



NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COURSE CODE: POL 231

**COURSE TITLE: ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
DIPLOMACY**



POL 231

ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY

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2014

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Introduction

POL 231: Essentials of International Relations and Diplomacy is a 3-unit course that introduces students to the subject matter, meaning, nature and scope of international relations. It covers the theories, concepts and praxis of International relations, which is often defined as the study of the interactions among the various actors in the international system. These interactions cover a whole range of *issue areas*, which inevitably, include all activities that engage the attention of humanity.

What You Will Learn From This Course

You will explore the fundamental concepts, theories and paradigms of international relations. Among these are the International System, International Law, International Politics, Ideology, Sovereignty, Balance of Power, Non-alignment, Realism, Liberalism, Systems theory, Game theory, Functional theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, the Level of Analysis construct, Power, Power theory and decision-making theories, principles actions.

The course will enhance your knowledge, understanding and appreciation of events, actions and incidents in the international system. It will assist you to give meaning to actions that unfold among state and non-state actors in historical times, in the contemporary world and in the future. It will also enable you to discern the reasons why governments, including that of your country, pursue their various foreign policy goals in time and space.

Course Aims

1. The course seeks to introduce students to the subject matter of international relations.
2. It seeks to enhance their knowledge, understanding and appreciation of international events as they affect their country, their regions and the international community.
3. It seeks to assist students to identify and explain the emergence of a range of new issues in the realm of international relations

4. Assist students to acquire a basic understanding of the evolution of the academic field of international relations
5. Assist students to understand the concepts, theoretical framework and discourse conventions of the academic field of international relations
6. Assist students to acquire the ability to conduct independent research on topics in international relations using of a range of relevant sources
7. Assist students to develop a more thorough understanding of the explanatory power of major theories in international relations
8. Assist students to develop critical thinking and analytical skills on issues relating to international relations
9. Assist students to develop an understanding of the foreign policy processes that inform the actions of countries around the world, including their own country.

Course Objectives

1. Explain the meaning, nature and scope of international relations
2. Describe the properties and characteristics of the International System
3. Distinguish between International Relations, International Politics, International Law and Diplomacy
4. Explain the origins and development of international relations
5. Describe the various approaches to the study of international relations
6. Explain the assumptions of the theoretical study of international relations with particular reference to System theory, Game theory, Functional theory, Realism, Idealism and decision-making theories such as the Unitary Actor model, the Bureaucratic Politics model and the Hero-in-History model.
7. Explain international relations concepts such as Power, Sovereignty, Independence, territoriality, national Interest and Non-Alignment.
8. Explain the processes and procedures of Foreign Policy Analysis

Working through the Course

This course guide is written in Modules (Sections) and Units. There are end of unit reviews and examination questions at the end of each unit. You are expected to answer these self review questions unaided. Additional requirements for the course will include an appraisal paper and a final examination. The course guide tells you briefly what the course is all about, what you are expected to know in each unit, what course materials you need to use and how you can work your way through these materials.

The Course Materials

The main components of the course are:

1. The Course Guide
2. Study Units
3. References
4. Assignments
5. Presentation Schedule

Study Units

There are twenty-four study units in this course spread through five modules. These are as follows:

MODULE 1: Meaning, Nature and Scope of International Relations

Unit 1 Meaning of International Relations

Unit 2 Nature of International Relations

Unit 3 Scope of International Relations

Unit 4 Origin and Development of International Relations

Unit 5 Approaches to the Study of International Relations

MODULE 2 International Relations, International Politics and International Law

Unit 1 International Relations and International Politics

Unit 2 International Relations and International Law

Unit 3 International Relations and International Society

Unit 4 Ideology and International Relations

MODULE 3 The International System

Unit 1 The Evolution and Structure of the International System

Unit 2 Power

Unit 3 Power Theory

Unit 4 Diplomacy

Unit 5 International Regimes

MODULE 4 Paradigms and Theories in International Relations

Unit 1 Theories of International Relations

Unit 2 Realism

Unit 3 Idealism

Unit 4 Foreign Policy Analysis

Unit 5 Foreign Policy in Action: Two Case Studies

MODULE 5 Basic Concepts in International Relations

Unit 1 Sovereignty, Independence and Territoriality

Unit 2 Balance of Power

Unit 3 National Interest

Unit 4 Non-Alignment

Unit 5 Responsibility to Protect

As noted earlier, each unit contains a number of self-assessment exercises (SAE). These self-assessment exercises are designed to test you on the materials you have just covered. They will help you to evaluate your progress as well as reinforce your understanding of the material. Together with tutor-marked assignments, these exercises will assist you in achieving the stated learning objectives of the individual units and of the Course.

References/Further Reading

The following books are suggested for further reading:

K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis 4th Edition* (Prentice-Hall, 1983).

Walter S. Jones and Steven J. Rosen, *The Logic of International Relations 4th Edition* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982).

Christopher Thorne, *The Limits of Foreign Policy* (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1973).

Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations 4th Edition* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966).

Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James N. Rosenau, (eds.) *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Boston; Unwin Hyman, 1987).

Richard Snyder, Henry Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (1954).

James Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. B. Farrell (ed.) *Approaches in Comparative and International Politics* (1966).

Presentation Schedule

Your course materials give you important dates for the early and timely completion and submission of your TMAs and attending tutorials. You should remember that you are required to submit all your assignments by the stipulated time and date. You should guard against lagging behind in your work.

Assignment File

In your assignment file, you will find all the details of the works you must submit to your tutor for marking. The marks you obtain for these assignments will count towards the final mark you obtain for this course. Further information on assignments will be found in the Assignment File itself, and later in this Course Guide in the section on assessment. There are many assignments for this course, with each unit having at least one assignment. These assignments are basically meant to assist you to understand the course.

Assessment

There are two aspects to the assessment of this course. First, are the Tutor-Marked Assignments; second, is a written examination. In tackling these assignments, you are expected to apply the information, knowledge and experience acquired during the course. The assignments must be submitted to your tutor for formal assessment in accordance with the deadlines stated in the Assignment File. The work you submit to your tutor for assessment will account for 30 per cent of your total course mark. At the

end of the course, you will need to sit for a final examination of three hours duration. This examination will account for the other 70 per cent of your total course mark.

Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMAs)

There are 21 tutor-marked assignments in this course. The best four (that is, the highest four of the 20 marks) will be counted. Each assignment counts for 20 marks but on the average when the four assignments are put together, then each assignment will count 10% towards your total course mark. This implies that the total marks for the best four (4) assignments, will constitute 30% of your total course mark. The Assignments for the units in this course are contained in the Assignment File. You will be able to complete your assignments from the information and materials contained in your references, reading and study units. However, it is always desirable at this level of your education to research more widely, and demonstrate that you have a very broad and in-depth knowledge of the subject matter.

When each assignment is completed, send it together with a TMA (tutor-marked assignment) form to your tutor. Ensure that each assignment reaches your tutor on or before the deadline given in the Assignment File. If, for any reason you cannot complete your work on time, contact your tutor before the assignment is due to discuss the possibility of an extension. Extensions will not be granted after the due date unless there are exceptional circumstances warranting such.

Final Examination and Grading

The final examination for **POL 231: Essentials of International Relations and Diplomacy** will be of three hours' duration and have a value of 70% of the total course grade. The examination will consist of questions, which reflect the practice exercises and tutor-marked assignments, you have previously encountered. All areas of the course will be assessed. The time between the completion of the last unit and sitting for the examination can be used to revise the entire course. You may find it useful to review your tutor-marked assignments and comment on them before the examination. The final examination covers information from all aspects of the course.

Course Marking Scheme**Table 1: Course Marking Scheme**

ASSESSMENT	MARKS
Assignments	Best four marks of the Assignments @10% each (on the average) = 30% of course marks
Final examination	70% of overall course marks
Total	100% of course marks

How to get the most from this Course

- 1) In distance learning, the study units replace the university lecture. This is one of the great advantages of distance learning; you can read and work through specially designed study materials at your own pace, and at a time and place that suits you best. Think of it as reading the lecture instead of listening to the lecturer. In the same way a lecturer might give you some reading to do, the study units tell you when to read, and which are your text materials or recommended books. You are provided exercises, to do at appropriate points, just as a lecturer might give you an in-class exercise.
- 2) Each of the study units follows a common format. The first item is an introduction to the subject matter of the unit, and how a particular unit is integrated with the other units and the course as a whole. Next to this is a set of learning objectives. These objectives let you know what you should be able to do, by the time you have completed the unit. These learning objectives are meant to guide your study. The moment a unit is finished, you must go back and check whether you have achieved the objectives. If this is made a habit, then you will significantly improve your chances of passing the course.
- 3) The main body of the unit guides you through the required reading from other sources. This will usually be either from your references or from a Reading section.

- 4) The following is a practical strategy for working through the course. If you run into any trouble, telephone your tutor or visit the study centre nearest to you. Remember that your tutor's job is to help you. When you need assistance, do not hesitate to call and ask your tutor to provide it.
- 5) Read this Course Guide thoroughly, it is your first assignment.
- 6) Organise a Study Schedule- Design a 'Course Overview' to guide you through the Course. Note the time you are expected to spend on each unit and how the assignments relate to the units. Important information, e.g. details of your tutorials, and the date of the first day of the Semester is available at the study centre. You need to gather all the information into one place, such as your diary or a wall calendar. Whatever method you choose to use, you should decide on and write in your own dates and schedule of work for each unit.
- 7) Once you have created your own study schedule, do everything to stay faithful to it. The major reason that students fail is that they get behind with their course work. If you get into difficulties with your schedule, please, let your tutor know before it is too late for help.
- 8) Turn to Unit 1, and read the introduction and the objectives for the unit.
- 9) Assemble the study materials. You will need your references and the unit you are studying at any point in time.
- 10) As you work through the unit, you will know what sources to consult for further information.
- 11) Visit your study centre whenever you need up to date information.

- 12) Well before the relevant due dates (about 4 weeks before due dates), visit your study centre for your next required assignment. Keep in mind that you will learn a lot by doing the assignment carefully. They have been designed to help you meet the objectives of the course and, therefore, will help you pass the examination. Submit all assignments not later than the due date.
- 13) Review the objectives for each study unit to confirm that you have achieved them. If you feel unsure about any of the objectives, review the study materials or consult your tutor. When you are confident that you have achieved a unit's objectives, you can start on the next unit. Proceed unit by unit through the course and try to space your study so that you can keep yourself on schedule.
- 14) When you have submitted an assignment to your tutor for marking, do not wait for its return before starting on the next unit. Keep to your schedule. When the Assignment is returned, pay particular attention to your tutor's comments, both on the tutor-marked assignment form and also the written comments on the ordinary assignments.
- 15) After completing the last unit, review the course and prepare yourself for the final examination. Check that you have achieved the unit objectives (listed at the beginning of each unit) and the course objectives (listed in the Course Guide).

Tutors and Tutorials

There are 15 hours of tutorials provided in support of this course. However, tutorials are not compulsory, demand driven, and are meant to be problem- solving sessions. You will need to contact your tutor for more information of these tutorials, together with the name and phone number of your tutor.

Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments, keep a close watch on your progress and on any difficulties you might encounter and provide assistance to you

during the course. You must mail your tutor-marked assignments to your tutor well before the due date (at least two working days are required). They will be marked by your tutor and returned to you as soon as possible.

Do not hesitate to contact your tutor by telephone, e-mail, or discussion board. The following might be circumstances in which you will find help necessary. Contact your tutor if: –

- You do not understand any part of the study units or the assigned readings.
- You have difficulties within the exercises.
- You have a question or problem with an assignment, with your tutor's comments on an assignment or with the grading of an assignment.

You should try your best to attend the tutorials if you have problems. This is the only chance to have face-to-face contact with your tutor and ask questions which are answered instantly. You can raise any problem encountered in the course of your study. To gain the maximum benefits from course tutorials, prepare a question list before attending them. You will learn quite a lot from participating in the discussions.

Summary

POL 231 aims at equipping you with the skills required in understanding the essentials of international relations and diplomacy. Upon completion of this course, you should be acquainted with the various theories, principles and concepts of international relations and diplomacy. You will also be able to appraise these theories, principles and concepts as the basis for enhancing your understanding of past and current events in the international system.

We wish you success with the course.



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NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

MODULE 1:**MEANING, NATURE AND SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Unit 1 Meaning of International Relations

Unit 2 Nature of International Relations

Unit 3 Scope of International Relations

Unit 4 Origin and Development of International Relations

Unit 5 Approaches to the Study of International Relations

UNIT 1 MEANING OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**CONTENTS**

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 Meaning of International Relations

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

International relations (IR) is a continuously popular subject. It concerns peoples and cultures all over the world. The scope and complexity of the interactions between the various groups makes IR a challenging subject to master. IR is new and dynamic and has a special appeal to everybody.

However, some people perceive IR as a distant and abstract ritual conducted by a small group of people like presidents, generals and diplomats. This assumption is not accurate because despite the fact that leaders play a major role in international affairs, many other people participate as well. For instance, students and other citizens participate in international relations every time they vote in an election or watch the news. In fact, the choices we make in our daily lives ultimately affect the world we live in.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of the topic, students should be able to:

1. Define the concept
2. Explain the meaning of international relations
3. Identify the boundaries of international relations

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Meaning of International Relations

International Relations is the study of conflict and cooperation by international actors, as furthered by the development and testing of hypotheses about international outcomes. The field of international relations concerns the relationships among the various governments of the world. These relationships are connected with other actors such as international organisations (IOs) non-governmental organizations (NGOs) transnational corporations (TNCs) and notable individuals. This implies that the relationships among states in the international system cannot be understood in isolation. Indeed, no nation can live in isolation independent of other nations. Whether big or small, rich or poor, powerful or weak, every nation depends on other nations. This explains why all states in the international system live in an atmosphere of interdependence.

Owing to the fact that IR is in transition following emerging realities in the international system, it has become difficult arriving at a universally acceptable definition of the subject. However, scholars have persisted in their attempt to define international relations. In the words of Karl Deutsch, international relations is that area of human action where inescapable interdependence meets with inadequate control” There is no escaping from world affairs, yet we cannot shape them totally to our will. There is always interplay between foreign policy and domestic politics, the two component parts of international relations. There are multiple contests and conflicts of interests, which ensure that both foreign policy and domestic politics are constantly pushed and pulled in contradictory directions. The safety and prosperity of each nation and indeed the survival of humanity hangs on this sea-saw.

Trevor Taylor defines IR “as a discipline that tries to explain political activities across states boundaries.” Another scholar, Seymour Brown postulates that international relations is the investigating and study of patterns of actions and reactions among sovereign states as represented by their governing elites” Quite often, IR scholars view international relations as a mix of **conflict** and **cooperation** in relationships among nations. Power is germane to international politics. Indeed, power is the currency of the international system. This explains why some scholars define international relations in terms of power relations between states. For example, Stanley Hoffman posits that “the discipline of international relations is concerned with the factors and the activities which affect the external policies and power of the basic units into which the world is divided”

As a field of study, IR has elastic boundaries. To some extent, the field is interdisciplinary relating international politics to economics, sociology, history and other disciplines. Whereas some Universities offer separate degrees or Departments of IR others teach international relations as part of political science. Before 1914, the conduct of international relations was the concern of persons professionally engaged in it. In democratic countries, foreign policy was regarded as something outside the scope of party politics; and the representative organs did not feel themselves competent to exercise any close control over the mysterious operations of foreign offices. In Great Britain, public opinion was readily aroused if war occurred in any region traditionally regarded as a sphere of British interest, or if the British navy shortly ceased to possess that margin of superiority over potential rivals that were deemed essential. In continental Europe, conscription and the chronic fear of foreign invasion created a more general and continuous popular awareness of international problems. However, this awareness found expression mainly in the labour movement, which from time to time passed somewhat academic resolutions against war. Indeed, political relations among nations cover a range of activities- diplomacy, war, trade relations, cultural exchanges, participation in international organizations, alliances and counter- alliances. Traditionally, the study of IR focused on questions of war and peace. The movement of armies and of diplomats, the crafting of treaties and alliances, the development and deployment of military capabilities- these issues

dominated the study of IR in the past, particularly in the Cold War era. Although they still hold central position in the field, the end of the Cold War in 1990 brought in new challenges. The study of IR involves the mastery of some basic concepts. It is advisable to internalize these concepts in the course of study rather than memorize them piecemeal. Some of these concepts are international politics, international system, foreign policy, domestic politics, defence policy, national interest, sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, international order, security, conflict and conflict resolution and so forth.

International relations refer to all those actions taking place between actors in the international system. The international system is a set of relationships among the world's states, structured according to certain rules and patterns of interaction. Why some of these rules are explicit, others remain implicit. The history of the present international system started in 1648 after the peace of Westphalia. The field of IR reflects the world's complexity, and IR scholars use many theories and concepts in trying to describe and explain it. Underneath this complexity, however, lie a few basic principles that shape the field. Within domestic societies, governments solve collective goods problems by forcing the members of society to contribute to common goals, such as by paying taxes. Conversely, the international system lacks such governments. Three core principles—dominance, reciprocity, and identity—offer different solutions to the collective goods problem.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is your understanding of International relations?
2. Who are the actors in IR?
3. Mention the activities covered in international relations.
4. Why do states live in an atmosphere of interdependence?

4.0. CONCLUSION

Our world is large and complex. International relations is an interesting topic because it concerns peoples and cultures all over the world. The scope and complexity of the interactions among these groups make international relations a challenging subject to

master. Indeed, there is always more to learn. Largely, the field is interdisciplinary relating international politics to economics, sociology history and other disciplines. IR revolves around one key problem: How can a group—such as two or more nations—serve its collective interests when doing so requires its members to forgo their individual interests?

5.0. SUMMARY

In this unit, we have examined the meaning of international relations and the various definitions given by different scholars. We established that, IR is a new subject that affects daily life profoundly and that we all participate in it. Broadly, IR concerns the relationships among world governments. We also established the boundaries of international relations. Today, the multidisciplinary approach is the best approach to the study of IR. International relations refer to all those actions taking place between actors in the international system. The international system is a set of relationships among the world's states, structured according to certain rules and patterns of interaction. Why some of these rules are explicit, others remain implicit. The history of the present international system started in 1648 after the peace of Westphalia. The field of IR reflects the world's complexity, and IR scholars use many theories and concepts in trying to describe and explain it. Underneath this complexity, however, lie a few basic principles that shape the field.

6.0. TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAs)

1. Describe the boundaries of international relations?
2. Explain why Power is often described as the currency of the international politics.
3. Explain why IR scholars use theories and concepts?

7.0. REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Burton, J.W. *International Relations: A General Theory*. Cambridge, England, 1965.

Carr, E.H. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, 2nd Edition, London, 1946. First published in 1939, it remains one of the most essential works on international relations.

Deutsch, Karl. *The Analysis of International Relations*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.

UNIT 2 NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Objectives
- 3.0 Main Content
- 3.1 Nature of International Relations
- 4.0 Conclusion
- 5.0 Summary
- 6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment
- 7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Like the world community, which is rapidly changing, international relations is in transition. Indeed, contemporary international relations is a study of the world community in transition. The world that we live in is increasingly complex and consistently changing.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain the nature of international relations.
2. Appreciate why IR is in a state of flux.
3. Explain the state-centric view of IR.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Nature of International Relations

IR deals with the relationship between nation states, international organizations and other groups. These are the *actors* in international relations. The most important actors in IR are states. This accounts for the *state-centric-view* of the international system. The nature of the international system from the realists' perspective is anarchical. This state of anarchy does not imply a complete chaos or absence of structures and rules; rather it portrays a lack of central government that can enforce rules. In domestic

society within states, governments can enforce contracts, deter citizens from breaking rules and use their monopoly on legally sanctioned violence to enforce a system of law. In the case of international relations, the great power system and the hegemony of a superpower can provide relative peace and stability for decades on end but then can break down into costly wars among the great powers. The development of sovereign states dictates the very structure of international politics and determines the pattern of relations in IR. Since the actors in world politics are sovereign, international relations must be anarchical. This essential anarchy of a system of sovereign states leads to the conclusion that the study of IR must be distinct from the study of domestic politics. Where domestic politics denotes the study of the institutions of government IR remains the study of the institutions of international governance and of power politics. Indeed, a history of the practice of war, diplomacy and international law offers intriguing insights into the nature of modern international society and the politics of what Hedley Bull famously called the anarchical society. The key is to recognize that a grasp of the nature of the balance of power is essential to an understanding of IR.

When we look at the world of global politics, we inevitably see international or trans-national governmental organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations (UN) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We see regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU) or the African Union (AU), and important non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross, Amnesty International, and powerful multinational corporations (MNCs) with bigger annual turnovers than the gross national product (GNP) of many countries. We also find that many issues that we associate with IR transcend this basic description.

Undoubtedly, Hitler's violent assault on the post-World-War I, world order had important consequences on the ways in which scholars in IR approached their subject. Many observer became impatient with the descriptive, moralistic and legalistic orientation of the 1920s and realized that as important as treaties and international organizations were to IR, objectives such as security and expansion, processes such as trade and diplomacy, and means such as propaganda and subversion had to be studied as well. Thus, while one group of scholars continue to emphasize the traditional concerns of law, institutions, and current affairs, another branched off to

begin more systematic and comparative studies of objectives, processes, and means, as well as those basic forces assumed to affect a state's foreign policy behaviour. These studies assessed the phenomenon of nationalism, the influence of geography on a country's foreign policy, and particularly the effect of power or lack of it on a nation's fate. The content as well as the approaches to the subject is continuously expanding as scholars apply the insights and techniques of many disciplines and the tools of modern technology to the problems of international affairs. To this end, the traditional approaches of a **historical**, **descriptive** and **analytical** nature are gradually being supplemented or replaced by other approaches that attempt to give greater order and form to the volume of data available.

This explains the multi-disciplinary approach to the study of international relations that allows the gathering of information from a wide variety of sources like the international aspects of politics, geography, economics, history, law, strategic studies, peace and conflict studies, and cultural studies. These approaches have already made a significant impact on the study of international relations. They are designed to bridge the gap between theory and practice and to provide better tools for analysis of the increasingly complex data of international relations research. Indeed, the best way to begin to get a grip on this wide-ranging and challenging subject is not to become an expert in every aspect of world politics. This might be an ideal solution but it is simply not a realistic goal. Rather, you need to find a way to cope with complexity and multidisciplinary approach. This is what IR, as an academic discipline, and you, as a student of IR, must try to achieve. IR, at its most basic level, is a matter of orientation. It attempts to manage the deeply complex nature of world politics by breaking it down into understandable chunks and helpful general theories. The key is to find ways of describing and analysing world politics that can both acknowledge the vast array of causal and determining factors yet give us the critical leverage we need.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What do you understand by the anarchic nature of IR?
2. Who are the main actors in IR?
3. Identify the best approach to the study of IR
4. Why is IR constantly changing?

4.0 CONCLUSION

IR deals with the relationship between nation states, international organizations and other groups. Its nature from the realists' perspective is anarchic. The anarchical nature of IR does not mean a state of chaos; it only suggests the lack of a central government that is supreme to others since all sovereign states are equal in the international system. The legalistic approach to the study of IR in the pre-World War I became obsolete in the post-World War II era. Today, the multidisciplinary approach remains the best approach to the study of international relations. IR is the setting upon which the many dramas of world politics are played out. Therefore, you will need to master a whole range of historical and conceptual skills to understand IR. Learning to understand the historical development of the state, the international system, globalization, and so forth offers huge insights in to the nature of IR. Similarly, learning to understand the political, cultural and moral arguments that defend or criticize these features of our world is crucial to a basic understanding of international relations. Despite the anarchical nature of the international system, the international environment is not chaotic.

5.0 SUMMARY

States are the most important actors in IR. The international system rests on the sovereignty of the independent states. The nature of the international system from the realists' perspective is **anarchical**. This state of anarchy does not imply a complete chaos or absence of structures and rules; rather it portrays a lack of central government that can enforce rules. The content as well as the approaches to the subject is continuously expanding as scholars apply the insights and techniques of many disciplines and the tools of modern technology to the problems of international affairs. Different approaches to the study of international relations were discussed.

The multidisciplinary, multifaceted and inter-disciplinary approach bridges the gap between theory and practice. It provides better tools for analysis of the increasingly complex data of international relations research.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain why international relations is often described as anarchical.
2. Explain the state-centric view of international relations.
3. Explain the different approaches to the study of international relations.
4. Assess the multidisciplinary approach to the study of IR
5. Identify the various actors in the international system.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, Third Edition, New York: Palgrave Books, 1995.

Olson, William C. and Fred, A. Sonderman. *The Theory and Practice of International Relations*, 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

Palmer, Norman D. and Perkins, Howard C. *International Relations: The World Community in Transition*, 3rd Revised ed. A.I.T.B.S, Krishan Nagar, Delhi, 2004.

Wright, Quincy. *The Study of International Relations*, New York, Appleton- Century-crofts, 1965. It remains one of the most comprehensive surveys of the subject

UNIT 3 SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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3.0 Main Content

3.1 Scope of International Relations

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

As a field of study, IR has elastic boundaries. The sub-fields it encompasses define its scope. Since it contains a myriads of disciplines, attempts to intellectualize it have often been thematically and analytically confined to boundaries determine by the available data and facts. The core concepts of international relations are foreign policy, international law, international organization, international conflicts, International Economic Relations, military thought and strategy. IR also covers such areas as state sovereignty, ecological sustainability, biodiversity, nuclear proliferation, nationalism, terrorism, economic development, terrorism, organized crime, foreign interventionism, human security and human rights. Similarly, IR covers other areas like gender studies, peace studies, postmodernism, globalization, feminism, collective security, diplomacy, crisis management, democracy, integration, international development, and interdependence.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of the unit, you should be able to:

1. Define the scope of international relations.
2. Identify the sub-fields of international relations.
3. Why are theories important to the study of IR?

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Scope of International Relations

The scope of international relations has greatly expanded over the years and of late scholars have tried to build up certain theories of international politics. Until very recent time, scholars studied international politics as it is and paid no attention to the problems of policies, as it ought to be. They conceived international relations as generalised picture of the international scene and did not build up any theories with a view to explaining the behaviour on the international scene.

However, in recent years, scholars under the impact of behavioural sciences have tried to build up theories of international politics and the scope of the subject has undergone great changes. The scholars, instead of giving a historical narrative of the world have preferred to discuss the various events.

Generally, all students of IR must begin with an introduction to the basic vocabulary of the discipline. This is known as IR theory. IR theory is basic to the study of world politics in that it represents a series of attempts to explain or understand the world in ways that frame the debates in foreign policy, law, ethics, security studies etc. Put differently, IR theory attempts to elaborate general principles that can help orientate us in our encounter with the complexities of world politics.

The need for a general viewpoint has influenced the development of IR as an academic discipline. Every aspect of IR focuses on key issues and ideas, highlighting them as worthy of attention because of their explanatory or critical force. Some arguments highlight specific characteristics of international politics. For instance, many IR scholars have sought to highlight the existence of the sovereign nation-state as the principal *actor* in world politics. The fact that nation-states are sovereign means that they are legally and politically independent.

As a field of study, international relations conceived in such broad terms as all social relations that transcend national boundaries. Thus, the focus of the introductory course remains the political processes of international society. One of the reasons for the wide range of approaches to the study of international affairs and for the absence of an agreed-upon frame of reference is the lack of a basic theory. Many scholars of a

theoretical bent of mind have made significant contributions to the formulation of such a theory, and many practitioners of diplomacy have called attention to the need for further work in this field.

The subject deals with important aspects of human nature and conduct, with the behaviour and standards of groups, with the principles and forces underlying and motivating national and international actions, with ideological considerations, with ends and means, and with values and value judgments and hypotheses. As Stanley Hoffmann has suggested, “the discipline of international relations is concerned with the factors and activities which, affect the external policies and the power of the basic units into which the world is divided and these include a wide variety of transnational relationships, political and non-political, official and unofficial, formal and informal. All of these and many related considerations are of deep concern to the social philosopher. Thus, a philosophy of international relations may be an appropriate term for this area of ideology, visions, values, principles, plans and solutions in the area of foreign politics.

Obviously, one way to keep abreast of current trends in international relations research is to consult professional journals in the field, such as *Journal of International Affairs* (Published by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, (NIIA) Lagos. Similarly, any student of international relations should also have some knowledge of the most important writings and the distinctive contributions of eminent scholars in the field. Among these are E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Quincy Wright, Morton Kaplan, Karl Deutsch, David Singer, Walter Lippmann, and so forth.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. Why is theory basic to the study of world politics?
2. How can you keep abreast with current affairs?
3. Why is world politics complex?
4. List some of the sub-fields of IR.

4.0 CONCLUSION

As a field of study, IR has elastic boundaries. The sub-fields it encompasses define its scope. Since it contains a myriads of disciplines, attempts to intellectualize it have often been thematically and analytically confined to boundaries determine by the available data and facts. Over the years, international relation's scope has greatly expanded as scholars try to build up certain theories of international politics. IR theory attempts to elaborate general principles that can help orientate us in our encounter with the complexities of world politics. The subject deals with important aspects of human nature and conduct, with the behaviour and standards of groups, with the principles and forces underlying and motivating national and international actions, with ideological considerations, with ends and means, and with values and value judgments and hypotheses.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have studied the scope of international relations. We established that as a field of study, IR has uncertain boundaries. The sub-fields it encompasses define its scope. Since it contains a myriads of disciplines, attempts to intellectualize it have often been thematically and analytically confined to boundaries determine by the available data and facts. Over the years, international relation's scope has greatly expanded as scholars try to build up certain theories of international politics. The subject deals with important aspects of human nature and conduct, with the behaviour and standards of groups, with the principles and forces underlying and motivating national and international actions, with ideological considerations, with ends and means, and with values and value judgments and hypotheses. As Stanley Hoffmann has suggested, "the discipline of international relations is concerned with the factors and activities which, affect the external policies and the power of the basic units into which the world is divided and these include a wide variety of transnational relationships, political and non-political, official and unofficial, formal and informal.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Enumerate clearly the scope of international relations.
2. Explain the relationship between international relations and its sub-fields.
3. Explain why is the scope of IR is ever expansive.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Goldstein, J.S. and Pevehouse, Jon C. *International Relations*, 9th edition, Longman, Pearson Education, San Francisco, 2011.

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UNIT 4 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 Origin and Development of International Relations

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The earliest writings on international relations were largely concerned with proffering practical advice to policy makers. For instance, the Chinese philosopher Mencius in the fourth century B.C, Kautilya, under the Indian emperor Chandragupta (326-329 B.C) and Nicolo Machiavelli wrote works that are studied today for their insights into the kinds of problems that still confronts political leaders. However, the intention of these authors was not so much to provide general analysis of the relations between states as to offer advice on the most effective forms of statecraft.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain the origins of international relations.
2. Trace the growth and development of IR.
3. Why did the legalistic and moralistic study of IR in the 1920s give way to a new approach in post WW II?
4. Explain the emergence of the realist school of IR.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Origin and Development of International Relations

The earliest writings on international relations were largely concerned with proffering practical advice to policy makers. For instance, the Chinese philosopher Mencius in the fourth century B.C, Kautilya, under the Indian emperor Chandragupta (326-329 B.C) and Niccolo Machiavelli wrote works that are studied today for their insights into the kinds of problems that still confronts political leaders.

However, the intention of these authors was not so much to provide general analysis of the relations between states as to offer advice on the most effective forms of statecraft. Academic studies in the 1920s largely continued to expand on the pre-war perspectives, although establishment of the League of Nations gave observers something new to write. Institutes dedicated to the study of international law and organization were established in the United State, Great Britain, and Switzerland. Articles in scholarly journals contained lengthy descriptions of international conferences and treaties, while popular and academic analysts presented innumerable commentaries on the proceedings of the League of Nations.

Aside from these descriptive studies from which one could deduce few generalizations most work in the field during this decade had a normative orientation: Writers were less concerned with the variables or conditions affecting government behaviour in external relations than with judging the policies of states according to their own values. The only new development in courses and texts, aside from the analyses of the League of Nations, was an emphasis on description of the background conditions of current international affairs.

Therefore, the study of international relations emerged from this earlier status as a poor relation of political science and history. Today, it is still far from being a well-organized discipline. It lacks a clear-cut conceptual framework and a systematic body of applicable theory; and it is heavily dependent upon other disciplines. However, it does have certain features that set it apart from other disciplines besides; it has a particular approach to the problems with which it deals.

Some behaviourally oriented students insist that international relations is on the way to becoming a science, or at least that this should be the object of all those who are trying to give greater meaning and significance to the field. Measured by any rigid test, international relations is clearly not a science, nor is it even a discipline, if one accepts Dale Fuller's definition that this requires "a body of data systematized by a distinctive analytical method and capable of permitting predictions with exactitude." However, Stanley Hoffmann has argued that it is possible to distinguish the field of international relations for analytical purposes, and that therefore it "should be treated as an autonomous discipline."

In its early stages, as Carr has pointed out in one of the basic works in the field, it was "markedly and frankly Utopian," for "the passionate desire to prevent war determined the whole initial course and direction of the study." However, the failure of the League of Nations and of the collective security system clearly revealed the inadequacy of pure aspiration as the basis for a science of international politics, and made it possible for the first time to embark on serious and critical analytical thought about international problems. However, Hitler's violent assault on the post war order had grave consequences on the ways in which scholars in the international relations field approached their subject. Many observer became impatient with the descriptive, moralistic and legalistic orientation of the 1920s and realized that as important as treaties and international organizations were to IR, objectives such as security -and expansion, processes such as trade and diplomacy, and means such as propaganda and subversion had to be studied as well.

Fundamentally, the study of international relations has seen important changes since the end of World War II. The development of basic animosities between the United States and the Soviet Union, led to the Cold War rivalry that dominated the international system from 1947 to 1990. The-Middle East crises, China and its neighbours, the creation of weapons of mass destruction and the rise of more than ninety new states. In these circumstances, policy makers have had to cope with extremely difficult, dangerous, and unprecedented problems. Most academics, no matter how concerned with creating a scientific field of study, could not avoid becoming involved in the great policy and ethical issues of the day.

The disillusionment of the two decades of aggression and war gave impetus to a realist school of international politics. Here, the emphasis was on power politics and the virtual inevitability of war. Indeed, much of the period after World War II focused on the search for a new international system to replace the old order that was shattered in two world wars and to work out a new pattern of relationships in a world dominated by two superpowers.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. Why is international relations constantly changing?
2. What led to the Cold War rivalry?
3. Which school of IR emerged at the end of World War II?
4. Is international relations a science?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Clearly, the international system is changing in a number of ways. Old actors are playing new and often reduced roles, and new actors of uncertain quality and prospects, are appearing constantly. Academic studies in the 1920s largely continued to expand on the pre-war perspectives, although establishment of the League of Nations gave observers something new to write.

