Viewpoint in Language

A Multimodal Perspective

Edited by

Barbara Dancygier

and

Eve Sweetser



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Lieven Vandelanotte

9.1 Introduction

Research from various angles has amply demonstrated the fact that viewpoints of others are routinely embedded as the speech, thoughts, or emotion states of those others in various text types. In conversation, for instance, direct speech is often used to highlight dramatic peaks (e.g. Mayes 1990; Shuman 1993; Holt and Clift 2007); news reporting uses both explicit and implicit speech reporting modes to incorporate the viewpoints of different sources (e.g. Short 1988; Semino and Short 2004; Sanders 2010); and fiction makes extensive use of a range of direct and (free) indirect modes of discourse presentation, not just to move the action forward, but also to conjure up characters' inner lives (e.g. Banfield 1982; Fludernik 1993; Vandelanotte 2009).

This chapter takes as its focus only cases where reported material is explicitly presented,[1] typically in the form of a reported clause, though sometimes the reported material particularly in direct speech or thought consists of just a minor clause or one-word utterance (*She said, "Yes", I was like "Wow!"*). This excludes from consideration so-called "narrative reports" of speech or thought acts as described by Leech and Short (1981: chapter 10) and Semino and Short (2004), as in *he thought about his childhood* or *she talked on*. Discussion of forms that present the reported material usually centers on three main forms, direct, indirect, and free indirect speech or thought, which have been analyzed in cognitive linguistics as involving different forms of mental space embedding (Sanders and Redeker 1996), with the embedded space being accessed either directly as a new Base Space (in direct speech/thought) or indirectly, via the narrative Base Space, with different degrees of narrator's influence (in [free] indirect speech/thought).

The first aim of this chapter is to argue that the variable landscape of speech and thought representation is better described if a further, fourth landmark is recognized in it, in addition to the three traditionally included. This type, called "distancing indirect speech or thought" (Vandelanotte 2004a, 2004b, 2009), differs from the types looked at by both Sanders and Redeker (1996) and Nikiforidou (this volume), in that the deictic viewpoint of the "narrator"

is not shifted wholly (as in direct speech/thought) nor even partly (as in [free] indirect speech/thought) to the character. Instead, another's discourse space is evoked from the narrator's deictic viewpoint, to serve the narrator's discourse purposes – for instance, to provide evidence or to express irony or sarcasm.

In thus extending the frame of reference for describing forms and functions of speech and thought representation, the claim is not that every instance encountered will fit seamlessly into one of four clear-cut categories. As is well known, grammatical categories show prototype structure as much as lexical items (Lakoff 1987; Taylor 2003 [1989]), so it should come as no surprise that mixed forms also occur in the realm of speech and thought representation, as witnessed, for instance, by the widespread journalistic usage of combining direct and indirect modes, as in Example (1), in which the first person pronoun *my* (along with the conventional use of quotation marks) indicates that a direct quote is incorporated into indirect speech.

(1) Dr. Lopez said last night he wished "to express my gratitude to all the Stanford students for all the time spent" in the search for his small son.
(*Stanford Daily*, 20 February 1956, cited in Schuelke 1958: 90)

While mixed forms as well as ambiguous and vague instances should be recognized (cf Vandelanotte 2009: 171–5, 240–3), the claim here will be that separating out distancing indirect speech/thought, where the viewpoint remains with the narrator, from free indirect speech/thought, where viewpoint is located with the character, permits a more fine-grained analysis of reportative constructions.

The sense in which the various types of speech and thought representation can be called "constructions" is that described by Nikiforidou (this volume) and Dancygier (this volume), namely as discourse constructions that are not necessarily identifiable by a complete array of lower-level constructional forms. Instead, the presence of a particular salient aspect of form may metonymically afford or cue access to the whole constructional frame, with "contextual background [being] involved in setting off such cuing" (Dancygier and Sweetser 2005: 272).

In the next section, I will briefly survey some terminological preliminaries, and set out the main features of direct, indirect, and free indirect speech or thought. Against this background, section 9.3 then proposes to distinguish distancing indirect speech/thought (DIST) as a mode of speech and thought representation that incorporates another discourse without a shift in the deictic center from narrator to character, and section 9.4 illustrates some of its range of usage. Section 9.5 next considers the way in which the "distancing" characteristic affects the type of mental space blending involved in DIST, compared to the type of blend described for free indirect forms by Nikiforidou

(this volume). The role of DIST in the intersubjective management of viewpoints is considered in section 9.6, and conclusions are offered in section 9.7.

9.2 A brief sketch of direct and (free) indirect speech and thought constructions

A defining feature of all speech and thought representation is that it involves two events, with the *current* speech event serving as a frame from which a *represented* speech or thought event is accessed. Correspondingly, we can speak of the "current" speaker, who presents some material as the utterance or thought of the "represented" speaker; in narrative contexts, these two roles are often referred to respectively as the narrator and the character. The doubling of speech events also implies that other aspects making up the two situations usually differ, including time, place, and speech participants, which means we can distinguish current and represented addressees as well. The notion of deictic center can be used to refer to the total set of coordinates that require reference to a speaker for meaningful interpretation, including *I*, *you*, *here*, and *now*.

