

Functional Graph Revisited: Updates on (Second) Preimage Attacks on Hash Combiners

Zhenzhen Bao Lei Wang Jian Guo Dawu Gu




NANYANG
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UNIVERSITY

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Santa Barbara, CA, USA

Security Requirements for Hash Functions


- 1 **Collision resistance:** It should be computationally difficult to find two messages M and M' such that $\mathcal{H}(M) = \mathcal{H}(M')$.
- 2 **Preimage resistance:** Given a target V , it should be computationally difficult to find a message M such that $\mathcal{H}(M) = V$.
- 3 **Second-preimage resistance:** Given a message M , it should be computationally difficult to find another message $M' \neq M$ such that $\mathcal{H}(M') = \mathcal{H}(M)$.



Underlying Construction - Iterative Hash Functions

- 1 The Merkle-Damgård construction (MD) [Mer90; Dam90]:
Padding and dividing $M = m_1 \| m_2 \| \dots \| m_L$, where m_L is encoded with the length the message $|M|$:

$$x_0 = IV \quad x_i = h(x_{i-1}, m_i) \quad \mathcal{H}(M) = h(x_{L-1}, m_L)$$




An Approach to Construct a Secure Hash Function - Hash Combiner

Hash Combiner


- Security amplification
the combiner is more secure than its underlying hash functions;
- Security robustness
the combiner is secure as long as any one of its underlying hash functions is secure

Hash Combiners - Parallel

- Concatenation combiner: $\mathcal{H}(M) = \mathcal{H}_1(M) \parallel \mathcal{H}_2(M)$




- XOR combiner: $\mathcal{H}(M) = \mathcal{H}_1(M) \oplus \mathcal{H}_2(M)$




Hash Combiners - Cascade

- Hash Twice: $\mathcal{H}(M) = \mathcal{H}_2(\mathcal{H}_1(IV, M), M)$



- Zipper Hash [Lis07]: $\mathcal{H}(M) = \mathcal{H}_2(\mathcal{H}_1(IV, M), \overleftarrow{M})$



Security of classical hash combiners

- Generic attacks: upper bound;
- Security proofs: lower bound;

Security of classical hash combiners

- Generic attacks: upper bound;
- Security proofs: lower bound;

the main focus of this work

Expected Security of Hash Combiners Before 2004


	Digest Size	Collision Resistance	Preimage Resistance	Second Preimage Resistance
Ideal \mathcal{H}	n	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	2^n
Ideal $\mathcal{H}_1 \parallel \mathcal{H}_2$	$2n$	2^n	2^{2n}	2^{2n}
Ideal $\mathcal{H}_1 \oplus \mathcal{H}_2$	n	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	2^n

↑
birthday bound
half of digest size

↑
full digest size

Joux's Multi-collisions (JM [Jou04])

- Get 2^k -multicollision by successively applying birthday attack k times.




Security Status of MD Hash Combiners in 2004


	Collision Resistance	Preimage Resistance	Second Preimage Resistance
Ideal \mathcal{H}	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	2^n
MD \mathcal{H}	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	2^n
Ideal $\mathcal{H}_1 \parallel \mathcal{H}_2$	2^n	2^{2n}	2^{2n}
MD $\mathcal{H}_1 \parallel \mathcal{H}_2$	([Jou04] JM) $\cancel{2^n}$ $\approx 2^{n/2}$	([Jou04] JM) $\cancel{2^{2n}}$ $\approx 2^n$	([Jou04] JM) $\cancel{2^{2n}}$ $\approx 2^n$
Ideal $\mathcal{H}_1 \oplus \mathcal{H}_2$	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	2^n
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Kelsey-Schneier's Expandable Message (EM [KS05])

- Get 2^k -multicollision with length cover the whole range of $[k, k + 2^k - 1]$ by successively applying birthday attack k times.



