NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COURSE CODE: PCR 803

COURSE TITLE: PEACE AND SECURITY IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

COURSE GUIDE

PCR 803
PEACE AND SECURITY IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

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Table of Contents Page

Introduction

Wecome to PCR 803: Peace and Security in a Global Context. This is a one- semester course, and it will be available to all students to take towards the core module of the programme for the Masters in Peace and Conflict Resolution. It is designed for post-graduate students taking courses in Peace studies and Conflict Resolution. It focuses on the imperative of collectively designing measures to predict and effectively respond to natural disasters and conflicts.

This course consists of 25 comprehensive Units; it examines in detail the concept of Peace and Security, terminologies for Peace and Security, Problems and prospects of Peace and Security, the United Nation's role in Peace and Security especially in Africa.

There are compulsory prerequisites for this course. The course guide tells you briefly what the course is all about, what you are expected to know in each unit, what course materials you need to use and how you can work your way through these materials. It also emphasizes the necessity for tutor–marked assignments. There are also optional tutorial classes that are linked to this course.

What you will learn in this course

The overall objective of **PCR 803 Peace and Security in a Global Context** is to expose students to the fact of this concept, its constraints and potentials and the efforts being made to apply it at different levels of the society - the state, national, international and even the Non-Governmental Organizations. The ultimate aim of being in a position to maintain peace and security at all levels.

Your understanding of this course will serve to expose you to a very important part of Peace studies and Conflict Resolution.

Course Aims

The basic aim we intend to achieve in this course is to expose you to the nature of the concept of peace and security in our world today. The essence is to introduce it, as an important component of building peace in troubled regions of the world. You are however, expected to practicalize this by attempting the use of peace and security as a solution in the resolution of potential conflicts and in situations of disaster avoidance and control.

Course Objectives

The objective of this course is to enable you to understand issues and concepts of peace and security. The course will systematically establish the unfolding and ever increasing concept of security and peace in a world of endless conflict. Several objectives can be delineated from this course. In addition, each unit has specific objectives. The unit objectives can be found at the beginning of a unit. You may want to refer to them during your study of the particular unit to check on the progress you are making. You should always look at the unit objectives after completing a unit. In this way, you can be sure that you have covered what is required of you in that unit.

On successful completion of the course, you should be able to:

1. To understand the meaning of Peace and Security and its application to conflicts
2. Identify the elements found in Peace and Security.
3. Understand the role of the civil society in the use of this Mechanism.
4. Identify the problems or constraints inherent in the application of this concept.
5. Discuss the links of the Early warning System.
6. Discuss the role of the Multilateral Organizations like the UN and the AU in the use of this Mechanism.
7. Discuss the OAU/AU Conflict Prevention and Resolution.
8. Understand the workings of the AU Peace and Security Council.
9. Discus the UN Forum for early Warning and Early Response.
10. Understand the need for a rapid response capability.
11. Define and understand the meaning of civil society and its role in EWER.
12. Discuss state-civil society relations.

Working through this Course

To complete this course you are required to read the study units, and other recommended books. Each study unit contains a self-assessment exercise, and at points in the course, you are required to submit assignments for assessment purposes. At the end of this course is a final examination. Stated below are the components of the course and what you are expected to do.

Course Materials

Course Guide

1. Study Units
2. Textbooks and other Reference Sources
3. Assignment File

4. Presentation

Study Units

There are 25 study units in this course, broken down into six(6) modules. They are as follows:

MODULE 1

Unit 1 Theories of Security
Unit 2 The Concept oof Human Security
Unit 3 Conflict and Internally Displaced Persons
Unit 4 Peace Enforcement

MODULE 2

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Unit 1 The Meaning of Disarmament
Unit 2 What is a Public Safety System
Unit 3 Security and Violence
Unit 4 Environmental Degradation and Safety

MODULE 3

Unit 1 Refugees
Unit 2 The Evolution of Strategic Thoughts
Unit 3 Concept of Strategic Studies
Unit 4 Crisis Management

MODULE 4

Unit 1 Crisis Bargaining
Unit 2 The Prerequisites for Revolution
Unit 3 The Nature of Limited War
Unit 4 War and its Resolution

MODULE 5

Unit 1 Building Capacity for Managing Africa's Social Economic Crisis
Unit 2 Peace-Making and Peace-Sharing: A case study of Sierra Leone
Unit 3 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Unit 4 African Government and Crisis Management

MODULE 6

Each unit contains a number of self-assessment exercises. In general, these exercises question you on the materials you have just covered or require you to apply it in some way and, thereby, assist you gauge your progress as well as reinforcing your understanding of the material. Together with tutor-marked assignments, these exercises will assist you in achieving the stated learning objectives of the individual units and of the Course.

Textbooks and References

These textbooks are recommended for further reading:

Akindele R.A and Ate, B. (2001). Beyond Conflict Resolution, Lagos, Nigerian Institute International Affairs.

Okwudiba Nnoli, (1998). Ethnic Conflicts in Africa, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press.

Hopmann, P. T The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts, New York, Oxford University Press.

Agbu Osita et.al (2004). Human Security and Development: Nigeria and Ethiopia, Lagos, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2004.

Mark Egbe, (2004). The State and Civil Society in Nigeria, Lagos, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

Assignment File

There are two aspects to the assessment of this course. In this file, you will find all the details of the work you must submit to your tutor for marking. The marks you obtain for these assignments will count towards the final mark you obtain for this course. Further information on assignment will be found in the Assignment File itself, and later in this Course Guide in the section on assessment.
There are many assignments for this course, with each unit having at least one assignment. These assignments are basically meant to assist you to understand the course.

Assessment

There are two aspects to the assessment of this course. First, are the tutor-marked assignments; second, is a written examination.

In tackling these assignments, you are expected to apply the information, knowledge and experience acquired during the course. The assignments must be submitted to your tutor for formal assessment in accordance with the deadlines stated in the Assignment File. The work you submit to your tutor for assessment will account for 30 per cent of your total course mark.

At the end of the course, you will need to sit for a final examination of three hours duration. This examination will account for the other 70 per cent of your total course mark.

Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMAs)

There are 25 tutor-marked assignments in this course. You will need to submit all the assignments. The best three (i.e. the highest four of the 25 marks) will be counted. Each assignment counts for 20 marks but on the average when the four assignments are put together, then each assignment will count 10 % towards your total course mark. This implies that the total marks for the best three (3) assignments would count for 30% of your total mark.

The Assignments for the units in this course are contained in the Assignment File. You will be able to complete your assignments from the information and materials contained in your set books, reading and study units. However, it is always desirable at this level of your education to research more widely, and demonstrate that you have a very broad and in-dept knowledge of the subject matter.

When each assignment is completed, send it together with a TMA (tutor-marked assignment) form to your tutor. Ensure that each assignment reaches your tutor on or before the deadline given in the Assignment File. If, for any reason you cannot complete your work on time, contact your tutor before the assignment is due to discuss the possibility of an extension. Extensions will not be granted after the due date unless there are exceptional circumstances warranting such.

Final Examination and Grading

The final examination for **PCR 803 Peace and Security in a Global Context** will be of three hours' duration and have a value of 70% of the total course grade. The examination will consist of questions which reflect the practice exercises and tutor-marked assignments you have previously encountered. All areas of the course will be assessed.

Use the time between the completion of the last unit and sitting for the examination, to revise the entire course. You may find it useful to review your tutor-marked assignments and comment on them before the examination. The final examination covers information from all aspects of the course.

Course Marking Scheme

Table 1: *Course marking Scheme*

Assessment	Marks
Assignments 1-4 (four of all the assignments submitted)	Best three assignments, marked out of 10% Totaling 30%
Final examination	70% of overall course score
Total	100% of course score

How to get the most from this Course

In distance learning, the study units replace the university lecturer. This is one of the great advantages of distance learning; you can read and work through specially designed study materials at your own pace, and at a time and place that suits you best. Think of it as reading the lecture instead of listening to the lecturer. In the same way a lecturer might give you some reading to do, the study units tell you when to read, and which are your text materials or set books. You are provided exercises to do at appropriate points, just as a lecturer might give you an in-class exercise.

Each of the study units follows a common format. The first item is an introduction to the subject matter of the unit, and how a particular unit is integrated with the other units and the course as a whole. Next to this is a set of learning objectives. These objectives let you know what you should be able to do by the time you have completed the unit. These learning objectives are meant to guide your study. The moment a unit is finished, you must go back and check whether you have achieved the objectives. If this is made a habit, then you will significantly improve your chances of passing the course.

The main body of the unit guides you through the required reading from other sources. This will usually be either from your set books or from a Reading section.

The following is a practical strategy for working through the course. If you run into any trouble, telephone your tutor. Remember that your tutor's job is to help you. When you need assistance, do not hesitate to call and ask your tutor to provide it.

1. Read this Course Guide thoroughly, it is your first assignment.
2. Organize a Study Schedule. Design a 'Course Overview' to guide you through the Course. Note the time you are expected to spend on each unit and how the assignments relate to the units.. You need to gather all the information into one place, such as your diary or a wall calendar. Whatever method you choose to use, you should decide on and write in your own dates and schedule of work for each unit.
3. Once you have created your own study schedule, do everything to stay faithful to it. The major reason that students fail is that they get behind with their course work. If you get into difficulties with your schedule, please, let your tutor know before it is too late for help.
4. Turn to Unit 1, and read the introduction and the objectives for the unit.
5. Assemble the study materials. You will need your set books and the unit you are studying at any point in time.
6. Work through the unit. As you work through the unit, you will know what sources to consult for further information.
7. Well before the relevant due dates (about 4 weeks before due dates), Keep in mind that you will learn a lot by doing the assignment carefully. They have been designed to help you meet the objectives of the course and, therefore, will help you pass the examination. Submit all assignments not later than the due date.
8. Review the objectives for each study unit to confirm that you have achieved them. If you feel unsure about any of the objectives, review the study materials or consult your tutor.
9. When you are confident that you have achieved a unit's objectives, you can start on the next unit. Proceed unit by unit through the course and try to pace your study so that you keep yourself on schedule.
10. When you have submitted an assignment to your tutor for marking, do not wait for its return before starting on the next unit. Keep to your schedule. When the Assignment is returned, pay particular attention to your tutor's comments, both on the tutor-marked assignment form and also the written comments on the ordinary assignments.
11. After completing the last unit, review the course and prepare yourself for the final examination. Check that you have achieved the unit objectives (listed at the beginning of each unit) and the course objectives (listed in the Course Guide).

Tutors and Tutorials

There are 15 hours of tutorials provided in support of this course. You will be notified of the dates, times and location of these tutorials, together with the name and phone number of your tutor, as soon as you are allocated a tutorial group.

Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments, keep a close watch on your progress and on any difficulties you might encounter and provide assistance to you during the course. You must mail your tutor-marked assignments to your tutor well before the due date (at least two working days are required). They will be marked by your tutor and returned to you as soon as possible.

Do not hesitate to contact your tutor by telephone, e-mail, or discussion board. The following might be circumstances in which you will find help necessary. Contact your tutor if -

You do not understand any part of the study units or the assigned readings.

You have difficulties within the exercises.

You have a question or problem with an assignment, with your tutor's comments on an assignment or with the grading of an assignment.

You should try your best to attend the tutorials. This is the only chance to have face to face contact with your tutor and ask questions which are answered instantly. You can raise any problem encountered in the course of your study. To gain the maximum benefits from course tutorials, prepare a question list before attending them. You will learn quite a lot from participating in the discussions.

Summary

Peace and Security in a Global context introduces you to the nature of the concept of peace and security as an important component of building peace in troubled regions of the world. It addresses the elements that characterise te concept of peace and security, and the role of civil society, and multilateral organizations in the use of early warning mechinisms. It is expected that a sound theoretical understanding of the concepts presented in this course will lead to effective application and practice of the same.

We wish you success in the programme.

MAIN COURSE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS **PAGE**

MODULE 1

MODULE 2

.

MODULE 3

MODULE 4

MODULE 5

MODULE 6

MODULE 1

INTRODUCTION

UNIT 1 THEORIES OF SECURITY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The post-Cold War wave of culturalism in security studies is a broad research program with a wide range of research focuses (such as military doctrine, escalation, weapons acquisition, grand strategy, and foreign policy decision making), embracing a diverse range of epistemologies (from the avowedly positivistic to the explicitly anti positivistic) and utilizing a broad array of explanatory variables. Four strands of cultural theorizing dominate the current wave: organizational, political, strategic, and global. For example, Jeffrey Legro holds that militaries have different organizational cultures that will lead them to fight differently.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you will learn the following:

i) The latest wave of cultural theories in security studies
ii) Focusing on some of its most prominent examples.
iii) How states behave in cultural theories.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Security Theories

Security theories have long enjoyed a prominent place in the field of international security. Indeed, low waves have come and gone since the start of World War II, and we are now at the high watermark of a third. Today's culturalists in national security studies are a heterogeneous lot who bring variety of theories to the table. However, virtually all new culturalists in security studies are united in their belief that realism, (the dominant research program in international relations that emphasizes factors such as the material balance of power), is an overrated, if not bankrupt, body of theory, and that cultural theories, which look to ideational factors, do a much better job of explaining how the world works.

The course assesses this latest wave of cultural theories in security studies by focusing on some of its most prominent examples. There is no question that virtually all cultural theories tell us something about how states behave. The crucial question, however, is whether these new theories merely supplement realist theories or actually threaten to supplant them. I argue that when cultural theories are assessed using evidence from the real world, there is no reason to think that they will relegate realist theories to the dustbin of social science history. The best case that can be made for these new cultural theories is that they are sometimes useful as a supplement to realist theories.

Elizabeth Kier argues that different domestic political cultures will adopt divergent means of controlling their militaries based on domestic political considerations, not external strategic concerns. Similarly, Peter Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, and Thomas Berger, maintain that domestic political attitudes toward the use of force vary significantly among states similarly situated in the international system. Stephen Rosen argues that societies with different domestic social structures will produce different levels of military power. Ian Johnson suggests that domestic strategic culture, rather than international systemic imperatives, best explains a state's grand strategy. Martha Fennimore argues that global cultural norms rather than domestic state interests, determine patterns of great power intervention. Likewise, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald claim that global cultural norms proscribing the use of particular weapons best account for why they are not used. Robert Herman argues that the Soviet Union bowed out of the cold war because it was attracted to the norms and culture of the West.

Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coalesce around global norms rather than responding to mutual treats. In a similar vein, Michael Barnett maintains that common identity, rather than shared threat, best explains alliance patterns. Finally, Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman argue that all states will acquire similar sorts of high-technology conventional weaponry, not because they need them, but because these weapons epitomize "stateness".

These diverse arguments have a common thread: dissatisfaction with realist explanation for state behavior in the realm of national security. As Ian Johnston notes, "all cultural [approaches] take the realist edifice as target, and focus on cases where structural material notions of interest cannot explain a particular strategic choice. Although it is obvious that cultural theories seek to challenge the realist research program, the key question is whether the new strategic culturalism supplants or supplements realist explanations. Some of the new strategic cuturalists take an uncompromising position that rejects realism as a first cut at explaining strategic behavior and maintains that material and structural variables are of "secondary importance." Others concede that sometimes-structural variables will trump culture, but that most of the time the reverse will be true. All maintain that cultural variables are more that epiphenomenona to material facers and often explain outcomes for which realism cannot account.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Because no proponent of realism thinks that realist theories explain everything, there will be little argument about culture, or any other variables, supplementing realism. The major debate will concern whether cultural theories can supplant realist theories. To make the case that cultural theories should supplant existing theories, the new culturalists would have to demonstrate that their theories outperform realist theories in "hard cases" for cultural theories. As I show, however, most new culturalists do not employ such cases.

5.0 SUMMARY

I begin this course by tracing the rise and fall of cultural theories in security studies. Next I discuss the challenges to testing the post-cold war wave of cultural theories. I then show that this third wave cannot supplant realism. Before concluding, I suggest when and how the third wave might supplement realist theories in national security studies. I conclude with a qualified endorsement of the return to culture in national security studies.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Define security and analyze the various theories in security studies.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Cairo A. R Robb, (2001) International Environmental Law Report (Trade and Environment), UK, Cambridge University Press.

Charles Goredema and Anneli Botha (2004) African Commitments to Combating Organised Crime and Terrorism (A Review of Eight NEPAD Countries), Compress Ethiopia, African Human Security Initiative.

Okwudiba Nnoli (1998), Ethnic Conflicts in Africa, Ibadan, University Press.

Gamaliel Onosode (2003), Environmental Issues and Challenges of the Niger Delta (Perspective from the Niger Delta environmental survey Process), Lagos, International Energy Communications.

UNIT 2 THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN SECURITY

CONTENT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

For more than two years now. I have been advocating an international political agenda that would include the idea of human security. The changing nature of violent conflict and intensifying globalization have increasingly put people at the center of world affairs. As a result, the safety of the individual – that is, human security – has become both a new measure of global security and a new impetus for global action.

As is often the case in public policy, practice has led theory. Efforts to promote greater human security, including the Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Landmines and the Rome Treaty creating an International Criminal Court, have attracted overwhelming international support. As momentum gathers around the idea of human security, greater clarity on the meaning of the term is needed.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit you are expected to know the following:

i) To provide a definition of human security
i) To set out the rationale for a human security approach, and
iii) To clarify its relationship to national security and to human development.

3.0. MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Need For A New Approach To Security

Since the end of the Cold War, security for the majority of states has increased, while security for many of the world's people has declined.
The end of the superpower confrontation has meant greater security for states touched by that rivalry. Yet during this decade we have seen new civil conflicts, large-scale atrocities, and even genocide. Globalization has brought many benefits, but it has also meant a rise in violent crime, drug trade, terrorism, disease and environmental deterioration. It clearly does not follow that when states are secure, people are secure.

Security between states remains a necessary condition for the security of people. The principal objective of national security is the protection of territorial integrity and political sovereignty from external aggression. While declining in frequency, the threat of inter-state war has not vanished, and the potential consequences of such a war should not be underestimated. Technological advances and proliferation of weaponry mean that future wars between states will exact a horrific toll on civilians. At the same time, national security is insufficient to guarantee people's security.

A growing number of armed conflicts are being fought within, rather than between states. The warring factions in these civil wars are often irregular forces with loose chains of command, frequently divided along ethnic or religious lines. Small arms are the weapon of choice and non-combatants account for eight out of ten casualties. Once considered merely "collateral damage," civilians are being thrust into the epicenter of contemporary war.

Greater exposure to violence is not limited to people in situations of armed conflict. It is also directly related to the erosion of state control. This decline is most evident in failed states, where governments are simply incapable of providing even basic security for people threatened by warlords and bandits. Challenges to state control can also be seen in the expansion of organized crime, drug trafficking, and the growth of private security forces.

A broadening range of transnational threats also affects security for people. In an increasingly interdependent world, we routinely experience mutual, if unequal vulnerability. Opening markets, increased world trade, and a revolution in communications are highly beneficial, but they have also made borders more porous to a wide range of threats.

A growing number of hazards to people's health – from long-range transmission of pollutants to infectious diseases – are global phenomena in both their origins and their effects. Economic shocks in one part of the world, can lead rapidly to crises in another, with devastating implications for the security of the most vulnerable.

These broad trends are clearly not new to the 1990s; each has been intensifying over recent decades. During 40 years of superpower rivalry however, nuclear confrontation and ideological competition dominated the security agenda. As a result, these other challenges have only been widely acknowledged in more recent years. Outside the confines of the Cold War, the opportunity exists to develop a comprehensive and systematic approach to enhancing the security of people.

3.2 Background To The Concept Of Human Security

While the term "human security" may be of recent origin, the ideas that underpin the concept are far from new. For more than a century – at least since the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the 1860's – a doctrine based on the security of people has been gathering momentum. Core elements of this doctrine were formalized in the 1940's in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Geneva Conventions.

The specific phrase "human security" is most commonly associated with the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, an attempt to capture the post-Cold War peace dividend and redirect those resources towards the development agenda. The definition advanced in the report was extremely ambitious. Human security was defined as the summation of seven distinct dimensions of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political. By focusing on people and highlighting non-traditional threats, the UNDP made an important contribution to post-Cold War thinking about security.

The very breadth of the UNDP approach, however, made it unwieldy as a policy instrument. Equally important, in emphasizing the threats associated with underdevelopment, the Report largely ignored the continuing human insecurity resulting from violent conflict. Yet by the UNDP's own criteria, human insecurity is greatest during war. Of the 25 countries at the bottom of the 1998 Human Development Index, more than half are suffering the direct or indirect effects of violent conflict. The UNDP definition of human security was proposed as a key concept during the preparatory stages of the 1995 Copenhagen Summit on Social Development. But it was rejected during the Summit and has not been widely used thereafter.

Over the past two years, the concept of human security has increasingly centered on the human costs of violent conflict. Here, practice has led theory. Two initiatives in particular, the campaign to ban landmines and the effort to create an International Criminal Court, have demonstrated the potential of a people-centered approach to security. Anti-personnel landmines are a clear example of a threat to the security of people. While contributing only marginally to the security of states, mines have a devastating impact on ordinary people attempting to rebuild their lives in war-torn societies.

