

of Canada shall establish the electoral divisions for the first organization of the Federal Parliament, they do not determine in whose hands the duty of distributing any additional members is to be vested. No doubt on this head need exist; the Federal Parliament will of course have full power to regulate all arrangements for the election of its own members. But I am told by Upper Canadians—the constitution of the Lower House is all well enough, it is in the Upper House arrangements that the scheme is objectionable. And first, it is said that Upper Canada should have had in the Legislative Council a greater number of members than Lower Canada.—

MR. T. C. WALLBRIDGE—Hear, hear!

HON. MR. BROWN—The honorable member for North Hastings is of that opinion; but that honorable gentleman is in favor of a legislative union, and had we been forming a legislative union, there might have been some force in the demand. But the very essence of our compact is that the union shall be federal and not legislative. Our Lower Canada friends have agreed to give us representation by population in the Lower House, on the express condition that they shall have equality in the Upper House. On no other condition could we have advanced a step; and, for my part, I am quite willing they should have it. In maintaining the existing sectional boundaries and handing over the control of local matters to local bodies, we recognize, to a certain extent, a diversity of interests; and it was quite natural that the protection for those interests, by equality in the Upper Chamber, should be demanded by the less numerous provinces. Honorable gentlemen may say that it will erect a barrier in the Upper House against the just influence that Upper Canada will exercise, by her numbers, in the Lower House, over the general legislation of the country. That may be true, to a certain extent, but honorable gentlemen will bear in mind that that barrier, be it more or less, will not affect money bills. (Hear, hear.) Hitherto we have been paying a vast proportion of the taxes, with little or no control over the expenditure. But, under this plan, by our just influence in the Lower Chamber, we shall hold the purse strings. If, from this concession of equality in the Upper Chamber, we are restrained from forcing through measures which our friends of Lower Canada may consider injurious to their interests, we shall, at any rate, have power, which we never had before, to prevent them from forcing through

whatever we may deem unjust to us. I think the compromise a fair one, and am persuaded that it will work easily and satisfactorily. (Hear, hear.) But it has been said that the members of the Upper House ought not to be appointed by the Crown, but should continue to be elected by the people at large. On that question my views have been often expressed. I have always been opposed to a second elective chamber, and I am so still, from the conviction that two elective houses are inconsistent with the right working of the British parliamentary system. I voted, almost alone, against the change when the Council was made elective, but I have lived to see a vast majority of those who did the deed wish it had not been done. It is quite true, and I am glad to acknowledge it, that many evils anticipated from the change, when the measure was adopted, have not been realized. (Hear, hear.) I readily admit that men of the highest character and position have been brought into the Council by the elective system, but it is equally true that the system of appointment brought into it men of the highest character and position. Whether appointed by the Crown or elected by the people, since the introduction of parliamentary government, the men who have composed the Upper House of this Legislature have been men who would have done honor to any legislature in the world. But what we most feared was, that the Legislative Councillors would be elected under party responsibilities; that a partisan spirit would soon show itself in the chamber; and that the right would soon be asserted to an equal control with this House over money bills. That fear has not been realised to any dangerous extent. But is it not possible that such a claim might ere long be asserted? Do we not hear, even now, mutterings of a coming demand for it? Nor can we forget that the elected members came into that chamber gradually; that the large number of old appointed members exercised much influence in maintaining the old forms of the House, the old style of debate, and the old barriers against encroachment on the privileges of the commons. But the appointed members of the Council are gradually passing away, and when the elective element becomes supreme, who will venture to affirm that the Council would not claim that power over money bills which this House claims as of right belonging to itself? Could they not justly say that they represent the people as well as we do, and that the control of the purse strings ought, therefore, to belong to them as much as to us. (Hear, hear.) It is said they have not