

two branches of the Legislature? Suppose the Lower House turns out to be chiefly Liberal, how long will it submit to the Upper House, named by Conservative administrations which have taken advantage of their temporary numerical strength to bring about such a change as is now proposed? Remember, sir, that, after all, the power, the influence of the popular branch of the Legislature is paramount. We have seen constitutions like that of England adopted in many countries, and where there existed a nobility, such as in France in 1830, the second chamber was selected from this nobility. In Belgium, where the Constitution is almost a *fac-simile* of that of England, but where there are no aristocracy, they adopted the elective principle for the Upper House, and no where in the world is there a fixed number for it, unless it is also elective. It must be fresh in the memory of a great many members of this House how long the House of Lords resisted the popular demand for reform, and great difficulties were threatened. At last in 1832 the agitation had become so great that the Government determined to nominate a sufficient number of peers to secure the passage of the Reform Bill. The members of the House had to choose between allowing the measure to become law, or see their influence destroyed by the addition of an indefinite number of members. They preferred the first alternative, and thereby quieted an excitement, which if not checked in time, might have created a revolution in England. The influence of the Crown was then exerted in accordance with the views of the people; but here we are to have no such power existing to check the action of our Upper Chamber, and no change can be made in its composition except as death might slowly remove its members. I venture to prophesy, sir, that before a very short time has elapsed a dead-lock may arise, and such an excitement be created as has never yet been seen in this country. (Hear, hear.) Now, if this Constitution had been framed by the members of our Government, we could change some of its provisions—this provision would most certainly be altered—there is not a man in the Liberal ranks who dare vote for such a proposition as this, that could go before his constituents and say, “I have taken away the influence and control of the people over the Upper Chamber, and I have created an entirely independent body, to be chosen by the present governments of the several provinces.” But no, the Constitution is in the nature of a compact, a treaty, and

cannot be changed. (Hear.) But, sir, the composition of the Legislative Council becomes of more importance when we consider that the governors of the local legislatures are to be appointed by the General Government, as well as the Legislative Council; their appointment is to be for five years, and they are not to be removed without cause. I will venture upon another prediction and say we shall find there will be no such thing as responsible government attached to the local legislatures.

MR. DUNKIN—There cannot be.

HON. MR. DORION—There will be two, three, or four ministers chosen by the lieutenant-governors and who will conduct the administration of the country, as was formerly done in the times of Sir FRANCIS BOND HEAD, Sir JOHN COLBORN, or Sir JAMES CRAIG. You will have governments, the chief executives of which will be appointed and hold office at the will of the Governor. If that is not to be the case, why do not honorable gentlemen lay their scheme before us? (Hear.) Is this House, sir, going to vote a Constitution with the Upper House as proposed, without knowing what sort of local legislatures we are to have to govern us? Suppose, after we have adopted the main scheme, the Government come down with a plan for settling the local legislatures upon which great differences of opinion will arise, may it not happen then that the majority from Lower Canada will unite with a minority from Upper Canada and impose upon that section a local Constitution distasteful to a large majority of the people of Upper Canada. The whole scheme, sir, is absurd from beginning to end. It is but natural that gentlemen with the views of honorable gentlemen opposite want to keep as much power as possible in the hands of the Government—that is the doctrine of the Conservative party everywhere—that is the line which distinguishes the Tories from the Whigs—the Tories always side with the Crown, and the Liberals always want to give more power and influence to the people. The instincts of honorable gentlemen opposite, whether you take the Hon. Attorney General East or the Hon. Attorney General West, lead them to this—they think the hands of the Crown should be strengthened and the influence of the people, if possible, diminished—and this Constitution is a specimen of their handiwork, with a Governor-General appointed by the Crown; with local governors also, appointed by the Crown; with legislative councils, in the General Legislature, and in all the provinces, nominated by the