NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COURSE CODE: PCR 733

COURSE TITLE: ETHNIC CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION

COURSE GUIDE

PCR 733
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION

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INTRODUCTION

PCR 733: Ethnic Conflict and Resolution is a first semester, 3-credit unit course designed to be taken by all students in the Master's degree programmes of School of Arts and Social Sciences. It is suitable not only for students who train as tomorrow's teachers and instructors, but also for those who will combine theory with practical challenges in addressing the challenges of ethnic and identity–based conflicts. The course consists of general and specific explanations of ethnic conflict, theories and causes of conflict, ethnic insurgency and the trauma associated with it, global and regional case studies in third party intervention in ethnic conflicts, early warning indicators in ethnic conflict, the nature of response and resolution processes in ethnic conflict. The reading materials have been thoughtfully developed and meet international standards.

There are no prerequisites for this course, except otherwise requested by the university authorities in the future. The course guide describes briefly what the course entails and what you are expected to learn in each unit, what course materials you will need and how to study or grasp these materials. It also contains Tutor-Marked Assignments. There are periodic tutorial classes that are linked to the course.

WHAT YOU WILL LEARN IN THIS COURSE

PCR 733 aims at acquainting you with basic issues that are associated with ethnicity designed to be studied in its specific approaches. The area of focus of conflict studies and management is wide, but this course specifically aims at bringing ethnic conflict and resolution to the basic understanding of students and practitioners. Notwithstanding its specificity, the general issues about conflict and ethnicity are discussed. Your understanding of ethnic conflict resolution and the nature of response will equip you both in analysing and applying basic skills to complex tasks in peace studies.

COURSE AIMS

The aim of this course is to enable you understand and appreciate salient issues and requirements in ethnic conflict and resolution. To attain this, the course will introduce you to:

1. The general background and basic concepts of ethnicity for an adequate understanding of some of the underlining issues in ethnicity.

2. The meaning and philosophical basis of third party conflict resolution.
3. The nature and environments for effective third party mediation challenges.
4. The process, personal qualities as well as professional expertise a mediator must possess in order to be efficient and result-oriented in third party mediation.
5. The behavioural attitude or code of conduct of parties in conflict in negotiation.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

The study is designed to equip you with basic understanding of ethnic conflict resolution. Conflict precedes any form of resolution. As we have already indicated, it is imperative that you grasp the basic concepts, theories, nature and processes of ethnic conflict resolution.

At the end of the course, you should be able to:

- grasp the concepts and meaning of ethnic conflict
- appreciate the imperatives of conflict resolution in general, and responses to ethnic conflict
- discuss the elements of ethnic identity and applications of ethnicity and ethnic identity formation in Africa
- appreciate the connection between ethnicity, citizenship and nationalism
- comprehend the complexities associated with the manipulation of ethnicity
- discuss ethnicity as engine of, and threat to national integration
- predict, prescribe or recommend ways of responding to ethnic conflicts
- contribute to research and practice in the field peace studies especially the area of ethnic conflict and resolution.

WORKING THROUGH THIS COURSE

To complete this course, you are expected to read the study units and recommended texts including other relevant materials. Each unit contains self-assessment text/questions and tutor-marked assignments. At the end of this course you will take an examination. The details of the components of the course are set out in subsequent pages.

COURSE MATERIALS

The main components of the course are:

1. Course Guide
2. Study Units
3. Textbooks
4. Assignments File
5. Presentation Schedule.

MODULES/STUDY UNITS

There are 4 modules in the course. Each module contains 5 units. The first module is the introduction and general background. It discusses the nature, causes and theories of conflict: The second examines ethnicity in context of conflict: The third takes a look at ethnicity, identity and insurgency. The fourth module presents ethnic conflict resolution approaches/processes.

There are 18 study units in this course. Modules 1 and 3 contain 4 units study units each while modules 2 and 4 contain 5 units.

MODULE 1	**ETHNICITY: AN INTRODUCTION**
Unit 1	Ethnicity
Unit 2	Conceptual issues
Unit 3	Ethnicity, Citizenship and Nationalism
Unit 4	Ethnicity and Integration: Case Studies from Africa and beyond
MODULE 2	**ETHNICITY IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT**
Unit 1	Salience of Ethnicity
Unit 2	Ethnicity and Conflict
Unit 3	Ethnicity as conflict generating factors in socio-political interactions
Unit 4	Colonialism and Ethnic Identity formation in Africa
Unit 5	Theoretical Explanations of Ethnicity
MODULE 3	**ETHNICITY, IDENTITY AND INSURGENCY**
Unit 1	Ethnicity as Identity
Unit 2	Insurgency
Unit 3	Ethnic Insurgency and Society

ASSIGNMENT FILE

The details of the work you must submit to your facilitator for marking will be found in this file. The marks you obtain from these assignments will count as part of the cumulative score for this course.

Additional information about PCR 733 may be found in the same file.

PRESENTATION SCHEDULE

The presentation schedule included in your course file gives you the important dates for completion of tutor-marked assignments and attendance to tutorials. Don't forget to submit all your assignments by deadlines. Avoid falling behind in your work.

ASSESSMENTS

There are two aspects to the assessment of the course: the tutor-marked assignment and the written examination. The assignments must be done and submitted to your facilitator on the dates specified/deadlines, and will account for thirty percent (30%) of your total score. The remaining 70% will be by examination at the end of the course.

TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENTS

There are Tutor-Marked Assignments at the end of every unit. There is need to do and submit all the assignments. All will be marked, but your best 3 will be counted. It will account for 30 per cent of your total score. Each assignment carries 10 marks. Do all your assignments contained in the assignment file and send it to your tutor.

