FOUNDATIONS OF SEMIOTICS

General Editor
ACHIM ESCHBACH
(University of Essen)

Advisory Editorial Board

Herbert E. Brekle (Regensburg); Geoffrey L. Bursill-Hall (Burnaby, B.C.)
Eugenio Coseriu (Tübingen); Marcelo Dascal (Tel-Aviv)
Lambertus M. de Rijk (Leiden); Max H. Fisch (Indianapolis)
Rudolf Haller (Graz); Robert E. Innis (Lowell, Mass.)
Norman Kretzmann (Ithaca, N.Y.); W. Keith Percival (Lawrence, Kansas)
Jan Sulowski (Warszawa); Jürgen Trabant (Berlin)

Volume 25

Karl Bühler

Theory of Language
The Representational Function of Language

KARL BÜHLER

THEORY OF LANGUAGE

THE REPRESENTATIONAL FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE

Translated by

DONALD FRASER GOODWIN

JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY
AMSTERDAM/PHILADELPHIA

1990

ER 730 F771A-05

Autorisierte Übersetzung nach der deutschen Originalausgabe: Karl Bühler, *Sprachtheorie*.

© Gustav Fischer Verlag, Jena/Stuttgart 1934/1982

The translation of this book into English was supported by Inter Nationes, Bonn, Germany.

813/91/76

FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bühler, Karl, 1879-1963.
[Sprachtheorie. English]
Theory of language: the representational function of language / Karl Bühler; translated by Donald Fraser Goodwin.

p. cm. -- (Foundations of semiotics, ISSN 0168-2555; v. 25)
Translation of: Sprachtheorie.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
1. Language and languages. I. Title. II. Series.
P105.B8513 1990
401 -- dc 20 90-20219
ISBN 90 272 3297 0 (Eur) / 1-55619-200-2 (US) (alk. paper) CIP

© Copyright 1990 - John Benjamins B.V.
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher.

Table of Contents

III. The Symbolic Field of Language and the Naming Words

IV. The Make-up of Human Speech: Elements and Compositions

Editor's Introduction — Karl Bühler: Sematologist

I.

The breadth and depth of Karl Bühler's work has not yet been fully fathomed. Although there are probably few who seriously treat linguistic problems who have never heard of Karl Bühler, many of Bühler's lasting insights are so much a matter of course in science that they are detached from the name of their author (cf. Fónagy 1984: 224). Fónagy writes:

> Bühler's theories quickly became fundamental elements of our linguistic thought, which are regarded as 'innate' or as a part of an ancient heritage that is as anonymous as folklore. (*ibid.*)

For similar reasons, Gerold Ungeheuer felt just cause for repeatedly urging colleagues who were about to formulate a new linguistic theorem to take a close look at Bühler first, since so many of the fundamental insights of modern linguistics had long since been treated by him. The fact that on the one hand Bühler's thought should attain this level of presence as a constantly recurrent theme, though detached from his authorship, and that on the other hand his positive research results should be largely forgotten certainly has many reasons. A first reason, perhaps only a partial explanation, is that Bühler's research models were so convincing and his formulations so compelling that many of his ideas have achieved the status of common knowledge; examples are his famous *organon model of language*, which constitutes an elementary statement of semiotic, communication-theoretical and linguistic principles; his life-long concern with the *Gestalt principle* in human and animal life; his idea of the *aha-experience*, which has become proverbial; his cybernetic model of the *control of community life*; or his discussion of *deixis*. A further factor, which shall occupy us in greater detail below, has to do with the scientific paradigms that formed the context of Bühler's work. This second point is particularly important because it can be clearly shown that Bühler assailed prevalent paradigms not just once, but several times in the course of his long life as an active researcher. That he

or interjections. By the same token, most languages have curious field fusions between governing and dependent sentences. Still, one would lose access to many language theoretical insights if simply because one sometimes encounters curious intermediate phenomena one were to deny that there is a normal field breach in both the former and the latter. For very powerful *joints* of human speech are developed in the field breach between dependent clauses themselves; and it is something completely different that is developed in the field breach between compound and sentence. More about this in the last section of this book.

