

Conclusion: multiple viewpoints, multiple spaces

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The establishment, maintenance, and negotiation of viewpoints in discourse are cognitive phenomena which take a number of forms, affecting various levels of linguistic structure. While specific expressions (like modals) or constructions (such as represented speech and thought) have received thorough treatment in a variety of linguistic approaches, it is not common for broader ranges of viewpoint constructions to come under investigation at the same time. The framework chosen throughout this volume, Mental Spaces Theory, provides a natural opportunity for such a bird's-eye view and invites some reflection on the general nature of viewpoint in discourse.

Viewpoint phenomena come under scrutiny mostly in the cases where the basic deictic arrangement is somehow extended or disrupted. By default, we expect at least two participants in any discourse – the speaker and the hearer. These participants have each other's communicative needs at the center of attention and they alternate their deictic roles with every new turn. Thus, even when we are analyzing a speaker's expression of her construal or speech act, we are tacitly assuming that it does more than put the speaker on record with regard to some belief, description, or any other kind of utterance, and that the production of the utterance is situated in the context in which the hearer will receive it.

In the mental spaces and blending framework, the roles of the speaker and the hearer have been described in varying degrees of detail and have been given differing degrees of salience. For example, Coulson and Oakley (2005) assign the subjectivities of the speaker and the hearer to the "grounding box" of the expression, alongside the remaining aspects of the context, as they are deemed relevant to the exchange. Verhagen (2005), on the other hand, accepts the role of the Ground as a default basic arrangement, but proceeds to distinguish a variety of ways in which the subjectivities of the speaker and the hearer are involved in the negotiation, rather than simply communication of construals. In what follows, I will assume, with Verhagen, that the participants directly involved in an exchange, as well as the subjectivities evoked by the participants, are all engaged in viewpoint-specific construals negotiated in discourse. I will thus attempt to distinguish various classes of viewpoint configurations prompted by

the linguistic choices of the participants, and the ways in which these choices engage participants in the Ground and beyond.

There are several distinctions we need to draw. The viewpoint structure of an expression may be associated with one participant/subjectivity or more, who may be present in the context of the exchange (speaker and hearer) or not. Then, viewpoint may structure one mental space (locally) or a network of spaces (globally), all emerging in the discourse of one participant. For instance, a stance expression such as *perhaps* elucidates the speaker's epistemic viewpoint on the content of the utterance, but a complex clause such as *He must know I'm away* is engaging the speaker's stance and another person's stance. Even more interestingly, a participant may engage other viewpoints – either associated with the same participant in different situations, or with other participants, all brought into focus by the speaker, for the purposes of either cross-participant coordination, or negotiation, potentially leading to viewpoint shift or maintenance. Furthermore, as in the cases of reports and narratives, one participant (the speaker/narrator) may engage viewpoints expressed in other discourses, either simply to represent them/align herself with them, or to mark a specific attitude (of acceptance, irony, distance, etc.). Finally, discourse may focus on blending different viewpoints at the constructional level, instead of clearly marking the different viewpoint alignment of different participants. All these options require different constructional choices, and, as the chapters in this volume show, engage elaborate discourse patterns, designed specifically to manipulate viewpoint across different spaces.

Viewpoint may affect various aspects of utterance construal, beyond the spatial arrangement of the Ground – that is, the speaker may align her utterance with various aspects of the space topology (such as epistemic stance or temporal location), reaching far beyond the spatial viewing arrangement. In the simplest cases, epistemic modal verbs (*can*, *may*, *must*, or *have to*) mark attitudes of speakers, while deontic ones mark stances of obligating or permitting agents (who may be identified with the speaker). Stance verbs (such as *believe*, *know*, *doubt*, *wish*, or *guess*) project epistemic and/or emotional stance into the space in their scope. Viewpoint expressions may thus add or highlight aspects of the topology of one space, as in the case of modals, but they may also project aspects of viewpoint into the spaces lower in the network (as in the case of *wish* or *know*). A very good example of such projections is Cutrer's analysis (1994) of time in narrative stretches of discourse,¹ where the speaker's alignment with one temporal space, such as the present, allows her to then view past situations from the present perspective, as in the standard uses of Present Perfect forms, while an alignment with the past event yields a Past Perfect form. For example, *I have already seen "Avatar"* presents the speaker as looking at the past film-viewing from the perspective of the present moment, while *I had seen "Avatar" before you did* describes the movie-watching event (possibly the same as the

one referred to in the previous sentence) from the compound viewpoint of the speaker's "now" and the interlocutor's visit to the movie theatre.² Such chains of temporal spaces are indeed good examples of viewpoint taking, but what the analyses in this volume suggest is that viewpoint-related constructional or grammatical choices rely on types of viewpoint much more complex than the temporal construals prompted by the grammar of tense and aspect, especially on attitudinal and narrative choices. They also reach far beyond Cutrer's treatment of temporal viewpoint spaces as linked into a coherent viewpoint network. As the chapters in this volume show abundantly, a whole range of constructional phenomena depend crucially on competing, blended, or distanced viewpoints.