Utilise the materials and information contained in your set textbooks, readings and study units. Other references will also be useful in broadening your viewpoint and understanding of the subject matter. If

as a result of reasonable excuse/problem beyond your control, you could not submit on deadline please contact your tutor.

FINAL EXAMINATION AND GRADING

The final examination on PCR 733 will be taken within three hours duration. The examination will make up the remaining seventy per cent (70%). The questions will reflect both the Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMAs) and Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs) you have come across in the course of reading the text and practice exercises.
Revise your TMAs and SAEs before sitting for the examination. You will find it useful to review your TMAs and the tutor's comments on them before the examinations.

HOW TO GET THE MOST FROM THIS COURSE

In distance learning, the study units replace the lecturer. The advantage is that you can read and work through the study materials at your pace, and at a time and place that suits you best. Think of it as reading the lecture instead of listening to a lecturer. Just as a lecturer might give you in-class exercise, your study units provide exercises for you to do at appropriate times. Each of the study units follows the same format. The first item is introduction to the subject matter of the unit and how a particular unit is integrated with other units and the course as a whole. Next is a set of learning objectives. These objectives, lets you know what you should be able to do, by the time you have completed the unit. You should use these objectives to guide your study. When you have finished the unit, you should go back and check whether you have achieved the objectives. If you make a habit of doing this, you will significantly improve your chances of passing the course. Self-Assessment Exercises are inter-spread throughout the units and answers are given at the end of the course. Working through these exercises will help you to achieve the objectives of the units and prepare you for the assignments and the examination. You should do each Self-Assessment Exercise as you come across it in the study units. Work through exercises when you come to them.

TUTORS AND TUTORIALS

There are 12 hours of tutorials provided in support of this course. You will be notified of the dates, times, and location of these tutorials, together with the name and phone number of your tutor, as soon as you are allocated a tutorial group. Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignment, keep a close watch on your progress and on difficulties you might encounter and provide assistance to you during the course. You must send your Tutor-Marked Assignment well before the due date.

They will be marked by your tutor and returned to you as soon as possible. Do not hesitate, to contact your tutor by telephone or e-mail if you need help. Contact your tutor if:

- you do not understand any part of the assigned readings
- you have difficulty with the self-assessment exercise
- you have a question or a problem with an assignment, with your tutor's comment or with the grading of an assignment.

You should try your best to attend the tutorials. This is the only way to have face-to-face contact with your tutor and ask questions which are answered instantly. You can raise any problem encountered in the course of your study. To gain the maximum benefit from course tutorials, prepare a question list before attending them. You will gain a lot from participating actively.

SUMMARY

Ethnic Conflict and Resolution (PCR 733) is designed to introduce you to conceptual, theoretical and practical issues in ethnic conflict and resolution. As a student of the Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution Programme, you can apply the benefits gained from this course in understanding your immediate context. All over the world, the main causes of political, social and economic crises, violence, and war that have resulted in a major disturbance of the peace, death and destruction that took years of negotiation, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and other forms of multilateral diplomatic efforts to resolve, have often been set off by many acts which could collectively be described either as the violation of the basic rules and practices that are in-built into cultures of social or political governance. At the end of this course, you should have been well acquainted with ethnic conflicts and the nature of response.

We wish you success with the course and hope that you will find it interesting and useful.

MAIN COURSE

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MODULE 1 ETHNICITY: AN INTRODUCTION

UNIT 1 ETHNICITY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The major focus of this unit is to explore the various definitions and concepts of ethnicity as a way of preparing the ground for an adequate understanding of some of the underlining issues in ethnicity particularly as it affects group relationships in societies.

The nature and characteristics of ethnicity in the world show that ethnicity is an issue that has scarred most countries in all continents of the world. From Europe to Africa, Asia to Americas and the Middle East, the story remains the same. Such ethnic sentiments in affected countries often instigate violence. Caselli and Coleman (2012), posit that violent confrontation that goes along ethnic lines is the most apparent form of ethnic conflict, which unfortunately has claimed lives in such diverse places as the Balkans, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Indonesia, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, and several

other countries. They further to assert that in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Belgium, and many other countries rent seeking on behalf of one's ethnic group crowds out productive activities, and the threat of violence discourages investments in human and physical capital. A good example is Kenya where mutual distrust exists between over 42 ethnic nationalities.

On the other hand, Nnoli (1978) gives a clue into the origins and nature of ethnicity in Nigeria. He asserts that ethnicity developed from colonialism, and that the provenance of ethnicity was the colonial urban setting where exploited Africans experienced the racial prejudice of colonial government and its discrimination against natives in the fields of jobs, remunerations, location of housing schemes, recreational facilities, and burial grounds. From all indications, the resultant alienation and subjugation affected the subject's socio-economic and political activities. It should be reiterated that the exploitative tendency of the colonial administration and the scarcity of socio-economic and political opportunities in the colonial period generated intense elite competition. However, some other salient factors contribute to the emergence of ethnicity and also produce series of resultant negative effects following the play of ethnicity. All these would be adequately examined as we proceed further.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the basic meaning of ethnicity as a concept
- state the salience of ethnicity
- determine the roles of ethnicity in the society
- explain how groups use their ethnic identity to mobilise support
- state why ethnicity constitutes a rallying point for ethnic groups.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 What is Ethnicity?

Osaghae (1995:11) defines ethnicity as the employment or mobilisation of ethnic identity and differences to gain advantage in situation of competition, conflict or cooperation. From this definition, it could be inferred that ethnicity is neither a natural nor an accidental phenomenon, but a creation of man. It could also be regarded as an outcome of conscious effort by individuals who are involved in the task of ethnic manipulation for a known reason. However, it should be noted that ethnicity manifest itself in so many forms, and impacts on the political, economic and social life of the people.

