Husserl's and Peirce's Phenomenologies: Coincidence or Interaction

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HUSSERL'S AND PEIRCE'S PHENOMENOLOGIES: COINCIDENCE OR INTERACTION. *

Until the late thirties, phenomenology in today's sense of the term was for American philosophy a "foreign affair." To this generalization there is only one possible exception: the phenomenology of Charles Sanders Peirce.[1] True, the mere absence of the word from the works of other American philosophers does not prove the absence of the thing so designated. Thus the psychology of William James and the philosophy of George Santayana contain many phenomenological ingredients without the trademark. On the other hand, the mere presence of the name "phenomenology" in Peirce's writings constitutes no guarantee that it meant the same thing to him as it did to Edmund Husserl. The principal objective of the present paper is therefore to determine whether and to what extent there is common ground between Peirce's and Husserl's ideas, and whether this ground is sufficient to speak of their phenomenology in the singular.[2] In so far as such common ground emerges, I shall also discuss the possibility of mutual influences.

My point of departure will be the following remarkable coincidence. In 1901 the second volume of Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* appeared under the title of *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*, a book in which Husserl used the word "Phänomenologie" prominently for the first time. The following year, 1902, seems to be the

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* Read in part at the Meeting of the Peirce Society at Goucher College, December 28, 1954.

[1] Even in this case it should be remembered at the outset that, prior to the appearance of Volume I of the edition of the *Collected Papers*, Peirce's phenomenology was practically unknown. Even the term "phenomenology" did not occur in any of his published articles and can be found only in such places as his four-page *Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic* (Boston, Alfred Mudge & Son, 1903), an outline printed specifically for his Lowell Institute lectures of 1903, and in scattered and unidentified entries in the New Volumes of the *Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia* of 1909. Peirce's manuscripts dealing with this field weer apparently inscribed "phaneroscopy," not "phenomenology." In view of the prominent place given to the term "phenomenology" in the *Collected Papers*, it seems worth pointing out that, of the two editors, Charles Hartshorne, before beginning work on the edition, had studied under Edmund Husserl at the University of Freiburg in 1923, and that Paul Weiss had likewise been in Freiburg between 1929 and 1930.

[2] To my knowledge no confrontation between these two phenomenologies has as yet been undertaken, except for one suggestive page in an article by Marvin Farber on "Descriptive Philosophy and the Nature of Human Existence," in *Philosophic Thought in France and the United States* (University of Buffalo Publications, 1950), pp. 420–1.

earliest certain date for Peirce's use of the term "phenomenology" as a label for a branch of his new classification of the sciences and of philosophy in particular.[3] Yet, while Husserl not only continued using it, but even made it the official label of his philosophy, Peirce, as will be shown in a later section, abandoned the term after about two years, to replace it by several neologisms, among which "phaneroscopy" is the one best known. What was behind this striking though temporary terminological parallel?

In trying to answer this question I shall begin with Husserl's phenomenology and then in this light discuss comparable features of Peirce's phenomenology. One minor reason for beginning with Husserl is that his use of the term 'phenomenology' apparently precedes Peirce's by at least one year. A more important one is that it will facilitate the subsequent comparison.

(1) *The Nucleus of Husserl's Phenomenology*

It would be foolhardy to attempt here a full presentation of Husserl's phenomenology, let alone of that of other phenomenologists. Besides, Husserl's conception of phenomenology was a growing and changing one, and this is not the place to trace its development. Instead I shall try (1) to point out the germinal idea of Husserl's phenomenology as it stood when Peirce was formulating his own conception of phenomenology, and (2) to indicate the later direction which it was to take.

When Husserl first used the term "phenomenology" in 1900 in a footnote close to the end of the first volume of his *Logische Untersuchungen*, which contained his celebrated refutation of psychologism in logic, he was hardly aware of a revolutionary philosophical or terminological innovation. He simply adopted a term then freely in use among various philosophical and scientific thinkers. These ranged all the way from the Hegelians to positivists like Ernst Mach, with whose use of the term in physics Husserl was demonstrably familiar. What was significant, nevertheless, was the wording of this footnote. For, after once more rejecting the "psychologistic" claims of an *empirical* psychology to supply the foundations

[3] "Minute Logic" (1902) in *Collected Papers* 2.120. – That "the term phenomenology appears in none of the writings of the *Collected Papers* before the Minute Logic of 1902" is also the opinion of Manley Thompson Jr. in *The Pragmatic Philosophy of C· S· Peirce* (The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 157. Thomas A. Goudge, in *The Thought of C, S, Peirce* (University of Toronto Press, 1950), merely mentions the year 1900 as a *terminus post quem*, but without giving evidence that it appeared prior to 1902 (p. 76). David Savan's statement that Peirce suggested the existence of a "positive science of Phenomenology" for the first time in the early 90's ("On the Origins of Peirce's Phenomenology" in Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young, editors, *Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Harvard University Press, 1952. p. 185) does not mean to imply that even the *term* "phenomenology" occurs in Peirce at such an early date, as Savan assures me in a recent letter.

for a pure logic, Husserl contrasted it with a "descriptive *Phänomenologie* of inner experience which forms the foundation of empirical psychology and, in a very different sense, at the same time of the critique of knowledge." This formulation[4] was the one which Husserl tried to develop and to exemplify in the decisive second volume of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, published in 1901.

The introduction to this volume contained the first systematic attempt to clarify the scope and character of such a pre-psychology and pre-epistemology, as one might call it. Among the main characteristics of this new strange science of experience were (*a*) its *purity*, (*b*) its *reflective character*, and (*c*) its analytic approach based on the pattern of so-called *intentionality*.

(*a*) *Purity* actually meant two things: Negatively, it signified independence of empirical facts; for phenomenology "makes not the slightest assertion about existence," even though most of its material may come from experience. Thus it was to study perception in its ideal structure, regardless of whether such ideal perception has ever occurred in psychological observation. Positively, purity meant exclusive concern for the general essences of the experiences in question; for phenomenology concentrated on their essential properties, while disregarding their accidental modifications in individual cases. Thus it had no interest in mere individual case studies of perception.

