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Image-schematic scaffolding in textual and visual artefacts

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Abstract

This paper expands the understanding of how image schemas, while essentially spatial in nature, allow more complex concepts involving non-spatial elements to emerge later. We suggest that the explanation requires adding viewpoint characterization to the concept of image schemas. It is their viewpoint affordances which allow image schemas to form the conceptual scaffolding which becomes subsequently enriched through frames, applied metaphorically, and/or blended with textual and/or visual representations, yielding new and complex meanings in a wide array of multimodal artefacts. As a case in point we study examples instantiating the BARRIER schema across a wide range of text types (poetry, prose, political discourse) as well as in visual and material artefacts such as cartoons, graffiti or film, showing how people 'fill in' the skeletal structure of a BARRIER, through frames, metaphors and blends, often resulting in a changed embodied interaction with the BARRIER (characterized by restricted permeability, mobility, vision, or control) or a reconstrual of its materiality, making it (fictively) permeable, transparent, etc. The cross-modality approach we adopt in this research supports the idea that image schemas are not just linguistic (i.e. prompted and maintained through language) but truly conceptual and psychologically real.

Keywords: Barrier; Blending; Frames; Image schemas; Multimodality; Viewpoint

1. Introduction

Image schemas – skeletal conceptual structures arising from perception, bodily movements, manipulation of objects and experience of force, such as UP/DOWN, FORCE, COUNTERFORCE, or IN/OUT – were first proposed by Johnson (1987), and have attracted much attention since. In his 2005 paper Johnson reminds us that image schemas are primarily used as an explanation of the link between embodied experience (especially basic spatial experience), and higher cognition. Thus, as Johnson puts it, they provide the 'bones' on which the meaningful 'flesh' can then be put. At the same time, Johnson seems to call for further work to focus less on what image schemas really are, and more on how they come to yield the meanings that we observe, and especially on how expressions relying on them create the sense of a situation beyond its spatial structure. We take this comment to refer to the fact that a child can happily spend quite a lot of time putting a ball in the box and then taking it out, thus developing the idea of containment, but this behaviour does not explain why it may become rather unhappy when confined inside a container such as a playpen, and then again very happy when held in the caregiver's arms. These are indeed 'experiences', and they can be different, even when the same schema lies underneath. We argue in this paper that such felt differences in how schemas shape experiences depend on an additional conceptual element – that of *viewpoint*. The addition of a viewpoint may mean that the same type of structure yields

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different experiential results; for example, even a simple schema such as BLOCKED MOVE yields one kind of result if the speaker/experiencer is attempting to move and another kind if one is able to block the movement of an approaching large object.

Schemas have been studied from many angles (Hampe, 2005), and have recently come in for reappraisal and redefinition, based on new insights from studies of concept formation in infants (Mandler and Pagán Cánovas, 2014; henceforth M&PC). The emphasis in this new approach is on the essentially spatial nature of early infant concepts, with non-spatial elements such as force, time and emotion only emerging later through schematic integration. Schematic integration, essentially a form of blending, is what explains the ways in which simple skeletal spatial structures yield more complex conceptual patterns. For example, relying on the Container schema may be a starting point for understanding actions such as MOVE INTO/OUT OF. The question remains, we argue, how we move conceptually beyond simple patterns to understanding complex situations (for example, from MOVE INTO to the idea of a Military Invasion or Buying a House). While we can see how schemas participate in complex structures when they do participate, we should be more specific about how such choices are made.

We argue here that choices of expressions reflecting an underlying schema are additionally driven by the concept of *viewpoint*. So in our MOVE INTO example, Military Invasion involves a viewpoint from the inside of a country, with unwanted agents entering it by force (as different from Travel), while the idea of a house purchase involves a view from the outside, of someone who can now start occupying the inner space of the house. In such cases the schemas function as the core of culturally rich frames and it seems useful to consider how the viewpoint potential of image schemas opens some choices of relevant frames to be used to construe new situations, while limiting other choices, making frames less applicable. In this paper, we consider the viewpoint potential and resulting uses of a specific schema – that of a BARRIER.

The source of a schema's viewpoint potential lies in what Johnson (1997) and Grady (1997) have referred to as Primary Scenes – early childhood experiences, which yield conceptual foundations of more complex concepts, especially metaphoric ones. C. Johnson talks about the mechanism of *conflation*, as in the case of the verb *see* – a parent suggesting *Let's see what's in the drawer* is inviting the child to look, but also to learn what the container hides, thus conflating the primary experiences of being able to see and gaining knowledge, later solidified into Primary Metaphors such as KNOWING IS SEEING. In the context of Primary Scenes involving CONTAINERS and BARRIERS, an infant will understand the viewpoint implications of being inside a container (such as a play pen) or behind a barrier (restricted motion, or safety), and also of being outside a container/in front of a barrier – very likely wanting to enter or cross to the other side.

We show how this viewpoint potential is exploited across a range of examples through framing, metaphor and blending. Evidence is drawn from textual as well as visual artefacts, which points to shared underlying conceptual patterns of meaning-making across different modalities. Textual examples show clearly how rich the potential of the Barrier schema is, but the visual and material examples add an important piece of the puzzle – the ways in which conceptualization can effectively change the perception of material objects. Also, the added evidence from looking at visual artefacts supports the claim that schemas are psychologically real, rather than being primarily prompted and maintained through language. Thus our choice of examples from across modalities is aimed at providing broad support for the need to include viewpoint affordances of images in our discussion. Spatial primitives and the viewpointed image schemas they feature in provide, on our analysis, the *scaffolding* which allows increasingly complex creative artefacts to be built, thus revealing the nature of these underlying simple concepts. Retracing elaborate construals back to skeletal spatial concepts in this way is a promising avenue in ongoing cognitive viewpoint research (e.g. Dancygier and Sweetser, 2012; Dancygier et al., 2016; Dancygier and Vandelanotte, 2017).