Second Preimage Attack Using Expandable Message [KS05]



- Step 1: Start from IV , build an expandable message and end up at arbitrary state x .
- Step 2: Start from x and try different m' until $h(x, m') = x_p$ (for each trail $\Pr(\text{succceed}) = L/2^n$).
- Step 3: Select message \bar{m} of appropriate length $p - 1$ and output $M' = \bar{m} || m' || m_{p+1} || \dots || m_L$.


Security Status of MD Hash in 2005

	Collision Resistance	Preimage Resistance	Second Preimage Resistance
Ideal \mathcal{H}	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	2^n
MD \mathcal{H}	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	([KS05] EM) $\cancel{2^n}$ $2^n/L$
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
A Primary Second Preimage Attack Against Concatenation Combiner

Goal:

\mathcal{H}_1




\mathcal{H}_2



Simultaneous Expandable Message (Parallel) (SEM [Din16])

$$T : n \cdot 2^k + n^2 \cdot 2^{\frac{n}{2}}, M : n^2 + k \cdot n, D : 2^{\frac{n}{2}}(n + k)$$



Functional Graph

The Functional Graph (FG) of Random Mapping:

Let $f \in \mathcal{F}_N$, $x \rightarrow f(x)$, FG of f is a directed graph, nodes are $[0 \dots N - 1]$ and edges are $\langle x, f(x) \rangle$

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- Starting from a random point x_0


x_0 ●

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
- Starting from a random point x_0
- Iterate: $x_1 = f(x_0)$, $x_2 = f(x_1), \dots$



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


- Starting from a random point x_0
- Iterate: $x_1 = f(x_0)$, $x_2 = f(x_1)$, \dots
- Before N and $\approx \sqrt{N}$ iterations, we will find a value x_j equal to one of x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{j-1} .

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


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- Iterate: $x_1 = f(x_0)$, $x_2 = f(x_1)$, \dots
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- We say collision x_j is an α -node and the path $x_0 \rightarrow x_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow x_{j-1} \rightarrow x_j$ connects to a cycle.

Functional Graph


The Functional Graph (FG) of Random Mapping:

Let $f \in \mathcal{F}_N$, $x \rightarrow f(x)$, FG of f is a directed graph, nodes are $[0 \dots N - 1]$ and edges are $\langle x, f(x) \rangle$



- Starting from a random point x_0
- Iterate: $x_1 = f(x_0)$, $x_2 = f(x_1)$, \dots
- Before N and $\approx \sqrt{N}$ iterations, we will find a value x_j equal to one of x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{j-1} .
- We say collision x_j is an **α -node** and the path $x_0 \rightarrow x_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow x_{j-1} \rightarrow x_j$ connects to a **cycle**.
- Starting from all possible points, paths confluence and form into **trees**; trees grafted on **cycles** form **components**; components forms a **functional graph**.


Properties of Functional Graph [FO90]



[PSW12; LPW13; PW14; Guo+14; DL14]


- ① # Components: $\frac{1}{2} \log N = 0.5 \cdot n$
- ② # Cyclic nodes: $\sqrt{\pi N/2} = 1.2 \cdot 2^{n/2}$
- ③ # Terminal nodes: $e^{-1}N = 0.37 \cdot 2^n$
- ④ # Image points:
 $(1 - e^{-1})N = 0.62 \cdot 2^n$
- ⑤ # k -th iterate image points:
 $(1 - \tau_k)N$, where the τ_k satisfy the
recurrence $\tau_0 = 0, \tau_{k+1} = e^{-1+\tau_k}$.
- ⑥ Maximum cycle length: $0.78 \cdot 2^{n/2}$.
- ⑦ Maximum tail length: $1.74 \cdot 2^{n/2}$.
- ⑧ Maximum rho length: $2.41 \cdot 2^{n/2}$.
- ⑨ Largest tree size: $0.48 \cdot 2^n$.
- ⑩ Largest component size: $0.76 \cdot 2^n$.