23. The Metaphor in Language

23.0 The sematological core of the theory of the metaphor

There is a tree in the Black Forest that is called the *Hölzlekönig* (woods king); not too far from it is another, the *Hölzlekönigin* (woods queen).[1] The King and the Queen are the finest trunks far and wide, they are veritable *tree-giants*. Let us now examine the manner of speech that forms such compounds as these, and beyond that look at the metaphor in language in general. Once one begins to observe the linguistic phenomenon that is usually called metaphor, it seems that human speech is made up of metaphors almost as the Black Forest is of trees. Compounds such as '*Fingerhut* [thimble, literally "finger-hat"], *Handschuh* [glove, literally "hand-shoe"], *Tischbein* [table-leg] are metaphors; if I say of a married couple that 'he is an elephant and she is a deer', then the same conceptual word, namely "metaphor", comes to mind again; and so on down to the sensory metaphors 'light, sharp tones (or dark, soft ones), tone colour, *Farbenton* [hue, literally "colour-tone"], sweet joys, bitter pain, cold murder, dark plans', and up to the more daring and studied metaphors of rhetoricians, poets and philosophers. As far as I am familiar with them, the wide-ranging collections of examples compiled by ancient rhetoric, which had primarily didactic purposes, are sterile from a language-theoretical point of view, whereas modern researchers have tended to get stuck in questions of experiential psychology, which are, of course, also relevant.[2] What I have

1. [A note on these compounds: the basic form of the word for "woods" is *Holz*; here it is in the diminutive form with the (dialect) ending *-le* and vowel modification. The word for queen, *Königin*, is derived from that for king by adding the feminine ending *-in*.]

2. Aristotle's definition and explanation (*Poetics*, chapter 21) is appropriate and sound: "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy" (1457b7-9). "Analogy is possible whenever there are four terms so related

[343] in mind as the *sematological core* of a well-constructed theory of the metaphor is something that must be worked out immediately following the treatment of the summative wholes and the compound: for every linguistic compound is metaphoric to some degree, and metaphor is no exceptional phenomenon.

23.1 Psychological remarks — findings of historians of language — parallels outside of language — two metaphors by children

Stählin's[3] experts on psychology felt that such simple linguistic constructions as '*der greise Wald*' (the aged[4] forest) were metaphorical; the subjects stated that the adjective reminded them of certain properties, for example the bark of old trees or dishevelled lichens, and that they became peculiarly aware of the superimposition and intertwinement of two spheres of meaning (man — tree). If the expression 'a weathered, aged man' is constructed parallel to this, it will be similar properties of the appearance of old people that are stressed in the experience [of understanding the expression]. It is just that this time they are conceived (and perhaps also seen with the mind's eye) as belonging to a person; and it is as if this time they had come over from the sphere 'masonry, rock'. Hence, the subtle analysis of experience in Stählin's study shows that the use of the term metaphor that the Greeks invented and originally tailored to their intricate poetic and rhetorical comparisons is also justified and apt for an analysis in terms of experience. A duality of spheres (even in the simple examples that we have intentionally chosen) and something like a transition from one to the other

that the second (B) is to the first (A), as the fourth (D) to the third (C); for one may then metaphorically put D in lieu of B and B in lieu of D. Now and then, too, they qualify the metaphor by adding on to it that to which the word it supplants is relative" (1457b17-20). [Quoted from the Oxford translation: *De Poetica*, trans. by Ingram Bywater, in: *The Works of Aristotle*, Vol. XI. (Oxford University Press 1946).] According to Aristotle, only analogy is metaphoric in the strict sense of the word. It is evident that this objective analysis lacks an impulse to illuminate the matter from the other side, experience, whereas the modern studies tend to be wanting firm support in objective analysis of language.

3. Cf. Stählin "Zur Psychologie und Statistik der Metaphern [On the psychology and statistics of metaphors] (Stählin 1914); on what follows: Sterzinger "Die Gründe des Gefallens und Mißfallens am poetischen Bilde" [The reasons for pleasure and displeasure in the poetic image] (Sterzinger 1913).

4. ['Aged' translates *greis*, which is normally used only for persons.]

can often be detected in the experience [of understanding], and this often vanishes only when idiomatically familiar constructions are involved.

We are not, however, engaged in stylistics or experiential psychology here, but rather, as theoreticians of language, we are wondering what to make of the ubiquity of metaphorical turns and techniques in representational language. Is this mixture of spheres not a very curious way of making cocktails? To what end is it done? The facts of meaning change, for example, lead the historian of language to reflect on the phenomenon of the metaphor, and he ascertains that much that was originally metaphorical gradually stops being felt to be such in the course of the history of language. Jean Paul, the romantic poet, expresses this fact in his well-known (meta- [344] phorical) dictum on the innumerable yellowed metaphors of language. But Hermann Paul, the prosaic linguist, is more informative when he tries to make sense of the language historical phenomenon of the metaphor as follows:

> The metaphor is one of the most important resources for making terms for complex ideas for which no adequate designations exist. Its use is not, however, restricted to cases in which such an external compulsion is given. Even where a term is already available, there is often an inner drive to prefer a metaphorical expression. The metaphor simply is something that necessarily flows from human nature and makes itself felt not only in poetic language, but also and primarily in popular colloquial language, which always has a tendency to be vivid and to use drastic characterizations. Many such metaphors gain currency, even if not as easily as in the cases in which the lack of another designation also plays a role.
>
> It is a matter of course that to the extent that the production of metaphors is carried out naturally by the people, it draws on the domains of ideas that have the most powerful grip on the mind. What is further removed from understanding and interest can thus be made more vivid and familiar by virtue of something closer at hand. The individual diversity of interest is thus expressed in the choice of metaphorical expression, and the entirety of the metaphors that have gained currency in a language shows what interests were especially strong in that people.
>
> The task of giving an exhaustive survey of all kinds of metaphor can hardly be fulfilled. I shall content myself with a discussion of some that are particularly usual. (Paul 1909: 94-95)[5]

5. [Chapter IV was expanded for the third edition. This passage is not contained in the translated edition.]