This rather limited set of primitives already prompts questions as to whose deictic viewpoint – the current or the represented speaker's – determines such features as the use of first, second or third person pronouns, tense forms, and deictic adverbials. Apart from these concerns, syntactic considerations also play an important role in defining different types of speech and thought representation: the freer syntax of direct speech or thought, for instance, easily allows reported clauses starting with discourse markers and interjections, and can accommodate non-declarative syntax (question inversion, exclamations, and so on), whereas the more strongly dependent reported clause of indirect speech is limited in these regards. Let us look briefly at some of the resulting features of the three main types usually distinguished (for a fuller account, see Vandelanotte 2009).

An important feature of direct speech or thought (DST) is the full deictic and expressive shift (von Roncador 1980, 1988) from current to represented speaker: all manner of deictic forms (such as tense forms, personal pronouns, and spatiotemporal adverbials) in the reported clause of DST are viewed from the represented speaker's deictic center. One obvious sign of this is the occurrence of two referents for the first person within the confines of a single sentence (Banfield 1982), as when *me* in Example (2) refers to the current speaker and *I* to the represented speaker.

(2) Then he was introduced to Andrea. "*I* couldn't get over how lovely she is," she told *me*.

(Cobuild corpus)[2]

In addition to the shift in the deictic center, there is in direct speech or thought also a kind of syntactic "reset," as the directly reported material can feature any one from the whole range of expressive features, such as interjections and discourse markers (*He exclaimed "Shit! I'm bored!"*, *She was like "Oh well, we'll see"*), as well as non-declarative structures (compare *He asked her "Do you love me?"* to the declarative structure in indirect *He asked her whether she loved him*).

Indirect speech or thought (IST) is distinguished by the lack of the deictic shift to the represented speaker, particularly as regards pronouns, the grammatical number of which clearly is determined from the current speaker's deictic viewpoint. Nevertheless, some forms do occur which deviate from the IST prototype in that they involve the kind of blend described by Nikiforidou (this volume) and Sweetser (this volume). In (3) and (4), for instance, the current speaker's speaker-hearer referential system is blended with the represented speaker's temporal deictic viewpoint.

(3) Erm my little boy's now seven and he will be one of the first to be tested and we went to a meeting today at school er for the head teacher to explain what was being done and he said that they'*re* not being tested as such but we were told to take it as an assessment.

(Cobuild corpus)

(4) He told Soviet television he *now* had a mandate from the republics to take to the London talks.

(Cobuild corpus)

The present tense in (3) indicates that the view that the "assessments" are not really "tests" lies with the represented speaker (the head teacher), and not with the current speaker (the parent, who, judging by the second clause, does take these assessments to constitute tests; see Davidse and Vandelanotte 2011 for discussion). Similarly, the *now* in (4) refers to the represented speaker's "original" *now*, and not to the moment of the current speaker's report of the announcement.

A further indication of the possible viewpoint complexity of IST lies in the realm of referring expressions for which the reference can be resolved either from the current or from the represented speech event, as in the textbook example of Oedipus and his mother Jocasta:

(5) Oedipus said that *his mother* was beautiful.

We know that in the legend Oedipus unwittingly married his mother, so the standard interpretation of (5) sees *his mother* as the current speaker's designation, but in principle nothing precludes an interpretation whereby *my mother* is presumed to be the represented speaker Oedipus's designation.

Thanks to its "free" syntax, free indirect speech or thought (FIST) can go further than IST in (re-)creating the represented speaker's viewpoint: the reported material of FIST can include, for instance, interrogative and exclamative clauses, as in (6) and (7), incomplete sentences, discourse markers, and interjections (for many examples of such expressive devices used in FIST, see Fludernik 1993).

(6) She opened her scissors, and said, *did he mind her just finishing what she was doing to her dress?*
(Virginia Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, cited in Banfield 1982: 281, note 7)

(7) To-morrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week!
(D. H. Lawrence, *Women in Love*, cited in Oltean 2003: 173)

As Example (6) shows, I do not consider the absence of a reporting clause as a defining feature of FIST: in more typical cases like (7) none is present, and if one is present it is typically interposed or postposed, but if there is a kind of break, as suggested in (6) by the comma, even a preposed reporting clause is, less typically, possible. The main point is that the reported material of FIST allows "main clause" syntactic phenomena such as the interrogative clause structure in (6), and this distinguishes it from IST, which is more restricted in this regard.

In terms of viewpoint, the combination of having key deictic coordinates blended with the represented speaker's coordinates (as with *To-morrow* in [7]), and of allowing the full range of expressive constructions to occur in its reported material, means that viewpoint in FIST becomes located in the represented speech event, with the represented speaker (or "character"), despite the fact that tense as well as the number of pronouns are seen from the current speaker's deictic center (see, for example, the past tense in [6] and [7] and the third person *he* in [6]). These last two features effectively separate FIST from the direct mode, and the resulting blend has often been described in terms of a "dual voice" (e.g. Pascal 1977), on the assumption that both narrator and character "speak" at the same time. A different view is espoused by van der Voort (1986) and Vandelanotte (2009: chapter 7), among others, who argue that the blended deictic viewpoint of FIST does not mean that the current speaker or "narrator" overlays his or her own evaluation (for instance, ironic distance), but instead serves to silence, in van der Voort's (1986) phrase, the "loud *I*" of DST often felt to be inappropriate for rendering a character's typically unverbalized thoughts and feelings. When a current speaker's subjective viewpoint does intervene beyond mere deictic alignment of pronouns and tense, I would argue that there are good grounds to treat such a case as an instance of distancing

indirect speech or thought (DIST) as a current-speaker oriented counterpart of FIST. It is to a description of this type that I turn in the next section.