The International Criminal Court establishes a mechanism to hold individuals accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and holds the promise of preventing the future abuse of people by governments and other parties to conflicts. Both measures are practical, powerful applications of the concept of human security.

3.3 Defining Human Security – A Shift In The Angle Of Vision

In essence, human security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even their lives. From a foreign policy perspective, human security is perhaps best understood as a shift in perspective or orientation. It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments. Like other security concepts — national security, economic security and food security, it is about protection. Human security entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize risk, and taking remedial action where prevention fails.

The range of potential threats to human security should not be narrowly conceived. While the safety of people is obviously at grave risk in situations of armed conflict, a human security approach is not simply synonymous with humanitarian action. It highlights the need to address the root causes of insecurity and to help ensure people's future safety. There are also human security dimensions to a broad range of challenges, such as gross violations of human rights, environmental degradation, terrorism, transnational organized crime, gender-based violence, infectious diseases and natural disasters. The widespread social unrest and violence that often accompanies economic crises demonstrates that there are clear economic underpinnings to human security. The litmus test for determining if it is useful to frame an issue in human security terms is the degree to which the safety of people is at risk.

3.4 A Necessary Complement To National Security

Human security does not supplant national security. A human security perspective asserts that the security of the state is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a means of ensuring security for its people. In this context, state security and human security are mutually supportive. Building an effective, democratic state that values its own people and protects minorities is a central strategy for promoting human security. At the same time, improving the human security of its people strengthens the legitimacy, stability, and security of a state. When states are externally aggressive, internally repressive, or too weak to govern effectively, they threaten the security of people.

Where human security exists as a fact rather than an aspiration, these conditions can be attributed in large measure to the effective governance of states.

From a human security perspective, concern for the safety of people extends beyond borders. Although broadening the focus of security policy beyond citizens may at first appear to be a radical shift, it is a logical extension of current approaches to international peace and security. The Charter of the United Nations embodies the view that security cannot be achieved by a single state in isolation. The phrase "international peace and security" implies that the security of one state depends on the security of other states. A human security perspective builds on this logic by noting that the security of people in one part of the world depends on the security of people elsewhere. A secure and stable world order is built both from the top down, and from the bottom up. The securities of states, and the maintenance of international peace and security, are ultimately constructed on the foundation of people who are secure.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The two concepts of human security and human development are mutually reinforcing, though distinct. The UNDP report itself, whilst proposing a very broad definition of human security, was clear that the two concepts were not synonymous. Together, human security and human development address the twin objectives of freedom from fear and freedom from want.

People's freedom to act can be constrained by both fears; and for the poorest and most vulnerable members of society, poverty and insecurity are linked in a vicious circle. Breaking that cycle requires measures to promote human development, through access to reliable employment, education, and social services. But it also requires measures to promote human security by offering protection from crime and political violence,

respect for human rights including political rights, and equitable access to justice.

The absence of such guarantees of human security constitutes a powerful barrier to human development. Regardless of levels of income, if people lack confidence in society's ability to protect them, they will have little incentive to invest in the future. A development optic highlights this positive dimension of the concept — namely the opportunity that human security provides to liberate the potential for growth.

5.0 SUMMARY

Human security provides an enabling environment for human development. Where violence or the threat of violence makes meaningful progress on the developmental agenda impractical, enhancing safety for people is a prerequisite. Promoting human development can also be an important strategy for furthering human security. By addressing inequalities which are often root causes of violent conflict, by strengthening governance structures, and by providing humanitarian assistance, development assistance complements political, legal, and military initiatives in enhancing human security.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What is human security and its provisions?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Cairo A. R Robb, (2001) International Environmental Law Report (Trade and Environment), UK, Cambridge University Press.

Charles Goredema and Anneli Botha (2004) African Commitments to Combating Organised Crime and Terrorism (A Review of Eight NEPAD Countries), Compress Ethiopia, African Human Security Initiative.

Okwudiba Nnoli (1998), Ethnic Conflicts in Africa, Ibadan, University Press.

UNIT 3 CONFLICTS AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Like refugees are helpless civilians often caught up in an endless round of civil conflict or persecution. There are an estimated 20-25 million of them around the world and they are known by the clumsy bureaucratic acronym of IDP… an Internally Displaced Person. What is the difference? When a fleeing civilian crosses an international frontier, he or she becomes a refugee and as such receives international protection and help. If a person in similar circumstances is displaced within his or her home country and becomes an internally displaced person, then assistance and protection is much more problematic. UNHCR currently helps 6.3 million IDPs and a lively international debate is underway on how to more effectively help this group.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit you should be able to understand the following:

i) Who an IDP is?
ii) Differentiate between an IDP and a Refugee
iii) The management of IDPs

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Disisplaced Person

A displaced person (sometimes abbreviated DP) is the general term for someone who has been forced to leave his or her native place, a phenomenon known as forced migration.

The term first gained widespread usage during World War II and the resulting refugee outflows from Eastern Europe, when it was used to specifically refer to one removed from his or her native country as a refugee, prisoner or a slave laborer.

The meaning has significantly broadened in the past half-century. A displaced person may also be referred to as a "forced migrant". The term "refugee" is also commonly used as a synonym for displaced person, causing confusion between the general descriptive class of anyone who has left their home and the subgroup of legally defined refugees who enjoy specified international legal protection.

If the displaced persons have crossed an international border and fall under one of the relevant international legal instrument, they are considered as refugees. A forced migrant who left his or her home because of political persecution or violence, but did not cross an international border, is commonly considered to be the less well-defined category of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), and is subject to more tenuous international protection. The forced displacement of a number of refugee or internally displaced persons according to an identifiable policy is an example of population transfer.

A displaced person who crosses an international border without permission from the country they are entering is often called an Illegal Immigrant . The most visible recent case of this is the large number of North Koreans who have settled in the border region of China. A migrant who fled because of economic hardship is an economic migrant. A special sub-set of this development-induced displacement, in which the forced migrant was forced out their home because of economically-driven projects like that of the Three Gorges Dam in China and various Indian dams. There is a body of opinion that holds that persons subject to development-induced displacement should have greater legal protection than that granted to a normal economic migrant.

For decades they were largely ignored and forgotten, but together they comprise probably the world’s largest group of vulnerable people.
Currently, there are an estimated 25 million of them living amidst war, persecution and natural disaster: in at least 50 countries. They have little legal

or physical protection and very uncertain future-outcasts in their own countries.

Bureaucratically, they are described as IDPs- Internally Displaced Persons. In the real world, they are civilians, mostly women and children, who have been forced to abandon their homes because of conflict or persecution to seek safety elsewhere..

When these displaced civilians cross an international frontier to a second state, they are generally afforded food and shelter by the host state, protected by international laws and legally classified as refugees.
Others in similar circumstances but who for whatever reason remain in their own countries become IDPs with few, if any, of the safeguards and assistance afforded refugees, under the 'protection' of often antagonistic governments or prey to rebel militias.

UNCHR's mandate does not specifically cover IDP's, but because internally displaced civilians are often caught up in the same conflicts and face the same problems as refugees, and because of the agency's expertise, at the behest of the UN Secretary-General or other UN agencies, it does help some of these people, currently an estimated 5.8 million.

In the last few years the international community has begun to more vigorously debate major IDP issues -the question of the sanctity of state sovereignty versus human rights, how better to help these vulnerable people and what organizations should fulfill what roles.

During that same period, the number of IDPs has remained relatively stable though there were major population movements, with millions of persons returning to their homes in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka. Angola and Bosnia, but similar numbers being displaced in Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan and Africa's Congo basin.

3.2 How Do IDPs Differ From Refugees?

Both groups often leave their homes for similar reasons. Civilians become internationally recognized as 'refugees' when they cross an international frontier to seek sanctuary in another country. The internally displaced, so-called IDP's remain, for whatever reason, in their own states.

3.3 How Are The Two Groups Treated

Newly arrived refugees normally receive food, shelter and a place of safety from the host country. They are protected by a well-defined body of international laws and conventions. The UN refugee agency and other

humanitarian organizations work within this legal framework to help refugees restart their lives in a new state or eventually return home.
Internally displaced persons often face a far more difficult future. They may be trapped in an ongoing internal conflict. The domestic government, which may view the uprooted people as 'enemies of the state', retains ultimate control over their fate. There are no specific international instruments covering the internally displaced, and general agreements such as the Geneva Convention are often difficult to apply. Donors are sometimes reluctant to intervene in internal conflicts or offer sustained assistance.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The guiding principles are not legally binding, but the recommendations, which define who IDPs are, outline a large body of international law already in existence, protecting a person's basic rights and the responsibility of states-are increasingly being accepted by more and more states.

5.0 SUMMARY

The overall number of Internally Displaced Persons remained relatively stable at around 25 million in the first years of the new millennium. However, there were still significant population movements with several million people in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Sri Lanka returning home, but similar numbers being displaced in Colombia, Burundi, Africa's Congo basin, Sudan and other regions.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Differentiate between an Internally Displaced Person and a Refugee?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Raymond Cohen (1979), Threat Perception in International Crisis, UK, Oxford University Press

"Cooperation and Conflict" 2004, Journal of Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 39, No. 4.

" Disarmament Forum" July 2004, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Volume 4, No.1.

UNIT 4 PEACE ENFORCEMENT

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Peace enforcement operations are usually beyond the UNs ability to command, control, and plan. They may be carried out by a coalition of countries or by a regional organization such as NATO. For this reason, an international mandate is normally necessary for the operation to be considered legitimate.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you are expected to learn the following;

i) The meaning of peace enforcement
ii) Who enforces peace in a war-torn environment?
iii) How is it enforced?
iv) The legal dimension.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Peace Enforcement

☐ Forces may or may not be under UN command.
☐ Does not have to end in combat.
☐ A subset or armed intervention.
☐ Intervention force riot perceived as neutral.
☐ International mandate required

Peace enforcement entails the use of armed forces to separate combatants and to create a cease-fire that does not exist. Force may also be used to create other peaceful ends such as safe havens for victims of the hostilities.

The United Nations Secretary General also uses the term to refer to forceful

actions to keep a cease-fire from being violated or to reinstate a failed cease-fire.

By the American definition, in a situation for which peace enforcement operations are required, armed conflict and not peace describes the situation. Also, one or more of the belligerents usually prefers it that way. This means that, unlike peacekeepers, peace enforcers are not welcomed by one of the belligerents. Rather, the peace enforcers are active fighters who must force a cease-fire that is opposed by one or both combatants; in the process, they lose their neutrality.

Peace enforcement operations are usually beyond the UNs ability to command control, and plan. They may be carried out by a coalition of countries or by a regional organization such as NATO. Peace enforcement combatant who opposes peace and has not invited the peace enforcers into his territory. For this reason, an international mandate is normally necessary for the operation to be considered legitimate.

Because the enforcement force may resort to the use of arms against the belligerents, it must deploy with sufficient military strength to achieve those objectives established by political authorities. Unlike peacekeeping, enforcement will require a full range of military capabilities that has the potential to meet or exceed that of the belligerents. Although the preferred objective is commitment of superior military force to dissuade belligerents from further conflict, forces deployed for these operations should assume for planning purposes that use of force will be necessary to restore peace. But unlike war, enforcement operations are more constrained by political factors designed to bring warring parties to the negotiating table.

3.2 Settlement, Not Victory, Is The Goal.

The peace enforcement force will presumably have to fight its way into the combat zone and use force to physically separate the combatants. It will likely inflict and suffer casualties possibly making it less welcome and undercutting domestic support back for its mission. The peace enforcement force is not suited for transition to a peacekeeping force, primarily because it can never be considered neutral again.

Peace enforcement cannot solve the underlying problems in most areas of problems in most areas of potential application. The insertion of forces to stop combat may be effective in making the continuation of violence impossible. It cannot, in and of itself, create the conditions for lasting peace, which involves the political embrace of peace as more attractive than war. The insertion of outside force may break the cycle of violence and convince the combatants that resistance to the peace enforcers if more painful than compliance to an imposed peace since there conflicts are

normally very deeply rooted and desperate. The shock effect of outside force may prove to be no more that a break between rounds of fighting.

There is a danger in thinking peacekeeping forces can be inserted into peace enforcement situations. Peace enforcement requires very different forces than peacekeeping does. The result of confusing roles and forces can be seen in the placing of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeepers in a war zone in Sarajevo. These peacekeepers were placed in a peace enforcement situation and have proven not to be armed and manned for the task.

Political and military decision makers must understand and clearly specify the nature of the mission of forces deployed to assist in restoring peace. Further, they must continuously review the circumstances under which the force was committed to ensure it remains suited to that mission. The catastrophic failure of the Multinational Forces in Lebanon in 1983 may present a vivid example of what happens when the wrong type of force is used.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The following units present some specific lessons from past and present peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. They are intended to help prepare units to perform the missions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The format is a topic, a discussion, and lessons learned. The topics apply to both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations unless otherwise stated.

5.0 SUMMARY

We have been able to discuss about the peace enforcement and its operations in a post-conflict environment. We have also seen how peace enforcement is applied, the people in position to enforce and the mechanisms of enforcement.

The roles of the International Organisations like the UN, UNHCR and the Non-Governmental Organizations have also been identified.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- ☐ What is Peace enforcement?
- ☐ How is it enforced?
- ☐ Who is in charge of the enforcement?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Cairo A. R Robb, (2001) International Environmental Law Report (Trade and Environment), UK, Cambridge University Press.

Charles Goredema and Anneli Botha (2004) African Commitments Combating Organised Crime and Terrorism (A Review of Eight NEPAD Countries), Compress Ethiopia, African Human Security Initiative.

Okwudiba Nnoli (1998), Ethnic Conflicts in Africa, Ibadan, University Press.

Gamaliel Onosode (2003), Environmental Issues and Challenges of the Niger Delta (Perspective from the Niger Delta environmental survey Process), Lagos, International Energy Communications Ltd.

Raymond Cohen (1979), Threat Perception in International, UK, Oxford University Press.

MODULE 2

INTRODUCTION

UNIT 1 THE MEANING OF DISARMAMENT

CONTENT

1.0INTRODUCTION

The term 'Disarmament' is used to refer to the reduction or control or elimination of all kinds of weapons in order to avoid war and establish peace.' Disarmament allows a nation to maintain weapons for the purpose of internal security only. Its objective is the obliteration of all offensive weapons.

Disarmament is popularly taken to mean the stricture on the production and maintenance of all nuclear weapons. In less developed countries where money is needed for more pressing needs like providing food, education and medical care for the people, disarmament implies that there should be a curb on money spent on weapons.
For disarmament to be effective it is essential that all countries abide by it.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you are expected to learn the following:

i) What disarmament is?
ii) Why disarmament is a necessary process?
iii) How effective disarmament is?

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Reduction of Nuclear and Conventional Weapons

When any nation builds its arms stock, other nations are forced to do the same in fear and for the sake of defense. Alliances are formed on this basis and such alliances often lead to war. It is imperative that measures be taken to ensure disarmament.

The leading world powers' expenditure on weapons is astronomical. The military expenditure of the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987 was 293 billion and 260 billion dollars respectively. A recent World Bank Report discloses that the world spends more than one trillion dollars (1,000,000,000,000,000,000) on the military and its upkeep. Developing countries also spend huge amounts on defense.

Conventional weapons did cause destruction, however their effects were limited. Modern nuclear weapons have ghastly after effects. Hence disarmament is of utmost importance today.

On August 6, 1945, America released an atomic bomb on Hiroshima in Japan. The fiery ball with a temperature of one million degrees centigrade transformed the place into a furnace, causing colossal destruction leaving 78,150 dead. The effects of atomic radiation, intense heat and the blinding light of the explosion were infertility, temporary impairment of vision and cancer in those who could come through the disaster. High levels of radiation emit from the bombarded sites because of which these places have become useless for dwelling. Besides, air and water carry the radioactive particles to places far from the site and cause damage to all living creatures alike.

Radioactivity causes genetic changes also, and results in the birth of babies with grotesque forms. The world powers today have more than 50,000 nuclear warheads whose destructive capability equals a million Hiroshima bombs. A nuclear war may, thus mean the total annihilation of our planet.

3.2 Disarmament as an Instrument of Limiting War

It involves a variety of schemes, designed or facilitated either in genuinely or sentimentally for cooperation of disputing parties, with the objective aim of reducing the likelihood of war or increased violent hostility. Most of the international reactions are seemed to mostly appreciate a reduction in the quantity of weapons, which usually cause humanitarian collapse in any conflict situation. Disarmament can be comprehensive when taking into consideration other variables rather than focusing on the reduction of hostilities alone, it considers the common interest of the disputing parties to see the need to appreciate their individual needs through creation of mutual trust. Disarmament may be less comprehensive when it focuses primarily and only on the reduction of human and material losses.

However, disarmament has become a central and of various state and non-state actors. It has long been a set of efforts to limit war situation in the recent past efforts have been geared towards controlling the weapons of war in order to achieve a lasting peace in the world. The process of disarmament has involved a series of bilateral agreements (e.g. Rush-Bagot agreement between the United States and Great Britain in 1817, with the aim of limiting naval forces on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain to a few vessels on each side), and multilateral agreements like the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which articulated the need to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to weapons use.

The nuclear energy as well as the techniques of industrialization applied to the manufacture of weapons, mounting imperial enmity, nationalism, competing alliance system have all contributed to increasingly dangerous and cost arms races. To address the underlying problem pertaining to arms race or arms proliferation, disarmament plans to focus on political effects of military preponderance rather than the implications of such proliferation of weapons. Tension usually leads to insurgency, insurgency often leads to counter insurgency and this violent behaviour tends to increase tension situation that will attract eventually a catastrophe of high magnitude.

It is important to note as a student of peace and conflict studies that over proliferation of military hardware and establishments has a great probability of attracting very violent and destructive conflicts. Thus, availability of arms makes disputants to be more of irrational beasts than reasonable and peaceful enemies. For instance, since the end of cold war, Europe has experienced a paradigm shift in their pre and cold war era relations' confrontation to that of cooperation and integration in the New World Order. Economic cooperation and competition has replaced

the unholy military confrontations and arms race that bedeviled the continent and other parts of the world system. Economic tool has become a superior object of international dominance.

Disarmament has really proved effective in the control and reduction of arms particularly those considered to be weapons of mass destruction. It is a viable mechanism in peace appreciation by reducing the tendency for huge loss of human and material resources as a result of bloody conflict. This unit has made us to appreciate the need to propagate the gospel of disarmament at levels of human interactions as well those of state actors in order to achieve mutual security system, economic prosperity and respect of the needs of every individual, group, community, sect, or state.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The amount of money spent by developing countries on nuclear arms is disturbing because more acute problems like unemployment, malnutrition, disease and poverty are neglected. Here is where the UN should step in firmly.

5.0 SUMMARY

It was the Hiroshima and Nagasaki disasters that aroused world opinion for disarmament. Formerly it was only the US that had nuclear capability. Today countries like Israel, Brazil, South Africa, India and Pakistan have acquired nuclear potential. In fact, in May 1998 both the South Asian countries of India and Pakistan who are not signatories to the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) exploded nuclear devices to test their capabilities. Efforts are on to get them to agree to sign the CTBT at the earliest.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

a) What is disarmament?
b) Why is disarmament process necessary?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Raymond Cohen (1979), Threat Perception in International Crisis. UK, Oxford University Press.

"Cooperation and Conflict" (Dec.2004), Journal of Nordic International Studies Association. Vol.39, No.4.

UNIT 2 WHAT IS A PUBLIC SAFETY SYSTEM?

CONTENT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

A "Public Safety" department is one in which there is some degree of integration of police and fire services. This integration may range from separate departments that share a single administrator or department head, to a fully integrated department composed of cross-trained officers, who seamlessly function in both police and fire roles in a single shift. The definition encompasses many agencies in a range of governmental entities.

An example of another level of integration would be a department that is fully cross-trained but not cross-functional. Its members are trained as police officers, firefighters, and paramedics. Although trained in all job functions, these department members are assigned to one job function. They report to fixed assignments as a police officer or firefighter/paramedic. Training is maintained in all aspects of the job, and transfers can be made from one job function to another.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you are expected to learn the following:

i) What is Public safety?
ii) Who are the people in charge of public safety?
iii) How effective have they been?

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Benefits Of Public Safety To An Organisation

There are three main benefits to a public safety organization. First, is the obvious potential to save money in personnel costs.

The use of personnel in both the police and firefighter roles allows equal coverage with fewer personnel in certain cases. Depending upon the organization chosen for the public safety system, employee idle time can be greatly reduced. This, of course, has to be weighed against the call load, size, geography, and demographics of the area being protected. If the police or fire services are already being taxed to the limit by the number of calls for service then there is little hope that integrating the services will allow any reduction of personnel.

The second benefit to be derived from a public safety system is that there is a unified organization and command structure. This benefit has two major points. First, if all personnel are within a single department under a single management team, it eliminates much of the inter-departmental rivalry that is common between police and fire departments. Since all personnel are members of the same department, what benefits one benefit all. The second point is that in emergency situations, there is already a unified command structure present. There is only one chain of command to direct both police and fire operations.