Indeed, institutes were established in Britain, Switzerland and the United States for the study of international relations in the decades following the end of World War I. In its early stages, as Carr has pointed out in one of the basic works in the field, it was “markedly and frankly Utopian,” for “the passionate desire to prevent war determined the whole initial course and direction of the study.” However, the failure of the League of Nations and of the collective security system clearly revealed the inadequacy of pure aspiration as the basis for a science of international politics, and made it possible for the first time to embark on serious and critical analytical thought about international problems.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have studied the origin and development of International relations. Both the content of and the approaches to the subject are expanding as scholars apply the insights and techniques of many disciplines, and the tools of modern technology, to the problems of international affairs. In its early stages, as Carr has pointed out in one of the basic works in the field, it was “markedly and frankly Utopian,” for “the passionate desire to prevent war determined the whole initial course and direction of the study.” However, the failure of the League of Nations and of the collective security system clearly revealed the inadequacy of pure aspiration as the basis for a science of international politics, and made it possible for the first time to embark on serious and critical analytical thought about international problems. Fundamentally, the study of international relations has seen important changes since the end of World War II. The development of basic animosities between the United States and the Soviet Union, led to the Cold War rivalry that dominated the international system from 1947 to 1990. The-Middle East crises, China and its neighbours, the creation of weapons of mass destruction and the rise of more than ninety new states. In these circumstances, policy makers have had to cope with extremely difficult, dangerous, and unprecedented problems. Most academics, no matter how concerned with creating a scientific field of study, could not avoid becoming involved in the great policy and ethical issues of the day.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain the origin of international relations.
2. Trace the growth and development of international relations.
3. Explain the emergence of the realist school of IR

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

- Goldstein, J.S. and Pevehouse, Jon C. *International Relations*, 9th edition, Longman, Pearson Education, San Francisco, 2011.
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UNIT 5 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**CONTENTS**

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 Approaches to the Study of International Relations

3.2 Classical or Traditional Approach

3.3 Scientific Approach

3.4 The Realist and the Idealist Approach

3.4.1 The Realist Approach

3.4.2 The Idealist Approach

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Scholars have adopted different approaches to the study of international relations. An approach consists of a criterion of selection, i. e. criteria employed in selecting the problems or questions to consider and selecting the data to bring to bear in the course of analysis. It consists of standards governing inclusion and exclusion of questions and data. In simple words, an approach is a set of standards governing the inclusion and exclusion of questions and data for academic purposes. It implies looking at the problem from a particular angle and explaining the phenomenon from same angle. As different scholars have adopted different criteria selecting problems and data and adopted different standpoints, this resulted in different approaches for the study of international relations.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain the meaning of approach in IR.
2. Explain the classical approach.
3. Explain the scientific approach.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Approaches to the Study of International Relations

Scholars have adopted different approaches to the study of international relations. An approach consists of a criterion of selection, i. e. criteria employed in selecting the problems or questions to consider and selecting the data to bring to bear in the course of analysis. It consists of standards governing inclusion and exclusion of questions and data. Hedley Bull has divided the various approaches for the study of international policy into two categories (1) classical approach and (2) scientific approach.

3.2 Classical or Traditional Approach

The classical approach is also known as traditional approach. This approach was mainly in vogue until the middle of the last century, even though until now certain writers continue to subscribe to this approach. These writers mainly made descriptive analysis of international relations. The main objective of the scholars adopting traditional approach was to report and analyze current international problems and to speculate on these sources and outcomes of various policy alternatives for specific states or for international organisation. According to Hedley Bull, the traditional approach is “the approach to theorising that derives from philosophy, history and law. In his view, it is characterised by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgement and by the assumptions that if we confine ourselves to strict standards to verification and proof there is very little of significance that can be said about international relations. Therefore, general propositions about IR must derive from a scientifically imperfect process of perception or institution, and that these general propositions cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin. In other words, the traditional approach is normative, qualitative and

value judgement approach. Most scholars adopted the traditional approach until the scientific approach made its appearance. It nourished two dominant schools of international political thought; “Idealism and Realism” and greatly contributed to the sophisticated understanding of the nature and determinants of international relations. The traditional approach mainly concerns itself with the historical tensions and lays emphasis on diplomatic, historical and institutional studies. This explains why the classical approach had variants, such as historical approach, philosophical approach, legal approach and institutional approach. The historical approach focussed on the past or on a selected period of history to find out an explanation of what institutions are, how they came into being and makes an analysis of these institutions as they stand. This approach helped in illuminating the present by drawing on the wisdom of the past.

The philosophical approach regarded the state as an agent of moral improvement of international relations, and stood for attainment of perpetual peace. However, this approach was defective as far as it was abstract, speculative, and far removed from reality. The legal approach laid emphasis on the need of having a system of world law to regulate the behaviour of nation states and insisted on a code of international law to ensure world peace and security. It insisted on evolving some legal machinery for resolving state conflicts through mediation, arbitration or judicial settlement. Finally, the institutional approach focussed on the formal structure for the maintenance of peace and enforcement of principles of international law. It lays special emphasis on the study of the organisation and structure of the League of Nations, the United Nations, and other specialised agencies like WHO, UNESCO, etc.

3.3 Scientific Approach

The scientific or behavioural approach to the study of international politics became popular in the wake of World War II. The devotees of the scientific approach aspire to a theory of international relations. The propositions rest either upon logical or mathematical proof, or upon strict empirical evidences. It lays more emphasis on the methods of study rather than the subject matter. This approach relies on the simple proposition that international politics like any other social activity involves people and

hence it could be explained by analysing and explaining the behaviour of people as it reflected in their activities in the field of international relations. The scientific approach applies scientific methods and ignores the boundaries of orthodox disciplines. It insists that the central aim of the research should be to study the behaviour of men. A notable feature of this approach is that it is interdisciplinary and draws from various social sciences like sociology, psychology and anthropology. The scientific approach differs from the traditional approach as far as there is a definite trend away from description, legal analysis and policy advice. Its objective has not been to assess the main issues in the cold war or describe current international developments, but to create explanatory theories about international phenomena, and in some cases, even to propose the development of a general and predictive science of international relations. Generally, there are many varieties and combination of these two approaches variously applied by scholars. Scholars who are more concerned with substance rather than method, particularly those of the older generation tend to favour the first approach while those who are particularly absorbed with method and techniques, including large proportion of younger generation prefer the latter. However, the two approaches are compatible and many scholars manage to combine them with fruitful results. Morton Kaplan is a leading proponent of the scientific approach.

3.4 The Realist and the Idealist Approach

The two variants of the classical approach are; the realist approach and the idealist approach.

3.4.1 The Realist Approach

The basic assumption underlying the realist theory is the perpetual existence of conflict among nations in one form or the other. This is a fixed doctrine. Therefore, it is evident that a contest for power is going on in the world that cannot be controlled nor regulated by international law, world government or an international organisation. Thus, realism unequivocally accepts as its guiding principle the permanence of the struggle for power. The prominent realists include the classical theorists Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli. In the 20th century, George Kennan, Hans J.

Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger etc. were the leading exponents of the realist theory. Indeed, Morgenthau has offered the best exposition of the realist theory of international relations. In his view: International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aim of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Political leaders and People may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic or social ideal. They may hope that this ideal will materialize through its own inner force, through divine intervention, or through the natural development of human affairs. They may also try to further its realisation through non-political means, such as technical co-operation with other nations or international organizations.

Nevertheless, whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for Power.

3.4.2 The Idealist Approach

The other aspect of the classic approach is the Utopian or the idealist approach. It regards the power politics as the passing phase of history and presents the picture of a future international society based on the notion reformed international system free from power politics, immorality and violence. It aims at bringing about a better world with the help of education and internal organisation. This approach is quite old and found its faint echoes in the Declarations of the American War of independence of 1776 and French revolution of 1789. The greatest advocate of the idealist approach was President Wilson of USA who gave a concrete shape to his idealism through the text of the Treaty of Versailles. He made a strong plea for world peace and international organization. He visualised a future system free from power politics, immorality and violence. Because of their optimism, the idealists regard the power struggle as nothing but the passing phase of history. The theory proceeds with the assumption that the interests of various groups or nations are likely to be adjusted in the larger interest of humanity as a whole. The difficulty with this approach is that such a system could emerge only by following moral principles in mutual relations in place of power, which is not possible in practice.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. Mention two approaches to the study of IR.
2. Identify three realist thinkers in IR
3. Identify the main objective of the classical approach
4. What are the variants of the traditional approach?

4.0 CONCLUSION

At present most of the scholars are of the view that traditional and the scientific methods can be used for fruitful study of international relations. David Singer realised this and made his observation, “science is not a substitute for insight and methodological rigour is not a substitute for wisdom -both imagination and rigour are necessary but neither is sufficient.” Similarly, David Vital wrote that classic approach consists of two elements: the method and the subject matter. As a method, the classical approach insists on the need for borrowing from history, law and philosophy and on depending upon judgement; and as the subject matter, it is concerned with the general questions of the nature of the study, the role of the use of force, and the significance of diplomacy. The subject matter of international relations is in fact not the as classicists believe.

Since the end of World War II, a great deal of changes has taken place that has made it necessary for looking at it from a different angle. The scientific theorists are deeply involved in their techniques and purposes and it is hardly possible to generalise about them. The scientific approach suffers from the serious flaw that it puts exclusive reliance on methods and tends to stress that the method itself will determine the nature of the subject matter. The scientific theorists seem to believe that the real crux of the subject matter of international relations would be revealed if they adopted the right methods and techniques. Both scientific and the classical methods are useful in the study of international relations.

5.0 SUMMARY

An approach consists of a criterion of selection, i. e. criteria employed in selecting the problems or questions to consider and selecting the data to bring to bear in the course

of analysis. The classical approach is also known as traditional approach. This approach was mainly in vogue until the middle of the last century, even though until now certain writers continue to subscribe to this approach. These writers mainly made descriptive analysis of international relations. The main objective of the scholars adopting traditional approach was to report and analyse current international problems and to speculate on these sources and outcomes of various policy alternatives for specific states or for international organisation. The two variants of the classical approach are; the realist approach and the idealist approach. The scientific or behavioural approach to the study of international politics became popular in the wake of World War II. It lays more emphasis on the methods of study rather than the subject matter. This approach relies on the simple proposition that international politics like any other social activity involves people and hence it could be explained by analysing and explaining the behaviour of people as it reflected in their activities in the field of international relations.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain clearly the traditional approach to the study of IR.
2. Explain in detail the realist approach to the study of IR.
3. Explain the usefulness of adopting a combination of approaches to the study of IR.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Palmer, Norman D. and Perkins, Howard C. *International Relations: The World Community in Transition*, 3rd Revised ed. A.I.T.B.S, Krishan Nagar, Delhi, 2004.

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MODULE 2**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW**

Unit 1 International Relations and International Politics

Unit 2 International Relations and International Law

Unit 3 International Relations and International Society

Unit 4 Ideology and International Relations

UNIT 1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**CONTENTS**

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 International Relations and International Politics

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In the past, some scholars used the terms, international relations and international politics interchangeably. However, modern students especially those who study political behaviour have come to question this usage. They postulate that a distinction ought to exist between the two terms. They believe that failure on the part of the earlier writers and practitioners of international affairs and diplomacy to make a distinction led to the semantic confusion in the study of IR today.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of the unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain the differences between IR and International politics.

2. Distinguish international politics from international relations.
3. Identify the components of international politics.
4. Identify the contents of international relations.
5. Establish that IR is a broader term than international politics.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 International Relations and International Politics

Modern scholars argue that international politics should deal with the politics of the international community focussing on the diplomacy and the relations among states and other political units.

According to this school of thought, international relations embraces the totality of the relations among peoples and groups in the world society. Those who subscribe to this broader and more nebulous term differ in the role they assign to international politics in international relations. Whereas some assign international politics a major role, others subordinate it to various cultural, social and psychological forces in the world environment. Taking a brief glance at the world around us, we find that some of the principal actors in world politics, the agents of international relations that make up the political landscape of our subject area, are not nations at all. A unique feature of recent studies of international relations and international politics, aside from theoretical activity and attempts to create new research techniques, has been the extent to which they have become interdisciplinary blending the data, concepts, and insights of all the social sciences. In the past, historians, political scientists, geographers, and legal scholars monopolized the field of international relations. Today, anthropologists, economists, sociologists, and psychologists enrich our understanding of international relations by bringing their special skills to problems of common interest or opening previously neglected areas of enquiry.

Most students of international relations concur to the view that international politics should be used primarily to denote official political relations between governments acting on behalf of their states. The term, international relations is broader and less easily circumscribed. Indeed, international relations is synonymous

with international affairs. To study IR is to become a generalist. It is to find a way of engaging with a hugely complex, but fascinating and politically urgent, aspect of our lives. Politics and

IR shares this multidisciplinary feature. Those aspects of our world that we describe as political form the framework of the world within which we live. International politics impacts on us from the price we pay for our shopping, to the laws our government imposes. IR embraces all kinds of relations traversing state boundaries, be they cultural, economic, legal, political, or any other character, whether they be private or official and all human behaviour originating on one side of a state boundary and affecting human behaviour on the other side of the boundary.

International relations is a broader term than international politics. Its study is constantly improved by the wider and more versatile approaches and methods of study. New insights and techniques are constantly used to enhance the understanding of the “core” and the “peripheral” aspects of IR. It is interesting to work fruitfully on the peripheries of a field without neglecting its central focus.

While the historians, economists, sociologists, geographers, anthropologists and other specialists make their distinctive contributions, the fact remains that the working relationships of states are conditioned principally by the enactments and engagement of governments. Finally, the use of "international relations" to mean essentially "international politics" is by no means a deliberate effort to exclude the non-political.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is international politics?
2. What differentiates international relations from International politics?
3. What distinguishes international politics from international relations?
4. What are the components of international politics?
5. What is the focus of international relations?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this unit, a distinction was established between international relations and international politics. Whereas, international politics deals with the politics of the international community focussing on the diplomacy and the relations among states and other political units, IR is a broader concept, which embraces the totality of the relations among peoples and groups in the world society. IR is synonymous with international affairs. It covers all kinds of relations traversing state boundaries. Most students would agree that the term international politics is used primarily to describe official political relations between governments acting on behalf of their states, although at least one political scientist has asserted, rather cryptically, that international politics today is not conducted between or- among nations, nor in its most important phases even between states. The term international relations is broader and less easily circumscribed.

As Stanley Hoffmann has suggested, “the discipline of international relations is concerned with the factors and activities which, affect the external policies and the power of the basic units into which the world is divided” and these include a wide variety of transnational relationships, political and non-political, official and unofficial, formal and informal.

5.0 SUMMARY

International relations is a broader and wider term that encompasses international politics. In the past, some scholars used the terms, international relations and international politics interchangeably. However, modern students especially those who study political behaviour have come to question this usage. They postulate that a distinction ought to exist between the two terms.

Whereas international politics denotes official political relations between governments acting on behalf of their states, international relations embraces the totality of the relations among peoples and groups in the world society. Indeed, IR embraces all kinds of relations traversing state boundaries, be they cultural, economic, legal, political, or any other character, whether they be private or official and all human behaviour originating on one side of a state boundary and affecting human

behaviour on the other side of the boundary. Indeed, International politics is part of international relations that deals with the political aspects of the relationships.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain the term, international politics.
2. Explain the differences between international politics and IR.
3. Assess the view that IR encompasses international politics.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Hans J Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1948.

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UNIT 2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**CONTENTS**

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 International Relations and International Law

3.2 Sources of International Law

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

International law is common to all states. It is the moral code of states in the international system. If all states in the international system obey international law, there will be no recourse to war. However, some writers are not comfortable with the term, “international law” saying that it implies the existence of a law over states. They argue that in reality, international law is a law among states not over them. International law is an aspect of international relations that moderates, regulates and controls the relationships between states in the international system.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain the meaning, nature and content of international law.
2. Explain the relationships between international law and IR.
3. Distinguish between international law and Municipal law.
4. Identify the various branches of international law.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 International Relations and International Law

International law has been variously defined by several scholars. To some scholars, international law is just an aspect of the municipal law. Others regard it as superior to the municipal laws. For example, in 1905, Oppenheim referred to international law as the name for the body of customary and conventional rules that are considered legally binding by civilized states in their intercourse with each other. In his words, it is a law for the intercourse of states with one another not a law for individuals; it is a law between, not above, the single states.

Undoubtedly, States are the subjects of international law, which means that they control access to dispute resolution tribunals or courts. They typically designate the adjudicators of such tribunals. States also implement, or fail to implement, the decisions of international tribunals or courts. Therefore, in interstate dispute resolution, states act as gatekeepers both to the international legal process and from that process back to the domestic level. Indeed, the tradition in international law has long been that only sovereign states have full international legal personality, this accords states an exclusive right to conclude international agreements and to bring claims regarding treaty violations.

According to Ellery Stowell, (1931) international law embodies certain rules relating to human relations throughout the world, which are generally observed by humankind and enforced primarily through the agency of the governments of the independent communities into which humanity is divided. The fundamental international legal principle of *pacta sunt servanda* means that the rules and commitments contained in legalized international agreements are regarded as obligatory, subject to various defences or exceptions, and not to be disregarded as preferences change. They must be performed in good faith regardless of inconsistent provisions of domestic law. There is a strong connection between international politics, international law, and domestic politics. Clearly, the power and preferences of states influence the behaviour of both governments and of dispute resolution tribunals. In fact, international law operates in the shadow of power.

Essentially, international law provides the framework for political discourse among members of the international system. The framework does not guarantee consensus, but it does foster the discourse and participation needed to provide conceptual clarity in developing legal obligations and gaining their acceptance. In playing this role, international law performs two different functions. One is to provide mechanisms for cross-border interactions, and the other is to shape the values and goals these interactions are pursuing. The first set of functions are called the “operating system” of international law, and the second set of functions are the “normative system.”

Similarly, international law provides principles for the interpretation of agreements and a variety of technical rules on such matters as formation, reservation, and amendments. Breach of a legal obligation is understood to create legal responsibility, which does not require a showing of intent on the part of specific state organs.

Establishing a commitment as a legal rule invokes a particular form of discourse. Although actors may disagree about the interpretation or applicability of a set of rules, discussion of issues purely in terms of interests or power is no longer legitimate. In transnational dispute resolution, by contrast, access to courts and tribunals and the subsequent enforcement of their decisions are legally insulated from the will of individual national governments. In the pure ideal type, states lose their gate keeping capacities though in practice, these capacities are exaggerated. This loss of state control, whether voluntarily or unwittingly surrendered, creates a range of opportunities for courts and their constituencies to set the agenda. Yet within that political context, institutions for selecting judges, controlling access to dispute resolution, and legally enforcing the judgments of international courts and tribunals have a major impact on state behaviour.

The purpose of this unit is to describe the basic components of the operating and normative systems as a conceptual framework for analyzing and understanding international law. In a preliminary fashion, the interaction of these two systems are explored, specifically the conditions under which operating system changes occur in response to normative changes. It also discusses the steps taken by states to change international legal rules so that this norm could influence state behaviour.

International law remains principally a body of rules and practices to regulate state behaviour in the conduct of interstate relations. Much of international law also regulates the conduct of governments and the behaviour of individuals within states, and may address issues that require transnational cooperation. Human rights law is an example of the normative system regulating behaviour within states. Today, participants in the international legal process include more than 190 states and governments, international institutions created by states, and elements of the private sector – multinational corporations and financial institutions, networks of individuals, and NGOs.

3.2 Sources of International Law

Municipal laws come from central authorities- legislators or dictators. However, states are sovereign and recognise no central authority, thus international law rests on different basis. The declarations of the UN General Assembly are not laws, and most do not bind the members. Four sources of international law are identifiable- treaties, customs, general principles of law and legal scholarship (including past judicial decisions). Treaties and other written conventions signed by states are the most important source. A principle in international law states that treaties, once signed and ratified must be observed (*pacta sunt servanda*). States violate the terms of treaties they have signed only if the matter is very important or the penalties for such a violation seem very small. Treaties and other international obligations such as debts are binding on successor governments whether the new government takes power through election, a coup or a revolution.

The second major source of international law is Custom. When states behave towards each other in a certain way for a long time, their behaviour becomes generally accepted practice with the status of law.

Thirdly, general principles of law serve as a source of international law. Actions such as theft and assault recognized in most national municipal laws as crimes have the same meaning in international arena. For instance, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was illegal under treaties signed by Iraq (including the UN Charter and that of the

Arab League) and under the custom both countries had established of living in peace as sovereign states.

The fourth source of international law is legal scholarship. These are the written arguments of judges and lawyers around the world on issues in question. Only the writings of the most highly qualified and respected legal figures could be recognized, and then only to resolve points not resolved by the first three sources of international law.

3.3 The Legality of International Law

Some writers, especially those of the Austinian school argue that, what is called international law is not law at all but a branch of international morality. Others argue that it is a matter of definition, yet another group staunchly defend the validity of the term. It has also been argued that international law is not true law because it is not binding.

The Austinian definition holds that law is a rule of conduct issued by a superior authority to persons over whom it has jurisdiction. From the foregoing, Austin argued that international law is not true law since neither the UN nor any other international organization has jurisdiction over states. Some writers who insist on measuring international law with municipal law believe that the absence of centralized legislative and judicial authority disqualifies international law as true law.

The dual character of international law results from its Westphalian legacy in which law functions among, rather than above, states and in which the state carries out the legislative, judicial, and executive functions that in domestic legal systems are performed by separate institutions. The operating system of international law therefore functions in some ways as a constitution does in a domestic legal system— by setting out the consensus of its constituent actors on distribution of authority and responsibilities for governance within the system. Legal capacity can be expressed and recognized in terms of rights and duties, and is a major portion of constitutions. Nevertheless, constitutions also provide more. Dahl identified a number of items that constitutions generally specify, several of which are also specified by international law. These include competent decisions, accountability, and ensuring stability, to

name a few. In order for the operating system to maintain vibrancy and resiliency, and to ensure the stability necessary for orderly behaviour, the operating system must provide for dynamic normative systems that facilitate the competition of values, views, and actors. It does so by applying the constitutional functions as described above when including new actors, new issues, new structures, and new norms.

For instance, who are the authorized decision makers in international law? Whose actions can bind not only the parties involved, but also others? How does one know that an authoritative decision has taken place? When does the resolution of a conflict or a dispute give rise to new law? The operating system answers these questions. Note, in particular, that where the operating system may be associated with formal structures, not all operating system elements are institutional. For example, the Vienna Convention on Treaties entails no institutional mechanisms, but does specify various operational rules about treaties and therefore the parameters of lawmaking.

The operating system has a number of dimensions or components, typically covered in international law textbooks, but largely unconnected with one another. Some of the primary components include the following:

- **Sources of Law:** These include the system rules for defining the process through which law is formed, the criteria for determining when legal obligations exist, and which actors are bound (or not) by that law. This element of the operating system also specifies a hierarchy of different legal sources. For example, the operating system defines whether United Nations (UN) resolutions are legally binding and what role they play in the legal process.
- **Actors:** This dimension includes determining which actors are eligible to have rights and obligations under the law. The operating system also determines how, and the degree to which, those actors might exercise those rights internationally. For example, individuals and multinational corporations may enjoy certain international legal protections, but those rights might only be asserted in international forums by their home states.
- **Jurisdiction:** These rules define the rights of actors and institutions to deal with legal problems and violations. An important element is defining what problems or situations will be handled through national legal systems as opposed to

international forums. For example, the Convention on Torture (1985) allows states to prosecute perpetrators in their custody, regardless of the location of the offense and the nationality of the perpetrator or victim, affirming the “universal jurisdiction” principle.

- **Courts or Institutions:** These elements create forums and accompanying rules under which international legal disputes might be heard or decisions might be enforced. Thus for example, the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides for the creation of the institution, sets general rules of decision making, identifies the processes and scope under which cases are heard, specifies the composition of the court, and details decision-making procedures to name a few.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is international law?
2. Who are the subjects of international law?
3. What are the sources of international law?
4. Why is international law seen as no law by Austin and his group?
5. What does international law provide to states?
6. What is the relationship between international law and international relations?
7. What distinguishes international law from Municipal law?
8. What are the various branches of international law?

4.0 CONCLUSION

States are the subjects of international law, which means that they control access to dispute resolution tribunals or courts. They typically designate the adjudicators of such tribunals. States also implement, or fail to implement, the decisions of international tribunals or courts. Therefore, in interstate dispute resolution, states act as gatekeepers both to the international legal process and from that process back to the domestic level. Indeed, the tradition in international law has long been that only sovereign states have full international legal personality, this accords states an exclusive right to conclude international agreements and to bring claims regarding treaty violations. In this section, we discussed international law and international

relations. There is a strong connection between international politics, international law, and domestic politics. Clearly, the power and preferences of states influence the behaviour of both governments and of dispute resolution tribunals. To be sure, international law operates in the shadow of power.

International law provides the framework for political discourse among members of the international system. The framework does not guarantee consensus, but it does foster the discourse and participation needed to provide conceptual clarity in developing legal obligations and gaining their acceptance. In playing this role, international law performs two different functions. One is to provide mechanisms for cross-border interactions, and the other is to shape the values and goals these interactions are pursuing. Some scholars find it difficult to agree with the term, international law since all states are sovereign and equal in the international system. International law differs from municipal law in that municipal laws emanate from central legislative or executive authorities that is lacking in the international system.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have studied that international law is the law among civilized states that interact in the international system. Indeed, states are the subjects of international law, which means that they control access to dispute resolution tribunals or courts. They typically designate the adjudicators of such tribunals. States also implement, or fail to implement, the decisions of international tribunals or courts.

Therefore, in interstate dispute resolution, states act as gatekeepers both to the international legal process and from that process back to the domestic level. Indeed, the tradition in international law has long been that only sovereign states have full international legal personality, this accords states an exclusive right to conclude international agreements and to bring claims regarding treaty violations. There is a strong connection between international politics, international law, and domestic politics. Clearly, the power and preferences of states influence the behaviour of both governments and of dispute resolution tribunals. In fact, international law operates in the shadow of power.

International law provides the framework for political discourse among members of the international system. The framework does not guarantee consensus, but it does foster the discourse and participation needed to provide conceptual clarity in developing legal obligations and gaining their acceptance. Treaties, customs, general principles of law and legal scholarship are the sources of international law.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain the nexus between international law and IR.
2. Examine the following statement: “There is nothing like international law, what we have is international positive morality.”
3. Explain the sources of international law.
4. Assess the view that without internal law, international relations will be impossible.

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UNIT 3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 International Relations and International Society

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

International relations is used to describe all the interactions taking place between actors in the international system. The international system consists among others of political, economic, physical and cultural environment. The international society consists of states that interact through their governing elites. The international system is the prevailing structure of the international community. It is about the political, social, economic and information structure at any given time. An international system is a collection of independent political entities- tribes, city-states, nations or empires that interact with considerable frequency and according to regularized processes.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain the meaning of IR
2. Identify the international society.
3. Establish the link between IR and the international society.
4. Define the international system.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 International Relations and International Society

The present nation-state system emerged in 1648 when European diplomats and princes congregated in Westphalia to sign a peace treaty that ended the thirty years war. This vital feature of our political landscape continues to shape the internal system 365 years after. The Peace of Westphalia incorporated the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück and officially put an end to the long wars between Protestant and Catholic powers that had raged across the continent. The significance of this treaty is that it put an end to the dominion of the leader of the Holy Roman Empire into the territories of princes and sovereigns.

Before this time, the groups and individuals in Western Europe existed with loyalty to a few feudal Lords or central monarch and not to the state. A history of the practice of war, diplomacy and international law offers intriguing insights into the nature of modern international society and the politics of what Hedley Bull famously called the anarchical society. The key is to recognize that a grasp of the nature of the balance of power is essential to a grasp of IR. This is not just, because it helps us understand how the great powers of modern Europe acted and offers insights into the conduct of European statecraft. The modern European states system has been hugely successful and influential. What started as a political settlement to a European problem eventually spread across the globe. Thereafter, the Westphalian system became the universal system of international politics. Until date, this trend still underpins contemporary international relations.

Undoubtedly, a functioning international system requires a high degree of interaction, and it is most effective when safeguarded by a supporting community structure. The international society provides the platform for interaction between states that remain the principal actor in international relations. Integration is one of the central themes in the interdisciplinary approach to international relations. Studies of past and present tendencies towards integration as well as towards conflict in the international community suggest factors that have important bearing on contemporary diplomacy and political behaviour.

Scholars like Karl W. Deutsch, Amitai Etzioni, and Ernst B. Haas have all analysed experiments in integration, successful, unsuccessful, past, and contemporary. In fact, Deutsch who was the first academic to propound community approach to international relations concluded that most cases of successful integration occurred in the pre-modern era. However, Etzioni disagrees with this view. He posits that conditions are ripest in modern times for the formation of transnational structures.

The international society approach to IR theory, often referred to as the ‘English school’ or the Grotian School exists outside the mainstream social science debates that dominate US international studies. Its own rich history characterizes its attempts to avoid the polarization seen in the debates between realists and liberals and by its commitment to the study of what Hedley Bull, one of the school’s chief contributors calls ‘the anarchical society.

The English school approach recognizes that anarchy is a structural feature of international relations but also recognizes that sovereign states form a society that uses conceptions of order and justice in its rhetoric and its calculations. Therefore, the approach looks at balance of power and international law, great power politics and the spread of cosmopolitan values. The great strength of the approach is its refusal to engage with the positivist methodological turn in IR.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is the meaning of international society?
2. What are the components of the international society?
3. What is the international system?
4. What provides the platform of interaction?
5. Why is anarchy a structural feature of international relations?

4.0 CONCLUSION

International system may be studied historically or from the perspectives of contemporary world politics. Contemporary international system may be constructed based on concepts, such as bipolarity, multi-polarity or other versions of polarity. A history of the practice of war, diplomacy and international law offers intriguing insights into the nature of modern international society and the politics of what Hedley

Bull famously called the anarchical society. The key is to recognize that a grasp of the nature of the balance of power is essential to a grasp of IR. This is not just, because it helps us understand how the great powers of modern Europe acted and offers insights into the conduct of European statecraft.

The modern European states system has been hugely successful and influential. What started as a political settlement to a European problem eventually spread across the globe. Thereafter, the Westphalian system became the universal system of international politics. Indeed, the defining character of the international society remains the Westphalian model that emerged in 1648.

5.0 SUMMARY

The emergence of the modern international system in 1648 marked the effective beginning of an international society that allows for considerable interaction between states in the international system. This vital feature of our political landscape continues to shape the internal system 365 years after. The Peace of Westphalia incorporated the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück and officially put an end to the long wars between Protestant and Catholic powers that had raged across the continent. The significance of this treaty is that it put an end to the dominion of the leader of the Holy Roman Empire into the territories of princes and sovereigns. The ‘international society’ approach to IR theory, often referred to as the ‘English school’ or the Grotian School, exists outside the mainstream social science debates that dominate US international studies. Its own rich history characterizes its attempts to avoid the polarization seen in the debates between realists and liberals and by its commitment to the study of what Hedley Bull, one of the school’s chief contributors calls ‘the anarchical society.’

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain why the international society is described as the anarchical society.
2. Explain the Grotian school of international relations.
3. Explain the view that the international society is the arena where states interact.

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UNIT 4 IDEOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 Ideology and International Relations

4.0 Conclusion

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6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The word ideology is a common term in the vocabulary of international relations. Indeed, the main issues that divide nations and peoples are ideological in nature, and conflicting ideologies are a major cause of war in the international arena. An ideology is a cluster of ideas about life, society or government, which originate through consciously advocated or dogmatically asserted social, political or religious slogans or battle cries, and which through continuous usage gradually become the characteristic beliefs or dogmas of a particular group, party or nationality.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain the meaning and nature of ideologies.
2. Explain the origin and intrusion of ideology into World politics.
3. Explain the relationship between ideology and international relations.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Ideology and International Politics

The most common way ideology is defined is as “a fairly coherent and comprehensive set of ideas that explains and evaluates social conditions, helps people understand

their place in society, and provides a program for social and political action. A ready-made set of meanings and interpretations can help us to make sense of our world and tell us how to act in relation to our world.

Indeed, an ideology presupposes a system of ideas, usually a closed system put together in some logical way. The word ideology is applicable to a great variety of the moving ideas of international life. Examples of “conscious ideologies” are liberalism, conservatism, socialism, feminism, nationalism, anti-imperialism, totalitarianism, communism, fascism, Nazism, Marxism, socialism, liberalism, collectivism, individualism and even vegetarianism. Conscious ideologies are easily identifiable. We know what they are, and we can subscribe to them or reject them. Largely, democracy is an ideology in many respects, the same is true of the major religions particularly the proselytizing ones such as Christianity and Islam.

Ideologies may be classified in a variety of ways. For instance, Hans Morgenthau discusses certain typical ideologies of foreign policies under three headings: (1) ideologies of the status quo, such as peace and international law (2) ideologies of imperialism and (3) those ideologies that appear to be somewhat ambiguous, such as the principle of national self-determination.

Undoubtedly, ideologies became an important factor in international relations after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917. In fact, the Bolshevik emphasized ideological factors, and Western reactions to the consolidation of Communist control over a major state also had intense ideological overtones. The struggle between Democracy and Communism or as the Soviets described it, between Socialism and Capitalism dominated international relations in the greater part of the twentieth century. The rise of Fascism and Nazism in the 1930s further complicated the international ideological picture.

Therefore, one can argue that World War II was in part an ideological conflict as World War I had also been. At the end of World War II, ideologies dominated the international system from 1947 to 1990 when communism collapsed. The Cold War that led to the bifurcation of the international system into East/West blocs may be viewed as an ideological conflict as well as a test of strength and will between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies.

Indeed, the infusion of ideology into world politics is a twentieth century phenomenon. While its development produced a new cohesiveness within some nations and groups of nations, it exerted a disturbing and dangerous influence in others. To be sure, ideologies are sources of international conflicts and they greatly complicate the task of the peaceful resolution of conflicts. During the Cold War, the split between the Communist and non-Communist worlds constituted one of the major threats to peace. This is true because when strongly held ideology comes into conflict with other strongly held ideologies, international crises are bound to occur and solutions are bound to be more elusive.

Understandably, ideologies may be good or bad depending on the situation. Ideologies give strength to worthy causes, unity to nations and a sense of common interest to peoples in different parts of the world. In examining ideology and IR, it is important to know that IR is a site of cultural practices imbued with conscious and unconscious ideologies. Today, there is a claim that ideological struggles are over. This is precisely what Francis Fukuyama claims in his famous 1989 essay "The End of History?" and later elaborates on in his book *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992). Fukuyama argues that liberal democracy as a system of governance has won an "unabashed victory" over other ideas to the point that liberalism is the only legitimate ideology left in the world. Not only are there no coherent ideological challenges to liberalism; liberalism itself is free of irrational internal contradictions that lead to the collapse of ideologies. Having no internal contradictions means, that liberalism is a finished idea. For Fukuyama, all this marks "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution" signifying that liberalism is "the final form of human government." In his view, because the history of the conflict of ideas in the form of ideological struggle is now over, all that is remaining is to spread liberal ideology throughout the world as a material way of life, through social, political, and economic institutions.

Today, in many countries, it may be argued that ideologies have lost their old appeal, however, in international politics this seems to be less true. Indeed, it is premature to talk of the end of ideology in international relations.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is the meaning of ideology?
2. List some examples of conscious ideologies in international relations.
3. Identify the components of ideologies of the status quo.
4. Mention the two ideologies that dominated the Cold War era.
5. Did the collapse of the USSR mark the end of Communism?
6. What is the relationship between ideology and international relations?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Throughout the twentieth century, most of international relations centred on ideological issues with complicate and obstruct efforts to emphasize long-range problems and needs. The primary issues that divide nations and peoples are ideological in nature, and conflicting ideologies are a major cause of war in the international arena. Ideologies became an important factor in international relations after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917. In fact, the Bolshevik emphasized ideological factors, and Western reactions to the consolidation of Communist control over a major state also had intense ideological overtones. Since the end of World War II, ideology has had powerful impact in international relations. The term, ideology can be applied to a great variety of moving ideas in the international arena.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, the meaning and nature of ideologies were discussed. An ideology presupposes a system of ideas, usually a closed system put together in some logical way. The word ideology is applicable to a great variety of the moving ideas of international life. Examples of “conscious ideologies” are liberalism, conservatism, socialism, feminism, nationalism, anti-imperialism, totalitarianism, communism, fascism, Nazism, Marxism, socialism, liberalism, collectivism, individualism and even vegetarianism. Conscious ideologies are easily identifiable. The introduction of ideology into world politics is a twentieth century phenomenon. While its development produced a new cohesiveness within some nations and groups of nations, it exerted a disturbing and dangerous influence in others. To be sure, ideologies are

sources of international conflicts and they greatly complicate the task of the peaceful resolution of conflicts. During the Cold War, the split between the Communist and non-Communist worlds constituted one of the major threats to peace. Fukuyama argues that liberal democracy as a system of governance has won an “unabashed victory” over other ideas to the point that liberalism is the only legitimate ideology left in the world. Not only are there no coherent ideological challengers to liberalism; liberalism itself is free of irrational internal contradictions that lead to the collapse of ideologies.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Critically examine the view that ideology is a disturbing element in world affairs.
2. Explain the origins of ideology in international politics.
3. Explain the relationship between ideology and international relations.
4. Assess the view that the collapse of Communism signified a victory for Democracy.