(*b*) *Reflectiveness* implied that phenomenology turned its attention to the way in which phenomena, for instance percepts, were given to our intuitive experience (*Anschauung*). It studied particularly the varying aspects under which these phenomena may present themselves, and the various degrees of clarity with which they were given,

(*c*) *Intentional* analysis implied that phenomenology analyzed and described the phenomena in terms of their intentional structure, that is, paying equal attention to the intending act, e.g., the perceiving, and to the intended content, e.g., the perceived. As is now commonly recognized, it was Husserl's teacher, Franz Brentano, who had first drawn attention to the phenomenon of intentional reference. But he had used it only to distinguish between psychology and the physical sciences. Husserl made it the basis for a methodical analysis of all phenomena of consciousness in which the parallel structures of the intending acts and the intended contents were studied in their reciprocal relationships.

In the *Logische Untersuchungen* Husserl had applied this reflective analysis of consciousness in its pure structures only to the foundations of logic and mathenatics. But during the first decade of the new century, he

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[4] In the second edition of 1913 it was slightly amended: "phenomenology understood as the pure theory of conscious acts."

came to extend it to an ever widening range of phenomena, until he finally formulated the program of phenomenology as that of the universal foundation of science and of every philosophy that aspired to be a rigorous science (*strenge Wissenschaft*).

Up to 1906 Husserl's phenomenology was epistemologically neutral, although his doctrine of essences showed a decided tendency toward a Platonic realism. The subsequent development of his phenomenological idealism occurs in a period when Peirce had already stopped using the name "phenomenology." Nevertheless the general direction of Husserl's phenomenology should at least be indicated, if only for the sake of the record, which continues to be marred by the seemingly ineradicable legend of Husserl's epistemological realism. In 1906, in his Göttingen lectures on the *Idee der Phänomenologie,* Husserl, under the influence of Descartes' method of doubt, introduced for the first time his method of "reduction" or bracketing, which demanded the suspension of all belief in the existence of the world of our naive experience. In due course this led to the development of a phenomenological idealism, which became manifest first in the *Ideen* of 1913 and assumed even more radical form later on. While Husserl himself increasingly insisted on the fundamental importance of this step, not yet mentioned as such in the *Logische Untersuchungen,* I shall refrain from discussing this highly technical and controversial subject in this context. Yet it is important to realize that Husserl now conceived of phenomenology as a study inaccessible to the "naive" or "natural" approach. According to this later interpretation it required a fundamental reversal of this approach, which was to give access to an entirely new dimension in the world of every-day experience. It is hardly necessary to point out that this later Neo-Cartesian approach would have been utterly inacceptable to Peirce, the avowed anti-Cartesian.

(2) *Peirce's Phenomenology as Seen from Husserl's Perspective*

I shall not dwell upon the fundamental importance which the later Peirce attached to his new discipline of phenomenology or phaneroscopy.[5] Nor shall I attempt to duplicate accounts of Peirce's phenomenology which can be found in the comprehensive studies of such Peirce scholars as James Feibleman, Manley Thompson and Thomas A. Goudge, all based on the texts published in the *Collected Papers,* edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. Instead I want to utilize a still unpublished statement on phenomenology contained in one of Peirce's letters to William James,

[5] This is confirmed by the following communication, which I owe to Professor C. I. Lewis, the first curator of the Peirce papers: "As I remember it, Peirce's Phaneroscopy was one of the few larger pieces of his manuscripts which were all together and not represented by several different and unfinished drafts."

of which only a small part has been printed in Ralph Barton Perry's selection from the James-Peirce correspondence.[6] The background for this statement is briefly as follows: In an earlier letter, dated June 8, 1903, Peirce had tried vainly to convince James of the necessity of his new phenomenology as outlined in his first two Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism – those lectures which had elicited James' well-known remark about "flashes of brilliant light relieved against Cymmerian darkness;" in fact, it seems that it was precisely Peirce's doctrine of the phenomenological categories, i.e., firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which James had found so dark.[7] Now, in a second letter, dated October 3, 1904, in replying to the reprint of James' essay "Does consciousness exist?," Peirce tries to prove to James that his phenomenology is really what James himself was propounding under the new title of radical empiricism.[8] So he writes:

> "As I understand you, then, the proposition you are arguing is a proposition in what I called *phenomenology*, that is just the analysis of what kind of constituents there are in our thoughts and lives (whether these be valid or invalid being quite aside from the question). It is a branch of philosophy I am most deeply interested in and which I have worked upon almost as much as I have upon logic. (*Here the letter shows an insert*: It has nothing to do with psychology.) .... Perhaps the most important aspect of the series of papers of which the one you sent me is the first, will prove to be that phenomenology is one science and psychology a very different one ... Phenomenology has no right to appeal to logic, except to deductive logic. On the contrary, logic must be founded on phenomenology. Psychology, you may say, observes the same facts as phenomenology does. No. It does not *observe* the same facts. It looks upon the same world and the same world that the astronomer looks at but what it observes in that world is different. Psychology of all sciences stands most in need of the discoveries of the logician, which he makes by the aid of the phenomenologist."

There is hardly one sentence in this statement with which Husserl could not fully agree. What would have had Husserl's particular approval is the disregard for the question of validity or invalidity, the emphasis on the radical difference between phenomenology and psychology, the affirmation that phenomenology is a science, a point particularly important to Husserl, and as such the foundation not only of philosophy, but even of logic. Nor would this exhaust the list of possible agreements.

But behind the agreements of this programmatic façade of Peirce's

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[6] *The Thought and Character of William James* (Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 1935), Vol. II. Chapter LXXVI, I wish to thank the Library of Harvard University for the permission to include the quotations from the original letters.

[7] Letter of June 3, 1903, in *The Thought and Character of William James*, II, 427.

[8] To be sure this label appeared for the first time in the article "A World of Pure Experience" in the issue of the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method* of September 29; apparently Peirce had not yet seen it when he composed his letter of October 3.

phenomenology there remain considerable differences. Of these I shall select merely those most relevant to the proposed comparison.

a. The Phenomenology of Categories

The conception of Peirce's phenomenology had grown out of his pervading interest in a system of categories for the entire universe of knowledge. It "simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon and discerns its ubiquitous elements, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, together perhaps with other series of categories." (5. 121) As such it was to exclude only the "the universal and necessary laws of the relations of Phenomena to Ends," which Peirce reserved for *Normative Science*, and the consideration of the "Reality of Phenomena," which he left to *Metaphysics*. (5. 121) Thus, Peirce's phenomenology was primarily motivated by his intent to find a system of categories for all the ranges of being as such, an intent congenial primarily to Aristotle's science of being *qua* being, i.e., his metaphysics in the sense of ontology.