Functional Graph Corresponding to Underlying Compression Functions




Deep Iterates in Functional Graph (FGDI [Din16])


- It is easy to get a large set of deep iterates: $T : 2^k, M : 2^k, D : 2^k$
- A deep iterate has a relatively high probability to be reached from a randomly selected starting node.



Second Preimage Attacks on Concatenation Combiner Using Deep Iterates in FG [Din16]



Preimage Attacks on XOR Combiner Using Deep Iterates in FG [Din16]



(Second) Preimage Attack on Concatenation and XOR Combiner [Din16]


Simultaneous Expandable Message and Deep Iterates in FG (SEM+FGDI [Din16])

	Collision Resistance	Preimage Resistance	Second Preimage Resistance
Ideal \mathcal{H}	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	2^n
MD \mathcal{H}	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	$\frac{2^n}{2^n/L}$
Ideal $\mathcal{H}_1 \mathcal{H}_2$	2^n	2^{2n}	2^{2n}
MD $\mathcal{H}_1 \mathcal{H}_2$	$\frac{2^n}{\approx 2^{n/2}}$	$\frac{2^{2n}}{\approx 2^n}$	$\frac{2^{2n}}{\approx 2^{3n/4}}$
Ideal $\mathcal{H}_1 \oplus \mathcal{H}_2$	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	2^n
MD $\mathcal{H}_1 \oplus \mathcal{H}_2$	$2^{n/2}$	$\frac{2^n}{\approx 2^{2n/3}}$	$\frac{2^n}{\approx 2^{2n/3}}$

Functional Graph Multi-cycles (FGMC [Our's])

Cyclic Node and Multi-cycles in Functional Graph:

- It is easy to locate the largest cycle: Repeat the cycle search algorithm a few times $T : 2^{\frac{n}{2}}, M : 1, D : 2^{\frac{n}{2}}$
- It is effortless to loop around the cycles to correct differences between the distances to the target nodes.




Functional Graph Multi-cycles (FGMC [Our's])

$$f_1^{d_1}(x_r) = \bar{x}, f_1^{L_1}(\bar{x}) = \bar{x} \Rightarrow f_1^{d_1+i \cdot L_1}(x_r) = \bar{x} \text{ for } \forall i$$

$$f_2^{d_2}(y_r) = \bar{y}, f_2^{L_2}(\bar{y}) = \bar{y} \Rightarrow f_2^{d_2+j \cdot L_2}(y_r) = \bar{y} \text{ for } \forall j$$

\Downarrow

$$\exists (i, j) \text{ s.t. } d_1 - d_2 = j \cdot L_2 - i \cdot L_1 \Rightarrow \exists d \text{ s.t. } f_1^d(x_r) = \bar{x}, f_2^d(y_r) = \bar{y}$$



Functional Graph Multi-cycles (FGMC [Our's])


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\Downarrow

$$\exists (i, j) \text{ s.t. } d_1 - d_2 = j \cdot L_2 - i \cdot L_1 \Rightarrow \exists d \text{ s.t. } f_1^d(x_r) = \bar{x}, f_2^d(y_r) = \bar{y}$$

correctable distance bias



Preimage Attacks on XOR Combiner Using Multiple Cycles in FG

- Step 1

\mathcal{H}_1


IV_1 ————— \hat{x}

IV_2 ————— \hat{y}


\mathcal{H}_2

Preimage Attacks on XOR Combiner Using Multiple Cycles in FG


\mathcal{H}_1



- Step 1
- Step 2



\mathcal{H}_2




Preimage Attacks on XOR Combiner Using Multiple Cycles in FG

\mathcal{H}_1




\mathcal{H}_2


- Step 1
- Step 2
- Step 3




Preimage Attacks on XOR Combiner Using Multiple Cycles in FG



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



Preimage Attacks on XOR Combiner Using Multiple Cycles in FG




Hash Combiners - Cascade

- Zipper Hash [Lis07]: $\mathcal{H}(M) = \mathcal{H}_2(\mathcal{H}_1(IV, M), \overleftarrow{M})$