The third benefit to the public safety concept is the speed of delivery of fire and EMS services. In traditional fire and EMS systems, personnel respond from the station or a fixed staging point. This necessitates a longer response time to remote locations. If cross-trained personnel are available to respond from police patrol districts, it is highly likely that these personnel will be closer and able to respond quicker in an emergency. The first minutes of any emergency are crucial in determining the outcome and resources required to mitigate the emergency. If CPR can be started in the critical first four minutes of a fire can be extinguished before it gains headway, then lives and property can be saved. This is the real benefit to a public safety system.

4.0 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it can be said that a public safety system is one possible solution to the needs of a community. This solution must be weighed against the call load, size, geography, and demographics of the community. It may be that one level of public safety integration would work well and that another level would not work at all. It is also likely that a public safety system is not the solution that many communities need. Careful evaluation of the needs will tell if a public safety system is right for your community.

5.0 SUMMARY

In conclusion, it has been said that there are three main benefits in relation to public safety and the different organizations charged with in

their own various capacities. The police force as the unified command structure present, have been seen to be at the fore front of all emergency situations closely followed by the fire brigade.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

i) What is Public safety?
ii) What are the benefits of public safety organizations?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Raymond Cohen (1979), Threat Perception in International Crisis, UK, Oxford University Press.

"Cooperation and Conflict" December 2004, Journal of Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 39, No. 4.

"Disarmament Forum" 2004, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Volume 4, No.1.

UNIT 3 SECURITY AND VIOLENCE

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Violence is defined as violent acts and threats of assault directed toward persons at work or on duty. These violent acts include, but are not limited to, homicide, beating, stabbing, suicide, shooting, rape, intimidation, stalking, vandalism, obscene phone calls, and verbal attacks. Incidents of workplace violence usually fall into one of four categories based on the relationship between the worker and the assailants.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

By the end of this unit you would have learnt the following:

i) Violence seen as a threat to security
ii) The various categories of violence
iii) Violence prevention.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Illustration of Violence

The categories illustrated below are those of violence with actual incidents:

Violence by Co-Workers: Medical Center of Central Massachusetts. MA: As a patient slept in the operating room a surgeon and an anesthesiologist began arguing. The surgeon threw a cotton swab at the anesthesiologist. After they briefly scuffled on the floor, the two resumed the operation without further incident.

Violence by Strangers: Belleview Hospital, NY: A vagrant, who was living in the hospital for weeks, beat, raped and strangled to death a 33 year-old female pathologist.

Violence by Personal Relations: Huntsville Hospital. AL: A 45 year-old male took a sawed off shotgun to the hospital to confront his estranged wife, a nurse's aid. Two police officers were wounded when they tried to take the gun away from the assailant.

Violence by Customers/Clients Sandy, Utah: A 39 year-old man armed with dynamic and two guns, killed a nurse and held 8 people hostage. The man was angry with a physician for performing sterilization surgery on his wife years prior to the incident.

What are the factors that may increase a healthcare worker's risk for workplace violence?

The factors related to an increased risk of violent acts in Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) include:

The presence of handguns and other weapons among patients, family members, and friends
The use of MTFs by military police for criminal holds and the care of acutely disturbed and violent individuals
An increasing number of released acute and chronically mentally ill patents without follow-up care
The presence of drugs or money, providing robbery targets
The presence of gang members, drug or alcohol abusers, trauma patients, or distraught family members
An unrestricted movement of the public in the MTF
Frustration subsequent to long waits in the emergency department or clinic areas.
Low staffing levels during meal times, visiting hours, or patient transport times
Isolated work with patients during examination or treatment
Solo work in high crime areas without alarm or support systems
Workers inadequately trained to recognize and manage increasingly hostile behaviors
Poorly illuminated or distant parking areas.

3.2 What are the core elements of an effective violence prevention program?

Effective violence prevention programs include five fundamentals: management commitment and employee involvement work site analysis , hazard prevention and control incident reporting, emergency response, follow-up, investigation, and record keeping; and safety and health training. Security officers and safety managers should read the following: USACHPPM Fact Sheets for more detailed information on these fundamentals.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Violence occurs in all societies, because every society is a collection of competing interests and forces. Violence occurs through various dimensions and at different levels as seen above. If not well managed, violence can lead to all manners and forms of casualties

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit we have discussed the meaning of violence, types of violence, and the threat to security especially human security. Further, we also talked on violence prevention.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What are the various categories of violence mentioned

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Cairo A. R Robb, (2001) International Environmental Law Report (Trade and Environment), UK, Cambridge University Press.

Charles Goredema and Anneli Botha (2004) African Commitments to Combating Organised Crimeand Terrorism (A Review of Eight NEPAD Countries), Compress Ethiopia, African HumanSecurity Initiative

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Raymond Cohen (1979), Threat Perception in International, UK, Oxford

University Press.

UNIT 4 ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND SAFETY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The age-old scourge of armed conflict (warfare), with the stakes now massively raised in the face of nuclear and chemical weapons of mass destruction, and the emerging global scourge of anthropogenic (humanly caused) environmental degradation, represent perhaps the two biggest, though potentially controllable, threats to the health and well-being of humankind – and of many other creatures as well – in the twenty-first century. To make matters worse, these two problems can interact in such a way as to feed off each other in a vicious circle, each exacerbating the other. This paper addresses these twin scourges and what might be done to mitigate their often intertwined effects.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you will learn to understand:

i) The relationship between the global environment and armed conflict
ii) How to summarize separately the status and dynamics of each.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 What Degradation Is All About?

Unsustainable discharges of waste gases into the atmosphere and large numbers of species extinctions throughout the world are but two of the most obvious indicators of the increasingly deleterious impact of humankind on the global biosphere.

In fact, humans are utilizing all of the world's major renewable natural resources – agricultural soils, forest trees, range grasses, and ocean fishes – at rates ever more greatly exceeding their natural abilities to renew themselves. Humans are introducing pollutants – not only gaseous wastes, but also liquid and solid wastes – into the environment at levels increasingly beyond the point at which they can dissipate or decompose to insignificance. And humans are encroaching ever more drastically upon what remains of relatively with nature throughout the world. Suitable land for agriculture and other human development, as well as fresh-water supplies, and other natural resources continue to rise, representing a direct competition with wildlife. In 1850, humans and their livestock accounted for but 5% of total terrestrial animal biomass (an essentially finite amount); a century later replacement by humans of the terrestrial wildlife will have risen to 30% or more.

The various above-noted indicators of increasing levels of environmental degradation worldwide began to significantly exceed biosphere sustainability (i.e. exceed the globe's human carrying capacity) roughly 40 or 50 years ago. The noted degradation (lack of sustainability) can be attributed to a combination of increasing human numbers despite rising numbers of malaria, tuberculosis, cholera, and AIDS fatalities), increasing human needs, desires, and technological abilities, and a reluctance by human society to deal with the problem in regionally and globally unified and otherwise responsible fashions, such reluctance exacerbated by the immense and growing North-South disparities in wealth, and further exacerbated in wealth, and further exacerbated by the immense and growing numbers of displaced persons (refugees).

Armed conflict is by its very nature deadly and destructive, sometimes dramatically so. Most of the environmental degradation caused by armed conflict is of an incidental or ancillary nature, but some of it is intentional, with these two categories of damage being outlined separately below. However, it should be noted at the outset that the ultimate levels of environmental degradation depend not so much on whether they were brought about intentionally or unintentionally (or even whether the weapons employed were old-fashioned or modern), but rather on the objectives, the will, and the tenacity of the parties involved.

Unintentional environmental degradation by armed conflict begins with the preparation for such action, being associated with: (i) establishing military fortifications and other military facilities; (ii) equipping and supplying armed forces with weapons and other military needs, and, in turn, disposing of these once they become obsolete of otherwise unwanted; (iii) training armed forces and testing the weapons they use; and (iv) deployment of armed forces nationally, in other sovereign states, and in areas beyond any national jurisdiction. Then during armed conflict

unintentional (collateral) environmental degradation can result from: (i) the often profligate employment of high-explosive munitions against enemy personnel and material (ii) the use of tanks and other heavy off-road vehicles (iii) the construction of base camps, fortifications, and lines of communication, and (iv) the often heavy exploitation by armed forces in the field of timber, food and feed, both within the theater of military operations and beyond. For example, in the Kosovo (NATO-Yugoslavian) Conflict of 1999 the demolition of numerous oil refineries and fuel storage facilities had a substantial collateral impact on the local environment and public health. The aftermath of armed conflict often results in yet further forms of unintentional environmental degradation.

3.2 Deliberate Degradation

The pursuit of armed conflict often involves the intentional destruction of field or forest as a specific means of denying to the enemy the benefits of such components of the environment. The benefits being denied to the enemy include access to water, food, feed, construction materials, and access to forest cover or sanctuary. Forests can be devastated for hostile purposes by various means, among them (e.g; during the Second Indochina war of 1961-1975) by spraying with herbicides, by the use of heavy tractors equipped with special forest-clearing blades, by saturation bombing, and at certain times and places by the setting of self-propagating wild fires – all such actions leading secondarily to the decimation of wildlife as well as to soil erosion. Area denial, barrier, or channeling operations via the employment of land or sea mines result in especially pernicious impacts, particularly on the rural human environment. Moreover, the residual mines are often significantly augmented by a battlefield legacy of other unexploded ordnance, especially in terrestrial operations in which cluster the belligerents had employed munitions. The employment of biological, chemical, or especially nuclear weapons is likely to have an extraordinarily severe impact on the environment.

A number of important rivers flow through more than one sovereign state providing an opportunity for an upstream belligerent to divert or befoul the waters before they reach a downstream enemy with which it is engaged in armed conflict, a potentially major social and environmental calamity in an arid region. In some battlefields (e.g during the Gulf War of 1991) it is possible to release into the environment large quantities of oil for hostile purposes which in liquid form lead to terrestrial or marine pollution, and if ignited lead to air pollution.

Under certain conditions, it is possible to manipulate some component of the natural or built environment for hostile military purposes in a way that is intended to result in the release of dangerous pent-up forces. The sort of

military effort – which is often referred to as 'environmental warfare' – becomes especially tempting when the hostile manipulation involves a relatively modest expenditure of effort (i.e. of triggering energy) leading to the release of a substantially greater amount of directed destructive energy. Environmental manipulations of particular concern with reference to magnified destructive potential involve attacks on. (i) fresh-water impoundments (e.g. during the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, World War II, and the Korean War of 1950-1953); (ii) nuclear power stations resulting in the release of iodine-131, cesium-137, strontium-90, and other radioactive elements (recall Chernooby1 1986); and (ii) industrial facilities that could release dangerous chemicals r(recall Bhopal, 1984).

4.0 CONCLUSION

It is evident that armed conflicts can lead to environmental problems in terms of both resource scarcity and environmental degradation. However, those same environmental problems, whether caused by armed conflict or by other means, are increasingly understood to play an important role in generating or exacerbating disputes that might lead to armed conflict. Depleting water resources, over-exploiting fisheries, degrading arable land, decimating forests, and altering the natural balance of ecosystems from wetlands to coral reefs are among the principal processes of anthropogenic environmental change. Climate change is likely to augment these challenges.

5.0 SUMMARY

Environmental degradation is one of the challenges of human security in the world today. It is one of the greatest problem facing humanity today, ranging from Tsunami, fire disaster in France, hurricane Katrina in the US and the flood in India, torrential rain in Britain etc.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Explain the concept of deliberate degradation.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Cairo A. R Robb, (2001) International Environmental Law Report (Trade and Environment), UK, Cambridge University Press.

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MODULE 3

INTRODUCTION

UNIT 1 REFUGEES

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In conflict and post-conflict environments, landmines and unexploded ordinance can also lead to displacement, threaten the security of returnees, impede reintegration, restrict freedom of movement, inhibit life from returning to normal, and therefore, prevent the sustainability of refugee and IDP returns. As a large number of returnees, particularly women and children, are victims of landmine explosions, it is critical to focus on mine awareness before the repatriation process begins.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you will learn the following:
i) Who a refugee is
ii) Why refugees need protection

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Who Is A Refugee?

The term "Refugee" has been defined in various ways, each reflecting the orientation and intention of its author.

Some definitions are very broad, encompassing a wide variety of people who are forced to move. Even economically motivated migrants are sometimes included. One of the books on African refugees says, "They are not refugees in the political sense, but that is their real condition in terms of the cutting of old ties and the building of new" (Books and CY-Ayauty, 1970: xi-xv).

However, even broad definitions require that refugees be persons displaced by a forceful agent, such as war, natural disaster, famine, or government, while people who migrate for economic reasons (desire for a better life or better job) are not considered to qualify for refugee status. (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1986: 153), made some distinctions between refugees and non-refugees. For instance, certain limits and restrictions are used to discriminate between refugees and
i) Migrants who cross interstate borders and should be handled by the usual immigration legislation and procedures.
ii) Victims of hostilities, who may be fleeing the same sorts of forceful agents but remain within their country of origin (Wenk 1968).

There are even differences between refugees covered by international conventions and de facto refugees who may not be easily placed into these categories (Weis 1978).

The broader definition of refugees was applied in a speech that the former Tanzanian president – Julius Mwalimu Nyerere made in 1979 to the first international conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICRAR), he defined refugees as "people who are now, or may in the future be, forced to flee from their homelands and seek refuge in another country in order to escape persecution, death, or starvation", he went on to note that the 1967 OAU conference on refugees had divided them into three categories:

1. Political refugees, who were often more educated and more urban;
2. Freedom fighters, who fight war caused by external domination; and
3. "the most numerous … men, women and children fleeing from war, racial, religious or cultural persecution or conflict and from families or other natural disasters".

Monitoring the Situation of Refugees and IDPs. Humanitarian organizations monitor the situation of refugees and IDPs and intervene to ensure they receive adequate protection both during

displacement and upon return. Specifically, humanitarian organizations will seek to do the following:

Gain access to vulnerable populations. Humanitarian workers need direct and unrestricted access to vulnerable populations. This includes access to conduct full assessments and analyses of the different protection needs of refugee and displaced women, men, girls and boys. Personal data collected during such assessments or through registration should be strictly protected in accordance with relevant international standards.

Engage authorities. Through advocacy and, in exceptional cases, public denunciation, humanitarian organizations will endeavour to persuade authorities, including de facto authorities, to put an end to human rights violations.

Seek and establish partnerships. To the extent possible, humanitarian organizations will establish collaborative arrangements with regional and national institutions, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), particularly human rights groups, to strengthen advocacy and action to protect the uprooted.

Build capacity. Capacity-building activities include the strengthening of national institutions, laws and policies to enable proper handling of refugee and asylum issues. These activities are designed to complement host country initiatives and engage regional and international partners in a spirit of solidarity and participatory burden sharing. Capacity-building activities may include the following:

Promotion of international refugee law and human rights and international humanitarian treaties;
Training;
Technical cooperation and advisory services to develop legal frameworks and the capacities of those involved in the process;
Material and financial support to build institutions and structures; and
Organizational and community development.

Integrate protection concerns in programme design. Humanitarian organizations are often perceived strictly as providers of emergency relief and assistance. Protection, however, remains the primary mandate of organizations designated to assist refugees and IDPs, such as UNHCR and ICRC. These organizations design their assistance programmes to ensure they address the different protection needs of refugee and displaced women, men, girls and boys.

Implement protection measures for vulnerable groups, including protection from sexual and gender-based violence. Protection measures to address the needs of vulnerable groups, such as unaccompanied minors, women, the elderly and the disabled, are critical. Development of effective mechanisms to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence is also a critical component of refugee protection. Displaced children, particularly girls, face risks that include separation from their families, military recruitment, sexual violence, abuse, exploitation and forced labor.

Programme planning, therefore, needs to address prevention of family separations, identification of unaccompanied and separated children, placement of these children in foster families, rapid tracing services to reunite families and facilitation of family reunifications. In addition, mechanisms need to be set up to identify, report and address problems of military recruitment and sexual and gender-based violence.

Address the need for physical safety. Refugees and IDPs, as well as the national and international humanitarian workers who protect and assist them, need physical security. National authorities are responsible for the protection of refugees and humanitarian personnel, operations and installations. In exceptional circumstances, particularly when host countries are unable to provide such security on their own, assistance from the international community can strengthen local capacity to ensure the physical security of refugees, IDPs and humanitarian workers.

Liaise with military forces. Humanitarian organizations will be in contact with international and national militaries and even armed groups to gain access to vulnerable populations and ensure the safety and security of their staff, beneficiaries, the operation and its material assets.

Providing Assistance. Humanitarian organizations that work with refugees begin emergency deployment during or immediately following a sudden and massive movement of people. Once the emergency is under control, the situation typically moves into a phase when more comprehensive programmes can be developed and implemented. Finally, particularly when returns are possible, international support favors activities leading to safe return, reintegration and development. Of course, not all situations evolve in this linear manner.

Emergencies may develop in previously stabilized situations and, at times, sustainable solutions may become so elusive that both refugees and the international community are faced with a protracted situation of displacement, such as in the Middle East, where some Palestinian refugee camps have existed since 1948 and in Kenya where refugee camps have existed on the border with Somalia since 1991. Emergency relief operations generally occur in the initial phase of an international humanitarian intervention and, in the case of refugees and IDPs, are launched when there is a situation "in which the life or well-being of refugees will be threatened unless immediate and appropriate action is taken, and which demands an extraordinary response and exceptional measures." The objectives of emergency operations are to save lives, ensure protection and meet as rapidly as possible the most basic and urgent needs of displaced persons in terms of food, water, sanitation, shelter and emergency health care services, including services for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Special attention must be paid to the identification of the urgent needs of groups that are at particular risk, such as women, children (especially separated and unaccompanied children), the elderly and the disabled.
Throughout the emergency response period, it is important to keep longer-term objectives in mind and begin planning for the more comprehensive humanitarian programmes that will be possible in a more stable environment. Many of the decisions made, standards achieved and partnerships established during the emergency phase will continue to influence the operation well beyond the emergency phase. This is the case, for example, in choosing a site for a refugee or IDP camp, where longer-term legal, technical, environmental and security factors, as well as self-reliance prospects, need to be considered to avoid problems later on.

5.0 SUMMARY

As soon as possible, emergency programmes need to be responsive to the different personal and social needs of refugee and displaced women, men, girls and boys. Programmes should be based on a thorough gender and age assessment and the different protection needs of the displaced population. Ongoing participation of both refugee women and men in the development of protection and material assistance is critical to making the assistance as useful as possible.

Activities promoting self-sufficiency, such as those that allow refugees to earn income, should be established wherever possible. Programming will also need, from the start, to look at linkages between the refugee or IDP community and the surrounding local population in terms of access to services, general area development and environmental and security concerns.

For children, such programmes include rapid assessment of education needs, followed by the implementation of emergency education and recreation programmes. These types of programmes for children provide important protection against forced labour, military recruitment and sexual exploitation while giving children some sense of normalcy and stability. In addition to these programmes, mechanisms to identify, report and address problems of military recruitment and sexual and gender-based violence need to be established.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Why is a refugee situation peculiar?

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UNIT 2 THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC THOUGHTS

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

It goes with saying that there have always been wars and that men, with a curious mixture of horror and fascination, have always been interested in them. "It is a good thing war is so terrible, or we should become too fond of it" was General Robert E. Lee's first-hand observation, while Thomas Hardy was expressing a common attitude when he wrote that "War makes rattling good history but Peace is poor reading." In view of this fascination with war it is in some ways surprising that the comprehensive study of strategy (as opposed to the study of individual battles, campaigns, wars, leaders, or weapons) is such a relatively recent activity, in terms of the significance accorded to it, and the quantity of professional expertise invested in it. With proliferating shelves of books and journals on the subject, it is sometimes difficult to realise that it is only since the mid-1950s that the subject has been thoroughly studied on a wide scale.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you are expected to know the following;

i) The evolution of strategic thinking
ii) Several explanations are required.
iii) The art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.
iii) The history of war and war plans, and the developing foreign policies of different countries.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Evolution of Strategic Thinking

There is some profit to be gained, and certainly some interest to be had, from an examination of some of the very early contributors to thinking about war and strategy. Several names are outstanding, in particular Sun Tzu, Thuccidid,, and Machiavelli, Sun Tzu's Art of War, written in China about 500 BC has been said by Liddell Hart, Britain's most prolific writer on strategy in recent times, to outshine Clausewitz's On War in terms of its style and quality. Equally important it is said to have been "the source" of Mao Tse-tung's strategic theories and the tactical doctrine of the Chinese armies.[2] Thucydides (ca. 460-404 BC) who is often thought to have been the first important writer on war, can also be recommended. The writings of Machiavelli (1469-1527), although limited terms of strategy, were informed by a long interest in military affairs, were full of military imagery, and were an exhibition of the rationality and Realpolitik which many students of this subject – certainly its practitioners – would regard as its starting point. In addition to theoretical writings such as these, military professionals have traditionally searched the campaigns of famous commanders such as Frederick the Great and Marlborough for insights into the dynamic interplay of material and non-material factors in the prosecution of war.