2. Spatial primitives, image schemas and viewpoint

Mandler and Pagán Cánovas (2014) have recently refocused our understanding of preverbal cognitive structures formed in infancy (the first six to seven months of life), and in doing so separated out a number of levels that were previously conflated. Thus, they argue that the kinds of skeletal conceptual structures designated as image schemas, as described in the work of e.g. Johnson (1987) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999), arise from a variety of sources – ''perception, bodily movements, manipulation of objects and experience of force'' (M&PC, 2014:511) – which are in fact not yet conceptualized. Based on infant research carried out in recent decades, M&PC stress that ''with the exception of eyes seeing, all the information being conceptualized appears to be spatial in nature, either describing what something looks like and how it moves or what happens in the events in which it participates'' (2014:512). Not yet present in the first months of life are thus, for instance, conceptualizations of force, emotions, taste or touch. In order to better capture the prelinguistic development of cognitive structure, M&PC propose to distinguish three steps, in which each next step builds on the preceding, more basic one, and of which the first two are exclusively spatial:

- *spatial primitives*: the first things that infants attend to are motion along paths, locations in space, occlusion and containment, and goal-directed paths (of which sources are probably not yet a part). This observation prompts M&PC to

draw up as a tentative list of primary building blocks, termed spatial primitives, the following: PATH, START PATH, END PATH, PATH TO, LINK, THING, ± CONTACT, CONTAINER, OPEN, LOCATION, ± MOVE, ANIMATE MOVE, BLOCKED MOVE, INTO, OUT OF, BEHIND, APPEAR, DISAPPEAR, EYES.

- *image schemas* use primitives in building representations, by means of imagery, of simple spatial events, thereby allowing us to structure our memory; examples include e.g. PATH TO THING or THING INTO CONTAINER.
- *schematic integrations* form the step in which the first non-spatial elements such as force, time and emotion are included, through blending (cf. Fauconnier, 1994; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002), in conceptual representations.

As noted above, this paper proposes to investigate viewpoint effects in various creative artefacts across different (textual and visual) modalities by tracing these effects to their image-schematic origins. We believe it is important to study not only texts but also visuals, precisely to underscore the point about the prelinguistic nature of spatial primitives and image schemas. The notion of *image-schematic scaffolding* is intended to emphasize the absolutely pivotal role of image schemas and the spatial primitives they build on in constructing elaborate creative edifices. More specifically, as we will see, it is the viewpoint affordances of basic spatial concepts that provide the 'bones' which poems, plays, films and visual art put 'flesh' on.

We should also point out that distinguishing the steps in the development of complex concepts is an issue which has not been fully clarified yet. While it seems intuitively convincing to distinguish the level of spatial primitives in addition to what has been considered 'image-schematic' so far, the level of 'schematic integrations' needs further clarification. The term ''integration'' refers to the mechanism of meaning emergence described as blending, and thus suggests that simpler schematic ''inputs'' are integrated into more complex and yet manageable structures. M&PC, however, seem to suggest that the operations yielding more complex schemas represent meaning emergence independent from what we typically think of in the context of blending. What we propose, then, is a separation of schematic integrations from levels of integration typically discussed under the rubric of blending. Schematic integrations are a useful level, where the emotional or temporal event structures are added to spatial events, and it is also, we claim, the level at which the viewpoint potential of a spatial schema is realized. Based on these concepts, integrated schemas can form the basis of the choice of appropriate frames, and potentially yield more complex structures, metaphors and blends.

We see several reasons for keeping schematic integration separate from blending, which involves rich frames and mental spaces. Most of our argument comes from the proposed emergence of the schema of FORCE only at the integration stage. First, it is not clear to us why FORCE cannot be involved at levels more basic than the integrated ones. It is hard to imagine why concepts such as THING INTO CONTAINER would not involve FORCE at all – objects typically enter containers because of force applied to them. So in some cases the dividing line between schematic and integrated concepts is not clear. But, more importantly, the use of the concept of blending here is more powerful than usual – since it has not been specifically restricted, it seems to now apply to anything above the level of schemas, from simple expression of FORCE, as in the use of modal verbs (*must* suggests FORCE, *mustn't* suggests FORCEFUL RESTRAINT, while *can* relies on REMOVAL OF RESTRAINT), to complex narrative, artistic, or textual blends. The implied claim that FORCE cannot be expressed without blending is too strong to be accepted without a more specific argument.

Furthermore, we consider it important to put the three stages proposed by M&PC in the context of some form of participation which allows viewpoint to be construed, and thus opens the application of the schema to a larger number of cases. This approach attempts to respond to Johnson's (1987) call for looking at schemas in the context of felt experience. We note that there seem to be two trends in the discussion of schemas – on the one hand, there is the question of their emergence out of the experience in early life (Gibbs, 2005; Mandler, 2005; M&PC 2014), and on the other hand researchers are considering the role of schemas in adult conceptualization, especially figurative conceptualization. We are interested in the latter, rather than the former, but it would make sense to also argue that the process whereby schemas become entrenched requires the addition of viewpoint.

The crucial question is whether schemas are to be seen as static or dynamic. In the original formulation, it seemed that, for example, the concept of FORCE was predicated upon dynamic construals, making change possible as a result of application of force. In their re-statement of what image schemas are, M&PC assume that FORCE is an experience added later in life (since small babies do not yet move on their own, though they can and often are moved by adults, so they do not experience the 'oomph' of applying force). But looking at FORCE as a later stage does not help in understanding the dynamic or static nature of primitives and image schemas proper. For example, BLOCKED MOVE may not initially involve force, but the schema has to be understood dynamically (there is no such concept as 'static motion'). Additionally, many of the questions of further, socially situated, uses of schemas (Kimmel, 2005) emerge from the viewpoint potential of the primitives. For example, the negative impact of BLOCKED MOVE emerges in situations where the experiencer is inclined to continue along a selected PATH, but is not able to do so. The positive impact, on the other hand, can only be perceived when moving objects threaten the individual's space of safety. In a social context, then, being prevented from moving up the career ladder is felt as negative, while being protected from harsh and unfair criticism is felt as positive, though both rely on various complex uses of the primitive BLOCKED MOVE.

It is possible that we also need further clarification regarding the status of MOTION versus FORCE. Looking at Primary Scenes (Johnson, 1987; Grady, 1997) and the resulting metaphors in the Event Structure Metaphor system of Primary Metaphors seems to suggest some clarification. There is an interesting difference between metaphors such as STATES ARE LOCATIONS/BOUNDED REGIONS, which are static, and are seen as built on the CONTAINER schema, and those which involve motion. Among the latter there are two types: ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION and CAUSATION IS FORCED MOVEMENT. We might assume that both of the dynamic metaphors involve motion, but only the second one explicitly involves FORCE. However, it is not clear how 'self-propelled motion' would not require FORCE, albeit of a different kind, as it still causes one to move. Additionally, the application of FORCE may result in change, or in blocking the change. All these are questions regarding how the primitives combine into schemas (and here we agree with M&PC), but they also inextricably engage experiential viewpoint – causing oneself to move or causing something else to move concerns the question of whether the experiencer is aligned with the source of force, the object affected by force, or both. Further discussion of these questions is beyond the scope of the present paper, but what we essentially need to say is that schematic integrations allow us to represent a wide range of experiences, but the salience of these experiences is created through addition of viewpoint to the spatial schemas as such.