Yinger (1994), identifies three ingredients that should be reflected in any definition of an ethnic group. First, that a group is perceived by others in the society to be different in some combination of the following traits - language, religion, race, and ancestral homeland with its related culture; secondly, that members perceive themselves as being different in a number of ways from other groups; and, thirdly, that they participate in shared activities built around their real or mythical common origins and culture.

However, given that these criteria can change, ethnicity tends to range in degree. He further noted that a society can be composed formally of equal ethnic groups or can be characterised by a major national cultural group, separated from one or more other ethnic grouping by a highly permeable boundary. In addition, one or more ethnic groups can be strongly oriented towards an outside Diaspora society, and there may be situations where one or more ethnic groups can be "subjugated" and deprived because they are minorities within the larger society and therefore having little or no power to contend with others who are perceived to be in positions of influence.

As societies change, some patterns of relationship emerge. It is most likely that boundaries become more or less permeable; equality among ethnic groups increase or decrease; orientation to outside societies may grow stronger or weaker. These patterns of intermittent shifts in configuration and the accompanying transformation in the forms of interaction and relationships between the different ethnic groups will be a crucial component in the examination of the roots and rise in incidents of conflicts involving the differentiated ethnic groups in a society. All these issues and the social challenges that they provoke will therefore always reflect in our definition of ethnicity.

Following Osaghae's position, ethnicity from all indications derives its capacity from a common ground where shared interests or commonality is found and used in response to a need to defend certain gains or an attempt to recover certain benefits which may have been lost to a more powerful group over a period of time. Ethnicity therefore provides a platform where a group is formed with the members finding some strings of commonality among themselves, which reassures individuals within such groups that they are not alone. Ethnicity also creates a sense of community and a feeling that members have some legacy they can promote not only for their own benefit, but also for the benefit of other members who will belong to the group in future.

3.2 Ethnicity: The Problems of Definition

There are a lot of problems that are associated with attempts at defining ethnicity. During the 1980s and early 1990s, there was a high level of awakening and an explosion in the growth of scholarly research on ethnicity particularly in the fields of political science, history, sociology and social anthropology. This was as a result of the complex nature of ethnicity. Ethnicity emerges through ongoing social situations, and resulting outcomes of challenges associated with group interactions. It suffices to say that the phenomenon has become increasingly visible in many societies, and is creating frictions that cannot be ignored. For instance, Cohen (1978) notes that only few of those who use the term 'ethnicity' have bothered to define it and for that reason, few definitions exist and there are evidences of disparity when one looks at the divergent analytical approaches of such definitions.

One common point of agreement is that ethnicity has to do with classifications of people as well as group relationships. However, in everyday use of the word 'ethnicity', we could infer that there is the salient issue of "majority", "minority" and "race" relations. Banton (1967) argues for instance that there is a need to distinguish between race and ethnicity. In his view, race refers to the categorisation of people, while ethnicity has to do with group identification. He further reiterated that ethnicity is generally more concerned with identification of "us", while racism is more oriented to the categorisation of "them". He noted in addition that ethnicity can assume many forms, and since ethnic ideologies tend to stress common descent among their members, the distinction between race and ethnicity is a problematic one and thus makes a precise definition of the latter more complex.

One major finding on the difficulty of defining ethnicity is that it is a dynamic concept encompassing both subjective and objective elements. Rupesinghe (2003) maintains for instance that ethnicity is the mixture of perception and external contextual reality which provides it with meaning. In political theory, "ethnicity" describes the possession of some degree of coherence by a group and perhaps only latently, of having common origins and interests. Thus, an ethnic group is not a mere aggregate of people but a self-conscious collection of people, united or closely related by shared experiences and a common history.

It is a bit more difficult to find a satisfactory definition of multi-ethnicity or multiethnic society. But the implication is that there is more than one group possessing some degree of coherence and solidarity whose members have common origins and interests which they do not share with other groups. In this sense, few nation-states are ethnically homogeneous while many are poly-ethnic in composition.

3.3 Elements of Ethnic Identity

It is common to hear people define an ethnic group as a collectivity of people who share the same primordial characteristics. Although certain elements such as common ancestry, language, and culture have been used to substantiate the claims of belonging to a particular group, the above-mentioned elements only serve to clarify what people consider to be the identity of individuals. This, as a matter of fact, could be described as social identification based on the presumption of shared history and common cultural inheritance going by what people say about the group to which they belong. In some situations, people use identity to make themselves fit into certain social system or social class. While looking at ethnic relations in Bolivia, Rupesinghe and Rubio (1994) pointed out that identity defines to a great extent, people's social relationship in that system. To them the use of identity for social manipulations has indeed generated serious problems wherein people have tried to cut away from their ancestral link in order to fulfill conditions for a much more inclusive societal belongingness.

So far, one of the basic ways identified in defining the belongingness of people to certain ethnic group is by the use of primordial considerations. This practice seeks to use past relationships and history of the people to trace their roots to a particular background. This as a matter of fact, is often substantiated by different myths of origin derived from oral traditions passed down from generation to generation. In time past, this phenomenon has generated a lot of controversy, particularly when groups try to lay claims to certain advantages and in the process, they come up with different history to gain support for their claims. Certain groups have become assimilated through past relationships which were so cordial that it has become very difficult to separate the groups from one another. This is because over time, there has been an intense culture mix and a high level of social change leading to adaptation. It is therefore not surprising that we find groups who are differentiated in several respects being more alike in culture and tradition. All in all, primordialism has helped people in tracing their identity and using this as an avenue to become embedded in a social system.

