

way and provide a super ferry service, a boat-train on the Gulf like the one I spoke of on the debate on the Transportation Report in 1947. These are just two examples of real bait to get us into confederation, something to make it really worthwhile. But what are we going to get? Margarine. They are going to let us make and eat margarine; what generosity!

I said, Mr. Chairman, concessions like these might make it worthwhile, on a financial basis, to enter confederation. And why not concessions? We are not bankrupt as in 1895; we are not a shaky, insecure colony as in 1867. We are today, in 1947, comparatively well-off with many of the characteristics of a nation. We deserve special inducements to get us to forsake our traditional independence and our economic sovereignty. But we are not getting them; we are not even offered them. We are handed something and told to take it or leave it: "the Government of Canada believes that the arrangements go as far as the government can go under the circumstances". The confederates have been preaching that if we do not take it, then we are doomed and damned. That is their propaganda. Newfoundland has no future, her future is built on sand, she must clutch this Canadian straw or go down in the financial whirlpool. They are not arguing for confederation on its merits; they are trying to press their case by aiming to prove that Newfoundland is headed for ruin otherwise. They are apparently blind — conveniently so — to the fact that as yet Newfoundland has not been able to ask the United States for any concessions — concessions, it is needless to point out, that could only be sought and secured by a sovereign government of the Newfoundland people.

I say again, Mr. Chairman, there should be special concessions before we should, in our present position, even consider confederation. Yet there are none, and they call them generous terms. I don't know that we have a right to even call them "terms" — nowhere in any of the documents which I have, does the Canadian government call them "terms". The Grey Book is titled *Proposed Arrangements for the Entry of Newfoundland into Confederation*. Arrangements — that doesn't mean very much. I can arrange for you to become a member of my club, but I do not guarantee that if you accept, you will become its president. That would have to be a deal of some

kind, we would have to agree on terms for that. We should not be using that word "terms" so glibly; neither should we be using the word "generous" in connection with them. They are not generous, neither should they be. "Fair", yes; "equitable", yes, if they are (which I doubt); but "generous" — no! We do not want generosity. Some of our people may be looking for a handout, but most of them are not, I believe. As Major Cashin said, Newfoundland's entry into confederation is a going into partnership. Partners are equals, at least that's how I always understood it. Partners do not expect generosity from each other. They expect co-operation. They expect each other to accept equal responsibilities, receive equal gains, share equal losses. A partnership is not one-sided. One partner does not get all the benefits and the other take all the risks. It is like marriage, or like marriage is supposed to be. Of course, there's divorce from marriage in Canada, but not in Newfoundland. We have not heard much about that yet. But there is no divorce from confederation — it is final, it is forever. You cannot try it for ten or 15 years, like Commission or responsible government, and then change. No, sir, you are stuck with it.

But getting back to partnership and confederation between Canada and Newfoundland as an arrangement between equals, these so-called terms are, as far as I can see, a one-sided affair. If anyone is going to benefit from confederation, it is going to be Canada. We will get a few paltry millions in family allowances, old age pensions, and other subsidies which will cease after the first eight years of union; and Canada will get control of Newfoundland and Labrador. There will pass into her hands the control of one of the most strategic areas of the earth with all that implies in these days. What she pays into Newfoundland will return in time to her a hundredfold from the exploitation of that strategic position, and the tremendous bargaining power that will accrue to her in dealing with the United States in particular, by virtue of air bases like Gander and Goose; the United States bases; the immense iron and mineral deposits of Labrador. In regard to the Labrador, the Privy Council heard the case on the boundary in 1926; their judgement was handed down in 1927, giving Newfoundland 110,000 square miles. Early in 1928, Senator C.E. Tanner moved the following resolution: "That in the