Then there is the level of figurative enrichment (metaphor or blending), which yields a large variety of artefacts – as the discussion below shows. But we may need one more preliminary example to illustrate the steps of meaning emergence. We pointed out above that a schema such as MOVE INTO/OUT OF CONTAINER or THING INTO CONTAINER (as composed out of the primitives, in M&PC's terminology) can apply to various situations. Each such situation requires the recognition of two potential positions of the THING, inside the container or outside of it, the PATH between the two positions, and the time and force required for the position to be changed (moving a toy into a box or outside of a box may be easy for an adult but not for a child, it may take more time if the toy is in fact in a store, rather than in the next room, or even in the basement). This level naturally includes viewpoint – depending on whether the person to receive the THING is inside or outside of the container, whether that person will move the thing or just receive it, etc. Such considerations form the level of schematic integrations.

When we move to the next level of complexity (as in the above example of Military Invasion or Buying a House), the schematic integrations apply unchanged – each requires two locations, path, force, time, and viewpoint. But the nature of objects and locations, the time required, the nature of the path, and the experience of viewpoint have all changed – they have been made very specific through the integration of the schematic level with the frame level. So the integrations do not have to stop here and can develop into complex figurative forms. If we feel that somebody's behaviour is intrusive and we talk about *invasion of our privacy*, we are adding another level of integration, where a metaphorical invasion 'feels like' a military invasion. This integration, which uses the schematic level as a scaffold to build on, adds more frame structure while preserving the type of schematicity, and, crucially, it also preserves the viewpoint. Representing one's response to, say, nosy enquiries, as being inside the bounded region of one's private life and having someone use force to enter, breaking the boundaries, relies on the shared viewpoint structure, while using the spatial and force-related schematicity as a scaffold which supports different frames. This is a simple example of the use of metaphorical language, but our examples below show in more detail how scaffolding is at the same time a topology-preserving operation and a creative operation. We argue that the viewpoint (such that being inside a container and having the boundaries broken by force in any sense is an undesirable situation) plays a crucial role in scaffolding. Scaffolding, and the emergence of the integrations it makes possible, are viewpoint-preserving operations.

The example we focus on in this paper will be that of BARRIERS (such as walls, fences and – real or metaphorical – borders between regions). A number of the spatial primitives proposed by M&PC (2014) can be seen to be involved in barriers, including, for instance, BLOCKED MOVE, END PATH, BEHIND or DISAPPEAR. Barriers are not strictly speaking spatial events, but they are spatial concepts (they separate two regions in space) and they do evoke various types of spatial events, relying on schemas such as, e.g., PATH TO BARRIER or THING BEHIND BARRIER and leading to integrations with motion, action and force, to produce further structures such as CROSS BARRIER, REMOVE BARRIER or PUSH AGAINST BARRIER. From there on, they yield increasingly elaborate integrations and develop into the kinds of texts or visuals studied below. As we have suggested above, these integrations are driven by the viewpoint configuration associated with barriers. First, however, we need to further clarify the nature of scaffolding.

3. Barriers

We focus our discussion here on the schema we labelled BARRIER. It has not, to our knowledge, been previously discussed, but it has been a good tradition of image schema analyses to add new concepts. We can construe a BARRIER as a static structure, separating two regions in space. It is a bit similar to the CONTAINER in this respect, but a BARRIER has no inside or outside, and it does not require ENTRY (see Dewell, 2005). It may inherit the positive and negative aspects of BLOCKED MOVE, but not because it is itself moving, but because it can prevent further movement along a path, unless sufficient force is applied. This enrichment possibly results from levels of integration, as suggested by M&PC, but what plays a crucial role in making those blends possible is viewpoint. We will not go into much depth here describing viewpoint further at lower levels of conceptualization; instead, we will support the need for such a unifying concept in image schema

analysis by analysing a range of textual and visual examples. Let us just refer here to the discussion of BARRIER proposed in Dancygier and Sweetser (2014:184–185), where two different perceptions of the experience of serious illness, in texts by Susan Sontag and Christopher Hitchens, yield different metaphors. Our argument is that these differences emerge because of experiential viewpoint. The experience of serious illness as *dual citizenship* in Sontag's text is different from the experience of *deportation* in Hitchens' comments, because of two viewpoint configurations: either one believes in moving back and forth between the land of the healthy and the country of the sick, or one feels forcefully removed from one of these regions, across a barrier. Consequently, the choice of metaphors depends not only on the underlying image-schematic concepts, but also their viewpoint and experience potential.

This brings us to another issue recurring in image schema analyses – the difference between perception and experience. Some scholars (Grady, 2005) see schemas as perceptual. We do not feel that such an approach is helpful in seeing the role of schemas in the emergence of more complex meanings, because experience does not rely only on sensory perception. We argue that both categories are crucial to image schemas – in the case of the BARRIER, seeing or touching a barrier (and also having one's vision blocked by it), is an experience independent of the inability to cross to the region beyond the barrier or becoming aware of what happens on the other side that could turn out to be either dangerous or positive for us. To sum up, a BARRIER, though static, builds on BLOCKED MOVE and FORCE, but also yields much more complex experiential integrations, with clear emotional consequences, based on its viewpoint potential. That potential relies crucially both on perception (seeing the barrier/not being able to see beyond, which also calls up more specific primitives described by M&PC, such as OCCLUSION or BEHIND) and on the embodied experience of SELF-PROPELLING MOVE, BLOCKED MOVE, and RESTRAINT. The BARRIER is thus a complex integrated schema, which itself constitutes the conceptual 'bones' for further blends of various complexity. But because the BARRIER integrated structure relies centrally on alignment with either side, the source of force, the nature of visual experience, etc., these further integrations (discussed in the main body of this paper) have to preserve the essential viewpoint affordances of the lower level schemas involved.