3.2 Strategy in the Age of Nationalism and Industrialization

The period of Napoleonic warfare has been generally considered to be a useful beginning for students of modern strategy. In contrast to the limited wars of maneuver which characterized the conflicts between the absolute monarchs of the previous century, Napoleonic warfare presaged total war, being characterized by the dynamic of escalation rather than the habit of moderation. In place of the old rules and constraints, "modern" war tended to free itself of limitations. Modern war was nourished by nationalism and ideological conviction; it became equipped with the products of the industrial revolution; and it was manned by the system of universal conscription. Although some of the old traditions of war remained for another century, the Napoleonic era was the harbinger of the fact that warfare had ceased to be another of the blood sports of kings for dynastic trifles, and instead had become a clash between whole peoples over their very political and physical independence. In this new era of expanding force the concept of strategy grew from being the "art of the general', focusing on the

battlefield conduct of affairs, to being the business of arranging a nation's whole disposition for war – a business which increasingly intruded upon peacetime affairs.

The first writer to incorporate Napoleonic warfare into what became a major treatise on strategy was the Swiss military theorist, Henri Jomini (1779-1869). His major work, the Precis de l'art de la guerre (first published in 1838) was very influential in the following half-century in teaching the armies of Europe and North America what he thought were the lessons of the great struggles which he had witnessed. Because Jomini wrote for directly practical purposes, he had a relevance to nineteenth-century military life and thinking which is now difficult to recapture. With the declining relevance of his prescriptions, however, he was overtaken in reputation by Clausewitz. This change was widespread by about 1870, but had occurred much earlier in Germany.
Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) has been widely acknowledged to be "the first modern strategist". His chief work Vom Kriege (On War), which was first published in 1832, has been recognised in many countries to be a classic. It covers a wide range of subjects, from the philosophical to the minutely practical. It deals with the nature of war, the theory of war, the interplay of theory and practice, the relationship between war and politics, the object of strategy, the relationship between the civilian and military leaderships, the psychological aspects of war, battles, tactics, and is at the same time full of military history. His discussion of these subjects (with the exception of the directly practical side of battles and tactics, and the military history) is still pertinent to thinking about war and strategy today. He provides no final answers, but he is a good (if complicated) staring point for students of the subject today. He cannot be ignored.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Clausewitz's importance lies largely in the fact that he has been the leading exponent of what has been called the "political philosophy of war"; this is the view that war is rational, national, and instrumental. As the leading exponent of the prevailing philosophy of war in the last 150 years Clausewitz's importance has been secure. His influence has been both direct and reinforcing. His most famous adherents were a succession of German military leaders and some founders of Soviet strategic doctrine including Lenin.

5.0 SUMMARY

Although Clausewitz's importance has been secure, his precise reputation has not been: in fact, his reputation has fluctuated considerably, in both time and place.

He has been variously identified as a strategist who recommended pushing violence to its utmost (the "Apostle of Violence"), as the man who created the climate in which decision by bloody battle became accepted by political and military leaders alike as the proper objective of a campaign and which reached its culmination in the attrition of the Great War (the "Mahdi of Mass"), as a proponent of militarism, as a writer whose ideas were betrayed by his style and the approach of his readers (the "misunderstood Metaphysician") and as one of the keenest observers of war and one of its most perceptive interpreters (the "great philosopher of war").

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What is strategic thought?

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UNIT 3 CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

During the period since 1945 nuclear deterrence has gradually become the mainstay of international peace and security, although not without arousing considerable disquiet about its moral basis and acute anxiety over its dangers. Indeed, the concept of deterrence has been elaborated, analysed, dissected, and criticized in innumerable discussions and arguments. The literature on nuclear deterrence has become voluminous and ranged from the work of those who see in its operation the prospect of minimizing, if not abolishing, international violence, to the analyses of those critics who condemn any posture that rest ultimately upon an ability and willingness to commit mass slaughter of innocent civilians. Furthermore, theories of arms control and limited war have been developed as adjuncts to deterrence, the former being concerned with stabilizing, and the latter with strengthening it. The question arises, however, of why deterrence has attained such pre-eminence in the post-war era when it has after all, been a characteristic feature of inter-state relations throughout history.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you are expected to learn the following:

i) The meaning of deterrence
ii) Nuclear deterrence
iii) Theories of arms control

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Move to Curb Deterrence

The original conception of the Western Alliance, for example, was of a traditional guarantee pact in which the strength of the United States was added to that of the much-weakened West European nations to offset the power of the Soviet Union. The rationale underlying the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 was that any Soviet move against Western Europe could most surely be prevented by making it clear that it would inevitably involve hostilities with the United States, whose massive war potential had already been clearly demonstrated in the struggle against Germany and Japan. 'The guarantee was not, as it commonly assumed, an essentially nuclear one, for it antedated the full dawn of the nuclear age, preceding as it did the invention of the thermonuclear weapon and the emergence of nuclear plenty.'

One of the major reasons for this early emphasis on deterrence was the experience of conciliation and appeasement in the inter-war years. The Western democracies had pursued a policy of appeasement towards Nazi Germany in the 1930s which, far from placading Hitler, directly encouraged his expansionist designs and therefore failed in its primary objective of avoiding war. Thus it is not surprising that in the aftermath of World War Two, conciliation of potential enemies was eschewed, any hint of weakness under pressure scrupulously avoided. Appeasement had fallen into complete disrepute: there were to be no 'Munichs' in the post-war world. With such a sentiment firmly entrenched among Western governments it was perhaps inevitable that, as East-West relations deteriorated and an open schism developed between the superpowers, the United States adopted a deterrent posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Deterrence was developed as a means of protecting vital security interests and upholding international order while simultaneously preventing war. At times it seems to have been regarded almost as a panacea, as the answer to most of the West's security problems in the struggle against the Communist states. Indeed, the notion of deterrence was nurtured and developed almost entirely within an intellectual context dominated by the problems of the Cold War and the bipolar relationship between the superpowers. The problems demanding attention throughout the 1950s centred on Washington's ability to prevent Soviet aggression against either the United States homeland itself, or that of America's allies in Europe and Asia. The academic literature on deterrence fully reflected this preoccupation with immediate security problems.

Despite the time and attention devoted to the mechanics of deterrence as part of the supowerpower relationship however, it should not be forgotten that it has far wider application. The principles and practices of deterrence are neither unique to international politics nor to the post-war era. Deterrence is a mode of behaviour common to many walks of life – both human and animal – and one with a long history. Furthermore, it is present in areas rarely associated with it, such as parent-child and husband-wife relationships, and is perhaps ultimately as important in domestic politics as it is in international affairs. The functioning of deterrence is essential to civilized society since it forms one of the main bases of law enforcement. Although habitual obedience and a strong sense of obligation to the community are crucially important considerations in ensuring adherence to the law, in very few societies can the element of deterrence be completely disregarded. In some cases deterrence is likely to be the most significant factor promoting obedience: unpopular laws will be observed merely because the citizens fear the consequences of breaking them. By acknowledging the wide ramifications of deterrence, it becomes clear that it is not the exclusive prerogative of statesmen and soldiers, to be explained solely in terms of the esoteric language of the 'defence intellectuals' or 'nuclear strategists'. Rather does it intrude into everyday life and personal relationships to such an extent that it can be understood without resort to highly abstract speculation or elaborate scenarios depicting the horrors of nuclear war. Thus it seems useful and appropriate to analyse deterrence, initially at least, in very broad and general terms, particularly as this facilitates an understanding of the basic principles involved in its operation.

3.2 The Concept of deterrence

In its simplest form, deterrence can be seen as a particular type of social or political relationship in which one party tries to influence the behaviour of another in desired directions. Influence can, of course, be wielded in many different purposes. Deterrence, however, involves a particularly distinctive type of influence that rests directly and openly upon threats of sanctions or deprivations. It is basically an attempt by party A to prevent party B from undertaking a course of action which A regards as undesirable, by threatening to inflict unacceptable costs upon B in the event that action is taken. Although this is a crude rough and awkward definition, it nevertheless captures the essence of the concept. Furthermore, it is possible by elucidating or elaborating it, to highlight the various characteristics inherent in any situation which deterrence is operative.

It is obvious from the definition that deterrence is an attempt by party A to influence the intentions, and consequently the actual behavior, of party B in a particular direction – that of inaction. Moreover, this attempt at exerting influence is very much a psychological phenomenon. It does not involve physically obstructing a certain course of action, but making that action appear costly and unattractive. Thus the strategy of deterrence attempts to influence B's perceptions or structure his image of the situation in such a way that he decides not to undertake the move he might have been contemplating[7]. In other words, B is prevented from doing something by being made to believe that to refrain from the action is in his best interests. Deterrence, therefore, makes certain options or course of action which are available to B, and possibly appear highly attractive and tempting, to look most unattractive. Any potential gains to be made must be outweighed by the costs which B believes would be inflicted upon him in the event of the specified option being chosen or the prohibited action taken.

The other side of the coin is that by refraining from the action, party B will not suffer any costs. Deterrence involves the threat rather than the application of sanctions, and the threat is contingent. It will be carried out and the costs actually inflicted in the event – and only in the event – that the undesired action takes place. This gives the party being deterred every incentive to refrain from the prohibited behaviour. In other words, deterrence posits a close inter-relationship between the behaviour of the deterred and that of his adversary. More specifically, the former's behaviour is highly dependent upon the actions of the latter. Once the deterrence situation has been clearly established, A will act so as to inflict costs only in response to B's initiatives.

Because of this responsive element in deterrence, the fulfillment of the threat often seems to take the form of retaliation, of punishment after a transgression has occurred. But this is not invariably the case, however, as becomes clear from the following example. The commander of an attacking force laying siege to a defensive position may realize that he could successfully storm the fortifications, although only at the expense of exorbitant losses among his men. Such costs would obviously be suffered during the hostilities themselves rather than incurred as retaliatory punishment after the event but nevertheless might be sufficient to deter an attack. In this situation the defenders could successfully avoid combat by convincing the opponent that the pain and suffering involved would be too high to make an attack worthwhile, even though it would ultimately succeed in its objective of overrunning the position. The problem is how to do this, how to demonstrate clearly that the costs attendant upon an offensive would be prohibitive.

To assess the extent of this problem it is necessary to look at the requirements of deterrence in greater detail. So far the concept of deterrence has been anaylsed in its simplest and most rudimentary form in order to discern clearly the major principles involved in its operation. The way deterrence functions in practice must now be examined and an attempt made to describe more fully the prerequisites of an effective deterrence posture. The complexities and difficulties of successfully implementing such a strategy contrast starkly with the basic simplicity of the notion itself, calling to mind the remark by Carl von Clausewitz that "in strategy everything is very simple, but not on that account very easy'.[9] If deterrence is not to fail dismally, therefore, it must meet fairly stringent requirements.

3.3 The Requirements of Deterrence – Communication, Capability and Credibility

1 Communication

The first requirement of an effective deterrent posture is that the adversary be made aware of precisely what range of actions is prohibited, and what is likely to happen if he disregards the prohibition. Clear and careful communication is therefore a necessity. Many examples of such communication occur in the animal kingdom. A grizzly bear, for example, demarcates certain territory as his own particular province by making claw marks as high as he can reach on tree trunks around the periphery of his chosen area. This has a dual function of communicating to would-be interlopers in the bear kingdom not only that it is private property, but also that trespassers will be prosecuted. In the world of international politics, of course, communication is in some respects more difficult and the room for error and misinterpretation much greater. The prospects for states with differing cultures and value systems, divergent historical traditions and beliefs, and alien political structures, to readily achieve understanding of, and sympathy for, each other's position, problems and objectives, are not considerable. Understanding can be achieved, but perhaps not without making full use of a variety of channels and methods of communication. Public statements, private messages and demonstrative actions may all have to be used to convey accurately and successfully a particular message to a rival state. The Berlin airlift in 1948, for example, combined with public statements and private messages, communicated clearly to the Soviet Union that West Berlin was irrevocably within the United States' sphere of interest and that any direct attempt to take it by force would set off a disastrous and perhaps uncontrollable chain of consequences.

One of the advantages for the West in this instance was that a clear dividing line had already been drawn. Even before the blockade was initiated by the Soviet Union there had been a de facto division of the city into the Eastern zone under Soviet control and the Western zones of Britain, France and United States. With Western occupation troops permanently stationed in the city, the Soviet leaders could have little doubt about where their jurisdiction ended and that of the West began. The same has been true for the European situation as a whole during most of the post-war era. The line between East and West, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia, has been clearly and unequivocally demarcated. In his discussions of limited war, Thomas Schelling emphasized that prominent geographical landmarks or salient 'focal points', as he called them, could facilitate tacit agreement on the territorial limitation of hostilities. This notion has equal, if not more, relevance to preventing the initiation of hostilities in the first place. The clearer, more salient, and less ambiguous the line a potential aggressor must not cross, the more successful is deterrence likely to be. Unfortunately, not all situations are so clear cut: many lines do not stand out in such bold relief. In these situations there will be serious difficulties in communication. An inevitable result of this is the existence of 'grey areas' where there is ambiguity about the line itself or the extent to which a particular action is prohibited, and further uncertainty about the deterrer's intention, ability and willingness to act if the line is crossed.

There is likely to be an irreducible minimum of such uncertainty in many relationships among states. Governments face numerous problems and have limited time and resources to cope with them. As a result they are unable to communicate clearly their likely response to all possible contingencies. Circumstances may arise which government did not foresee and for which it has not made prior plans or pronouncements. Moreover, a government may be unable to communicate its likely response to an opponent's actions in advance purely because it is uncertain of its own intentions and likely behaviour. The transmission of messages is further complicated by the fact that governments are not monolithic actors rationally determining their interests and planning out their future actions to accord with these.[12] It is easy to imagine a situation where, for example, there are profound and irreconcilable differences among policy-makers on the question of whether or not the state should offer protection and help to a small nation in danger or attacked by a larger neighbour. The degree of support for this nation will vary considerably. Some officials and agencies will be militant in their support, others lukewarm, and yet others indifferent if not openly hostile to any idea of a guarantee.

The result may be a series of bureaucratic manoeuvres, in which a variety of different messages and 'signals' emanate from particular elements within the bureaucracy as part of the attempt to strengthen political bargaining positions. This will increase dramatically if the issue becomes a matter of public debate and controversy. Policy-makers in the state contemplating a move against the small nation may find this all very confusing. Trying to gauge the likely reaction to such a move, they will find it enormously difficult to make sense of the varied and contradictory 'signals' they are receiving. The dangers of miscalculation, therefore, are considerable to say the least.

4.0 CONCLUSION

But the problems of communication do not all lie with the deferrer. The reception, analysis, and interpretation of 'signals' is probably fraught with even more difficulties than their transmission. Thus, even if a government manages to decide upon its future intentions, and openly and clearly declares them, there is no guarantee that they will be received or understood correctly by a putative aggressor. 'Signals' transmitted by one government have to be processed as incoming information by the recipient states. In some cases this may require that the communications run the whole gamut of the bureaucracy. Bureaucratic organizations are the 'eyes' and 'ears' of governments. But although completely indispensable they are not without serious deficiencies and defects. These may have significant and far-reaching implications for the interpretation of information. When information is passed up the organizational hierarchy it almost inevitably goes through a process of selection and distortion which, at its worst, can render the final assessment given to the decision-makers a complete travesty of the original 'signal'. Psychological preconceptions may also adversely affect the interpretation and evaluation of another state's behaviour. If policy-makers have a preconceived belief (stemming from past experience, the traditional image of the other state, or merely intuition) as to a rival power's unwillingness to take a strong hand on an issue, then most communications and 'signals' to the contrary will make little impression. Public statements will be regarded as meaningless unless, or until, they are backed up by firm actions communicating an unequivocal declaration of intent. But by then it could be too late: deterrence may have failed and an attempt already being made to overturn the status quo.

5.0 SUMMARY

Thus preconceived beliefs may result in the acceptance only of ideas and facts confirming those beliefs and rejection of anything contradicting them. The consequences of this are sometimes

incalculable. 'Misperceptions among nations may have disastrous effects on policy decisions', During the Korean War, for example, the Chinese tried to convey to the United States just how seriously they regarded the advance into North Korea. Washington, however, regarded the signals and continued its chosen course of action until it provoked a Chinese intervention that took the United States completely by surprise. Communist China's attempt at deterrence failed partly because its threats were not transmitted clearly and explicitly enough. At least equally important, however, was the firm United States belief that 'the Chinese Communists neither would nor could intervene in Korea', particularly with American and United Nations forces so near 'victory'. Despite such occurrences, the problems surrounding communication in a deterrence relationship have been given little attention by academic strategists. Foreign policy analysts have analyzed the difficulties of assimilating and evaluating information in somewhat greater depth, but the implications of these difficulties for the functioning of deterrence remain to be examined. This is an area demanding much further thought and research. What can be said with some certainty, however, it that a government trying to deter rival states from actions it deems undesirable should endeavour to make as clear as possible what the prohibited actions are, as well as indicating the possible penalties for non-compliance with its wishes. Whether or not the state has the ability or capacity to inflict these penalties and whether they in turn will be a sufficient threat to deter are matters for separate discussion. It is to these questions that attention must now be given.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What do you understand by nuclear deterrence?

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UNIT 4 CRISIS MANAGEMENT

CONTENT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

"We create and enjoy crises … why, I don't know. I wish I knew. But all of us like them. I know I enjoy them. There is a sense of elation that comes with crises." Although this statement, made by an unidentified American diplomat is rather chilling in its implications, it does express what may be a more widespread attitude than is generally realized[1]. The way that crises are seized upon and dramatized by the media, for example, indicates the interest and excitement that a confrontation between states arouses in a public that is otherwise largely uninterested in foreign affairs. But it also seems likely that crises have a similar macabre fascination for policy-makers themselves. For the diplomat or statesman the confrontation with rival governments is the ultimate movement of truth, the time when his will, ability, wisdom and leadership qualities are all stretched to the utmost. If he comes through it successfully he knows that his personal prestige and stature will be enormously enhanced both within his own state and in the eyes if other governments. The sense of pride with which statesmen in their memoirs highlight their decisions and actions during periods of acute tension or crisis is symptomatic of the importance they attach to these situations.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you are to learn the following
i) What is crisis?
ii) Why are the root causes of crisis?
iii) How do we manage crisis?

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Crisis and Its Management

The academic strategist is concerned with the potential as well as the actual use of force and international crises therefore provide an obvious area of interest and attention. It is in these situations that perhaps the most vigorous and explicit attempts are made by decision-makers to influence the behaviour of their opponents in desired directions. Tactics such as escalation and brinkmanship are carefully employed to this end. Indeed, techniques of coercive diplomacy and the "manipulation of the shared risk of war" lie at the heart of the tough bargaining process that is an integral feature of crisis interaction. One of the main tasks of the analyst is to disentangle this bargaining process and attempt to assess the impact and utility of the various techniques that are used by the participants. Furthermore, crises provide an essential testing ground in which the more abstract theories of escalation, together with idea about the coercive value of commitments and threats can be balanced against the considerations that actually motivate policy-makers involved in conflict situations short of war.

At the same time it has to be recognized that crises lie at the crucial juncture between peace and war. Crisis interactions can result either in the outbreak of war between the protagonists or in the peaceful resolution of the crisis on terms that are at least sufficiently satisfactory to the participants as to make the option of the resorting to force seem unattractive. It is a matter of prime importance to determine the reasons for the first type of outcome as opposed to the second. An attempt must be made to isolate those tendencies that render war more likely on the one hand, and those considerations and techniques that facilitate a non-violent solution to the conflict on the other. If this were successful it would have considerable practical import and provide a useful point of contact for the practitioner and the analyst of international affairs. It would also go at least some way towards meeting the demands of those who argue the need for "policy-relevant theory".

As well as providing insights into the ways in which war might be precipitated, and the manner in which states employ what has been described as the "diplomacy of violence", the study of crises is important for yet other reasons. Not only do crises offer insights into patterns of interaction between states but also into the decision-making processes within the governments involved. Crises are in a sense discrete event in which the whole process of evaluating an initiative of the opponent, deciding on an appropriate response and implementing that response can be seen very clearly.

Thus it is possible to focus on the way policy is made during crises and to examine the manner in which decision-makers handle information, formulate alternative course of actions and cope with the high level of stress that is an inevitable accompaniment of crisis situations.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Against all this it could be argued that crisis studies are redundant now that the superpowers have entered an era of détente. This suggestion seems rather foolhardy, however, since it rests on the assumption that all the potential conflicts of interest remaining in the superpower relationship will be eliminated. While there might in fact be a gradual movement from crisis management to crisis prevention considerations, there is no guarantee that superpower crises can be avoided in the future. It is possible that the Soviet attainment of nuclear parity heralds a greater willingness of the Kremlin to take high risks in its dealings with the United States. Even if this does not materialize, however, current trends in international affairs militate against the total absence of crises. Nuclear proliferation, for example, increases the likelihood of dangerous and destabilizing confrontations between states, which hitherto have been regarded as relatively minor powers whose conflicts could easily be contained or localized. The energy problem and the resulting competition for scarce resources could provoke serious divisions and rivalries among the advanced industrialized states that have hitherto enjoyed a relatively tranquil and cordial relationship. Alternatively, one or two of these governments could decide that the only way to have regular energy supplies at reasonable economic cost is through military action against the oil-producing states. This would almost certainly precipitate a major crisis. Although such possibilities may be rather remote, they should not be ruled out altogether. Furthermore, the rise of China and the gradual emergence of Japan to great power status will add even more uncertainties to the future and widen the range of possible conflicts or confrontations that could have global implications.