To repeat the point briefly: the metaphor is a help *in want of an expression* (*Ausdrucksnot*), when our vocabulary fails us, and it is a means of *drastic characterization*. Since the rule holds that things unknown can only be determined by means of things known, what is removed from interest only by means of what is closer to my interests, metaphor provides the historian with the evidence mentioned [evidence on what is most interesting to a people]. These are noteworthy key-words for which every historian could probably offer abundant pertinent evidence from his own field; Paul himself gives evidence from German (Paul 1909: 95ff.). It seems to me that the corollary that the metaphor "necessarily flows from human nature" is jejune and indeterminate. It would certainly be more satisfactory if such an emanation could be correlated more strictly and clearly with both the want of expression and the drastic expression [or forcefulness of expression] (*Ausdrucksdrastik*), and if as a background to this a connection to the basic facts of symbolizing with spoken language in general could be found. The question that will help us along is as follows: what specifically does *composition that mixes spheres* contribute in comparison with the summative whole and the ordinary compound?

[345] In diverse representational techniques outside of language there are both distant and close parallels to the mixing procedure used in the metaphor in language. Galton, for example, photographed several people in succession at the same part of a photographic plate in a cunning attempt to gain from the technology of photography what was otherwise only available as the product of psychophysical "processing" and from representational art, namely a *type image*. The familiar action of binocular vision, that the same thing is projected onto two retinae and still seen as one under normal circumstances, comes closer to what is to be explained here; binocular vision is simple, and more plastic than vision with one eye alone when the minimal differences between the images (their lateral disparation) is used for the effect of more precise and clear vision in depth.[6] However, the

6. Narziß Ach has recently conjectured that according to the pattern of the exploitation of the familiar subsidiary technical effect, parallaxis, there may well be other important ways of putting things to use in the psychophysical system, and has offered examples as evidence for his idea in his paper "Das Kompensations- oder Produktionsgesetz der Identifikation" [The law of compensation or production in identification] (Ach 1932). This idea is probably correctly conceived and may also be fruitful for the realm of metaphor. Before that, however, *omission* must be taken note of as such. Compare the fact that there are 'right-eyed' and 'left-eyed' people, as mentioned above on page 146 in the footnote.

remark that the binocular union *omits* everything genuinely disparate which cannot be united is much more important for the comparison attempted here. Galton's picture has blurred contours, but the binocular image does not, nor does a thing that is characterized with a metaphor.

Let me dwell on this last point, appealing for a change to two metaphors produced by children as evidence: 'The soup has a cold,' and, 'The butterfly is knitting socks.' In the first case a bubble had formed on the surface of the soup in the soup-dish, and in the second a pitched butterfly was crossing its long feelers alternately right over left and left over right just as Grandmother does with her long knitting needles. Such cases make it clear to us that composition that mixes spheres is the psychophysically simplest *technique of abstraction*, one which in the original case makes the least possible psychophysical demands: namely wherever the strong impression made by a perceived phenomenon leads us to feel a want of expression because we lack words for the phenomenon, or where such a phenomenon requires a drastic characterization. In such cases the creative language user does nothing more (and also nothing less) than that he notices what is characteristic and that he is helped by the fundamental law of the so-called [346] association of similarity. This is how innumerable curious titles or names arise in the life of children, names that no one writes down — unless by chance something is said that strikes the ears of the admiring parents as special.

23.2 The physiognomic gaze — pleasure in functioning

We are no longer very far from our aim. My book *Ausdruckstheorie* [Theory of expression] (Bühler 1933a) treats the facts of *sensual* metaphor in detail, which pose no problem as long as one abides by what Piderit and Wundt have discovered and interpreted about human bodily expression. 'Bitter' pain and 'sweet' luck, to renounce something 'sourly' are not free inventions of poets, but are visible expressive phenomena on human faces. Whoever is interested in further details will have to consult the documentary evidence adduced in the book on expression. The formulation in language is here *not itself productive* in bringing things together, but only reproduces what is already perceived together wherever natural human expression is seen and understood.