We will now look more broadly at how the integrated schema functions in various artefacts. As shown by Dancygier (2016a), the essential spatial understanding of a barrier can be seen to underlie an extensive range of texts, as well as visual artefacts, involving crossing, removal or reconstrual of a wall or a border. Metaphorical applications abound in everyday discourse, for instance of people feeling blocked or walled in by illness, or of highly charged political meanings being attached to walls, fences and borders, from Donald Trump's US presidential campaign pledge to build a wall separating the US and Mexico to novelist Zadie Smith's reflections on the Brexit vote as a fencing off of England from Europe (*NYRB* 18 August 2016), in line with other fences being raised ''[a]round school districts, around neighbourhoods, around lives''. In an *Economist* leader article arguing that, in the era of Brexit and Trump, the new political divide is between open and closed, not left and right, the argument is likewise couched in terms of walls: ''A world of wall-builders would be poorer and more dangerous'' (*The Economist* 30 July 2016).

Whether physical or imaginary, as we have suggested, a BARRIER involves a line separating two areas of space, imposing a range of restrictions, and allowing different forms of alignment. A cartoon example can serve to illustrate the naturalness with which viewpoint is integrated with the BARRIER schema: in Fig. 1, showing Trump building a wall from the American side of the border (as shown by the flag), the viewer is inevitably located on the ''Mexican'' side of the argument, presumably the anti-Trump side the cartoonist Joris Snaet and most readers of the Belgian daily *De Standaard* in which it was published sympathize with.

The boundaries imposed by barriers may be negatively or positively connoted. The former is perhaps more readily apparent, as much public discourse revolves around breaking down barriers, for instance in reference to various kinds of discrimination, and negative connotations derive from the restricted access imposed by barriers, turning them into obstacles which need to be overcome by crossing or removing the barrier. Robert Frost's classic poem ''Mending Wall'', discussed in Dancygier (2016a), captures this in terms of an elusive ''something'' being there ''that doesn't love a wall, / that



Fig. 1. Imposing a viewpoint: cartoon of Trump building a wall between the US and Mexico (Copyright Joris Snaet – De Standaard).

wants it down''. While the wall between the poem's persona's land and that of his neighbour shows gaps for any number of specific reasons, including the workings of frost followed by sun and the work of hunters driving rabbits out of hiding, the deliberate and repeated mention of there being ''something (. . .) that doesn't love a wall'' calls up a fundamental resistance to having one's motion and/or vision impeded. As Dancygier (2016a:59) notes,

> Regardless of the level of our lives involved, being able to move on and make progress as well as to know what is in front of us are crucial needs that walls subvert. That is why we often want them down.

Nevertheless, some circumstances do involve people welcoming walls and attaching positive connotations to them. If crowds cheer Donald Trump when he is promising to ''build a great, great wall on our southern border'', they see the wall as a positive because it keeps what they consider to be unwanted elements out. More generally, then, barriers can be positive because they help provide protection, shelter, safety, as with dams preventing flooding. In metaphorical rather than physical senses, barriers can offer protection against undesirable or scary thoughts or knowledge, as in the interview excerpt below, in which artist and presenter Grayson Perry talks to a woman whose husband is afflicted with Alzheimer's disease:

> - So his kind of positive attitude really only goes so far, and there comes a point where, perhaps, he doesn't want to look over the wall.
> - No you're right.
> - What do you think is beyond the wall?
> - Oh well I don't want to look over the wall either. I should probably wish we did.
>
> (Channel 4, ''Grayson Perry: Who Are You?'', presented by Grayson Perry)

The metaphorical wall here keeps out thoughts of further deterioration and death, allowing husband and wife to continue to enjoy positive moments together as best they can and for whatever time they have left together. Applying a barrier's positive affordances to less dramatic circumstances, Seamus Heaney's poem ''Scaffolding'' uses the building of walls ''of sure and solid stone'' – dependable and protective structures – as an image for a successful marriage. Once ''the job's done'' the scaffolding can safely come down because protection is in place, as the poem's conclusion shows:

> So if, my dear, there sometimes seem to be
> Old bridges breaking between you and me
>
> Never fear. We may let the scaffolds fall
> Confident that we have built our wall.

Where communion and intimacy are more important than outward looking and going out into the world, then, the restrictions implied in the basic schema of a barrier can be positively valued as providing comfort. The point of the poem is its focus on just one viewpointed understanding of the metaphoric wall, but the added Scaffolding frame adds an important aspect of meaning – the time it takes to erect a truly protective, reliable structure, and the need for the structure to be strong. This is particularly important in the context of our other examples, where the desire is to remove barriers rather than let them stand. Feeling protected by a wall calls for keeping it strong, while feeling restricted calls for demolishing it – the viewpoint yields very different framing and blending potential.

More often, then, the ''something (. . .) that doesn't love a wall'' provides the stronger impulse, driving us to cross, remove or reconstrue barriers. The next section turns to a prime set of examples from political discourse around the Berlin Wall, in which the basic spatial structure of barriers receives a rich emotional meaning based on viewpoint.

4. ''Tear down this wall'': the Berlin Wall and beyond

The Berlin Wall stands as a highly symbolic example of a literally and ideologically divisive wall, whose fall in 1989 had enormous impact around the globe. The Berlin Wall was a physical manifestation of the ideological Iron Curtain splitting Europe in a Western NATO-allied part and an Eastern, Soviet-dominated part, and can thus be seen as a purpose-built structure intended to impose a physical barrier giving a material form to an ideological and political divide. That the frame of the Berlin Wall is rich in associated meanings above and beyond the physical barrier should thus not come as a surprise; it also includes the viewpoint potential of barriers generally, and images often adopting a perspective from on high, showing both sides, invite viewers to align themselves – bodily and perhaps ideologically – with a side and simulating the inaccessibility of the other side (with possible family members, former co-workers, etc. on it). Before the wall physically came down, people from either side climbed on top – to fraternize, to be sure, but also to gain control and overcome the restrictions in terms of vision and knowledge imposed by the wall. Over the course of its history, many have in fact died attempting to cross to the other side of the wall.

The case is particularly interesting in that the material wall was erected with a specific type of division in mind, and with a 'ready-made' definition of what was being walled in and what was being walled out. The very existence of the spatial BARRIER was understood as a representation of force, blocking citizens of Germany from being connected. In this case, the viewpoints (political and ideological) were clearly associated with the two sides of the wall. While the BARRIER schema was given a material form, it was also unambiguously blended with the understanding of the political divisions of the post-war era, and all the material actions, including the final tearing down of the wall, were understood strictly in political terms. The moral and political messages that emerged over time all stress the need for the wall to come down, and present it as a moral choice.