5.0 SUMMARY

It seems reasonable to argue, therefore, that so long as international politics remain in a state of anarchy, periodic crises are inevitable. The changing constellations of power and alignment merely make it more difficult to predict where, and in what circumstances, the major problems and issues are likely to arise. It may also be the case that the changing context of crises will add to the difficulties of resolving them without resort to war.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS

What are the processes involved in crisis management?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

The diplomat is quoted in O.R. Olsti, 1972,Crisis, Escalation, War Montreal and London: McGill – Queen's University Press.

See T.C. Schelling,1066, Arms and Influence (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, especially Ch.3.

This has been done superbly in O.R. Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining during Superpower Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) which is an important pioneering work on international crises and the way they are handled.

The question of 'policy-relevant theory' is discussed at length in A.L. George, D.K. Hall, and W.E. Simons, 1971, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown.

MODULE 4

INTRODUCTION

UNIT 1 CRISIS BARGAINING

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

International crises typically involve tests of will between the protagonists. Throughout periods of high tension or confrontation, attempts are constantly made both to assess the intentions and to influence the determination of the opponent. It is possible to wield such influence successfully by manipulating the opponent's perception of one's own determination and resolve. Indeed, a state's image of its adversary will have a significant effect on its own behaviour, and do much to determine whether it will adopt coercive bargaining tactics and exhibit a relatively high propensity for taking risks or tend toward accommodation and a significantly lower level of risk-taking. Much of the art of crisis bargaining lies in influencing this image in desired directions.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you are expected to learn:

i) The vital key to successful bargaining
ii) The art of influencing one person over the other
iii) The dangers of crisis

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Bargaining

Probably the vital key to successful bargaining is the ability of party A to convince party B that possesses the greater resolve and consequently is prepared to tolerate a much higher level of risks in the crisis than is B. In other words, crisis bargaining is, in large part at least, a "competition in risk-taking", This competition as indicated in an earlier chapter, has been discussed by some academic strategists in terms of the chicken game in which two teenagers in cars drive towards each other as speed, and the first to swerve aside is the loser. Although the competition that occurs in international crises is much more complex, the analogy is both highly striking and extremely useful, and is taken up and developed slightly in the following discussion.

The central problem for each of the major participants in a crisis or chicken game is to establish the credibility of his threats and make clear to the opponent the strength of his will or resolve. Neither wants the game to result in a head-on collision since that would almost certainly be fatal for both. The aim, therefore, becomes one of convincing the opponent that he must be the party to move aside or back down if disaster is to be avoided. Since both sides know that the other would prefer a peaceful outcome to collision, however, each will attempt to convince the opponent of his unwillingness to give way. There are various strategies and tactics that can readily be exploited to this end, since they are designed specifically to promote an image of oneself as an inveterate risk-taker determined to compete successfully. Such strategies must now be outlined, albeit fairly briefly.

Superficially, at least, one of the most attractive and effective coercive bargaining moves is to "burn one's bridges". When it does not seem to be in the interests of one of the protagonists to carry out a particular threat, the opponent will almost certainly doubt the credibility of that threat. These doubts are likely to disappear, however, if it is made clear to him that the threatened action will, in certain specified circumstances, be carried out automatically. In other words, the credibility of a threat is enormously enhanced when it involves an "irrevocable commitment". By cutting off the line of retreat and locking oneself into a particular position, disaster can only be avoided if the opponent is prepared to stop or swerve aside. The adversary is made to realize that you cannot fail to act or react in the manner suggested if he perseveres with the prohibited course of action.

By destroying one's own path of possible retreat, the only options left open are those available to the opponent. It is he – and he alone – who had the "last clear choice" to avoid a collision. Attractive as such a bold commitment move might be in terms of winning the game, however, it demands an excessively high level of nerve and skill.

An alternative means of strengthening a commitment, but one that does not cut off irretrievably all possible means of retreat and manoeuvre, is to publicize it. While a public pledge, an open treaty of alliance, or an explicit and formal guarantee pact, does not bind a state finally and irrevocably, it does substantially increase the costs of not meeting the commitment. A threat that is made to the opponent in public, therefore, is likely to have greater impact and be more credible than the same threat made privately and through secret communication channels, since the costs of not fulfilling the latter are considerably lower. To evoke a public commitment while under duress, to renege on a universally recognized guarantee, or to fail to implement an explicit and well-publicized threat can do considerable harm to the state's reputation and prestige, and invite further challenges not only from the current adversary but also from other governments. The state's behaviour in this situation will influence the expectations of others about its likely behaviour in the future. Similarly it is possible to "couple" the immediate issue with other matters in dispute and suggest that it is impossible to concede victory to the opponent on this occasion as this would lead him to expect a similar type of accommodation on other occasions and over these other disputes. This is not to overemphasize the interdependence of commitments but is merely to highlight the advantages to be gained from linking issues in this way, It tends both to strengthen the credibility of one's threats and make concessions less likely and less necessary.

Yet another way of establishing credibility of one's threats – even when it is obvious that to implement them would be suicidal – is to convey the impression of being irrational. Indeed, what has been described as "the rationality of irrationality" strategy is an explicit recognition that significant advantages may accrue to one of the participants in the bargaining process if his opponent believes that he is not entirely rational and not completely in command of his senses or in control of his actions. The skill is to convince the opponent that one is oblivious to the risks of a collision, which once again puts the onus on him to avoid it. A variant of this tactic is for one of the parties to play down or dismiss the costs of collision to himself relative to the costs to the opponent. The skill here is not in seeming oblivious to the costs and dangers involved – in fact it is probably to emphasize them – but to suggest that they will be more severe for the opponent than for oneself.

Another coercive bargaining tactic is to increase both the likelihood and the potential magnitude of the disaster. This can be done by escalatory tactics such as the dramatic crossing of a threshold or the flouting of conventions that have hitherto been observed. Such actions leave the opponent with the next move and have therefore been described as "initiatives that force the opponent to initiate".

3.2 The Dangers of Crises

The above discussion of coercive bargaining tactics is designed to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, and to convey the flavour of the process rather than all its subtleties and nuances. It is also suggestive, however, of the very significant dangers that are involved in the competition in risk-taking. Perhaps the most important of these stem from the fact that it is competitive. Both participants will be adopting one or more of these tactics in an attempt to make the other back down. Furthermore, each will know that the other is trying to frighten him into submission and will treat his moves with skepticism and incredulity. The potential for disaster, therefore, is far from negligible even in this relatively straightforward game. Most of the tactics described depend for their success on unilateral use. If both of the protagonists make strong public commitments, both adopt rationality of irrationality tactics, or if both are prepared to escalate, the likelihood of disaster is enormously increased. The danger is essentially one of miscalculating the opponent's willingness to stand firm and can be seen most clearly if we revert to the discussion of perhaps the most dangerous move of all, the irrevocable commitment.

Throwing the steering wheel out of the window in the context of the chicken game is a valuable tactic so long as a number of conditions are met. The first is that the opponent does not do the same thing at the same time, in which event both cars would be inevitably locked on to a collision course. The second condition is that the opponent realizes what has happened and is aware that only he can now prevent the disaster which neither really wants: he must see the steering wheel being thrown out and assess the implications of this quickly enough to be able to swerve aside before the two cars meet head on. Thirdly, the opponent must be convinced that the steering wheel is genuine and that the action is really a firm commitment rather than merely a bluff. In other words, the competition can end in disaster through the simultaneous establishment of irreversible commitments, a failure of communication, or an unwillingness to recognize that the opponent is not bluffing.

As Herman Kahn has put it: 'neither side is willing to back down precisely because it believes or hopes it can achieve its objective, without war. It may be willing to run some risk of war to achieve its objective, but it feels that the other side will back down or compromise before the risk becomes very large'. Should these beliefs, hopes, or feelings be mistaken then war becomes much more likely: strong commitments by both sides and a miscalculation of intent can all to easily lead to disaster. Such dangers have been discussed here in relation to the "irrevocable commitment" since it is in this context that they emerge most clearly, but they are only slightly less relevant to the other tactics outlined above.

Indeed the simple chicken-game that has been alluded to suffers from a number of important defects. Most importantly, it minimizes the dangers and risks associated with the "competition in risk-taking" as it could develop in international politics. It seems appropriate, therefore, to suggest a modified analogy that is perhaps more akin to the reality of interstate crises. Rather than seeing the cars moving towards each other on a straight road which gives them very clear vision, it seems more fruitful to regard them as heading towards one another from the opposite ends of a very long winding lane and being connected by a radio telephone which is subject to interference and distortion, and for some of the time at least is barely audible above the sound of the car engines. Neither driver is able to see what is around the next bend and cannot be aware how fast the other is going, or how far apart they are at any point in time. Furthermore, the cars are badly maintained and subject to possible mechanical faults such as brake failure. The drivers may not be particularly skilled and it is not inconceivable that they might lose control of their vehicles at a crucial juncture in the proceedings. Described in this way the chicken game bears greater resemblance to the confrontation that actually occur in world politics, mainly because it incorporates the element of unintended risk and the possibility of errors in decision-making.

The autonomous risk that is inherent in crisis situations has been explicitly and fully acknowledged by Thomas Schilling. At the same time though, he has suggested that this can be exploited by "making threats that leave something to chance". The gambit here is not coolly and calmly to threaten to inflict unacceptable costs on the opponent, particularly if this invites a similar level of pain and damage to oneself. Rather is it to start events moving in such a way that mutual disaster becomes a distinct possibility even though neither side really wants it.

In fact, it can be argued that such threats are implicit, if not explicit, in many coercive moves that are made during crises, especially if it is accepted that "the essence of a crisis lies in its unpredictability", and the fact that "the participants are not fully in control of events" but have to "take steps and make decisions in the realm of risk and uncertainty".

4.0 CONCLUSION

The dangers in crises, therefore, stem not only from the bargaining process, but are also a consequence of the characteristics generally attendant upon crisis situations. A crisis is by nature extremely volatile and explosive, full of ambiguities and intangibles. Thus there are various ways in which the situation might get out of hand and lead to war despite prodigious efforts by the protagonists to prevent such an occurrence. These possibilities must now be examined.

A major problem in these situations is the danger of a violent flare-up. Incidents that are accidental and wholly unintended rather than the result of deliberate provocation can nevertheless initiate a rapid escalation that neither of the parties really wants. An outbreak of violence, even though it might have its origins in a riot or the actions of an over-zealous military commander, for example, will be difficult to contain, particularly in a situation where suspicion and hostility are rife. Indeed, it has been argued that if violence occurs directly between the forces of the two superpowers it could all too easily culminate in large-scale hostilities involving the use of nuclear weapons.

5.0 SUMMARY

"Violent interactions acquire a momentum of their own" and may precipitate an ever-deepening conflict from which both sides find it increasingly difficult to withdraw without undue loss of pride, prestige, and self-confidence. To some extent, of course, this is part of a more general problem that is probably best enshrined in the notion of events getting out of hand and developing their own logic instead of remaining susceptible to government directions and control.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What are the dangers of crisis?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

T.C. Schelling, (066) Arms and Influence, New Haven and London & Yale University Press.

Snyder, op. cit., pp.241 –2, notes an extremely useful distinction between "autonomous" risks or the danger that the parties will "lose control of events" and the risks of miscalculation "inherent in the bargaining process". See also Schelling, Arms and Influence, op. cit., p.97.

This is one of the major themes in H, Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965.

UNIT 2 THE PREREQUISITES FOR REVOLUTION

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Revolutions originate and prosper under so many different conditions involving man's dissatisfaction with his lot that it is difficult to generalize. Some are predominantly urban, others are rural. Some are "bad", as seen from the U.S. standpoint. Others can be "good". Most often they occur in underdeveloped countries, but they also crop up in some very sophisticated environments.

The conditions that spawn insurgency are remarkably similar. Revolution rarely rears its head in the midst of abject poverty and despair. Zealots most often surface in societies where rising expectations breed impatience. Intolerable frictions are commonly compounded by communications gaps, between parties in power and the people; rich and poor; young and old; peasants and proletariat; ethnic groups and religious factions. The resultant antagonisms can be deftly exploited by demagogues. The breakdown of tradition, which almost inevitably occurs in modern societies, frequently is a factor. Influential intellectuals who shift their allegiance to revolutionary ideals contribute inadvertently or deliberately. If such circumstances combine with flagrant economic or social injustices, real or imagined, the situation is ripe for revolution.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit you would have learnt the following:

i) The cause,
ii) The organization and
iii) The phases of revolution.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Cause

The second prerequisite for any revolution is an emotional cause, one worth dying for. It must have broad appeal and be vague enough so that each man can supply his own interpretation. There is no need for it to be realistic or attainable. Abstract themes like freedom, human rights, colonial oppression, equal opportunity, and self-determination, are causes that fire men's imaginations. The strongest appeals since World War II have been patriotic and nationalistic.

3.2 Organization

Dreams without direction, of course, are useless. The cause, whatever it is, must be promoted by clever leaders who are skilled in mobilizing and manipulating people, and can focus the endemic energies of the mass to generate power. The initial objective is to establish a system of "dual power", wherein a subversive shadow government vies with duly constituted authority for control. Its operatives concurrently undermine the incumbent regime and root out internal opposition within the revolutionary body. The key is sound organization. Sir Robert Thompson, an authority on this subject and sometime advisor to President Nixon, rates infrastructure as "quite the most vital feature of revolutionary war":
[The infrastructure] is established in two parts. The first, and by far the most important, is the political underground organization within the population in which cells are created, by a process described as "bead stringing", throughout the country in all villages and towns… The main function of the underground organization as a whole is to provide a support and maintained unless it has a home base on which it can rely for its supplies and recruits…

It is essential at this point to understand the relationship between the organization [and] the cause… [As the war progress] the original cause will become less and less relevant because the immediate concern of most people will be survival for themselves and their families and there will be an inclination to support the side which looks like winning. It is at this point that the [revolutionary] party, as one means of hastening the collapse of government and the existing structure, will be better able to exploit all the contradictions which exist within any society.
In studying any revolutionary war, therefore… it is necessary to assess whether its organization or its ostensible cause (often no more than a pretext) is the vital factor because this will dictate the emphasis of the response.
If the organization is the vital factor, then the revolutionary movement will not be defeated by reforms designed to eliminate the cause. It will

only be defeated by establishing a superior organization and applying measures designed to break the revolutionary organization…
Generally it can be said that, where both the cause and the organization are good, the revolutionary movement will win, probably at an early stage. The long-drawn out struggle occurs when the organization is good and the cause is weak.

An ailing body politic with low resistance to infection usually presages a successful insurgency. Regimes that lack national consensus, that are irresolute and indecisive, that are ignorant of counterrevolutionary strategy and tactics, and lack the machinery for effective control – political, administrative, or military – are asking to be replaced.

3.3 Phases of Revolutionary War

The classic three-phase strategy for revolutionary war, expounded by Mao in 1938 during China's war with Japan, outlines a practical framework that has been adopted by most insurgent groups around the world, modified to suit their particular circumstances
Phase I (Organization, Consolidation and Preservation) Phase I is devoted to organizing, consolidating, and preserving the incipient insurgent mechanism. It lays the political and psychological groundwork for expansion to be achieved later.
The first steps are to investigate social class structure, identify grievances, and compile the intelligence base needed to formulate campaign plans and supporting propaganda objectives/themes aimed at enlisting enthusiastic, voluntary support. Dedicated revolutionary cadres must be recruited and trained and an apparatus must be developed.

Skilled revolutionaries capitalize on a prominent quirk in human nature: man is a social animal, conformist rather than individualistic. He clings to small primary groups, like the family, friends, classmates, and business associates, which set and support standards, sustain their members in time of stress, and approve or disapprove performance. The clusters may be as rigidly regimented as a rifle squad or as loosely structured as a car pool. Controlling these primary groups inevitably is a high-priority project. Those that resist are destroyed. New cliques are created where no effective ones exist, all presumably representing the people's will. The task is monumental, since it entails realigning entire societies, but the end product is well worth the effort.

Using techniques just described, revolutionaries can infiltrate the policy machine of mass organizations – the news media, unions, schools, cooperatives, associations, armed forces, police, and the government

itself. No activity or institution is too ostentatious or too obscure if it grants close contact with the people.
Success results in near monopoly of access to the rank and file. This is particularly true in developing countries where rudimentary road, rail, and telecommunications nets inhibit correspondence between the central government and the provinces, and where ruling elites frequently lack psychological rapport with either urban workers or peasants.

Finally, the over struggle commences, including sporadic low-intensity military operation. Revolution flourishes in an atmosphere of social and administrative disorder that seriously disrupts the daily lives of the population. Strikes, riots, sabotage, black markets, insidious rumor campaigns, and agitation among minorities are typical of the discord fomented by subversive parties. Such activities are cheap to produce and costly to prevent. Governmental expenditures in money, manpower, and material may exceed those of the insurgents by 20:1 or more. If these tactics proceed unchecked, social disruption eventually becomes so severe that the revolutionists' political program is the only perceived alternative to chaos. The entire arrangement is completely flexible. Incentives are applied along with coercion. Operations habitually are recycled, even in areas solidly under revolutionary control.

3.4 Phase II (Progressive Expansion)

Phase II involves progressive expansion with two basic motives in mind: to solidify mass support and bring pressure to bear on the enemy. This is a period of terror, sabotage, and active guerrilla war. The insurgents begin to depend heavily on raids and ambushes as primary sources arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and radios. They seek food, clothing, shelter, information, and security from the civilian populace. Home guard or militia units are formed to handle local security and to act as reserves.

Favourable terrain, which can cover revolutionaries and inhibit the opposition, is crucial during Phase II. Jungles, swamps, mountains, and urban areas seen to be best suited for guerrilla operations. Open country with few places to hide is a distinct disadvantage.

Geographical contiguity with a friendly foreign power becomes increasingly important during this second stage, when the growing revolutionary movement displays an avid appetite for the accountrements of armed combat. Outside military and economic aid often plays a critical role, as it does today in Palestine and Southeast Asia; it occasionally is decisive. Isolated insurgents frequently run into trouble, as demonstrated during the past two decades in Angola, the

Philippines, and Malaya. However, that need not be the case. Cuba is a striking exception. Moral support, including diplomatic gestures, may prove even more effective then logistical contributions by outsiders. In addition, sponsors sometimes furnish leaders, organizers, cadremen, advisors, funds, and training facilities.

As the insurgent movement gains momentum and major elements break cover, survival and success hinge heavily on a steady stream of timely, accurate intelligence concerning the government's capabilities, intentions, activities, and plans. The positive intelligence apparatus must be complemented by an effective counterintelligence screen. Failure to satisfy either requirement during Phase II can be disastrous.

Stepped-up propaganda campaigns, directed primarily at the local populace and revolutionary forces, solicit support and security from the community. Written and oral attacks degrade the government, discourage the people from tendering it comfort of any kind, and suggest that the rebels eventually will prevail, regardless of temporary setbacks or sacrifice. Scare tactics supplement suasion on demand – threats, intimidation, coercion, mental and emotional stress all help to create converts when logic and inducements fail. Revolutionary propaganda holds a heavy advantage, since the rebels are judged by premises, not what they produce. Incumbents, who are tied to responsibilities, must run on their records.

3.5 Phase III (Decision)

During Phase III, insurgents step up the scale of armed combat to defeat the enemy with orthodox forces on the field of battle. Vigorous negotiations may be featured at this time to buttress political, military, economic, or social positions, to wear down and frustrate opponents, and to influence world public opinion. Concessions are rare, and are made only to further the insurgents' strategic design. Phase III confrontations almost never revert to strictly conventional war. Even during the culminating stages, territory is of little moment to the revolutionaries. Their main interest is in people.

No hard-and-fast rules fix the over-all sequence. It is characteristic for different phases to be in progress concurrently in different parts of an afflicted country. Phase III conceivably could stem directly from Phase I if the strategic climate were conducive. When revolutionaries run into unexpectedly effective resistance, they can always face reality and retrench, retrograding from Phase III to Phase II, or even Phase I, if the situation dictates, with the expectation of rejuvenation later.

4.0 CONCLUSION

However it is conducted, revolutionary war poses some very sticky problems for established regimes. The first, and by far the most important, requirement is to prevent revolutions from flowering. That task can best be accomplished by attacking insurgent causes at the grass roots level before revolutionary signs appear. A substantial body of serious scholars maintains that insurgencies cannot be deterred effectively after they start – the rebels know their initial position is weak, but take heart from future possibilities, and are determined to pursue their course. Consequently, counter threats are seldom credible.