3.4 Applications of Ethnicity

3.4.1 Political Applications of Ethnicity

In any political system where ethnic consciousness defines participation and how much advantage that could be realised by applying it, manifestation of rivalry amongst various groups within such a system is intense and targeted to produce certain predetermined outcomes. People in different parts of the world have applied ethnicity in different ways,

and as such, it has become a tool for realising individual and group objectives. Several groups have been denied the right of political participation because they are from ethnic groups which were considered to be minority in comparison to others or in competition with whose interest are seen as preeminent on account of their status as a majority or advantaged group.

Similarly, some other groups have succeeded in taking advantage of their large number to suppress others in order to secure power or some other forms of economic, political or social advantage. Ethnicity therefore remains a veritable weapon of oppression and repression in politics. In Nigeria for example, ethnic and regional polarisation went a long way to savage the first republic (Suberu 1994). Amoo (1997) also observes that events in Africa since independence indicates that during periods of political crises, ethnic ties are by far more important to individuals than civil ties. He draws our attention to the fact that the two forces that operate at the core of politics in Africa are ethnic groups and political parties. To him, ethnicity mostly provided the focus for "party loyalty" especially during the early years of political independence, and that on the basis of the social patterns of voting behaviour in Africa, the two variables — ethnic groups and political parties — are overlaps. The use of ethnicity as a political resource is evident enough from all indications, and it has also become so glaring that ethnicity has been invented mostly for political ends.

3.4.2 Economic Applications of Ethnicity

Another critical issue common to ethnicity is that of resource or economic accumulation. Ethnicity has been used severally to corner economic resources. Most times, large ethnic groups have used the advantage of size to deprive others of such resources. A good number of manipulations have taken place, which are practically aimed at securing economic advantage for such ethnic groups. This is why it is often argued that intense and sometimes brutally violent conflict over resources stem from denial of the rights and privileges of some minority groups. In some situations, states have been accused of uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources for the benefit of some majority group, without a corresponding improvement in the living standards of other people who are considered to be minorities. This explains why aggression towards the state is sometimes targeted at those who occupy the seats of government because some ethnic groups dominate. For example, different minority ethnic groups from the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria agitated many years for resource control. This has contributed significantly to the occurrence of conflict and violence in that region of Nigeria. Apart from grievances towards the state, individual ethnic

groups in the region have also been in constant conflict over the ownership of land which is perceived to have natural resources.

3.4.3 Social Applications of Ethnicity

The use of ethnicity has social implications, which tend to affect relationships between groups in plural societies. When ethnicity becomes so entrenched in a system, it largely affects social and societal relationships, and this invariably affects social development in such a society. Oftentimes, memories and enemy images define how people from different groups relate with one another. This may derive its force from deep-rooted conflicts that borders mostly on deprivations and unmet needs. Amoo sees some conflicts in Africa as rooted in basic human needs for identity, security, recognition, participation and autonomy. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was as a result of unhealthy relationship between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis which resulted from manipulations by Belgian colonial administrators. Incidentally, these two major ethnic groups are from the same ancestry but the colonial administrators in a bid to differentiate those who have property from those who do not, used the description "Hutu" and "Tutsi" as a way of demarcation. This was the origin of the brutal friction between the two groups that resulted in the massacre of more than 800,000 Tutsis in 1994.

3.5 Ethnicity in African Politics

In terms of nation building and the creation of a conducive and enabling environment to open up African states to democratic processes, the question of ethnicity and management of ethnic relations among various ethnic groups in each country within the continent has been in the front burner of discourses on Africa's political development for decades. For instance, since most African countries gained independence, most governments in the continent have always explored the best way to tame negative ethnicity. However, in practical terms, the overall response of African governments to ethnicity and the conflicts that they tend to trigger from time to time has been reactive rather than proactive. Attempts were made in various states within the continent to introduce one-party system with the purpose of reducing ethnic tensions and conflicts. Unfortunately, the outcomes have not been impressive as minority and majority politics continues to dominate political discourses in most nations on the continent.

Nevertheless, the collapse of communism and the failure of Eastern Europe's one-party systems have had a great impact on the interrelationships among African ethnic groups and on African nation states. In most parts of Africa today, ethnic nationalism and ethnicity

have become important political issues as many ethnic groups are struggling to move from being groups of common culture to groups of political will and are striving to give territorial expression to the inalienable sovereignty of the groups to which they belong. Ethnic nationalism is thus gaining ground in Africa and demonstrating that people who share one or more cultural traits become conscious of their internal cohesion and difference from others.

3.6 Ethnic Identity Formation in Africa

Attempts by some European powers to graft the Western system upon Africa have resulted in dismal failures. This is evident in the continuing struggle by many post-colonial African states for domestic survival and international relevance. This pathetic condition was not entirely unpredictable given the role of ethnicity in pre-colonial society. Pre-colonial Africa included hundreds of societies ranging from small bands of hunters and gatherers to large, agricultural-based communities with highly sophisticated and centralised political structures dominated by chiefs and kings. Most of these societies were held together by a strong sense of kinship and common territory.

According to Thompson, despite their diverse forms of social, political, and economic organisation, pre-colonial Africa had several features in common. These included the fact that each society identified with a 'homeland,' a specific territory not defined in the legalistic sense of a modern state boundary, but in the equally forceful sense of a 'common land' occupied since the beginning of the 'people' themselves. Even more important, as far as the ethnicity is concerned, Africans attached to each place an emotional and cultural significance that could only be regarded as sacred (Thompson, 1989). This realm – the subjective domain of emotion, culture, and spirituality – must have escaped the attention and understanding of colonial empires and officials.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Ethnicity is a very complex phenomenon. Like any other social phenomenon, ethnicity is not absolute. It alters its form, its place and its role in the life of society. New elements appear in its content and it is linked to other social phenomenon. For example, in our present day society, ethnicity poses such a challenge to national and social development processes that makes it necessary for special attention to be focused on the elucidation of the relationship between the class and ethnic elements of society.