9.3 DIST: evoking another's discourse from a constant deictic viewpoint

So far we have distinguished three prime landmarks in the landscape of speech and thought representation by combining a syntactic criterion – a freer vs a more dependent type of relation between reporting clause and reported material – with variation in terms of deictic shift. In DST, it was argued, there is a complete deictic shift to the represented speaker's deictic center. FIST is typically characterized by a partial deictic "displacement" (Sweetser and Nikiforidou, both in this volume), whereby spatiotemporal coordinates expressed by adverbs such as *now* and *here* are viewed from the represented speaker's deictic center. IST also allows this to some extent, though this seems less common. We can thus posit a cline from full deictic shift (DST) over partial (FIST) to a minimal or even absent shift (IST).

What this section argues is that DIST represents a further step on this cline, where typically the reported material is presented from the single deictic viewpoint of the current speaker in the syntactically freer kind of syntax shared with DST and FIST. Compared with FIST in particular, DIST then involves the current speaker structuring a "borrowed," non-asserted thought or utterance from his or her own viewpoint, rather than locating viewpoint with the represented character as in FIST. The main grammatical symptoms promoting a reading as DIST are illustrated in this section.

In the realm of person deixis, what DIST uniquely allows is for first and second person pronouns to refer to the current speaker and addressee in the current speech situation. That this is not the case in the reported clause of DST will be clear: here, *I* and *you* refer to the represented, not the current speaker and addressee respectively. In FIST, *I* can occur only with first person reporting clause subjects to refer to the represented speaker, deictically remote from the current speaker (as in *Now my luck was coming to an end, I realized (then)*), and *you* only occurs in the infrequent context of second person narrative, as a kind of story-internal, "addressed" protagonist. Crucially, as Banfield (1982) has argued, no addressed *you* can occur in the reported clause of FIST.[3]

The examples in (8) and (9) below show how this possibility of incorporating another's discourse while keeping the viewpoint and deictic center constant has been exploited in narrative and drama. In (8), the I-narrator Max recalls a scene in which the topic of sin is discussed by a friar, referred to as "Foamfleck" by his students because he had "flecks of white stuff permanently at the corners of his lips". (8a) and (8b) indicate a corresponding direct and free indirect rendering of the crucial part. The pronoun *we* in (8) refers to the current speaker (narrator)

Max, along with his peers; the direct "original" is *you* (8a), and opting for *they* would be consistent with a free indirect rendering in which the viewpoint is located with the friar in the represented speech event (8b). Instead, the current speaker Max "egocentrically" draws the report into his own viewpoint, echoing the friar's discourse to serve Max's current discourse purposes – for instance, the expression of a dissociative, possibly ironic attitude towards the friar's "disquisition."

(8) I am recalling with especial clarity an enraptured disquisition he delivered to us one fine May morning on the sin of looking. Yes, looking. We had been instructed in the various categories of sin . . . but here it seemed was a new category: the passive sin. *Did we imagine, Fr Foamfleck scoffingly enquired*, pacing impetuously from door to window, from window to door, his cassock swishing and a star of light gleaming on his narrow, balding brow like a reflection of the divine effluvium itself, *did we imagine that sin must always involve the performance of an action? Looking with lust or envy or hate is lusting, envying, hating.*

(John Banville, *The Sea*)

(8a) DST: *do you imagine . . .*

(8b) FIST: *did they imagine . . .*

An example that illustrates the potential of DIST to feature second person pronouns referring to the current addressee is (9), in which the *you* directly addressed by Mrs. Zero is her husband, whom at the beginning of the play she elaborately condemns for not having lived up to the expectations he had raised when, as a young, ambitious man, he was her suitor. As shown in (9a), the husband's role of current addressee is conflated with that of represented ("original") speaker.

(9) [Mrs. Zero:] I was a fool for marryin' you . . . I wish I had it to do over again, I hope to tell you. *You* was goin' to do wonders, *you* was! *You* wasn't goin' to be a bookkeeper long – oh no, not *you*. Wait till *you* got started – *you* was goin' to show 'em. There wasn't a job in the store that was too big for *you*. Well, I've been waitin' – waitin' for you to get started – see? It's been a good long wait too.