There is no direct parallel to this objective in Husserl's phenomenology, whose primary concern was epistemological. While Peirce's interest in ontological categories may not be incompatible with Husserl's philosophizing – some of it is reflected in the "formal ontology" of his Pure Logic – his phenomenology shows no particular interest in the search for and discovery of a system of categories nor any parallel to Peirce's triadic pattern.

b. The Nature of Firstness

The basic category in Peirce's phenomenology is Firstness. However, though pivotal to the whole scheme, it is far from easy to understand, since it is actually "the most elusive" of the categories.[9] Firstnesses, according to Peirce's chief characterization, consist in "Qualities" or "Qualities of Feeling." Without discussing ambiguities of this term, one had best consider its denotation which, while of "myriad-fold variety" includes such items as redness, an odor, "an infinite dead ache," and nobleness. (5. 44) Thus Firstnesses seem to coincide chiefly with what are usually called 'data,' although not only with sense data.

It would appear that in the beginning Peirce himself was far from sure that anything like a systematic study of these qualities in their chance-like flux was possible. Thus, in his *Guess at the Riddle* (1890) he wrote:

> "Firstness precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought; assert it, and it has already lost its innocence; for assertion always implies the denial of something else .... Remember that every description of it must be false to it. (1. 357)

[9] Isabel Stearns, "Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness," in *Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 199. See also Ernest Nagel, "Guesses at the Riddle" in *Journal of Philosophy* XXX (1933), pp. 366 ff.

Considering such a nearly Heraclitean, or even Cratylean, picture it is not surprising that Peirce never gave any systematic development of his phenomenological program, a fact which is actually the major obstacle to a full-scale comparison between the two phenomenologies. Husserl, much as he realized that in this area precise mathematical description was essentially impossible,[10] was never that pessimistic as to the chances of phenomenological description. And while he never arrived at a final formulation of his phenomenology, he left at least an impressive array of concrete systematic studies.

Nevertheless, it would seem that even Peirce had become more hopeful as to the chances of a scientific study of Firstness by the time he had adopted the term "phenomenology" for his science of categories. Thus, when he advanced the program of phenomenology as a science in his Lectures on Pragmatism of 1903, he merely stressed the need for the student of phenomenology – in the letter to James of October 3, 1904, he called him actually the "phenomenologist" – to develop the following three qualities:

> (1) "Seeing what stares one in the face, just as it presents itself, unreplaced by any interpretation, unsophisticated by any allowance for this or that modifying circumstance;"
> (2) "resolute discrimination, which fastens itself like a bulldog upon the particular features that we are studying;" and
> (3) "the generalizing power of the mathematician who produces the abstract formula that comprehends the very essence of the feature under examination purified from all admixture of extraneous and irrelevant accompaniments." (C.P. 5. 42)

I can think of few, if any, passages in Husserl's writings in which the primary requirements of the phenomenological approach are stated with equal impressiveness.

But even at this stage there remained certain basic ambiguities in Peirce's conception of Firstness which make a full-scale comparison with equivalents in Husserl's phenomenology next to impossible. Thus, as far as I can make out, Peirce's Firstness occurs as a result of two basically incompatible procedures. According to the one, represented in the quotations above, it makes its first appearance once we assume a merely passive, receptive attitude and abstain from all tampering with the phenomena.[11] According to other passages, however, it would seem that Firstness is given as a result of an operation called "prescission," a type of abstraction without which it is impossible to even distinguish between

[10] *Ideen zu einer reinen Phaenomenologie.* § 73.

[11] See also *Collected Papers,* 1. 357: "What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence ...."

the various categories. (4.235) In fact, in such contexts Firstness is even called "the most abstract of the categories," an "abstract potentality," and "a pure abstraction" (1.551); also, in his "New List of Categories" (1867) Peirce explicitly contested the view that qualities are "given in the impression." Thus there may well have been a shift in Peirce's views about the proper approach to Firstness. Nevertheless, he seems to have held at all times that "separation from all conception of reference to anything else" was characteristic of all Firstness.

Does Husserl's conception of phenomena have any equivalent of Peirce's Firstness? True, Husserl has an elaborate theory of abstractions, in which there is also room for the isolation or prescission of various features in them. But he indicates no preference for qualities as having a privileged status over other types of properties such as quantity or even of substance. In fact, from Husserl's original viewpoint there seems to be no reason for assigning priority to any particular aspect of phenomena. If at all, such priority pertains to the phenomenon as a structured and interrelated whole, which, for Husserl as well as for the gestaltists, is characterized primarily by the character of unity in the context of a horizon, or world.

There is, to be sure, in Husserl's analysis of phenomena an element, later on designated as the "hyletic datum," which one might feel tempted to relate to Peirce's Firstness. But this raw material for fully constituted phenomena is so closely linked up with Husserl's whole conception of knowledge as an "intentional" process that there would seem to be little sense in correlating it with Peirce's thought, without discussing at the same time this very conception, for which, as will be shown, there is no clear equivalent in Peirce.

c. Secondness and Thirdness

There is in Husserl's scheme no exact equivalent of Secondness, as little as there was one of Firstness. Secondness, characterized by Peirce as "the most prominent" of the three categories, is to him an "experience," which "comes out most fully in the shock of reaction between ego and non-ego," in the "double consciousness of effort and resistance." [12] Its primary character, according to Peirce, is "struggle." (5.45) It has also a "predominant" place in the idea of reality. (1.325)

Husserl reserves no peculiar status for the phenomena of interaction between ego and non-ego and for "struggle" in particular. The closest to it one might discover is the peculiar treatment he accords to the character of existence in connection with the operation of phenomenological re-

[12] Letter to William James of June 8, 1903, published in R. B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James* Vol. II, p. 429

duction, or bracketing. For it implies that existence is presented in a way quite different from essence, which does not call, nor even allow for, a parallel operation. In passing it might be mentioned, however, that Max Scheler's conception of reality as revealed in the experience of resistance comes very close to Peirce's conception of Secondness.

