

tion, and having to select from two alternatives, numbers or the State, I preferred numbers, because it would have conferred upon us a larger share of representation and of influence. The words which follow, and which I will give, clearly prove my thought at that time:—

The Constitution of the United States, on which, perhaps, ours would be modeled, would not give to us Lower Canadians the same protection and the same guarantee of safety, as by it we should in reality enjoy a little protection only in the House of Representatives, in which we should be one to three.

Thus the protection would have been vested in the Legislative Council itself, if it had been created on the principle of the State and not of numbers. To shew that my mind was then filled with but one idea—that of obtaining the greatest share of influence in the Federal Legislature for Lower Canada, by any constitutional system whatever, I also wrote in the same pamphlet:—

Under the Federal principle, small and great provinces will carry equal weight in the single (general) legislature; the little island of Prince Edward as much as the twelve hundred and fifty thousand souls of Lower Canada.

Having no information to go upon, I then thought that the American system would be adopted, which gives in the Federal Senate to the little states of Rhode Island, Jersey, Maine, Vermont and Connecticut the same representation as it gives to the large states of New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio. But the scheme that we have before us proves that I was mistaken, as Prince Edward's Island, instead of having as many representatives in the Legislative Council as we shall have, will only have one-sixth of the number. For the purpose of representation in the Legislative Council, the three Atlantic Provinces are grouped together, and are to be represented together by but twenty-four votes, just the same as Lower Canada. (Hear, hear.) As the question was as to the establishment of equilibrium between the provinces, if the scheme of the Quebec Conference gives me the same result as an elective Legislative Council, what contradiction is there in my returning to the nominative principle, which I always preferred to the elective principle? The conditions of equilibrium being the same, I give the preference to the principle which confers on legislation the best guarantee of wisdom and

mature judgment. (Hear, hear.) But supposing—what is not the case—that I had contradicted myself, in what way could my contradictions have affected the merits of the question under discussion? If it can be proved that my opinions of to-day are not based on reasonable grounds, let it be proved. If it cannot be proved, do not let anyone imagine that he has answered me by saying: "You thought differently six years ago." Because I reasoned in 1858 on hypotheses which are controverted by facts to-day, must I then, in order to appear consistent, adhere to those suppositions which substantive truths so completely contradict? (Hear, hear.) The hon. member for Hochelaga told us that the Constitution of the Belgian Senate is less conservative than that of the Legislative Council which we propose to establish under the Confederation, because the members of the Belgian Senate are in part changed every four years. To this I reply, that the conservative principle may be found elsewhere than in the manner of selecting the councillors or the senators, and that in Belgium it is found in the excessively high standard of qualification which is required of candidates for the Senate; so much so that only men of large fortune, who are everywhere few in number, can aspire to enter it. In Belgium the Constitution requires that there shall be one man qualified in every six thousand souls of population, and that man must pay one thousand florins of direct taxes. Will it be said that the Belgian Senate, so constituted, is not more conservative than our Legislative Council will be—the Belgian Senate, in which none can sit but very rich men and large landed proprietors? (Hear, hear.) I am answered that one-half this Senate is renewed every four years, and that the Crown may dissolve it at pleasure. But can the Crown prevent men of large fortune and large landed proprietors from entering it? It is proved that it is with difficulty that there can be found in the House of Lords any scions of the great families who flourished there under CHARLES II.; but that House is constantly recruited from among the territorial nobility and from among men who render great political or military services to the state. By renewing it thus with the same elements, does the Crown take away its conservative character? (Hear, hear.) The hon. member stands in perpetual dread of conflicts and disagreements. Supposing that the House of Lords had persisted in its opposition to