In our example of the childish expression, the play of the Grandmother's knitting needles and the play of the butterfly's feelers were not

actually seen together or perceived in comparison one next to the other. It would probably be love's labour lost to place the knitting Grandmother and the pitched butterfly together next to each other in an experimental situation with children in order to provoke a metaphor. Elaborate flashes are difficult to provoke, and this childish metaphor was a 'free' flash of fancy. Two situational images have come together in it by virtue of a process of remembering; the factor of playfulness deserves strong stress. The impulse was given by contemplatively observing what was perceived and seizing on a pregnant aspect in it. As a rule, children learn from such pregnant aspects to characterize the events of their small world *physiognomically*: that the cat, too, 'grasps', that the chair 'stands' and can 'fall down' on the floor like a child, and so on *in infinitum*.[7] Our own everyday language is full to the brim with such physiognomic characteristics; that is a good portion of its "yellowed", its inconspicuous metaphors.

[347] Let us now vary the case of the knitting needle metaphor so that a Grandmother who tells fairy tales would want to integrate the image discovered by the individual child into her description of a butterfly for further use for other children. She would certainly not have much luck with it if she only used words, as is usual in fairy tales, if in telling her story she did not, say, take up her knitting needles to demonstrate. How is it with the wide-ranging, involved metaphors in Homer's narratives? According to an old convention, Homer is blind and would hence be a poor demonstrator if such were necessary somewhere among his innumerable and often very complicated metaphors. Moreover, his listeners are not children, but adults for whom, with all their practical knowledge of the world, it must have been a source of *primary pleasure in functioning* to carry out in imagination the to and fro mixture of spheres required by the metaphor when Homer sets out to characterize such diverse situations in his intricate and leisurely manner. Children's fairy tales are extremely sparing with figurative language, Homer luxuriates in it; he offers what children in principle are not capable of even if the figures used in narration were all such as are encountered in

7. The "physiognomic" way of looking at the world is primary (autochthonous) in the child's life; the theorist need not assume a special factor called *anthropomorphism*. On special performances of physiognomic recognition see my book on the theory of expression (Bühler 1933a: 203).

the child's nursery.[8] I am not acquainted with the mentality of Homer's hearers, but imagine that their mentality includes a pleasure in the function of bringing about coincidence of spheres such that the coincidence results in abstraction; precisely this procedure of abstraction was probably a fresh source of pleasure in functioning for them, differently than for us. Of course, we, too, find Homer's images refreshing; but if I am not mistaken, we must artificially reduce our expectations, much as we are even able to reduce ourselves to the much more distant mentality of children's fairy tales so as to gain access to the otherwise lost paradise of the phantasies of early childhood.[9]

23.3 The differential effect, the technical model of the double filter — the law of suppression — plasticity of meanings

What I have been able to do up to now is not a sufficient basis for an exact verification of the conjectural model of the metaphor sketched here, which was originally conceived on the basis of observations of children. The [348] simplest technical analogy for this model would perhaps be as follows: if instead of a transparency I insert an opaque cardboard disc with holes punched into it into a projector, patches of light with the shape of my holes will become visible on the screen. If I insert a second disc with different openings, a *differential phenomenon* will be projected on the screen, that is, patches of light only to the extent that a hole or part of a hole on one disc coincides with one on the other. If my openings are long fissures that are somehow arranged, say parallel to each other on each disc but in different directions on both, as in the following figure, the ensuing differential image will again be a simple and clear pattern:

8. The reasons for this are summarized and discussed in my book *Die geistige Entwicklung des Kindes* [The mental development of the child] (Bühler 1930: 358ff.). It is based on circumstantial evidence; this not unimportant matter should be dealt with sometime directly with adequate methods.

9. We modern narrators, saturated with language and hurried in our use of images, say, for example, of a grenade that it *shaves away* the surface of the ground, and rely on the hearer to understand in a twinkling the disappearance. Homer the story-teller would have taken his time and set out to portray this in many lines to similar effect, and his hearers must have had not only patience, but also pleasure in the function in the mixture of spheres.



Figure 9

The technical model with the projector did not slip into the text by chance, but rather is supposed to help to explain that the construction of compound meaning contains a projective character or component. In another context I hope to have a more exact basis so as to be able to present something more adequate than these vague hints; the projective (centrifugal) character in apparently pure receptional processes must first be recognized and studied in simple perception and in certain curious psychopathological disorders before one can hope to be able to grasp it in the higher region of speech thought. The question is whether a *double lattice* or *double filter* in the technical realm makes it possible to do things that can properly be regarded as analogues to the exceptionally fine abstractional effects of metaphorical coincidence of spheres. If I hear the name *Hölzlekönig* (woods-king) from an inhabitant of the Black Forest as the name for a tree that I have not yet seen; if I understand the expression immediately and, with Hermann Paul, feel it to be a "drastic" characterization, then my task as a psychologist is to make simple psychological (psychophysical) sense of the origin of the phantasy image I have on hearing this expression.

