

that question according to its wishes ; but the Federal Parliament, sitting at Ottawa, will be empowered to force upon us principles utterly opposed to our own, and even to establish a Court of Divorce at Quebec. Under the Federal system, nothing so unjust, nothing so revolting to the feelings of the people could occur. In the American union there are some states in which divorce is permitted, and others in which it is not—another proof that sovereignty may be vested in each state, without detriment to the union. (Hear, hear.) I am opposed to the scheme of Confederation, because the courts of justice of Lower Canada will be under the control of the General Government. We should have courts of justice in Lower Canada, but the judges who would sit in them would be appointed by the Government of the Confederation. It would be the same in the other provinces ; but Lower Canada, with her laws, which are peculiar to her, ought especially to resist the interference of the General Government in the administration of justice. It will be said that the Conference endeavored to cause their intentions to be suspected, and it has already been urged that this arrangement is a stroke of the lawyers, who would prefer to see the nomination of the judges vested in the General Government, because they would receive higher salaries, rather than see them appointed by the local governments, who would be obliged to have recourse to direct taxation in order to pay their salaries. But setting aside this idea, I assert that the appointment of the judges in each province by the General Government appears to me an uncalled-for interference, an anomaly which cannot be too strongly opposed. (Hear, hear.) I am opposed to the scheme of Confederation, because the local governors would only be tools in the hands of the General Government, who would interfere in the local matters by the continual pressure they would bring to bear on them whenever they desired to change the opinions of the local parliaments, elected by the people in each province, on any question which they might have to discuss. Why have the local governments, with the insignificant powers which it is proposed to confer upon them—why, I say, have they not been allowed to elect their respective governors ? Would there be any more harm in this than results from the elections of mayors in our large towns ? There was once a time when even the wardens were appointed by the Government. Has the election of mayors and wardens been produ-

tive of evil or discontent throughout the country ? I am opposed to the scheme of Confederation, because by means of the right of *veto* vested in the Governor by the 51st resolution, local legislation will be nothing but a farce. They may try to make us believe that this power would be but rarely exercised, and that it differs in nowise from that exercised by the present Governor when he reserves bills for the Royal assent ; but all the country knows that it would not be so. From the moment that you bring the exercise of the right of *veto* more nearly within the reach of interested parties, you increase the number of opportunities for the exercise of the right—you open the door to intrigues. As, for instance, a party will oppose the passing of a law, and not succeeding in his opposition in Parliament, he will approach the Ministers and the Governor General, intriguing to obtain as a favor that the law may be disallowed. Take an example. I suppose your Confederation to be established ; that a bill is passed for the protection of settlers, such as we have seen pass the House six times in ten years without becoming law, on account of the opposition to it in the Legislative Council by the councillors from Upper Canada ; what would happen ? The few interested parties who were opposed to the measure would rush to the Governor General to induce him to disallow the law. By an appeal to the right of property, to the respect due to acquired rights, and to other sophistries, they would override the will of the people on a measure which is just in itself, and which is sought for and approved of by all legal men of Lower Canada in the present House. The people of Lower Canada will be prevented from obtaining a law similar to those now existing in thirteen different states of the American union, and which would in no way affect the principles of the existing law in Lower Canada. (Hear, hear.) This is one instance out of a thousand, and will serve to illustrate the effect of this right of *veto*. I am opposed to the scheme of Confederation, because I cannot see why, on the one hand, it has been agreed to give all the public lands to the Government of each province, and on the other hand that the Government should purchase the lands in the Island of Newfoundland. The General Government gives up the fertile lands of Upper and Lower Canada, but it purchases the barren lands of Newfoundland at the enormous price of \$150,000 per annum, a sum representing a capital of \$2,500,000. Is not this a grand