Peirce's Thirdness, which, not differently from Firstness, defies any brash attempt at a definition, may be said, nevertheless, to consist in a connecting bond mediating between the other two categories. Its prime examples for Peirce are signs, meanings and general laws. Husserl, again, has no comparable status for these phenomena either. It seems legitimate, however, to suggest that his theory of intentionality, at least insofar as it deals with the structure of signs, would find its proper place under Peirce's Thirdness.

d. The Non- reflective Nature of Peirce's Phenomenology

Peirce's main injunction to the phenomenologist is to look at what is "before our minds," at "what stares one in the face." It is therefore not surprising that his findings consist primarily of such qualities as colors, rarely, if ever, of items like consciousness or acts such as seeing or hearing, but never of the "mind" itself, an entity of rather uncertain status in Peirce's whole philosophizing. Only introspection could possibly reveal it, and such introspection is for Peirce a matter of inference (5.462, 5.244 ff.), hence not accessible to phenomenology.

From Husserl's point of view, such an approach can at best develop a phenomenology of the intended contents straight ahead (*geradeaus*), a phenomenology such as was developed particularly by some of Husserl's early students under the name of *Gegenstands-phänomenologie*, but never a phenomenology of our acts and of the structure of our consciousness. By contrast, Husserl wants us to focus as much on what is within as on what is ahead. In fact, reflection on the acts of our consciousness is for Husserl the decisive step, though only the first step, in the development of a phenomenological psychology. In Peirce's perspective there is no room for such a psychology. Actually, he seems sceptical of, if not downright hostile to, all existing psychology. Against the background of such "anti-psychologism," Husserl's attitude appears to be equally removed from a certain phobia of logic in James and a similar phobia of psychology in Peirce. What Husserl's phenomenology tries to establish is, among other things, a deeper link between logic and psychology, while defending the autonomy of each.

e. The Absence of Intentionality from Peirce's Phenomenology

Closely related to the preceding point is probably the most basic differ-

ence between Peirce's and Husserl's phenomenologies: the absence in Peirce of what Husserl called "intentionality."

Apparently, when Peirce speaks of Firstnesses as "qualities of feeling," he never distinguishes between the quality felt and the feeling *of* a quality. Thus it is not surprising that he lists among his Firstnesses the color of magenta side by side with the quality of emotion upon contemplating a fine mathematical demonstration, the quality of the feeling of love, etc. (1.304) In fact, in his "Objective Logic" (6.221) Peirce goes so far as to say that "a quality is a consciousness" and speaks subsequently of a "*quale*-consciousness," which he illustrates by sense-data such as redness. Here Peirce simply shares the monistic conception of phenomena, which can also be found in Ernst Mach and in the radical empiricism of the later William James.

By contrast, Husserl's conception of consciousness is fundamentally "bi-polar" (a term which seems to me more expressive than Perry's ambiguous "dualistic"). This allows Husserl not only to distinguish between acts and contents but also to pay special attention to the varying subjective appearances of the identical objective contents. It also yields a much more differentiated structure of the field of phenomena compared with Peirce's phenomenon of Firstness, which consists simply in a sequence of "seemings," without any structural depth or referential links. It is only Secondness and Thirdness that would seem to open up the possibility of phenomena comparable with Husserl's intentional patterns.

Thus, seen from Husserl's perspective, Peirce covers at best half of the world of phenomena, namely the objective or intended pole of our consciousness. The other half, the subjective or intending pole of it, remains outside its scope.[13]

The fact that Peirce's phenomenology does not include Husserl's intentionality of consciousness as the basic structure in the field of phenomena does not prevent that at least some of it is paralleled in a more limited area of Peirce's phenomenology, notably in his theory of Thirdness, in as much as it deals with the nature of signs. For the relationship between the "repraesentamen," the "object" and the "interpretant" is clearly based on some kind of reference from the sign to the object, although Peirce does not give any further description of this relationship except by words like "representation" or "signifying."

Now, Husserl too shows a considerable interest in the theory of signs. In fact, the second volume of his *Logische Untersuchungen* begins with a study of symbolism (*Ausdruck und Bedeutung*). It is here, in connection

[13] Peirce's phenomenology resembles in this respect the conception advanced in 1905 by Carl Stumpf, who preceded Husserl as student of Franz Brentano. See his "Zur Einteilung der Wissenschaften" in *Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*. Berlin, 1906.

with his discussion of the structure of signs, that he introduces for the first time his doctrine of intentionality. Only in later parts of his work does he take up the intentionality of conscious acts, which also provides indirectly the foundation for the intentionality of signs. It is thus the first and more limited study which comes closest to Peirce's theory of signs as an outstanding case of Thirdness.

f. Peirce's "Firstness" and "Secondness" as Particulars, not Universals

Phenomenology in Husserl's sense is a study of the general essence of phenomena. Particulars may be used as stepping stones for insights into these general essences. But, at least for Husserl, there can be no phenomenology of particulars.

How far are the basic categories of Peirce's phenomenology either particulars or universals? In describing Firstnesses as qualities of feeling Peirce never makes their status plain in terms of this alternative. All he requests is the disregard of the question of reality and of connections with other phenomena. However, the fact that universals appear only under the heading of Thirdness indicates that neither Firstnesses nor Secondnesses have reached the level of universality. As to Secondness, Peirce, in denying that it can ever be conceived, asserts explicitly its essential individuality.[14]

g. Induction as the Method of Peirce's Phenomenology

The preceding section does not mean to imply that Peirce's phenomenology exhausts itself in a description of particular phenomena. For Peirce states clearly that the task of his phenomenology is to find the universal qualities of the "phenomena" by way of inductive generalization. It is, however, this very generalization which again marks an important difference from Husserl's method of determining the properties of his "phenomena." For here Husserl appeals to his characteristic intuition of essences (*Wesensschau*). It would be beyond the scope of this account to give a full explanation of what this involves. But it certainly differs from a mere collecting generalization. For, while based on a study of examples, real and imaginary, it tries to grasp their essential character and properties in a special and unique way, very much in the manner of what W. E. Johnson in later years described under the name of intuitive induction. There is no indication that Peirce's phenomenological generalization involved a similar operation.