The conceptual sphere *forest* and the conceptual sphere *king* are united; the same integral object is supposed to conform to both at once. I
[349] thus impute kingly qualities to a tree. The metaphorical compound alone is not enough to teach me to proceed in this direction and not the other way around, for a "woods-king" could just as well be a person to whom I attribute a wooded demesne and by virtue of the woods a regal role among other property owners. That would be a substantially different case. But when I read or hear the word in the context of the first sentence with which this section begins, all wavering is precluded. A combination of words to form the phrase "a kingly tree" would do about the same service, but has a less drastic effect in the passage, and would, moreover, be equivocal. If I worked analytically and added adjectives to the name 'tree' (the largest, the most beautiful, overtowering, dominating), I would have to accumulate a

number of them to reach more or less the same effect as regards meaning and imagination as by the mixture of spheres.

The selective effect of the coincidence of spheres hardly needs to be worked out specially; juxtapose some other, newly polished example or the hackneyed metaphor '*Salonlöwe* [woman-killer, literally "living room lion"]: 'Our friend N. has become quite a lion in the living room.' This inhabitant of the savannah, the lion, has many proverbial properties, among them bloodthirstiness and courage. But the sphere 'living room' *suppresses* them, just as the tree sphere suppresses all inappropriate kingly properties; I will not expect to see crown and ermine cape on my walk in the Black Forest to the Woods-King, nor at my meeting with my friend the lion of the living room will I expect bloodthirstiness and masculine courage. It is one of the central questions for psychology of language how such suppression comes about in the psychophysical system.

The metaphor in the full sense, for all its frequency, is an exceptional phenomenon, but the *law of suppression* is universal. In the compound, we were able to illustrate the fact that attributive compound meanings are supersummative (in Ehrenfels's genuine sense of supersummativity) by pointing out the surplus which is contributed by acquaintance with the thing meant in compounds such as '*Backofen*' (baking oven) and '*Backstein*' (baked brick)[10] [or glass-blower and glass-house]. But what has thus been said would only be a half-truth if the fact of *subsummativity* (*Untersummativität*) were not also explained. Suppression, omission, selection and differential effect are all expressions for one and the same simple phenomenon, and if a complete description of the attributive complexes of language is to be possible, this phenomenon must come to supplement the criterion of supersummativity, which is what Gestalt theory since Ehrenfels has exclusively stressed.

Pure logic comes along and demands one thing of the conceptual signs, [350]
meaning constancy: the same word — the same meaning, wherever it is used. Since classical antiquity, critics of language have frequently and amply enough demonstrated that intersubjective communication with the signs of natural language is exceptionally imperfect in conforming to this requirement. But the author of this book is exceptionally fond of natural language and prefers to listen to it first and to make a scientific record of

10. [See note page 87.]

the facts before conniving with the critics. He also finds that the rigidity of a stiff riding boot[11] may well have advantages, for example for the horse rider; for the speakers of the clear language of science are proud riders who insist on riding on rigid, well-defined word meanings. However, there are other advantages for intersubjective communication that are provided by a certain plasticity of the meaning spheres of our naming words. Modern technology knows that one can and must work with degrees of freedom in mechanical engineering; organisms have known this much longer. As in very complicated modern machines and the organs of organisms, there are safety devices to correct the degrees of freedom of the meaning spheres of our naming words. Supersummativity and subsummativity of attributive complexes increase the productivity of language to a remarkable extent, and make it possible to give things laconic names. This presupposes, of course, that a correction of the indeterminateness and equivocalness of the complexes formed in this way is available for use.

Something further is also presupposed and must be specially stated as the premise of the doctrine that interfering factors are suppressed in the procedure of mixing spheres. It is the fact that when we hear the words spoken by our fellows, we generally do so as hearers willing to understand. In normal verbal contact we make the well-founded presupposition that the speaker is forming meaningful linguistic constructions, and when a portion of what is said is difficult to understand we try out a few variants to find out what order it ultimately admits of. Sometimes it is like guessing at puzzles. A proper puzzle requires us to perform unusual feats in trying out variants; some metaphors are easy puzzles, not designed specially as a test of acuity. But we should have to have reached a profounder grasp of the law of the spheres in our speech thought than we have so far in order to be able to offer more than just aphoristic observations about this point. — But let us now turn to a completely different attempt to interpret and explain the metaphor in language.

