



SAPIENZA  
UNIVERSITÀ DI ROMA

## **Security in Software Applications Proj 1**

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## Abstract

This is the report for the **first project** of the Security in Software Applications course directed by Daniele Friolo for the Academic Year 24/25 for the Master's Degree in **Cybersecurity** at Sapienza University of Rome. In this homework, the goal was to use the flawfinder tool to **statically analyze** the provided code fragment, **reason** on all of the tool's reports, and finally output a **corrected** version where all found vulnerabilities are removed.

## Flawfinder

The flawfinder tool is a **simple, fast and lightweight** command-line utility tool for scanning C/C++ code for known security vulnerabilities. It is great as a **first check** for quickly identifying possible security problems within the code before it is sent to **more thorough** analysis tools.

Its biggest **weaknesses** lie in the fact that it is limited to static analysis only, has a high **false positive** rate, has no context awareness, and that it cannot be relied upon on its own.

## Making the code compilable

The provided C code is **not compilable** due to multiple syntax errors, part of which are shown below

```
(proj1venv) alex@alex-MS-7C37:~/uni/ssa/proj1$ gcc project1_SSA24_compilable.cpp -o compiled_project1_SSA24
project1_SSA24_compilable.cpp: In function 'void func2(int)':
project1_SSA24_compilable.cpp:21:17: error: invalid conversion from 'void*' to 'char*' [-fpermissive]
   21 |     buf = malloc(len+1);
      |           ^
      |           |
      |         void*
project1_SSA24_compilable.cpp: In function 'int main()':
project1_SSA24_compilable.cpp:47:11: warning: ISO C++ forbids converting a string constant to 'char*' [-Wwrite-strings]
   47 |     func4("fooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo");
      |           ^
project1_SSA24_compilable.cpp:56:16: warning: format not a string literal and no format arguments [-Wformat-security]
   56 |     fprintf(stderr, message);
      |           ^
(project1venv) alex@alex-MS-7C37:~/uni/ssa/proj1$ gcc project1_SSA24.c -o compiled_project1_SSA24
project1_SSA24.c:2:9: error: expected '=', ',', ';', 'asm' or '__attribute__' before '<' token
   2 | include <stdlib.h>
      |         ^
project1_SSA24.c: In function 'func2':
project1_SSA24.c:16:1: error: unknown type name 'size_t'
   16 | size_t len;
      | ^
```

In order to have a **more representative** output from the tool, it was decided to make the code compilable by fixing the errors in the **most faithful way** possible. The philosophy behind this idea is that even if every vulnerability was fixed in the noncompilable version, someone would **eventually need** to make the code compilable, which could lead to new vulnerabilities.

Most importantly, the code was converted into C++ to preserve the `trycatch` construct, as it does not exist in plain C. This is **not an issue** as the tool is able to analyze .cpp files either way.

## Utilizing the tool

The tool was then ran on the **compilable version** of the code to look for potential vulnerabilities

```
(proj1env) alex@alex-MS-7C37:~/uni/ssa/proj1$ flawfinder project1_SSA24_compilable.cpp --neverignore
Flawfinder version 2.0.19, (C) 2001-2019 David A. Wheeler.
Number of rules (primarily dangerous function names) in C/C++ ruleset: 222
Examining project1_SSA24_compilable.cpp
Warning: Skipping non-existent file --neverignore

FINAL RESULTS:

project1_SSA24_compilable.cpp:40: [4] (buffer) strcpy:
  Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination [MS-banned]
  (CWE-120). Consider using snprintf, strcpy_s, or strncpy (warning: strncpy
  easily misused).
project1_SSA24_compilable.cpp:56: [4] (format) fprintf:
  If format strings can be influenced by an attacker, they can be exploited
  (CWE-134). Use a constant for the format specification.
project1_SSA24_compilable.cpp:8: [2] (buffer) char:
  Statically-sized arrays can be improperly restricted, leading to potential
  overflows or other issues (CWE-119!/CWE-120). Perform bounds checking, use
  functions that limit length, or ensure that the size is larger than the
  maximum possible length.
```

The following is a **rundown** of all the 13 detected warnings ordered by their **[risk levels]**

### 1. project1\_SSA24\_compilable.cpp:40 [4] (buffer) strcpy

Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination [MS-banned] (CWE-120). Consider using snprintf, strcpy\_s, or strncpy

**(True Positive)** This alert is shown because the variable foo is copied into buffer with strcpy() without boundary checking the source's length. This can easily lead to heap buffer overflow and is extremely dangerous to leave as is.