Simultaneous Expandable Message (Cascade)



$$T : n \cdot 2^k + n^2 \cdot 2^{\frac{n}{2}}, M : n^2 + k \cdot n, D : 2^{\frac{n}{2}}(n + k)$$




Second Preimage Attacks on Zipper Hash

- Step 1

\mathcal{H}_1





\mathcal{H}_2




Second Preimage Attacks on Zipper Hash

- Step 1
- Step 2

\mathcal{H}_1





\mathcal{H}_2




Second Preimage Attacks on Zipper Hash

- Step 1
- Step 2
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
\mathcal{H}_2




Second Preimage Attacks on Zipper Hash

- Step 1
- Step 2
- Step 3
- Step 4


\mathcal{H}_1




\mathcal{H}_2




Second Preimage Attacks on Zipper Hash




Second Preimage Attacks on Zipper Hash



Second Preimage Attacks on Zipper Hash



Second Preimage Attacks on Zipper Hash



Upper Bounds vs Lower Bounds (Ignoring the factor n)


$\mathcal{H}_1 \parallel \mathcal{H}_2$	Collision Resistance	Preimage Resistance	2nd Preimage Resistance
Ideal	2^n	2^{2n}	2^{2n}
MD \top	([Jou04] JM) $2^{n/2}$	([Jou04] JM) 2^n	([Din16] SEM+FGDI) $2^{3n/4}$
MD \perp	$2^{n/2}$ [HS08]	$2^{n/2}$ [HS08]	$2^{n/2}$ [HS08]
HAIFA \top	([Jou04] JM) $2^{n/2}$	([Jou04] JM) 2^n	([Jou04] JM) 2^n
HAIFA \perp	$2^{n/2}$ [HS08]	$2^{n/2}$ [HS08]	$2^{n/2}$ [HS08]

$\mathcal{H}_1 \oplus \mathcal{H}_2$	Collision Resistance	Preimage Resistance	2nd Preimage Resistance
Ideal	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	2^n
MD \top	Birthday $2^{n/2}$	([Din16] SEM+FGDI) $2^{2n/3}$ ([Our's] SEM+FGMC) $2^{5n/8}$	([Din16] SEM+FGDI) $2^{2n/3}$ ([Our's] SEM+FGMC) $2^{5n/8}$
MD \perp	$2^{n/2}$ [HS08]	$2^{n/2}$ [HS08]	$2^{n/2}$ [HS08]
HAIFA \top	Birthday $2^{n/2}$	([LW15] IS) $2^{5n/6}$	([LW15] IS) $2^{5n/6}$
HAIFA \perp	$2^{n/2}$ [HS08]	$2^{n/2}$ [HS08]	$2^{n/2}$ [HS08]


Upper Bounds vs Lower Bounds (Ignoring the factor n)

Hash Twice	Collision Resistance	Preimage Resistance	2nd Preimage Resistance
Ideal \top	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	2^n
MD \top	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	([And+09] EM+JM+DIA) $2^{2n/3}$
MD \perp	$2^{n/2}$	$2^{n/2}$	$2^{n/2}$
HAIFA \top	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	2^n
HAIFA \perp	$2^{n/2}$	$2^{n/2}$	$2^{n/2}$
Zipper Hash	Collision Resistance	Preimage Resistance	2nd Preimage Resistance
Ideal \top	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	2^n
MD \top	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	([Our's] SEM+JM+FGMC) $2^{3n/5}$
MD \perp	$2^{\min(m,n)}$	$2^{\min(m,n)}$ [Lis07]	$2^{\min(m,n)}$ [Lis07]
HAIFA \top	$2^{n/2}$	2^n	2^n
HAIFA \perp	$2^{\min(m,n)}$	$2^{\min(m,n)}$ [Lis07]	$2^{\min(m,n)}$ [Lis07]

Trade-offs Between the Message Length and the Attack Complexity



Trade-offs Between the Message Length and the Attack Complexity



Thanks for your attention!

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