Epistemic stance

Possibly the most widespread range of viewpoint expressions has to do with epistemic stance – the speaker's or another participant's attitude to the certainty of what is being communicated. At the lowest level, stance can be marked through the choice of verb forms. Fillmore's (1990a, 1990b) initial discussion of verb choices as signals of stance helps to distinguish the positive-stance sentences using present or future forms in main clauses (as in *I will finish the paper tomorrow*) from neutral-stance present tense uses in causal and conditional clauses (*When/if I finish this tomorrow*), and negative-stance past tense forms (*If I finished this tomorrow*). Characteristically, the past tense is not used here to express temporal reference, but to mark the speaker's stance as negative – that is, as an expression of uncertainty, doubt, or, in other cases, deference or politeness (cf Fleischman 1989).

However, the verb-related stance phenomena are also associated with constructional patterns (cf Fillmore 1990a, 1990b; Sweetser 1996; Dancygier 1998; Dancygier and Sweetser 2005), so that the negative stance of the conditional clause (*If I finished/had finished this*) is further projected into the ensuing (syntactically higher but spatially embedded) main clause (*I would start/have started another project*). Required maintenance of negative stance throughout the construction suggests that the viewpoint, once expressed, has to extend over all the discourse elements further projected in the scope of the initial stance-setting clause/space. In other words, the epistemically distanced conditional (*If I finished the project next month, I would start another one right away*) has to maintain distanced verb forms in both clauses of the construction, because the viewpoint set up by the conjunction and the first clause needs to be maintained throughout the network. Even a further continuation of the same train of thought (*It would be about adjectives, but I'm not sure it would be as interesting as the previous one*) will also be marked with the same stance. Such examples clearly suggest that viewpoint is a composite concept – past tense alone may mean simply past time, but can also mark epistemic stance

in a construction such as a conditional, set up with a conjunction and clearly referring to the future.

Stance marking via stance verbs (see Kärkkäinen 2003; Dancygier, this volume; Ferrari and Sweetser, this volume) requires a different constructional pattern (*I know that X, he thinks that Y*, etc.), but a similar projection pattern – the stance of the higher space (*know* or *think*) is projected into the lower space (the complement clause). It might then be argued that the viewpoint marked in the higher space of the network is projected down into its daughter space, but the direction is not correlated with syntactic structure – the subordinate conditional clause marked with *if* determines the stance in the main clause, but the stance marked by the main verb in *I know* is then projected to the complement clause. At the same time, the epistemic stance of *know* may affect a preceding subordinate clause, as in *He's going to win, I know*. In such a case, however, the “expectation” stance of the main clause is reinforced and strengthened with the added *I know* expression. The variety of viewpoint/stance configurations cannot be sufficiently described here, but it is important to note that viewpoint structure is correlated more closely with the online sequence of the spaces set up than with patterns of subordination of clauses.

One participant, many viewpoints

The above examples illustrate how grammatical forms and stance expressions can represent one participant's viewpoint in a network of constructionally linked spaces. Apparently, different means are required when a single participant (e.g. a writer) attempts to represent multiple viewpoints, without adding discourse participants. Such viewpoint shifts through the choice of deictics were described in Rubba (1996). Recently, instances of shifts marked solely through the choice of lexical descriptors were described in Dancygier (2005) as decompression for viewpoint, where an otherwise unified concept is decompressed to create additional loci for the profiling of additional viewpoints.

- (1) The Mississippi was two rivers. They lay right beside each other, but flowed in opposite directions. The steam boats, the fancy Golden Age hotels, the scenic bluffs and gift shops were all going one way, while the river on the charts, with its tows, grain elevators . . . was going quite another. I had done my share of travelling on the first river, but it was a cute irrelevance compared with the deep, dangerous, epic power of the real Mississippi.