A series of American presidential speeches delivered in Berlin is instructive in charting some of the basic spatial as well as further enriched structure of the wall being addressed in political discourse. Examples in the discussion which follows come from speeches by John F. Kennedy in 1963, Ronald Reagan in 1987, Bill Clinton in 1994, and Barack Obama in 2013. All four speeches play out the idea of containment and blockage imposed by the Berlin Wall. Kennedy provides a powerful ideological critique when he says ''we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in, to prevent them from leaving us'', and Reagan speaks of a wall ''encircl[ing] the free sectors of this city''; both thus criticize East Germany for restricting people's freedom. In a similar vein, post-fall, Clinton sees the wall as proof ''that no wall can forever contain the mighty power of freedom'', and Obama adds in vivid detail of ways in which people sought to overcome the wall and regain freedom:

> And here, they will recall how people trapped behind a wall braved bullets, and jumped barbed wire, and dashed across minefields, and dug through tunnels, and leapt from buildings, and swam across the Spree to claim their most basic right of freedom.

In addition to 'entrapment' and containment, a basic dimension present in all four speeches is that of the division and separation effected by the wall, ''separating families, dividing husbands and wives and brothers and sisters, and dividing a people who wish to be joined together'' (Kennedy), with Reagan reflecting on the ''vast system of barriers that divides the entire continent of Europe'', opening up the space geographically as well as ideologically, since not all barriers implied here can be seen as physical. Post-fall, Clinton speaks of ''stand[ing] where crude walls of concrete separated mother from child'' and now finally ''meet[ing] as one family'', and Obama remembers ''the fault line where a city was divided''.

The broadening of spaces separated by the wall suggested in the Reagan quote just above is explicitly gone through step by step in Kennedy's speech, thereby broadening its symbolic importance well beyond Berlin to represent all barriers against freedom on a global scale:

> So let me ask you (. . .) to lift your eyes beyond the dangers of today to the hopes of tomorrow, beyond the freedom merely of this city of Berlin, or your country of Germany, to the advance of freedom everywhere (. . .) When all are free, then we can look forward to that day when this city will be joined as one, and this country, and this great Continent of Europe, in a peaceful and hopeful globe.

Across the four speeches, removing the physical wall in Berlin is conceived of as restoring freedom, peace, choice, openness, and prosperity. Reagan's rousing address of Gorbachev to ''tear down this wall'' if he truly seeks peace, prosperity and liberalization is echoed in Clinton speaking of the ''courage to endure, to resist, to tear down the Wall'', and in Obama's praise for the citizens ''who choose whether to be defined by a wall, or whether to tear it down'', which he equates with the choice between living free, in open societies, or in chains, ''in closed societies that suffocate the soul''. Obama's speech also sounds a cautionary note against possible complacency setting in once physical walls have been torn down, encouraging each individual citizen to tear down any walls of prejudice in their hearts:

> And as long as walls exist in our hearts to separate us from those who don't look like us, or think like us, or worship as we do, then we're going to have to work harder, together, to bring those walls of division down.

In this way, Obama completes the process of expanding the regions separated by barriers begun in Kennedy's speech, first expanding across successive geographical regions, then moving on to ideological regions, and culminating in personal belief systems excluding or including prejudice (Fig. 2). Interestingly, the metonymy used, HEART FOR EMOTIONS, while standard and unremarkable, shows the power of image-schematic scaffolding particularly clearly. What is required is some conceptualization of division, and, in the emerging blend, the nature or size of the regions on the two sides are compressed out – but the viewpoint structure is not; walls of prejudice in people's hearts restrict those who are on the 'wrong' side of the barrier. As Fig. 2 shows, the nature of the regions is not determined, as long as there is a possible metaphorical construal of spatial regions or ideological realms as bounded regions.

While a significant expansion of meaning was thus built on top of the basic spatial and viewpoint affordances of a BARRIER, other aspects also play a role. Reagan's speech introduces a striking embodied twist in speaking of ''barriers cut[ting] across Germany in a gash of barbed wire, concrete, dog runs, and guard towers'' and, zooming in on Berlin, of



Fig. 2. Expansion of regions separated, physically or symbolically, by the Berlin Wall in presidential speeches.

‘‘this scar of a wall’’. Listeners or readers can vividly simulate how painful a gash is, and how painful psychologically, and perhaps still physically, a scar can be, and this embodied simulation (see Bergen, 2012) provides the kind of immediate understanding, signifying to the audience the pain caused by the wall’s brutal separation. The reconstrual of a divided Europe as a human body adds an important emotional dimension to the speech.

In addition to embodiment, Reagan relies in his use of the barrier schema on force dynamics (Talmy, 2000) – specifically a reversal of the standard situation in which forces actively impact on the wall, which is stronger and resists such forces. For Reagan, however, ‘‘across Europe, this wall will fall. For it cannot withstand faith; it cannot withstand truth. The wall cannot withstand freedom’’. Rather than focusing on forces assailing the wall, the perspective starts from the wall itself, whose properties apparently are such that it cannot withstand the forces pushing it – faith, and truth, and freedom. Obama’s much later speech echoes this force-dynamic set-up and this language, but imagines the wall being forced down by human *desire* for freedom, rather than by the abstract idea of freedom as such: ‘‘No wall can stand against the yearning of justice, the yearnings for freedom, the yearnings for peace that burns in the human heart’’. This echoes, though in reverse, the poem by Heaney, where the wall required strength – showing again the importance of viewpoint in creative integrations relying on schemas.

In his 2014 commemorative speech, 25 years on from the fall of the Berlin Wall, the then president of the European Parliament Martin Schulz, stressing the division worked by what he calls ‘‘the wall of fear’’, argues that the wall’s fall turned it instead into ‘‘a symbol of unity and freedom’’. Like Obama the year before, however, he cautions against complacency: ‘‘Will we stand by and watch as new walls and new borders are put up in Europe?’’ Interestingly, in a passage in which he lists a number of peaceful moves towards freedom and democracy in different parts of Europe earlier in 1989, Schulz recalls the Baltic Chain, which was formed on 23 August from Vilnius via Riga to Tallinn: ‘‘1.8 million people, standing hand in hand in three Baltic states, commemorated the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact’’. This human chain formed by a linking of hands is at the same time also a barrier, but this time of a desirable kind, as a kind of human shield against new divisions and more oppression. This illustrates the point made previously about the (more common) negative and the (less frequent but possible) positive affordances of barriers: some barriers impose division and separation and we want them down, but others can be erected to protect us from unwanted threats.