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MODULE 3

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Unit 1 The Evolution and Structure of the International System

Unit 2 Power

Unit 3 Power Theory

Unit 4 Diplomacy

Unit 5 International Regimes

UNIT 1 THE EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

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3.2 The Boundaries of the System

3.3 Actors in the International System

3.3.1 State Actors

3.3.2 Non-State Actors

3.3.3 Classification of Non-State Actors

3.4 The Structure of the International System

3.4.1 The Contemporary International System

3.5 The Forms of Interaction

3.6 The Rules and Norms of Interaction

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The unit discusses the structure and characteristics of the international system. It identifies the character of the actors and describes the extent to which power determines the structure of inter-relationships within the system.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

Students should be able to:

1. Describe the characteristics of the international system
2. Identify the nature and type of actors in the international system
3. Explain the rules of interaction
4. Describe the historical and contemporary structure of the international system
5. Demonstrate a basic understanding of how the interaction between these actors is regulated by international norms and institutions.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The International System: The Arena of Interaction

International Relations occur through the regularised interactive processes among state and non-state actors. These interactions take place within an arena called the *international system*. Although interactions take numerous and diverse forms they can be classified either by *type* or *issue areas*. Issue areas include trade and commerce, security, tourism, finance, technology transfer, cultural exchange, sports, educational exchange, immigration, crime and criminality, etc. The classification by type shows that irrespective of the issue area interactions are either *conflictual* or *collaborative*. Conflict and cooperation are the dualities of interaction and are therefore pervasive, permanent and inherent characteristics of international relations. The international system has the following identifiable characteristics.

3.2 The Boundaries of the System

All International Systems have identifiable boundaries outside which the actions and interactions among the constituent political units do not affect the environment. Similarly, events or conditions outside the system's boundary do not affect the actions of the political units. Hence, the boundaries of the system refer to the line between

interaction and the environment. Historically, the Western Sudan, the environment that gave rise to the ancient empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai, constituted an international system. Interactions in this system had no effect whatsoever on Medieval Europe or China or the Americas. In due source, however, this situation was reversed following the gradual extension of European power and influence overseas from the 15th century. The expansion, which followed a historical sequence—the voyages of discovery, the slave trade, and colonization—ultimately incorporated the West African sub-region into the European international system.

3.3 Actors in the International System

At the most general level, an actor in world politics has been defined as “any entity which plays an identifiable role in international relations.” In his seminal essay “The Actors in World Politics,” published in 1972, Oran Young define an actor in world politics as “any organized entity that is composed, at least indirectly, of human beings, is not wholly subordinate to any other actor in the world system in effective terms, and participates in power relationships with other actors.” In general, actors are classified into two: **state** and **non-state** actors.

3.3.1 State Actors

Traditionally state actors are considered the most powerful actors in the international system. States have four characteristics:

1. Territory
2. A sovereign central government
3. A loyal population
4. Recognition by other states

Historically actors have been organised as city-states, empires and kingdoms, and in contemporary times as states or nation-states of varying sizes and configurations. In terms of political organisation state actors are classified as totalitarian, democratic, militaristic, and ideologically as capitalist, socialist, welfarist, communist or an admixture. Each political unit is independent and sovereign and is ready to deploy all its power and capabilities in defence of its status.

Since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 which ended the Thirty Years War legitimised the state System, states or nation-states have been considered the primary actors in the international system. This is the central paradigm of the school of thought known as Realism or the Realist school. Realists base their position on three fundamental assumptions:

- The state-centric assumption whereby states are the primary and only important actors in world politics;
- The rationality assumption whereby states are analysed as if they were rational and unitary actors;
- The power assumption whereby states primarily seek power, most often military power, both as a means and as an end in itself.

Although these assumptions do not establish a genuine scientific basis, they had a definite appeal because they were easily applicable to the practical problems of international relations. The key to understanding the assumptions of political Realism lies in the concept of power. As Hans Morgenthau asserts in his book, *Politics among Nations* (1949, p. 13), “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.” He asserts further that “All political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power.” (1949, p. 21). As states alone have the necessary resources to exercise power, they are consequently the most important actors. In Morgenthau's view the obvious measure of a nation's power is found in military strength. Such power is the main determinant for the place of state actors in the hierarchically-arranged international system the agenda of which is dominated by security concerns (Morgenthau, 1949, p. 54).

The state, acting through its government, is seen as a unitary and rational actor which pursues, above all, national interests and competes in this matter with other nation-states in an environment characterized by anarchy. Realists maintain that governments act rationally because they have ordered preferences. Governments calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies so as to choose those practices that maximize their interests.

It is thus the structural constraints of the international system that will explain the behaviour of the units, not the other way around. In contrast to behavioural and

reductionist approaches which try to explain international politics in terms of its main actors, structural Realism accounts for the behaviour of the units as well as international outcomes in terms of the character of the system or changes in it (Waltz, 1979, pp. 69-72). Waltz maintains that: States set the scene in which they, along with non-state actors, stage their dramas or carry on their humdrum affairs. Though they may choose to interfere little in the affairs of non-state actors for long periods of time, states nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse, whether by passively permitting informal rules to develop or by actively intervening to change rules that no longer suit them. When the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate (Waltz, 1979, p. 94). According to Waltz (1979, p. 95), states are the units whose interactions form the structure of the international-political systems. They will long remain so. The death rate among states is remarkably low. Few states die; many firms do.

3.3.2 Non-State Actors

The growth of non-state actors, particularly multinational corporations (MNCs), international organizations such as the United Nations, and transnationally organized groups, in the post-World War II period, led to the abandonment of the traditional view which saw states as the only actors in the international system. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were among the first scholars to call for a revision of the state-centric paradigm, because it failed to recognize the importance of non-state actors. In their 1971 essay collection *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, they identify the phenomena of “transnational interaction” which they define as “the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government” (Keohane and Nye, 1971, p. 332). The authors highlight the importance of nongovernmental actors in a great number of international interactions. They present a number of case studies examining such varied transnational actors and behaviour as multinational cooperation, foundations, churches, revolutionary movements, labour unions and scientific networks. They conclude that the state is no longer the only important actor in world politics. In “Analyzing Non-State Actors in World Politics,” Gustaaf Geeraerts has described the phenomenal growth of non-state

actors as follows: One of the most prominent features of the global political system in the second half of the twentieth century is the significant surge in numbers and importance of non-state entities. With the growth of interdependence and communication between societies, a great variety of new organizational structures, operating on a regional and global basis, have been established. The rise of these transnationally organized non-state actors and their growing involvement in world politics challenge the assumptions of traditional approaches to international relations which assume that states are the only important units of the international system. While some authors recognize that these non-sovereign entities and their activities have led to fundamental changes in world politics, others maintain that the structure of the international system can still be treated on the basis of inter-state relations.

To test the assumption of the growing importance of non-state actors, a series of empirical studies was carried out during the 1970s. Kjell Skjelsbaek, in his essay "The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century" (1971), gathered a vast amount of empirical data showing the rapid growth of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) since 1900 and particularly after World War II. He found that the number of INGOs had grown from 1012 in 1954 to 1899 in 1968. While the number of INGOs increased on an average of 4.7 % per year from 1954 to 1968, the annual growth rate was 6.2 % between 1962 and 1968 (Skjelsbaek, 1971, p. 425). In his examination of the distribution of INGOs by field of activity, he found that the categories of economic/financial organizations and commercial/ industrial organizations constituted the greatest percentage of organizations established in the period 1945-54 (Skjelsbaek, 1971, p. 429).

Another empirical study was carried out by Richard Mansbach et al. in *The Web of World Politics: Non-state actors in the Global System* (1976). In this study, the authors contend that the state-centric model has become 'obsolete' due to the growing involvement of non-state actors in world politics (Mansbach et al., 1976, p. 273). Relying on the Non-State Actor Project (NOSTAC), they use 'events data' in three regions - Western Europe, the Middle East and Latin America - from 1948 to 1972 to investigate empirically the emergence and behaviour of non-state actors

(Mansbach et al., 1976, pp. 14-15). Their findings indicate that half of the interactions in the regions involve nation-states as actors and targets simultaneously and that eleven percent involves non-state actors exclusively. The authors conclude that only half of the dyads can be analyzed from a state-centric point of view because the remaining half of the combinations includes non-state actors (Mansbach et al., 1976, pp. 275-76).

Richard Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, in their 1981 explorative work *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics* carried out a similar study to argue for an alternative paradigm based on non-state actors. In this study, they use a data-set of event interactions between American-based and West German-based actors during the period 1949-1975 (Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981, p. 16). In the first part of their study, they rank order the number of actors that appear in their data according to the frequency of their behaviour. Of the thirty actors that appear in their study, nine are nongovernmental actors (4), two of which (individual US congressmen and West German political parties) rank eleventh and twelfth in frequency of behaviour. The authors then investigate the rank order of actors by per cent of conflict they initiate and receive to indicate that non-state actors are not only present but also significant in world politics. Nine of the ten most conflict prone actors in their study are non-state actors and 18 of the 25 non-state actors are conflict-prone. Only eight of the twenty-six governments in the study are involved in any conflict at all (Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981, pp. 17-19). Their findings also suggest the importance of examining the role of bureaucratic agencies as individual actors because their results show that there are “significant deviations from the conflict score of specific agencies of a government and the aggregate score for the national government as a whole” (Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981, p. 21). Under conditions of complex interdependence, Keohane and Nye view non-state actors as possible direct participants in world politics. The existence of multiple channels of contacts among societies implies that transnational actors, trans-governmental relations and international organizations play an active role in world politics. The authors argue that transnational actors such as multinational firms, private banks and other organizations have become “a normal part of foreign as well as domestic relations” (Keohane & Nye, 1977, 1989, p. 26). These

actors are important not only because of their activities in pursuit of their own interests, but also because they 'act as transmission belts, making government policies in various countries more sensitive to one another' (Keohane & Nye, 1977, 1989, p. 26).

The recognition that states are not the only actors in the international system led to the introduction of what Oron Young described as the "Mixed-Actor Perspective." In his 1972 article "The Actors in World Politics" Young proposed a conceptual framework challenging the single-actor model of the state-centric view of politics. According to Young (1972, p. 136), "the basic notion of a system of mixed actors requires a movement away from the assumption of homogeneity with respect to types of actor and, therefore, a retreat from the postulate of the state as the fundamental unit in world politics. Instead, the mixed-actor world view envisions a situation in which several quantitatively different types of actor interact in the absence of any settled pattern of dominance-submission or hierarchical relationships."

3.3.3 Classification of Non-State Actors

Scholars of international relations often disagree over how to classify non-state actors in world politics. Because the study of transnational relations and non-state actors is a relatively new phenomenon, much of the terminology used for classifying actors is unclear and contradictory. Especially, the definition of transnational organizations appears to pose a lot of conceptual difficulties. Another problem concerns the categorization of more complex non-state actors that are neither purely governmental nor purely private in nature. These kinds of mixed organizations, of which the International Labour Organization is a classic example, are not recognized as a separate category of actors in conventional classification schemes.

An initial classification of non-state actors distinguishes between two major types of international organizations: **International Governmental Organizations** (IGOs) and **International Non-Governmental Organizations** (INGOs). These two categories have been recognized as the main non-state actors alongside the traditional state actors.

Both IGOs and INGOs are alike in having participants from more than one state. An IGO is defined as an “institutional structure created by agreement among two or more sovereign states for the conduct of regular political interactions” (Jacobson, 1984, p. 8). The constituent members of IGOs are states and their representatives are governmental agents. This type of organization has meetings of the state representatives at relatively frequent intervals, detailed procedures for decision making, and a permanent secretariat. The most well known contemporary IGO is the United Nations. Other examples are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the International Trade Organization (ITO), the European Union, the Economic Community of West Africa States, ECOWAS, and the African Union (AU). In these organisations sovereignty rests in the hands of the member states. These are multi-lateral institutions. IGOs are viewed as permanent networks linking states because they are largely dependent on the voluntary actions of the member states for the implementation of their decisions.

INGOs also have states as their constituent members, but the state representatives are non-governmental agents. Furthermore, these organizations are non-profit making entities whose members range from private associations to individuals. Like IGOs, they have a permanent secretariat, regular scheduled meetings of representatives of the membership, and specified procedures for decision making. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the International Chamber of Commerce are two examples of INGOs. The distinction between IGOs and INGOs, however, is not always clear because a number of international organizations allow for both governmental and non-governmental representation. A great number of organizations within the communication and transport services are difficult to categorize because they have a mixed membership and are subject to varying amounts of governmental controls. Organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Telecommunication Union and certain other international organizations, although composed primarily of governments, also allow the participation of such private associations as, for example, labour unions, employers groups and manufacturers of telecommunications equipment.

To overcome this classification problem, many authors choose to follow the conventional practice of using a UN decision whereby IGOs are defined as organizations established by intergovernmental treaty and INGOs are defined as “any international organization which has not been established by an inter-governmental agreement” including those which accept governmental agencies or ministries as members (Union of International Associations, 1990, p. 1643). INGOs are international organizations with individuals or private groups as members, such as the World Council of Churches, Red Cross, and Amnesty International. Multinational Corporations (MNCs), terrorist groups, are also classified as non-state actors. A final category of non-state actors are Non-Governmental organisations or NGOs which are established usually to pursue social and humanitarian causes, promote self-help projects to help the poor, family planning, poverty alleviation, a host of related objectives.

3.4 The Structure of the International System

The structure examines the distribution of power and influence in the system, particularly the forms of dominant and subordinate relationships. Sometimes, as the history of the Western Sudan reveals, power is concentrated disproportionately in one state, as it was in Ghana Empire, Mali Empire, Oyo Empire or the Asante Kingdom, etc. Another example is the contemporary international system in which, following the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States has emerged as the only hyperpower, the most powerful state in the world, with a preponderance of power incomparable to that of any other state, or a group of states for that matter. Such a system is described structurally as unipolar.

In other historic international systems, such as in Europe from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, power is distributed equally among a large number of states in such a way that none is capable of dominating or leading the others for any length of time. This is a multipolar system. Sometimes the structure is bipolar. The system is structured into two or more antagonistic blocs of states, each led by a state of superior strength. This was the structure of the international system during the cold war, i.e., between the end of World War II and the collapse of the Soviet Union (from

about 1947 to 1990). The two blocs were the United State and its NATO allies in the West; the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites in the East.

The structure paradigm reveals the great or major powers in each system, the nature of their dominance, and their relationship with other political units. It also reveals the degree of stratification within the system, the major subsystems, the most important rivalries, issues, alliances, blocs, or international organizations.

It is thus the structural constraints of the international system that will explain the behaviour of the units, not the other way around. In contrast to behavioural and reductionist approaches which try to explain international politics in terms of its main actors, structural Realism accounts for the behaviour of the units as well as international outcomes in terms of the character of the system or changes in it (Waltz, 1979, pp. 69-72). A system, according to Waltz, is composed of a structure and interacting units (Waltz, 1979, p. 79). The structure of the international system is characterized both by anarchy and by the interaction among like units - the states (Waltz, 1979, p. 93). States have to be treated as like units because their goals are similar. Although states may vary in size, wealth, power and form, they are functionally similar (Waltz, 1979, pp. 96-97). As Waltz (1979, p. 88) contends, the parts of international-political systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic.

The only element of the international structure that varies is the distribution of capabilities across the system's units. The structure of the international system will therefore change only with changes in the distribution of power. As Waltz (1979, p. 99) puts it: "in defining international-political structures we take states with whatever traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government they may have. We do not ask whether states are revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic. We abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities." In arguing for his choice of states as the units of the system, Waltz contends that the international structure has to be defined not by all actors within it but only by the major ones (Waltz, 1979, p. 93). According to Waltz, it is the units of greatest capability that will 'set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves'

(Waltz, 1979, p. 72). This entails that the most powerful actors will define the structure of the international system. International politics, according to Waltz, is like economics where the structure of a market is defined by the number of firms that compete in it (Waltz, 1979, p. 93.).

3.4.1 The Contemporary International System

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, international relations was largely a European affair with not more than twenty countries fully engaged in the interaction process. The dominant states in this period were the so-called great powers namely, Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia (later Germany). The extension of the European state system into the rest of the world in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the subsequent emergence of over 200 independent political units in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and in other corners of the world has created a truly global international system. In essence the boundary of the contemporary international system is global in scope and dimension. The system has a multiplicity of actors which can be grouped broadly into two categories, namely, states and non-state actors. Some non-state actors such as multinational corporations, international organisations and terrorist groups exercise significant and often disproportionate influence on the system. There is a great diversity in the size, population resource endowment, military capability economic strength and industrial capacity among the state actors. This has created relationships of dependence and interdependence among the state actors. The rules of interaction revolve around the concepts of sovereignty, territorial integrity and equality of states. The system places premium on such normative values as democracy, human rights, freedom and free enterprise.

In the contemporary international system the existence of nuclear weapons restrains war between the major powers. The danger however lies with terrorists networks. Groups like Al Qaeda have demonstrated their capacity to precipitate conflict that could lead to the death of millions, if they could lay their hands on nuclear weapons. Unlike in previous systems states no longer have a monopoly of the

instruments of violence. This new reality distinguishes the contemporary international system from all historic systems.

3.5 The Forms of Interaction

These interactions are adversarial or collaborative and take the form of diplomatic contacts, trade, rivalries, war, sports, culture, tourism, immigration, etc.

3.6 The Rules and Norms of Interaction

The rules of interaction may be explicit or implicit. They may be formal and legalistic as in international law and conventions, or they may be derived from custom and practice. Relations between states in a system are often regulated by certain assumptions and values accepted by all the component units. Together with the associated institutions for conflict resolution the rules are often peculiar to and identifiable in any historical international system.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What are the four characteristics of a state?
2. Why does conflict occur in international relations?
3. Mention two IGOs and two INGOs
4. Describe the nature and type of actors in the international system
5. What are the rules of interaction?
6. What are the norms of interaction?
7. What is the boundary of the contemporary international system?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Although all international systems have the same characteristics, they can be differentiated one from the other based on the extent to which power is distributed among the actors and components parts. Hence systems can be hierarchical, unipolar, multipolar or bipolar. In essence, power symmetries determine the structure and character of the international system

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit we have examined the historical evolution of the international system paying particular attention to its characteristics, the nature of the actors, the extent to which power determines the structural relations among the various components and actors.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Describe the characteristics of the international system
2. Describe the nature of the contemporary international system
3. Describe the nature and character of the actors in the international system
4. "Power determines the structure of the international system." Discuss.

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UNIT 2 POWER**CONTENTS**

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Unit discusses power, which is often described as the currency of international politics. Power is to international relations just as money is to economics and commerce. Power is the central ingredient of international politics. Power determines the relative influence of state actors in the international system, just as it shapes the structure of the system itself. International relations is therefore in essence power relations.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

Students should be able to:

- Define power in its various forms
- Explain why power is the currency of international politics
- Explain the indices of power
- Define and explain the differences between soft power, hard power and smart power

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Power

Hans Morgenthau, the archetypal realist, asserts in his book *Politics Among Nations*: "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power." Power is without doubt the most crucial of all concepts in the study of International Politics. Power has been defined both in **relational** and **material** terms.

The **relational** definition formulated by Robert Dahl sees power as "A's ability to get B to do something it would not otherwise do." The **relational** nature of power can also be demonstrated with this example. Take for instance 2 states (the United States and the Soviet Union) that were approximately balanced in their capabilities. As long as this condition existed, the power of either nation vis-a-vis the other was almost zero, even though with their capabilities they could mutually annihilate each other. In a stalemate where capabilities are equal, power tends to disappear completely. However, a small increase in the capabilities of one of the two nations could translate into a major advantage in terms of its power. With the demise of the Soviet Union the power balance between its successor state, Russia and the United States, is no longer zero. The United States is clearly now more powerful than Russia, and can in consequence exercise power over Russia.

The **material** definition sees power as capabilities or resources, mainly military with which states can influence one another. Power in material terms equates capabilities. Using the materialist paradigm John Stoessinger defines power as "the capacity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to affect the behaviour of other nations." It is often suggested that a nation's power is the sum total of its capabilities. Yet power is not limited to capabilities; there are other dimensions to it. Whereas capabilities are measurable there are certain qualities to power that are more psychological and relational.

The **psychological** aspect of power is crucial. Since a nation's power may depend in considerable measure on what other nations think it is or even on what it thinks other nations think it is. This relates to **perception**. State A might perceive state

B as being more powerful although in reality this may not be so. However, as long as this perception persists A dares not go to war with B yet this is the only way its perception can be proved wrong. Similarly state A might consider itself more powerful than state B and might wage war against B only, to suffer defeat and humiliation. This was the situation which Hitler suffered when he launched Operation Babarossa against the Soviet Union in June 1941.

In *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Joseph Nye, one of the foremost authorities on power, defines power as follows:

Power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it. Just as farmers and meteorologists try to forecast the weather, political leaders and analysts try to describe and predict changes in power relationships. Power is also like love, easier to experience than to define or measure, but no less real for that. The dictionary tells us that power is the capacity to do things. At this most general level, power means the ability to get the outcomes one wants. The dictionary also tells us that power means having the capabilities to affect the behaviour of others to make those things happen. So more specifically, power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants. But there are several ways to affect the behaviour of others. You can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want.

Some people think of power narrowly, in terms of command and coercion. You experience it when you can make others do what they would otherwise not do.! You say "Jump!" and they jump. This appears to be a simple test of power, but things are not as straightforward as they first appear. Suppose those whom you command, like my granddaughters, already love to jump? When we measure power in terms of the changed behaviour of others, we have first to know their preferences. Otherwise we may be as mistaken about our power as a rooster who thinks his crowing makes the sun rise. And the power may evaporate when the context changes. The playground bully who terrorizes other children and makes them jump at his command loses his power as soon as the class returns from recess to a strict classroom. A cruel dictator can lock up or execute a dissident, but that may not prove his power if the dissenter was really seeking martyrdom. Power always depends on the context in which the

relationship exists. Knowing in advance how others would behave in the absence of our commands is often difficult. What is more, as we shall see, sometimes we can get the outcomes we want by affecting behaviour without commanding it. If you believe that my objectives are legitimate, I may be able to persuade you to do something for me without using threats or inducements. It is possible to get many desired outcomes without having much tangible power over others. For example, some loyal Catholics may follow the pope's teaching on capital punishment not because of a threat of excommunication but out of respect for his moral authority. Or some radical Muslim fundamentalists may be attracted to support Osama bin Laden's actions not because of payments or threats, but because they believe in the legitimacy of his objectives.

Practical politicians and ordinary people often find these questions of behaviour and motivation too complicated. Thus they turn to a second definition of power and simply define it as the possession of capabilities or resources that can influence outcomes. Consequently they consider a country powerful if it has a relatively large population and territory, extensive natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability. The virtue of this second definition is that it makes power appear more concrete, measurable, and predictable. But this definition also has problems. When people define power as synonymous with the resources that produce it, they sometimes encounter the paradox that those best endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they want.

Power resources are not as fungible as money. What wins in one game may not help at all in another. Holding a winning poker hand does not help if the game is bridge) Even if the game is poker, if you play your high hand poorly, you can still lose. Having power resources does not guarantee that you will always get the outcome you want. For example, in terms of resources the United States was far more powerful than Vietnam, yet we lost the Vietnam War. And America was the world's only superpower in 2001, but we failed to prevent September 11. Converting resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed strategies and skilful leadership. Yet strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently misjudge-witness Japan and Germany in 1941 or Saddam Hussein in 1990. As a first approximation in any game, it always helps to start by figuring out who is

holding the high cards. But it is equally important to understand what game you are playing. Which resources provide the best basis for power behaviour in a particular context? Oil was not an impressive power resource before the industrial age nor was uranium significant before the nuclear age.

In earlier periods, international power resources may have been easier to assess. A traditional test of a Great Power in international politics was "strength for war." But over the centuries, as technologies evolved, the sources of strength for war often changed. For example, in eighteenth-century Europe, population was a critical power resource because it provided a base for taxes and the recruitment of infantry. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, Prussia presented its fellow victors at the Congress of Vienna with a precise plan for its own reconstruction with territories and populations to be transferred to maintain a balance of power against France. In the pre-nationalist period, it did not matter that many of the people in those transferred provinces did not speak German. However, within half a century popular sentiments of nationalism had grown greatly, and Germany's seizure of Alsace and Lorraine from France in 1870 became one of the underlying causes of World War I. Instead of being assets, the transferred provinces became liabilities in the changed context of nationalism. In short, power resources cannot be judged without knowing the context. Before you judge who is holding the high cards, you need to understand what game you are playing and how the value of the cards may be changing. For example, the distribution of power resources in the contemporary information age varies greatly on different issues. We are told that the United States is the only superpower in a "unipolar" world. But the context is far more complex than first meets the eye.

The agenda of world politics has become like a three-dimensional chess game in which one can win only by playing vertically as well as horizontally. On the top board of classic interstate military issues, the United States is indeed the only superpower with global military reach, and it makes sense to speak in traditional terms of unipolarity or hegemony. However, on the middle board of interstate economic issues, the distribution of power is multipolar. The United States cannot obtain the outcomes it wants on trade, antitrust, or financial regulation issues without the agreement of the European Union, Japan, China, and others. It makes little sense to

call this American hegemony. And on the bottom board of transnational issues like terrorism, international crime, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases, power is widely distributed and chaotically organized among state and non-state actors. It makes no sense at all to call this a unipolar world or an American empire—despite the claims of propagandists on the right and left. And this is the set of issues that is now intruding into the world of grand strategy. Yet many political leaders still focus almost entirely on military assets and classic military solutions—the top board. They mistake the necessary for the sufficient. They are one-dimensional players in a three-dimensional game. In the long term, that is the way to lose, since obtaining favourable outcomes on the bottom transnational board often requires the use of soft power assets.

3.2 Indices of Power

Geography: According to Morgenthau the most stable factor upon which the power of a nation depends is geography. As an indication of the strategic importance of a state's geographic location to its aggregate power he gives the example to the continental United States that is separated from other continents by 3000 miles of the Atlantic Ocean to the east and over 6000 miles of the Pacific to the west.

The decisive role which Morgenthau claims for geography, as a factor in a nation's power may have been right in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The contemporary reality is that nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles have reduced the importance of a nation's spatial location as a factor of its power. In any case, Russia's huge landmass did not prevent it from being defeated by tiny Japan in a naval battle in 1904. However, where mutual nuclear deterrence exists between two states, as it did between the United States and the Soviet Union, or currently between India and Pakistan, wars may still largely be fought on conventional weapons. In this scenario geography or territoriality remains important in calculating the power of nations.

Natural Resources: Possession of natural resources is a major factor in a nation's international power. This factor is significant although not decisive. It is not the mere possession of raw materials that determines a nation's power. It is the ability to use the

resources that counts. For instance, even though the Arab states have grown very rich from their oil resources none of them can in fact be described as a powerful nation. A state's ability to use its resources is dependent on the level of its economic and industrial development. A powerful military can only be built on an advanced technological base. Japan has little raw materials yet its technology has transformed it into an economic giant and thus a powerful nation.

Population: A nation's population is a major element of its power. Its significance is however dependent on other considerations as well. In the 1950s neither China nor India, both populous nations, was considered a powerful nation. Population is in fact potential power. Hence, nations with large populations could be weak although it is impossible for nations without large populations to be powerful. China, whose population endowed it with potential power, was granted great power status in the UN Security Council in the late forties for that very reason even though it was at the time not a powerful state. What makes population a significant and decisive index of power is again industrialization. Industrialization leads to an increase in population, which in turn may generate further industrialization. Thus a highly industrialized China has the potential with its huge population to become one of the most powerful nations on earth.

Governmental System: The extent to which a nation's government contributes to its power is difficult to assess. To say that democracy provides greater national strength than dictatorship is not historically valid. After all, there have been instances where dictatorial states have overwhelmed democracies. Totalitarian Sparta conquered Democratic Athens in the era of the Greek city-states. Students of power however believe that democracy offers greater advantage because it derives its essence from the consent and voluntary support of the governed whereas dictatorships depend on coercion. Even this ignores the historical lessons of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Communist China and the Soviet Union. These were all dictatorships yet they evolved highly effective methods of psychological indoctrination of their citizens. In general therefore a nation's power depends on the use which the government makes of such physical factors as geography, population, natural resources, etc. Both democratic and dictatorial governments can and have effectively harnessed these resources to increase

their power. In addition to the physical factors of power discussed above there are also the intangible image phenomena involving specific indices as national character and morale, ideology and national leadership.

National character and morale: National character is an elusive concept very difficult to define. Its relevance to the power equation is based on the persistence of stereotypes that one nation imputes or holds about another. For instance in the late 1930s the Japanese viewed the West and the United States in particular as a decadent, corrupt and spineless society which would disintegrate in the face of a sustained military attack. This stereotype was of course a distorted and unrealistic perception of America and its power. In contrast the Japanese held a self-image of absolute superiority and invincibility. This induced in the Japanese a high national morale, which, combined with their stereotype image of America, led them to invade Pearl Harbour in 1941. The end result of this was the nuclear bombardment of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. But for this high national morale the Japanese could easily have recognized the objective fact that they could not possibly win a war against the United States with its overwhelming capabilities. It was Japan's national character and morale, rather than a rational calculation of power, which led the island nation to attack the United States in 1941. Similarly what sustained the Biafran war effort against the overwhelming might of the Federal Government of Nigeria during the civil war was national morale.

Ideology: Ideology's peculiar function is to justify power and transform it into authority. Ideology reduces the amount of power that a government needs to deploy to achieve compliance from and control over its citizens. As a source of power, ideology is largely a phenomenon of totalitarian states. Whereas democracy accommodates disagreements on substantive national goals and is therefore devoid of ideology a totalitarian state like communist China promotes one ideology with all its associated fanaticism and uniformity to compel compliance among its citizens. The Soviet Union also used ideology to compel its Eastern bloc satellites to comply with its international political posture. The Odua People's Congress, OPC, has used Yoruba nationalism as a mobilizing ideology to entrench itself among the Yoruba in Nigeria.

Quality of Leadership: This is an important source of power. A defective leadership will squander all other sources of power. It is the leadership that harnesses and uses all the other resources with maximum effect to build national power. This has led to the axiom: the tangible or physical resources are the body of power; the national character its soul; and leadership its brains. For instance Nigerian leaders have been very restrained in their response to military provocation from Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsular. An objective assessment of both countries' power capabilities shows that Nigeria can overwhelm Cameroon in a military conflict. That it has pursued a policy of restraint is a function of its national leadership. The same leadership has deployed the country's resources for peacekeeping in Liberia and Sierra Leone. National leadership is therefore a decisive index of a nation's international power.

3.3 Soft Power

The analysis of soft power in this section is based on the writings Joseph Nye, the scholar who first coined the expression and is acknowledged as the foremost authority on the subject. In his book, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* Professor Nye writes as follows: What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced. America has long had a great deal of soft power. Think of the impact of Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms in Europe at the end of World War II; of young people behind the Iron Curtain listening to American music and news on Radio Free Europe; of Chinese students symbolizing their protests in Tiananmen Square by creating a replica of the Statue of Liberty; of newly liberated Afghans in 2001 asking for a copy of the Bill of Rights; of young Iranians today surreptitiously watching banned American videos and satellite television broadcasts in the privacy of their homes. These are all examples of America's soft power. When you can get others to admire your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive. As

General Wesley Clark put it, soft power “gave us an influence far beyond the hard edge of traditional balance-of-power politics.” But attraction can turn to repulsion if we act in an arrogant manner and destroy the real message of our deeper values. The United States may be more powerful than any other polity since the Roman Empire, but like Rome, America is neither invincible nor invulnerable. Rome did not succumb to the rise of another empire, but to the onslaught of waves of barbarians. Modern high-tech terrorists are the new barbarians. As the world wends its way deeper into a struggle with terrorism, it becomes increasingly apparent that many factors lie outside American control. The United States cannot alone hunt down every suspected Al Qaeda leader hiding in remote regions of the globe. Nor can it launch a war whenever it wishes without alienating other countries and losing the cooperation it needs for winning the peace.

The four-week war in Iraq in the spring of 2003 was a dazzling display of America's hard military power that removed a tyrant, but it did not resolve our vulnerability to terrorism. It was also costly in terms of our soft power-our ability to attract others to our side. In the aftermath of the war, polling by the Pew Research Center showed a dramatic decline in the popularity of the United States compared to a year earlier, even in countries like Spain and Italy, whose governments had provided support for the war effort, and America's standing plummeted in Islamic countries from Morocco to Turkey to Southeast Asia. Yet the United States will need the help of such countries in the long term to track the flow of terrorists, tainted money, and dangerous weapons. In the words of the Financial Times, “To win the peace, therefore, the US will have to show as much skill in exercising soft power as it has in using hard power to win the war.”

Everyone is familiar with hard power. We know that military and economic might often get others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements ("carrots") or threats ("sticks"). But sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible threats or payoffs. The indirect way to get what you want has sometimes been called "the second face of power." A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness-want to follow

it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft power getting others to want the outcomes that you want-co-opts people rather than coerces them. Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. At the personal level, we are all familiar with the power of attraction and seduction. In a relationship or a marriage, power does not necessarily reside with the larger partner, but in the mysterious chemistry of attraction. And in the business world, smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you want. It is difficult to run a large organization by commands alone. You also need to get others to buy in to your values. Similarly, contemporary practices of community-based policing rely on making the police sufficiently friendly and attractive that a community wants to help them achieve shared objectives.

Political leaders have long understood the power that comes from attraction. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to use carrots or sticks to make you do it. Whereas leaders in authoritarian countries can use coercion and issue commands, politicians in democracies have to rely more on a combination of inducement and attraction. Soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead.

Soft power is not merely the same as influence. After all, influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. Simply put, in behavioural terms soft power is attractive power. In terms of resources, soft-power resources are the assets that produce such attraction. Whether a particular asset is a soft-power resource that produces attraction can be measured by asking people through polls or focus groups. Whether that attraction in turn produces desired policy outcomes has to be judged in particular cases. Attraction does not always determine

others' preferences, but this gap between power measured as resources and power judged as the outcomes of behaviour is not unique to soft power. It occurs with all forms of power. Before the fall of France in 1940, Britain and France had more tanks than Germany, but that advantage in military power resources did not accurately predict the outcome of the battle. One way to think about the difference between hard and soft power is to consider the variety of ways you can obtain the outcomes you want. You can command me to change my preferences and do what you want by threatening me with force or economic sanctions. You can induce me to do what you want by using your economic power to pay me. You can restrict my preferences by setting the agenda in such a way that my more extravagant wishes seem too unrealistic to pursue. Or you can appeal to a sense of attraction, love, or duty in our relationship and appeal to our shared values about the justness of contributing to those shared values and purposes. If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place—in short, if my behaviour is determined by an observable but intangible attraction—soft power is at work. Soft power uses a different type of currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation—an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values. Much as Adam Smith observed that people are led by an invisible hand when making decisions in a free market, our decisions in the marketplace for ideas are often shaped by soft power—an intangible attraction that persuades us to go along with others' purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place.