### 2. project1\_SSA24\_compilable.cpp:56 [4] (format) fprintf

If format strings can be influenced by an attacker, they can be exploited (CWE-134). Use a constant for the format specification.

**(True Positive)** This alert raises the issue that the message thrown to handle the isalpha() failed check in func3() can be exploited by an attacker to perform format string due to missing format specifiers in fprintf() in the catch code block.

**3. project1\_SSA24\_compilable.cpp:8 [2] (buffer) char**

Statically-sized arrays can be improperly restricted, leading to potential overflows or other issues (CWE-119!/CWE-120).

**(True Positive)** This alert is concerning but not for the reason specified, as `dst` initialization is properly sized, but for the fact that if the attacker could input an arbitrarily long `src` then they could cause the stack to blow, causing a denial of service.

**4. project1\_SSA24\_compilable.cpp:27 [2] (buffer) char**

Statically-sized arrays can be improperly restricted, leading to potential overflows or other issues (CWE-119!/CWE-120).

**(False Positive)** This alert isn't concerning, because `fgets()` correctly prevents the user from inputting more than 1024 characters inside `buffer`. The only problem may be that `\n` is not removed upon copying, which isn't a security issue.

**5. project1\_SSA24\_compilable.cpp:32 [2] (buffer) char**

Statically-sized arrays can be improperly restricted, leading to potential overflows or other issues (CWE-119!/CWE-120).

**(False Positive)** This alert also isn't concerning, because `strncpy()` correctly prevents the user from inputting more than 1024 characters inside `errmsg`.

**6. project1\_SSA24\_compilable.cpp:34 [2] (buffer) strcat**

Does not check for buffer overflows when concatenating to destination [MS-banned] (CWE-120). Risk is low because the source is a constant string.

**(False Positive)** This alert also isn't concerning because `strcat()` is concatenating a constant string on the destination buffer `errmsg` and there is exactly enough space for it (20 bytes). It is, however, bad practice manually counting the bytes in the string.

**7. project1\_SSA24\_compilable.cpp:8 [1] (buffer) strlen**

Does not handle strings that are not `\0`-terminated; if given one it may perform an over-read (could cause a crash if unprotected) (CWE-126).

**(True Positive)** This alert shows that the code assumes that `src` is null-terminated, if so then `strlen()` works as expected, otherwise an attacker that has access to `src` may be able to copy strings that are longer than the code is expecting, leading to undefined behaviour.

**8. project1\_SSA24\_compilable.cpp:9 [1] (buffer) strncpy**

Easily used incorrectly; doesn't always `\0`-terminate or check for invalid pointers [MS-banned] (CWE-120).

**(True Positive)** This alert is a concern because `strncpy()` assumes that `src` is a null-terminated string, if so then the terminator `\0` is successfully copied, otherwise it is not, also leading the following null-termination to fail.

**9. project1\_SSA24\_compilable.cpp:9 [1] (buffer) strlen**

Does not handle strings that are not `\0`-terminated; if given one it may perform an over-read (could cause a crash if unprotected) (CWE-126).

**(True Positive)** This alert is a problem due to the fact that as already explained in **7.** the code is assuming `src` to be null-terminated, if this isn't the case then `strncpy()` will keep reading bytes from memory until it finds a terminator `\0` or terminates the bytes it has to read.

**10. project1\_SSA24\_compilable.cpp:10 [1] (buffer) strlen**

Does not handle strings that are not `\0`-terminated; if given one it may perform an over-read (could cause a crash if unprotected) (CWE-126).

**(True Positive)** This alert is also a concern because as already explained in **7.** and **9.** the code is assuming `src` to be null-terminated, if this isn't the case then the terminator `\0` would be appended later than expected and causing undefined behaviour, including crashes.

**11. project1\_SSA24\_compilable.cpp:16 [1] (buffer) read**

Check buffer boundaries if used in a loop including recursive loops (CWE-120, CWE-20).

**(False Positive)** This alert does not raise such concern because the buffer in question (`len`) is not used within a loop.

**12. project1\_SSA24\_compilable.cpp:22 [1] (buffer) read**

Check buffer boundaries if used in a loop including recursive loops (CWE-120, CWE-20).