[14] "To conceive it is to generalize it; and to generalize it is to miss altogether the *hereness* and *nowness* which is its essence." Letter to William James of June 8, 1903 in R. B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*. Vol. II, p. 429.

h. Different Estimates of Mathematics

Particularly in his criticisms of Hegel's phenomenology, Peirce, deploring his neglect of mathematics, claimed for this study the status of the fundamental science, more fundamental even than phenomenology. Despite Husserl's own indifference, if not hostility, to Hegel, this fact would also mark a sharp dividing line between Peirce and Husserl, although Husserl can certainly not be charged with a neglect of mathematics. But whereas Peirce never seems to have questioned mathematics and never seems to have been disturbed by the so-called crisis in the foundations of mathematics, as other philosophical mathematicians have been, these very difficulties were at the root of Husserl's whole turn to philosophy and ultimately to phenomenology. To him phenomenology was designed to supply not only an ultimate philosophical foundation for logic but also for a *mathematica universalis* of which mathematics proper was to be only a part. Mathematics was therefore to him anything but a pre-philosophical self-sufficient discipline. Here Husserl shares the view, proposed most effectively in Russell's and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica,* about the derivative character of mathematics. Actually, according to Goudge's interpretation, even Peirce originally took this position.[15] I shall refrain from discussing the reasons for Peirce's reversal and for his ensuing classification of the sciences in the order mathematics-phenomenology-logic.

i. The "Ethics" of the Phenomenological Terminology

Finally, there are some aspects in the comparative histories of the term "phenomenology" in Husserl and in Peirce which throw revealing light on the different spirit of the two enterprises.

Husserl never seems to have given explicit thought to the question of the principles, let alone, the ethics, of philosophical terminology. Nor does he seem to have been guided even unconsciously by any definite policy in adopting and modifying pre-existing philosophical terms. Thus, when he took over the term "phenomenology" in 1900, which was then widely and loosely used in Germany, he seems to have felt no hesitation in assigning to it a new and more specific meaning. At that time, and even more so later on, he simply implied that he had the right to change the traditional meanings in accordance with his own evolving and deepening conception of phenomenology – a fact which has been responsible for a good deal of confusion without and even within the socalled Phenomenological Movement.

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[15] *The Thought of C. S. Peirce.* p. 57.

In contrast, Peirce's scrupulous ethics of terminology not only forbade him to adopt terms which had been in use for different designata, but induced him to abandon them when they were being misused by others. Thus, quoting once more from the letter to James of October 3, 1904, Peirce, after taking James to task for his use of the term "pure experience," and recommending to him again his choice "phenomenology" states:

> "It is downright bad morals so to misuse words, for it prevents philosophy from becoming a science ... it is an indispensable requisite of science that it should have a recognized technical vocabulary composed of words so unattractive that loose thinkers are not tempted to use them, and a recognized and legitimated way of making up new words freely when a new conception is introduced, and that it is vital for science that he who introduces a new conception should be held to have a *duty* imposed upon him to invent a sufficiently disagreeable series of words to express it. I wish you would reflect seriously upon the moral aspect of terminology. [16]

It is well known how this stringent ethics made Peirce, when "finding his bantling 'pragmatism' wrongly promoted" (to wit, by James and Schiller)

> "kissed his child good-by and relinquished it to its higher destiny; while, to serve the precise purpose of expressing the original definition, he begs to announce the birth of the word pragmaticism which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers." (C.P. 5.414)

Apparently it has not yet been realized that the very same principles responsible for this terminological purge were also effective in both Peirce's original choice of the term "phenomenology" and its later abandonment and replacement.

It was probably in the early years of the new century that Peirce, having developed his conception of a science of categories in the nineties, also began looking for an appropriate label for it.[17] About the same time he came to think that his triadic pattern of categories was so similar to Hegel's scheme that he called his own philosophy a "variety of Hegelianism" (5.38) and a "resuscitation of Hegel, though in a strange costume" (1.42) – this despite the fact that he confessed to his original antipathy and even to his feeling of repulsion toward Hegel.[18] Thus it may well

[16] See also *Collected Papers* (5. 413), and *Nation* 76 (1903), 498.

[17] This hypothesis would also fit in with Peirce's simultaneous ambitious attempts to develop a "natural classification of the sciences," including the philosophical sciences and mathematics, about which he reports to the Secretary of the Philosophical Society, S. P. Langley, in a letter of May 6, 1902 (Philip P. Wiener, "The Peirce–Langley Correspondence" in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 91 (1947), p. 211).

[18] See, E.G., Letter to Lady Welby of October 12, 1904 in *C. S. Peirce's Letters to Lady Welby*, edited by Irwin C. Lieb (New Haven, Whitlocks, Inc., 1953), p. 8; *Collected Papers* 4.2.

have been this new interest in Hegel which gave him the idea that Hegel's term "phenomenology" could be used without undue violence for the common doctrine of categories, although the equivalent of what Peirce interprets as Hegel's categories actually occurs in Hegel's *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (Part I), rather than in the *Phenomenology of the Spirit.*[19] In adopting it, he was probably guided more by the literal meaning of the term "phenomenology", as "a description or history of phenomena" (see, for instance, the *Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia* VI (1891), p. 4441), than by Hegel's much more restricted use in the third part of the *Enzyklopädie*, translated by Wallace two years later in a separate volume (*Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*).[20]

There are a number of concrete evidences for Peirce's acute interest in Hegel just during these years. The invitation which he extended to Josiah Royce to spend the summer of 1902 with him in Milford is one of them.[21] An even more concrete expression of his intensified stake in Hegel can be found in two reviews of books on Hegel for the *Nation.* Of these, the one on J. B. Baillie's *The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic*, published on November 12, 1902 (Vol. 75, p. 390), contains one of the peaks of Peirce's Hegelianism, even at that clearly not without reservations:

> "Hegel is a vast intellect. The properly prepared student cannot but feel that the mere contemplation of the problems he presents is good. But the student of Hegelianism tends too much toward subjectivism, and is apt to break the natural power

[19] See, especially 5.43. Circumstantial evidence makes it seem very unlikely that Peirce ever studied Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, especially since the first English translation by J. B. Baillie did not appear until 1910. His knowledge of Hegel's *Logik* and specifically of his list of the categories seems to have been based on William Wallace's translation of Part I of the *Enzyklopädie*, which appeared under the title *The Logic of Hegel* in 1892, rather than on the *Wissenschaft der Logik.* This may also be inferred from the list of the Hegelian "categories" as given in Peirce's article "Category" in the New Volumes of the *Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia* (1909), a list which differs slightly from the one in Hegel's larger work.