(Jonathan Raban, *Old Glory*)

In this example, the writer Jonathan Raban retains his single-handed grasp of narratorship, but presents the Mississippi river from two perspectives. His use of the expression *two rivers* suggests a decompression of a single concept into

two construals – each one representing a different viewpoint. The narrator's own attempt to do justice to the power of the river is contrasted with the glitz of the touristy side of it, which is the only construal accessible to those unwilling to look for the day-to-day reality. In such cases, where viewpoint is not associated with any grammatical forms and not connected to epistemic stance, the profiling of viewpoint is a matter of competing construals, adding depth to the narrative, but not requiring additional participants. What such cases share with the epistemic stance instances described above is the consistent construction of a mental space network from the perspective of one, primary participant.

Raban's travel narratives consistently maintain his viewpoint. Even when decompression signals the availability of other viewpoints, they are still construed from the point of view of the narrator. We can note that even in the cases of decompression, as in the Mississippi example, the "other" (tourist) viewpoint is not attributed to any participant of discourse context. Rather, it is still construed as the narrator's comment on various perspectives available. The two construals are thus representative of different viewpoints, as seen from the narrator's viewpoint; it is a matter of narrative construction, rather than of representation of discourse. Similar types of choices are apparently being made by the participants in the experiment conducted by Parrill (this volume), where gesture indicates varying alignment of the teller with either a participant in the story recounted or an observer. In the instances described by Parrill, all the gesturing modes seem natural by virtue of representing some identifiable aspect of the linguistic narrative's contents; but Raban's narrative choices are rather conspicuous because they rely entirely on the wording. This may suggest that the gesturing options naturally structure the multiple viewpoints available in the act of storytelling, but do not allow or require stylistic acrobatics of the kind found in Raban's texts.

Multiple participants

The examples discussed by Parrill are interesting in that the gestures aligned with the character evoke story participants rather than discourse participants. At the same time, other aspects of gesture move the teller from "inside" the story space to its "outside" – for example, a narrator may go from gestural representation of story events (climbing a ladder) to holding eye contact with the addressee and holding out a palm-up hand (possibly meaning "see, I've made my point") (McNeill 1992, 2005). However, viewpoint phenomena become significantly more complex with the explicit profiling of participants other than the speaker. One such case is a narrative report in which various subjectivities have to be profiled to represent the events of the story from a chosen narrative or reporting perspective. Here the choices are structured by at least two

major viewpoint options. In one, the teller maintains one coherent viewpoint, deictically connected to herself/himself, and incorporates other available participant viewpoints into the one, top-level viewpoint space. Examples of this option include many varieties of represented speech and thought, or the use of negation. Further structural complexity is added by varying degrees of distance across viewpoint spaces, to yield a variety of stylistic and cognitive effects. For example, the speaker may use negation to initiate a construal wherein something absent should be present (as in *We have no bread for lunch*), or also add a distancing stance expression (as in *I'm afraid we have no bread for lunch*, or *I think we have no bread for lunch*).

The second strategy is to use the profiling of various subjectivities in an attempt to either overtly coordinate viewpoints or to open them to negotiation – along the lines described by Verhagen (2005). In an example quoted in Verhagen, the speaker objects to the hearer's description of a person as "happy" by negating the utterance and proposing a different description, as in *Mary is not happy. On the contrary, she is quite upset*. Such an utterance relies on various constructional forms (negation, the expression *on the contrary*) to explicitly evoke the interlocutor's statement and object to it at the same time. The network thus profiles two viewpoints, not just the one of the speaker. Crucially, intersubjective construals are similarly structured in American Sign Language (ASL), as discussed in Janzen and Shaffer (2008). Each of the major strategies outlined involves various constructional choices, from negation, through adverbial constructions, to a broad range of constructions known as "represented speech and thought."³

There are many such strategies and options described throughout this volume, and the profiling of multiple subjectivities is dealt with in different ways by the various viewpoint constructions discussed. Even though the chapters focus on various communicative modalities (sign language, gesture, spontaneous discourse, or fiction narratives), there are mental space structure commonalities across various modes which shed some light on the nature of viewpoint phenomena in general.

Many of the constructions discussed throughout this volume have the speaker/writer/signer report events allocated to a specific reported or narrative space. The "reported" or "narrative" space (I will refer to it as "narrative," since most reports are mini-narratives as well) is thus separate, and often temporally and epistemically distanced from the "reporting" or "narrating" space. The crucial aspect of such constructions is thus the way in which the teller negotiates the difference between the two spaces – either treating them as distanced or as partially, or perhaps even fully, blended. The degree of integration depends crucially on whether the teller is placed in the narrative space, along with the other participants, or in the narrating space, separate from them. These varying viewpoint configurations yield different constructional forms.