**(False Positive)** This alert does not raise such concern because the buffer in question (`buf`) is not used within a loop.

**13. project1\_SSA24\_compilable.cpp:33 [1] (buffer) strncpy**

Easily used incorrectly; doesn't always `\0`-terminate or check for invalid pointers [MS-banned] (CWE-120).

**(False Positive)** This alert is very similar to **6.** but despite `strncpy()` not copying the terminator `\0` from buffer, in this specific case `strcat()` concatenates a constant string next to it which has it. If this wasn't the case, then it would have been an issue.

## Undetected vulnerabilities

Flawfinder has its own *flaws* (pun intended) with unfortunately its own fair share of **false negatives**. The following is a list of **everything** it has missed.

```
// No checks on the return value of read()
void func2(int fd) {
    char* buf;
    size_t len;
    read(fd, &len, sizeof(len));

    if (len > 1024)
        return;
    ...
    read(fd, buf, len);
}
```

The `read()` function could return **partial data or fail**, and no check is performed to ensure its correctness. In the case of failure, data in `len` and/or `buf` may be **garbage or malformed values**.

```
// Potential null pointer dereferencing on buf
buf = (char*)malloc(len+1);
buf[len] = '\\0';
```

Due to missing checks on `malloc()` return value, in case of failure the last line will try to dereference a `null` pointer, causing the problem to **crash**.

```
// Potential null pointer dereferencing on src
void func1(char* src) {
    char dst[(strlen(src) + 1) * sizeof(char)];
    ...
}
```

This function assumes that `src` is a non-null string, if this is not the case then the following line will try to dereference a `null` pointer, causing the program to **crash**.

```
// Potential invalid read() call
void func2(int fd) {
    char* buf;
    size_t len;
    read(fd, &len, sizeof(len));
    ...
}
```

The function assumes that `fd` is a **positive integer**, if this isn't the case then `read()` would fail and, being not handled by the program, would result in undefined behaviour.

```
// Out-of-bounds on first iteration
int main() {
    int y=10;
    int a[10];
    ...
    while (y>=0) {
        a[y]=y;
        y=y-1;
    }
    return 0;
}
```

In this snippet the `while` loop starts iterating on a starting from `a[10]`, which is **outside the array** itself, causing an out-of-bound write on the **very first** iteration.

```
// No checks on the return value of fgets()
void func3() {
    char buffer[1024];
    printf("Please enter your user id :");
    fgets(buffer, 1024, stdin);
    ...
}
```

The `fgets()` function in above code could return an **error** of an **EoF**, no check is performed to ensure its correctness. In the case of failure, data in `buffer` may be **garbage or malformed values**.

```
// Potential null pointer dereferencing on buffer
void func4(char *foo) {
    char *buffer = (char *)malloc(10 * sizeof(char));
    strcpy(buffer, foo);
}
```

Due to missing checks on `malloc()` return value, in case of failure the last line will try to dereference a `null` pointer, causing the problem to **crash**.

```
// Potential null pointer dereferencing on foo
void func4(char *foo) {
    ...
    strcpy(buffer, foo);
}
```

This function assumes that `foo` is a non-null string, if this is not the case then the last line will try to dereference a `null` pointer, causing the program to **crash**.