(Elmer Rice, *The Adding Machine*, cited in Fludernik 1993: 117–18)

(9a) DST: *I'm going to do wonders, I am! I'm not going to be a bookkeeper long . . .*

(9b) FIST: *He was going to do wonders, he was! He wasn't going to be a bookkeeper long . . .*

The appearance of first and second person pronouns referring to current speaker and addressee is not the only striking characteristic flowing from DIST's deictic viewpoint singularity. Still in the realm of reference to people, the different viewpoint structure of FIST and DIST has implications for the choice of noun phrase type – pronouns vs fuller NPs such as proper names and descriptive NPs – when reference is made to represented speakers and addressees. In FIST, where viewpoint resides in the represented speech event, pronouns are used to refer to represented speakers and addressees because these speech participants are fully cognitively "activated" from the viewpoint of the represented speaker. Cognitively active referents are highly accessible and thus easily retrievable (Ariel 1990), which explains why pronouns can be used to refer to them. NPs such as proper names or descriptive NPs (e.g. "the minister of education"), on the other hand, mark low cognitive accessibility, and can be used to introduce referents not assumed to be known to an interlocutor, or to reintroduce such referents after some break in the flow of discourse (e.g. paragraph breaks, chapter breaks). In DIST, in which viewpoint remains in the current speech event (or base space), it is the current speaker who assesses the cognitive accessibility of characters, and who can thus choose to use proper names or descriptive NPs wherever judged necessary or appropriate.

As an example of this, consider the underlined NPs in (10) and their direct and free indirect counterparts in (10a) and (10b) respectively. The represented speaker, Sir William, and the represented addressee, Mrs. Warren Smith, are referred to pronominally in direct and free indirect speech, as the speaker and addressee in any exchange are inherently maximally accessible. When the entire obliquely rendered dialogue is drawn into the viewpoint of the current speaker (narrator) as in (10), however, it is the current speaker's prerogative to opt for proper names, if only to clearly distinguish the characters at every stage, but perhaps also to suggest mild mockery of the tone and style of the interaction by signaling the narrator's presence in the choice of NP type.

(10) Shortly and kindly Sir William explained to her the state of the case. *He [Septimus] had threatened to kill himself. There was no alternative. It was a question of law. He would lie in bed in a beautiful house in the country. The nurses were admirable. Sir William would visit him once a week. If Mrs. Warren Smith was quite sure she had no more questions to ask – he never hurried his patients – they would return to her husband.*

(Virginia Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, cited in Ehrlich 1990: 75)

(10a) DST: *I will visit him once a week. If you are quite sure you have no more questions to ask . . .*

(10b) FIST: *He would visit him once a week. If she was quite sure she had no more questions to ask . . .*

The way in which person deixis works in DIST thus suggests that the represented speaker's discourse space is aligned with the current speaker's viewpoint. In a sense this means that the represented speaker's discourse ends up submerged in that of the current speaker, who, by adjusting the former's utterance or thought deictically to his or her own viewpoint, effectively appropriates this "other" discourse. Such appropriation seems to bear resemblances to the system of mentally rotated space in American Sign Language as described by Janzen (this volume), in which the signer (like the current speaker in DIST) brings narrative interactants' views into alignment with his or her own view. This particular mode of conceptualizing space in ASL interaction requires identification of referents by means of full NPs (also more likely to be used in DIST), since "pronominal" (indexical) pointing to a space to identify a referent does not work within a 180-degree rotated space.

As an illustration of the fact that the description of DIST given so far extends to other domains besides person deixis, consider example (11), in which, apart from the occurrence of a first person referring to the current speaker (who, as shown in [11a], is the represented addressee, *you*), the occurrence of the adverb *there*, interpretable clearly from the current speaker's viewpoint, and not from that of the represented speaker, suggests a reading as DIST.

(11) The moment I tried to speak of the business that had brought me to his house, he [Mr. Fairlie] shut his eyes and said I "upset" him . . . As to the settlements, if I would consult his niece, and afterwards dive as deeply as I pleased into my own knowledge of the family affairs, and get everything ready, and limit his share in the business, as guardian, to saying Yes, at the right moment – why, of course he would meet my views, and everybody else's views, with infinite pleasure. In the meantime, *there* I saw him, a helpless sufferer, confined to his room.
(Wilkie Collins, *The Woman in White*, "The Story Continued by Vincent Gilmore," I, cited in von Roncador 1988: 230)

(11a) DST: *In the meantime, here you see me, a helpless sufferer, confined to my room.*

(11b) FIST ($i \neq j$): *In the meantime, here he$_i$ saw him$_j$, a helpless sufferer, confined to his$_j$ room.*

Separating current-speaker-oriented DIST from represented-speaker-oriented FIST in the area beyond the direct and indirect prototypes on the basis of grammatical distributional criteria like those just sketched enables a more nuanced stylistic and narrative analysis, as it removes the difficulty in traditional models which claimed that FIST was sometimes empathetic, sometimes ironic (Leech and Short 1981; Semino and Short 2004; see Vandelanotte 2009: chapter 7 for discussion). Considering the radial structure of grammatical categories,

however, it is only to be expected that instances are found that do not completely correspond to the "idealized" kind of DIST that is deictically entirely current-speaker-construed. A case in point is (12), which represents a son's grilling of his mother on the whereabouts of paintings he considered part of his inheritance, and the mother's equally fierce riposte.

(12) That did it. I shouted, I waved my fists, I stamped about stiff-legged, beside myself. Where were they, the pictures, I cried, what had she done with them? I *demanded* to know. They were mine, my inheritance, my future and my son's future . . . Demand, did I? – I, who had gone off and abandoned my widowed mother, who had skipped off to America and married without even informing her . . . what right, she shrilled, what right had I to demand anything here?