5.0 SUMMARY

The introduction of this course is meant to bring to the knowledge of the student the fact that ethnicity is a phenomenon associated with the interactions of different ethnic groups. Ethnic groups are social formations distinguished by the communal character of their boundaries. The relevant communal factors may be language, religion, race, and ancestral homeland with its related culture. These elements have been used to substantiate claims of belonging to a particular group.

Ethnicity exists only within a political society consisting of diverse ethnic groupings. Thus, political application of ethnicity result in rivalry among various ethnic groups and some have succeeded in using ethnicity as a veritable weapon of suppression and repression to clamp down on others, in order to secure power in political situations. Conflict is an important aspect of ethnicity. This is inevitable under conditions of interethnic competition for scarce resources, particularly in societies where inequality is acceptable as natural and wealth is greatly esteemed. In an economic situation, ethnicity is used to secure economic advantage; while the application of ethnicity in a social context inform the nature of relationships between social groups and reflect how people in different groups relate with one another.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. What do you understand by ethnicity?
2. List and explain the various applications of ethnicity known to you.
3. Examine the problems associated with the definition of ethnicity.

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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UNIT 2 ETHNICITY: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Conceptual issues in ethnicity refer to those salient issues which are commonly raised when discussing ethnicity. They are worthy of note in this work because of their importance to the central notion of ethnicity, which deals with "identity". One may then begin to ask to what extent we can say that ethnicity helps in reshaping the society positively or causing frictional change which is detrimental to the society. These and more other critical issues in ethnicity would be discussed so as to have a broad perspective on issues that border on group relationships.

For the purpose of this study, concepts that are frequently mentioned in relation to ethnicity are identity, minority, consciousness, agitation and relative deprivation will be highlighted so as to have abroad understanding of issues involved in the study of ethnicity. These will be highlighted so as to have broad understanding of issues involved in the study of ethnicity. These concepts would also provide for us the necessary guide in a general view of ethnicity as one of the contextual basis of conflict.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define ethnicity
- discuss the relationship between ethnicity and identity.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Conceptual Issues in Ethnicity

i. **Identity** as a basic standpoint in ethnicity has to do with the "consciousness" of being different, and simply connotes separateness, consciousness of being different from the other persons or groups either within the same society where they all live or elsewhere. On the other hand, the feeling that other people elsewhere are part of one's group identity cannot also be overruled. Basically, the whole idea is mostly about claims to certain peculiarities, which becomes a veritable platform for co-opting others and gaining support. People have used all sorts of indices to showcase the fact that they are actually not the same as other people around them. Some of these indexes are to be found in the various theories of ethnicity through which scholars have attempted to make sense of the phenomenon. These are found in the theories of primordialism, constructivism, and instrumentalism.

The primordialist theory of ethnicity attempts to trace the identity of individuals or groups by seeking to know their "roots". This simply means the source of origin of such people. For instance the Yorubas have so many groups who are different when it comes to language, and ways of life, but there is a belief that all Yoruba peoples are from the same ancestry - Oduduwa.

In the constructivist theory of ethnicity, identity is said to be constructed. This implies that some people see themselves as belonging to the society where they were born into, or where they have lived for a long time. A close example is a situation where someone who was born in New York City, sees himself or herself as a New-Yorker.

Those who apply the instrumentalist theory of ethnicity make claims to be a part of a society due to certain gains which they feel they would enjoy by claiming to be a member. According to Johnson's *History of the Yoruba*, a good number of the people of Ilorin prefer to be addressed as Fulanis although history has it that they are actually Yoruba people. Insisting on this instrumental definition of self enables Ilorin people to be partakers of what they consider as political advantage that Hausa/Fulani people enjoy in the Nigerian political system. This is not only peculiar to Africa, but a general practice across the world.

ii. Ethnic Minority: The term "minority" is another important concept in studies of ethnicity. It remains a contextual phenomenon, which has generated so many questions. As defined by the United Nations,

> *minority refers to a group that is numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position whose members possess ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population, and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, tradition, religion or language* (cited in Thornbery, 1980).

From this definition, one could infer that minorities, as they are usually called, are intentionally incapacitated by those who have all it takes politically, economically and otherwise to relegate them to a status of lesser privilege. Oftentimes, it is evident in all the stratum of the society. Contrary to the notion that minorities are always at a disadvantage, there are some instances where minorities are favoured at the expense of larger groups. This in fact became one of the key issues in Rwanda which underlined the Hutu/Tutsi rivalry that led to the 1994 genocide (Seyoum, 1997).

iii. Consciousness and Agitations: Once a group perceives an action which it defines as oppression against it from others, particularly those who claim to be in possession of power, they are naturally stirred up to repel such claims and also mobilise members of their group to see reasons why they must resist such oppression. This, as a matter of fact, often results in resistance and protest and the tabling of certain demands in order to address the salient issues such as:

- recognition
- active participation and proportional representation
- equal rights in resource allocation and access.

iv. Relative Deprivation: When we talk of relative deprivation, what we are referring to in practical terms is deliberate action aimed at preventing others from enjoying what they are entitled to. This invariably connotes denial, discrimination, and repression. Those who experience this situation react violently when their complaints are not attended to. Most agitators in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria insist that deprivation in terms of

inequitable sharing of proceeds from oil resources has been a major bone of contention because when cocoa, groundnut, and other cash crops were the mainstay of Nigeria's economy, the regions from where they were produced procured extensive benefits. However, some other nations of the world have similar issues of deprivation to contend with, most especially in the area of resource sharing. Sudan for instance gets the bulk of its resources from the southern part of that country, but the people from the south have remained impoverished, while development seems to tilt more to the northern part.