Hard and soft power is related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behaviour of others. The distinction between them is one of degree, both in the nature of the behaviour and in the tangibility of the resources. Command power—the ability to change what others do—can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power, the ability to shape what others want, can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. The types of behaviour between command and co-option range along a spectrum from coercion to economic inducement to agenda setting to pure attraction. Soft-power resources tend to be associated with the

co-optive end of the spectrum of behaviour, whereas hard-power resources are usually associated with command behaviour. But the relationship is imperfect. For example, sometimes countries may be attracted to others with command power by myths of invincibility, and command power may sometimes be used to establish institutions that later become regarded as legitimate. A strong economy not only provides resources for sanctions and payments, but can also be a source of attractiveness. On the whole, however, the general association between the types of behaviour and certain resources is strong enough to allow us to employ the useful shorthand reference to hard-and soft-power resources.

In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others. Governments sometimes find it difficult to control and employ soft power, but that does not diminish its importance. It was a former French foreign minister who observed that the Americans are powerful because they can "inspire the dreams and desires of others, thanks to the mastery of global images through film and television and because, for these same reasons, large numbers of students from other countries come to the United States to finish their studies." Soft power is an important reality. Even the great British realist E. H. Carr, writing in 1939, described international power in three categories: military, economic, and power over opinion. Those who deny the importance of soft power are like people who do not understand the power of seduction. During a meeting with President John F. Kennedy, the senior statesman John J. McCloy exploded in anger about paying attention to popularity and attraction in world politics: "World opinion"? I don't believe in world opinion. The only thing that matters is power." But like Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, Kennedy understood that the ability to attract others and move opinion was an element of power. He understood the importance of soft power.

As mentioned above, sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire spectrum of behaviour from coercion to attraction. A country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose not only its hard-power resources but also some of its ability to shape the international agenda and some of its attractiveness. Some

countries may be attracted to others with hard power by the myth of invincibility or inevitability. Both Hitler and Stalin tried to develop such myths. Hard power can also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for smaller states—witness Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe. President Kennedy was properly concerned that although polls showed the United States to be more popular, they also showed a Soviet lead in perceptions of its space program and the strength of its nuclear arsenal. But soft power does not depend on hard power. The Vatican has soft power despite Stalin's mocking question "How many divisions does the Pope have?" The Soviet Union once had a good deal of soft power, but it lost much of it after the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Soviet soft power declined even as its hard economic and military resources continued to grow. Because of its brutal policies, the Soviet Union's hard power actually undercut its soft power. In contrast, the Soviet sphere of influence in Finland was reinforced by a degree of soft power. Similarly, the United States' sphere of influence in Latin America in the 1930S was reinforced when Franklin Roosevelt added the soft power of his "good neighbour policy." Sometimes countries enjoy political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight would suggest because they define their national interest to include attractive causes such as economic aid or peacemaking. For example, in the past two decades

Norway has taken a hand in peace talks in the Philippines, the Balkans, Colombia, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, and the Middle East. Norwegians say this grows out of their Lutheran missionary heritage, but at the same time the posture of peacemaker identifies Norway with values shared by other nations that enhance Norway's soft power. Foreign Minister Jan Peterson argued that "we gain some access," explaining that Norway's place at so many negotiating tables elevates its usefulness and value to larger countries.

Michael Ignatieff describes the position of Canada from a similar point of view: "Influence derives from three assets: moral authority as a good citizen which we have got some of, military capacity which we have got a lot less of, and international assistance capability." With regard to the United States, "we have something they want. They need legitimacy." That in turn can increase Canada's influence when it

bargains with its giant neighbour. The Polish government decided to send troops to post-war Iraq not only to curry favour with the United States but also as a way to create a broader positive image of Poland in world affairs. When the Taliban government fell in Afghanistan in 2001, the Indian foreign minister flew to Kabul to welcome the new interim government in a plane not packed with arms or food but crammed with tapes of Bollywood movies and music, which were quickly distributed across the city. As we shall see in chapter 3, many countries have soft-power resources.

Institutions can enhance a country's soft power. For example, Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the second half of the twentieth century advanced their values by creating a structure of international rules and institutions that were consistent with the liberal and democratic nature of the British and American economic systems: free trade and the gold standard in the case of Britain; the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations in the case of the United States. When countries make their power legitimate in the eyes of others, they encounter less resistance to their wishes. If a country's culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. If a country can shape international rules that are consistent with its interests and values, its actions will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others. If it uses institutions and follows rules that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it will not need as many costly carrots and sticks.

3.3.1 Sources of Soft Power

On sources of soft power Joseph Nye writes as follows: The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority.)

Let's start with culture. Culture is the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society. It has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish between high culture such as literature, art, and education, which appeals to elites, and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment.

When a country's culture includes universal values and its policies promote values and interests that others share, it increases the probability of obtaining its desired outcomes because of the relationships of attraction and duty that it creates. Narrow values and parochial cultures are less likely to produce soft power. The United States benefits from a universalistic culture. The German editor Josef Joffe once argued that America's soft power was even larger than its economic and military assets. "U.S. culture, low-brow or high, radiates outward with an intensity last seen in the days of the Roman Empire-but with a novel twist. Rome's and Soviet Russia's cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders. America's soft power, though, rules over an empire on which the sun never sets."

Some analysts treat soft power simply as popular cultural power. They make the mistake of equating soft power behaviour with the cultural resources that sometimes help produce it. They confuse the cultural resources with the behaviour of attraction. For example, the historian Niall Ferguson describes soft power as "non-traditional forces such as cultural and commercial goods" and then dismisses it on the grounds "that it's, well, soft."¹⁸ Of course, Coke and Big Macs do not necessarily attract people in the Islamic world to love the United States. The North Korean dictator Kim Jong 11 is alleged to like pizza and American videos, but that does not affect his nuclear programs. Excellent wines and cheeses do not guarantee attraction to France, nor does the popularity of Pokemon games assure that Japan will get the policy outcomes it wishes.

This is not to deny that popular culture is often a resource that produces soft power, but as we saw earlier, the effectiveness of any power resource depends on the context. Tanks are not a great military power resource in swamps or jungles. Coal and steel are not major power resources if a country lacks an industrial base. Serbs eating at McDonald's supported Milosevic, and Rwandans committed atrocities while wearing T-shirts with American logos. American films that make the United States attractive in China or Latin America may have the opposite effect and actually reduce American soft power in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. But in general, polls show that our popular culture has made the United States seem to others "exciting, exotic, rich,

powerful, trend-setting-the cutting edge of modernity and innovation." And such images have appeal "in an age when people want to partake of the good life American-style, even if as political citizens, they are aware of the downside for ecology, community, and equality."²⁰ For example, in explaining a new movement toward using lawsuits to assert rights in China, a young Chinese activist explained, "We've seen a lot of Hollywood movies-they feature weddings, funerals and going to court. So now we think it's only natural to go to court a few times in your life." If American objectives include the strengthening of the legal system in China, such films may be more effective than speeches by the American ambassador about the importance of the rule of law.

As we will see in the next chapter, the background attraction (and repulsion) of American popular culture in different regions and among different groups may make it easier or more difficult for American officials to promote their policies. In some cases, such as Iran, the same Hollywood images that repel the ruling mullahs may be attractive to the younger generation. In China, the attraction and rejection of American culture among different groups may cancel each other out. Commerce is only one of the ways in which culture is transmitted. It also occurs through personal contacts, visits, and exchanges. The ideas and values that America exports in the minds of more than half a million foreign students who study every year in American universities and then return to their home countries, or in the minds of the Asian entrepreneurs who return home after succeeding in Silicon Valley, tend to reach elites with power. Most of China's leaders have a son or daughter educated in the States who can portray a realistic view of the United States that is often at odds with the caricatures in official Chinese propaganda. Similarly, when the United States was trying to persuade President Musharraf of Pakistan to change his policies and be more supportive of American measures in Afghanistan, it probably helped that he could hear from a son working in the Boston area.

Government policies at home and abroad are another potential source of soft power. For example, in the 1950s racial segregation at home undercut American soft power in Africa, and today the practice of capital punishment and weak gun control laws undercut American soft power in Europe. Similarly, foreign policies strongly

affect soft power. Jimmy Carter's human rights policies are a case in point, as were government efforts to promote democracy in the Reagan and Clinton administrations. In Argentina, American human rights policies that were rejected by the military government of the 1970S produced considerable soft power for the United States two decades later, when the Peronists who were earlier imprisoned subsequently came to power. Policies can have long-term as well as short-term effects that vary as the context changes. The popularity of the United States in Argentina in the early 1990S reflected Carter's policies of the 1970s, and it led the Argentine government to support American policies in the UN and in the Balkans. Nonetheless, American soft power eroded significantly after the context changed again later in the decade when the United States failed to rescue the Argentine economy from its collapse.

Government policies can reinforce or squander a country's soft power. Domestic or foreign policies that appear to be hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the opinion of others, or based on a narrow approach to national interests can undermine soft power. For example, in the steep decline in the attractiveness of the United States as measured by polls taken after the Iraq War in 2003, people with unfavourable views for the most part said they were reacting to the Bush administration and its policies rather than the United States generally. So far, they distinguish American people and culture from American policies. The publics in most nations continued to admire the United States for its technology, music, movies, and television. But large majorities in most countries said they disliked the growing influence of America in their country. The 2003 Iraq War is not the first policy action that has made the United States unpopular. As we will see in the next chapter, three decades ago, many people around the world objected to America's war in Vietnam, and the standing of the United States reflected the unpopularity of that policy. When the policy changed and the memories of the war receded, the United States recovered much of its lost soft power. Whether the same thing will happen in the aftermath of the Iraq War will depend on the success of policies in Iraq, developments in the Israel-Palestine conflict, and many other factors.

The values a government champions in its behaviour at home (for example, democracy), in international institutions (working with others), and in foreign policy

(promoting peace and human rights) strongly affect the preferences of others. Governments can attract or repel others by the influence of their example. But soft power does not belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does. Some hard-power assets such as armed forces are strictly governmental; others are inherently national, such as oil and mineral re-serves, and many can be transferred to collective control, such as the civilian air fleet that can be mobilized in an emergency. In contrast, many soft-power resources are separate from the American government and are only partly responsive to its purposes. In the Vietnam era, for example, American popular culture often worked at cross-purposes to official government policy. Today, Hollywood movies that show scantily clad women with libertine attitudes or fundamentalist Christian groups that castigate Islam as an evil religion are both (properly) outside the control of government in a liberal society, but they undercut government efforts to improve relations with Islamic nations.

3.3.2 The Limits of Soft Power

Joseph Nye describes the limits of soft power as follows: Some skeptics object to the idea of soft power because they think of power narrowly in terms of commands or active control. In their view, imitation or attraction is simply that, not power. As we have seen, some imitation or attraction does not produce much power over policy outcomes, and neither does imitation always produce desirable outcomes. For example, in the 1980s, Japan was widely admired for its innovative industrial processes, but imitation by companies in other countries came back to haunt the Japanese when it reduced their market power. Similarly, armies frequently imitate and therefore nullify the successful tactics of their opponents and make it more difficult for them to achieve the outcomes they want. Such observations are correct, but they miss the point that exerting attraction on others often does allow you to get what you want. The skeptics who want to define power only as deliberate acts of command and control are ignoring the second, or "structural," face of power-the ability to get the outcomes you want without having to force people to change their behaviour through threats or payments.

At the same time, it is important to specify the conditions under which attraction is more likely to lead to desired outcomes, and under which it will not. As we have seen, popular culture is more likely to attract people and produce soft power in the sense of preferred outcomes in situations where cultures are somewhat similar rather than widely dissimilar. All power depends on context—who relates to whom under what circumstances—but soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers. Moreover, attraction often has a diffuse effect, creating general influence rather than producing an easily observable specific action. Just as money can be invested, politicians speak of storing up political capital to be drawn on in future circumstances. Of course, such goodwill may not ultimately be honoured, and diffuse reciprocity is less tangible than an immediate exchange. Nonetheless, the indirect effects of attraction and a diffuse influence can make a significant difference in obtaining favourable outcomes in bargaining situations. Otherwise leaders would insist only on immediate payoffs and specific reciprocity, and we know that is not always the way they behave. Social psychologists have developed a substantial body of empirical research exploring the relationship between attractiveness and power.

Soft power is also likely to be more important when power is dispersed in another country rather than concentrated. A dictator cannot be totally indifferent to the views of the people in his country, but he can often ignore whether another country is popular or not when he calculates whether it is in his interests to be helpful. In democracies where public opinion and parliaments matter, political leaders have less leeway to adopt tactics and strike deals than in autocracies. Thus it was impossible for the Turkish government to permit the transport of American troops across the country in 2003 because American policies had greatly reduced our popularity in public opinion and in the parliament. In contrast, it was far easier for the United States to obtain the use of bases in authoritarian Uzbekistan for operations in Afghanistan.

Finally, though soft power sometimes has direct effects on specific goals—witness the inability of the United States to obtain the votes of Chile or Mexico in the UN Security Council in 2003 after our policies reduced our popularity—it is more likely to have an impact on the general goals that a country seeks.²⁴ Fifty years ago,

Arnold Wolfers distinguished between the specific "possession goals" that countries pursue, and their broader "milieu goals," like shaping an environment conducive to democracy.²⁵ Successful pursuit of both types of goals is important in foreign policy. If one considers various American national interests, for example, soft power may be less relevant than hard power in preventing attack, policing borders, and protecting allies. But soft power is particularly relevant to the realization of "milieu goals." It has a crucial role to play in promoting democracy, human rights, and open markets. It is easier to attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic. The fact that the impact of attraction on achieving preferred outcomes varies by context and type of goals does not make it irrelevant, any more than the fact that bombs and bayonets do not help when we seek to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, slow global warming, or create democracy.

Other skeptics object to using the term "soft power" in international politics because governments are not in full control of the attraction. Much of American soft power has been produced by Hollywood, Harvard, Microsoft, and Michael Jordan. But the fact that civil society is the origin of much soft power does not disprove its existence. In a liberal society, government cannot and should not control the culture. Indeed, the absence of policies of control can itself be a source of attraction. The Czech film director Milos Forman recounts that when the Communist government let in the American film *Twelve Angry Men* because of its harsh portrait of American institutions, Czech intellectuals responded by thinking, "If that country can make this kind of thing, films about itself, oh, that country must have a pride and must have an inner strength, and must be strong enough and must be free."

It is true that firms, universities, foundations, churches, and other nongovernmental groups develop soft power of their own that may reinforce or be at odds with official foreign policy goals. That is all the more reason for governments to make sure that their own actions and policies reinforce rather than undercut their soft power. And this is particularly true since private sources of soft power are likely to become increasingly important in the global information age.

Finally, some skeptics argue that popularity measured by opinion polls is ephemeral and thus not to be taken seriously. Of course, one must be careful not to

read too much into opinion polls. They are an essential but imperfect measure of soft-power resources because answers vary depending on the way that questions are formulated, and unless the same questions are asked consistently over some period, they represent snapshots rather than a continuous picture. Opinions can change, and such volatility cannot be captured by anyone poll. Moreover, political leaders must often make unpopular decisions because they are the right thing to do, and hope that their popularity may be repaired if the decision is subsequently proved correct. Popularity is not an end in itself in foreign policy. Nonetheless, polls are a good first approximation of both how attractive a country appears and the costs that are incurred by unpopular policies, particularly when they show consistency across polls and over time. And as we shall see in the next chapter, that attractiveness can have an effect on our ability to obtain the outcomes we want in the world.

3.4 Smart Power

In *Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power*, Ernest J. Wilson, III defines smart power as “the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor's purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently... Smart power requires the wielder to know what his or her country or community seeks, as well as its will and capacity to achieve its goals; the broader regional and global context within which the action will be conducted; the tools to be employed, as well as how and when to deploy them individually and in combination. Genuinely sophisticated smart power approach comes with the awareness that hard and soft power constitute not simply neutral "instruments" to be wielded neutrally by an enlightened, all-knowing, and independent philosopher king; they themselves constitute separate and distinct institutions and institutional cultures that exert their own normative influences over their members, each with its own attitudes, incentives, and anticipated career paths.” In the same article he analyzes smart power as follows: The growing interest in smart power reflects two contemporary trends, one structural and long-term, the other short-term and conjunctural, driven mainly by the policies of the current administration. The most obvious reason to reflect seriously on smart power is because of the widely perceived

shortcomings of the policies of the U.S. administration over the past seven years. There is widespread belief in America and around the world that the Bush administration's national security and foreign policies have not been smart, even on their own terms, and, as a result, that they have compromised the diplomatic and security interests of the United States, provoked unprecedented resentment around the world, and greatly diminished America's position in the world.

In contrast, leaders in other countries have been more sophisticated in their use of the instruments of power. Though not without significant flaws, the leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC), for example, has deployed power resources strategically. The individual policy choices made by President Hu Jiantao and his advisors have reflected a sophisticated analysis of the world as it is; and they have deployed a balanced, integrated array of instruments to achieve their narrow political goals as well as to advance their national purposes. Hu's decisions to develop and consistently pursue a doctrine of "China's Peaceful Rise" are a clear counterpoint to President George W. Bush's approach, which has focused largely on the need to maintain military superiority. Yet both approaches constitute clear examples of policy calculations made by a powerful country's leadership that is relatively independent and not inevitably shaped by structural factors. The leadership of the PRC made conscious decisions to pursue this smarter course. It could have pursued a strategy of "China's Militant Rise." It could have been diplomatically dysfunctional in its treatment of African nations and clumsy in its pursuit of oil and mineral resources; instead, it created what Josh Kurlantzick (2007) called a multifaceted "charm campaign" offering African leaders foreign assistance and high-level attention. Likewise, it could have ignored Europe and relied mostly on hard power across the straits of Taiwan. While the charm offensive of the PRC has yielded mixed results, it was based on a sophisticated appreciation for the full range of instruments of national power. The G-8 nations are accelerating their transformation from industrial to post-industrial economies, where power increasingly rests on a nation's capacity to create and manipulate knowledge and information. A country's capacity for creativity and innovation can trump its possession of armoured divisions or aircraft carriers, and new hi-tech tools can greatly enhance the reach of military and non-military influence. But

the current thirst for smart power is not driven only by the good or bad choices of individual leaders. Even if the U.S. administration had not displayed so many weaknesses of its own making, there are some longer-term secular trends that would have provoked a demand for a new way to conceive of and exercise state power. A country's capacity for creativity and innovation can trump its possession of armoured divisions or aircraft carriers, and new hi-tech tools can greatly enhance the reach of military and non-military influence. Armies and militaries remain important, but their relative role has changed radically, in terms both of how the military conducts warfare and in the mix of military to non-military assets. The world of warfare has become more digital, networked, and flexible, and non-military assets like communications have risen in the mix of instruments of state power. Sophisticated nations have everything from smart bombs to smart phones to smart blogs. The fact is that as states get smarter, so too do non-state actors like Al Qaeda in their use of the media across multiple platforms. Any actor that aspires to enhance its position on the world stage has to build strategies around 'these new fundamentals of "smartness." Smart strategies must also take into account the shifting influence among traditional states, with the rise of India, China, Brazil, and other actors on the world stage, since the old cold war dichotomies have collapsed. Their new power imposes new constraints on the unilateral actions of the more established G-8 nations, including the United States. Designing foreign policies cognizant of new technological capacities and new actors requires greater sophistication than in the past. A final reason for the hunt for smart power today is that target populations themselves have become "smarter."

With the steady spread of secondary and higher education and the availability of more media outlets, populations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have grown much more affluent, more sophisticated and knowledgeable about their own and other societies, and less easily influenced by the exercise of soft or hard power. These newly educated populations demand to be treated differently than in the past; as their world becomes more urban and more middle class, individuals are becoming more assertive. The spread of democratic practices has meant that foreign leaders also have less leeway than in the past to act as American surrogates, as stand-ins for American power from over the horizon. Democracy places distinct constraints on the design and

conduct of U.S. foreign policy just as it provides opportunities. In brief, the world has become smarter, and America's foreign policy elites have not kept up. Until very recently, the Bush administration officials have demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to conceive of and deploy power creatively, in ways appropriate to our times, and synthesizing the strengths of the different instruments of state power. Alas, this has proven a bipartisan problem, as the previous Democratic administration was not a paragon of smart power either, with serious missteps in its initial efforts to mix military power, trade, and diplomatic influence.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is power?
2. What are the indices of power?
3. What is soft power?
4. What is smart power?
5. What is hard power?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Since power is the currency of international politics it is the most important issue that dominates the interest of state actors. Actors pursue their interests to enhance their power while the extent of their influence in the international system is also determined by their aggregate power. However, with technological development power can now be segregated into three categories: hard power, soft power and smart power. The success of states in the pursuit of their foreign policy goals is contingent upon the use of a combination of any element of these three or in combination.

5.0 SUMMARY

We have studied in the unit the various definitions, categories, indices, typologies and characteristics of power in its variegated forms. A state that seeks to deploy power successfully should measure its means to its ends and should know which of these categories of power or in combination to deploy to each situation.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Define power and identify its various characteristics
2. Explain why power is described as the currency of international politics.
3. Described the indices of power
4. Explain soft power
5. Explain smart power.
6. Compare smart power with soft power.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 3 POWER THEORY

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 Power Theory

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Unit analyzes Power Theory, which provides a Realist perspective to the analysis of war causation. Power is the central organising principle of war causation. Since states wage war, and power is so central to the existence, indeed, the very survival of states, it is simply logical that the causes of war should be located in the correlation of power between them.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

Students should be able to:

- Define power theory
- Explain the assumptions of power theory
- Explain why it provides a convincing explanation to the fundamental causes of war

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Power Theory

Power theory offers a theoretical framework to explain the incidence of wars in the international system. Throughout history, war has been a normal way of conducting disputes between political groups. These wars do not start accidentally; they usually result from deliberate and calculated acts of decision-makers in the belligerent states.

As Clausewitz noted so graphically, reciprocity and force are the two most important characteristics of war; “war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (Clausewitz, 1976: 75). State agents make a conscious decision to go to war based on their calculations or miscalculations of risks and benefits. They choose war rather than dialogue because they believe that it offers greater rewards at acceptable risk levels. War, as Michael Howard (1970: 41) asserts, “is simply the use of violence by states for the enforcement, the protection or the extension of their political power.” Power is the central organising principle of war causation. Since states wage war, and power is so central to the existence, indeed, the very survival of states, it is simply logical that the causes of war should be located on the correlation of power between them. States employ or threaten physical force as the simplest means of asserting power or effecting desired control or changes in the international system. In *The Causes of War* Geoffrey Blainey (1977: 149-50) writes: All war “aims are simply varieties of power.” Whether the war is driven by nationalism, the desire to spread an ideology or religion, ethnic irredentism, the desire for territory, conflicting claims of interest, etc; all these are in the main manifestations of power relationships.

Similarly, Quincy Wright (1941: 144) describes war as being essentially “a function of state politics.” Michael Howard and indeed most historians who have studied the subject agree with Blainey that power theory provides the most adequate explanatory paradigm on the causes of wars. From Thucydides to Machiavelli to Morgenthau; from Realpolitik statesmen like Frederick the Great to Bismarck to Kissinger, the causes of war are at bottom conflicts of power. The power model can well be illustrated by the work of Thucydides. In his book, *History of the Peloponnesian War* the Greek historian describes the cause of that war in power terms: “What made war inevitable was the growth in Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta.” Like the leaders of Sparta, statesmen employ war as an instrument of state policy on calculations of power. Their decisions, their attitudes, their perceptions, and their calculations are based on the fundamental issues of power. In essence, the power model argues that states go to war “in order to acquire, to enhance or to preserve their capacity to function as independent actors in the international system” (Howard, 1983: 13-14).

Since states are rational actors whose decisions to go to war are based on rational calculations of risks and gains and of the shifts in the power equation in the international system, the power model rejects the individual level of analysis theories that attribute war to man's innate aggressiveness. In place of such sublime causes as aggression and animalistic instincts power theory focuses on analytical rationality, on perception and misperception, on calculations and miscalculations. For instance, it was the mutual perception of threat induced by the exponential growth in the military capabilities of the great powers that turned Europe by 1907 into an armed camp of two hostile coalitions. It was the calculation by German political leaders of the configuration of power within this framework that compelled them to embark on a course that led to World War I. Similarly, it was Saddam Hussein's calculations and miscalculations of power that precipitated the Gulf War.

Michael Howard (1983: 18) captures power theory very succinctly: "the causes of war remain...rooted in perceptions by statesmen of the growth of hostile power and the fears for the restriction, if not the extinction, of their own." Irrespective of the underlying causes of international conflict power theory holds as sacrosanct the fact that wars result from reasoned and rational calculations by both parties that they stand to gain more by going to war than by remaining at peace (Howard, 1983: 22). If this proposition holds true it stands to reason in the face of nuclear weapons rational calculations of risk will demonstrate that any war likely to involve nuclear exchange and mutual annihilation will not benefit the states in question. Consequently, this will promote cooperation rather than conflict in the international system.

However, are all statesmen rational in their calculations? The model assumes so and does not account for the likelihood of such irrational leaders as Saddam Hussein of Iraq. In general, however, power theory provides the most convincing explanatory paradigm on the causes of war. The historical record provides ample justification for power theory.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is power theory?
2. What are the assumptions of power theory?

3. What is the main cause of war in the international system?
4. Are all statesmen rational actors?
5. Why do state agents make a decision to go to war?

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Unit has analysed power theory as the most convincing theory on the fundamental causes of war in the international system.

5.0 SUMMARY

Power is the central organising principle of war causation. Since states wage war, and power is so central to the existence, indeed, the very survival of states, it is simply logical that the causes of war should be located in the correlation of power between them.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain the basic assumptions of power theory.
2. Critically examine the arguments of power theory.
3. Assess the effectiveness of power theory to explain the causes of war.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 4 DIPLOMACY

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 Origins and Development of Diplomacy

3.2 Types of Diplomacy

3.2.1 Democratic Diplomacy

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5.0 Summary

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7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Diplomacy is a very important concept in the study of international relations. It consists of the techniques and procedures for conducting relations among states. Certainly, diplomacy remains the only normal means for conducting international relations and the opposite is war. It embraces a multitude of interests, from the simplest matter of details in the relations between two states to vital issues of war and peace. When it breaks down, the danger of war or at least a major crisis is looming. Indeed, diplomacy is that great engine used by civilized states for maintaining peace. Diplomacy has no universally acceptable definition. However, the following will suffice. The *Oxford English Dictionary* conceives diplomacy as (i) the management of international relations by negotiation, (ii) the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; (iii) the business or art of the diplomatist; (iv) skill or address in the conduct of international intercourse or negotiations.

Sir Ernest Satow defines diplomacy as the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states... the conduct of business between states by peaceful means.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of the unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain the origins of modern diplomacy
2. Discuss the types of diplomacy
3. Explain the importance of diplomacy to the international system.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Origins and Development of Diplomacy

The endemic nature of conflict in the international system makes it imperative for states and other international actors to devise ways of ameliorating its consequences, reducing its intensity and finding ways to bring the belligerents to a state of peace. These measures come under the rubric, *conflict resolution mechanisms*. Outside the use of force, diplomacy offers the best mechanism for ameliorating conflict in the international system.

To be sure, diplomacy in one form or the other has been in practice ever since human beings organised themselves into separate and distinct socio-political units. These social units had to interact, establish contact, seek or exchange information, collaborate or resolve disputes among themselves. They had to employ messengers to facilitate communication. In recognition of the strategic nature of their functions, messengers became accredited and were treated as sacred and inviolate. They carried emblems of authority from their sovereigns or communities and were received and treated with elaborate ceremonial.

These processes led to the evolution of diplomacy, which refers to the practices and institutions through which interacting actors conduct their relations. As a paradigm, diplomacy operates within the realm of international relations and foreign policy. Diplomacy lubricates the international system and is used to advance

the interest of all actors, state and non-state. Although diplomacy often seeks to preserve the peace and employs negotiation as its chief instrument, sometimes actors find it necessary and expedient to employ coercion, threats and intimidatory tactics to compel their adversaries to follow a particular line of action. However, irrespective of the - method employed—negotiation or coercion— diplomacy's success and effectiveness depends on a number of variables, the most important being the relative power of the actors involved.

Historically, the earliest records of interstate diplomacy date from 2850 BCE. These are records of treaties between Mesopotamian city-states. For much of this period, Akkadian, the Babylonian language, served as the language of international diplomacy in the Middle East until Aramaic replaced it much later. Ancient Egyptian diplomatic records date back to the fourteenth century BCE. In Biblical lore, the Apostle Paul described himself as an ambassador in the second letter to the Church of Corinth.

The term *ambassador* is derived from Medieval Latin, *ambactiare*, meaning, "to go on a mission." The word gained currency in Italy in the late twelfth century and by the fifteenth century had become the common title for the envoys of secular rulers. The papacy continued to use the term *legates* and *nuncios* for its own diplomatic emissaries.

Modern diplomacy began in Renaissance Italy. Commercial success made it imperative for the Italian city-states to devote attention to establishing and maintaining diplomatic contact with other states in order to minimize risk and enhance prosperity. Venice pioneered the process of giving written instructions to envoys and maintaining an archive of diplomatic correspondence. Other Italian city-states copied the practice, and by the late fifteenth century, resident embassies had become the norm throughout Italy. From there the practice spread to France and Spain until it covered Europe. From Europe, the practice spread throughout the world.

Undoubtedly, the diplomacy of the courts entered its golden age in the eighteenth century. The game came to be played according to well-understood rules, with a great deal of glitter on the surface but with much incompetence and intrigue

beneath. Diplomats represented their sovereigns, and often were merely the willing tools in the great contests for empire and for European supremacy, which dominated that century. Strong rulers like Peter the Great of Russia and Frederick the Great of Prussia used diplomacy and force, as the occasion seemed to demand, to achieve their ends.

As diplomacy became less formal and restricted, its rules became more standardized and more generally accepted. The Congress of Vienna made particularly important contributions in this respect. To place diplomacy on a more systematic and formal basis, the Congress laid down certain rules of procedure that regulate diplomatic practices until date. These rules were embodied in the Reglement of March 19, 1815, and in regulations of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. The diplomatic hierarchy thus established consisted of four ranks or classes of representatives: (1) ambassadors, papal legates, and papal nuncios; (2) envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary; (3) ministers resident, later merged with the second rank: and (4) charges d'affaires.

The question of precedence in a particular country was resolved by providing that the order of priority within each- rank should be based on the length of service in that country rather than on the more subjective basis of the relative importance of the sovereign or country, the diplomat represented. The ambassador who was senior in terms of length of service in a country should be *doyen* or dean of the diplomatic corps in that country. Since the papacy, as a general practice, changed its representatives less frequently than most states, many of the deans at foreign capitals were papal representatives. The Vienna conventions of 1961 and 1963, constituted an effort to state the commonly accepted rules regarding the status of diplomatic officials.

3.2 Types of Diplomacy

3.2.1 Democratic Diplomacy

By the early twentieth century, the term democratic diplomacy had become part of the diplomatic vocabulary. It seemed to symbolize a new order in international affairs - one in which governments were fast losing their aristocratic leanings and their aloofness, and peoples were speaking to peoples through democratic representatives

and informal channels. In effect, the new order was not as different from the old as it seemed in the atmosphere of hope that ushered in the twentieth century. While diplomacy remained a rather esoteric profession, carried on by men of wealth and influence and power, it was conducted with the assistance of a growing number of career officers, the elite guard of diplomacy, whose standards of competence and training were being steadily raised.

However, experience in democratic diplomacy has been disappointing. In a brilliant chapter in his *Diplomacy*, Nicolson calls attention to some of the evils of democratic diplomacy. The first and most potent source of danger, he declares, is the irresponsibility of the sovereign people. The second is ignorance, arising not so much from a lack of facts as from the failure of the ordinary citizen to apply to the general theory of foreign affairs that thought and intelligence which he devotes to domestic matters. In other words, foreign affairs are too foreign to the citizens of a state, and their implications are difficult to grapple.

3.2.2 Coercive Diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy employs threat or limited force to persuade an opponent to call off or undo an encroachment. It emphasizes the use of threats and the exemplary use of limited force to persuade an opponent to back down. In fact, the strategy of coercive diplomacy calls for using just enough force to demonstrate resolution to protect one's interests and to emphasize the credibility of one's determination to use more force if necessary. In coercive diplomacy, one gives the opponent an opportunity to stop or back off before employing force or escalating its use, as the British did in the early stages of the Falklands dispute in 1982. Coercive diplomacy encapsulates the instruments of bargaining and negotiation.

Coercive diplomacy offers the possibility of achieving one's objective economically, with little bloodshed, fewer political and psychological costs, and often with much less risk of escalation than does traditional military strategy. For this reason, it is often a beguiling strategy. Leaders of militarily powerful countries are tempted to believe that they can with little risk to themselves, intimidate weaker opponents to give up their gains and objectives. If the opponent refuses to be threatened and, in effect calls the bluff of the coercing power, the latter must then

decide whether to back off or to escalate the use of force. For instance, Lyndon Johnson, in his unsuccessful use of air power against Hanoi in 1965 decided to back off. Essentially, it is pertinent to identify the conditions necessary for successful employment of this strategy, since in their absence even a superpower will flounder in attempt to intimidate a weak opponent and find itself drawn into a costly or prolonged conflict. Three principal conditions are important for the success of coercive diplomacy:

- The coercing power must create in the opponent's mind a sense of urgency for compliance with its demand.
- A belief that the coercing power is more highly motivated to achieve its stated demand than the opponent is to oppose it.
- The threat to escalate conflict if the opponent fails to meet the demand.

Generally, what one demands of the opponent can affect the balance of motivation. If one demands a great deal, the opponent's motivation not to comply will likely be very high. The essentials and drawbacks of the strategy of coercive diplomacy have long been established. Although its use in the European balance-of-power era was evidently not systematically articulated, it was part of the conventional wisdom of statesmen in the business of statecraft and diplomacy. Indeed, coercive diplomacy bears a close resemblance to the ultimata that were often employed in the conduct of European diplomacy. A full-blown ultimatum has three components: a specific, clear demand on the opponent; time limit for compliance; and a threat of punishment for noncompliance. These conditions are both credible and sufficiently potent to impress upon the opponent that compliance, is preferable. There are several variants of coercive diplomacy. In addition to the full- ultimatum version of the strategy already mentioned, there is what has been called the "try-and-see" approach. In this variant of the strategy, only the first element of an ultimatum, a specific and clear demand, is conveyed and the coercing power does not announce a time limit or attempt to create a strong sense of urgency for compliance.

The successful use of coercive diplomacy by President Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 enabled him to strike a deal with Nikita Khrushchev to remove his missiles from Cuba. It will be recalled that Kennedy and Khrushchev did negotiate

and agree upon a *quid pro quo*, which ended the missile crisis, Khrushchev agreeing to remove the missiles and bombers in return for Kennedy's pledge not to invade Cuba. Therefore, Coercive diplomacy is best conceived as a flexible strategy in which what the stick cannot achieve alone, one can possibly obtain by adding a carrot.

3.2.3 Gun-Boat Diplomacy

The use of gunboat diplomacy in IR has become a common phenomenon since the early twentieth century. In fact, the twentieth century introduced new and disturbing problems into international relations. The emergence of European states with ruthless and insatiable thirst for territorial expansion and colonies in Africa, Asia and South America brought in the new concept of gunboat diplomacy. They presented a fundamental challenge to human freedoms everywhere by their subordination of the individual to the collective will determined by a few men at the top. They had worldwide propaganda to disguise or hide aggressive policies, and by their contemptuous **power projection** beyond their shores to acquire more territories.

Quite often, the colonizing powers browbeat the native rulers in Africa and Asia into signing bogus treaties. The British clearly demonstrated the art of gunboat diplomacy in a disputed succession in Lagos in 1851. In a brazen demonstration of naval power, the British deposed Kosoko and installed Akintoye to the Lagos throne. Thereafter, a succession of British officials employed gunboat diplomacy in former Northern and Southern Nigeria to reduce African resistance to a barest minimum. By 1914, Britain had succeeded in making herself the new paramount ruler over Nigeria. This explains why T.N. Tamuno posits that; British rule in Nigeria was in the final analysis buttressed by force or the threat of using it. In fact, with gunboat diplomacy, these maritime powers utilized modern techniques of military, political, and psychological power to expand their dominions, gain control of other states, and subverted other regimes.