(John Banville, *The Book of Evidence*)

The consistent use of *I* across the two sides of the dialogue, with first the son as speaker (*I* demand *to know*) and then the mother (*Demand, do you?*) shows that the I-narrator egocentrically presents the exchange from his deictic viewpoint (and so uses DIST), but the deictic *here* at the end of the excerpt cannot be understood as the narrator's current location – the prison cell where he is rehearsing his defence for a theft which led to a murder. On account of this spatial coordinate located in the represented rather than the current speech event, (12) thus deviates slightly from the DIST prototype.

This section's description of DIST as a current-speaker-oriented counterpart to FIST yields an interesting picture as far as discourse goals are concerned: what is it that the current speaker aims to "do" with the deictically adjusted discourse borrowed from the represented speaker? The next section argues that the current speaker's communicative goals may vary, but that some kind of attitude is always expressed towards the appropriated or "borrowed" represented discourse.

9.4 Current speaker attitudes expressed in different uses of DIST

If in DIST the current speaker appropriates another's discourse by adjusting it deictically to the current speech event, we can expect that there are current communicative purposes for doing this instead of shifting wholly or partly, as in direct or (especially free) indirect forms, to the represented speech event. As argued in Vandelanotte (2004b, 2009: chapter 7), these purposes may either be more associative or more dissociative. In terms of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]), DIST can be considered an "echoic" type of language use, as it involves a type of meta-representation (like all reported speech), but combines this with an attitude expressed towards the meta-represented discourse.

More *associative* attitudes expressed in DIST can be found in contexts – for instance, in conversation, journalism or argumentative prose – where the current speaker associates with a viewpoint while at the same time indicating that the source of the viewpoint is ultimately another speaker. Reinhart's (1975: 136) example (13a) illustrates such usage, whereas (13b) is a FIST version with different effect.

(13a) John will be late, he said. (current speaker's viewpoint)

(13b) He would be late, John said. (represented speaker's, i.e. John's, viewpoint)

In this example set, the distinct status of DIST shows up in tense use,[4] since associative or "evidential" DIST allows non-subordinated, "absolute" tense related directly to the current speaker's deictic center; FIST normally allows absolute tense only in the exceptional context of gnomic statements (see Vandelanotte 2009: chapter 6 for discussion). The relative (or "subordinated") tense *would* in (13b) is future with respect to the represented speaker John's past moment of speaking, not to the current speaker's moment of telling. In contrast, in DIST (13a), the futurity *is* plotted precisely from the current speaker's deictic center, as it is she who is announcing John's late arrival, with reference to something John said to make her conclude he would be late (e.g. "I will be late," "My car broke down so I'll have to take the bus").

Attested examples that likewise show absolute tense in the reported clause are given in (14) and (15).

(14) Indonesia has arrested the alleged operations chief of an al-Qaeda-linked terror group blamed for bombings on the resort island of Bali, the nation's police chief said Wednesday.
(www.usatoday.com, December 4, 2002, cited in Vandelanotte 2004b: 560)

(15) Prof. Nowé has taken a few days off, he says, so he won't be there.
(attested from email, April 12, 2000, cited in Vandelanotte 2009: 209)

(14) is taken from an online news report and is more amenable to a DIST reading than a DST reading, on account of such elements as *Indonesia* and *alleged*, which are best understood as designations chosen by the current speaker (i.e. the journalist). The absolute tense *has arrested* strengthens the interpretation of (14) as "evidential" DIST, in which a news fact is reported with identification of the source in the reporting clause. (15) is a "conversational" example in which the reporting clause itself is already present tense, and the present perfect *has taken* is motivated by the relevance to the current speaker's moment of speaking (in the interaction with the current addressee): the currently relevant fact that

Prof. Nowé has taken a few days off implies that he will not be in his office, which in turn implies that there is not much reason for the current speaker (or addressee) to go up there.

Conversation can also be a source of strongly *dissociative* uses of DIST, particularly when another's negative comments about oneself are sarcastically echoed. If someone says *I am a moron, I can't do anything on my own*, thereby echoing what someone else said about him or her, the usual interpretation is as an ironic echo and not as an expression of low self-esteem. This DIST interpretation may be made more easily available if the hearer was present at the original exchange in which the insults were uttered, or if the current speaker accompanies his delivery with verbal, prosodic, or gestural cues.

In narrative examples, DIST often involves a milder attitude of mockery or some form of intellectual superiority – for instance, in representing, from a consistent current speaker's viewpoint, the petty concerns of, or the exchange of formalities between, different characters, as in (16) below. In this example, there are two brief stretches of direct speech, signaled typographically as well as by the use of *you* to refer to the represented, not the current addressee (*Very well, indeed, father. And you father?* and *Good afternoon, Mrs Sheehy*). The part in between those two lines obliquely represents the dialogue between Father Conmee and Mrs Sheehy in the form of DIST, as witnessed, among other things, by the use of full NPs to refer to the represented speaker Father Conmee and the represented addressee "the wife of Mr David Sheehy M.P." (compare direct *I am very glad to see you looking so well*).

(16) He walked by the tree of sunnywinking leaves and towards him came the wife of Mr David Sheehy M.P.