3.2 Ethnicity as a Contested Concept

There are a number of difficulties with using the concept of ethnicity in the quest to understand and address conflicts between human groups. In the first place, it is not always clear what people mean when they use the terms "ethnic group," "ethnicity," and "ethnic conflict." In several cases, concepts such as nationality, tribes, and clan, have been used interchangeably to refer to an ethnic group, and it is therefore very difficult to differentiate between them. A common definition is that an ethnic group is a collectivity of people who share the same primordial characteristics such as common ancestry, language, and culture. People have also included religion in the category of shared culture. Ethnicity then refers to the feeling that one has about oneself and others that theoretically emanates from membership of an ethnic group. For this reason, ethnic conflict has come to mean antagonism and clashes between individuals and groups based on perceived differences' in their ethnic identities.

A question that then arises from such definitions of "ethnic group" is whether people must share commonalties in all conditions mentioned in order to be members of the same ethnic group or to share the same ethnic identity. There are instances where belonging to the same religion is sufficient reason to classify people as members of an ethnic group, although they might be different in all other areas. In some cases, language has been used as the criterion for determining membership of an ethnic group. A good example is the popular usage of the Hausa language in the northern parts of Nigeria even where there are hundreds of groups who claim to have their own identities (Gwari, Nupe, Fulani, Kanuri, Tiv, Kamberi, Jukun, Tarok, Berom, Idoma, Angas, etc.). But there are also cases where commonality in language and religion has not signified membership of the same ethnic group. In cases where groups have cohabited for a long period of time, one may find relationships in one of these ethnic criteria - religion, language, culture, or ancestry, but they will have differences in other areas.

It has been argued by Hymes (1968:1220) and others like Nadel (1947: 13) that rather than see membership of an ethnic group as being determined by objective factors like sharing common primordial characteristics, one should pay more attention to subjective factors such as perception, feeling or sense of belongingness, self-identification, and so on. They are of the opinion that regardless of the individuals' primordial commonalities, they could claim membership of an ethnic group as long as they feel and act as a member and this self-definition is accepted as valid by the group in question. Is it not possible that people could share common interests, aspirations, psychological orientations without necessarily belonging to the same ethnic group? If so, why should this be characterised as "ethnic"? What happens in situations where a group refuses to accept the membership of an individual who feels and acts as if he/she belongs to the group?

In conclusion, the definition of ethnic groups and the distinction between people based on ethnic criteria is complicated, inconsistent, and perplexing. This has led to great controversy concerning the identification and measurement of ethnicity. It means in essence, that we cannot develop effective strategies for resolving a problem if we do not understand it well enough.

3.3 Ethnicity and Identity

According to Repusinghe (2003), the search for identity is a powerful psychological driving force which has propelled human civilisations across the ages. Identity is evocative: we are dealing with a myth or an imagined community which has all the power necessary for political mobilisation after all. Identity has also been defined as an abiding sense of selfhood, the core of which makes life predictable to an individual (Northrop, 1989: 55). To have no ability to anticipate events is essentially to experience terror. Identity can be conceived of as more than a psychological sense of self; it encompasses a sense that one is safe in the world physically, psychologically, socially, even spiritually.

Events that threaten to invalidate the core sense of identity will elicit defensive responses aimed at avoiding psychic and/or physical annihilation. Ethnicity and identity are two concepts which are used to explain the notion that one individual or one group is different from another. The factor of identity has to have gone through several manipulations for claims of separateness to be substantiated. It is when there is a bid to gain certain advantages that the issue of identity becomes more prominent in group relationships. As Ikime rightly stated in his 1985 inaugural lecture, identity emerged as a critical issue at the emergence of the colonial state of Nigeria. Before this event, it never occurred to the various ethnic groups to engage in any unhealthy

speculations of identity. Though people identify themselves as different, such action was not geared towards separation in practical terms.

3.4 Fluidity of Ethnic Identity

Identity in some situations is fluid in nature. By this we mean that individuals may want to claim affiliation to a particular group based on certain factors, which may include a long term association with members of the group or residence in the locality where the group is located. This is largely determined by acceptance of the group with which such individual is trying to identify. However, we cannot rule out the fact that some groups are unwilling to accept certain people as a member if such persons are not related by blood or birth to the group in question. In Ibadanland for instance, indigeneity claims largely depends on the length of an individual's stay, but when it come to serious issues which is related to chieftaincy, there might be some problem of belongingness.

4.0 CONCLUSION

This unit laid emphasis on those conceptual issues which are mostly used when discussing ethnicity. Most scholars on the concept of ethnicity agree that it refers to the social elaboration of collective identities whereby individuals see themselves as one among others like themselves. Collectively, people whose boundaries may be loosely or tightly defined distinguish themselves from other people. In essence, the understanding of these conceptual issues would help the reader to have a broader perspective on the issues that borders group relationships.

Consciousness and agitations are seen as political expressions of a group, which comes to the fore once a group perceives an action of segregation against it from another group. In relative deprivation, a group is been deprived of something that will improve their wellbeing or deliberate actions aiming at preventing others from enjoying what they are entitled to. This invariably connotes denial, discrimination, and repression.