Generally, they invoked strange doctrines of racial superiority, materialism, and militarism in furtherance of their ends. They used diplomacy as an instrument of national policy, but in doing so, they degraded its language and its practice. Diplomats became agents of conquest, double-dealing, and espionage, whose business was not to work for peaceful international relations but to provoke dissension rather than

understanding - to make the leaders and peoples of other nations weak, blind, and divided in the face of the growing colonial menace. The era of gunboat diplomacy, speaking softly and carrying a big stick, seems decidedly outdated and increasingly inconceivable in the practical relations of the international system in the 21st century.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is diplomacy?
2. Mention the types of diplomacy you know.
3. Which type of diplomacy encourages speaking softly, but carrying a big stick?
4. Which type of diplomacy allows states to project power beyond their shores?
5. What are the origins of modern diplomacy?
6. Why is diplomacy important to the international system?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Diplomacy embraces a multitude of interests, from the simplest matter of details in the relations between two states to vital issues of war and peace. When it breaks down, the danger of war or at least a major crisis is looming. Diplomacy is the great engine employed by civilized states for maintaining international peace and stability. Although diplomacy often seeks to preserve the peace and employs negotiation as its chief instrument, sometimes actors find it necessary and expedient to employ coercion, threats and intimidatory tactics to compel their adversaries to follow a particular line of action.

5.0 SUMMARY

The focus of this unit is diplomacy. The endemic nature of conflict in the international system makes it imperative for states and other international actors to device ways of ameliorating its consequences. Diplomacy lubricates the international system and is used to advance the interest of all actors, state and non-state. Modern diplomacy began in Renaissance Italy. Commercial success made it imperative for the Italian city-states to devote attention to establishing and maintaining diplomatic contact with other states in order to minimize risk and enhance prosperity. Venice pioneered the process of giving written instructions to envoys and maintaining an archive of diplomatic correspondence. There are different variants of diplomacy-

democratic, coercive and ping-pong diplomacy are some of its variants. However, irrespective of the - method employed—negotiation or coercion—diplomacy's success and effectiveness depends on a number of variables, the most important being the relative power of the actors involved. Indeed, nations go to war only when diplomacy fails. Similarly, when war fails to win total annihilation it takes diplomacy to negotiate a truce.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain the origins of modern diplomacy.
2. “Nations go to war only when diplomacy fails.” Discuss.
3. Assess the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy.
4. Explain the term, gunboat diplomacy.

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UNIT 5 INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 International Regimes

3.2 Theoretical Approaches

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

International regimes are the networks of rules, norm, and procedures that regularize and govern behaviour and control arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence. However, in world politics, rules and procedures are neither so complete nor as well enforced as in well-ordered domestic political systems, and the institutions are neither so powerful nor so autonomous. The rules of the game include some in national rules, some international rules, some private rules, and large areas of no rules at all.

The weakness of international organizations and the problems of enforcing international law sometimes mislead observers into thinking that international regimes are insignificant, or into ignoring them entirely. To understand the international regimes that affect patterns of interdependence, one must look at structure and process in international systems, as well as at how they affect each other.

The structure of a system refers to the distribution of capabilities among similar units. In international political systems, the most important units are states, and the relevant capabilities are their power resources.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of the unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain the meaning of international regimes.
2. Explain the relevance of International regimes to the international system
3. Explain the three schools of thought within the study of international regimes.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 International Regimes

An international regime is a set of rules, norms, and procedures around which the expectations of actors converge in a certain issue area. This could be arms control, international trade, or Antarctic exploration. The convergence of expectations means that participants in the international system have similar ideas about what rules will govern their mutual participation; each expects to play by the same rules. International regimes help to provide the political framework within which international economic processes occur. Indeed, regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, which pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations. Thus, the complex apparatus of principles, norms, rules, and procedures collapses into the single concept of rules. According to Stephen Krasner, regimes are implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action.

Similarly, Keohane and Nye define regimes as sets of governing arrangements that include networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behaviour and control its effects. Haas argues that a regime encompasses a mutually coherent set of procedures, rules, and norms. Hedley Bull, using a different terminology, refers to the importance of rules and institutions in international society where rules refer to general imperative principles that require or authorize prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways. It is important to understand regimes as something more than temporary arrangements that change with every shift in power or

interests. A definition of international regimes formulated by Stephen Krasner in 1983 has become the accepted consensus among international relations scholars. Krasner defines international regimes as: implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.

In *Theories of International Regimes* (1997) Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger have demonstrated how the above definition can be illustrated by the international regime for the prevention of nuclear proliferation. The regime rests on four principles:

1. A principle which links the proliferation of nuclear weapons to a higher likelihood of nuclear war
2. A principle that acknowledges the compatibility of a multilateral nuclear non-proliferation policy with the continuation and even the spread of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
3. A principle stating a connection between horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation (i.e. the notion that in the long run the proliferation of nuclear weapons can only be halted if the nuclear powers are ready to reduce their nuclear arsenals)
4. A principle of verification (Hasenclever, 1997, 9).

According to the same authors, a number of norms guide the international regime for the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Among these are

1. The obligation of non-nuclear weapon states to refrain from producing or acquiring nuclear weapons
2. The obligation of all members not to assist non-nuclear weapon states in the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons
3. The obligation of nuclear weapon states to enter into serious negotiations with the purpose of concluding nuclear disarmament treaties.

These norms have also engendered a number of detailed rules and regulations that specify the obligations of states or make it possible to distinguish between complaint and non-compliant states. Finally, as indicated in the definition, a variety of procedures “form an integral part of the non-proliferation regime, e.g. procedures for the collective review and revision of provisions of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).” The authors assert further that: “While this treaty forms the normative backbone of the regime, it must not be equated with the regime as such. Various other documents (formal and informal ones), including the London Suppliers' Guidelines, the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the safeguard rules in INFCIRC/66 and /153, and the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties, spell out injunctions which, together with the NPT, constitute the content of the nuclear non-proliferation regime” ((Hasenclever, et al; 1997, 9-10).

It is essential to distinguish clearly between international regimes, on the one hand, and mere *ad hoc* substantive agreements, on the other. Regimes facilitate the making of substantive agreements by providing a framework of rules, norms, principles, and procedures for negotiation. A theory of international regimes must explain why these intermediate arrangements are necessary. Agreements are *ad hoc*, often single, arrangements. Indeed, the purpose of regimes is to facilitate agreements. Regimes can help solve collective goods problems by increasing transparency because when everyone knows what everyone else is doing cheating becomes risky. The current revolution in information technologies is strengthening regimes particularly in this aspect. Indeed, with better international communication, states can identify conflicts and negotiate solutions through regimes more effectively.

The most common conception of regimes combines elements of realism and liberalism. States function and operate as autonomous units maximizing their own interests in an anarchic context. Regimes do not play a role in issues in which states can realize their interests directly through unilateral applications of leverage. Rather, regimes come into existence to overcome collective goods dilemmas by coordinating the behaviours of individual states. Although states continue to seek their own interests, they create frameworks to coordinate their actions with those of other states when such coordination is necessary to realize self-interest that is, in collective goods

dilemmas. Regimes do not substitute for the basic calculations of costs and benefits by states; they just open up new possibilities with more favourable benefit-cost ratios. Regimes do not constrain states, except in a very narrow and short-term sense. Rather they facilitate and empower national governments faced with issues in which collective goods or coordination problems would otherwise prevent these governments from achieving their ends. Indeed, regimes are intervening variables between the basic causal forces at work in IR. For realists, the relative power of state actors—and the outcomes such as international cooperation or lack thereof. For realists in particular, regimes do not negate the effects of power; more often, they codify and normalize existing power relations in accordance with the dominance principle. For example, the nuclear non-proliferation regime protects the status quo in which only a few states have nuclear weapons.

Because regimes depend on state power for their enforcement, some IR scholars argue that regimes are most effective when power in the international system is most concentrated—when there is a hegemon to keep order. Yet, regimes do not always decline with the power of hegemons that created them. Rather, they may take on a life of their own. Although hegemony may be crucial in establishing regimes, it is not necessary for maintaining them. Once actors' expectations converge around the rules embodied in a regime, the actors realize that the regime serves their own interests. Working through the regime becomes a habit, and national leaders may not seriously consider breaking out of the established rules. This persistence of regimes was demonstrated in the 1970s, when U.S. power declined following the decades of U.S. hegemony since 1945. The international economic regimes adjusted somewhat and survived.

In part, the survival of regimes rests on their embedding in permanent institutions such as the UN, NATO, and the International Monetary Fund. These institutions become the tangible manifestation of shared expectations as well as the machinery for coordinating international actions based on those expectations. In international security affairs, the UN and other IGOs provide a stable framework for resolving disputes.

Principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime. There may be many rules and decision-making procedures, which are consistent with the same principles and norms. Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes if principles and norms are unaltered. For instance, Benjamin Cohen points out that there has been a substantial increase in private bank financing during the 1970s. Fundamental political arguments are more concerned with norms and principles than with rules and procedures. Changes in the latter may be interpreted in different ways. For instance, in the area of international trade, recent revisions in the Articles of Agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provide for special and differential treatment for less developed countries (LDCs). All industrialized countries have instituted generalized systems of preferences for LDCs. Such rules violate one of the basic norms of the liberal post war order, the most-favoured-nation treatment of all parties.

Indeed, extant international regimes offer a number of examples of such behaviour, particularly in the area of North-South relations. The Third World has used international regimes to enhance power and control over international transaction flows in a number of issue-areas. The Third World has advocated allocative systems based on authoritative state control rather than on the market. Similarly, in the area of shipping, developing countries have supported the United Nations Convention on Liner Conferences, which establishes a norm of a 40-40-20 split of cargo between exporting, importing, and third-country liners. In the area of trade, developing countries have used the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and UNCTAD to press for special and differential treatment. Through international agreements on business practices and technology transfer, developing countries have sought to legitimate and thereby enhance the power of national government to regulate multinational corporations. The Law of the Seas negotiations have afforded developing states the opportunity to claim revenues from the exploitation of deep seabed nodules even though they lack the technology and capital to undertake development on their own.

However, the industrialized nations have treated these alterations in the rules as temporary departures necessitated by the peculiar circumstances of poorer areas. In

the US insistence, the concept of graduation became part of the GATT Articles after the Tokyo Round. Graduation holds that as countries become more developed they will accept rules consistent with liberal principles. Hence, Representatives of the North have chosen to interpret special and differential treatment of developing countries as a change within the regime.

3.2 Theoretical Approaches

Essentially, three theories provide explanations to the study of regimes in international relations. According to the explanatory variables that these theories emphasize, they may be classified as power-based, interest-based, and knowledge-based approaches, respectively. In fact, we may talk of three **schools of thought** within the study of international regimes. The realists who focus on power relationships, the neoliberals who base their analyses on constellations of interests, and the cognitivists who emphasize knowledge dynamics, communication, and identities. The use of the term schools does not imply that there are no significant differences among the positions taken by members of the same school with respect to international regimes.

One major difference separating the three schools of thought is the degree of institutionalism that power-based, interest-based, and knowledge-based theories of regimes tend to espouse. A regime is effective to the extent that its members abide by its norms and rules. This attribute of regimes is termed regime strength. In addition, a regime is effective to the extent that it achieves certain objectives or fulfils certain purposes. The most fundamental and most widely discussed of these purposes is the enhancement of the ability of states to cooperate in the issue-area. *Power-based theories of regimes*, which assume that states care not only for absolute, but for relative gains as well, are least inclined to ascribe a considerable degree of causal significance to international institutions, although they acknowledge that regime-based inter-state cooperation is a reality that is in need of explanation. In a sense, power theorists of regimes face this need even more than others, since sustained international cooperation that is not readily reduced to a form of external balancing represents a major puzzle to the realist research program. Realists who take international institutions seriously argue that power is no less central in cooperation

than in conflict between nations. According to these authors, the distribution of power resources among actors strongly affects both the prospects for effective regimes to emerge and persist in an issue-area and the nature of the regimes that result, especially as far as the distribution of the benefits from cooperation is concerned. Generally, realists have stressed the way in which considerations of relative power forced upon states by the anarchical environment in which they struggle for survival and independence create obstacles for international cooperation that tend to call into question the effectiveness of international regimes.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What do you understand by international regimes?
2. How many schools of thoughts explain international regimes?
3. Name the schools of thought.
4. What major difference exists among the schools?

4.0 CONCLUSION

International regimes are the networks of rules, norm, and procedures that regularize and govern behaviour and control arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence. International regimes help to provide the political framework within which international economic processes occur. Indeed, regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, which pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations. Thus, the complex apparatus of principles, norms, rules, and procedures collapses into the single concept of rules. Regimes can help solve collective goods problems by increasing transparency because everyone knows what everyone else is doing cheating becomes risky. The current revolution in information technologies is strengthening regimes particularly in this aspect. Indeed, with better international communication, states can identify conflicts and negotiate solutions through regimes more effectively.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we focused on international regimes. An international regime is a set of rules, norms, and procedures around which the expectations of actors converge in a

certain issue area. This could be arms control, international trade, or Antarctic exploration. The convergence of expectations means that participants in the international system have similar ideas about what rules will govern their mutual participation; each expects to play by the same rules. International regimes help to provide the political framework within which international economic processes occur. three theories provide explanations to the study of regimes in international relations. According to the explanatory variables that these theories emphasize, they may be classified as power-based, interest-based, and knowledge-based approaches, respectively. In fact, we may talk of three **schools of thought** within the study of international regimes. The realists who focus on power relationships, the neoliberals who base their analyses on constellations of interests, and the cognitivists who emphasize knowledge dynamics, communication, and identities. The use of the term schools does not imply that there are no significant differences among the positions taken by members of the same school with respect to international regimes.

One major difference separating the three schools of thought is the degree of institutionalism that power-based, interest-based, and knowledge-based theories of regimes tend to espouse.

6.0 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain in detail what you understand by international regimes.
2. Explain the three approaches to the study of international regimes.
3. Explain the significance of international regimes to the international system.

7.0. REFERENCE/ FURTHER READING

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, Fourth Edition, (New York: Longman Pearson Education Inc, 2012).

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MODULE 4**THEORIES AND PARADIGMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Unit 1 Theories of International Relations

Unit 2 Realism

Unit 3 Idealism

Unit 4 Foreign Policy Analysis

Unit 5 Foreign Policy in Action: Two Case Studies

UNIT 1 THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**CONTENTS**

1.0 Introduction

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3.0 Main Content

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3.2.1 Individual Level of Analysis

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3.2.3 System Level of Analysis

3.3 System Theory

3.4 Functional Theory

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3.6 Decision Making Theories

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7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Unit discusses the importance of the theoretical study of international relations using the level of analysis construct. It explains in detail Systems theory, Game theory and Functionalism. It also explains three decision making theories, namely, the Rational Actor Model, the Bureaucratic Politics model and the Hero-in-History model.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

Students should be able to:

- Discuss the importance of the theoretical study of international relations
- Understand and explain the assumptions of system theory
- Understand and explain the assumptions of Functional theory
- Understand and explain the assumptions of Game theory
- Understand and explain the decision-making theories
- Develop the ability to apply the various theories in their analysis of issues in international relations.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Origin and Importance of the Theoretical Study of International Relations

Although the study of international relations must account for the unique, new, and non-recurring phenomenon, it is also concerned with recurring processes and patterns of behaviour. These patterns occur with much regularity and often transcend specific historical episodes. They provide opportunities for scholars to draw generalisations and conceptualisations that cut across historical events. The generalisations provide a platform for the formulation of explanatory paradigms on such issues as the causes of war, imperialism, escalation, crises, alliance, deterrence, etc. without having to describe specific historical wars, alliances, crisis and other issues. It is the possibility of drawing such generalisations and concepts, building explanatory models and paradigms which underlines the importance of the theoretical study of international relations.

Since World War II international relations scholarship has moved from mere description of events, the analysis of international treaties with a legalistic and moral tone, to the development of explanatory theories and paradigms on international phenomena. The process evolved towards the development of a “predictive science” of international relations. The logic of international relations as a predictive science is based on the claim that when enough basic propositions about the behaviour of policy makers, states, and international systems have been tested and verified through rigorous research methods, predictive statements, i.e., theories, can be advanced with sufficient clarity.

3.2 Levels of Analysis

Another important aspect to the theoretical study of international relations revolves around the “level of analysis” construct. International relations is such a broad field that scholars have devised major units or levels for analytical discourse. These are the **individual, the state, and the system** levels of analysis. Each level focuses on different aspects of international relations.

3.2.1 Individual Level of Analysis

The Individual level of analysis focuses on the actions, behaviour, attitudes, idiosyncrasies or psychology of individual policymakers. It examines leaders’ personalities, perceptions and misperceptions. For instance, in a discussion of the Nigerian civil war the individual level of analysis approach will consider the personality of the key players – Ojukwu and Gowon – as causal factors in the war. Did Ojukwu miscalculate dreadfully and provoked a war the Igbo could not win? Did Gowon underestimate the resolve and the resilience of the Igbo and thereby adopted strategies that prolonged the war unnecessarily? The level’s focus on the actions and behaviour of individual statesmen is based on the reasonable proposition that when we refer to the way states behave we really mean that policymakers define purposes choosing among courses of action and utilising national capabilities to achieve objectives in the name of the state.

3.2.2 State Level of Analysis

The State level of analysis assumes that all policymakers act essentially the same way once confronted with similar situations. It therefore concentrates on the behaviour of states. Many analysts consider the state level to be the most important. They treat the state as the basic unit of international relations. For instance, on the issue of international conflict, a pervasive and permanent feature of international relations, analysts will want to know whether it arises from such attributes of the state as sovereignty, territoriality, nationalism, power, economic structure, etc. Questions such as the following are germane to the state level of analysis: What are the characteristics and peculiarities of states in a given issue area? What are the domestic conditions that affect policy formulation? Generally, the state level of analysis assumes that governmental actions express the needs and values of their own populations and political leaders. Domestic political pressures, national ideologies, public opinion, economic and social needs, all contribute to the way states interact with other actors in the international system.

3.2.3 System Level of Analysis

The System level of analysis looks at the international system holistically. It considers the structure of the system and the distribution of power and influence within the system; the form of superior and subordinate relationships, etc. For instance, do anarchy and the power symmetries within the system explain the form, and the intensity of conflict? The classic theory of the balance of power, to pick one of the system level theories, explains the behaviour of many states over a period of time. It proposes that states will form coalitions and counter-coalitions to fend off hegemonic drive and that a “balancer” will intervene on behalf of the weaker side to redress the balance or restore the equilibrium. The system level explains the actions of individual actors in terms of the state of the whole system. It makes no reference to personalities, domestic pressures, or ideologies within states. To pick another example the system level will explain the outbreak of World War I as a consequence of the breakdown of the balance of power system.

Generally, each level of analysis contributes to our understanding of international relations although each on its own fails to account for certain aspects of the situation under consideration. Thus for a thorough understanding and explanation of international relations phenomena it is important to consider all three levels of analysis at relevant points depending on the type of problem to be analysed. Scholars employing the different levels of analysis to the study of international relations have formulated theories and analytical models suitable to each level. Balance of power and System theory are examples of system level of analysis theories. So also are Game theory, Field theory, Power Transition theory, and Long Cycle theory.

Decision-making theories such as Motivational Analysis, Rational or Unitary Actor model, Corporatist Synthesis, are examples of state level of analysis theories. Other examples include Capability Analysis. Morgenthau's Grand Theory of international politics based on a model of power politics can be categorised under the state level of analysis because it situates the sources of state behaviour in the search for power. It can also be described as a system level of analysis theory because power symmetries between and among states create a balance of power. At the individual level of analysis are the psychological and ethological theories which have been used to explain the actions of statesmen as well as the causes of war. Another example is the Hero-in-History model employed in foreign policy analysis.

3.3 System Theory

General System Theory, (GST) was first formulated by Ludwig von Bertalanffy as an explanatory paradigm in Biology. It has since been applied in other sciences such as physics, chemistry, ecological studies, and subsequently, to the behavioural and social sciences. GST approaches a subject holistically, i.e. as a totality, a whole entity, or, to use international relations terminology, a world view. It views its subject as an organism, an integrated unit rather than the sum of its constituent parts. GST offers an alternative to the mechanistic conception implicit in the literature on international relations in which the society and the individual man are thought of in terms of the analogy of the machine and its constituent parts. The mechanistic model that GST seeks to supplant deduces the meaning of the whole from knowledge of the character

of the components. GST principles on the other hand are based on the empirically verified fact that living beings and their organisations are not collections of separate units, the sum of which accounts for a total phenomenon. Instead all the phenomena of the living world show the characteristics of open systems in which the constituent parts are sets of organised actions that are maintained constantly by exchanges in the environment.

By way of contrast the classical mechanistic approach conceptualised phenomena as a closed system separated from the outer environment so that the outcome results from initial conditions. Analysis of the closed system focuses on the characteristics and quantities of the basic components. The method is based on the concept of the sum of the parts; it deduces the meaning of the whole from knowledge of the characteristics of the parts. The open system principle of GST holds true for all phenomena ranging from particles, atoms, molecules, genes, cells, tissues, organs, individuals, and populations to societies. Any living system according to the GST principle is composed of other organised complexes of open systems. What on superficial observation may appear as a stable unit is in reality a complex changing system of lesser units. Another dimension of GST is that an organisation in the open system maintains itself not in a state of equilibrium but in a steady state. For instance, in the history of modern international relations post-war periods exhibit a tendency toward the establishment of orderly relations between governments, based on the conditions created by the war. No matter the political decision, and with or without governmental direction men will do what they can to eliminate disruptions and restore order; they will adapt old ways and ideas to novel circumstances. The steady state refers in essence to the inherent tendency to maintain the organisation of the system.

The open system approach leads to the generalisation that final outcomes are not determined by initial conditions, rather, by conditions of outflow and inflow over a period of time. Based on this paradigm the rapid rise of Japan with very poor initial conditions can be explained. Systems are said to be **coupled** when the output of one system affects an input of the other system. Hence the foreign policy of the United States is an input for the international system just as Nigeria's foreign policy actions serve as inputs for African international relations. NEPAD is a case in point.

Similarly, when systems, whether on the same or different levels, are coupled in two directions, this results in **feedback**. Take for instance United States relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. US policy affected that of the Soviet Union and was in turn affected or influenced by that of the Soviet Union. **Negative feedback** operates in the direction opposite from that of the input as exemplified by US/Soviet or US/Cuban relations. **Positive feedback** will result from US/British or US/Canada or Nigeria/South Africa relations. In the case of the latter feedback was negative during the Apartheid era; it has been positive since 1995. The **rate of change** is important in the feedback process. For instance an increase in the capabilities of a national actor, if great enough and if at a fast enough rate, may prevent other national actors from taking compensating action. This may lead to the transformation of a system or its destruction.

Steady State

In the steady state some variables in the system continually readjust to keep other variables within given limits. A good example of a steady state is the way the temperature of the human body is maintained by the system of perspiring in hot weather and shivering in cold weather. Political systems maintain steady-state stability. However, if a system is subjected to a disturbance of sufficient critical strength, it will either change to a new state of equilibrium or it will cease to exist as an identifiable system with boundaries distinguishing it from its environment.

Variables

The systems theory also involves the study of relationships between variables. It is therefore important to specify explicitly those variables employed in the study of any phenomenon. For instance, physicists use such variables as mass, energy, temperature, pressure, etc. Normally the subject matter determines the choice of variables to be used. The variables permit generalisations as well as focus attention on specific aspects of a problem. For instance, in studying the state of an international system or of its subsystems the following variables will be useful: the essential rules of system, the transformation rules, the actor classificatory variables, the capability variables, and the information variables.

The Essential Rules of a System

The essential rules of the system describe general relationships between the actors. They also assign role functions to actors independent of the labelling of the actors. The rules are not laws in the physical sense but merely specify characteristic behaviour in the system. The rules apply whether the actors are tribes, empires, city-states, nation states, inter-governmental organisations, small states, rich, poor etc or any other classificatory labelling model employed to designate actors in the system. Essential rules permit the investigation of types rather than of particulars.

The Transformation Rules of a System

The transformation rules of a system are those rules which relate given sets of essential rules to given parameter values, depending upon the previous state of the system. The transformation rules are the laws of change of the dynamic system. Thus given knowledge of the present state of a system and of the value of its parameters, the future states of the system can in principle be predicted. When environmental conditions induce changes in the characteristic behaviour, i.e., in the essential rules, the changes are made in accordance with the transformation rules. Behaviour is thus a function of internal system influences as well as of external influences. Different kinds of systems will therefore respond or change in different ways.

The Actor Classificatory Variables

The actor classificatory variables specify the structural characteristics of actors. These characteristics modify behaviour. For instance “nation-state” “alliance” and “international organisation” are actor categories whose behaviour will differ as a consequence of structural characteristics. Similarly a classification of nation-states as democratic or authoritarian will have consequences for their behaviour.

The Capability Variables

The capability variables specify the physical capability of an actor to carry out given classes of actions in specified settings. Various factors are used in determining capability: territory, population, industrial capacity, skills, military forces, transport and communication facilities, political will, ability to draw on the aid of others.

Information Variables

This includes knowledge of long-range aspirations as well as immediate needs. Information may be accurate or inaccurate; it may be sufficient or limited in scope. For instance an actor may fail to do something he has the capability to do if he is unaware of his capabilities. He may also attempt something beyond his means if he overestimates his capabilities. Information also involves perception and misperception. It includes estimates of capabilities; it includes knowledge of the means by which objectives may be achieved and of the ways in which other actors may behave in response to one's actions or in pursuit of their own independent objectives. Information is thus an important determinant of action in any political or social system. Accurate information assists in the achievement of objectives; inaccurate information hinders or interferes. In general the knowledge of information which an actor has is important in predicting what that actor is likely to do.

The international system is the most inclusive system analysed by system theorists. National and supranational systems are subsystems of the international system. They may however be treated separately as systems. The system has no absolute status and as indicated earlier consists of variables employed for the investigation of the subject matter.

3.4 Functional Theory

The theory of functionalism was elaborated by David Mitrany in a series of books and articles among which are *The Progress of International Government* published in 1933; the article "Functional Federalism" in the Journal *Common Cause* of November 1950 and particularly the book *A Working Peace System* published in 1946. The theory asserts and justifies the proposition that the development of international economic and social cooperation is a major prerequisite for the ultimate solution of political conflicts and elimination of war. As Mitrany puts it "the problem of our time is not how to keep the nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together". In other words peace can be maintained not by addressing the issues of conflict but by promoting cooperation in areas of mutual interest. According to Mitrany, functional development of special-purpose organisations will evolve their own distinctive structural patterns, procedures, and areas of competence in accordance with inherent

requirements of their functional missions. In general the theory seeks to shift attention away from the vertical divisions of human society into sovereign states towards the horizontal strata of social needs which cut across the national divide. Rather than reconciling conflicting interests as emphasised in power theory, functionalism promotes efforts to solve common problems. Mitrany sees functionalism as a method “which would... overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually integrated.” International peace can be maintained by solving economic and social problems through agencies covering the problem areas. The problems which are crucial to maintaining international peace are bigger in scope than nation states. Hence, the mission of functionalism is to make peace possible by organising the particular layers of human social life in accordance with their particular requirements.

In addition functional theory envisages the ultimate development of organisational and institutional patterns of internationalism which may supersede the nation state system. Functional organisations, by focusing attention on areas of common interest, will promote habits of cooperation which will equip human beings for the conduct of a system of international relations in which the expectation of constructive cooperation will replace conflict. Working international agencies will create a system of mutual advantages that will overcome the desire and tendency for war.

In sum, functionalism seeks to promote peace by eliminating objective conditions conducive to war. It seeks to introduce new patterns of organisation that may transform the global institutional system. By providing services which populations find desirable, functional institutions will share fundamental loyalties with the State. This will deepen the sentiment of human solidarity and initiate the development of subjective trends which may cause the erosion of sovereignty. Inherent in functional theory are elements of Devil Theory. Diplomats and other state officials, who take action in defence of national interest, in particular officials of Foreign Offices, are used to treating international affairs as an area of conflict and competition. Their roles are therefore incompatible with the operational mechanism of

functionalism. Functionalism will bring into international relations other officials in labour, health, agriculture, commerce, transport, disease control, etc. in collaborative efforts through specialised international agencies. Those traditional officials in charge of diplomacy will hence be circumvented in the promotion of international peace. Functional theory thus envisages the ultimate production of a world capable of sustaining peaceful relationships. It postulates a transfer of loyalties to the international community in response to the growing usefulness of functional agencies. Functionalism eschews the rigidity of a formula and the neatness of a blueprint; it projects the growth of international organisation as needed and in accordance with needs. It is flexible and opportunist; it makes an appeal to common sense for the discovery of practicable solution to define problems.

Students of international organisation should be careful not to be carried away by the impressiveness of the theory and attractiveness of the programme of functionalism. For instance, the central thesis that war is a product of unsatisfactory economic and social conditions in the global community contradicts the various theories and explanatory paradigms on the causes of war, particularly the power theory. In any case the historical evidence does not confirm the existence of direct correlation between national economic backwardness and aggressiveness. After all, it was advances Germany and Japan that plunged the world into war in 1939 and 1941.

Moreover the separation of the economic and social strata from the political, and the belief that actions and results from the non-political field can be brought to bear on the political arena flies in the face of the evidence. The history of international relations in the 20th century demonstrates clearly the politicisation of all issues. Can states be induced to join hands in functional endeavour before they have settled the outstanding political and security issues that divide them? History does not justify such an assertion. Another problem area is the assumption based on the concentric circle principle that success in one functional area will lead to a steady progression of ever widening circles of cooperation until it encompasses all available areas of cooperation in international relations. The reality is that recurrent setback, the interruption and disruption by war of functional projects. Functionalism cannot

guarantee that one thing leads inexorably and interminably to another in international relations.

Functionalism in Practice

Articles 23-25 of the Covenant of the League of Nations established a rather vague mandate for League excursions into functionalism. This informed the creation of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The designers of the post-World War II international order assigned major importance to the creation of functional organs in the economic and social fields. Pre-existing specialised agencies were retained, remodelled, or replaced, and new ones were created. These functional organisations are described as the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations Organisation. The Economic AND Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN coordinates the functional activities of the Specialised Agencies. Unlike the League the UN system was, in its original conception, a full-fledged experiment in the application of the functional theory to international relations. The functional agencies include the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), UNESCO, International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), IBRD, IMF, WHO, etc.

The UN has steadily enlarged and diversified its functional programme. These cover technical, economic, social, ecological, humanitarian problems. But the fact that these agencies are competent to *deal* with these problems does not mean that they are equipped to *solve* them. Functional agencies have not been given the full authority to make decisions, to order compliance, to command resources, and to initiate and conduct activities. To a limited extent, organs of the UN have acquired powers of a legislative and executive nature in regard to their specialised substantive areas, including the responsibility for framing technical regulations and the right of following up passage of resolutions. Bodies such as the UN Refugee Agency have directly administered and managed field programmes doing jobs through their own personnel and their own budgetary resources. Generally, however, the primary functions of UN agencies have been more modest, restricted to fact-finding, research into the nature and magnitude of problems, idea shaping, sponsorship of consultation among experts and responsible government officials. They also encourage of the

standardisation and harmonisation of national programmes and policies. Their work has been largely confined to helping governments help themselves and encouraging inter-governmental cooperation. None of these agencies is a supranational institution.

3.5 Game Theory

Game Theory was developed by mathematicians and economists who were particularly concerned with political phenomena. It is a general theory, like power theory, designed to deal with a wide range of situations and problems in terms of repetitive patterns of behaviour, common aspects of phenomena, and types of actions and factors. Game theorists are interested in decisions, decision-making and conflict. Policymakers try to select a successive course of action from among alternatives. It offers a way of thinking about conflict and decision-making as well as a device for discovering optimum strategies to illuminate problems of decision. This involves a prediction of consequences based on assessed possibilities. The theory focuses on the “reasonable” or rational policymaker who weighs values or options with probabilities and maximises choice. Most policymakers must consider the choice of policies or actions by others at home and abroad who may interfere substantially with desired success. The theory is also directed to the question: What would I reasonably do if I were in the other fellow’s shoes? Policymakers have to be conscious about the ingredients of their own decisions and the decisions of those who can affect their interests and intentions. Game theory characterises decision-making behaviour in certain situations in order to discover, if possible, the conditions under which the aims of the policymaker can be promoted or protected to the greatest extent. It seeks to describe, explain, and prescribe human behaviour manifest in conflict situations where decisions must be made.

Game theory is a method of analysis and a method of selecting the best courses of action. It focuses on situations that call for rational behaviour, i.e., behaviour designed to produce decisions and courses of action involving the least costly way to achieve goals or to keep losses to a minimum given particular operating conditions. These situations are marked by conflict, competition, and often cooperation.

Game theory attempts to answer the question: What action is rational when all relevant possibilities are known and the outcome is not determined by any one participant? To answer this question the theory develops a mathematical model for choice making among alternative courses of action when the actions of others make it impossible to control all the factors involved. Although the theory involves rational choice of action it also considers irrational behaviour. Game theory employs as its basic model the game of strategy as distinct from games of chance. It offers the most important theoretical tool in the area of strategy.

The Issue of Strategy

Strategy is concerned with choices from among alternative actions rather than with alternative end states. For example, consider a scenario in which two tribes or parties of hunters are hungry and close to starvation. The one food source available will not provide enough food to save both parties from starvation. If the parties are enemies, a number of alternative strategies are available to them. Suppose there are alternative routes to the food source, but it is unknown which route is the shortest. One strategic option would be to fight before seeking the food. Clearly such a choice will be appealing and rational to the stronger but slower body of hunters. A second strategy would be to choose one of the alternative routes. A third alternative would be to divide the party and try several routes simultaneously. This strategy however involves the risk for the smaller group that arrives first: it could be set upon by the full party of the enemy and destroyed. A rational actor would have to consider all the alternatives before eventually adopting a particular strategy.

A strategy is a complete description of the choices a player will make under any possible set of circumstances. The strategy is so complete that it accounts for all possible variables. Thus, if the strategies of the players are given to an umpire, the players can retire while the umpire plays a completely determined game. This is because a strategy is a complete statement of moves under all possible contingencies. As such, the initial moves of the players determine all subsequent moves.

The Issue of Games

Game theory employs games as an analytical device. It deals with simple games such as poker and with simplified versions of more complicated games such as war. The

theory has developed a number of game parameters among which are **zero-sum-game** and the **n-person non-zero-sum game**.

Zero-Sum Game

This is a basic game. It is a two-person game. There are two players only in this game, and the winning and losses cancel each other out. This means that the gains of some players equal the losses of others. For instance if **A** wins 3, **B** losses 3. For instance, in a two-candidate election the votes won by one are lost by the other. Since war has a characteristic of a zero-sum-game. Bilateral international relations are however characterised by the two-person non-zero-sum-game.

N-Person Non-Zero-Sum Game

Here there are more than two players in a game in which the winning and losses do not cancel out. For instance, in a 3-candidate election to one office the result will be +1 for the winner and -1 for each of the losers. Games of this type are more complicated and are more common in international relations.

Concepts Employed in Game Theory

There are five major concepts in game theory. The concept of game has associated with it the concepts “Players”, “Rules”, “Moves”, “Strategies”, and “Payoffs”. In football, for instance, there are rules and players, the players can make certain moves, the team can adopt certain strategies, and there are payoffs. Usually the concepts employed in game theory have an intuitive meaning for various kinds of economic, political and military conflicts.