– Very well, indeed, father. And you father?

Father Conmee was wonderfully well indeed. He would go to Buxton probably for the waters. And her boys, were they getting on well at Belvedere? Was that so? Father Conmee was very glad indeed to hear that. And Mr Sheehy himself? Still in London. The house was still sitting, to be sure it was. Beautiful weather it was, delightful indeed. Yes, it was very probable that Father Bernard Vaughan would come again to preach. O, yes: a very great success. A wonderful man really.

Father Conmee was very glad to see the wife of Mr David Sheehy M.P. looking so well and he begged to be remembered to Mr David Sheehy M.P. Yes, he would certainly call.

– Good afternoon, Mrs Sheehy.

(James Joyce, *Ulysses*, partly cited in Banfield 1982: 208)

The current speaker's appropriation of character discourse in (16) is shown not only in the choice of noun phrase type, but also in the deliberate choice to present only one side of the dialogue in the DIST part, that of Father Conmee, addressing Mrs. Sheehy and reacting to her replies, which we do not get (the part *Still in London* could be read as Mrs. Sheehy's reply, but seems more likely to be Father Conmee's consenting repetition of her reply). All of this, in combination with the rather pompous use of the lengthy NPs *the wife of Mr David Sheehy M.P.* and *Mr David Sheehy M.P.* in one and the same sentence, adds an air of comedy and mockery, though not irony as such, to the scene.

With this overview of some of the main characteristics (section 9.3) and usage range (section 9.4) of DIST in mind, we are in a position to consider more closely the way in which DIST involves distancing and blending.

9.5 DIST, discourse distance, and blending

In a general sense, all types of speech and thought representation are "non-assertive" or "non-commitment" constructions: they allow us to *say* things without *asserting* them ourselves. If DIST is called "distancing," then, it is clear that something more specific is meant than this general, non-assertive feature. The specific sense of distance involved in DIST results from the unusual combination of two characteristics:

(i) The absence of deictic shifting to the represented speech event, and of syntactic limitations of the kind IST imposes on its reported clause, means that there are no clear deictic or syntactic indications to suggest that something other than an ordinary speech act is going on (to which the current speaker would be committed).

(ii) In spite of this, nonetheless two speech events – current and represented – are involved, possibly signaled by the presence of explicit reporting clauses or by the presence of expressive elements originally linked to the represented speaker, or else contextually reconstrued.

A kind of contextual "doubling back" (Galbraith 1995: 40), whereby an initial interpretation of a stretch of discourse has to be altered on closer inspection, has also been discussed for FIST (e.g. Ehrlich 1990; Galbraith 1995; Mey 1999; Sotirova 2004; Bray 2007). However, in the case of DIST it can be argued that the "garden path" effect is more fundamental: because shifted deictics such as a *now* drawing its reference from the represented speech event will typically be absent, and because of the use of first and second person pronouns and full NPs described above, readers may initially be led up the garden path of a non-reportative reading as a straightforward current speaker's statement (or question, etc.).

Such "momentary processing difficulties" (Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]: 237–43) often posed by DIST seem close in kind to those described by Tobin and Israel (this volume) for irony. Like irony, DIST requires a "zooming out"

or "re-evaluation" to resolve a perceived incongruity, in the case of DIST between current speaker construal and the involvement of a represented speech event. Along the lines suggested by Tobin and Israel, the recognition of this apparent mismatch or incongruity in DIST can be analyzed as prompting the current addressee/reader to decompress the blend of represented speaker discourse with the current speaker's deictic viewpoint, and to construe a "higher," decompressed current speaker's space as the one from which the blend is ultimately viewed. Unlike irony more generally, however, this zooming out in DIST need not always result in dissociative attitudes, and more associative uses can also be found (section 9.4 above).

While FIST can also be analyzed as a blend of the current and represented speaker's spaces, in the manner described for the *was–now* pattern by Nikiforidou (this volume), in the FIST blend the viewpoint adopted is the represented speaker's, with no decompression involved. In contrast, in DIST the blend adopts the current speaker's deictic viewpoint and is decompressed to create the altered, attitudinally "distanced" view of the current speaker on the represented utterance or thought.

The fundamental sense in which DIST involves this attitudinal distance arrived at through decompression motivates the use of "distancing" in its name. Dancygier and Vandelanotte (2009) have specifically proposed the notion of *discourse distance* to refer to material being inconspicuously borrowed from another speaker by the current speaker to construct his or her own discourse, without a deictic shift and without subscribing to or asserting the borrowed thought or utterance. This utterance or thought need not necessarily really have occurred, but may be something that was inferred or contextually "around," and may also be a non-verbal contextual prompt, as when someone responds to seeing a map of London by saying "The British Museum is near University College?" (Noh 2000: 148).