23.4 Werner's taboo hypothesis — criticism: the metaphor and paraphenomena

[351] The book by Heinz Werner on the metaphor in language (Werner 1919) attracted much attention among experts in 1919. Rightly so, I am

11. [*Spanischer Stiefel*, literally "Spanish boot", also an instrument of torture.]

inclined to think; for it contains a large collection of metaphorical names and turns of phrase from less well-known languages, as well as an energetic attempt to come to terms theoretically with this multifarious problem. Werner's basic ideas can already be recognized from the subtitles in his eighth chapter, which summarizes the developmental psychology of the metaphor: 1. The principal line of development of metaphor *from the taboo mentality*; 2. The development of genuine metaphor by modification of motive; 3. The development of metaphor by way of reversal of the process of metaphorization; 4. The degenerative development of genuine metaphor out of the pseudo-metaphor. — Now what is a genuine and what a pseudo-metaphor?

A step forward towards clarification is the usual result when an innovator who can carry it off contradicts the traditional doctrine as the antithesis contradicts the thesis. According to Werner, the genuine metaphor emerged long ago at a certain time from the taboo mentality, and does not serve to emphasize, but rather serves the *urge to conceal*:

> The metaphor resorted to for want of an expression and for want of abstraction as well as the metaphor of anthropomorphic intuition are among the pseudo-metaphorical constructions. If, beyond the objective appearance, we intend to accept only the subjective fact then we must *reject* the view that these attitudes are *primal roots of figurative language*, although we admit that they are valuable as preliminary practice and preliminary training of figurative thought, though this only becomes serviceable by virtue of the significant modification of motives that takes place in the age of taboo. (Werner 1919: 190)

Hence, the experts' old hypothetical model is not bluntly rejected, though it is put into a corner; the "preliminary practice" in uninhibited figurative thought, on the basis of which we thought we could understand the child and Homeric images, is not enough. Rather, in its early phases humanity had to be subject to the constraint of the urge to conceal because of taboo so that the genuine metaphor could originate from this urge and diffuse through the languages of the post-taboo peoples. The proof is the paucity of figurative speech of the pre-taboo languages, which is explained as follows:

> The nomad can give vent to his affects without inhibition, there is no disturbance of the balance between the stimulation and its discharge. For this reason we encounter even quite advanced nomadic peoples (such as a great many of the Indians of North America and the Massai in Africa) who display an exceptional paucity of taboo-motivated constructions. The

[352] nomad is certainly just as fearful as the sedentary person, but his fear finds an immediate outlet, if the worst comes to the worst in flight; the sedentary person must willy-nilly drink the cup of his adversity to the dregs. The nomad is the child of the moment. The exchange between objective and subjective forces takes place in him exclusively in the present. The sedentary person, contrariwise, is a person of the future and of the past. (Werner 1919: 191)

Care and the distress brought about by memory emerge in the sedentary person, "every tree and stone can be a perceptible sign of a happy past, which evokes melancholy, or of an unhappy past, which evokes bitterness." (*Ibid.*; but why so pessimistic?) A way of avoiding is the technique of concealment through the verbal taboo.

Inscribe what was just quoted into the context of a magical view of the world, one that is experienced as completely magical, and take note of the fact that this is all handled not as an issue of representation but of expression, that is, as a question of free or inhibited discharge of affects. With that we have collected the basic ideas of Werner's theory. Werner outlines the modes of appearance of the metaphor with his documents and finds that the "material metaphor"[12] always comes first.

> Whereas the purely linguistic metaphor is still at a quite primitive stage among the Australians so that all formation of surrogates is performed by a purely generalizing metaphorics, the metaphor that comes of symbolic insight into things is relatively well developed. We encounter here a highly developed material metaphorics with little development of imaginary or verbal figures. The psychological root of material metaphorics is not such as at the level of poetic development, namely the adaptation of the world of imagination to an artistic will, but rather insight into available natural forms. By way of an elevation of a normal occurrence to a figure the *second* level is developed, at which an expression from the realm of imagination as a replacement for a taboo expression is not found ready at hand in the environment, but must first be looked for. (Werner 1919: 194)
>
> The third level, to which, however, there are several transitions from the previous one, is the sedentary cultural state; those who are at this level are not able to quell their fear by the simple motor means of leaving the place of death. Hence, all sorts of defensive provisions are developed; the taboo of death, the simple form of which consists in avoiding the dead person, is converted into a complicated defensive system.
>
> Hence, we recognize the development of taboo as a consequence of the development from nomadic to sedentary culture. The original inconstant restlessness is used on a somewhat higher level to work off the fear in a purely motor atavistic manner. But this form of expression is progressively reduced to a minimum of motor expression so that precisely the timidness that was previously the motivation for an exceptional development of motor powers in nomadic restlessness now becomes plainly negative, it becomes an inhibition to every grasping motion. (Werner 1919: 195f.)
>
> In its primal form the metaphor is intellectual self-defence on the part of the individual. The preliminary expression of this self-defence is in the fact that the metaphor is the product of two tendencies: of the tendency to suppress an idea or thought the expression of which is taboo because of sin or danger; and on the other hand the tendency to make communication possible through the choice of linguistic resources.
>
> This opposition between taboo and revelation is further developed so that the taboo, as an inhibiting tendency which was originally at a maximum, *is progressively reduced*. (Werner 1919: 196f.)