The Player

The first unit of analysis is the player. He is the actor I the game situation. This does not mean that the player is a single individual or single national actor. It refers to the decision-making unit in the situation being studied. It could, for instance be an alliance like the Triple Entente or the Triple Alliance in World War I. It could all the states in Africa on the one hand, and the G-8 on the other, if the situation being studied is NEPAD. Consider for instance a situation where the player is an alliance. The members of the alliance have a different set of alternatives open to them. They could leave the alliance or join a different one; they could decide to remain independent. The fact that a member might leave is a possible payoff of the game the

alliance is playing. However, in the game in which two alliances confront each other the individual members of the alliance are not players. The players are each of the two alliances considered as a single unit.

The Rules

These are instructions that clearly specify what is allowed and what is not. They are the limiting conditions under which the game is played. In Nigerian politics it is a rule of the game that the person who wins a majority of the votes cast in a particular number of states becomes president. The rules of Nigerian politics can be changed by constitutional amendment. Such a change, although it changes the rules, will still be in accordance with the rules of the game. However, the rules may be changed by physical force, as in the case of a successful coup d'état. This is important because in international relations, if it is not considered, it may give a misleading impression of the rationality of a given strategy. An important actor may be able to change or vitiate the essential rules of the game of balance of power. This was what Napoleon tried to do. The rules of the game determine the moves a player may make. You may recall that in our study of international systems the rules of interaction are one of its characteristics. In the contemporary international system only the political units, i.e. nation states legally have a monopoly of the instruments of violence. To pick another example all states, irrespective of size and capabilities are presumed equal and sovereign.

Strategy

As employed in game theory strategy means a complete plan --- so complete that it cannot be upset by an opponent or by nature. Strategy takes into account the potential behaviour of opponents and renders irrelevant the expectations of the latter concerning one's own behaviour. If only a single strategy happens to be optimal for each player it is called pure strategy. (See above for a more comprehensive discussion of strategy)

Information

Every game has a structure of information. Players in a game have full information i.e., they are aware of all the rules of the game and the payoffs for any situation. Game theory describes this as **complete information**. The theory distinguishes **complete information** from **imperfect information**. Although all actors in an international

system are fully informed about the rules of interaction, i.e. **complete information**, their knowledge of each other's capabilities is limited and imperfect. This constitutes **imperfect information**.

Payoffs

This refers to the value of the game to each player. It refers to what the game is worth at the end in terms of fulfilled probabilities, in terms of winnings and losses, and in terms of positive or negative progress towards avowed goals or ends.

3.6 Decision Making Theories

Scholars have devised various paradigms for analysing decision making in foreign policy. Three of these will be considered here, namely the Unitary Actor model, the Bureaucratic Politics model, and the Hero-in-History model.

3.6.1 The Rational or Unitary Actor Model

This is an analytical construct derived from political realism otherwise known as the realist perspective or *realpolitik*. Realists assert that the primary objective of nation-states' foreign policy is to protect their sovereignty. The international system is hostile and Hobbesian because the interests and objectives of other nation-states frequently threaten the freedom that states cherish most. Consequently the primary task that decision makers face is to formulate foreign policies to ensure their state's independence and, ultimate survival. The choices they make are shaped by strategic calculations of power, not by domestic politics or the process of decision-making itself. Realists conceive of the nation-state as the principal actor in world politics. They maintain that foreign policy choices are dictated by the realities of international politics. The international environment determines state action. Accordingly all states and the individuals responsible for foreign policy formulation respond similarly to the problems and challenges of the environment. The basic motive of states and the corresponding decision calculus of policymakers are the same; as such realism assumes that each state makes its choices as though it were a unitary actor.

In the game of world politics the actions of each actor are determined by the interactions between them, not by what occurs within them. As such neither the character nor type of leadership making the decision, the type of government, the characteristics of the society, the internal economic and political situation is of any

importance in the foreign policy decision-making process. It is the interaction process itself that determines each actor's foreign policy behaviour. This is the logic of power politics or real politik. The unitary actor model maintains that all policymakers follow the same routines and calculations to define their country's national interest. That the overriding concern of the national interest requires the rational calculation of opportunities risks and benefits so that the state can maximise its power and cope successfully with threats from the international arena. The model presumes that all decision makers go through the same processes to make value-maximizing choices designed to pursue the national interest defined in power terms. In essence the power model assumes that all decision makers are essentially alike.

Rational decision-making process ought to go through the following four steps:

1. **Problem Recognition and Definition.** This requires an objective assessment of the problem as it actually exists and not merely as they assume it to be. Accuracy requires full information about the actions, motivations, and capabilities of other actors as well as the state of the international environment and the transforming trends within it. Information must of necessity be exhaustive. All relevant facts must be assembled.
2. **Goal Selection.** Rational actors must define precisely how they want the problem to be solved.
3. **Identification of Alternatives** Rational actor model requires that an exhaustive list of all available policy options be compiled including an estimate of costs and opportunities associated with each alternative course of action.
4. **Choice.** This requires choosing among all the assembled alternatives the one option with the best prospect of achieving the desired goal. It should involve rigorous means-ends, cost-benefit analysis.

The rational choice model describes the most ideal situation. Decision makers often lay claim to having made decisions based on rational calculations. Still it is clear that there are substantial impediments to rational decision-making. There are clear deficiencies in intelligence; in capabilities, and in the psychology of those making the decisions. There is also the fact that international situations are often ambiguous; the need for consensus in the decision-making process in order to generate the necessary

national support impinges on the rational choice model. It is therefore impossible to discountenance the importance of domestic political factors in the policy process. In real life foreign policy making lends itself to error, rigidity, bias, miscalculation, misperceptions, mistakes, and fiascos. The reality is that the ideal requirements of rational decision-making are rarely, if ever met in practice. There is a wide discrepancy between the ideal process of rational decision-making and actual performance. Still, policy makers aspire to rational decision-making behaviour. The rational model provides a vision of how the decisional process should work.

3.6.2 Bureaucratic Politics Model

Heads of governments need information and advice to make decisions; they also need and, in fact, depend on a machinery to implement their decisions and policies. These functions are performed by organisations or bureaucracies that manage foreign affairs. They have become indispensable to a state's capacity to cope with changing global circumstances in a complex world. Bureaucracies have thus become a necessary component of modern governments.

By and large many different bureaucratic organisations are involved in the formulation and executing of foreign policy. In the United States for instance, the White House, the State Department, Defence Department, the CIA, Commerce Department, and a host of other governmental agencies make inputs into and are involved in the implementation of foreign policy. In Nigeria the Office of the President and the Vice President, the Ministry of External Affairs, NNPC, and other agencies of the federal government are involved in the foreign policy process. The involvement of multiple bureaucracies, and the interplay of politics, rivalry, and competition for influence among them give rise to the bureaucratic politics model of decision-making in foreign policy. The American diplomatic historian, Graham Allison, has identified two elements in the bureaucratic politics model. One is **Organisational process** which reflects the constraints that bureaucracies place on decision-makers' choices. The other is **governmental politics** which refers to the competition for influence among the key participants in the decision process.

Organisational Process

Bureaucracies contribute to the policy making process by devising **standard operating procedures** (SOPs) for coping with policy problems when they arise. Arms of the bureaucracy called upon to implement a presidential decision will follow previously devised routines. The routines or SOPs effectively limit the range of viable policy choices which political decision-makers might select options. In essence, rather than expanding the number of policy alternatives in a manner consistent with the logic of rational decision-making, what the organisation can or cannot do defines what is possible and what is not. In short, bureaucratic constraints limit the choices available to the policy maker. Organisational procedures and capabilities consequently shape in a profound way the means from which the government could choose to realise its objectives.

Governmental Politics

This relates to the bureaucratic character of modern foreign policy making in complex societies. Participants in the discussions that lead to policy choices often define issues and favour policy alternatives that reflect organisational affiliations. Hence the aphorism “where you stand depends on where you sit” which aptly reflects bureaucratic imperatives. For instance, officials of the Ministry of External Affairs would typically favour diplomatic approaches to policy problems whereas Ministry of Defence officials would routinely favour military solutions. In the Bakassi crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon the Justice and External Affairs ministries would clearly favour a policy bias directed at the International court of Justice while Defence would naturally favour a military option. Because the players in the game of governmental politics are responsible for protecting the nation’s security, they are obliged to fight for what they are convinced is right.

As a result of the conflicting preferences and the unequal power and influence which individuals involved in the process wield the result of the decision process differs from what any person or group intended. This makes the process intensely political. According the bureaucratic politics paradigm then, the explanation of why nations make the choices they do resides not in their interaction in the international arena but within the governments themselves. Instead of the unitary actor of the realist paradigm

the model identifies the games, the players, the coalitions, bargains and compromises which influence the decision making process. In the Bakassi example the final policy choices made by the government reflect the varied influences and capabilities of the participants in the decision process. In accordance with the model policy choices are the result of a tug of war among competing agencies; a political game with high stakes in which differences are settled at the minimum common denominator instead of by rational, cost-benefit calculations.

3.6.3 The Hero-in-History Model

The model equates national action with the preferences and initiatives of the highest officials in national governments. It argues that the course of world history is determined by the decisions of political elites. Leaders shape the way that foreign policies are made and the consequent behaviour of nation-states in world politics. The model is a popular image of the sources of states' foreign policies. It sees foreign policy as being determined exclusively by the hopes and visions of a head of state. To reinforce this image names of leaders are attached to policies as though the leaders were synonymous with the nation itself, and most successes and failures in foreign affairs are attributed to the leader in charge at the time they occurred. By extension the Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines, to pick some examples, were simply products of the personalities of the leaders who enunciated them. But as the rational actor and bureaucratic politics models reveal it is erroneous to attach too much importance to the impact of the individual leader in the policy process. Their influence may not be as prominent and pre-eminent as the model assumes.

Most leaders operate under a variety of political, psychological, and circumstantial constraints that limit considerably what they can accomplish. There are limits and restraints on the leader decreed by law, by history, and by circumstances. Leaders no doubt lead, and they do also make a difference. Yet they are not in complete control and their influence is severely circumscribed. In general, particularly in authoritarian or totalitarian states, the leader's impact on a nation's foreign policy behaviour increases when the leader's authority and legitimacy have popular support. On the other hand leaders governed by self-doubt will undermine their own capacity to lead and implement policy changes. When circumstances are stable and normal

routines operate, and when leader's egos are not entangled with policy outcomes, the impact of their personal characteristics is less obtrusive. The most critical factor in determining a leader's control over foreign policy decision-making is the existence of conditions of national crisis. During crisis decision-making tends to be centralised and handled exclusively by the top leader. In a crisis the situation is ambiguous and threatening; and crucial information may not be available. Leaders then assume responsibility for outcomes. Not surprisingly, great leaders in history have customarily arisen during periods of extreme challenge. The moment makes the person, rather than the person the moment. In general therefore leaders shape decision-making more powerfully in some circumstances than others. The impact of personal factors varies with the context, and often the context is more powerful than the leader.

The model appears much too simple an explanation of how states react to pressures from abroad. Most leaders follow the rules of the game which suggests that the ways in which states respond to international circumstances is often influenced less strongly by the type of people leading states than by other factors. In other words states respond to the international environment in often-similar ways, regardless of the predisposition of the leaders. This is why the realist model of power politics remains eternally reasonable and compelling.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. How many levels of analysis do we have in IR?
2. Identify the most important analytical theories in IR.
3. What are decision-making theories?
4. List three decision-making theories in international relations.

4.0 CONCLUSION

International relations accounts for the unique, new, and non-recurring phenomenon. It is also concerned with recurring processes and patterns of behaviour. These patterns occur with much regularity and often transcend specific historical episodes. They provide opportunities for scholars to draw generalisations and conceptualisations that cut across historical events. The generalisations provide a platform for the formulation of explanatory paradigms on such issues as the causes of war, imperialism, escalation,

crises, alliance, deterrence, etc. without having to describe specific historical wars, alliances, crisis and other issues. It is the possibility of drawing such generalisations and concepts, building explanatory models and paradigms which underlines the importance of the theoretical study of international relations. Among the most important analytical theories are Systems theory, Game theory and Functionalism. Other theories provide a basis for decision-making. Three of these are the Rational or Unitary Actor model, the Bureaucratic Politics model, and the Hero-in-History model.

5.0 SUMMARY

The unit has reviewed the importance of the theoretical study of international relations. It has explored the assumptions of Systems theory, Functionalism and Game theory. It has also explored three decision-making theories, namely, the Rational or Unitary Actor model, the Bureaucratic Politics Model and the Hero-in-History Model.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Assess the importance of the theoretical study of international relations
2. Explain Systems theory.
3. Explain the processes of Game theory
4. Explain the assumptions of Functional theory
5. Why are Unitary Actors described as Rational Actors?
6. Explain the Bureaucratic Politics Model

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UNIT 2 REALISM

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

There is no single theory that has entirely explained the wide range of international interactions both conflictual and cooperative. However, one theoretical framework has historically held a central position in the study of IR. This approach is called **realism**. Whereas, some IR scholars favour it, others vigorously contest it, yet almost all consider it.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of the unit, you should be able to:

4. Explain the meaning of realism.
5. Explain the realist approach to the study of IR.
6. Explain the concept of offensive realism.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Realism

Realism is a school of thought that explains international relations in terms of power. Some scholars refer to the exercise of power by states toward each other as **realpolitik** or power politics. Like utopianism in international relations theory, realism has its intellectual roots in the older political philosophy of the West and in the writings of non-Western ancient authors such as Sun Tzu in China, Kautilya in India, as well as Thucydides in ancient Greece.

Indeed, modern realist theory developed in reaction to a liberal tradition that realists call **idealism**. As an approach, idealism emphasizes international law, morality, and international organizations, rather than power alone as key influences on international relations. Idealists think that human nature is good. They see the international system as one based on a community of states that have the potential to work together to overcome mutual problems. Indeed, for idealists the principles of IR must flow from **morality**. However, from the realists' paradigm, states are rational actors whose decisions to maximize power derive from rational calculations of risks and gains, and of the shifts in the power balance in the international system. The nature of the international system reflects this emphasis on power. To be sure, a handful of "great powers" and their military alliances define the world order. For instance, two superpowers with their allies defined the system during the Cold War, from 1945 to 1990. Against this background, realists ground themselves in a long tradition. Indeed, realists believe that power politics is timeless and cross-cultural. For instance, the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, who lived 2,000 years ago, advised the rulers of states on how to survive in an era when war has become a systematic instrument of power. According to Sun Tzu, moral reasoning is not very useful to the state rulers who are surrounded with armed and dangerous neighbours. He showed rulers how to use power to advance their interests and protect their survival.

Similarly, the Greek historian, Thucydides captures the essence of relative power among the Greek-City-States. In his book, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, he describes the causes of the war in power terms, "What made the war inevitable was

the growth in Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta” Today, statesmen like the leaders of Sparta, employ war as an instrument of state strategy and policy on calculations of power. Indeed, today’s international relations operate on the famous dictum by Thucydides, “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept. Indeed, his conception of the importance of power, together with the propensity of states to form competing alliances places Thucydides well within the **realist school**. Niccolo Machiavelli, like Thucydides, who developed an understanding of state behaviour from his observation of relations between Athens and Sparta, Machiavelli, analyzed interstate relations in the Italian system of the sixteenth century. His emphasis on the ruler’s need to adopt moral standards different from those of the individual in order to ensure the state’s survival, his concern with power, his assumption that politics is characterized by a clash of interests, and his pessimistic view of human nature clearly puts him within the **realist paradigm or school** of international relations.

In the 17th century, Thomas Hobbes discussed the free-for-all that exists when government is absent and people seek their own selfish interests. He called it the “state of nature” or “state of war”-what we would call in today’s parlance the law of the jungle in contrast to the rule of law. Like other modern realists, Hobbes concerned himself with the underlying forces of politics and with the nature of power in political relationships.

3.2 Morgenthau’s Theory of International Politics

Since Hans Morgenthau is the chief priest of the realist school, it becomes pertinent to discuss in details his realist theory of international relations. After World War II, Hans Morgenthau argued that international politics is governed by objective, universal laws based on national interests defined in terms of power not psychological motives of decision makers. In his celebrated work, *Politics Among Nations*, (1948), the chief realist sets forth six principles of realist theory.

3.2.1 Morgenthau’s Six Principles of Political Realism

Firstly, certain objective laws that have their roots in human nature govern politics. It maintains that human nature has not changed since classical times. Therefore, in

order to improve society, it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operations of these laws being impervious to our performances, men will change them only at the risk of failure. For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Therefore, in theorizing about international politics, it is necessary to employ historical data for examining political acts and their consequences. In systematizing these vast amounts of historical data, the student of politics should empathize with the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances. Therefore, we must ask, what are the rational alternatives from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose.

Second, Morgenthau posits that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power and that historical evidence proves this assumption. This concept, central to Morgenthau's realism, gives continuity and unity to the seemingly diverse foreign policies of the widely separated nation-states. Moreover, the concept interest defined as power makes it possible to evaluate actions of political leaders at different points in history. To describe Morgenthau's framework in more contemporary phraseology, it is a model of interaction within an international system. Using historical data, Morgenthau compared the real world with the interaction patterns within his model. The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible.

Thirdly, realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category, which is universally valid, but it does not endow the concept with a meaning that is final. However, in a world in which sovereign nations vie for power, the foreign policies of all nations must consider survival the minimum goal of foreign policy. Accordingly, all nations are compelled to protect their physical, political, and

cultural identity against encroachments by other nations. Thus, national interest is identified with national survival. Taken in isolation, the determination of its content in a concrete situation is relatively simple, for it encompasses the integrity of the nation's territory, of its political institutions, and of its culture. As long as the world is divided into nations, Morgenthau asserted, the national interest would remain the last word in world politics. In this regard, interest is the essence of politics. Fourth, political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action, it is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirement of successful political action. Indeed, Morgenthau states that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract, universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.

In pursuit of the national interest, nation-states are governed by a morality that differs from the morality of individuals in their personal relationships. To confuse an individual's morality with a state's morality is to court national disaster. Because the primary official responsibility of statesmen is the survival of the nation-state, their obligations to the citizenry require a different mode of moral judgment from that of the individual. Fifth, political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. The knowledge that interest is defined in terms of power saves from moral excesses and political folly. Indeed, knowing that international politics is placed within a framework of defining interests in terms of power makes us able to judge other nations as we judge our own.

Sixth, the difference between political realism and other schools of thought is not only real but also profound. In Morgenthau's view, the political realist maintains the autonomy of political sphere just as the economists, the lawyer, and the moralist maintain theirs. In fact, he stresses the autonomy of the political sphere. In his view, Political actions must be judged by political criteria. The economist asks, how does this policy affect the welfare of society, or a segment of it? The lawyer asks, is this policy in accord with the rules of law? The realist asks, how does this policy affect the power of the nation?

In power struggles, nations follow policies designed to preserve the status quo, to achieve imperialistic expansion, or to gain prestige. In Morgenthau's view, domestic and international politics can be reduced to one of three basic types: A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power.

3.3 Neorealism

The realist theory has furnished an abundant basis for the formation of what is termed a neorealist approach to international relations theory. It explains patterns of international events in terms of the system structure- the international distribution of power rather than in terms of the internal make up of individual states. Waltz argues for a neorealist approach based on patterned relationships among actors in an international system that is anarchical. In this respect, drawing, upon the paradigm of international politics of classical realism, Neorealism contains an emphasis on those features of the structure that mould the way in which the components relate to one another. According to Waltz, the term structure connotes the way in which the parts are arranged. In domestic politics, there is hierarchical relationship in which units stand in formal differentiation from one another by reference to the degree of authority or the function, which they perform. By contrast, the international system lacks comparable governmental institutions. Actors stand in a horizontal relationship with each other, with each state the formal equal (sovereignty) of the other. The focus of structural realism is the arrangement of the parts of the international system with respect to each other. According to Waltz, the concept of structure is because units differently juxtaposed and combined behave differently and interestingly produce different outcomes. Basic to an anarchic system, by virtue of its structure, is the need for member units to rely on whatever means or arrangements they can generate in order to ensure survival and enhance security.

3.4 Offensive Realism

At the end of the Cold War in 1990, the international community was greeted with a lot of optimism. Many believed that “perpetual peace” among the great powers is finally at hand. That the world has entered a stage in which there is little chance that the major powers will engage each other in security competition, much less war,

which has become an archaic enterprise. In the words of one famous author, the end of the Cold War signifies the “the end of history.” Indeed, this school of thought believes that great powers no longer view each other as potential military rivals, but instead as members of a family of nations, members of the “international community.

However, John Mearsheimer argues that the claim that security competition and war between the great powers have been purged from the international system is wrong. He established that there is much evidence that the promise of everlasting peace among the great powers was at best stillborn. In his theory of **offensive realism**, Mearsheimer took realism to a higher level when he argues that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. That, even though the intensity of the competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. In his view, the overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. The theory focuses on the great powers because these states have the largest impact on what happens in international politics. The fortunes of all states—great powers and smaller powers alike—are determined primarily by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability. Mearsheimer further posits that offensive realism is a rich theory, which sheds considerable light on the workings of the international system. Thus, like all theories there are limits to offensive realism’s explanatory power. Offensive realism assumes that the international system strongly shapes the behaviour of states. Structural factors such as anarchy and the distribution of power are what matter most for explaining international politics.

The theory pays little attention to individuals or domestic political considerations such as ideology. It tends to treat states like black boxes or billiard balls. For example, it does not matter for the theory whether Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm, or Adolf Hitler led Germany in 1905, or whether Germany was democratic or autocratic. What matters for the theory is how much relative power Germany possessed at the time. These omitted factors, however, occasionally dominate a state’s decision-making process; under these circumstances, offensive realism is not going to perform as well. In short, there is a price to pay for simplifying reality. It should be

apparent from this discussion that offensive realism is mainly a descriptive theory. It explains how great powers have behaved in the past and how they are likely to behave in the future. However, it is also a prescriptive theory. States should behave according to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world. Realism is a rich tradition with a long history, and disputes over fundamental issues have long been commonplace among realists.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is realism?
2. List the principles of realism.
3. What is neorealism?
4. What is the best way for states to survive in a dangerous world?
5. What is offensive realism?

4.0 CONCLUSION

In a world of sovereign states with no central government, how can each state achieve its interests, indeed its survival? Traditionally, the theory of realism, based on the dominance principle, holds that each state must rely on its own power and, less reliably, on its alliances to influence the behaviour of other states. Forms of power vary, but the threat and use of military force traditionally rank high in realists thinking. For all realists, calculations about power lie at the heart of how states think about the world around them. Realism is all about seeing things as they are, rather than as they ought to be, and to recognize that Power is the currency of great-power politics, and states compete for it among themselves. What money is to economics, power is to international relations. Realist theorists assume that certain largely immutable factors such as geography and the nature of human behaviour shape international conduct. In contrast to utopianism, realism holds that human nature is essentially constant, or at least not easily altered. From Thucydides to Morgenthau, political advisers statesmen to demonstrate prudence and practicability in their foreign policy objectives. Indeed, the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we discussed realism. The realist paradigm explains international relations in power terms. Realism has its intellectual roots in the older political philosophy of the West and in the writings of non-Western ancient authors such as Sun Tzu in China, Kautilya in India, as well as Thucydides in ancient Greece. According to Sun Tzu, moral reasoning is not very useful to the state rulers who are surrounded with armed and dangerous neighbours. He showed rulers how to use power to advance their interests and protect their survival. Hans Morgenthau, who is the chief priest of the school of modern realism, authored his famous book, *Politics among Nations*, (1948), shortly after the World War II. In the book, Morgenthau sets forth six principles of realist theory and provocatively argued that international politics is governed by objective, universal laws based on national interests defined in terms of power not psychological motives of decision makers. Taking realism to a higher level of refinement, Kenneth Waltz developed the concept of Neorealism. He opines that, the structure shapes the political relationships that take place among its members. Similarly, John Mearsheimer has taken realism further by developing what he calls offensive realism. Overall, today's international relations operate on the famous dictum by Thucydides, "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept." Indeed, realism prevails!

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain the six principles of realism as postulated by Morgenthau.
2. Explain the concept of Neorealism.
3. Explain in details the offensive realism theory.

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UNIT 3 IDEALISM

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1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 Idealism

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Idealism emphasizes international law, morality, and international organizations, rather than power alone as key influences on international events. Idealists think that human nature is good. They see the international system as one based on a community of states that have the potential to work together to overcome mutual problems. For idealists, the principles of IR must flow from **morality**. Idealists were particularly active between World War I and World War II, following the painful experience of World War I, The United States president Woodrow Wilson and other idealists placed their hopes for peace in the League of Nations as a formal structure for the community of nations.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain the origins of idealism.
2. Explain the inadequacies of idealism.
3. Explain beliefs of idealism

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Idealism

Idealism in international relations theory has its intellectual roots in the older political philosophy of scholars like Immanuel Kant. It tries to explain how peace and cooperation are possible. Indeed, from the beginning of the 20th century up to 1939, there was academic hegemony in the West. The most renowned scholars were the **idealists**. They believe that states could develop organizations and rules to facilitate cooperation by forming a world federation.

Idealism is a metaphysical term; however, we are concerned here with moral and political idealism. In international relations theory, **idealists** are often contrasted with **realists**. Generally, Idealists see international relations in terms of moral precepts, justice, trust and obligation. The approach of this theory of international relations was **law**, so it was both legalistic and historical. It merely describes international events at the time under review. It lacks the capacity to explain. For example, it describes a phenomenon thus, “England breached a treaty with France and then there was war.” Essentially, the idealists became very worried with the events that led to World War I. They preferred a more peaceful international system and a just system. They perceived the post-world-War I, international system as unjust and turbulent; therefore, they sought a change in the system through a gradual approach. It regards the power politics as the passing phase of history and presents the picture of a future international society based on the notion reformed international system free from power politics, immorality and violence. It aims at bringing about a better world with the help of **education** and **internal organisation**.

To effect a change in the international system, this moralistic approach arrived at the following conclusions: “Wars are not good, so they are not wanted.”

The aim is to achieve a just system:

- i. Spread democracy all over the world to get peace.
- ii. States should observe international law.
- iii. States should use their power for peaceful purposes. States should not use power (war) with weaker states – military, economic, diplomatic.

- iv. People should be educated and reforms made.
- v. A world government was necessary - the idealist looked at international organization as a nucleus for a world government.

One of the chief advocates of the idealist school was Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States during the First World War. An important development in realist thinking was the formation of the **League of Nations** at the end of World War I. The above stated Wilsonian ideals (famously called the fourteen points) were embodied in Article 18 of the League of Nations' Covenant and later in Article 102 of the United Nations (UN) Charter. They provided a means for registering international agreements and, in the case of the UN, an incentive to do so. Only registered agreements could be accorded legal status before any UN affiliate, including the International Court of Justice. This mixture of legalism and idealism could never abolish private understandings, but it did virtually eliminate secret treaties among democratic states. In fact, Woodrow Wilson's attempt to build a stable international order in the wake of World War I, failed spectacularly.

Generally, the values sought by idealism are different from those sought by realism. Whereas, the idealists can best support the value of power cherished by realists, empirically, the realists can only uphold the value of morality cherished by idealists on philosophical grounds. The idealists maintain that there is a fundamental problem of ethics, which exists at all levels of politics, international politics inclusive. To idealists, politics is an art of good government rather than art of the possible. The idealist view of international relations cannot stand the test of reality on the ground in 21st century international relations. It is a dream, a sermon from the height, utopianism! With the abysmal failure of the League of Nations and the outbreak of World War II, in 1939, it became obvious that the theoretical foundations of idealism were collapsing. This created a vacuum for the emergence of political realists who see international relations in power perspectives. The post-1945 changes in the nature of international politics have necessitated a reappraisal of the divergences between idealism and realism. The advance of science and technology has led to the shrinkage of the world, and has totally changed the character of war, thereby reminding us of the urgency of peace.

Finally, if the realists recognize the futility of unlimited war and the idealists recognize the reality of conflict, then they should work together for improving and strengthening the international system.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is idealism?
2. How do idealists see international relations?
3. How do idealists hope to bring about world peace?
4. Can there be a world government?
5. What is politics to the idealists?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Idealism emphasizes international law, morality, and international organizations, rather than power alone, as key influences on international events. Idealists think that human nature is good. They see the international system as one based on a community of states that have the potential to work together to overcome mutual problems. For idealists, the principles of IR must flow from **morality**. Idealists were particularly active between World War I and World War II, following the painful experience of World War I, the United States President Woodrow Wilson and other idealists placed their hopes for peace in the League of Nations as a formal structure for the community of nations.

It regards the power politics as the passing phase of history and presents the picture of a future international society based on the notion; reformed international system free from power politics, immorality and violence. It aims at bringing about a better world with the help of **education** and **internal organisation**. However, those hopes were ruined when that structure proved helpless to stop German, Italian, and Japanese aggression in the 1930s.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we learnt that Idealism in international relations theory, contests with the realist theory. As a theory of international relations, idealism has its intellectual roots in the older political philosophy of scholars like Immanuel Kant. It tries to explain

how peace and cooperation are possible. Beginning from the early the 20th century, idealism dominated the study of international relations up to 1939. Its approach to the study of international relations was **law**, so it was both legalistic and historical. It merely describes international events at the time under review. It lacks the capacity to explain. For example, it describes a phenomenon thus, “England breached a treaty with France and then there was war.” For idealists, the principles of IR must flow from **morality**. Idealists were particularly active between World War I and World War II, following the painful experience of World War I, the United States President Woodrow Wilson and other idealists placed their hopes for peace in the League of Nations as a formal structure for the community of nations.

It regards the power politics as the passing phase of history and presents the picture of a future international society based on the notion; reformed international system free from power politics, immorality and violence. It aims at bringing about a better world with the help of **education** and **internal organisation**.

One of the chief advocates of the idealist school was Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States during the First World War. An important development in realist thinking was the formation of the **League of Nations** at the end of World War I.

6.0. TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain the differences between idealism and realism.
2. “The failure of the League of Nations and the outbreak of WWII dealt a devastating blow to idealism” Discuss.
3. Explain the origins of idealist school of international relations.

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UNIT 4 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

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3.2 The Nature of Foreign Policy

3.3 Foreign Policy Outputs

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3.9 The Sources of Foreign Policy Objectives

3.10 Limitations on the Formulation of Foreign Policy

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Unit introduces the student to contents and procedures for foreign policy analysis. It traces the processes through which governments make decisions on foreign policy and analyzes the domestic, external and international constraints and influences on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

Students should be able to:

1. Define foreign policy
2. Analyse the nature of foreign policy
3. Describe and distinguish between foreign policy inputs and outputs

4. Identify the sources of objectives, decisions and actions in foreign policy analysis
5. Explain and distinguish among Core Objectives, Middle Range Objectives and Long Range Objectives

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Definition of Foreign Policy

George Modelski defines foreign policy as “the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment.” Foreign policy also refers to the goals that the state officials seek to obtain abroad, the values that give rise to those objectives, and the means or instruments through which they are pursued.

3.2 The Nature of Foreign Policy

The foreign policies of governments are reflected in the external behaviour of nation-states. Foreign policy analysis involves:

- Tracing the decisional processes through which foreign policies are framed.
- Measuring their direction and intensity.
- Conceptualising the interplay of forces that impinge upon the decision-making process and apparatus.

For instance, when Obasanjo decides on a foreign trip the processes leading to such a foreign policy decision will be multi-dimensional. The causal factors could include all or any combination of the following. All of them can be considered as **Foreign Policy**

Inputs:

1. The decision of the President as an individual.
2. The outcome of a policy-making process.
3. The sum of clashing interest groups.
4. The values of a dominant elite.
5. The product of society's aspirations.
6. The reinforcement of a historical tradition.

7. The response to an opportunity or challenge elsewhere in the world.

These are some of the explanatory layers or causal factors which a student of foreign policy has to consider in explaining the dynamics of state behaviour in international politics.

3.3 Foreign Policy Outputs

Foreign policy outputs are actions or ideas initiated by policymakers to solve a problem or promote some change in the environment, usually in the politics, attitudes, or actions of another state or states. Such outputs include all actions that transcend national borders, such as sending a diplomatic note, enunciating a doctrine, making an alliance, or formulating long-range, but vague objectives like “making the world safe for democracy”, promoting NEPAD, or Pan-Africanism. Clearly the scope of foreign policy outputs vary tremendously from specific actions like dispatching a diplomatic note to a friendly government to defining a state’s long term objective throughout the world. From the foregoing it is clear that foreign policy outputs range in scope from the very specific to the very general. Foreign policy outputs can be divided into two broad groups. The most general outputs deal with issues of **national orientations and roles of states**. The second group is more specific and concern the objectives, decisions and actions of states.

3.4 Orientation and Roles

The structure of the international system is a basic condition affecting the orientation of states. In a hierarchical system submission and dependence are the main orientations. This means that other members of the system occupy a subordinate and submissive relationship with the dominant state. On the other hand, in a polar system states usually orient themselves towards alliances while those states which seek security through isolation or nonalignment generally fail. They may be reduced to vassalage by bloc leaders or in some cases, simply destroyed and incorporated into the territory of bloc or alliance leaders.

For instance, in the polar structure of the Greek City States system the smaller allies of Athens and Sparta had few alternatives in their foreign policy orientations. They had to be faithful allies and pay tributes of taxes and armed forces or face

occupation by the bloc leaders. Similarly, the satellites of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe could not deviate from the pattern set by the bloc leader, i.e., the Soviet Union. Their foreign policies were orientated according to the designs of the Soviet Union. In general the orientations of most states in a bloc, multi-bloc, or hierarchical system are determined by the interest of the superior powers. The more cohesive a polar or hierarchical system, the less latitude of choice or freedom of action remains for the weaker members of the system. There are likewise limited opportunities for changing orientations and roles. These are determined by the general distribution of power in the system and by the needs and interests of the major actors.

In the diffuse system where power is distributed widely among the members, orientations are affected more by the presence or absence of specific threats, geographical location, internal conditions, capabilities, traditional roles, economic needs, ideological compatibility, cultural traditions, and national attributes, etc.

3.5 Objectives, Decisions and Actions

Although there is congruence between roles and orientations on the one hand and objectives, decisions and actions on the other, roles and orientations by themselves do not necessarily determine objectives, decisions and actions. Where there is conflict between immediate national interests and the duties dictated by national role conceptions, the former often prevails. A good example will be Nigerian-Cameroon relations. Although Nigeria's foreign policy orientation and role is towards promoting African brotherhood it does not translate to blanket support for Cameroon because Nigeria's national interest is impinged upon by the latter's objectives in Bakassi.

Secondly, a significant part of foreign policy deals with day-to-day problems that are essentially unrelated to role conceptions and orientations. For instance a decision to vote in support of a United Nations Resolution on the Middle East does not reflect a nation's orientation for or against Israel. Two or more states with the same or similar orientations may make different decisions or take dissimilar action in regard to a problem. African countries were clearly divided over the contest for FIFA Presidency between Isa Hayatou and Joseph Blatter even though they are all playing the same role and are all oriented towards promoting the African Union.

The sources of objective, decisions and actions can therefore not be situated in role conceptions and orientations. Instead they should first be seen as resulting from deliberate choices made by government officials. It will therefore be necessary to examine the perceptions, images, attitudes, values, and beliefs of decision-makers.

3.6 The Sources of Objectives, Decisions and Actions

The diverse factors that affect choice of objectives, decisions or actions include all external and domestic, historical and contemporary conditions that policy makers consider relevant to any given foreign policy problem. These may include

- Important events abroad
- Domestic political needs
- Social values or ideological imperatives
- State of public opinion
- Availability of capabilities
- Degree of threat or opportunities perceived in the situation
- Predicted consequences
- Cost of proposed courses of action
- The time frame of the situation

Following the level of analysis paradigm the sources of objectives, decisions and actions can be analysed from the individual, the state, and the system level.