For example, the integration of narrative and narrating viewpoint can take a fully embodied form in sign language. As the examples discussed by Shaffer (this volume) suggest, a signer may use her body to allocate the two viewpoints (narrating and narrated) in space – classically, the narrating viewpoint involves the signer facing forwards and making eye contact with the addressee, while a narrated viewpoint may involve a bodily rotation for role shift to a viewpoint character's space, and accompanying cessation of eye contact. The signer then uses bodily movement and signing to render the varying contributions of the representing and represented participants and maintain a coherent viewpoint structure within the narrated or narrating space. In the data discussed by Parrill, for comparison, even when the spoken text is third person narration (with no salient linguistic adoption of character viewpoint), accompanying gesture may have different effects. It may contribute to the distance between the spaces, by maintaining the narrator's perspective, or it may integrate them to some degree, by adopting a gesturing viewpoint of a participant inside the story being told. That duality of viewpoint is always relevant in reporting a sequence of events, but the particular ways in which discourse may highlight just one viewpoint or profile two is a matter of interest.

When the body position and gesture play a role independent of linguistic discourse (spoken or signed), the divergent or convergent allocation of viewpoint is achieved in different modalities. When viewpoint is negotiated within a single modality, such as narrative fiction, the contrast or convergence between the narrating space and the narrative space is achieved through interesting choices of linguistic forms. As Nikiforidou (this volume) shows in her chapter, narrative discourse may create constructions that are not found elsewhere and are specifically targeting the negotiation of viewpoint. Nikiforidou explains the occurrence of so-called *was–now* constructions, which combine the use of past tense and present time adverbials in one sentence, as in (2), where the narrator introduces his main character.

- (2) He now lived, for the most part, retired in the country, with one sister, for whom he had a very tender affection.

(Henry Fielding, *Tom Jones*)

Nikiforidou explains the constructional processes whereby a sentence marked with conflicting temporal signals is interpreted. Such a construction creates a viewpoint blend: the choice of tense maintains the selected temporal viewpoint affecting the narrative space (it is past with respect to the moment of telling), while the choice of time adverbial foregrounds the continued presence of the narrating space, where the (disembodied) narrator tells the story. In spite of the high degree of integration, then, the viewpoints of the two spaces are maintained without major shifts.

At the same time, it is not uncommon for the teller to yield the viewpoint to the participants, as in narrative fragments retaining pieces of dialogue. This

may be seen in speech as well as in writing, fiction or non-fiction, and allows the teller to step back and give the participant full voice, as well as focusing the viewpoint on them. There are also various “mixed” narrative modes (such as forms of free indirect discourse) which maintain both the teller’s and the participants’ viewpoints alongside each other. However, there is also a less explored viewpoint pattern wherein the teller’s space dominates throughout, at least as a shared deictic set-up. Interestingly, two chapters here explore the details of such a configuration, in different modalities. Vandelanotte’s analysis proposes a category of speech and thought representation, which, rather than blending the narrating space with the narrative one, evokes the discourse of participants, and subordinates it to the deictic viewpoint of the teller.

- (3) “What time does your train go?”
 “Heavens, what a question.” She glanced laughingly at John, sharing the joke. “You don’t come to meet me, and the first thing you ask is, *when am I going?* Half-past six, if you must know. What would you like to eat?” she added, as one of the ladies in print overalls came and stood by them.

(Philip Larkin, *Jill*; italics added)

The clause in italics is a rendition of the question asked in the first line. Characteristically for this reporting mode, the question form and the tense are repeated from the original question, but the speaker changes “you” into “I,” thus blending the report with her viewpoint represented throughout the response to the question. As a result, two viewpoints are aligned into the deictic viewpoint of one of the participants. In fact, such a viewpoint configuration is similar to the phenomenon of “mental space rotation,” identified by Janzen (this volume) in the discourse of ASL users, which allows the teller to adopt the viewpoint of a story participant while maintaining the narrating viewpoint at the same time.