12. [*Dingliche Metapher*. In Werner's theory, the material metaphor is not a figure of speech, but rather a material likeness of a thing (or person) fashioned by a magician so as to influence the model. The two conflicting goals in the process, the production of an effective likeness and the secrecy of the work, have the result that full similitude is overcompensated: the product is a surrogate of the model, it is the "material metaphor". An example would be when a magician works with a person's hair or finger-nails (Werner 1919: 191-193).]

This last reduction signifies a regressive movement, so to speak a deca- [353] dence of the genuine metaphor that originally was so vitally important and vitally energetic. An attenuated residue of taboo is also clearly retained in the use of metaphor for ridicule, for warning, for threatening. It is only in the latest and highest type, in ironic and flattering speech, that this residue is reduced to nothing. So much for our account of Werner's view.

To begin at the end of the critical appraisal, it seems to me that the "types" named have been well chosen; Freud, too, brought wit and taboo together, and in general it was appropriate. But what are we to make of, for example, the classification of Homeric images in the decadence branch of Werner's developmental curve? The taboo factor in them is certainly zero or not far from zero; and on the other hand they also have nothing to do with ridicule or wit, with irony or flattery. No, as a whole Werner's theoretical approach is all at sea when it comes to Homeric imagery. What is the point of subjecting the phenomenon that is so fresh and vivid in children and Homer to a pattern of thought that relegates it to the decadence branch? An experienced analyst of existing theories will think to himself that there may well be something wrong with the initial conception of what is metaphorical. And indeed there is. From the very beginning Werner feels entitled or forced to make an either-or decision. The metaphor (in the singular) is either a means of abstraction or a means of concealment; he thinks

he has shown the second alternative to be correct for the metaphor (in the singular). Now it may be that the entire demonstration, which is indeed based on an impressively broad collection of empirical material, actually does not have to be doubted at all for us to have good reasons to give the child and Homer their due. Their due and what is due to the entire known history of Indo-European languages is the tabooless metaphor, regardless of whether the concealing metaphor runs parallel to it or whatever import it may have had.

In the clearest cases we know of, Werner's idea of concealment is not realized with the resources of genuine metaphor in our sense, but much more simply. There is an abundance of allusions of every kind in human verbal contact. They are successful in communication between A and B
[354] when B also experiences A's inner situation and understands what is going on when A holds his tongue and beats around the bush. There are more ways to beat around the bush, however, than Werner cares to recognize. If I must not pronounce the word 'devil' and replace it by *Gottseibeiuns* [literally 'God-be-with-us', that is, 'Prince of this world'], when I speak of the 'unmentionables' to avoid saying 'underpants', it is certainly not a metaphorical replacement that we have to do with but rather something that could technically be most easily put on a par with the *paraphasias* of some patients suffering from speech disorders. The pure and perfectly adequate means of replacement in the sort of verbal communication that is highly inhibited, not to say infested by taboos, would not be metaphors in the sense of Aristotle's well-known division, but metonymies.

There are all kinds of para-phenomena in speech thought: in addition to missing the correct word, which is called paraphasia, there is also *paraphantasy*. Binet was the first to document and describe it; it is quite a trivial everyday phenomenon. Reflecting on this or that, making certain sensible things inwardly present to oneself in mental images in order to solve simple mental tasks, one may, for example, think of 'milk' and appropriately and correctly frame a judgement or a sentence in which the concept "milk" is contained. If one then manages to state satisfactorily what kind of phantasy it was that supported this quick, volatile thought and to describe it more exactly, it is often the case that exactly what is most important is missing. There is no doubt: our thinker really *thought* of milk and operated in speech thought with the familiar white liquid; but, to put it figuratively, his phantasy contained only the framework of the thing, not the thing itself, for example he saw with his mind's eye the receptacle, the

milk-jug. One of Binet's child subjects operates in speech thought with an elephant, but sees with his mind's eye not the pachyderm itself, but only the stairway-like wooden scaffold in the zoo with which children can climb up onto the tame animal. These, too, are well-known para-phenomena, and there is certainly nothing mysterious about them; and all para-phenomena are quite far removed from and different from metaphor. They, too, are important and instructive, but they lack the feature of duality of spheres and the decisive property that everything metaphorical has, namely that by virtue of the phenomenon of difference it can make a simple solution to an abstraction task possible.

