

need not go to the history of the South American republics, as the member for Lotbinière did, to find an illustration of the working of the principle of Confederation as applicable to our case. Being not only republican in their character, but based upon the principle of divided sovereignty, and inhabited by a people who had no aptitude for working democratic institutions, they can bear no comparison with this proposed Constitution. But if the hon. gentleman desired to travel to South America to find something approaching a parallel to this scheme of union, he could find it in the constitutional monarchy of Brazil, where the wide-spreading provinces of the empire have their local parliaments for their local affairs, and a central parliament and executive over all—elected and chosen pretty much as our Central Parliament and Executive will be, and exercising similar powers; and he would find that while the republics founded upon the doctrine of state sovereignty were in a state of perpetual turmoil, and whose daily bread was, according to the hon. member, anarchy and revolution, the Empire of Brazil was flourishing and shewed signs of stability that predicated its future greatness. (Hear, hear.) But to come nearer home, sir, we have abundant evidence of the dangerous character of the doctrine of state supremacy in a confederation. I would remind the House of the early ruin that threatened the United States under their first Constitution, which was an embodiment of this vicious principle, and how clearly the great men of the first year of the republic foresaw the ruin it threatened to bring upon them. WASHINGTON, perceiving the rapid decline of the Confederation, was incessant in his correspondence with the leading patriots of the day to obtain their opinions upon a new Constitution, and MADISON replies as follows:

Conceiving that an individual independence of the states is totally irreconcilable with their aggregate sovereignty, and that a consolidation of the whole into one simple republic would be as inexpedient as it is unattainable, I have sought for some middle ground which may at once support a due supremacy of the national authority, and not exclude the local authorities wherein they can be subordinately useful.

Mr. JAY's convictions in favor of central supreme authority are equally strong. He says:—

What powers should be granted to the Govern-

ment so constituted, is a question which deserves much thought. *I think the more the better*, the states retaining only so much as may be necessary for domestic purposes.

HAMILTON, likewise, speaking of Federation such as men had hitherto been familiar with, and such as then existed in America, and equally anxious with his co-patriots to save his country from the anarchy and ruin that he saw approaching as the inevitable result of a partitioned sovereignty, thus addressed the head of the republic:—

All Federal governments are weak and distracted. In order to avoid the evils incident to that form, the Government of the American Union must be a national representative system. But no such system can be successful in the actual situation of this country, unless it is endorsed with all the principles and means of influence and power which are the proper supports of government. It must, therefore, be made completely sovereign, and state power, as a separate legislative power, must be annihilated.

I read these extracts to show how rapidly the Central Government of the United States was falling into contempt because of its subordination to the separate states, and to show that the leading minds of America, while the republic was yet in its infancy, felt that the doctrine of state supremacy was one calculated to foster anarchy, and that was sure to bring the early destruction of the fabric they had reared, and also to show how earnestly they labored to remove the evil and transfer the sovereignty to the Central Government, as their only hope of maintaining permanent peace and order, and of imparting stability to their system. I think, sir, it becomes us in framing a Constitution for these provinces to profit, not only by the early but by the later experience of our neighbors—to enquire how far they succeeded in eradicating the evil from their new Constitution, and to what extent their present troubles are chargeable to what is left in their system of the dangerous principle referred to. Let us profit by the wisdom of the framers of the American Constitution, and by the experiences of that country under it—not to copy their work, but to help us when framing a Constitution for ourselves to steer clear of evils that they have felt. Believing that the Quebec Conference has done so and have presented to us the framework of a Constitution, the leading features of which are in unison with the constitutional principles of the British monarchy, and consistent with that allegiance