1. The Individual Level Variables: This covers the images, values, beliefs, personality characteristics and political needs of the individuals responsible for establishing the objectives, making the decisions, and determining the actions needed to achieve them. Policy makers often say that they have “no choice”, or are “compelled” to take certain action. In reality what they mean is that they have rejected other alternatives. In virtually all situations in which states have to respond to situations abroad they choose between a number of alternatives including acquiescence, inaction, threats, or commission of various acts of punishment. There is therefore always an element of choice in policymaking. These choices are influenced by the images, attitudes, values, idiosyncrasies, beliefs, doctrines and ideologies, as well as the historical analogies which decision

makers employ in the process. The idiosyncrasies and personality traits are most influential when

- a. Policy is made by one or a few key leaders such as Hitler, Saddam Hussein, Sani Abacha, Ibrahim Babangida, Gaddafi, etc. This is most peculiar to totalitarian states.
 - b. Where bureaucracies are uninvolved.
 - c. Where public opinion plays an insignificant role in limiting executive options.
 - d. Where compelling national needs are not involved.
- 2. The State Level Variables:** This looks at conditions inherent in the domestic structures, the influence of bureaucracies, national needs, and national attributes employed in the foreign policy making process. The variables include bureaucratic needs, values and traditions, social needs, the degree of domestic stability or instability, the type of regime governing the country, the size of the country and its level of development, public opinion, and the degree of interaction between public pressure and official decisions.
- 3. The System Level Variables:** Since states do not exist in a vacuum any explanation of foreign policy would be largely incomplete without analysing the conditions abroad that give rise to specific foreign policy actions. With only a few exceptions such as Hitler, Napoleon, most governments do not launch diplomatic or military crusades to change a regional or world order. Rather, they respond to a variety of other countries' objectives and actions, or to the changing conditions and trends in the international system or its subsystem. For instance Nigeria's initiation of ECOMOG was informed by the destabilising potential of the Liberian Civil War on the West African sub-region. NEPAD was initiated by Nigeria in response to the attitude of the developed world to Africa's development needs.

In general the objectives and actions of others set an agenda of foreign policy problems between two or more governments. The type of response will largely be similar to the stimulus, hence the notion that foreign policy actions are often reciprocal. There is also the trend towards economic diplomacy in the contemporary international system occasioned by the exponential growth in interdependence and dependent relationships in the international system. Typically

in a world of high economic interconnectedness those who are most dependent will suffer the most and yet have the least capacity to change or manage the system. These trends create a problem, but how governments respond to them will be determined by the state and individual level analysis variables. The structure of power and influence is another system level variable that impinges on the decision-making processes in foreign policy. They put limits on the type of actions or responses available to states, particularly the weaker or smaller states.

Yet another variable is the effect of system values. Any international system possesses certain values or doctrines that transcend purely local or national values. For example, in the contemporary international system the concept of governance, democracy and human rights, have assumed universal values. The result is the genocide tribunal on Rwanda at Arusha, Tanzania, the Hague tribunal on war crimes in Yugoslavia, and the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe and its suspension from the Commonwealth.

3.7 The Impact of Interdependence on Foreign Policy

The advent of an interdependent world has had a tremendous impact on the nature of foreign policy in two major ways.

- It has raised **economic issues** to the level of high politics. This is particularly so because of the nuclear stalemate and the emergence of the Third World with its stringent demand for a greater share of the world's wealth. The issues of political economy now occupy a central place in the global agenda.
- It has blurred the distinction between **domestic** and **foreign issues**, between the socio-political and economic processes within the country and those that transpire abroad.

Foreign policy studies cannot ignore the extent to which the international political economy shapes the domestic economy and politics. For instance, domestic interest rates, inflation, employment, foreign exchange, to mention only a few, are no longer exclusive issues of domestic policy. They respond to influences from the external environment and can be subjected to tremendous pressures by the international political economy. The same can be said of such issues as labour,

immigration, foreign investment trade flows, capital flows, prices of commodities and a host of other economic indices. Interdependence has greatly obfuscated, and possibly even erased in some respects, the distinction between domestic and foreign issues.

In spite of the effect of interdependence, however, foreign still has an identifiable nature and focus. It is still concerned with the plans, policies, and actions of national governments oriented towards the external world. Foreign policy analysis conceives of all foreign policy behaviour as having a common structure. Irrespective of their content and purposes, behaviour is seen to consist of a discrete action initiated by one state and directed toward one or more targets in the world arena.

3.8 Foreign Policy Objectives

Foreign policy objectives can be defined as an “image” of future state of affairs and future set of conditions that governments through individual policy makers aspire to bring about by wielding influence abroad and by changing or sustaining the behaviour of other states. The future state of affairs may refer to, for instance

- Concrete conditions such as passing a UN resolution or annexing territory.
- Values, such as the promotion of democracy abroad, achievement of prestige, popularity.
- A combination of the two.

Some objectives remain constant over centuries and directly involve the life and welfare of all citizens. Other objectives are transient and change regularly. They concern only a handful of government officials and citizens. Such a transient objective could be protecting a small industry from foreign competition.

Generally the objectives of states fall into three distinct categories.

Core Objectives

These are the values and interests to which nations and governments commit their very existence. Core values must be preserved or extended at all times. They are the kind of goals for which most people are willing to make the ultimate sacrifice. They are usually stated in the form of basic principles of foreign policy and become articles of faith that societies accept uncritically. Core values relate to the self-preservation of

a political unit. They are short-range objectives because other goals cannot be achieved unless the political unit maintains its existence. The following issues are usually treated as core values by all nation states.

- a) All nation-states now accept that the most essential foreign policy objective is ensuring sovereignty and independence of the home territory and perpetuating a particular political, social, economic system in that territory.
- b) Controlling and defending neighbouring or contiguous territories that could serve as channels of invasion or threat to the homeland. Russia traditionally sought to dominate the area between the motherland and Western Europe. The Soviet Union had the same attitude and policy towards Eastern Europe, Britain towards the North Sea area, and Nigeria towards West Africa. In the 19th century the United States formulated the Monroe Doctrine to reflect this core value while Britain on its part pursued command of the sea. In 1980 the United States formulated the Carter Doctrine with regard to the Persian Gulf even though the region is not contiguous to its territory.
- c) Another prominent core value is ethnic unity. Where ethnic groups are split between sovereignties conflict cannot be avoided. Irredentism, defined as a desire to liberate kith and kin from foreign domination, becomes a major foreign policy objective. The problem of Kashmir between India and Pakistan, struggle over divided Germany, Wars between Kenya and Somalia, Somalia and Ethiopia. The Korean War, the Vietnam War, the crisis in Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, offer ample examples of irredentism.

Middle Range Objectives

There are numerous varieties of middle range foreign policy objectives. In fact virtually all policy thrusts in pursuit of social and economic development fall within this category. These objectives cannot be achieved by dependence on internal sources only. These sources are in any case limited. Consequently states formulate foreign policies on trade, foreign aid, access to foreign markets as a means to promoting social and economic development.

Another example is increasing a state's prestige through diplomatic ceremonial and displays of military capabilities. In the contemporary era development is the

major index of prestige. Although middle range goals have no time limit developing countries hope to catch up with the economically advanced nations in a lifetime.

Long Range Goals

Long range goals deal with plans, visions, and dreams concerning the ultimate political or ideological organisation of the international system or subsystem. States make universal demands in order to realise their long-range goals. For instance under Lenin the Soviet Union pursued world communism. The United States and its western allies pursue a long-range objective aimed at making the world safe for democracy. Some long-range goals remain at the level of vision. It is not the vision itself which creates international tension and conflict, but the degree to which a political unit commits resources and capabilities to its achievement. The United States goal of global democratisation or Kwame Nkrumah's goals of Pan African Unity did not destabilise the international system because the architects did not commit all their resources and capabilities to its attainment. A classic example of a long-range goal that had a destabilising effect on the international system was Nazi Germany's dream of a Thousand Year Third Reich. Another was Japan's pursuit of its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere dream. Since long-range goals seek a destruction and reconstitution of an established order, they conflict with the middle range and core objectives of most members of the international community. As such any international system which contains one or more actors committed to such goals will be unstable and typified by violent conflict.

Generally such messianic plans seldom succeed because they threaten other states which then respond by coalescing into alliances to build a preponderance military capacity to destroy the revolutionary state in violent war. Examples are the French Revolutionary Wars, the Napoleonic Wars, Hitler's defeat in Europe, Japan's defeat in Asia and the collapse of its dream for an empire in Asia.

3.9 The Sources of Foreign Policy Objectives

Foreign policy objectives are derived from both internal and external sources.

The Internal Sources:

1. The most fundamental source of foreign policy objectives is the universally shared desire to insure the survival and territorial integrity of the community or state. Minimum security against invasion or attack is the minimum, irreducible objective of every state's foreign policy.
2. Another related and universal need is the preservation of the state's economy. These are usually purely defensive goals but under extraneous circumstances internal or external conditions may require offensive action to insure the survival of the community and or the state. It is important to emphasise that economic needs are fundamental sources of a state's foreign policy. First the need to satisfy economic aspirations of individuals and groups generates pressures on the state's political system. Secondly the economy of a state determines its capabilities and therefore its power relative to other states. In the light of these two considerations the economic needs of the community becomes the single most important domestic or internal source of foreign policy objectives. These needs are dynamic and respond to such variables as changing technology, population growth, economic development, changing values and class structures, beliefs and expectations, and changes in the political system itself. All these have to be taken into consideration in formulating foreign policy objectives.
3. Another domestic or internal source of foreign policy objectives is the political needs of a state and its leaders. If for instance, the political system is unstable or lacks legitimacy decision makers are likely to emphasise foreign policy objectives preventing foreign intervention on the side of the dissident group. On the other hand the ruling elite may embark on external adventures or create foreign policy threats to distract the attention of a dissatisfied population. This is currently the case facing the Charles Taylor government of Liberia.
4. The cultural, psychological, and ideological needs of the state for prestige and status in the world are an important source of foreign policy objectives. The foreign policy objective may be aimed at projecting a particular identity or world view, fulfilling religious or sacred ideological imperatives, pursue moral

principles or fulfil obligations such as coming to the aid of victims of aggression

5. Another important source is the capability requirement of the state. Although most capability needs are met in domestic policy other capability requirements can only be met through foreign policy decisions and actions. For instance diplomacy is needed to create alliances, acquire foreign air, naval and other installations, strategic assets, strategic minerals, and sophisticated military weapons. In fact realist like Morgenthau have argued that capability considerations (or what he calls power) are the most important sources of foreign policy and that states above all seek to increase their capabilities (power).

The External Sources

In formulating their foreign policy objectives states cannot ignore the realities of the external environment. Hence, in addition to the domestic sources there are also some important external sources of foreign policy which have to be taken into account. In fact many of the domestic sources have external counterparts.

1. External threats of military intervention and economic ruin. The possibility of invasion, subversion, and economic blockade by another state has important consequences on domestic stability and are therefore important sources of foreign policy. In any case the domestic sources of foreign policy particularly in the economic realm, have little meaning unless there is an external possibility of meeting those needs. How can the domestic economy improve if external trade is blocked as a consequence of another state's action?
2. Opportunities created by events outside one's state may provide sources of foreign policy objectives. For instance, two neighbouring states at war with one another; the disintegration of a neighbouring empire; the discovery of new mineral resources; these and other similar phenomena in the international environment create opportunities for a state to respond with creative foreign policies. Such opportunities might create avenues for a state to increase its power, size, wealth, prestige, or form alliances.

3.10 Limitations on the Formulation of Foreign Policy

1. The internal limitations include limited capabilities or a limited ability to mobilize them for foreign policy objectives. Any rational foreign policy formulation must therefore keep the objectives of the state within the limits of its capabilities to achieve them. This is important because a failure to achieve announced objectives can be costly in terms of loss of prestige and credibility. It can be expensive in terms of the wasted economic and military capabilities that could have been better deployed. Failure also means a loss of political capabilities such as reduced morale and loss of self-confidence and will.
2. There is also the issue of unforeseen circumstances. For instance, the weather might affect military operations unexpectedly as it did during Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Accidents may also abort well-planned operations even where the capabilities to execute them are available. The Carter administration (US President) rescue operation in Iran to free American hostages is a case in point. Unforeseen circumstances include the fact that other states may suddenly join together to form an alliance; there may be sudden advances in military technology. There are also the factors of strategy, morale and luck as elements of unforeseen circumstances. As such incorrect analysis, miscalculations and misperceptions are among the important causes of war.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. How do states demonstrate their foreign policies?
2. What are the sources of foreign policy objectives.
3. What is the impact of interdependence on foreign policy?
4. Mention the limitations on the formulation of foreign policy.

4.0 CONCLUSION

In an anarchic international system with finite resources state actors have to interact with each other in order to advance their national interests. This interactive process compels actors to formulate foreign policies. In doing this, decision-makers have to

take various domestic, external and international factors into consideration to determine the inputs and outputs of their foreign policies. To maximise the attainment of their foreign policy goals, state actors have to categorise their objectives into core, middle range and long term and measure their resources accordingly. Finally, even when actors have measured their means to their foreign policy ends, unforeseen circumstances, misperceptions and miscalculations can affect the outcome of their foreign policies, which may lead them into war with other actors.

5.0 SUMMARY

Foreign policy refers to the goals that the state officials seek to obtain abroad, the values that give rise to those objectives, and the means or instruments through which they are pursued. Foreign policy analysis involves tracing the decisional processes through which foreign policies are framed, measuring their direction and intensity, and conceptualising the interplay of forces that impinge upon the decision-making process and apparatus. Foreign policy inputs describe the processes that lead to the formulation of decisions while outputs describe the actions formulated to attain to solve a particular problem. Objectives, decisions and actions in foreign policy are often determined by a plethora of factors which are domestic, external or international in scope. In general, foreign policy objectives are in three categories, namely, core objectives, middle range objectives and long term objectives. The amount of resources which a state brings to bear in the pursuit of a particular objective is determined by its position in this category.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. “Unitary actors are rational actors”. Discuss this aphorism within the context of International Relations
2. Discuss the nature of Inputs and Outputs in Foreign Policy
3. Discuss the sources of Objectives, Decisions and Actions in Foreign Policy
4. Discuss the impact of interdependence on Foreign policy
5. Describe the three categories of Foreign Policy objectives

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UNIT 5 FOREIGN POLICY IN ACTION: TWO CASE STUDIES**CONTENTS**

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 American Foreign Policy

3.2 The United States Decision to Intervene in Korea

3.3 The United States Decision to Intervene In Kuwait

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Unit uses two events in international politics to demonstrate foreign policy in action. It explores the decision processes that led to the intervention of the most powerful state in the world, United States of America, in the Korean War in 1950 and in the Gulf War in 1991.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

Students should be able to:

1. Explain the historical cornerstones and trends of American foreign policy
2. Explain the reasons for American intervention in Korea
3. Explain Iraq's reasons and objectives for invading Kuwait
4. Explain why the United States decided to intervene to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation

3.0 MAIN CONTENT**3.1 American Foreign Policy**

Separated by 3000 km of the Atlantic to the West and 6000 km of the Pacific to the East, continental United States had throughout the 19th century remained aloof from

the balance of power politics of the European great powers. Its foreign policy during the period had three cornerstones:

1. **Isolationism:** In practical terms isolationism meant none-entanglement in the complex web of European military alliances and intrigues. These were perceived as having little consequences for Americans.
2. **The Monroe Doctrine:** The doctrine insisted on European non-intervention in the western hemisphere. It in effect declared Latin America as the United States sphere of influence.
3. **Commercial Expansion:** This entailed full participation in free international trade and access to world markets while avoiding foreign conflicts.

These principles asserted for the United States a major role as a world economic actor but a minor role in world political and military affairs. The First World War thoroughly upset the international order on which these principles were based. The United States enjoying the advantage of its geographical location stayed out of the war for three years while all the major European powers were involved. As the war progressed early neutrality and isolationism gave way gradually to growing hostility toward Germany and increasing sympathy to the Allies, particularly Britain. America's linguistic, cultural and commercial ties with Britain made absolute neutrality impossible. When German submarines began sinking American commercial vessels with civilian passengers aboard President Woodrow Wilson took the United States into the war.

The break with historic isolation signified for the United States the beginning of an active role in the defence of Western democracy. As Wilson declared to the American people in his message of April 2, 1917 "the world must be made safe for democracy." The Versailles settlement was based on the Wilsonian design aimed at seeking systemic guarantees against potential future threats to stability. It was based on the concept of collective security which formed the basis for the League of nations. It modelled future international relations on the principle of an alliance of major powers permanently committed to oppose aggression. As it happened the League was unsuccessful in fulfilling these goals when new threats to international peace developed.

Domestic political opposition and a resurgence of isolationism prevented the United States from actively supporting the League. In less than two decades after World War I revisionist aggressive states – Nazi Germany, Militarist Japan, and Fascist Italy – determined to overturn the international order emerged on the world scene. The consequence was World War II. The United States was drawn fully into the war following the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941. The purpose of the attack was to immobilise American defences against Japanese seizure of American, British, and Dutch possessions in the Far East. Following the war, the United States and its allies once again set about to secure the future international system. The German and Japanese political systems were redesigned by Occupation authorities along modern democratic lines; the United Nations was founded to re-establish the machinery of collective security. The United States joined the UN immediately whereas it had stayed out of the League. This was a clear evidence that there had been a dramatic shift in American policy – a strategic reorientation from isolationism to a permanent commitment to world responsibilities. America would henceforth be fully engaged in international politics. Its foreign policy and its military capabilities reflected this strategic engagement. Whereas it had implemented complete disarmament after World War I demobilisation after World War II left a standing army of more than a million and a global network of active military bases.

The post war settlement of 1945 planted the seed for the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union ceased to be allies in the common struggle against fascism; instead they entered a prolonged and intense ideological competition for the political mastery of Europe, Asia and the world. On March 5, 1946 Winston Churchill declared at Fulton, Missouri: “Across Europe...an Iron Curtain has descended across the continent.” Far more alarming was the perception that the Soviet Union was seeking to push the Iron Curtain forward towards Western Europe and bring new lands under Communist control. Communist insurgents were active not only in Eastern Europe but in China, Malaya, the Korean peninsula, Iran, Indochina, France, Italy, Turkey and Greece. It was however The Greek case that produced a crisis atmosphere in Washington.

The retreating Germans had destroyed railways, ports, bridges, communication facilities, and civil administration. The country was engulfed in civil war in which communists and monarchists contested for power. The Soviet Union, it was believed, was providing arms and logistic support to the communists in violation of the understanding that Greece was within the Western sphere of influence. In the ensuing debate in Washington about Soviet motives the dominant school of thought was that the Soviet Union was involved in a global struggle and opposition to capitalism. This school was based on the analysis of the United States' diplomat and scholar, George Kennan who provided a philosophical formulation for the policy of containment elaborated in the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947.

Kennan's analysis was that the United States should assume responsibility of containing Soviet power within its existing boundaries until internal changes within the Soviet leadership produced an abandonment of aggressive intentions. The Truman Doctrine offered to "support peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities." Hostility between the two superpowers deepened after the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine and the Establishment of NATO.

3.2 The United States Decision to Intervene in Korea

On June 25, 1950 North Korean forces invaded South Korea, a move which was perceived in Washington as "naked, deliberate, unprovoked aggression." As far as the Truman government was concerned North Korea with its leader Kim Il Sung was a puppet of the Soviet Union. The Soviets, from the American perspective, were on the march for world domination. President Truman believed that appeasement would only lead to further aggression and ultimately to war. The invasion of South Korea should therefore be opposed with firmness and resolve. In the light of the Truman Doctrine American intervention was a clear possibility. In any case Truman and his advisers were determined to thwart the adversary, if necessary with American forces.

The United States government responded to the invasion within the context of the Cold War. The attack had caught American officials by surprise. Not expecting any aggression they had been far more concerned with South Korea's inflation and its President's (Syngman Rhee) decreasing popularity. Under American pressure Rhee had allowed elections in May 1950 in which his supporters were badly beaten, North

Korea clearly saw Rhee's electoral setback as an opportunity to launch a new political offensive. Kim Il Sung desperately wanted to unite all Koreans under his regime. He was an intense nationalist and had offered sanctuary to many communist leaders who had fled from the South to the North to escape imprisonment or death. Early in June North Korea had called for reunification and nation-wide elections. The United States had regarded these northern initiatives as pure propaganda originating from Moscow. No one expected military aggression, and if it happened, military and intelligence estimates were that the South would repel it.

Like Kim, Rhee also nursed ambitions and hopes of reunification under his own control. He was planning to launch the military offensive sometime in 1951. In the light of the prevailing view the North's rapid advance, and the South's retreat shocked American officials. Northern forces seized Seoul, routed the southern army. The United States reacted with graduated intervention with its naval, air and ground forces. President Truman first approved the shipment of desperately needed supplies to Rhee's army on June 25. The following day he allowed US air and naval power to be used against North Korean tanks and armour. On the 27th the US pushed a second resolution through the UN Security Council calling for the restoration of peace and security and authorising assistance to South Korea in repelling the invasion. On the 29th Truman authorised the use of air power above the 38th parallel dividing North from South Korea. He also approved the first deployment of US ground forces to hold airfields and port facilities. The head of the US committed substantial ground forces.

From the onset of the war it was clear that the Truman administration would do what was necessary to thwart a North Korean victory. In fact at the very first meeting on June 25 Truman drew a line against Communist expansion. Although the president did not want a general war with the Soviet Union he and his advisers believed that if South Korea was lost the Soviet Union "will keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another...If we let Asia go the Near East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe." Clearly the administration would not waver in its commitment to the defence of South Korea. With the benefit of hindsight scholars are now certain that the Soviet Union was not in fact behind the Korean invasion. As Nikita Khrushchev wrote, "I must stress that the war wasn't Stalin's idea, but Kim Il-

song's. Kim was the initiator." At the time however the idea that North Korea might be acting on its own volition to bring about unification of the Korean people would have been too far-fetched to Washington. The administration had in fact intervened in a civil war-- a clear case of misperception in the conduct of international politics. The conflict was not created by the Soviet Union. Instead the policymakers in Washington believed that Stalin was testing their resolve. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July "It was an open, clear, direct challenge, and it was a challenge at about the only point in the world at which we were capable of picking it up in any way at all." This refers to the fact that the US had a large military base in Japan. But why the Soviet Union would pick the one spot where the US could react swiftly was left unanswered by the Secretary of State. In his view the Soviets were calculating that after the loss of China they could win another easy victory in South Korea and undermine the US position in Japan. He was now determined to show them that they had underestimated American resolve. And since the Soviets did not want global war if the US demonstrated toughness Moscow would back off.

By mid-July MacArthur's troops were fully involved in the conflict. From bases in Japan US airpower inflicted a heavy toll on the enemy. With the passage of the Uniting for Peace Resolution by the General Assembly of the UN and designation of North Korea as the aggressor small contingents of forces from other UN members such as Canada, Australia, Britain, joined the US forces in Korea. Ostensibly the war would be fought in behalf of the UN resolution to restore peace and security in Korea. But there was never any question that US civilian and military officials would control the diplomacy and strategy in the war.

In addition to driving the North back US officials aimed to cross the 38th parallel, rolling back Soviet influence, and creating a united, independent Korea. China which had been thwarted by the US Seventh Fleet from taking over Taiwan warned that it would enter the war if US operations above the 38th parallel threatened its security. In American intelligence and military circles the belief was that the Chinese were bluffing. When MacArthur, against specific instructions that US forces not operate near the Chinese border, deployed US forces into northern parts of North

Korea reserved for South Korean troops, Communist Chinese troops crossed the border at the end of October linking up with over 100000 North Korean troops. They stymied MacArthur's advance. By 1953 the war had ended in a stalemate, with the peninsula still divided at the 38th parallel. The end of hostilities was not accompanied by a peace settlement. Technically therefore the two Koreas have been at war ever since.

3.3 The United States Decision to Intervene In Kuwait

At 2 a.m. on 2nd August, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. Within 12 hours all of Kuwait was under Iraqi control. The Iraqi military had launched the invasion with calculated precision, recording less than a hundred casualties on both sides. The invasion raised some fundamental questions in international law such as whether a sovereign country, a member of the United Nations could simply be erased from the face of the earth with so much impunity. It also raised fundamental questions of foreign and security policy for the United States, the only remaining superpower in the world. How was the United States going to respond? What would be the response of the international community, the United Nations, and the Arab world? And not the least why would Iraq take such a step in flagrant disregard to the norms of international politics?

Iraq's Reasons and Demands

Iraqi resentment against Kuwait and other Gulf States had been building up since the end of the Iran-Iraq had stood up to Iranian bid for hegemony in the Persian Gulf and felt that it had not been adequately compensated by the Gulf States.

Iraq's resentment centred on its dire financial plight and the failure of the Gulf States to offer it assistance. The war with Iran had cost Iraq \$500 billion plus a foreign debt of about \$80 billion. Its post-war economy was suffering from severe unemployment, chronic shortages of basic goods and services, and the whole country was in immediate need of reconstruction. Like most of the states in the Gulf region Iraq depended on the sale of crude oil, but there was a glut in the oil market, with depressed prices, created, as far as Iraq was concerned, by overproduction by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirate. Both countries, Iraq claimed, had been cheating on OPEC quotas. The prevailing price of crude oil was clearly too low to meet Iraq's

desperate need for revenue to meet its domestic and international commitments. Hence, from February 1990 the government of Saddam Hussein began to pressure its Gulf neighbours to cut production in order to raise prices. Iraq subsequently made the following demands from Kuwait:

- A compensation of \$2.4 billion for the oil it allegedly pumped from Iraqi territory along their disputed 100-mile frontier.
- Kuwait should renounce its claim to the disputed Rumaila oil field on the common border.
- Pay Iraq a direct subsidy of \$12 billion in compensation for reduced oil prices triggered by Kuwait's overproduction.
- Forgive Iraq's war debt of about \$10 billion as Saudi Arabia had already done.
- Lease or cede to Iraq the island of Bubiyan which controls the approach to Iraq's port at Umm Qasr.

Iraq's invasion was its response to the Kuwaiti's failure to meet its demands. How and why did the United States of America respond?

United States' Reasons for Intervention

In foreign policy analysis it is axiomatic that a state would resort to force to protect its core values. (See the section on Core values above). In 1980 the then American President, Jimmy Carter made a policy statement on the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf to the United States. This policy otherwise known as the Carter Doctrine asserts as follows: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital (read 'core') interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

As far as the George Bush administration was concerned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait threatened the United States' vital interests. Not surprisingly, the President equated Saddam's action with Hitler's invasion of Poland, Japan's attack on Manchuria, and Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, events which preceded the Second World War. "No nation", the President said, "should rape, pillage, and brutalise its neighbour. No nation should be able to wipe a member state of the United Nations and the Arab League off the face of the earth." Iraq's action was naked aggression which

had to be punished and not appeased. The situation was for American officials “the first test of our ability to maintain global or regional stability in the post Cold War era.”

In general four principles guided American policy in the conflict. As outlined by President Bush:

- The immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait
- Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government to replace the puppet regime.
- Commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.
- The need to protect the lives of American citizens abroad.

What was at stake, to paraphrase President Bush, was the dependability of America’s commitments to its friends and allies, the shape of the post Cold War world, opposition to aggression, and the potential domination of the energy resources that are critical to the entire world. Once the Bush administration had concluded that the invasion of Kuwait impinged on its vital interests it immediately set in motion the necessary machinery to build an international diplomatic and military coalition against Iraq.

The Road to War: Desert Shield and Desert Storm

On the military front Operation Desert Shield was launched to build up a defence force of more than 250,000 troops to defend Saudi Arabia against any attack by Iraq. On the diplomatic front the UN Security Council voted on 5 August to impose trade sanctions on Iraq. The following day (6th August) Iraq responded by taking the first Westerners in Kuwait City, including 29 Americans, into custody. They were then transported by bus to Baghdad. It was clear to any observer that the United States and Iraq were now on a collision course. Any move by one required a corresponding response from the other. Saddam invaded Kuwait, Bush mobilised the UN. The UN voted sanctions; Saddam took hostages. Bush sent troops to Saudi Arabia; Saddam annexed Kuwait as Iraq’s 19th province. Meanwhile President Bush intensified his diplomacy to build an international coalition. The European Union froze Kuwait’s assets, placed an embargo on arms sales to Iraq, and suspended Iraq’s preferred trading status with the Community, halted purchase of Iraqi oil. Japanese Prime

Minister Toshiki Kaifu banned importation of Iraqi oil (12 % of its oil imports) and halted all commercial transactions. The Soviet Union and China supported the coalition. Yet the more pressure that was brought on Iraq the more determined Saddam became to hold on. President Bush believed that Saddam would back down in confronted with overwhelming force. Saddam believed that Bush was bluffing. This was clearly a problem of mutual misperception, a condition not infrequent in international relations, particularly on issues of conflict and war. Saddam believed that the shaky coalition Bush put together would fall apart and that in a showdown it was the United States that will back down.

On 7 August the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat proposed a peace plan with the following elements.

- Complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait
- Large cash payment to Iraq ostensibly by Kuwait and other Gulf States.
- Elections for a government to replace the Emir of Kuwait.
- Cession of Bubiyan and Warba islands to Iraq.

The plan appeared to garner support in Arab capitals. But it was rejected by President Bush and later by President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Instead the United States committed itself to the goal of liberating Kuwait. On 7 August President Turgut Ozal of Turkey announced his country's compliance with UN sanctions and halted the flow of Iraq oil. An 810 mile pipeline from Monsul to the Turkish port of Yumurtalik was used for Iraq oil exports. This and the pipeline through Saudi Arabia had a daily capacity of 2.3 million barrels or about 85% of total Iraqi production. Saudi Arabia also complied with UN Resolution by closing down the pipeline

On 12 August President Bush ordered American forces in the Gulf to intercept Iraq shipping. On August 25 the UN Security Council voted in support of forceful interdiction of Iraqi shipping. It was the first time in 45 years that the UN authorised the use of force to compel compliance with economic sanctions. Meanwhile the battle of rhetoric continued. While Bush was using the Hitler analogy not to appease but punish an aggressor Saddam in his vitriolic open letter to the President accused him of lying to the American people about the nature of the crisis. He threatened that the "thousands of Americans whom you have pushed into this dark tunnel will go home

shrouded in sad coffins.” At this point Saddam took one of the many irrational decisions that seriously undermined his cause. He announced that citizens of the UN coalition residing in Iraq and Kuwait would be detained “until the threat of war against our country ends.” They were to be housed in military and civilian sites to serve as human shields. The hostage issue evaporated whatever international support Saddam may have had. The UN responded immediately with a Security Council resolution demanding that Iraq permit all foreign nationals to depart without further delay. Iraq had indeed crossed the Rubicon. France ordered its fleet to join the US Navy in the Persian Gulf to enforce sanctions. Iraq now responded by offering to release the hostages in return for lifting of sanctions and the withdrawal of American forces from Saudi Arabia, i.e., an end to Desert Shield. But it made no corresponding offer to evacuate Kuwait.

Understandably Bush dismissed Iraq’s call for negotiations. Instead he made it clear that Saddam had to be seen to suffer punishment for aggression. He intensified the build-up of coalition forces in the Gulf. In the end 38 nations provided military forces to the coalition. Germany contributed \$11 billion, Japan 14 billion to offset the cost of the war. The conflict, as Bush noted, was between Iraq and the entire international community. On August 27, to break the deadlock, the UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuella, announced his intention to meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Amman to seek full implementation of UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. On the 28th Iraq announced that it was releasing women and children of foreign nationals as a “goodwill gesture”. This was however accompanied with a show of defiance: a presidential decree officially incorporating Kuwait into Iraq with the name Kadhima province. On the 9th of September President Bush and the Soviet leader Gorbachev met in Helsinki and after seven hours of talks issued a joint declaration condemning Iraq. And in a classic instance of realpolitik US Secretary of State James Baker visited Damascus to discuss with Saddam’s long-time antagonist, Hafez Assad whose country, Syria, was on the State Department’s list of terrorist states.

On 29th November UN Security Council voted to authorise the use of force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. Resolution 678 authorised member states “to use all

necessary means to liberate Kuwait if Iraq did not withdraw by January 15 1991. The resolution had little impact in Baghdad. Instead Saddam told Iraqi television “if war breaks out we will fight in a way that will make all Arabs and Muslims proud.” With the resolution American strategy changed from Desert Shield to Desert Storm.

At 3.00 a.m. desert time on January 17 (7.00p.m. January 16 in Washington) the first missiles hit their targets. Desert Storm with the objective of liberating Kuwait started. At 9p.m. President Bush addressed the American people: “Tonight the battle has been joined...Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq. It is the liberation of Kuwait. 43 days later the goal was achieved. The United States deployed 540,000 troops, its allies another 200,000. 132,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Iraq and Kuwait in the air bombardment phase. More than half a million Iraqis were killed or wounded. More than 100,000 Iraqi troops were killed, 300,000 or more were wounded, 60,000 were captured as prisoners of war. 3700 Iraqi tanks, 2400 armoured vehicles, and 2600 artillery pieces were destroyed. By way of contrast the United States suffered 148 casualties in action of which 35 were killed by friendly fire. 57 Allied planes and helicopters were lost; not a single tank was lost. Iraq’s defeat was massive and total.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. List the three cornerstones of American foreign policy during the 19th century.
2. Why did the US resort to force to protect Kuwait?
3. What was the main source of conflict in the Gulf war?
4. What were the objectives and motivations of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait?

4.0 CONCLUSION

The cornerstones of American foreign policy have determined the objectives the country has pursued in the international arena. Like every modern state the United States has acted to advance its national interest and this had informed its decision to intervene in both the Korean War and in the first Gulf War in 1950 and 1991 respectively.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit we have analysed the cornerstones of American foreign policy. These are Isolationism, which meant none-entanglement in the complex web of European military alliances and intrigues. The second was the Monroe Doctrine, which insisted on European non-intervention in the western hemisphere. The doctrine declared Latin America as the United States sphere of influence. The third was Commercial Expansion, which entailed full participation in free international trade and access to world markets while avoiding foreign conflicts. The unit has explained the reasons for American intervention in Korea, Iraq's reasons and objectives for invading Kuwait and why the United States decided to intervene to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain the cornerstones of American foreign policy
2. Explain the reasons for American intervention in Korea
3. Explain Iraq's reasons and objectives for invading Kuwait
4. Explain why the United States decided to intervene to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.
5. Describe the process that led to Desert Shield and Desert Storm

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MODULE 5**BASIC CONCEPTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Unit 1 Sovereignty, Independence and Territoriality

Unit 2 Balance of Power

Unit 3 National Interest

Unit 4 Non-Alignment

Unit 5 Responsibility to Protect

UNIT 1 SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIALITY**CONTENTS**

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 Sovereignty, Independence and Territoriality

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Sovereignty is one of the **corollaries** of the modern state system. Indeed, certain features of the state system are inseparable from it and sovereignty is one of such. The others are the doctrine of nationalism and the principle of national power. Sovereignty is the legal theory that gives the state unrestrained and unlimited authority in domestic matters and in its relations with other states. Like nationalism, the concept of sovereignty is strongly associated with the nation state system. Therefore, some understanding of this concept is essential to the purposeful study of international relations.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of the unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain sovereignty and trace its historical development as a fundamental concept in international relations.
2. Explain the meaning of independence
3. Explain the relevance of territoriality to the study of IR.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Sovereignty, Independence and Territoriality

The father of the modern theory of sovereignty was the sixteenth-century French political thinker, Jean Bodin (1530-96). His *De la Republique*, published in Paris in 1576, contained the first systematic presentation of his theory. In his words, sovereignty is the supreme power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by law. Writing less than half a century later, Hugo Grotius, who believed that states should be subject to the law of the international community gave a similar definition of the term in his famous work *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*. In his view, Sovereignty is that power whose acts may not be made void by the acts of any other human will.