Discourse distance is similar to earlier concepts such as "echo" in Relevance Theory (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]) or "mental space evocation" in cognitive linguistics (Dancygier and Sweetser 2000, 2005). It departs from the earlier concepts in attempting to analyze the phenomenon as an extension of the very basic underlying mental space structure of distance as a cognitive image schema, namely a set-up involving two separated spaces and the speaker's deictic alignment with one of them. What is specific to discourse distance is that a separate discourse space, emanating from a separate speaker's knowledge base, is used in the current speaker's discourse, without the current speaker knowing or asserting the content of the "borrowed" discourse. This is different from epistemic distance (Fillmore 1990), which involves a "non-real" space distanced from the current speaker's Base Space, and thus does not invoke a second speaker's space. An example of epistemic distance is (17), in which the hire is known by the current speaker to be counter to fact. In contrast, in the distanced discourse example in (18), the current speaker constructs a reasoning

about the hire on the basis of information gleaned from another speaker (*you*), the truth of which the current speaker of (18) does not commit to.

(17) If she had been hired, she wouldn't need our help anymore.

(18) If (as you say) she was hired, she doesn't need our help anymore.

Other examples of discourse distance in the realm of grammar include metalinguistic negation (Horn 1985; e.g. *that analogy wasn't strained, it was irrelevant*), metalinguistic conditionals (Dancygier 1998; e.g. *all I need to do for the oral presentation is powerpointize, if that's a word*), and "cited predictions" (Dancygier 1993, 1998; e.g. *if (as you say) he'll be buying me a nice birthday present after all I won't get angry with him just yet*); broader applications in literary discourse are discussed in Dancygier and Vandelanotte (2009) and Vandelanotte (2010).

It might be objected at this point that, just as any type of speech and thought representation involves some manner of "non-assertion" and "non-commitment," some form of appropriation and echoing of the represented speaker's utterance or thought is always involved, also in other types than DIST. Sternberg's (1982) "Proteus principle," for instance, holds that the function of any stretch of represented speech or thought is determined wholly by the surrounding context, so that basically any function can be performed by any type. While I agree that the wider embedding of represented discourse influences the functions fulfilled in context, I do think it makes sense to attempt a description of typical functions corresponding to the typical grammatical features of reportative modes such as DIST. The sense in which DIST involves distancing or echoing is fairly specific, as it involves an attitude expressed towards an utterance or thought borrowed from a represented speaker, but deictically incorporated into the current speaker's discourse. The way in which this distancing discourse representation contributes to the overall management of different subjectivities in a text forms the topic of the next section.

9.6 DIST and the mutual management of different viewpoints

As noted by Dancygier (this volume) and Ferrari and Sweetser (this volume), there are currently different, competing understandings of subjectivity and intersubjectivity in linguistics. Two prominent views on subjectivity, and the associated historical process of subjectification, are Langacker's (1985) in terms of implicit construal of Ground-related meanings (see Sweetser, this volume), and Traugott's (1989, 1995; Traugott and Dasher 2002) in terms of the encoding of speakers' subjective belief states and attitudes. While Traugott (1995) and Langacker (2006) analyze the differences between these conceptions, both De Smet and Verstraete (2006) and Ferrari and Sweetser (this volume) suggest

ways in which they can be reconciled. De Smet and Verstraete (2006: 369–70) pin down the way in which the two conceptions can be seen as overlapping as follows: Langacker's distinction between implicit and explicit reference to the speaker (as in implicit *this man* vs explicit *the man next to me*) subdivides along a vertical axis Traugott's understanding of "subjective" as "speaker-related," situated on a horizontal axis on which non-subjective constructions and subjective ones are distinguished.

This horizontal dimension can be enriched, as proposed, for example, in Traugott and Dasher (2002) and Traugott (2010), with a further point on the cline to distinguish intersubjective constructions, which in Traugott's understanding encode the speaker's awareness of the addressee's attitudes and beliefs, specifically the latter's "face" needs or self-image, and may include, for instance, honorifics and expletives. As Traugott (2010) points out, this conception of intersubjectivity differs from another that has recently hit the scene,[5] namely Verhagen's (2005) broad notion of intersubjectivity as the mutual management of cognitive states within the speech event or "ground" constituted by (essentially) speaker and hearer. While Dancygier (this volume) is optimistic about the compatibility of these views, Traugott (2010: 32) insists on the difference, suggesting that Verhagen's "mutual management" understanding captures aspects of context, whereas her own main concern is "not with this context, but with linguistic MARKERS and EXPRESSIONS that index subjectivity and intersubjectivity and how they arise."

Verhagen's notion of intersubjectivity as involving the coordination of cognitive states between two conceptualizers (typically speaker and addressee) in the Ground almost by definition does not work with a principled distinction between "subjectivity" and "intersubjectivity"; indeed at times the two seem to be used almost as notional variants (e.g. Verhagen 2005: 18; 133). The fact that the concept, like Langacker's notion of subjectivity, is mainly used "analytically" or "synchronically" constitutes a further difference with Traugott's approach, in which the dynamic, diachronic application ("[inter]subjectification") plays a central role, and the distinction between pragmatic (inter)subjectivity in context and the semanticization or codification thereof is insisted on (cf Traugott 2010). As a result of this, however, there seem to be only a few genuine examples of "intersubjectification" in the strict sense.