5.0 SUMMARY

Ethnicity does not exist in pure form. It is always closely associated with conceptual issues such as minority politics, ethnic consciousness and minority agitations, relative deprivation, and structural violence all of which constitute important ingredients of ethnic politics. Members of an ethnic group are conscious of belonging to an ethnic group, and group members identify with each other through a common heritage often consisting of a common language, a common culture and ideology

that stresses common ancestry. Minority issue in ethnicity is not necessarily a matter of numerically minority, it may include ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population. A group can become frustrated and aggressive when an action is directed towards preventing such a person from achieving something. In summary, the above discussed conceptual issues would invariably help the student in understanding the course.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. List and explain conceptual issues in ethnicity.
2. Ethnicity is a contested concept. Discuss.
3. What is the role of identity in ethnicity?

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UNIT 3 ETHNICITY, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALISM

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Ethnic nationalism has been politicised in various parts of Africa to the extent that leaders have to rely on the backing of their own ethnic group; and if a leader is seen as not adequately representing the interests of his own people, he or she is likely to be replaced by someone who will better represent interests of the ethnic group. This means that one's loyalty to his/her ethnic group or region can offer protection, but at the same time, it also has the potential to create divisions in the society. Ethnic divisions have impacted negatively on nationalism and development in Africa. Countries like Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Liberia, Burundi, Uganda, Kenya and recently Sudan, including others have had their share of ethnic rivalries that resulted in large scale violence, civil wars, and even genocide.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- identify different positions of individuals on ethnicity
- state how this has succeeded in shaping the various issues that have to do with ethnicity and nationalism
- explain the linkages between ethnicity and nationalism.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Ethnicity: Insider/Outsider Perspectives

The perspective of out-groups and in-groups or those that are often referred to as outsiders and insiders is so important in studies of ethnicity. As a matter of fact, their narrations of events and their significance cannot be analysed in the same way largely because each perception is largely shaped by experience. This is why an average European will see African traditional practices as barbaric. One cannot blame them for taking such positions or interpreting such practices the way they do because their society is culturally different, and as such, they can only measure what is good or bad with the lenses of their own culture.

In Nigeria and some other countries of the world, there have been a good number of conflicts, which arose as a result of ethnic factors. 'Outsiders' who are not there when certain activities or situations unfold may find it difficult to understand such situation or activity. This gives rise to a lot of misjudgments and wrong assumptions. When social relationships are approached with this kind of wrong notion, there is bound to be problems. However, it is only those who understand the situation surrounding a social event or practice that can better explain why things happen the way they do. It should be emphasised that it takes those who are close to the situation to attain a better understanding of it.

3.2 Ethnicity and Group Dynamics

Ethnicity and its ascription of identity, roots the individual in a special history. It is a unique heritage that provides support for his claims to certain advantages, which could not have been realised without affiliation to a particular social group. In most political systems where there seem to be some degree of increased centralisation of power, groups are always in contest with one another to gain access to the centre where the widening of the scope of corruption, increased suppression, the expansion and intensification of the process of class formation, the emergence of class factions, massive changes in the evolution of new identities, redefinition of pre-colonial and colonial identities, and the manipulation of these identities for political and other purposes is at play. Added to all this is the impact of the political, economic and ecological crises of the state on ethnicity and its growth.

Peoples often seek to resist oppressive state presence by embracing new identities that are sometimes different from their pre-colonial identities. They have overwhelmingly embraced primary identities such as ethnic and religious identities. Their preference for primary identities is

because of the generalised and cultural nature of the threats that they face. Such threats demand nothing but the crystallisation of the self holistically. This is precisely what primary identities do. However, as self-reflexivity demands, this type of primary identity takes itself and all its claims for granted but does not take rival identity claims seriously except in the confrontation by which it determines and invigorates itself by negation.

Nnoli (1995) is of the opinion that when the struggle against state violence is waged, ethnic conflict is sometimes directed against wrong enemies, namely other ethnic groups rather than the rampaging undemocratic state. However, the ethnicity that emanates from these rapidly changing national and global conditions is fiercely competitive and intolerant of ethnic minority views and feelings. It is not aimed at promoting production and commerce as in the pre-colonial past but the control and monopolisation of power and material resources. It seeks advantage in the socio-economic and political scheme of things. These characteristics are reinforced by the partisan nature of the African state in factional disputes, the extensive intervention of the state in economic and social life that makes the state a strategic instrument for power and wealth in Africa.

Thus, one can understand the intensity of struggles among ethnic groups to control and dominate the state. The exclusive and oppositional nature of contemporary ethnicity in Africa makes it inherently prone to conflict. Contemporary ethnicity emerged in response to state violence and thrives on it. Quite often, the incumbent government is on the other side of the conflict. This is reinforced by the ethnic composition of the government that controls state power. Thus, the state can bring its full weight into an ethnic confrontation on the side of a dominant group. The coercive apparatuses of the state such as the military, police and intelligence agencies often become involved, thereby raising the level of violence. For example, the participation of the state in ethnic conflict in Rwanda made possible the genocide in that country.

3.3 Citizenship and Ethnicity

The liberal notion of citizenship is part of the formation of ethnic or national unity and homogeneity, which may or may not involve the assimilation or combination of various ethnic groups. It is clear then why appeals to ethnic sentiment within a community are illegitimate in the liberal scheme; they destroy the illusion of unity that liberalism helped to invent. Citizenship is associated with a special nation, and removes internal differentiation, within the imagined community, while at the same time it separates particular nations from others.

3.4 Ethnicity, Nationalism and Ethnic Nationalism

As have been stated earlier on in this work, Osaghae (1995:11) defines ethnicity as the employment or mobilisation of ethnic identity and differences to gain advantage in situation of competition, conflict or cooperation. It can also be said to be categorisation of a group of people who tend to have myths of common origin, historical background and experience, culture, language, and sometimes religion. According to Joireman (2003:10), "ethnicity is subjective and all about the politics of belonging." It is constructed of memories and a sense of solidarity. Emotional ties lead to a political identity that can be strong enough to lead people to take up arms against the state or another group."