[20] The close association between phenomenology and the doctrine of categories in Peirce's mind, which is so surprising to one familiar only with the German original, would seem to be explainable on the basis of Peirce's use of Wallace's translation of Part I. For here Wallace used the word "category" to render not only the German "*Kategorie*" but also Hegel's much more general expression *Denkbestimmung* (see his *Prolegomena to Hegel's Philosophy* (Oxford, 1894), p. 227, which results in a rather suggestive juxtaposition of the two terms in a fairly important passage of the translation (p. 58 f.), where Hegel refers back to the more comprehensive conception of his earlier phenomenology.

[21] "You and I could pitch into the logical problems, and I am sure I could make it well spent time to you, while with all you should teach me of Hegel etc., I am equally sure it would tremendously benefit my own work." (Letter of May 28, 1902, published in James Harry Cotton, *Royce on the Human Self.* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 301.)

of penetrating fallacy, which is common to all men except students of logic, especially of the German stripe."

The second review, that of J. G. Hibben's book on *Hegel's Logic* published on May 21, 1903 (Vol. 76, 419–2, 420), reveals a much severer judgment on Hegel. Thus, he states that the Logik „now condemns itself," being "anti-evolutionary," and "anti-progressive," because, as he says, "it represents thought as attaining perfect fulfilment." More pertinent to the subject of phenomenology is the following passage:

"It is evident enough that all Hegel's categories properly belong to his third grand division, the *Begriff*. What, for example, could be more monstrous than to call such a conception as that of being a primitive one, or, indeed, what more absurd than to say that the *immediate* is *abstract*? We might instance a dozen of such self-refutations. That the Hegelians should have allowed the obviously unsuccessful development of the doctrine of *Wesen* to stand all these years uncorrected, is a striking instance of the mental fossilization that results from their method of study. A powerful and original study of what the true Hegelian doctrine of *Wesen* should be according to our present lights might breathe some real life into a modified Hegelianism if anything could have any effect."

At the same time, in his Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism (March to May 1903) Peirce attacked Hegel's doctrine of *Wesen* specifically for not having properly distinguished between essence and existence, a charge which might well be based on Part I, Section 9 of Hegel's *Enzyklopädie*, were *Existenz* figures prominently in the discussion of *Wesen*. Thus Hegel, according to Peirce, dealt only with "what actually forces itself on the mind," which makes his phenomenology "pragmatoidal." (5.37) Furthermore, Hegel's catalogue of special categories as descriptions of phases of evolution is to Peirce "utterly wrong." (5.37) Finally, he calls Hegel's phenomenology a "pitifully clubfooted affair since it does not take account of pure mathematics." (5.40)

Soon after his return from Harvard in a letter to William James of June 8, 1903, Peirce refers to Hegel's "monstrous blunders" in his interpretation of Thirdness.[22]

It is therefore not surprising that in his letter to William James of October 3, 1904, Peirce intimated that Hegel's *Phänomenologie* was "somewhat different"; and that he was in fact willing to acknowledge Hegel's prior claim to the term:

"I am not sure that Hegel ought not to have named the enterprise after

[22] "The third stage" (of Hegel's thought) "is very close indeed to Thirdness, which is substantially Hegel's *Begriff*. Hegel, of course, blunders monstrously, as we shall all be seen to do; but to my mind the one fatal disease of his philosophy is that, seeing that the Begriff in a sense implies Secondness and Firstness, he failed to see that nevertheless they are elements of the phenomenon not to be *aufgehoben*, but as real and able to stand their ground as the *Begriff* itself." (This passage is omitted from R. B. Perry's publication of the letter).

his attempt": A little farther on the letter, after charging James with misusing the term "pure experience," he states by way of an afterthought, added between the lines, why he feels he has to get rid of the first part of the term "phenomenology":

"My 'phenomenon', *for which I must invent a new word,* is very near your 'pure experience' but not quite, since I do not exclude time and also speak of only *one* phenomenon."

Nine days after this letter, Peirce tells Lady Welby in his long epistle of October 12, 1904, which deals chiefly with the theory of signs, of the need of a study, named "ideoscopy," which is to consist in "describing and classifying the ideas that belong to ordinary experience or that naturally arise in connection with ordinary life, without regard to their being valid or invalid or to their psychology." He adds that the word 'phenomenology' is used in a different sense. Of this new terminological creation the second part "-scopy," had already been sanctioned previously by Peirce when his classification of the sciences in 1902 had adopted the division into "coenoscopic" and "idioscopic" (sic) ontology and divided the sciences into mathematics, philosophy, and idioscopy. ((1.183) But the new *ideoscopy* had obviously nothing to do with this *idioscopy,* since the latter "embraces all the special sciences, which are principally occupied with the accumulation of new facts." (1.184) What Peirce seems to have liked in his new creation is the ending "-scopy," interpreted as "looking at," not as "observation of facts." This dates the abandonment of the term "phenomenology," as having occured between the two letters, although Peirce used it at least once more in the *Monist* of 1906 (vol. 16), where he referred in passing to "students of "phenomenology." (5.610)

The final replacement of "phenomenology" by "phaneroscopy" occurs in two paragraphs written for "Logic viewed as Semiotics, Introduction Number 2, Phaneroscopy," (1.286–287), which the editors date as "c. 1904." I submit that the first possible date for the second change is after the letter to Lady Welby of October 12, 1904, the last possible one the Adirondacks lectures of 1905, from which 1.284 is taken. Thus far no explicit statement has come to light explaining the quick abandonment of the transitional term "ideoscopy," which occurs only in the letter to Lady Welby. Quite apart from the misleading similarity of "ideoscopy" and "idioscopy," Peirce's main reason was probably that the word "idea" proved unsuited to his purposes, since, in the way it had been used by the British philosophers, it was too narrow and too loaded, as he put it, with "a psychological connotation which I am careful to exclude." (1.285) This conjecture is confirmed by Peirce's entry in the *Century Dictionary* under the heading "phaneron."[23]

[23] "A term proposed by C. S. Peirce in order to avoid loading 'phenomenon,' 'thought,' 'idea,' etc. with multiple meanings."