5.0 SUMMARY

The challenge is considerable. Revolutions lack the potential to literally atomize this planet, as a general nuclear war could do, but a coordinated communist strategy of cumulative encroachment using insurgent techniques nevertheless could endanger the entire Free World just as surely and just as effectively.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What are the consequences of revolution?

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UNIT 3 THE NATURE OF LIMITED WAR

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Between general war at one extreme and cold war at the other lies a wide range of conventional hostilities loosely described as limited war. That scope is a bit too comprehensive for strategy formulation purposes, because it lumps conflicts that are of little consequence even locally with serious confrontations that verge on global catastrophe. This chapter therefore concentrates on armed encounters, excluding incidents, in which one or more major powers or their proxies voluntarily exercise various types and degrees of restraint in order to prevent unmanageable flare-ups.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you are expected to learn the following:

i) What limited wars are?
ii) Ways to limit wars
iii) The limited objectives of wars

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Limited Wars

Limited war thus is markedly different than it was in ages past, when conscious conflict management to avoid unacceptable escalation was almost unknown. Wars then, Brodie notes, were mainly:
limited by the small margin of the national economic resources available for mobilization and by the small capability for destruction that could be purchased with that narrow margin. Today... we speak of limited war in a sense that connotes a deliberate hobbling of a tremendous power that is already mobilized and that must in any case be maintained at a very high pitch of effectiveness for the sake only of inducing the enemy to hobble himself to a like degree.

3.2 Ways to Limit Wars

The scope of war can be limited with regard to political objects and military aims, the choice of weapons (especially chemical, biological, and nuclear), target selection, the nature of participating forces, and geographic areas. Restrictions rarely are imposed by formal agreements. They usually result from "understanding". The room for interpreting "rules of the game" thus is fairly large, but since the dawn of the Nuclear Age strategists on both sides of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains have striven to reconcile incompatible international objectives without creating conditions that cause the unlucky living to envy the insensible dead.

3.3 Limited Objectives

Limited war commonly is linked with limited objectives, but that need not be the case. Restraints most often relate primarily to means, not ends. The crucial U.S. national security objective in Korea, which was to contain communism, never was compromised, even though the subsidiary goal of reunifying Korea had to be abandoned. When the Kremlin refused to reinforce its Arab clients during the Six Day War with Israel in 1967, it accepted a humiliating setback, but that temporary adjustment of immediate aims in no way suggested that Soviet long-range objective in the Middle East had been scaled down.

Choosing goals calls for caution if the foe possesses mass- destruction weapons. The trick is to avoid directly endangering, or appearing to endanger, the enemy's vital or compelling interest. With those criteria in mind, it is easy to understand why so many modern chiefs of state persist in playing platoon leader, although there is by no means any universal agreement that the advantages of such action outweigh the liabilities.

3.4 Arms Limitations

The role of nuclear weapons in limited war has always been controversial. Nearly everyone agrees that strategic nuclear bombardment of an enemy's homeland, particularly population centers, must be avoided, but there is no consensus concerning other uses.

One sizeable group, for example, predicts that the first blast, regardless of yield, would automatically lead to Armageddon. The Soviets implicitly espoused that view at one time, according to the 1962 edition of Marshal Sokolovsky's book Military Strategy, although they since have changed their minds.

A second faction rejects the idea of limited nuclear war, but for different reasons. In the opinion of its advocates, any use of nuclear weapons would encourage escalation.
A third school of thought endorses Alain Enthoven's "Firebreak Theory", which holds that "because nuclear war is so destructive, the use of nuclear weapons must be reserved only for the most desperate circumstances... The side with strong conventional forces is likely to be able to have its way on all issues less than vital."

One thing, however, seems certain. If the genie were unleashed, whether casually to shore up a single shaky position or after grave consideration to secure otherwise unattainable ends, the problems of controlling nuclear weapons in limited war would increase several fold. A whole new set of ground rules would have to supplant total abstinence. Should nuclear weapons be used offensively, defensively, or both? Should there be some restriction on yields and delivery means? Should surface bursts be outlawed? How any of these restrictions could be effectively policed? Agreements would be difficult to obtain and more difficult still to keep.

Chemical and biological warfare create similar problems for strategists who wrestle with concepts for limited war.

3.5 Target Limitations

Target selection, as well as choices of ordinance, can be an important factor in limiting the scope and intensity of war.

Assorted alternatives are evident, including the following couplets, in endless combination:

Vital – Nonvital
Tactical – Strategic
Animate – Inanimate
Military – Civilian
Combatant – Noncombatant
Mobile – Stationary
Immediate Effect – Delayed Effect
The Vietnam War affords splendid examples.

Tactical nuclear weapons probably could have been employed effectively in Indochina, despite widespread beliefs that there were no appropriate targets. In fact, attractive aiming points existed in many isolated locales, miles from population centers. Nuclear detonations might have been used to seal off mountain passes on the Ho chi Minh Trail, to destroy underground installations in or near the Demilitarized Zone, or to eliminate subterranean Viet Cong base areas. Political, not military, prohibitions prevailed, in an effort to limit the war.

3.6 Forces Limitations

Limiting the type, number, roles, and origins of participating military forces also can circumscribe the scale and severity of war. Defensive, support, and advisory troops are less provocative than front-line combat units. Confrontations between proxies are apt to be less incendiary than direct clashes between superpowers. Forces from world organizations are less subject to condemnation than those from separate states. The application of conventional air or naval power normally is less risky than are ground invasions.

3.7 Geographic Limitations

Geographic restrictions have been stringent in every limited war. The Korean conflict was confined to a small peninsula. Military maneuvering during the Cuban missile crisis (other than general war alerts in the United States and the U.S.S.R.) centered on the Caribbean. Military aspects of the Vietnam War were regional. The U.S. Navy's concepts for "war at sea", far from populated places, are specialized geographic limitations.

Area prohibitions might be more difficult to honor in Western Europe, as Robert E. Osgood indicates in his book Limited War:
We must recognize that in some highly industrialized and economically integrated areas – certainly the core of the NATO area – even limited military incursions would constitute such a serious threat to our security interests (and would be so difficult to check on a purely local basis) that

we could not afford to confine our resistance to the immediate combat area. This might even be true if the topography, the industrial and transport linkages, and other physical features made restriction theoretically feasible.

The concept of sanctuaries in limited war, born during the Korean embranglement and reinforced in Indochina, received a sharp setback when President Nixon elected to clean out communist safe havens in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. A rule of thumb might be that sanctuaries from which serious threats derive can survive only if the probable penalties for disturbing them surpass the potential benefits.

3.8 Escalation Problems

The conduct of limited war, which involves restrictions such as those outlined above, is an exercise in risk-taking, resolve, and the matching of local resources. Usually, either side could "win" by increasing the pressure in some way, provided the opposition declined to raise the ante. Herman Kahn's views follows:

> There are at least three ways in which a would-be escalator can increase, or threaten to increase, his efforts: by increasing intensity, widening the area, or compounding escalation... [The last] could consist of an attack on an ally or client of the principal opponent – though it could also be an attack on troops or colonies of the principal, but geographically outside the central sanctuary [homeland]...
>
> Thus, in any escalation, two sets of basic elements are in constant interplay: the political, diplomatic, and military issues surrounding the particular conflict, and the level of violence and provocation at which it is fought... There are [also} two basic classes of strategies that each side can use. One class of strategies makes use of features of the particular "agreed battle" that is being waged in order to gain an advantage. The other class uses the risks or threat of escalation and eruption from this agreed battle...
>
> Escalations are thus relatively complex phenomena. They are not to be ordered in a simple fashion, yet for some purposes we wish to do exactly this, even if it does some violence to reality. Very roughly, at any particular instant in a crisis or war, the degree of escalation might be measured by such things as:
>
> 1. Apparent closeness to all-out war
> 2. Likelihood of eruption

3. Provocation
4. Precedents broken
5 Committal (resolve and/or recklessness) demonstrated
6. Damage done or being done
7. Effort (scale, scope, or intensity of violence)
8. Threat intended or perceived.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Paradoxically, limitations adopted to avoid general war may actually increase risks if they destroy too many strategic options. Dr. Kissinger delineated that danger a decade ago in The Necessity for Choice:

Since limited war by definition does not involve all the resources of the opponents, it is easy to "prove" how a war could expand. No one can know whether either side would accept defeat. But we must be clear about what is involved in pressing the argument about escalation too far. A country prepared to risk mutual destruction rather than forego the possibility of gaining its objectives can be deterred only by surrender... An aggressor convinced that its intended victim is unwilling to run any risk may be positively encouraged to resort to the direst threat. A country not willing to risk limited war because it fears that resistance to aggression on any scale may lead to all-out war will have no choice in a showdown but to surrender.

5.0 SUMMARY

The purpose of a strategy of limited war, then, is first to strengthen deterrence and, second, if deterrence should fail, to provide an opportunity for settlement... The worst that could happen if we resisted aggression by means of limited war is what is certain to happen if we [capitulate or participate in a general war].

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

From this background knowledge what can you say are the limitations of war?

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UNIT 4 WAR AND ITS RESOLUTION

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

General war is identified by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as "armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy". That definition is inaccurate on two counts. First, war between regional powers like France and Germany would by no means be "general". And second, a spasmic encounter between superpowers conceivably could be over before total resources were brought to bear. In practice, therefore, the term general war commonly is reserved for a genocidal showdown between this country and the Soviet Union, during which an epidemic of mass destruction weapons might endanger the entire planet. That restricted interpretation will continue to apply until other countries acquire comparable capabilities.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit you would have learnt the following:

i) The concept of war
ii) Causes of war
iii) The uses and misuses of war
iv) Identifying just and unjust wars

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Utility of General War

General war poses strategic problems unparalleled in the past. The potential for global devastation is prodigious. Risks are grossly magnified in relation to most gains. Technological competition is unprecedented. There is little margin for strategic error. Consequently, men for the first time in history now devote more mental energy to the prevention of war (at this level of the spectrum) than to its prosecution.

Indeed, some say with utter conviction that force is no longer an appropriate means to attain political ends. They echo opinions expressed by fifty-two Nobel laureates who signed the Mainau Declaration in 1955: "All nations must come to the decision to renounce force as a final resort of policy. If they are not prepared to do this they will cease to exist".
Persuasive arguments can be expounded in support of that thesis, but not everyone is convinced. Annihilation may not be automatic in even to general war in their estimation. Nevertheless, the cause for caution is undeniable.

3.2 Potential Causes of General War

No strategist has much change of coping with the problems of general war unless he has a sound working knowledge of potential causes. Six categories stand out:

Deliberate initiation
Accidental initiation
Miscalculation
Misunderstanding
Catalysis
Irrational acts

Each of these warrants a brief survey.

Deliberate Initiation

Probably no sane individual who appreciated the implications ever would deliberately trigger a general war unless one of two preconditions existed: desperation or solid self-confidence. If, for example, a potential protagonist believed that his country was about to be eradicated by an inevitable attack, he might think he had nothing to lose by preempting.

Should that same party achieve a spectacular technological breakthrough, such as the birth of an airtight antiaircraft and antiballistic-missile defense that precluded effective retaliation, he might consider that probable risks would be more than outweighed by prospective gains. It is possible even to postulate scenarios that combine transitory self-confidence with impending desperation.

Regardless of the reasoning, however, any premeditated instigation of general war would involve soul-searching of the first order, as Kahn explained in his treatise On Thermonuclear War. To survive a conflict of this kind (let alone profit from it), national decision-makers would have to be completely convinced that their country could successfully solve a series of political, military, economic, social, psychological, and technological problem: wartime performance; the effects of acute fallout; survival and patchup; the maintenance of economic momentum; long-term recuperation; postwar medical care; and genetic aberrations. Failure to cope effectively with any of those areas would cancel accomplishments in the other.

The likelihood of deliberate initiation therefore seems low, as long as prospective victims maintain a credible deterrent posture.

Accidental Initiation

Accidental general war between the United States and the USSR is even less plausible, lurid tales like Failsafe and Dr. Strangelove notwithstanding. The safeguards against mechanical and human error and unauthorized tampering with nuclear delivery systems are virtually foolproof, although such may not be the case if nuclear weapons proliferate among careless or less responsive countries.

Miscalculation

Miscalculation is more to be feared than either of the causes above. The most innocuous annoyances could escalate to general war, either through poor judgment or through loss of control by any antagonist. Sophisticated games of politico-military “chicken”, in which one country or coalition seeks to blackmail or out-bluff another, are also in that category. None of the parties involved in those practices would want a head-on collision, but if no one yielded it would be unavoidable.

Misunderstanding

Misunderstandings, which can lead to preemption in response to false alarms, are a constant hazard. To help forestall communications failures that prevent the timely transmission of precise, coherent messages, the

two superpowers exploit multiple means of contact that include common-user electronic circuits, personalized facilities like the Washington-to-Moscow "hot line", routine diplomatic relations, and conferences between chiefs of state. In addition, nations often supplement written and oral exchanges with strategic signals that clarify intentions: for example, when President Kennedy dispatched Strategic Air Command bombers to holding patterns along the Soviet periphery in October 1962, he gave clear evidence of US resolve during the Cuban missile crisis.

Triggers

Catalytic conflicts, touched off intentionally by a third country or coalition, have occurred in the past and probably will in the future. Potential motives are many – ambition, desperation, and revenge are among them. Collective security systems, such as those maintained by the United States and the USSR, offer opportunities for catalysis, and the US-Soviet-Chinese Communist triangle opens temptations for any one of the three to play the others off to its benefit.

Irrational Acts

Finally, the possibility that normally responsible men might commit irrational acts can never be discounted. Anticipating abnormality, however, is very difficult, since "rationality" varies remarkably from culture to culture. Courses of action that appear wholly unrealistic to Americans, who place a high premium on human life, might be completely compatible with the coveted goals of "impetuous", "immoral", or "less civilized" combatants.

Strategic Options

The range of strategic options for general war reflects mankind's reactions, which run the gamut from despair to optimism. At one end of the scale is pacifism. At the other is preventive war.

3.3 Attitudes toward Deterrence

Deterrence aims at obviating war. It is a compound of threats, the capability to carry them out, and the will to execute, if necessary. Successful combinations preclude unwanted aggression by imposing on decrees the prospect of exorbitant costs in relation to anticipated gains. The end product is stability.

Credibility is the key. Y. Harkabi, in his Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace, abstracts the following "rules": for a threat to deter it must be

credible, but to every credible threat deters. It must be of sufficient magnitude. As the threat of punishment mounts, deterrent value grows, but only to some undefinable point. At that juncture, the probability that the threat will be implemented begins to decline, and so does credibility.

3.4 Approaches to War-Fighting

If deterrence were abandoned or failed, a variety of war-fighting options would be available. The sampling below, arranged without regard for matching pairs, demonstrates the diversity.

The two columns illustrate differences between offenses and defense, but considerable overlap occurs.

OFFENSE	DEFENSE
Malicious First Strike	Preemptive Surrender
Preemptive Attack	Accommodation
Surprise Attack	Launch-on-Warning
Attack After Ultimatum	Calculated Second Strike
Insensate (Spasm) Attack	Massive Retaliation
Controlled Attack	Flexible Response
Exemplary Attack	Tit-for-Tat Response
Intrawar Blackmail	Intra-war Deterrence

3.5 Deterrence

The situations facing attacker and defender would be sharply dissimilar. The instigator could almost always count on having the edge. War would begin at the time, place, and under circumstances of his choosing. Should he elect to capitalize on surprise, his ability to alert, augment, and redeploy assault forces, or even to evacuate cities, would be significantly greater than that of the opposition. The defender, having absorbed a first strike, would have to retaliate with truncated elements whose coordination and control were disrupted. He would have to function in a chaotic atmosphere, where nuclear effects – blast, heat and radiation – might drastically decrease anticipated capabilities. Herman Kahn speculates that operating in a post-attack, general war environment might be analogous to training at the equator, then moving incomplete units to the arctic. The likelihood is low that their performance would immediately equal expectations.

3.6 General-War Objectives

As in all other types of strife between states, national security objectives shape general-war strategies. Representative goals might be to eliminate intolerable threats, to restore the balance of power, to acquire territory,

gain material wealth, or propagate an ideology. The political objectives are the factors that determine what price a government is willing to pay; and these objectives are not set in absolute terms.

If world domination is the objective, then no price is too high provided that the rulers of the aggressor nation will survive and remain in control and all other countries will be reduced to impotence. Conversely, if the probable result of the war will be the overthrow of the ruling structure, no victory, no matter how cheap in lives and property, is worth the winning.

Whether war was started deliberately or resulted from misunderstanding, for example, would have great bearing on subsequent events. Further, counterforce and countervalue schools would fancy different ends. The former would strive to "win" the war in the classic sense, to "prevail" at some level below outright military victory, or simply to terminate the war on favourable terms. The latter school, lacking extensive war-fighting capabilities, could only hope to restore stability by punishing the enemy population until enemy leaders called it quits.

3.7 Counterforce-Counter value Considerations

Counterforce strategies are popularly coupled with offensive operations, counter value with defense, but those stereotypes are misleading. A first strike, for example, might be directed against cities to break the enemy's spirit and pave the way for bargaining. Further, the two approaches can be applied unadulterated or in combinations. General Curtis E. LeMay, a former SAC commander, laid out a few possibilities: "Pure" counterforce implies the destruction of all enemy strategic forces, regardless of the collateral damage to industry or population caused by attacking co-located targets. In other words, if any enemy airfield is located in a city, we would destroy it regardless of what incidental damage might be done to the city… Counterforce-plus-avoidance… is an attempt to signal to the enemy that we have no wish to harm his population, in hopes that he will avoid such targets in our country. Here, although the destruction of the enemy's nuclear forces remains primary, it is tempered… by not attacking a co-located target at all, by accepting a lower probability of destruction and attacking with fewer or smaller weapons, or by placing the aiming point of the weapons on the side of the target away from the population complex… Counterforce-plus-bonus is the opposite of counterforce-plus-avoidance, in that population destruction incidental to counterforce attacks would be considered desirable for intrawar deterrence or retaliation.

3.8 Termination Problems

A general nuclear war could erupt abruptly and subside spontaneously. However, Tom Schelling suggests that starting a general war may be much easier than stopping it:
Some kind of cease-fire or pause would have to be reached and phased into an armistice, by a bargaining process that might at the outset have to be largely tacit, based on demonstration more than on words, but that sooner or later would have to become explicit… the closing stage, furthermore, might have to begin quickly, possibly before the first volley had reached its targets.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Certainly, the Number One prerequisite would be to maintain communications with enemy representatives who have the authority, ability, and inclination to take appropriate actions. This need instills a good incentive for sparing capital cities and alternate seats of government, so that persons in authority not only live, but retain access to operational communications that are indispensable to war-termination dialogues. It might also justify avoiding the devastation of other population centers to prevent vindictive reprisals resulting from overheated emotions.

5.0 SUMMARY

The nature of general war is constantly changing as new concepts evolve. The prospect of an all-out nuclear exchange is withering away, but as it does the situation grows increasingly complex. Endless weapons-testing, war games, exercises, philosophizing, and analysis by military and governmental officials, civilian contract agencies, and scientific and academic communities on both sides of the Iron Curtain provide some means of estimating the validity of theories, but broad areas of uncertainty remain. Combat experience, after all, is still restricted to the almost clinical use of two atom bombs under conditions that precluded reciprocation.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What are the causes of General wars?

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MODULE 5

INTRODUCTION

UNIT 1 BUILDING CAPACITY FOR MANAGING AFRICA'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRISIS

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Faced with the deepening crisis and progressively abandoned by the once "benevolent" industrialized world, Africa is now faced with the challenge of developing the capacity to effectively contend with her own problems.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you are expected to learn the following:

i) What capacity building is
ii) Its challenges
iii) Africa's socio-economic crisis and,
iv) How to manage it.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Developing Human Resources Capacity

The World Bank, in a 1995 study of the sub-Saharan Africa, observed that "the first ingredient of capacity building. (is) education". [22] The persistence, and in some cases continuing aggravation, of Africa's socio-economic rises has been attributed partly, if not largely, to the human capacity deficiency that afflicts virtually the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. People are not only the basic catalysts of development, they also constitute the most critical factor in the management of the various crises plaguing and hampering Africa's development. Human capacities – problem solving abilities, command of relevant factual information, and mastery or even possession of technical, managerial and entrepreneurial skills – are acquired either through formal education or by experience (learning by doing). But, on both account, African nations achieved independence in the 1960s with severe deficits.

By the early 1960s, there were tens of thousands of expatriates' technical assistants in sub-Saharan Africa, more than the combined administration which pre-dated independence. As it turned out, however, this massive assistance did not serve to improve significantly

the efficiency or honesty of government, nor did it serve to build much African management capacity, either within or outside the government.

Recent literatures suggest that the effects were in fact sometimes the reverse, resulting in the repression of African capacity and demoralization of public administration officials. It should be stressed, however, that this did not characterize all foreign technical assistance; such assistance tended to be more damaging or problematic when it was long-term, and not directed toward training local personnel.

