

than their transitory impulses. But this advantage would be wholly lost if the whole body were chosen or could be removed under the influence of such an impulse. The first of these dangers is obviated (or intended to be so) by providing that half only of the Council shall be elected at one time. The second, by giving to each Councillor a fixed tenure of office, independent of any popular or governmental influence.

Thus, it will be seen, he would place the Council out of the reach of Government, while they should be under the influence of the settled convictions of the people and not their mere transitory impulse. He would have them elected by a conservative body of electors. The next clause of the instructions runs thus:—

In Prince Edward Island, I would enforce a tolerably high property qualification in the case of the electors, but of the candidate I would only require that he should be a British subject, resident in the colony, and thirty years of age.

This, I think, would be a wise provision here, because it would give the electors an opportunity, which they do not now possess, of selecting their candidates from any part of the country, so that they could choose the ablest and most trustworthy men in it, and being elected by a class who had a deep interest in the country, you might rely on their not being too vacillating, but on their proving a proper, healthy and valuable check on the lower branch of the Legislature. (Hear, hear.) Some honorable gentlemen have urged that the people should not elect their representatives to the Upper House, because it involves a very great expense on the part of the elected, and because they cannot judge who is worthy of their confidence so well as the Government of the day. Now, I argue that if the people are unfit to choose members of this House, they are unfit to choose members of the other House too. If three counties united are not able to make a good selection, how can one-third part of that constituency make a good one? And with regard to the corrupt influences that may be brought to bear, will it be for a moment said that a large constituency of three counties can be as easily corrupted as a constituency composed of only one county? I think not. I think a more independent vote is brought to bear on the election of a member of the Upper House than of the Lower. Yet the members of the Lower House want to assume the power of dictating who shall compose the Legislative Council. A few years ago, at the general elections, when two men were running, though they

were both conservative, we always found one taking the ground that no money should be spent by the Government of the day without the consent of Parliament, and all the liberal party, without exception, took that view; yet now we find that as some of these men have got into the Government they have unlimited confidence in the wisdom of the Executive; they say our very Constitution can be amended within a period of six months without the people having anything to say about it; they now think governments can do no wrong. Of course, this is in accordance with human nature—what they themselves do must be right; they themselves can do no wrong. (Hear, hear.) To sum up, honorable gentlemen, I complain that this arrangement for bringing about the Confederation of the British North American Provinces is being made on terms of great disadvantage to Canada, that a fair agreement has not been settled upon as between the several colonies. I complain that in making such an arrangement with the other provinces, the constitution of this House should have been interfered with; and I complain, finally, of the manner in which the whole measure is being forced through the Legislature, without first being submitted to the people for their sanction; and I cannot but feel that these proposed changes so rashly adopted, carry with them the seeds of their early dissolution—a result that all should regret who desire the permanent consolidation and well-being of these colonies. (Cheers.)

HON. MR. MCCREA—Honorable gentlemen, so much has already been said on the subject of the Confederation of the British American Provinces during the course of this debate, which has now occupied the House for several days, both here and in the Assembly, by the ablest men in the province, that I do not hope to add anything of great weight or importance to what has been urged on the question now submitted to our consideration; still, I feel that I should neither do justice to my constituents, who have sent me here, nor to myself, if I do not upon this occasion state, with what force I may, the reasons which induced me to give my hearty approval to this measure for the Confederation of all these provinces under one government, upon the basis of these resolutions which Ministers have laid upon the table of this House. Very much has been said, by almost every speaker who has preceded me, upon the importance of the subject now before us, and the consequent responsibility which attaches itself to every