One thing all the speeches from which we quoted in this section demonstrate is a curious move from imaginary, over physical, to a different kind of imaginary barrier: starting out from an ideological divide in Europe, the Berlin Wall was put up to externalize and ‘police’ the ideological barrier, but the political discourse that emerges and that enriches the frame of the Berlin Wall subsequently comes to stand for more than a divide between political systems, as it comes to represent a barrier between freedom and oppression, and even at the personal level between open, unprejudiced attitudes and closed, prejudiced ones. The next section turns to another wall fraught with political and cultural significance, and to how it can be symbolically questioned and even removed in visual artistic practice.

5. Reconstruing the wall’s materiality to overcome it: Banksy’s wall art

The Israeli West Bank barrier built by Israel to separate it from the bulk of the Palestinian Territories is, in some respects, ‘‘the ultimate wall’’ (Dancygier, 2016a:61). As graffiti artist Banksy commented in a statement in 2005, ‘‘It stands three times the height of the Berlin Wall and will eventually run for over 700 km – the distance from London to Zurich’’ (qtd. in Jones, 2005). It is also, of course, hotly contested, and was condemned by the International Court of Justice and the United Nations General Assembly. In such circumstances, a graffiti artist – who is now world-famous but at the time was reported on as an ‘‘art prankster’’ (BBC News) or a ‘‘spray can prankster’’ (Jones, 2005) – travelling to the area to paint graffiti on this imposing wall was sure to have an impact.

Considering its height and (for its best-known sections at least) the expanse of its solid concrete mass, the West Bank barrier perfectly embodies the basic features of blockage of motion and vision and strict separation of regions (and peoples) we set out in Section 3. In his wall art, Banksy creates new meaning through integration of these basic features with unexpected visual prompts, resulting in different viewpointed experiences of ‘un-walling’ the wall, of making the impermeable permeable, or the un-crossable crossable.

Fig. 3. Banksy West Bank barrier art: beach scene.

One basic strategy consists, essentially, in creating a (painted) hole in the wall. Two artworks portray the wall as having cracks and a large hole in it, restoring access (visual and in terms of motion) to the other side. In one of those (Fig. 3) two kids with bucket and spade stand underneath the hole, which gives out onto a beautiful, exotic beach scene; in the other (Fig. 4), one kid (also with a bucket) is in the process of stepping through the hole while looking back at us, the viewers. Given the irregular shape and size of the hole and the cracks connecting to it, as viewers we are invited to imagine and perhaps simulate a brute force (such as that of a wrecking ball) having opened up the wall. A rather different artwork (Fig. 5), but also one which creates an opening, features a neat window looking out over a mountainous landscape; by its side stand two comfy armchairs and a small table with a flower pot, placing the viewer inside a cosy domestic scene looking out. Each of these artworks maintains the wall as wall, but creates an opening – irregular or, in the case of the window, regular – in it, giving out onto a peaceful sky or landscape.

A second set of images do not reconstrue the wall as a wall with a hole or window in it, but rather as composed of another material which, unlike concrete, is not solid, but can be peeled off, cut out or pulled back easily. Two seem to create the illusion that the wall, or at least a significant portion of it, is made out of paper: in one (Fig. 6), a corner is curled up to reveal what looks like the green bank of a rustling stream, and suggesting that the rest could easily be peeled off if the viewer so wished; another (Fig. 7) reconstrues the wall as a sheet of paper with dotted lines and the scissors symbol, conventionally signalling an instruction to carry out the action of cutting out a portion of paper (like a voucher). Both these artworks as it were plant a prompt for the viewer, who needs neither great skill nor courage to complete the simple, playful action required to open up the ‘‘paper wall’’.

There are two additional points to be made here. One, these artworks not only mimic what is absent – permeability, vision, and access – they also they make the viewer actively involved in making it happen. The fictive visibility and access in Figs. 3–5 is enhanced in Figs. 6 and 7 with positioning the viewer as actually responsible for making it possible, and in fact they make it look like child’s play – peeling off stickers and cutting out shapes are things children often do. The viewpoint the viewer is expected to take is not just seeing the otherwise obstructed view or crossing the barrier – the viewer is fictively responsible for making it happen. The fictive ‘action’ created by the images is further enhanced by

Fig. 4. Banksy West Bank barrier art: stepping through.

Fig. 5. Banksy West Bank barrier art: mountain scene.

Fig. 6. Banksy West Bank barrier art: peeling off.

the fictive motion required – pulling the sticker till it comes off, cutting along the dotted line until the hole appears. The wall changes its nature not only because its material nature is altered, but also because it calls for action – fictive or not.

A similar wall reconstrual is involved in another artwork (Fig. 8) depicting an agent (apparently a police officer) drawing back what has been reconstrued as a curtain, or perhaps the side of a tent, to reveal a sun-drenched beach. The activity seems to take a slightly greater effort (considering the agent's posture, with spread-out legs, apparently pulling with both arms, and arching back), but nevertheless remains a fairly simple activity compared to the considerable force of a wrecking-ball which might be needed to actually pierce through the concrete wall. The presence of the agent carrying out the action constitutes a big difference with the previous artworks, which left any agent implied, the role to be filled by the viewer; here, given the presence of an agent, the viewer is still likely to simulate the action portrayed.

The presence of a human figure also characterizes the two final artworks we discuss here (Figs. 9 and 10), one involving a girl holding on to a cluster of balloons, allowing her to float over the wall, the other featuring a boy with a paintbrush, apparently putting the finishing touches to a painted ladder. Clearly in these cases, the wall is not presented as something that can be cut through or opened up in some way, but is still solid and must be overcome ''vertically'', either by seemingly effortlessly flying over it, or by using a ladder. The presence of the paint brush in the last image (Fig. 10) brings the series of artworks full-circle in its self-reflexive nature, with the boy-painter acting as a kind of stand-in for the graffiti artist; clearly the effect would have been different – and more like the other artworks – if there had just been a ladder painted on the wall, with no paintbrush in sight. Like the other artwork, however, it remains a playful, happy image,



Fig. 7. Banksy West Bank barrier art: cutting out.

Fig. 8. Banksy West Bank barrier art: drawing back.

not a frustrated or angry one, hinting at the innocence of children who simply like to play and explore, and who might fantasize or dream about what lies on the other side of the vast grey expanse they encounter in their daily lives.