## Corrected version

The following snippet contains the corrected version of the code with **comments** attached

```
#include <stdlib.h> // added
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h> // added
#include <unistd.h> // added

void func1(char *src) {
    // added null check
    if(!src) {
        return;
    }

    // added maximum length for security
    const size_t MAX_SIZE = 1024;
    // function assumes src is null terminated
    size_t len = strlen(src); // Flawfinder: ignore

    // check on maximum length
    if(len > MAX_SIZE) {
        len = MAX_SIZE;
        src[MAX_SIZE-1] = '\0';
    }

    // added +1 for more clarity and removed char
    char dst[len+1]; // Flawfinder: ignore
    // removed "+ sizeof(char)"
    strncpy(dst, src, len); // Flawfinder: ignore
    dst[len] = '\0'; // instead of strlen(dst)
}

// changed "int fd" into "size_t fd"
void func2(size_t fd) {
    // added maximum length for security
    const size_t MAX_SIZE = 1024;
    char* buf;
    size_t len;

    // checking partial read
    size_t n = read(fd, &len, sizeof(len)); // Flawfinder: ignore
```

```
    if (n != sizeof(len)) {
        return;
    }
    if (len > MAX_SIZE) {
        return;
    }

    buf = (char *)malloc(len+1);    // (char *) to make it compilable
    // checking malloc failure
    if(!buf) {
        return;
    }

    // checking partial read
    n = read(fd, buf, len);        // Flawfinder: ignore
    if (n != len) {
        free(buf);
        return;
    }
    buf[len] = '\0';
    free(buf);
}

void func3() {
    // added size variable to make counting easier and more reliable
    const size_t BUF_SIZE = 1024;
    char buffer[BUF_SIZE];        // Flawfinder: ignore

    printf("Please enter your user id :");
    if(!fgets(buffer, BUF_SIZE, stdin)) {
        // in case of error
        exit(1);
    }
    // buffer is already string terminated
    // here we substitute \n with string terminator instead
    buffer[strlen(buffer)-1] = '\0';    // Flawfinder: ignore

    if (!isalpha(buffer[0])) {
        // added to be sure of not failing the count
        const char* is_not_valid_ID = " is not a valid ID";

        // changed into malloc() to allow for variable length array
        // is to avoid counting strlen(is_not_valid_ID) manually
    }
}
```

```
// not actually a vulnerability, it is to avoid a bad practice
char *errmsg = (char *)malloc(BUF_SIZE + strlen(is_not_valid_ID)
↪ + 1);    // Flawfinder: ignore
if(!errmsg) {
    exit(1);
}

// may not copy string terminator, added for good practice
strncpy(errmsg, buffer, BUF_SIZE-1);    // Flawfinder: ignore
errmsg[BUF_SIZE-1] = '\0';
// this is ok: is_not_valid_ID has '\0' and strcat attaches it
strcat(errmsg, is_not_valid_ID);    // Flawfinder: ignore
// added otherwise function doesn't make sense
throw errmsg;
free(errmsg);
}
}

void func4(char *foo) {
    // added null check
    if(!foo) {
        return;
    }

    // added size variable to make counting easier and more reliable
    const size_t BUF_SIZE = 10;
    char *buffer = (char *)malloc(BUF_SIZE * sizeof(char));
    // checking malloc failure
    if(!buffer) {
        return;
    }

    // copies at most 10 bytes
    strncpy(buffer, foo, BUF_SIZE-1);    // Flawfinder: ignore
    buffer[BUF_SIZE-1] = '\0';    // added string terminator

    free(buffer);
}

int main() {
    int i=10;    // renamed into i for better understanding
    int a[10];
```

```

// does not cause malloc to crash anymore
func4("fooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo");

try {
    func3();
}
catch(char* message) {
    fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", message);    // added "%s"
}

// aFile not declared
//fprintf(aFile, "%s", "hello world");

// added predecrement
while (--i>=0) {
    a[i]=i;
}
return 0;
}

```

By also removing abovementioned false positives, the corrected code results in the tool making **no more complains**, as shown in the following screenshot

```

(proj1venv) alex@alex-MS-7C37:~/uni/ssa/proj1$ flawfinder project1_SSA24_compilable_corrected.cpp
Flawfinder version 2.0.19, (C) 2001-2019 David A. Wheeler.
Number of rules (primarily dangerous function names) in C/C++ ruleset: 222
Examining project1_SSA24_compilable_corrected.cpp

FINAL RESULTS:

ANALYSIS SUMMARY:

No hits found.
Lines analyzed = 117 in approximately 0.00 seconds (40370 lines/second)
Physical Source Lines of Code (SLOC) = 77
Hits@level = [0] 2 [1] 0 [2] 0 [3] 0 [4] 0 [5] 0
Hits@level+ = [0+] 2 [1+] 0 [2+] 0 [3+] 0 [4+] 0 [5+] 0
Hits/KSLOC@level+ = [0+] 25.974 [1+] 0 [2+] 0 [3+] 0 [4+] 0 [5+] 0
Suppressed hits = 11 (use --neverignore to show them)
Minimum risk level = 1

There may be other security vulnerabilities; review your code!
See 'Secure Programming HOWTO'
(https://dwheeler.com/secure-programs) for more information.
(proj1venv) alex@alex-MS-7C37:~/uni/ssa/proj1$

```

In conclusion, Flawfinder's purpose is to **find vulnerabilities** so that they can be fixed. However, it shall be said that developers must know how to develop secure software **to begin** with before utilizing it, as *a fool with a tool is still a fool!*