Viewpoint negotiation and subjectification

There is also the question of whether viewpoint needs to be aligned with a participant (real or profiled for the purposes of the discourse, as an “omniscient narrator”). As Tobin and Israel (this volume) show in their analysis of irony,⁴ there is an important difference between shifting to the viewpoint of another participant and shifting to a viewpoint involving a different space or an entire network of spaces. In numerous studies of viewpoint, especially in narratological studies of focalization, viewpoint is understood as aligned with a participant, whose mental or visual response to the events is the source of construal of the narrative events. But in the examples studied by Tobin and Israel, viewpoint shifts to one of the spaces in the network, while several remain available. Tobin and Israel consider some rather complex examples of irony,

but even in the simplest instances the network is set up and used similarly. Irony is often illustrated with an example wherein the speaker has planned a picnic and wakes up to see rain outside; what she might say then is something like, *Oh, what a wonderful day!*, which is blatantly not descriptive of the actual situation. The speaker is thus relying on the space profiling rain, but additionally sets up a “nice day” space that was imagined when the picnic was planned. The ironic viewpoint consequently relies on the contrasted topology of both spaces and sets up a viewpoint space wherein the contrast can be seen and the true situation, as well as the speaker’s sentiments, is available. As Tobin and Israel thus show, viewpoint may mean alignment both with a mental space (e.g. the one that is really true) and with its topology (as part of a network involving other mental spaces profiling different situations). Thus a construal such as irony involves a very specific configuration of mental spaces and the conceptualizer’s choice of the specific space as the locus of viewpoint relative to the larger meaning network. The analysis also opens many questions as to the mechanisms of viewpoint shift in other staples of pragmatic analysis, such as implicature. Importantly, Tobin and Israel’s return to the line of mental space analysis of pragmatic phenomena, started by Fauconnier in his discussion of presupposition (1985 [1994]), opens a new avenue in viewpoint studies.

Most of the studies in this volume make it clear that multiplicity of viewpoints can properly be explained through postulating an added layer of viewpoint – a “bird’s-eye view” space from which the other profiled viewpoints can be evaluated and construed. Contrary to the common understanding of viewpoint, tied to a “viewer,” aligning viewpoints with spaces allows us to reveal viewpoint hierarchies and relationships, regardless of the number of participants. Tobin and Israel are perhaps more explicit on this issue, but the need to consider viewpoint phenomena in terms of networks of spaces rather than viewers permeates the approaches presented here.

While Tobin and Israel stress the importance of considering viewpoint configurations set up by a participant, Dancygier (this volume) stresses the constructional aspects of the mechanisms of viewpoint negotiation. The examples of negation discussed in the chapter rely on the situations where the speaker is not only including the hearer’s stance in the network, but is actively rejecting it, as in (4).

(4) A: What do you expect Tim to do now?

B: I don’t expect anything. He has never helped me with anything.

Speaker B overtly disagrees with A as to the stance to be taken with regard to the subject matter under consideration. There are many complex constructional options available in such cases, involving stance and negation among others, which reveal subtle differences in viewpoint-taking among the participants

profiled. Interestingly, the chapter by Ferrari and Sweetser reveals the increasingly subjectified meaning structures of stance constructions, often involving meaning historically incorporated from context that was not originally conventional or constructional at all. Crucially, the two chapters jointly show various degrees of entrenchment of stance and viewpoint, also uncovering the range of lexical and constructional means of representing stance and viewpoint patterns. Also, they raise further questions regarding the expressions of intersubjectivity and the contrast between constructional and subjectified expressions of stance.

Moreover, as Narayan shows in her chapter, viewpoint negotiation may involve a complex exchange carried out at many levels of construal, starting with the orientational and directional perception of one's own body. Most crucially to Narayan's argument, negotiation of viewpoint requires that in order for visual viewpoint to emerge, the language users' bodies need to be relied on as the basic resource. The embodied viewpoint thus provides the ground for the visual viewpoint, which in turn provides the opportunity for the construal of the whole scene and the events within it. In a way, what Narayan's analysis is suggesting is that in order to come up with a narrative explaining the scene we attempt to construe, we need to begin with positioning the body mentally in a way that provides affordances for visual construal to emerge, thus allowing more complex aspects of the construal to enter the scene. Such a progression, from the body, through vision, to the narrative is further confirmed in the ASL data analyzed by Shaffer and Janzen, where the signer's body posture in telling a story essentially reflects the visual and embodied features of the scene.

Further directions

What future research should probably address in more detail is the nature of mechanisms yielding the configurations of viewpoint described throughout this volume. For example, earlier work by Dancygier (2005, 2007, 2008, 2011) has outlined the mechanism of viewpoint compression, which allows two or more viewpoints available in the network to be compressed to the higher space. One such example can be a third person narrative that represents a character's discourse or thought without using direct discourse. Thus the narrative passage in (5) represents the character's words, which could be rendered as in (6).

