towards the British Crown that Scotland and Ireland stood in before they were legislatively united with England; a something having no other tie to the Empire than the one tie of fealty to the British Crown—a tie which in the cases, first, of Scotland, and then of Ireland, was found, when the pinch came, to be no tie at all; which did not restrain either Scotland or Ireland from courses so inconsistent with that of England as to have made it necessary that their relations should be radically changed, and a legislative