Today, the three main elements of the modern nation-state system, which also formed the basis of the state, are sovereignty, territoriality and legal equality of states. (Independence) Sovereignty implies that the governments are the supreme law making authorities in their respective territories. The Treaty of Westphalia, which provides that only sovereign states could enter into treaty relations with each other first, established this principle. Thus, a political unit that lacks sovereignty could not become a legal unit in the system. It could not conclude treaties with other states, become member of international organizations, or claim any other rights available to the sovereign states under international law. Similarly, a political unit lacking sovereignty has no legal standing among other states. Palmer and Perkins have rightly observed that sovereignty gives the state unique and virtually unlimited authority in all domestic matters and in relation to other states. It implies that a sovereign state has a

right to govern the territory under its control, as it deems necessary and there is no external restriction on its authority, except the one, which it might have accepted under some treaty.

However, in the international context, sovereignty would imply only right of self-government and promotion of nation's interests through independent foreign policy. It is noteworthy that for the promotion of their national interests the states have to make several compromises and adjustments with other nations that naturally restrict their absolute sovereignty. The concept of state sovereignty in international relations implies the equality of all nations, big, small, great powers, or small powers. Hence, if we take a realistic view, we shall tend to agree with Clyde Eagleton that "Sovereignty cannot be an absolute term. Despite all the limitations on sovereignty, it cannot be denied. In fact, so long as the nation state system remains the basis of the prevailing pattern of international society, the substance of society will remain. Indeed, sovereignty is the supreme authority, and particularly the ultimate coercive power, which the state possesses, and which other institutions within the state lack.

The second important feature of a nation-state system is territoriality, which is a logical corollary of the first. A sovereign state does not like outside interference in its affairs and must therefore abstain from interference in the internal affairs of other states. The states may influence behaviour of each other through established diplomatic channels and must respect each other's territorial integrity.

Thirdly, all the nation states irrespective of their size, population, military capabilities, economic resources, etc. are equal members of the international community. This principle of "equal rights of all states; large, small, weak, strong has been accepted by the United Nations' Charter. This principle of equality of different independent states was recognised almost at the same time when the nation-states made their appearance on the international stage. Indeed, classical writers of the eighteenth century such as Cohen endorsed the principle of equality of states. For instance, Cohen argues that all powers in the state of nature are equal; the persons of international law are in a state of nature therefore, they are equal." In the nineteenth century, positivists challenged the principle of equality. In fact, the issue of inequality among states became apparent in the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 when the

Great powers showed a tendency to take decisions without the consent of the small powers. The peace treaty was negotiated by the Great powers while Germany and the small powers were merely asked to sign it.

Under the UN Charter, which came at the end of World War II, the principle of equality of nation-states became enshrined and the international organisation is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states. This formal assertion of equality of the sovereign states by the UN Charter did not deter the Great powers from asserting their greatness and special status. For instance, they impress on the small states that they could not make equal contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security and as such, the big powers have a special responsibility in the matter. This explains why they occupy the permanent seats in the Security Council and acquire the right to veto important decisions of the Security Council. No doubt, the small states are bitterly opposed to this arrangement but they accept it in the hope that they would amend the same in course of time.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is sovereignty?
2. Who is the father of modern sovereignty?
3. List the three main elements of the modern state.
4. Why do the great powers occupy the permanent seats of the UN Security Council?

4.0 CONCLUSION

The concept of sovereignty is very germane to the study of international relations. Sovereignty is the legal theory that gives the state unrestrained and unlimited authority in domestic matters and in its relations with other states. It is one of the corollaries of the modern state. In fact, a political unit that lacks sovereignty could not become a legal unit in the system. It could not conclude treaties with other states, become member of international organizations, or claim any other rights available to the sovereign states under international law. The concept of state sovereignty in international relations implies the equality of all nations, big, small, great powers, or small powers. The source of sovereignty in a state is often difficult, if not impossible,

to locate in any meaningful way. The problem was a relatively easy one to solve in an absolute state, where sovereignty resided in the Sovereign Monarch, as Jean Bodin believed. However, it became an increasingly baffling one with the evolution of non-monarchical forms of government, especially those of a federal type. If, as Jean Bodin insisted, sovereignty was absolute and indivisible, it certainly had to reside in some specific place or person in the governmental structure.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit analysed the basic concepts of sovereignty, independence and territoriality. The understanding of the concepts will help our understanding of the nitty-gritty of international relations. The three main elements of the modern nation-state system, which also formed the basis of the state, are sovereignty, territoriality and legal equality of states. Sovereignty implies that the governments are the supreme law making authorities in their respective territories. The Treaty of Westphalia, which provides that only sovereign states could enter into treaty relations with each other first, established this principle.

The concept of state sovereignty in international relations implies the equality of all nations, big, small, great powers, or small powers. An important feature of a nation-state system is territoriality, which is a logical corollary of the first. A sovereign state does not like outside interference in its affairs and must therefore abstain from interference in the internal affairs of other states. The states may influence behaviour of each other through established diplomatic channels and must respect each other's territorial integrity. A sovereign state does not like outside interference in its affairs and must therefore abstain from interference in the internal affairs of other states. The states may influence behaviour of each other through established diplomatic channels and must respect each other's territorial integrity.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain the three corollaries of the modern state
2. "In a democratic setting sovereignty belongs to the people" Discuss.
3. Explain in detail the meaning of territoriality in international relations.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 2 BALANCE OF POWER

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 Balance of Power

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The balance of power, (BOP) is very crucial to the maintenance of peace and stability in international relations. BOP is as old as human society, and according to David Hume, the notion prevailed even in ancient Greece. Kissinger's discussion of the origin of the balance of power concept has traced it to the city states of ancient Greece, renaissance Italy and European state system which arose out of the peace treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff also argue that the concept was implicitly in ancient India and in ancient Greece even though it was not formalized.

Yet, in spite of the old nature of the concept of balance, the concept does not enjoy universally acceptable definition, as there are as many definitions as there are many scholars in the field. Hans Morgenthau, a well-known exponent of this theory refers to balance of power as the state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality, (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990). In the words of Quincy Wright, "It is a system designed to maintain a continuous conviction in any state that if it attempts aggression, it would encounter an invincible combination of others". In other words, it implies such a distribution of power in a multi-state system that no single state would be able, with impunity, to overrun the other states.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of the unit students should be able to:

1. Explain the meaning of balance of power
2. Explain the relevance of balance of power to the international system
3. Explain the role of the hegemon in the maintenance of balance of power.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Balance of Power

Essentially, the balance of power is the maintenance of such a just equilibrium between the members of the family of nations as shall prevent anyone of them becoming sufficiently strong to impose its will upon the rest. Simply put, the concept can be seen as a power calculation mechanism in the international system. As a theory in international relations, balance of power tries to promote equality of power among members of the international community by discouraging a single power from dominating the system. For this reason, (Chandra,2004), sees balance of power as a policy sought by states because of fear that if one nation gains predominant power, such a nation may impose its will upon other states, either by the threat or actual use of violence. Chandra defines balance of power from a technical way to refer to a balance of power system in which any shift away from equilibrium in the state system leads to counter-shifts through mobilization of counter-railing power.

Furthermore, balance of power is seen as equilibrium of forces between the great powers of the international system to discourage unilateral aggression on the part of any of them.

Ernst B. Haas who had done an extensive study of international relations theories has attributed about eight meaning to the concept of balance of power.

According to him, balance of power could mean:

- (i) Any distribution of power
- (ii) Equilibrium or balancing process
- (iii) Hegemony or the search for hegemony
- (iv) Stability and peace in a concert of power,

- (v) Power politics in general;
- (vi) Instability and war;
- (vii) A system and guide to policy-maker; and
- (viii) A universal law of history.

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff have put Haas' definitions in the following perspective. According to them, balance of power should be seen as situation or condition, as a universal tendency or law of state behaviour, as a guide for diplomacy, and as a mode of system-maintenance, characteristic of certain types of international systems.

They also provided an explanation for their conceptualization of the concept. They believe that as a situation or condition, balance of power implies an objective arrangement in which there is relatively widespread satisfaction with the distribution of power. As a universal tendency or law, the concept describes a probability and enables nations to predict the system. As a policy guide, the concept prescribes to statesmen when to net against the disruptor of equilibrium. Lastly, as a system, it refers to a multinational society. And the concept of balance of power is used in holistic stage; it covers military economic and political suspects of interstates relations. Therefore, balance of power cannot be dissociated from an elitist desire by great power to perpetuate any given international order or status quo that favours their interest so that such an order will remain undisturbed.

We should also stress that under the balance of power arrangement, there is normally a power balancer called the hegemonic, which holds that balance on behalf of the other powers. Britain played this role in European international politics for a very long time following its emergence as the leading naval power in Europe.

Another important thing to note about balance of power is the way nations have tried to ensure they achieve power equilibrium. Thus, nations have adopted the following methods or techniques to balance of power: formation of alliances, the policy of divide and rule, territorial compensation after war, diplomatic bargaining, legal or peaceful settlement of disputes, creation of a buffer states, sphere of influence and war.

Hedley Bull,(1995) classified balance of power into what he called simple balance of power, complex balance of power, general balance of power, level balance

of power, objective balance of power, subjective balance of power, fortuitous balance of power and contrived balance of power. By simple balance of power, he meant balance between two powers such as the dish of France and Hapsburg, Spain and Austria in the sixteenth and seventh centuries. While by complex balance, he meant balance between these or more power, such as the balance between France, Austria, Russia, and England. General balance refers to the preponderant power in the international system as a whole, while level balance implies absence of preponderance of power to mention but a few. In the inter-war years, the Soviet-German pact of 1939 was a classical example of territorial compensation in maintaining the balance.

Indeed, the concept of balance of power has played important role in relations of states and nation states in the international system. The practical application has also be demonstrated in Europe, since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to the conclusion of the second war with its significance success.

The concept of balance of power is difficult to define but it has the idea of equilibrium in the distribution of power among states as central of it. It is for this reason that the definition given by Morgenthau has been generally accepted by scholars. According to Morgenthau, (1948), balance of power is “an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality”. However, balance of power as a theory has the problem of how an equilibrium could be maintained among countries in the international system as one of its greatest challenges. Nevertheless, the theory has developed its own techniques and devices of maintaining the balance, which have been used in the past. Some of these are; the international compensation arms racing, the alliance formation creation of buffer states and divide and rule.

Territorial compensation theorists of balance of power have argued that states within a region or system can redistribute territories and re-adjust boundaries to ensure that a measure of equilibrium is achieved within the system. States would also require territories from elsewhere to share up their power and compete favourably with their neighbours. This re-distribution of territories and reorganization of boundaries at the end of the Napoleonic wars in the post French revolution of 1789 was a prominent example of attaining balance of power through territorial compensation. In a related

development, during the last quarter of the 18th century, this strategy was employed to maintain the classical balance of power system in Europe. At the end of World War II in 1945, balance of power quickly returned as a way of checking aggression among states. Although not consciously designed, the arms racing, alliance seeking and assertive interventionism of the rival camps during the Cold War that emergence after World War II between the U.S.A and the defunct U.S.S.R, coupled with their allies ensured that balance of power became prominent from the late 1940s and 1989.

Indeed, during this period, balance of power became balance of terror in an international atmosphere of mutual assured destruction (MAD). The development of Thermo nuclear weapons and the intercontinental Ballistic missile in the late 1940s and during the 1950s with capacity to annihilate humanity, ensure that balance of power occupy the centre stage of global politics from the end of the Cold War to the 21st century.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is Balance of Power?
2. List the eight meanings of BOP by Ernst Haas.
3. Under what conditions does balance of power appear as balance of terror?
4. Why is balance of power relevant to the international system?

4.0 CONCLUSION

The concept of balance of power is very crucial to the maintenance of peace and stability in the international system. It enjoys a wide ranging definition from scholars in the field. BOP is a regulator that creates equilibrium. Its operation requires great skill and finesse and possibly a ruthless disregard of moral concepts and human welfare. Like in any perfected game, it has developed rules, techniques and devices of its own. For instance, territorial compensation theorists of balance power have argued that states within a region or system can redistribute territories and re-adjust boundaries to ensure that a measure of equilibrium is achieved within the system. States would also require territories from elsewhere to share up their power and compete favourably with their neighbours. This re-distribution of territories and reorganization of boundaries at the end of the Napoleonic wars in the post French

revolution of 1789 was a prominent example of attaining balance of power through territorial compensation.

5.0 SUMMARY

The concept of BOP in human relations is as old as humanity itself. As a theory in international relations, balance of power tries to promote equality of power among members of the international community by discouraging a single power from dominating the system. Indeed, balance of power is a policy sought by states because of fear that if one nation gains predominant power, such a nation may impose its will upon other states, either by the threat or actual use of violence. The concept of balance of power has played important role in relations of states and nation states in the international system. The practical application has also been demonstrated in Europe, since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to the conclusion of the second war with its significance success.

During the Cold War, balance of power became balance of terror in an international atmosphere of mutual assured destruction (MAD). The development of Thermo nuclear weapons and the intercontinental Ballistic missile in the late 1940s and during the 1950s with capacity to annihilate humanity, ensure that balance of power occupy the centre stage of global politics from the end of the Cold War to the 21st century.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Describe the importance of the use of balance of power in maintaining world peace.
2. “During the Cold War, balance of power became balance of terror” Discuss.
3. Explain why “BOP has become obsolete in the 21st century international relations”.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 3 NATIONAL INTEREST

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 National Interest

3.2 Types of National Interest

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The foreign policy of every country is designed to promote the national interest. However, the concept of national interest in international relations is surrounded with many contradictory perspectives. For instance, the use of terms like common interest and conflicting interest, primary and secondary interest, inchoate interest, community of interests, identical and complementary interests, vital interests, material interests, etc. by Morgenthau in his writings further adds to the confusion.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain the meaning of national interest.
2. Explain the differences between the concept and other related concepts.
3. Explain the approaches to national interest
4. Explain the kinds of national interest.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 National Interest

The concept of national interest is very vague and carries a meaning according to the context in which it is used. As a result, it is not possible to give any universally acceptable interpretation of this concept. Hans Morgenthau who has dealt with the concept in his various writings also used the term ‘national interest’ in different ways and assigned variety of meanings. The use of terms like common interest and conflicting interest, primary and secondary interest, inchoate interest, community of interests, identical and complementary interests, vital interests, material interests, etc. by Morgenthau in his writings further adds to the confusion. The problem of defining the concept is also complicated by the fact that researchers have tended to give the definitions of national interest according to the particular approach adopted by them. Frankel divides the various approaches adopted to define the concept of national interests into two broad categories—objectivist and subjectivist.

In the first category, he includes all those approaches that view national interest as a concept that can be defined or examined with the help of some definable criteria. In the second one, he includes those definitions, which seek to interpret national interest as a “constantly changing pluralistic set of subjective references. However, the most important reason that has added to the confusion regarding the meaning of the concept of national interest is the disagreement between those who view it in broad sense and those who conceive it in terms of a number of concrete single interests. Generally, the decisions at the operational level are conceived in a narrow context and only few dimensions are taken into account. At this level, the process of reasoning is inductive while at other levels it becomes more deductive.

Again the people with theoretical inclination take greater interest in the aggregate, while those with scientific bias lay more emphasis on the single dimension of the, concept. Because of all these difficulties, the concept of national interest has got confused and various meanings have been assigned to it. In view of the vagueness of the concept some scholars like: Raymond Aron has gone to the extent of suggesting that it is a meaningless or a pseudo-theory. However, some of the definitions given

below will help in clarifying the concept of national interest. Brookings's Institute defined national interest as "the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts." Charles Lerche and Abul Said defined it as "the general long-term and continuing purpose which the state, the nation, and the government all see themselves as serving. Dyke describes national interest as an interest that the states seek to protect or achieve in relation to each other. An analysis of the above definition will highlight the difference of approach. While the first two definitions interpret national interest in terms of permanent guide to the action of the state, the definition of Dyke refers to national interest as an action. Obviously, the first two definitions seem to be more logical.

The concept of national interest is comparatively a new concept. In the ancient and the medieval times, the states pursued certain substantial interests on the basis of which their relations were conducted. In the early Middle Ages the laws of Christianity formed the basis of these relations and the states were expected to ensure that their laws conformed to these principles. However, with the emergence of the secular state, the Church began to be looked upon as the enemy of national interest and the national interests were equated with the interests of the prince of the ruling dynasty. At that time, the national interest meant the interest of a particular monarch in holding fast to the territories he already possessed, in extending his domains and in aggrandizement of his house. Nevertheless, in course of time the popular bodies challenged the authority of the monarchs and asserted themselves. This resulted in the growth of democracy and the 'honour of the Prince was replaced by the honour of the nation'. Thus, the concept passed from the feudal and monarchical system to the republic and democratic system and soon gained a common usage in the political and diplomatic literature. In short, the term 'national interest' gained currency only with the emergence of the national state system, increase in popular political control and the great expansion of economic relations.

3.2 Types of National Interest

An examination of the various kinds of national interests will further help in clarifying the concept itself. According to Thomas W. Robinson, the national interest can be broadly classified into six categories, viz., primary interest, secondary interest, permanent interest, variable interest, general interest, and specific interest. Let us examine the various kinds of interests in some details.

The Primary interests of a nation include the preservation of physical, political, and cultural identity of the state against possible encroachments from outside powers. These interests are permanent and the state must defend them at all costs. No compromise of these interests is possible. *The Secondary interests* though less important than the first one are quite vital to the existence of the state. These include the protection of the citizens abroad and ensuring of diplomatic immunities for the diplomatic staff. Third, *Permanent interests* refer to the relatively constant and long-term interests of the state. The change in the permanent interests, if any, is rather slow. An example of this type of national interest is provided by the determination of Britain to maintain freedom of navigation during the colonial era for the protection of her overseas colonies and growing trade. Fourth, *the Variable interests* refer to those interests of a nation, which a nation considers vital for national good in a given set of circumstances. In this sense the variable interests of a state are largely determined by the cross currents of personalities, public opinion, sectional interests, partisan politics, and political and moral folkways. Fifth, *the General interests* of a nation refer to those positive conditions, which apply to a large number of nations in several specified fields such as economics, trade, diplomatic intercourse etc. For example, it was the general national interest of Britain to maintain balance of power on the European continent.

Finally, *Specific interests* through the logical outgrowth of the general interests are defined in terms of time or space. For example, Britain has considered it a specific national interest to maintain the independence of the Low Countries for the sake of preservation of balance of power in Europe. In addition to the above six types of national interests Prof. Robinson refers to three other interests which he describes as “international interests.” These include the identical interests,

complementary interests; and conflicting interests. The Identical interests refer to interests that are held in common by a number of states. For example, U.S.A. and Britain have been interested that Europe should not be dominated by any single power. The Complementary interests of the nations refer to those interests, which though not Identical, can form the basis of agreement on some specific issues. For instance, Britain was interested in the independence of Portugal against Spain because she wanted to control the reign of the Atlantic Ocean.

Similarly, Portugal was interested in the British maritime hegemony because this was a safe means of defence against Spain. The interests other than the identical and the complementary interests fall in the category of Conflicting interests. It may be noted that the conflicting interests are not fixed and undergo a change due to the force of events and diplomacy. Thus, the present time conflicting interests may become complementary interests. Likewise, the complementary and identical interests can also be transformed into conflicting interests.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is national interest?
2. List the types of national interest you know.
3. What do you understand by identical interests?
4. What is conflicting interests?
5. What are the various approaches to national interest?

4.0 CONCLUSION

This unit discussed the concept of National interest. The concept of national interest is very vague and carries a meaning according to the context in which it is used. As a result, it is not possible to give any universally acceptable interpretation of this concept. Brooking's Institute defined national interest as "the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts.

5.0 SUMMARY

The concept of national interest is somewhat confusing. This explains why different scholars have variously approached it. For instance, Hans Morgenthau

who has dealt with the concept in his various writings also used the term 'national interest' in different ways and assigned variety of meanings. The use of terms like common interest and conflicting interest, primary and secondary interest, inchoate interest, community of interests, identical and complementary interests, vital interests, material interests, etc. by Morgenthau in his writings further adds to the confusion. The concept of national interest is comparatively a new concept. In the ancient and the medieval times, the states pursued certain substantial interests on the basis of which their relations were conducted. In the early Middle Ages the laws of Christianity formed the basis of these relations and the states were expected to ensure that their laws conformed to these principles. However, with the emergence of the secular state, the Church began to be looked upon as the enemy of national interest and the national interests were equated with the interests of the prince of the ruling dynasty. At that time, the national interest meant the interest of a particular monarch in holding fast to the territories he already possessed, in extending his domains and in aggrandizement of his house. The Complementary interests of the nations refer to those interests, which though not Identical, can form the basis of agreement on some specific issues. For instance, Britain was interested in the independence of Portugal against Spain because she wanted to control the reign of the Atlantic Ocean.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain the term, National interest.
2. Critically evaluate the nature and scope of national interest.
3. Explain the differences between the primary interests and the general interests.

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UNIT 4 NON-ALIGNMENT**CONTENTS**

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 Non-Alignement

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Non-alignment is a policy of keeping out of alliances in general and military pacts in particular. The term is very close to neutralism, since the basic object of the two is non-involvement in the Cold War in particular and war in general. In fact, some scholars have used the two terms interchangeably. However, non-alignment has broader meanings. It means that a nation following such a policy needs not be neutral under all circumstances. A non-aligned state can participate actively in world affairs under certain circumstances.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain the origins of the Non-Alignment.
2. Explain why newly independent countries in Africa and Asia embraced the concept of Non-Alignment.
3. “The end of the Cold War signifies the end of Non-Alignment.” Discuss.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Non-Alignment

Generally, the Non-aligned Movement traces its origins to the Bandung Conference of April 1955. This conference, which had in attendance 29 African and Asian countries, was to devise a means for combating colonialism. Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the moving spirits of the conference remarked that the coming together of the leaders of Asian and African states signifies the birth of a new era. Indeed, the policy of non-alignment remains Indian's contribution to international relations. Soon after taking office in 1947 as interim Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru announced a policy that eventually metamorphosed into non-alignment. As a policy, non-alignment is a direct response to the Cold War that commenced as soon as the World War II ended in 1945. Cold War describes the acute tension that developed between two erstwhile allies, the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

During the World War II, 1939-1945, the allies-United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and others won a decisive war against Germany, Italy and Japan. Despite this victory, the victors could not permanently forget their ideological differences this led to the Cold War. It was a strange war, a war fought without weapons and armed forces, a war of nerves diplomatically fought between two hostile camps. The two blocs that emerged- (i) The Capitalist or Western or Democratic bloc, led by the United States; and (ii) The Socialist or Eastern or Soviet bloc, led by the Soviet Union.

Against this background, the policy of non-alignment emerged to keep states away from bloc politics, maintain friendship with both, but military alliance with none and evolve an independent foreign policy. Undoubtedly, non-alignment as an international group emerged at the Belgrade Conference of September 1961. India was largely responsible for launching the Non-Align Movement (NAM) in 1961. In this Conference, 26 Afro-Asian Nations and a European nation participated. Besides, three Latin American countries participated with observer status. Jawaharlal Nehru (India) Broz Tito (Yugoslav) and Abdul Nasser (Egypt) initiated the Conference. Tito presided over the Conference. These triumvirate leaders sent out invitations to

prospective participants after carefully scrutinizing their foreign policy orientation. The five criteria for joining NAM were:

- A country following independent foreign policy based on non-alignment and peaceful co-existence.
- A country opposed to imperialism and colonialism
- A country that has no Cold War military pact with any bloc
- A country that has no bilateral treaty with any of the power bloc
- A country that has no foreign military base on its territory

The Conference adopted a 27-point Declaration. Some of the crucial features of this declaration were that it made an appeal to the world powers to preserve and protect international peace and condemned all manifestations of colonialism and imperialism. It demanded freedom for all colonial people and condemned the policy of racialism in any part of the world. It praised the freedom struggle being held by Algeria, Tunisia, Angola, Congo, etc, and called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Africa. It called for just terms of trade for developing countries and laid emphasis on the economic, social and cultural progress of these countries. The Conference also appealed for complete disarmament. These principles strongly appealed to the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia and they joined the Movement.

Ever since its establishment, NAM has grown both quantitatively and qualitatively. This is evident in the ever-increasing membership from the original 27 states that participated in the Belgrade Conference of 1961 to 118 states, which participated in the Havana, Cuba Conference of 2006. Indeed, the non-alignment has consistently grown in popularity. Despite minor differences among members of Non-Aligned Movement, it has played important role in favour of world peace, disarmament, development and decolonisation. In fact, the non-aligned countries have played an active role at the United Nations and have refused to deviate from their chosen path despite all pressures. The main contributions of the non-aligned countries are as under:

1. The enormous growth in the number of the non-aligned countries greatly contributed to the easing of cold war and encouraged the newly independent

countries to keep away from power blocs.- No wonder, this helped in resolving several problems posed by the power politics.

2. It greatly transformed the nature of the United Nations and acted as a check on the arbitrary powers of the permanent members of the Security Council because by virtue of their overwhelming strength in the General Assembly the non-aligned countries were able to impose some moral check on the big powers.
3. Non-aligned countries promoted the ideology of coexistence or “live and let live” by keeping themselves away from the two blocs into which the world was divided in the Cold War era.
4. Non-aligned nations paid great attention to the problem of economic development and played a vital role in the formation of the UNCTAD. They were also instrumental in the formation of the Group of 77.
5. Finally, Non-aligned Movement contributed to the end of game of power politics by keeping aloof from power blocks. In fact, non-alignment represents a true blend of idealism and realism and had great relevance during the period of cold war.

Indeed, many countries joined the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, international system to afford them a position of standing apart from the US-Soviet rivalry. At the end of the Cold War, this Movement led by India and Yugoslavia agreed to still remain as a group in 1992 though most of its members now prefer to cooperate on security matters through regionally based institutions. Indeed, non-alignment remains a valid instrument for economic development and social change even in the 21st century.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. What is non-alignment?
2. Why was the Non-Aligned Movement formed?
3. How many states in the international system are NAM members

4.0 CONCLUSION

This unit focused on Non-alignment, which is different from neutrality. The Non-Aligned Movement that emerged from the Belgrade Conference of 1961 afforded its members the opportunity of pursuing independent foreign policy in a world divided into East/West blocs. Indeed, the policy of non-alignment remains India's contribution to international relations. Soon after taking office in 1947 as interim Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru announced a policy that eventually metamorphosed into non-alignment. As a policy, non-alignment is a direct response to the Cold War that commenced as soon as the World War II ended in 1945.

5.0 SUMMARY

Non-alignment remains the focus of this unit. We discovered that non-alignment is different from neutrality. It emerged as a direct response to the US-Soviet rivalry in the Cold War international system. Indeed, the policy of non-alignment emerged to keep states away from bloc politics, maintain friendship with both, but military alliance with none and evolve an independent foreign policy. Since then it has grown in popularity and membership.

Despite minor differences among members of Non- Aligned Movement, it has played important role in favour of world peace, disarmament, development and decolonisation. In fact, the non-aligned countries have played an active role at the United Nations and have refused to deviate from their chosen path despite all pressures. At the end of the Cold War, this Movement led by India and Yugoslavia agreed to still remain as a group in 1992 though most of its members now prefer to cooperate on security matters through regionally based institutions.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain the concept, non-alignment.
2. Trace the origins of the Non-Aligned Movement.
3. "The end of the Cold War signified the end of the NAM" Discuss.

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UNIT 5 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main Content

3.1 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

4.0 Conclusion

5.0 Summary

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The responsibility to protect (R2P) is a new phenomenon in the vocabulary of international relations. Since the emergence of the modern state in 1648, the basic principles guiding inter-state relations have been sovereignty and territorial integrity of states as equal and independent members of the international system.

Over the years, these basic principles have ensured that states do not interfere in the internal affairs of other states. In recognition of these principles, the United Nations Article 2, declares that, “the UN is based on the principles of the sovereign equality of all its members”

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of the unit, you should be able to:

1. Explain the concept, R2P
2. Explain the basic assumptions and principles of R2P.
3. Explain historical instances of the application of R2P.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

In the Westphalian tradition, sovereignty signifies the legal identity of a state in international law. It is a concept that provides order, stability and predictability in international relations since sovereign states are as equal, regardless of comparative size or wealth. This explains why the principle of sovereign sovereignty signifies the capacity to make authoritative decisions with regard to the people and resources within the territory of the state. However, the authority of the state is not absolute. It is constrained and regulated internally by constitutional power sharing arrangements.

Significantly, a condition of any state's sovereignty is a corresponding obligation to respect every other state's sovereignty. In fact, the norm and principle of non-intervention is enshrined in Article 2.7 of the UN Charter. A sovereign state is empowered in international law to exercise exclusive and total jurisdiction within its territorial borders. Other states have the corresponding duty not to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If that duty is violated, the victim state has the further right to defend its territorial integrity and political independence. In the era of decolonization, the sovereign equality of states and the correlative norm of non-intervention received its most emphatic affirmation from the newly independent states.

The responsibility to protect concept places a renewed emphasis on de facto rather than de jure grounds for authority. In doing so, it represents a significant departure from the conception of lawful authority that has formed the normative basis of the modern international legal system since 1945. International law has long treated effective control over territory as an important criterion of statehood. In that regard, statehood has in part been premised upon de facto authority. Yet the creation of the UN in 1945 saw the emergence of an international regime in which the principles of self-determination, sovereign equality and the prohibition against acquisition of territory using force were also treated as central to determining the lawfulness of particular claimants to authority. Understandably, R2P provides a fresh conceptual template for **reconciling** both the tension in principle between **sovereignty** and **intervention**, and the divergent interests and perspectives in political practice. The

roots of R2P lay in statements by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the 54th General Assembly of the UN in September 1999. R2P itself is directed primarily at the UN policy community in New York; it gives pride of place to the UN if the international community is to honour its international responsibility to protect; and if Responsibility to Protect is to be the basis of a new international consensus, this can only come about in the UN forum.

Historically, starting from April 1994 and lasting for ninety days, Tutsis and moderate Hutus became the victims of a systematic genocidal campaign that resulted in 800,000 deaths in Rwanda. In July 1995, with United Nations (UN) peacekeepers present, 8,000 Bosnian men and boys were massacred in the safe haven of Srebrenica over a few days. In March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started a bombing campaign against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to protect the Albanian population in Kosovo from being ethnically cleansed. In the Rwandese and Srebrenica episodes, the world bore silent and distant– very-distant witness to its own apathy. That indifference and inaction by the international community remains one of the most shameful episodes since the Holocaust. In fact, the deficiency has been widely recognized: just as **Munich** became subsequently an icon of appeasement, **Rwanda** has become an icon of moral indifference and failure of responsibility among bystanders.

This was not a matter of lack of knowledge and awareness, or even lack of capacity. Rather, it was a failure of collective conscience, of civic courage at the highest and most solemn levels of responsibility. Indeed, cases of genocide and mass violence have raised endless debates about the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention to save innocent lives. Therefore, in the face of the humanitarian tragedies in Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere, states started advocating a right to undertake interventions to stop mass violations of human rights from occurring. The doctrine of R2P recognizes that responsibility rests primarily with the state concerned. A key development in this context has been the report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 2001. The ICISS commissioned by the Canadian government in response to a request from the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and led by former Australian foreign affairs

minister, Gareth Evans, submitted a report, which argues that a state has the responsibility to uphold its citizens' human rights. If it is unable or unwilling to fulfil this responsibility, such as in cases of mass killing, its sovereignty is temporarily suspended. In such instances, the responsibility to protect these citizens transfers to the international community. The international community's responsibility to protect involves the 'responsibility to prevent' the crisis, the 'responsibility to react' robustly to it, and the 'responsibility to rebuild' thereafter.

This implies that, when the state is unable or unwilling to fulfil this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, it becomes the responsibility of others to act in its place. In many cases, the state seeks to acquit its responsibility in full and active partnership with representatives of the international community. Thus, R2P is more of a linking concept that bridges the divide between the international community and the sovereign state, whereas the language of the right or duty to intervene is inherently more confrontational between the two levels of analysis and policy. In recognition of this policy, the Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation in a series of speeches concerned with the conflict in Sudan stated that Sweden must 'put its responsibility to protect into practice' and 'contribute to an improved situation for the suffering civilians' in Darfur.

The provision of humanitarian aid, diplomatic efforts to support implementation of the North–South peace agreement and Sweden's contribution to reconstruction have been characterised as part of Sweden's 'responsibility to protect civilians' in Darfur. In this regard, the UN intervention in the Congo was the first of many such UN interventions in internal conflicts, including in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Haiti and Sierra Leone. The 2001 report put forward three components of the broader responsibility to protect umbrella, namely the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. Nevertheless, September 2005 marks a defining moment in the evolution of the responsibility to protect. It marked the first time R2P was endorsed in a universal forum, with all UN member states unanimously accepting their responsibility to protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The UN Security Council has referred to R2P in three resolutions since then.

On 28 April 2006, resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict “reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” This is the first official Security Council reference to the responsibility to protect. For the normative development of R2P, the significance is that this is legally binding, unlike all its previous incarnations. R2P was further promoted by its reference in relation to specific conflicts. On 31 August 2006, the Security Council passed resolution 1706 that demanded a rapid deployment of UN peacekeepers in Sudan. This resolution made explicit reference to R2P, by reaffirming the provisions on R2P from resolution 1674 and from paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. Resolution 1894 passed in November 2009 was the last one, to date, to reaffirm the provisions on R2P included in the 2005 Outcome Document

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

1. Why do states respect the sovereignty of other states?
2. When was the responsibility to protect concept developed?
3. Why was the concept formulated?
4. What led to the endorsement of R2P?
5. Mention some places where it has been applied.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The right to protect is a new concept in the field of international relations. Since 1948, Sovereignty has come to signify, in the Westphalian concept, the legal identity of a state in international law. It is a concept that provides order, stability and predictability in international relations since sovereign states are equal, regardless of comparative size or wealth. In this regard, states were not expected to interfere in the internal affairs of other states in the international system. However, the changes in the international system in the wake of the Post-Cold War world, necessitated the need for the civilized states to devise a means of taming genocidal attempts and other crimes against humanity perpetrated by groups or national governments within the international system. Indeed, the 1994 Rwanda genocide, the Bosnian mass murder in

Srebrenica and other similar gory incidents gave rise to the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).

5.0 SUMMARY

The focus of this unit is the **Responsibility to Protect**. Before the introduction of R2P, the guiding principles regulating the conduct of international relations were those derived from the Westphalia Treaty of 1648. Indeed, in the Westphalian tradition, sovereignty signifies the legal identity of a state in international law. It is a concept that provides order, stability and predictability in international relations since sovereign states are as equal, regardless of comparative size or wealth. In recognition of this, sovereign states remained inviolable giving rise to the concept of non-interference in their internal affairs. In fact, the norm of non-intervention is enshrined in Article 2.7 of the UN Charter. A sovereign state is empowered in international law to exercise exclusive and total jurisdiction within its territorial borders. Other states have the corresponding duty not to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If that duty is violated, the victim state has the further right to defend its territorial integrity and political independence.

Understandably, the 1994 Rwanda genocide and other such dastardly and gory acts perpetrated by groups and some national governments have necessitated the doctrine of R2P. It places the responsibility to protect on the shoulders of state governments. However, when the state is unable or unwilling to fulfil this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, it becomes the responsibility of others to act in its place. In many cases, the state seeks to acquit its responsibility in full and active partnership with representatives of the international community. September 2005 marks a defining moment in the evolution of the responsibility to protect. It marked the first time R2P was endorsed in a universal forum, with all UN member states unanimously accepting their responsibility to protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT (TMAs)

1. Explain fully the origins of R2P.
2. With specific examples, assess the use of R2P in the last two decades.

3. “The responsibility to protect violates states sovereignty” Discuss.
4. “Like Munich that became an icon of appeasement, Rwanda has become an icon of moral indifference and failure of responsibility among bystanders.” Discuss.

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