The new term 'phaneron,' of which Peirce freely uses the plural form 'phanerons,' in contrast to his merely singular use of 'phenomenon,' is defined as "the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not" (1.284); which is of course identical in substance with his earlier descriptions of the "phenomenon." Actually, the literal meaning of the Greek term suggests more than a mere "*phenomenon*" (which merely appears), namely something that reveals itself in its real nature; what Peirce means is described much better by the English word "seemings" or appearances.

Was "phaneroscopy" Peirce's last and final terminological choice? This might be inferred from the fact that the pertinent manuscripts were inscribed with this name, or with the Greek abbreviation '*phan*'; see, e.g., the draft for an unpublished paper in the *Monist*, written in 1905. (1.306–311; 4. 6–10; 4.539 nl; 4.553 nl) Another manuscript, dated c. 1905, bears the title "Phaneroscopy or the Natural History of Concepts." (1.332–336) Also, on November 20–22, 1906, Peirce presented to the National Academy of Sciences a communication on "Phaneroscopy, or Natural History of Signs, Relations, Categories etc. ..." (*Report of the National Academy of Sciences*, for the year 1906, p. 18). After this entry the chronological bibliography of Peirce's writings by Arthur W. Burks lists no further item related to the whole field.

There exists, however, one piece of evidence which may suggest some continued indecision in Peirce's mind on this score. It consists, oddly enough, of his contributions to the two new volumes of the *Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia* of 1909. The significance of this evidence would clearly depend upon the date, or dates, of their submission to the Editor, which theoretically could have occurred at any time between the first edition of 1891 and the appearance of the supplementary volumes in 1909, although circumstantial evidence would make the time after 1904 more likely for most of them. According to Miss Mary Mackey of Harvard College Library, the interleaving next to the entry "phenomenology" in Peirce's own annotated set of the *Century Dictionary*, now at the Houghton Library, shows a disappointing blank.

The most puzzling fact about these contributions is that, while there is an entry under "phaneron," (p. 990) referring specifically to Peirce as the user of this term (now defined somewhat differently as "whatever is in any sense present to the mind, whatever its cognitive value may be, and whether it be objectified or not"), there is none under "phaneroscopy." On the other hand, there occurs an entirely new entry entitled "phenoscopy," (p. 991) which is even signed conspicuously by the name of C. S. Peirce in italics. This last neologism is defined as "that study which observes, generalizes and analyzes the elements that are always or very

often present in, or along with, whatever is before the mind in any way as percept, image, experience, thought, habit, hypothesis, etc." Despite minor variations the identity with the definiens of 'phaneroscopy' is obvious.

Besides, on the very same page, there appear lengthy additions to the brief entry "phenomenology" of the original volume, presumably at least in part prepared by Peirce. They consist of two more meanings, namely Kant's, taken from *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, and Hegel's, now clearly based on his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. These are followed by five further distinctions in small print. The first of these reads "Cenopythagorean phenomenology," described as "universal phenomenology as it is understood by those who recognize the categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness." [24] The fifth, (which follows the distinctions of phenomenology of conscience, clearly referring to Eduard von Hartmann, phenomenology of mind, probably meaning Sir William Hamilton's conception, and phenomenology of spirit, obviously in Hegel's sense) is called "Universal Phenomenology" and characterized as "the observation, analysis, and generalization of those kinds of elements that are present in the universal phenomenon"; a cross reference to the article "phenomenon" gives the following characterization of the "universal phenomenon": "that which is in any way before the mind (as by perception, imagination, conception, emotion, desire, etc.) considered only in its most general characters." A comparison between the characterization of Universal Phenomenology and that of "phenoscopy" indicates that for all practical purposes the two enterprises are identical. Nor would it seem that "Cenopythagorean phenomenology" would differ from it except by its commitment to Peirce's doctrine of the three categories.

Thus, barring further evidence concerning the history of these entries, the provisional conclusion would seem to be that Peirce's terminological conscience was never quite at ease, even after he had coined the term 'phaneroscopy,' and that he was tending toward "phenoscopy" as the simplest and most original solution, without abandoning alternatives like "Cenopythagorean" and "Universal Phenomenology." The latter would also have protected his conception sufficiently from confusion with the Hegelian version, which seems to have been his main concern after his final rejection of Hegel's philosophy.

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[24] An entry under "Cenopythagorean" identifies this kind of Neo-pythagoreanism as "pertaining to a modern doctrine which resembles Pythagoreanism in accepting universal categories that are related to and are named after numbers." A manuscript using the same adjective, entitled "Reflections upon Pluralistic Pragmatism and upon Cenopythagorean Pragmaticism," dated as c. 1906, is referred to in *Collected Papers* 5.555–5.563; see also 2.87.

3. Coincidence or Interaction

In summary, the main characteristics which distinguish Peirce's phenomenology from Husserl's are the following:
(1) Peirce's preponderant interest in the discovery of categories;
(2) his conception of Firstness as quality of feeling;
(3) the non-reflective nature of his phenomenology;
(4) the absence of the intentional pattern from his phenomenological accounts;
(5) the status of Firstness and Secondness as particulars;
(6) the use of inductive generalization in phenomenology;
(7) the priority of mathematics to phenomenology; and
(8) the different principles governing the adoption and modification of the phenomenological terminology.

These differences appear to be important enough to demand the use of the plural in referring to Husserl's and Peirce's phenomenologies rather than the singular.

Nevertheless, apart from the temporary terminological parallel, there remain such basic agreements as:
(1) the program of a fresh approach by way of intuitive inspection and description to the immediately given, an approach free from preconceived theories.
(2) the deliberate disregard, in so doing, of questions of reality or unreality;
(3) the insistence upon the radical differences between phenomenology and psychology;
(4) the claim that such a phenomenology would be a rigorous science, basic not only for philosophy but even for logic. These agreements seem to justify the reference to the two phenomenologies by the common noun.

Under these circumstances it seems natural enough to ask whether these agreements represent mere coincidences, comparable to the conjunction in the course of two planets at their point of nearest approach, or whether there could have been one-sided or mutual influences.

An answer to this question makes it necessary first to establish how far Husserl and Peirce were even aware of one another and of their philosophical ideas.