All the examples discussed start from our primary experience of barriers, and specifically walls, and our frame knowledge about walls. However, the artwork blends an imposing real wall visually with representations opening up the wall to attractive vistas, or prompts the viewer's engagement in or simulation of apparently simple or playful acts (cutting, balloon-flying, etc.), in many instances changing the materiality of the wall in the process. This creates new meanings which enrich our default frame understanding of walls, adding a number of conclusions to a newly expanded common ground: walls should not exist in the first place; what is on the other side of a wall is enticing rather than dangerous, and

Fig. 9. Banksy West Bank barrier art: balloon flight.

Fig. 10. Banksy West Bank barrier art: ladder.

finding out what is *actually* there (as opposed to any imagined threats) alleviates any fears one might have; and people will get to the other side of the barrier one way or another.

An interesting aspect of the West Bank barrier art we have not yet touched on concerns the question which side of the wall the work was painted on. The images clearly ''work'' without answering the question, which many people will likely not consider when seeing the images. In terms of Banksy's own politics, it is clear that he is critical of the existence of the wall which, as his 2005 statement put it, ''essentially turns Palestine into the world's largest open prison'' (qtd. in Jones, 2005). From news reporting at the time, it does indeed appear that the paintings were done ''on the Palestinian side of the barrier'' (BBC News); The Guardian's news report (Jones, 2005) places Banksy's summer 2005 visit more specifically in the Palestinian city Ramallah, about 10 km north of Jerusalem. Recently, in March 2017, to the south of Jerusalem in Bethlehem, Banksy opened up the aptly named Walled Off hotel, whose windows give out on the West Bank barrier but whose rooms come adorned with art (see e.g. Graham-Harrison, 2017).

Because the images as they became known via the Internet and other media do not contain any clear clues as to what side they are on, however, viewers are free to consider different interpretations. Whichever side you think you're viewing it from, however, the message seems to be that something, again, there is that wants the wall down: a human desire to

explore, to be unbounded, to take in large vistas, to be unafraid, perhaps naïve even, like a child at play. Barriers which symbolize security threats, and according to many people even symbolize hate, shouldn't need to exist.

The alignments which Banksy's artworks prompt, or force us to consider for ourselves, are of controversial political kinds. In the next section, we turn to rather different alignments in dramatic and film art, in which a barrier takes on a very different material nature indeed: that of the human body.

6. The body as barrier in drama and film

Arguably one of the most famous walls in world literature is that separating the lovers Pyramus and Thisbe in the tale best known from Ovid's *Metamorphoses*: thanks to a crack in the wall, the lovers can communicate their love for each other – forbidden by their rivalling parents – and set up a meeting (which, alas, will turn out to have a dramatic ending based on a misunderstanding). In Shakespeare's play *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, ''Pyramus and Thisbe'' is featured as a play within a play in which the wall is not represented by a stage prop, but instead by a living, breathing, talking character, ''Wall'': ''I, Snout by name, present a wall''. Dancygier (2016a:63–67) discusses this curious 'embodiment' of the wall by a character in great detail, but a few points from this analysis merit highlighting here.

One concerns the address by Pyramus of the wall. In Early Modern drama, address of inanimate objects is not unusual, which is analyzed in Dancygier (2012:Ch. 6) as one of the ways in which thoughts, emotions and feelings can be presented on stage without characters having to say ''I feel x'' or ''I think x'' directly to the audience. Thus, in *Romeo and Juliet*, Juliet for instance addresses the dagger (''O, happy dagger'') or the night (''Come, gentle night''). Now that the wall is played by a flesh-and-blood actor, however, what would otherwise have been a conventional address of an inanimate object comes to be addressed to a character who can reply, and comply with requests, as when Pyramus asks ''. . . O Wall, O sweet and lovely wall, / Show me thy chink, . . .'', and Wall obliges, to great comic effect. Part of the humorous effect derives from another aspect of the conventional address of inanimate objects that gets subverted: ''sweet and lovely'' would normally be associated with the lover, but the wall being human seems to be blended here with the lover.

''Wall'' as character is thus several things all at once. Yes, the basic schema of a barrier applies to ''Wall'' too, as he forms an impermeable, material separation between the two houses in which the lovers dwell, and by transference between the union of the lovers. Yet at the same time these general aspects of the wall frame are blended with an actor's body, allowing the wall to be at once a material barrier, a human addressee executing commands (''show me thy chink'') and the object of romantic feelings (''sweet and lovely'').

While *A Midsummer Night's Dream* features the unusual portrayal of a real, physical barrier by a human actor, there is a more common counterpart in people experiencing their body or aspects of it, for instance medical conditions, handicaps or perceived unattractiveness, as a mental barrier towards fulfilling their desires. As an example where this experience is presented on screen with striking viewpoint effects, we briefly consider a character from the 2006 motion picture *Babel*, directed by Alejandro González Iñárritu (cf. Dancygier, 2016b). In the Japanese sections of the film, a Deaf character, Chieko, experiences her body as a barrier which she wants friends and potential lovers to cross to access her inner life, but they remain on the other side through misunderstanding and rejection.

This experience is best captured in a scene in a disco which features alternating shots. Shots of colours, lights, and other people dancing, but entirely without a soundtrack, alternate with views of Chieko dancing in the crowd accompanied by a soundtrack of the music being played at the discotheque. The silent shots clearly present the viewpoint of Chieko's inner experience, simultaneously showing her as wanting to belong but as ultimately living in a separate sphere from her peers; the shots with soundtrack in which we're viewing Chieko drive home the point that we are unable to fully grasp a person's inner sense of the world. Had Chieko not been Deaf, these shots would have looked and sounded exactly the same as they do now. Through no one's fault, then, Chieko's deafness instals an apparently impermeable barrier between her experience of the world and that of the hearing people around her.

Given that Chieko's loneliness and her desire to belong are an important theme of the movie, these alternating shots with their different visual and sound viewpoints provide an embodied sense of why she acts the ways she does. Indeed, throughout the film she seems reckless, using her body in sometimes inappropriate ways (exposing herself) to attract attention and become included rather than feel excluded.

Where Wall (the Shakespeare character) comically subverts dramatic conventions as a result of his 'embodying' a physical wall, here the body itself, because of its different functioning compared to 'the norm', throws up a very strong and disturbing mental barrier. Our final example to which we turn in the next section moves on from film and drama to literary narrative, to highlight a novel aspect of walls in a story that is in many ways all about walls, real and metaphorical.