While Traugott's precisely delineated notions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity allow one to chart the development of specific constructions from non- or less subjective towards subjective, and possibly into intersubjective meanings, Verhagen's notion seems better equipped to deal with the broader discourse level in charting the negotiation of different viewpoints between participants. The topic at hand in this chapter, DIST, is a discourse construction in the sense discussed by Nikiforidou (this volume), in that it needs contextual information about the current and represented speech events to combine with salient

formal cues to prompt the appropriate constructional frame. Considering its complex intertwining of conceptualizations attributed to different conceptualizers (the current and the represented speakers), DIST can thus more fruitfully be analyzed as an extension of Verhagen's framework, bearing in mind Dancygier's suggestion (this volume) that "intersubjectivity" in speech and thought representation is less argumentative in nature than Verhagen's examples such as clausal negation, which in prompting an alternative space foregrounds the hearer's viewpoint (cf Verhagen's example, *Mary is not happy. On the contrary, she is feeling really depressed*, discussed by Dancygier, this volume).

The point of departure for such an application to DIST is formed by Verhagen's (2005: chapter 3) analysis of complementation constructions as invitations to the addressee to entertain the content of the complement in the way that the onstage conceptualizer mentioned in the complement-taking clause does. Verhagen's focus is on complementation structures as in IST, of the (simplified) form *S-V (that)-Complement*, with extensions to impersonal complementation constructions such as *it is important that*. Constructions such as FIST and DIST, which represent speech or thought indirectly in complements with so-called "main clause" syntax and which typically occur either without reporting clause, or with an inter- or postposed one, are not directly examined by Verhagen.

The structural difference between IST (which is covered by Verhagen's analysis of complementation constructions) and the syntactically freer forms FIST and DIST is relevant to the kinds of lower-level constructions that may or may not occur in their respective reported complements. As we have seen in section 9.2, IST is more limited in its range of lower-level constructions: it reduces different clause types (such as interrogatives and exclamatives) to declaratives, and it does not as easily accommodate interjections, discourse markers, and "incomplete" complements (single words or phrases, as in *She said "No way!"*).

In addition, these structural differences are highly relevant to the identification of the relevant conceptualizer for the content of these complements. Due to the tighter incorporation of reporting and reported clause in IST, IST always has a sentence-initial reporting clause, putting the conceptualizer of the complement – the represented speaker – "onstage" in its subject (e.g. *he* in *he said that*...). In contrast, such an onstage conceptualizer is often not present in FIST and DIST, as witnessed by Examples (7), (9), (10), (11), and the second stretch of DIST in (8) above. If an onstage conceptualizer is explicitly given, this is typically in an interposed or postposed reporting clause, as in the first piece of DIST in Example (8) above. Sentence-initial reporting clauses followed by a prosodic and typographical break can occasionally also introduce FIST or DIST (as in the FIST example in [6] above), but the text frequency of this constellation seems very low. In most cases of FIST and DIST, then, what

Verhagen calls the "onstage conceptualizer" remains *implicit*, which leaves more work to be done by the addressee/reader to figure out a coherent reading.

As suggested above, in FIST this work is facilitated by certain lower-level constructions, such as the *was–now* pattern, which indicate the involvement of two deictically distinct speech events, with the current speech event forming the ground for the past tense and the represented speech event for the *now*. DIST, on the other hand, was argued in the previous section to require more effort to additionally decompress the blend of discourse spaces and to construe the current speaker's decompressed space as the "higher" one, so as to resolve the incongruity between deictic singularity and the borrowing nonetheless of material from another, represented speaker's discourse space. Following Tobin and Israel's (this volume) interpretation of the decompression and zooming out in irony, DIST's distance-taking with respect to the evoked represented speaker's thought or utterance can be viewed as a kind of *desubjectification*, as the current speaker invites the addressee/reader to coordinate with his view on the represented speaker's viewpoint. As the examples in section 9.4 have demonstrated, the "views on a viewpoint" afforded by DIST need not, as with the different kinds of irony Tobin and Israel discuss, always be dissociative, but can also be more associative.

9.7 Conclusions

In this chapter, I have argued that a more fine-grained description of the range of represented speech and thought phenomena is possible if the whole area between direct and indirect speech or thought is not lumped together in one broad category of free indirect forms, but rather approached through the lens of two categories: a represented-speaker-oriented type FIST and a current-speaker-oriented type DIST. In DIST, the current speaker submerges the represented speaker's discourse in his or her own discourse, by adjusting it to his or her current deictic viewpoint and judgment of the cognitive accessibility of referents. This allows the current speaker to use the submerged represented speaker's thought or utterance for current discourse purposes, such as providing evidence or expressing irony or sarcasm. FIST, in contrast, locates viewpoint with the represented speaker, while avoiding the full deictic shift to the represented speaker's deictic center characteristic of DST, for instance, because this is deemed stylistically inappropriate or inelegant for the representation of intimate, "preverbal" thoughts and feelings.

Next, I have tried to specify the sense in which the echoing of a represented speaker's discourse space from the current speaker's deictic viewpoint in DIST constitutes distancing, or, more specifically, "discourse distance." In order to make sense of the apparent clash between the current speaker's deictic viewpoint and the use of represented speaker discourse, decompression is required

to construct the current speaker's viewpoint as that from which the represented speaker's is viewed, whether in a more associative or more dissociative manner. While this complex interplay between viewpoints contributes in a general sense to the "intersubjectivity" of the discourse, the attitudinal distance it involves can be analyzed as an instance of "desubjectification" of the represented speaker's viewpoint.

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