I will have to leave it up to the expert linguists to check Werner's evidence; it seems to me that there is indeed much paraphasia or metonymy contained in it, and Werner may well have emphasized this aspect too [355]
strongly. But however that may be, the problem is precisely why the genuine metaphor plays such an important role in all of the paraphasias of the taboo-ridden person. This is what I make of it: not even the surge of taboo was able to drown the metaphor. It may well be that the metaphor is, as Werner portrays it, still conspicuously rare among the most primitive peoples we know, and that one step higher it is encountered conspicuously frequently, even in rank abundance. It may be that taboo is temporally not far removed from this blossoming of metaphor and that it is internally connected to it. But this internal connection is probably more complicated than Werner thinks. He has in my view too simple an idea of the roots of taboo in the life situation of the so-called primitives; for according to Frobenius there are sedentary planters who are not at all possessed by a taboo fear of the dead, but rather carefully collect the skulls of the deceased like other dear mementoes to be displayed in their surroundings. But on no account can the para-phenomena in language be regarded directly as the fertile soil in which metaphor grows.

23.5 General conclusion

From the bird's eye view of linguistic inventories, the following concluding remarks can be made: at first sight, the vocabulary of a language as it presents itself in catalogued form in the lexicon looks like a disorderly conglomerate, like a moraine. With the chunks from a moraine, Cyclopean walls can be constructed, with the lexical sense units of language only Cyclopean texts could be constructed. Real texts, however, look different.

And with a view to Leibniz's axiom quoted at the beginning of this Part, the two principles of *modification of the material* which our look at the compound and the metaphor has made clear to us can be presented quite simply. The first tells of the *supersummativity* and the second of the *subsummativity* of the compounded meanings; addition and subtraction take place in one and the same construction. '*Hausvater*' (father of the household) and '*Hausschlüssel*' (house key) are two compounds; the specification of how the relationship is conceived is added and is thus supersummative. '*Wachszündholz*' [literally "wax-igniting-woodstick", a wax match][13] is also a compound; it teaches us the same thing as the 'living-room lion', Homer's imagery and Goethe's striking dictum, 'Life's golden tree is green.'[14] The rule is that whatever is incompatible, such as the additional determination 'of wood' in the expression for 'wax matches' and the gold colour on the green tree, is omitted in understanding such composites. The extract from all of this is our conjectural model of the double filter.

[356] It is no accident that we were able to explain the phenomenon of omission by reference to the double images in human binocular vision, that is, with an example from the domain of (sensory) perception; for even perception is subject to the law of omission of the supplement because perception is a significant construction and demonstrates to us what is repeated by the linguistic construction on a higher level. The dvandva-compound and the summative wholes in language verify, as it were, the zero-case in both directions. Consider in this case first the complex numerals and along with these the and-conjunctions that collect things. The fact that, in contrast to this zero-case, genuine compounds as well as the rest of the constructions of language behave both supersummatively in one respect and subsummatively in another is not at all strange in terms of experiential psychology; there is nothing to stop metaphor, with its stress on selectivity, from emerging wherever the conditions that Hermann Paul already correctly listed are given.

13. [The word for 'match', *Zündholz*, contains the material designation for wood although in this case the thing itself does not consist of wood.]

14. [*Faust*. The entire quotation reads: "All theory is grey, but life's golden tree blows green."]

24. The Problem of the Sentence

24.0 The philological idea of the sentence and grammar

Considering all the acumen that has been employed on the task of defining the concept of the sentence, it is difficult not to write an elegy; John Ries appends to his careful report of the history of syntax, his book *Was ist ein Satz?* [What is a sentence?], a list of definitions containing 139 items (Ries 1931). Even if, despite the selectivity, some obviously empty nuts and many repeaters are encountered there, it is still remarkable enough that it is possible to set out a dozen times and always find a new trait or even an entirely new face of the sentence of human language. Experience shows that in other areas that is only possible with very ramified and highly synchytic central concepts of a domain, the sort of concepts that are formed in everyday language and remain undefined even when they reach deep into the sciences.

As a paragon of this sort of concept, the concept of the sentence deserves particular attention from the logician of the human sciences. It involves a multiple synchysis that must not be dissolved as long as it is a *philological* concept and is supposed to remain one. It is not until the formalization specific to grammar sets in that the diverse features of the philological sentence concept, which become evident when it is regarded under its several aspects, diverge from each other so far that each must then be investigated distinctly and completely on its own grounds. Orientation [357] within this curious situation becomes quite clear if it is discussed in the framework of our four-celled pattern. The qualified interpreter of texts encounters the "sentence" as a pregiven and describes it after his manner; it is a something that has its place in the quadrant Work: what the philologist has in mind when he speaks of the sentences of a text is the elementary language work. Each of these sentences is something that is rich in determinations, it is something that can be used to verify grammatical and psychological insights and to which these can be applied.