- (5) Mr. Pomfret didn't mention references. His sole concern was the nature of her past duties. Had she typed, had she filed, taken shorthand? . . . Also she was expected to brew the coffee; he hoped that wasn't a problem.

(Ann Tyler, *The Ladder of Years*)

- (6) Have you typed? have you filed, taken shorthand? . . . Also, you'll be expected to brew the coffee – I hope it's not a problem.

The tense and pronoun choices in (5) suggest an overall, text-wide viewpoint space (either profiling a teller or not), from the perspective of which all the embedded narrative spaces are viewed – hence past tense and third person. Crucially, all the reports of discourse taking place in the lower narrative spaces are structured from the perspective of the highest viewpoint space, but the grammatical integration of the lower space, as roughly represented in (6), also involves a compression of the entire space hierarchy, so that what was said is aligned with a local narrative viewpoint and becomes a part of the flow of the story. This requires that the lower space viewpoint is compressed into the higher-level viewpoint. Compression thus enables the continuity and viewpoint coherence of an extended narrative, while maintaining the (compressed, but recoverable) viewpoints of the lower spaces.

Compression may account for a number of viewpoint configurations described in this collection. It is useful in explaining both the subjectified cases discussed by Ferrari and Sweetser, where the compressed construal is now lexicalized or grammaticalized to the point where contributing spaces are no longer overtly available. *Good-bye* historically involved two mental spaces, that of a wish *God be with you*, and the canonical discourse context in which that wish was embedded, namely at a social parting of speaker and addressee, but only the discourse context mental space structure is now referred to. But compression also explains the way in which instances of irony or viewpoint negotiation allow a coherent understanding of the entire network, including the choice of the highest viewpoint space, from which the participating spaces, even the contrasting ones, need to be viewed. In other words, as Tobin and Israel argue, irony could not be processed successfully as a viewpoint taken by one space or affecting just one space. Instead the emerging viewpoint needs to have the entire network in its scope and blend the inconsistencies to create the compressed ironic viewpoint.

Compression, as exemplified here, may depend on decompression. In Example (1) above, the river is decompressed based on viewpoint, but both spaces thus created are compressed up to the overall story viewpoint, where it becomes clear that the writer is constructing the dual viewpoint for the reader, rather than bringing it from some independent discourse. Compression also seems to take part in all the narrative cases discussed in this collection. Pointing out the compression patterns represented by each of the analyses would exceed the limits of this discussion, but let me just mention the case of ASL “mental space rotation” discussed by Janzen. Janzen describes signers as simply assuming a character’s viewpoint (without the partial bodily rotation of canonical role shift), and interacting gesturally – pointing, for example – from that character’s viewpoint; the narrator can switch characters and must thus rotate the imagined construal of the signer’s physical space to represent a different character’s physical viewpoint. If two imagined characters are facing

each other, the result is a 180-degree virtual shift in interpretation of the signer's body; when one character points to the right, the other character would point left to the same imagined object or location. Note that compression is crucial here. These shifts between locally conflicting gestural patterns can only be seen as "rotation," rather than complete shift, if we can understand them as different character's views of a single scene or sequence of events – that is, conflicting viewpoints become coherent because the discourse maintains a higher narrative space where the viewpoint of the signer is located, and allows other viewpoints to be compressed temporarily with it.

Narayan's chapter provides an interesting related example of cross-speaker or intersubjective gestural viewpoint maintenance. In discussing and gesturing about a picture that only one of the participants can see, the speaker who lacks direct visual access initially uses gestural viewpoint parasitic on that of the speaker who can see the picture, showing in gestural viewpoint the degree to which his cognitive access is embedded in hers. But as he discerns something about the depicted events that she had failed to figure out, his gestures switch to a model as if he were looking directly at an imagined picture, reflecting gesturally his diminished cognitive dependence on her mental space.

We will, of course, be searching for further mechanisms that can explain the ways in which an overwhelming variety of viewpoint configurations and discourse goals can be smoothly processed. What this volume has definitely done is to show the rich variety of viewpoint patterns, in various modalities, but also to stress the usefulness of the mental spaces framework in bringing these different choices into a shared focus. We will no doubt find more interesting and unexpected viewpoint patterns, but we can use the common ground established by the discussion in this volume in arriving at an understanding of the phenomenon of viewpoint in its entirety.

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