7. A layered wall as an image for narrative

Smith's (2014) novel *How to be Both* presents the story of George, who in the present day is mourning the recent loss of her mother. It also presents the story of the Quattrocento painter Francesco del Cossa, painting the best of several

frescoes in the Palazzo Schifanoia outside Ferrara. The stories are interconnected – George (short for Georgia) and her mother had visited the Palazzo, and in the present day Francesco's ghost is somehow forced or compelled to follow George around – and can be read in either order, with half the print run starting with one story, the other half with the other, and the Kindle version offering a choice of where to begin (see Vandelanotte, 2015 for further discussion).

This already suggests the novel is much concerned with story-telling itself, with how to tell a story, especially how to tell several stories, and walls play a large part in these stories. At a plot level, walls are significant because Francesco del Cossa uses walls as a canvas on which to paint, and is the son of a brickmaker, so he has opinions on what makes a good wall, and is given to commenting on the poor quality of walls he encounters. Metaphorical walls feature too, as when Francesco describes a friend's frustration as ''walled-up power'' (367); or when, after a strong emotional experience, George is described as ''not a girl'' but ''a block of stone'', ''a piece of wall'', ''something against which other things impact without her permission or understanding'' (101), integrating the basic barrier schema with force, but in a twist similar to that in Reagan's speech discussed above, as here too it is the assailed wall which is vulnerable.

The most novel use of the barrier schema in *How to Be Both*, however, relates to the use of the wall as a canvas for fresco-painting. The important point is that frescoes combine an underdrawing which may differ significantly from the visible outer drawing, prompting the question ''. . . which came first? (. . .) The picture underneath or the picture on the surface?'' (103) – we may see the outer drawing first, but the underdrawing inevitably got applied first. In order to appreciate this, however, we need to enrich our basic ''wall'' frame: usually we do not attend to the internal composition of a wall at all, and essentially perceive it as a broadly homogeneous, impermeable mass, effecting the blockage in terms of vision and motion discussed previously. The knowledge the novel makes us acquire about frescoes, however, requires a shift of focus to understand the materiality of the wall differently, as a layered surface, of which only the outer layer is visible.

This fuller understanding of walls and fresco drawings feeds into our understanding of story-telling, as the simultaneous presence of different layers comes to represent the layeredness of narrative, as in the following passage:

> But though I was descended from the men who'd made the walls which themselves made the municipal palace – the walls on which the great Master Piero in his stay in Ferrara had painted for the Ests the victorious battle scenes (and from looking at whose works I learned the open mouths of horses, the rise of light in landscape, the serious nature of lightness, and how to tell a story, but tell it more than one way at once, and tell another underneath it up-rising through the skin of it) – I would paint my own walls. (236–237)

Telling a story ''more than one way at once'' is, then, like painting a picture more than one way at once: an attempt to capture things ''happening, both separately and connectedly'' (53).

8. Barriers and viewpoint: from schematic meaning to figurative meaning

Over the course of the examples we explored in this paper, the many different meanings construed on top of the basic image-schematic scaffolding provided by the concept of a BARRIER seem to cluster around a limited number of dominant aspects. That of a barrier as a dividing line between regions (real or metaphorical) is of course very prominent, for instance in separating one person's land from a neighbour's in Frost's poem ''Mending Wall'', or the domain of safe knowledge from that of unsafe and unwanted knowledge in the interview about Alzheimer's disease. Likewise the political discourse about the Berlin Wall redefines the regions we see as being divided by it (physical, ideological, even personal), while Banksy's artwork has as one of its effects to redefine how we view the 'other' side, learning to see it as attractive and desirable rather than fearsome and threatening. In *Babel*, Chieko's body imposes a barrier between the hearing and the non-hearing, and between the outer and the inner person.

Another prominent aspect highlighted in a number of cases is that of the barrier as a solid containing structure. Heaney's poem ''Scaffolding'' views this containment positively, with the walls having been built up together keeping people safe in a loving relationship. In the discourse about the Berlin Wall, on the other hand, containment becomes entrapment, and the wall must be torn down. Overcoming the containment is also a goal of Banksy's West Bank barrier art, but here it's not a question of tearing down so much as engaging viewers (through participation in the action, or simulation of action being carried out in the paintings) in rather playful, simple activities allowing the wall to be drawn back, cut open, overflown, etc.

What Banksy's wall art also involves is redefining the barrier's material structure: what is concrete gets to be reconstrued as paper, for instance, or as a curtain. Representing a wall with great importance to the plot as a human actor in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* allows Shakespeare to mock theatrical conventions, while the unusual focus not so much on 'redefining' a wall's materiality, but on zooming in on it and recognizing its layered structure offers Ali Smith a model to talk about storytelling in *How to be Both*.

In reviewing a broad range of examples involving barriers in one way or another, we have argued the more general point: that the viewpoint affordances emerging on the basis of spatial primitives and the image schemas they feature in provide an important tool for more insightful analyses of textual and visual artefact. Very basic spatial concepts, acquired

very early on and equipped with viewpoint, form the conceptual scaffolding which becomes subsequently enriched through frames, applied metaphorically, and/or blended with textual and/or visual representations, often resulting in a changed embodied interaction (restricted permeability, mobility, vision, or control in the case of barriers) or a reconstrual of materiality, yielding new and complex meanings in a wide array of multimodal artefacts. Crucially, we argue, the richness of the emerging meanings relies only partly, or perhaps not even primarily, on the spatial configuration. Rather, it is made possible by the viewpoint configuration prompted by the original spatial configuration. It seems natural that a visual or embodied viewpoint would be further developed into more abstract types of viewpoint – ideological, political, artistic, or narrative. The 'scaffolding' provided by the schema allows us to build so many different structures because of the viewpoint affordances, rather than spatiality itself. It thus seems warranted to add viewpoint characterization to the discussion of image schemas. The consequences are rich – if viewpoint is crucial to the scaffolding potential of spatial schemas, it is crucial to all of the more complex structures emerging on that basis: schematic integrations, metaphors and blends. We have considered just one example here, looking at various modalities, including textual, visual, and multimodal artefacts. All these examples seem to support our conclusions. Similar explorations can and should be undertaken for other concepts, such as size and depth, to further extend our understanding of how viewpoint comes in at so basic a level and in concepts formed so early, to influence and shape forms of communication and art of potentially great complexity and beauty.

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