During the last three decades, some countries in the region have made considerable progress in human resource capacity development. But, on a continental aggregate, this progress has been less rapid in other developing regions of the world and insufficient to significantly reduce Africa's dependence on the western industrialized nations for operating many vital functions and for managing the deepening crisis in the affected areas. More over, while most of this progress was made during the 1960s and 1970s, the 1980s actually witnessed some reversals. In several countries, primary enrolment rates have declined while expansion at the secondary and tertiary levels has at least shown in those countries where they have not similarly declined. At all levels, there is evidence that the quality of educational services being provided has deteriorated.

While the continent's tertiary institutions were designed to serve as a vanguard of Africa's drive towards rapid human capacity development, the lamentable state of decay to which most of them have been plunged is graphically captured by the Zambian educator, Trevor Coombe: one of the abiding impressions… is the sense of loss, amounting almost to

grief, of the most senior professors in the older African Universities as they compare the present state of the Universities with the vigor, optimism and pride which the same institutions displayed twenty or thirty years ago. It is not just the universal regret of age and the passing of youth, nor the sad awareness that a generation of unique academic pioneers has almost run its course. It is also the grim knowledge that the nature of the university experience today is profoundly different for many teachers and students, so different and so inferior that some wonder whether it can rightly be called a university experience at all.

The result of this as a recent World Bank study notes, is that while excellent educational institutions can be found in sub-Saharan Africa, standardized examinations scores suggests that the average quality of education is lower than elsewhere, and certainly lower by most reasonable standard of what should be achieve.

3.2 Developing Capacity of Government and Its Institutions

Beyond strengthening the human resources component, capacity building for better management of the economic and social crisis in Africa must also focus on the strengthening of institutional capacity within the public sector and the various bodies that constitute the government. For beyond the human resources element, capacity building includes the need to ensure that diverse social groups are able to get needed information and participate in the making of policy. It includes the need for vibrant markets and a private sector had operates in partnership with Government, and or both to have sufficient stability and confidence that they make the investments needed for tomorrow’s infrastructure.

3.3 The Imperative for Good Government

Good governance requires accountability by public officials, both elected political leaders and civil servants. Their public functions must serve the community at large. These include the allocation of public funds, providing the safety and security of citizens, and the equitable pursuit of economic well-being for society. Accountability reduces corruption and assures citizens that their government's actions are guided by the needs of society.

Also good governance requires transparency in public procedures, processes, investment decisions, contracts and appointments. It also requires wide participation in making public choice, such as policies and regulations (and even in the operation of the market).

Good governance is built on the rule of law. Also, public and private institutions, such as government agencies and markets, must have some measure of predictability.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Need for Better Inter-Governmental Co-Ordination

Many of the important strategies towards building capacity for crisis management on the continent involve not only the government at the national level but also state and local governments. Any examination of the roles played by these various levels of government over the years, and particularly the conflicts arising there from, easily suggests the need for better co-ordination of capacity building programmes.

Hence, many capacity building programmes on the continent have been designed on an isolated, ad hoc basis and not in an integrated and co-ordinated manner. So, most countries in the region could improve on their capacity building programmes significantly, if they could ensure better and sustained inter-governmental co-ordination.

5.0 SUMMARY

Developing Capacity in Private Sector Institutions and Organizations.

Special policy measures must also be targeted towards comprehensive development of entrepreneurial capacities within countries and co-ordination of such capacities between countries and regions. The strategy on the entrepreneurial development should be buttressed by the active government encouragement and support, covering extensive exchange of visits by entrepreneurs and some forms of technical co-operation among African countries.

Over the past decades, there has been a remarkable expansion of the number, scope and influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Africa. However, NGO input is vital in order to help develop action plans that address people's real needs – as well as help in monitoring and evaluating subsequent achievements.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What are the causes of socio-economic crises?

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UNIT 2 PEACE-MAKING AND PEACE-SHARING: A CASE STUDY OF SIERRA LEONE

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Lome Peace Accord remains a bitter pill to swallow for many Sierra Leoneans. But “they love not poison than do poison need”. The civil war in the country has ruined their live, and Sierra Leoneans want to an end to it .The doctors have prescribed medicine that could cure the ailment. The Government and insurgency groups have no other alternative but to cooperate. This mutual need for cooperation is attributable, in part, to the failure by either side to militarily defeat the other.

By signing the Lome Accord, the fighting parties-pushed by the African and international communities-have agreed to, and presented the people with a peace plan. The guns have all but gone silent. This silencing of the guns is their present to the people. The protagonists claim to be “determined to foster mutual trust and confidence between themselves”. And while the events of early 2000-with RUF attacks north of Freetown, the kidnapping of the UN soldiers and the capture and arrest of Foday Sankoh-give the lie to professions of “mutual trust” between the leaders, the Lome Accord remains as a document with which the Sierra Leoneans must build “confidence between themselves”.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit you expected to learn the following;

i) Critical problem relating to justice, forgiveness, atonement an

ii) Reconciliation remains. Herein lie the shifting sands in Lome riverbed.

iii) Careful reading of the Lome agreement confirms that it is more

about

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Peace Making Strategy

Transformation of the RUF/SL into a political party (article iii);

Enabling members of the RUF/SL to hold public office

(article iv)

Enabling the RUF/SL to join a broad-based government of national unity through cabinet appointment (article v);

The Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, whose chairmanship shall be offered to the leader of the RUF/SL, Corporal Foday Sankoh (article vii);

The Government of Sierra Leone shall take appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon (article ix);

The Government of Sierra Leone shall also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatant and collaborators (article ix);

The Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by them (article ix), etc.

3.2 Peace by Other Means

Internal solutions that address underlying causes of crisis are important to the process. The efforts of the international community on Sierra Leone's problems of pre-war phenomena predate 1991, while considerable and good intentioned, have still only succeeded in propping

up governments, which would otherwise collapse. It is time to also look within. It is in this context and within this logic that the Movement to Unite People (MUP), a locally based Sierra Leonean non-governmental organization, contributes to peace endeavors and reconciliation processes at the grass-root level.

The Movement to Unite People focuses on a grass roots intervention strategy predicated on personal and community interest, and demonstrates how?
These are best achieved in an atmosphere of peace and progress. Method includes individual and
group discussions, meetings and workshops, during which issues are addressed from individual and community perspectives.

The MUP intervenes to lead them from a path of death and destruction, along a path to peace and
Progress. After “disarmament”, these young people need to be helped to find themselves in a new
life where life is not supported from violence and abuse of the gun.

By the core of MUP programme which is the peace consolidation at combatant and community level, the combatant must be given the assurance that they will be able to live safely and peacefully in the community against which they have committed terrible atrocities as they are being largely neglected in the current peace process. The first MUP field trip was to Port Loko and Lunsar.

The former was under ECOMOG control and the latter was under rebel control. It was a tense time, and coincided with the abduction of ECOMOG and UNOSIL (United Nations Observation Mission in Sierra Leone) officers by rebel at the infamous Okrra Hill in early August

1999, just one month after the signing ceremony in Lome. MUP was the first organization to bring the Lome Accord to rebel occupied areas of the country. The goal of the trip was to consolidate peace at the grass roots. This was achieved by engaging communities and combatants in dialogue.

The Movement then proceeded to Lunsar, where it was well received by the RUF rebels. The story was retold, and the commanders heard the audiotapes from Port Loko. They agree to ask the communities through out Sierra Leone for their forgiveness and committed themselves to participate fully in the peace consolidation programme proposed by the Movement.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The activities of MUP go beyond sensitization. Without disarmament there can be no peace: but once people have been persuaded to lay down their arms, they must be given a vision of hope, an impression of economic and social progress. The MUP has presented a draft proposal to the Ministry of Housing, for a Housing project called Four Walls & a Roof. It is a Housing concept for low-income families in Sierra Leone. The concept goes beyond a Roof over one's head. It is conceived of as an economic development tool tied to a private sector and community based mechanism, including the national Housing Finance super structure. It stimulates growth and economic activity, and it is labour intensive.

5.0 SUMMARY

The MUP organization has also developed a post encampment re-integration support programme for child soldiers and young adult combatants, and is currently seeking funding for its implementation. The

programme uses the community-based mechanism for the sensitization and socio- economic rehabilitation of child combatants over fifteen years old. This group is considered high risk, because neither traditional foster care, nor adult re-integration programmes are fully appropriate or adapted to their unique needs.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What are the peace making and peace sharing techniques employed in Sierra Leone

7.0 REFERENCES / FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 3 DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATIONAND REINTEGRATION

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Ex-combatants constitute a considerable risk group that is capable of undermining any security gain in Sierra Leone. Therefore, they require attention and targeted assistance. In the short term, the security benefits of the disarmament and demobilization exercise have a financial cost. These costs will be incurred in facilitating the return of the combatant to normal civilian life. The Government of Sierra Leone is determined to ensure that the planned disarmament and demobilization of combatants is made socially and politically viable by putting in place a comprehensive reintegration programme.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit you would have learnt:

i) The goal of the Disarmament,
ii) Demobilization and Reintegration programme to consolidate the existing short-term security,
iii) TSo form a basis for lasting peace.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Programme of Disarmament

The overall programme aims to: Collect, register, destroy and dispose of all conventional weapons/ammunitions retrieved from the combatants during the disarmament process;

Demobilize appropriately 45,000 combatants;
Prepare for the sustainable social and economic reintegration of all ex-combatants for long-term security.

3.2 Justice and Reconciliation

One of the most controversial issues Sierra Leone will have to face on the "long road to peace" is: what to do with crimes and war criminals in the post-conflict era? This issue is essential about the question of amnesty, which is central to the peace process. The issue of amnesty, like the DDR programme, is central to peace process in Sierra Leone. In resolving large-scale conflicts involving gross atrocities, the reconciliation force of amnesty may commend itself as plausible political option. Retrospective and prospective kinds of amnesty are suggested. Retrospective amnesty is the prerogative of mercy provided for in certain constitutions It gives the head of state the power to pardon a person after having being adjudged guilty of a specified offence by

judicial due process of law. It does not, however, apply to civil wrongs. While prospective amnesty is essentially the waiving before the event, any future prosecution of person presumed to have committed criminal offences or civil wrongs, thereby pre-empting or short-circuiting the usual due processes of law for determining guilt or liability. This form of amnesty has serious legal, moral, and political implications. For instance, legally, it may run counter to certain international conventions on humanitarian law, war crimes or genocide that Sierra Leone may have signed.

In favor and against amnesty; as blanket amnesty will facilitate the process the process of reconciliation and heeling. Put differently, it is important to look forward to the future during this critical peace process. Lets bygones be bygones. It is argued that in Mozambique, reconciliation was achieved without digging up the horrors of the past; and it is not possible to resolve conflict and attain peace unless attention is given to the justice and fairness of the process as well as the outcome of the settlement. In other words, peace without justice is meaningless. If the victims of human rights abuses are denied justice, they may take the law into their own hands and seek retribution. A blanket amnesty, the argument goes, does not therefore argue well for national unity and reconciliation.

3.3 A Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Article 26 of the Lome Peace Accord Agreement says in part that:

A truth and Reconciliation commission shall be established to address impunity, break the circle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims of perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation. In the spirit of national reconciliation, the commission shall deal with the question of human rights violations since the

beginning of the Sierra Leone conflict in 1991. The Commission shall, among other things, recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human right s violations.

On 22 February the Sierra Leone Parliament enacted “The Truth an Reconciliation Commission Acts, 2000”; with the objectives and functions:

To create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement; To address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims; To promote healing and reconciliation; and To prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered; And the functions;

To investigate and report on the causes, nature, and the extent of the violations and abuses referred to the fullest degree possible, including their antecedents the context in which violation and abuses occurred, the question of whether these violation and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorization by any government, group or individual, and the role of both internal and external factors in the conflict;

To work to help restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation by providing an opportunity for victims to give an account of the violations and abuses suffered and for the perpetrators to relate their experiences, and by creating a climate which fosters constructive interchange between victims and perpetrators, giving special attention to the subject of sexual abuse and to the experience of the children within the armed conflict and to do all things as may contribute to the

fulfillment of the object of the Commission.

3.4 Approaches for Crisis Management in African States, Strategies for Crisis Management in Africa

On attainment of independence, a number of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa made self-reliance one of the cardinal principles on which their national development efforts, including their crisis management efforts, were based. As a result, virtually all of them subscribed to the policy of non-alignment. These countries tried to promote friendly relations between all actors in the international system, irrespective of their ideological orientation. They particularly emphasized the ordering of all relationships within the international system on the basis of peaceful coexistence, freedom, independence and equality of all the states. Noble as this posture so evidently was, the implied self-reliance and independence in national and international crisis management on the part of the newly independent sub-Saharan African states was beset with problems.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most important one was, and still is, that resulting from the industrial and technological backwardness of these states. This has led to the frequent resort to external sources for the material facilities for managing crisis in general and national security problems in particular. Another factor to be considered is the relative poverty of some of these countries. If most of the countries had enough internally generated resources to procure their security needs from outside, they could still have been able to uphold their policies of self-reliance to some extent, particularly in terms of crisis management. What makes the situation in sub-Saharan Africa particularly pathetic is that most of the states in the region have been unable to generate enough resources internally to meet their security and crisis management needs and have had to rely on

various forms of aid, grants, loans, etc. for these purposes. Since such aid is not always given without strings, it becomes clear why the security and crisis management situation in sub-Saharan Africa is easily susceptible to external manipulation.

5.0 SUMMARY

Given the crippling burden of sub-Saharan Africa's accumulated debt, which was put at 366 US Dollars per capita in 1994, there is still prospect that these countries will, in the near future, be able to individually generate the needed resources to sustain policies of, or develop the necessary capacity for, individual self-assertiveness in national crisis management.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Explain disarmament and give an example of a successful disarmament in Africa?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Explain reintegration and demobilization in relation to crisis management? Jordan, A.A. and Taylor, Jr. W. J. 1981, "American National Security: Policy and Process", (Baltimore, the John Hopkins University Press.

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UNIT 4 AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

CONTENTS

7.0 References/Further Readings

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Anyway, whether statesmen and people design their objectives in terms of religious, economic, political or social ideals, their ultimate goals remain the acquisition of power which they need not always physically express. This truism becomes even more appropriate in African states where resource constraints in the midst of competing needs, have led to "a clear recognition of the limit of morality and reason in politics; the acceptance of the fact that political realities are power realities and that power must be countered with power; that self interest is the primary datum in the action of all groups and nations". Like many statesmen everywhere, African leaders would consider it preposterous to question the values of military power given the prevalence of violence in the continent and the fact that military power is the legally sanctioned instrument that government uses when necessary, in an internal security role.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit you are expected to have learnt the following:

i) What crisis management is?

ii) The regional initiative and,

iii) The contribution of the African Governments.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 HOW TO MANAGE CRISIS

There is no denying the fact that the military is primarily the state's instrument for use in the conduct of relations with other states. Military management of violence relates to both the application of physical force

to overawe and / or to intimidate to the exercise of its inherent power to forestall a breakdown of law and order, or when that occurs, to restore the situation to normalcy. The reality of the present situation in Africa, with crises threatening the stability of regions and states, is that the military has become a primary instrument for internal crises management. The military now forms the arrowhead for African Security Forces in policing their own population. Even at that, Farer still asserts that they are unable to do this, much less to project force across frontiers without an invitation.

The late president Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) is archetypal of African rulers who employ the military to perpetuate themselves in power. When he considered it necessary, he invited friends from Morocco and France) to send in reinforcement to cope with internal crisis. Understandably the so-called intra-state crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo of the Mobutu era, typified internal turmoil in Africa that are externally supported and instigated to frustrate internal solutions. Even when special police and paramilitary forces are created for internal use, like Nigeria's Mobile Police force and the various presidential guards in Africa, these are equipped beyond the Civil Society's tolerance.

3.2 National Structures for Crisis Management

In determining appropriate structures for crisis management in Africa, there appear to be three principles that are considered. These are the principles of Locale, accessibility and antecedent. The place of occurrence of a crisis in relation to the tier of administration within the country is critical to crisis management.

Where as commonality of interests and geographical contiguity should be two inseparable criteria for internal administrative arrangement, this has not been so in Africa where local administrations are mere historical contraptions, which the dynamics of change could not alter because of the existing power configuration. Still, the Locale of crisis matters because it often helps to determine whether “sacred cows” are involved and what intensity of force can be used. It may be argued though, that this intensity of force reflexes the vehemence of resistance, which is expected to higher in areas where injustices are felt most. In situations where security forces are structured along geographic or area criteria, the principle of locale also helps to determine which force employed, in necessary, and what other measures are more or less appropriate.

The principle of accessibility is closely related to that of locale and refers as much to information, as to materials and forces involvement. It is predicated on the realization that information, personnel and materials required to manage a given crisis may not reside close to, and / or in the custody of the security community or even with other government agencies at the given level; and that someone who is better placed to assure compliance, should direct activities. Knowing what’s, when’s, where’s and whys of a crisis becomes critical. Intelligence is the most vital factor for planning and executing crises actions because, as Bozeman points out: “knowing the self, knowing the other, and knowing how to measure the distance between the two are prerequisites to all ventures”. Intelligence is an “indispensable component of statecraft” and it gives strength to those who have it at the expense of those who lack it”. African states acknowledge the importance of intelligence for which reason, they maintain security outfit that constitute the national intelligence communities. But sadly, these outfits appear to confuse regime security with national security.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Consequently, events are always seen from government perspective. Regime security can only equate national security when those in government at the given time, pursue national interests fairly and justly. The third principle, antecedent, rests on the reoccurrence of similar crisis situations and helps to establish mechanisms based on observed patterns for handling occurrences. On the basis of antecedent, nations are able to develop structures and procedures to contend with diverse crisis situations, provided enough safety valves are introduced. The structures may align with the administrative procedures, and modifications may be effected for convenience while the procedure allots functions to the various levels; taking into account the options available to the crisis managers.

5.0 SUMMARY

With the benefit of hindsight on the crisis situation in Africa, and given the principles evolved over time, it is not surprising that the constitutions of most African states, if not all of them, make provision for crisis management within the polity even if these functions are merely expressed in terms of national security and stability. Generally, the inclusive government takes primary responsibility for both internal and external security.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS

What are the steps taken by African Governments to resolve crisis in the continent?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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MODULE 6

INTRODUCTION

UNIT 1 NATIONAL DECISION MAKING IN CRISIS SITUATION

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Any inquiry into African crisis would sooner observe that government approach to crisis management is basically reactive: a crisis erupts into violence and security forces are required to be deployed to restore law

and order. This may be followed by an enquiry (judicial or otherwise) or such other options available to the government. All these are seen as reacting to the rupture in the system. Even in a situation where government has a fore knowledge of the crisis that is about to erupt, the government actions could still be termed reactive because the government is to act in response to the intentions or actions of the disputants.

This position has nothing to do with the appropriateness or even the effectiveness of government action, but to stress these strategies and resources are employed at the instance or in reaction to someone else's action rather than be based on the assessment on the crisis environment.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit you are expected to have learnt the following:

i) How crisis environments are constantly monitored and evaluated,
ii) How to identify crisis indicators
iii) How to build contingency and operational plans that deal with probable crises that may arise.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Decision Making

Proactive response so evolved, works on the basis that crisis could erupt at any moment, irrespective of the illusory peace that reigns. In the short term, government measure may tend to stretch national resources because testing and evaluation cost money: apart from high running cost as a result of the permanency of structures and the manpower employed. Whether the longer-term benefit of Early Warning, forecasting and pre-

eruptive actions associated with proactive approach cancel the losses incurred in reacting to sudden occurrence is still a matter of debate. Whatever the shortcomings of the proactive approach, however, at least, provide an avenue for constructive training and pre crisis preparation and planning to cope with diverse scenarios.

Whether a government adopts the reactive or proactive approach, it still requires taking decisions relying on the mass of information available to it and establishing a channel through which such decisions are processed and disseminated.

The crisis management system is further broken into sub-systems. The command sub-system determines and allots responsibility; directs and coordinates all activities; and ensures that all processes and actions are geared towards the attainment of the set objectives. The command system also coordinates the functions of monitoring and evaluation to ensure the correctness of operational and contingency plans. In establishing national command sub-system for management of crisis, five fundamentals are considered. First is the location of the crisis, which helps to determine the level of command and control. Second, is accessibility to such locations to help influence the choice of a course of action and forces deployment where necessary. Third, is the spread of crisis to determine appropriate forces. Fourth, is the intensity of crisis to determine what assistance is required in addition to knowing the level of force; and fifth is to ascertain precedence to assist in employing appropriate course of action.

Inseparable from the command sub-system is that of the control. Many commentators wonder how crisis can be controlled in spite of its essence, which is that crisis, are usually unpredictable and potentially

uncontrollable. Apparently the significance of the control sub-system is to account for or control the risks of war. As Williams observed "vigorous efforts are required to ensure that events remain under control and do not take on their own momentum and that decisions are made in as rational and calculating a manner as possible."