As far as Husserl, Peirce's junior by twenty years, is concerned, there is certainly no reference to Peirce in his published writings. All one can assume is that Husserl had come across Peirce's name when his eye passed over the famous page of credit to Peirce in William James' *Pragmatism*, a book which, however, greatly disappointed Husserl, in contrast to his enthusiasm for the *Principles of Psychology*. There is also in the Husserl Archives in Louvain a letter to Husserl by Charles Hartshorne, written

in October 1928, in which he reported his work on the edition of the *Collected Papers* and mentioned Peirce's phenomenology, actually suggesting the possibility of an influence from Husserl's side. However, when Dorion Cairns talked with Husserl three years later, Hussserl apparently did not even recognize Peirce's name.[25]

There is, to be sure, a very different story in the case of Max Scheler. True, even Scheler knew of Peirce only through James' *Pragmatism*. But in this extended discussion of pragmatism, on which he had been working since 1910, it was Peirce who served as its main representative. In fact, he took pragmatism of the Peircean variety so much more seriously than Husserl that, in his book on epistemology and sociology[26] he devoted a lengthy chapter to an examination of its claims. Also, while rejecting pragmatism as philosophically erroneous, he defended the right of Peircean pragmatism as a correct interpretation and account of our primary relation to the world and likewise of the nature of positive science. Scheler's interest in Peirce (whose name he misspells consistently as Pierce) rather than in James would seem to be another example of Scheler's un canny flair for what was philosophically significant, long before others had discovered it.

As to Peirce's knowledge of Husserl there is at least one piece of concrete evidence. In the course of a critique of the German logicians, which, interestingly enough, the editors found in his manuscript on "Phaneroscopy" of 1906, Peirce named as a representative example "the distinguished Husserl." However, what Husserl was supposed to exemplify was in Peirce's eyes anything but a distinguished and commendable tendency. For the context reads:

> "How many writers of our generation (if I must call names, in order to direct the reader to further acquaintance with a generally described character – let it be in this case the distinguished Husserl), after underscored protestations that their discourse shall be of logic exclusively and not by any means of psychology (almost all logicians protest that on file), forthwith become intent upon those elements of the process of thinking which seem to be special to a mind like that of the human race, *as we find it*, to too great a neglect of those elements which must belong as much to any one as to any other mode of embodying the same thought." (4.7)

On the one hand, one might well wonder what gave Peirce such a surprisingly high estimate of Husserl. No English-speaking philosophical magazine had taken note of Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*. Of other American philosophers only W. E. Hocking and Walter Pitkin had made his acquaintance in Germany at that time. Unfortunately there seems to

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[25] Private communication.

[26] "Der philosophische Pragmatismus" in *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* (Leipzig, Der Neue Geist, 1926), 259–323.

be no way of determining whether Peirce had owned and had worked through a copy of the *Logische Untersuchungen*. But even if he did not, there is at least the possibility that he used the copy owned by the Johns Hopkins Library since May 2, 1905.

On the other hand, Peirce's picture of Husserl's enterprise was clearly based on a grave misunderstanding. Certainly Husserl never showed the slightest interest in a study of the "thinking of the human race as we find it." What probably explains Peirce's impression was the typical surprise of those who, after reading Husserl's attack on psychologism in the first volume of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, expected from the second volume the development of a pure logic purged of all psychological infiltration. Instead they found themselves confronted with studies which, under the heading of "phenomenology," culminated in a discussion of the acts in which the logical entities and laws were given, a discussion, which Husserl in the first edition had even mistakenly called descriptive psychology. Despite Husserl's determined attempt to distinguish this phenomenology from a psychology in the current sense, the impression of a relapse into psychologism was widespread, even in Germany. This disappointment may well have prevented Peirce from reading on and finding, for instance, an important support for his "Scotist realism" which he might otherwise have discovered in Husserl's second study of the new volume ("*Ueber die ideale Einheit der Spezies*"). In any case, Peirce's reaction suggests that he was anything but sympathetic to the new kind of phenomenology which Husserl was about to develop, and simply considered it another type of psychology. This can also be gathered indirectly from the fact that Husserl's phenomenology is not listed in the extended article on "phenomenology" in the New Volume of the *Century Dictionary* of 1909.

Summing up, we may therefore say, that Husserl knew practically nothing about Peirce, and that Peirce knew about Husserl only the wrong things, at least in so far as Husserl's phenomenology was concerned. Thus I see no alternative to burying all wishful historical hypotheses about early interaction, let alone cooperation, between the European and the American branches of phenomenology. All that one might suspect – and that without concrete evidence – is that the acquaintance with Husserl's misinterpreted phenomenology confirmed Peirce in his decision to abandon the term "phenomenology" and to replace it by some new less ambiguous term. But it was chiefly Hegel who was on his mind, both when he adopted and when he dropped the phenomenological label.

Does this mean that the rapprochement between Husserl and Peirce was only a temporary affair, a "conjunction," ended perhaps less by Peirce's terminological innovation than by Husserl's shift toward phenomenological idealism? As far as the terminological aspect is concerned, the simultaneous choice of the label 'phenomenology' was clearly not more

than a coincidence. There was as little connection between these choices as there was between Hegel, Peirce's source, and Brentano, the most likely inspiration for Husserl's adoption, with whom Peirce does not seem to have been acquainted at all. And there can be no question that Brentano was deadly opposed to Hegel and to all his works. The same holds true for Husserl, athough in his later idealistic period he made some friendlier gestures toward the Post-Kantian Idealists collectively.

Nevertheless, there may be more than such a superficial coincidence when it comes to the *designata* behind the labels. Despite the deep-seated differences, there are enough parallels between Husserl's and Peirce's phenomenologies to justify the question about a common root for them both. This root can only be found in the very nature of the problems with which both Peirce and Husserl struggled. Both were originally mathematicians dedicated to the cause of establishing philosophy as a rigorous science. And both sought its foundation in a renewed and enriched approach to the phenomena given in experience. Thus one might look at Husserl's and Peirce's phenomenologies as two independent historical parallels. Their value is that of two experiments set up by the history of philosophy and serving as mutual controls for one another. Their outcome is all the more significant, and it does credit to both thinkers. Thus what Peirce wrote about his own relationship to Hegel could be said even more appropriately about his agreements with Husserl:

> "There was no influence upon me from Hegel unless it was of so occult a kind as to entirely escape my ken; and if there was such an occult influence, it strikes me as about as good an argument for the essential truth of the doctrine, as is the coincidence that Hegel and I arrived in quite independent ways substantially to the same result." (5.38)

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