4.0 CONCLUSION

Indeed, given the characteristics of crisis, the fact of emotional involvement and the psychological state of all those concerned, the control sub-system appears to be the most critical. Someone needs to influence the actions and conducts of all other participants (disputants and managers), and those who can address themselves to the issues at hand in the prescribe manner. This is what constitutes control. Control is further justified because of the diversity of orientation among participants, the multiplicity of forces usually employed and the modes of operation.

The spread factor often necessitates decentralization of control in crisis situations and changes may be made as situation demands.

The command and control sub-systems rely on communication for effectiveness.

5.0 SUMMARY

Humanity is relying more and more on modern communication and as Deutsh puts it, the expansion and sophistry of communication networks are making it possible for modern life to penetrate most regions of the world with ever new demonstration of human power and possibilities. In that case, communication could be a precipitant of crisis in the modern age as it is highly desirable, and a worthy tool for crisis management.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

How effective is the Government's approach to crisis management?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 2 AFRICAN SECURITY AND RELEVANT STRATEGY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

African states lack security and therefore are posed to so many threats. Hence, virtually all-African states devised the means or measures of protecting their interests against threats: these means were both military and non-military.

The Non-military means of protection among African states include religious, economic and diplomatic means. Religiously, an aura of respectability bordering on divinity was woven around the rulers. Kings and emperors in the pre-colonial Africa were regarded as representatives of God on earth. In Oyo, the Alaafin was regarded as Ekeji Orisa, meaning the deputy of God. Similarly, the Oba of Benin was seen as a divinity in his own right.

Economically, African states attempt to establish a monopoly of trade and the protection of trade routes. The gold trade in ancient Ghana and Mali were the king's exclusive preserve.

Alliances were negotiated among African states in the past at various times, depending on their interests at particular times to enhance their security. Like the military institution, the use of diplomacy for security is as old as the history of the state system in Africa.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit you would have learnt the following:

i) The relevance of African security

ii) The three different approaches to Africa's strategy and,

iii) Why they are limited to African states only?

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Military Options

Thus, the military options of states security in Africa develop their own armies to protect themselves against threats of internal subversion and external aggression. However, with the exception of Egypt, which as a result of the religious wars and external invasions from the 7_{th} century developed a professional standing army, African armies were citizens' militia. The 19_{th} century witnessed the move towards the development of standing armies in some parts of Africa. Even then, the practice of relying on the citizens' militia was not discarded.

1. Strategy of Self Reliance: This is a security management strategy that is based on self-help efforts. It is a policy by which a state relies totally on its own resources of men and material in the management of national security. The mobilization of such resources could be done through arms build-up, mass recruitment and training of troops, and the mobilization of the civil population in support of the country's defense efforts.

As a security strategy, self-reliance is quite honorable. The only problem is that it is an expensive strategy to adopt, especially if the country is threatened by a favorable adversary.

For a poverty-stricken and technologically backward African country, building a credible deterrence against a formidable enemy could complicate its development problems and compound its internal

security. Unless such an effort is based on the general mobilization of the populace for national defense, it could lead to an excessive miniaturization of the state.

2. Strategy of Extra-Africa Reliance: This relates to a situation whereby an African state, by special arrangement, comes under the security protection of an extra-African power. As practiced in Africa, the strategy is common with those countries that are eager to counter the power of their unfriendly but more formidable neighbours. What some of these states do is to enter into some form of defense agreement with a friendly extra-African power in which provision is made for military and related assistance under specified conditions. It is generally believed that the defense agreement Cameroon entered into with France is meant to counter the power of Nigeria; more so, because of the border dispute between the two countries. Apart from countering the power of their unfriendly neighbours or other perceived enemies, some African states are pushed into such pacts solely for the purpose of regime survival.

This strategy of extra-African reliance could serve the purpose of minimizing defense burden for the African countries involved, especially, if the assistance expected from the protecting is enormous. It means the affected African countries can afford to make minimal security efforts and concentrate their resources on civil production.

The problem with this strategy, apart from the fact that it is not honourable, is that some of the condition attached, like the provision of military base facilities, exclusive trade and related economic privileges for the protecting power, could go against the genuine interest of the respective African state.

One of the most unpalatable aspects of this strategy is the apparent loss of freedom in the strategic development of the affected African state.

The unpalatable aspects of the regime survival agreement, could lead to the perpetuation of unpopular regime in power.

Finally, while the African countries operating on the strategy may be protected from its enemies, both internal and external, the strategy does not protect it from blackmail from the protecting power. The experience of Jean-Bedel Bokassa in the hands of the French shows that the protection is guaranteed only as long as the African states are useful to the promotion of the strategic and other related interest of the protecting power.

3. Strategy of Intra-African State cooperation

This relates to the establishment of a common security arrangement by African states. The usefulness of joint security arrangement by African states is equally many. Even if one cannot guarantee their credibility in the face of more potent external trait, they can be useful as a way of discouraging competitive arms build-up, and in meeting lesser emergencies, especially in support of Africa's peace-making efforts. Equally important, is the opportunity they provide not only for sharing military intelligence, but also for joint planning, training and policy harmonization, especially, in areas of putting up joint economic and diplomatic pressures to bear on common adversaries where the group cannot marshal a credible military force.

In addition, common security arrangements are most likely to have a cushioning effect on inter-state relationship in Africa by minimizing the mutual suspicion that is usually attendant to the legitimate individual security efforts of African states. This is because individual security

efforts within a common security system are not usually given hostile interpretation by the other members of the community, but seen as serving the common security interest of the community.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The harmonization of inter-state relations in Africa, by minimizing, if not eliminating, inter-state hostilities, will have a salutary effect of inhibiting foreign intervention in Africa. Two forms of intervention are relevant. First, is the form of intervention on support of an ally or proxy against another African state. Such support could take the form of supply of military equipment free of charge, or on favourable terms, provision of technical experts and the sending of troops to defend such an ally.

The second form of intervention relates to the direct aggressive action or the use of mercenaries to destabilize the affected African state, prop up a favoured regime in power, or overthrow a regime that is regarded unfriendly. Examples of this type of intervention include the attempted mercenaries invasion of Guinea, Benin and Seychelles in 1971,1977 and 1981 respectively.

5.0 SUMMARY

It would appear that inspite of the apparent advantages of a commonsecurity arrangement; African states have not been enthusiastic in bringing it about. Since 1979 when the OAU accepted in principle the establishment of a collective defense system to be known as “OAU Defence Force”, nothing much has been done to bring it into reality. It is in realization that African states have a lot to gain from the establishment of a common security system that has been incorporated into the integrated strategy for managing African security at inter-state

level. We should therefore, seek to alleviate the circumstances that result in conflicts and to mitigate their effects wherever they occur.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Discuss the three limited relevant security strategies employed in Africa?

7.0 RERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Jordan, A.A. and Taylor, Jr. W. J., 1981, "American National Security: Policy and Process", (Baltimore, the John Hopkins University Press.

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UNIT 3 THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) AND CONFLICT RESOLUTIONS

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The desire to bring an end to warfare and replace it with functional forms of interaction has been a major pursuit of nation-states. Indeed, it was with the aim of bringing about an end to the scourge of war and converting "swords into plowshares" that the United Nations (UN) was established in 1945. Although it raison (d etre) was the elimination of war, the UN was not initially equipped with adequate institutional mechanism to achieve this monumental task. However, the turbulence of the international environment compelled the evolution of the peacekeeping force as an instrumental imperative for managing and resolving conflicts as well as for maintaining international security.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit you are expected to have learnt the following:

i) The role of the UN as an international organization in Peace and Conflicts situations.
ii) UN peace missions

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The UN and Peace Keeping

One of the primary purposes for which the UN was established, as is stated in Article 1 of the Charter, is to "maintain international peace and security" and to take "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace". It is in view if this fundamental role of the UN and against the background of the failure of the League of Nations to maintain peace that the involvement of the UN in peace-keeping as a method of conflict management can best be understood and appreciated.

The international community, in its efforts to make the UN more effective, gave the latter the authority, through the Charter, to identify parties that are guilty of aggression and to take effective steps to bring such conflicts to an end and to punish guilty parties to such conflicts. Under Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. In order to help it attain this objective, it is empowered by Article 29 to establish

such subsidiary organs as it may find necessary for the performance of its functions. Nowhere in the Charter, however, is there provision for the establishment of a permanent peace-keeping force for the UN. Instead, peace-keeping operations have been handled on an ad hoc basis with the Security Council or the General Assembly passing enabling resolutions which determine the purposes for establishing such peace-keeping forces as well as general guidelines for their operations. The importance and the significance of the involvement of the UN in peace-keeping operations cannot be overemphasized. This was lucidly communicated by the former Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, when he stated that, between 1990-1994: the United Nations has been called to more peace-keeping operations than in the previous 45 years. The demand for operation, the number of personnel, the size of the budget involved are all of vastly greater magnitude.

The quotation above gives an idea of the scope of demand for the intervention of the UN in conflict situations around the world. However, the conflicts and security problems of the African continent have been so dire that out of 49 peace-keeping missions that have been established by the UN since 1948, 16 of these mission have been in Africa. This is not only indicative of the high incidence of conflicts and disputes that obtain in Africa, it is also suggestive of the bulk of resources that the UN have invested in conflict management and the maintenance of security in Africa.

Nevertheless, the whole scenario portrays a reflection of the needs of the international system at large and particularly of the African state system in which conflicts have become endemic, and of the fact that the expected role of the UN is increasingly being seen to be one of maintaining peace and security. It must be emphasized, however, that

the increase in UN involvement in peace-keeping in Africa and the world at large has not only resulted in the quantitative or sheer numerical increase in peace-keeping forces, it has also resulted in the qualitative changes in the very nature and composition of the peace-keeping forces themselves.

3.2 The UN and Post-Conflict Peace-Building

As the term suggests, peace building is a post war phenomenon. It is basically an attempt to consolidate and build upon peace that may have been brokered at the end of a conflict. The former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, who developed the term, needs to be quoted at length here. He argued that: peace-making and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among the people.

Through agreement ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order; the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The process of peace building is much more difficult in reality than its description portrays. This is because peace has eluded the numerous conflicts in Africa; and where it has been brokered, it is usually of a fragile nature. Further more, the redevelopment and rebuilding of a physically devastated country with a population that has been psychologically traumatized by war in a very long-term venture that requires the involvement and cooperation of sister African nations.

5.0 SUMMARY

The process of post-conflict peace building is one that exceeds the mandate of any given peacekeeping mission on the continent. Indeed, the case that closely approximates this scenario is the UN involvement in post-civil war Rwanda. Although the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was abolished in 1996, the UN has been closely involved in the consolidation of peace there. Through its respective agencies, the UN has continued to be involved in the economic rehabilitation of Rwanda; the process of national reconciliation; the re-formation of the judiciary, politics and prisons; humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts; and the prosecution of war criminals through the International Tribunal for Rwanda.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

How far has the UN gone in ensuring its Peace keeping processes?

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UNIT 4 OAU AND CONFLICTS RESOLUTION

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

When the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded in 1963, the founding fathers had no illusion whatsoever regarding the organization's capacity for imposing military solutions to the multi-furious conflicts arising from the continent's political and cultural heterogeneity. Yet they saw only within an African framework, the genuine desire for solutions to African conflicts. Although they could not have been oblivious of the unfairness of the 1884 partitioning and the more contemptible horse trending that led to state of affairs at independence, they chose the lesser evil of accepting the continent's pre-independence boundaries as sacrosanct. They also endorsed the principles of sovereign equality of member state; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member state and their inalienable right to independent existence; and the peaceful settlement of disputes. These principles doubtlessly influenced the conduct of interstate

relations but obviously proved inadequate for the management of both intra and inter-state conflicts.

Indeed, the organization's general attitude to intra-state conflicts was one of non-involvement; yet, with the passage of time, these are the categories of conflict that have been prevailing, continue to stifle development in many African states, since independence.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of his unit you are expected to have learnt the following;

i) The formation of OAU
ii) Its charter and other provisions
ii) Conflict resolution provisions etc

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 OAU and Conflict Resolution

Four key organs were provided in the charter for the pursuit of the aims of the OAU: the assembly of Heads of States and Governments; Council of Ministers; the Secretariat headed by the Secretary General; and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. But the CMCA is the OAU's primary mechanism for crisis management and conflicts resolution. Article 20 of the charter established some specialized commissions; Economic and Social Commission; Educational and Cultural Commission; Health, Sanitation, and Nutrition Commission; Defense Commission; and Scientific Technical and Research Commission.

OAU is the main organ at the regional level responsible for the management of conflicts in Africa. Before the establishment of the OAU, the United Nations played a primary role in the management of the Congo conflict. Since the establishment of the OAU, the UN has essentially played a supportive role to OAU's initiatives, only assuming control, as in the case of western Saharan, when it is evidence that the OAU cannot cope with the problems.

The sad experience of African states in the UN peacekeeping operation in the Congo (1960-1964) made them to be wary of getting extra-African powers involved in the management and resolution of conflicts in the continent. In the Congo, the western and eastern nations fought out their cold war at the expense of African interests, while Belgium encouraged the mineral rich Katanga Province to declare secession. In the whole network of European intrigues, clash of ideologies, and economic manipulations, president Patrice Lumumba was killed in mysterious circumstances.

The event in the Congo served as an eye opener and an early warning for African states over getting extra-African powers involved in settling disputes and managing conflicts in Africa. This peace-keeping "allergy" in fact was a strong motivation for the African states. It devised a system by which African problems will be solved by African methods, without the intervention of extra-African powers.

Since the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) on July 9, 2002, there s an apparent optimism that this change of name and the inclusion of the few new clauses and institutions in the Constitutive Act establishing the new continental body would automatically make it an effective role player in the high-tech globalize environment of the 21_{st} century, especially in

finding enduring solutions to Africa's myriad of problems. Nowhere has this optimism been so evident as in the projected conflict management functions of the AU. This optimism is hinged on the fact that this time around, there is the provision for a new mechanism, the "Peace and Security Council" (PSC), which is expected to take over the functions earlier performed by the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA) and later, from 1993, by the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The general belief, which tallied with those of Africa's Council, would enhance the organisaiton's ability to promptly respond to matters affecting the peace and security of the continent.

Two important deductions can be made from the above impression. The first is that the OAU did not quite perform or performed below expectation in its handling of issues relating to conflict, peace and security in Africa. Second, that as presently structured, the AU has the potentiality of performing better. So the corresponding questions to ask are: first, in which areas has the OAU failed to perform? Second, what are the factors responsible for it? And third, which is very important to the central theme of this paper, what are the prospects that the AU, as presently structured, especially with the provision of PSC, would perform better? In short, is there any historical foundation for the apparent optimism that greeted the signing of the AU document especially as it relates to the conflict management role of the organization.

To find this out, a critical analysis of the conflict management mechanisms of the OAU against those now provided for the AU must be carried out. Through such analysis, it would be possible to determine the extent to which the new organization has taken care of the constraints and limitations of its predecessor.

Background to the Establishment of the PSC.

The idea of Peace and Security Council (PSC) has been on the drawing board of the OAU since June 21, 1980, though with a slight difference in its nomenclature. This was when Sierra Leone suggested the establishment of a fifteen-member Political and Security Council (PSC), "to monitor areas of potential conflicts" and "to deal with infringement of basic principles enshrined in charter of the Organisation". The PSC, as was proposed then was also to "investigate volatile situations", like situations of potential, incipient or actual conflict and "prescribe effective remedies or institute procedures with a view to preserving the peace, security of the continent.

The central point that was made about the necessity for a PSC at the time was that its establishment would greatly enhance the ability of the OAU to respond with the necessary speed to crises within the continent. The idea was that since the members would maintain permanent representation at the headquarters of the OAU, the Council could function on a continuous and permanent basis, while its members could be summoned at a moment's notice thereby avoiding the procedural and other practical obstacles that had bedeviled the convening of emergency sessions of the Council of Ministers".

Even though the PSC proposal was not eventually implemented under the OAU, it was nevertheless quite popular. It was accepted in principle and commended to the 14-member OAU Charter Review Committee, which was set up in July 1979 in order too revitalise the organisation and make it more effective. This means that its implementation was to await the comprehensive review of the Organisation's charter, which never came up until the present transformation of the organisatioon into AU. However, when the work of the Charter Review Committee became

stalled, the OAU in July 1993, through the initiative of the Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, decided at the Cairo summit to set up a new instrument for its conflict management activities known as the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. In addition, approval was given to the Secretary-General to set up a Division for Conflict Management in the political department of the Secretariat. Under the new "Mechanism", the Secretary-General was given an enhanced role to take personal initiative with full consultation with the Chairman of the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to put in place measures to prevent the outbreak or escalation of conflicts, or to actually help in resolving such conflicts, possibly, through the use of special envoys or eminent persons.

The information contained in the preceding paragraphs vividly shows that when AU member states enthusiastically decided at their inaugural summit in Durban, South Africa, to package the conflict management mechanism of the new organisaition around the PSC, there was an existing framework to build upon. Although the pace at which the ratification eventually took place did not match the enthusiasm that greeted the signing of the Protocol at Durban, it is important to note that by the end of May 2004, the simple majority requirement for its ratification had been secured as to make the PSC fully operational and ready to carry out its mandate".

4.0 CONCLUSION

What these African methods turned out to be at the formation of the OAU in 1963 was the establishment in the organization's charter of the mechanism called Commission for Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. Unfortunately, this commission could not deliver the much-needed services, and the OAU had to adopt other mechanisms. Thus, it

cannot be rightly said that since inception, the OAU, had adopted a single mechanism for managing conflicts, unless the phrase is used in the sense of a multi-phase mechanism.

However, one can identify three mechanisms as follows: the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration, Ad-hoc Commission; and the mechanism of Conflicts Prevention, Management and Resolution.

5.0 SUMMARY

So far, we have been able to discuss the formation of the OAU and its provision for conflict resolution .Again, the organization did not make provisions for resolving intra-state conflicts which is now biting hard in most of the African states; although the transformation of the OAU to AU has led to the establishment of the peace and security council which is now operational.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Explain the provisions of the OAU charter in relation to conflict resolution.

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UNIT 5 MECHANISM OF CONFLICTS PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The atrophy of the CMCA, and negative effects of ad hoc methods of managing conflicts, the changes in the world's political landscape, and the need for rapid development in Africa must have informed the establishment by the OAU in 1993 of the Mechanism of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR). This mechanism is the third in the life history of the organization, for even though the

MCPMR still has elements of ad hocism, we still regard it as a distinct mechanism.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit you are expected to know the following;

i) The mechanisms for conflict prevention
ii) Conflict management and ,
iii) How to resolve it?

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Mechanism of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

The objective of the MCPMR are essentially to anticipate and prevent tension situations from becoming violent conflicts; and undertaking peace-making and peace-building functions in situations where violent conflicts have already broken out, in order to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. To this effect, paragraph 22 of the June 1993 Cairo Declaration, establishing the mechanism provides that: the Secretary-General shall under the authority of the Central Organ and in consultation with the parties involved in the conflict, deploy efforts and take all appropriate initiation to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.

In paragraph 15, the OAU leaders undertake that, in circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it will be its responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military

missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration may be mounted and deployed.

Paragraph 16 anticipates the involvement of the UN as follows: in the event that conflicts degenerate to the extent of requiring collective international intervention and policing, the assistance or where appropriate, the services of the United Nations are sought under the general terms of its charter.

Structurally, the MCPMR is built around the bureau of the Assembly of the OAU Heads of States and Governments. It has a decision making body called the Central Organ which has three levels of authority-Ambassadorial, Ministerial and Heads of States and Governments levels.

Operation wise, the operational arm of the MCPMR revolves around the general secretariat, the office of the Secretary-General, and the Division of Conflicts Management. The mechanism if funded from the Peace Fund set up by the OAU is to be financed from 5% OAU regular budgetary appropriation, as well as voluntary contributions from Africa and non-African sources.

The MCPMR utilizes the gains of the early warning system, and the quiet but effective and growing role of the Secretary-General, who is now provided with a framework to take initiatives to carry out personal intervention, or send special envoys to promote peaceful settlement of disputes. The Chairman of the OAU and other individual African Heads of States who have insight to the conflicts within or between states, can under the present arrangement be mandated to intervene in conflicts

situation on behalf of the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments.

The foregoing presents the evolution (if one may use that word) and operation of OAU mechanisms for managing and resolving conflicts in Africa.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Above all, in particular, strenuous efforts must be made to put in place preventive mechanisms such as early warning systems that can reduce instances of conflicts. Beyond this, it is imperative to lessen conditions of tension associated with conflicts to enable mechanisms for conflict resolution to function efficiently and impede the probability of deterioration. In essence, it is important to place priority on crisis management in conflict situations and the bedrock of such efforts is Confidence Building Measures (CBM).

5.0 SUMMARY

The rationale for our continental focus is that Africa is now a conflict ridden environment. Instead the continent has been exposed to “a flood gate of conflicts”, the bulk of which are internal. The situation has distracted the continent from the objective task of economic development and social and political emancipation. It has become imperative to seek appropriate models of conflicts management, with crucial emphasis on confidence building measures that can enervate the process of conflict resolution.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Explain the mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution

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