3.4.1 Nationalism

Nationalism is characterised principally by a feeling of community among a people, based on common descent, language, and religion. Nationalism is a politicised form of ethnicity and there is homogeneity between the two concepts. There exists another form of nationalism, namely: cultural nationalism. In this form of nationalism, you find a group of people who insists on a recognition and protection of their culture. For example, the Quebecois Movement in Canada has consistently maintained the French cultural identity even in the midst of British conquest of the French in Canada. Poverty or quest for resources is not the reason for their nationalism. The aspiration of the Quebecois Movement is to retain the French cultural identity. However, sometimes the state and individuals erroneously try to justify violence against others on the grounds of nationalism.

3.4.2 Ethnic Nationalism

Ethnic Nationalism is an identity based on objective criteria, such as language. Those included in a group fall into it almost by default. At the same time, those that find themselves outside the group do not have the means to join the group. Individuals are unable to choose their ethnic group but are assigned their ethnic groups from birth. Ethnic nationalism calls on mobilisation of those people whose characteristics are chosen for them. Ethnic nationalism does not necessarily follow the lines of the state; therefore, multiple ethnic nations within a state can lead to the fracturing of the state, as seen in the case of former Yugoslavia (Joireman, 2003: 25). Therefore, ethnic nationalism is the political dimension of ethnicity.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Neither nationalism nor ethnicity is vanishing as part of an obsolete traditional order. Both are part of a modem set of categorical identities invoked by elites and other participants in political and social struggles. These categorical identities also shape everyday life, offering both tools for grasping pre-existing homogeneity and difference and for constructing specific versions of such identities. While it is impossible to dissociate nationalism entirely from ethnicity, it is equally impossible to explain it simply as a continuation of ethnicity or a simple reflection of common history or language. Numerous dimensions of modem social and cultural change, notably state building (along with war and colonialism), individualism, and the integration of large-scale webs of indirect relationships also serve to make both nationalism and ethnicity salient (Calhoun, 1993: 211).

5.0 SUMMARY

Numerous individuals and schools of thought have expressed opinions on the nature and dynamics of ethnicity. These opinions and arguments have characterised the discourse on the interaction between groups of people or minority-state relation in a plural society. When a group is prevented from having access to some political or social goodies for which it feels it is entitled to, it becomes aggressive and tries to mobilise its members using ethnic sentiments.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. What is the meaning of instrumental perspective on ethnicity?
2. What is the nexus between ethnicity and nationalism?
3. Why would people vigorously pursue an ethnic instead of national agenda?

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UNIT 4 ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Nnoli is of the view that colonial incursions exploited and compounded inter-ethnic relations in Africa (1998:417). He pointed at colonial influence in countries like Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mauritania, Kenya, Tanzania, Zaire, and Zimbabwe where colonial powers utilised the segmentation of ethnic groups to their advantage. The divide-and-rule policies of colonial administrators assured the docility of different ethnic groups and thus shielded them from the menace of insurrection. In other words, it was feasible to divide ethnic groups and pit them against each other so that they could focus their energies on fighting one another rather than on overthrowing colonial governments. This was also the strategy utilised by the former apartheid regime which held sway in South Africa until early 1990s.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss some events in some countries in Africa and examine how ethnicity has affected the polity
- identify the responses from different quarters to manipulations which arose from the play of ethnicity
- state the role colonialism has played in directing the course of ethnic relationships in the identified countries.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Ethnic Integration in Post-Colonial African Society

In the early period of independence in most African countries, laws were promulgated to promote national integration. Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania for example have constitutional provisions which considered ethnic accommodation, such as the Federal Character in Nigeria, *Ubuntu* in Tanzania, and *Negritude* in Senegal. For instance, South Africa portrays a good example where the shift towards municipalism has contributed to social development and peace building. District and municipal councils have increasingly emphasised in national policy making (Braathen and Hellevik, 2008:21). However, despotism, dictatorship and autocracy in places like Uganda, Zaire and Ethiopia dwarfed and transformed ethnicity and ethnic nationalism into ingredient for chaos and instability. According to Bates (1983) ethnicity can provide an attractive basis for coalition formation in purely distributional conflicts over political goods. Bates argued that African ethnic groups as opposed to the much more local, pre-colonial tribal formations developed as political coalitions for gaining access to the "goods of modernity" that were dispensed by the colonial and post-colonial states.

Diamond and Plattner (1994) noted that many of the countries in Africa came to experience challenges in diverse ways from imperfection to corruption. Nigeria as an example had numerous ethnic groups, which were at loggerheads with one another as a result of unequal economic and political access. This affected political processes and led to serious ethnic conflicts. In a bid to address the question of unequal representation and development, colonial rulers were propelled to divide Nigeria into three federal regions. This division, in practical sense, did not solve the problem as the action led to the lifting and creation of overwhelming advantages for the three major ethnic groups, that is, Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba, while leaving other groups subservient. However, subsequent division and creation of states, local governments and other political units did not solve the problem as more minorities emerged from such creations.

Nigeria has faced serious ethnic challenges and has had to contend with ethnic rivalry and structural imbalances since independence. In view of this trend, there have been series of constitutional amendments and policy formulations, which are all meant to address the problem. We cannot but mention amongst others the policy of federal character, which was practically aimed at promoting equal benefits for all the constituent ethnic groups that makes up the country.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, there have been a number of ethnic conflicts and disturbances, which led to several civil unrests. The political situation has remained chaotic as a result of rebellion embarked on by different warring groups. This atmosphere of rebellion had adversely worked against development and national integration in former Zaire. The nature of personal rule in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo DRC) was such that political office was perceived as private wealth, wherein there was little or no distinction between the person and the political role or between personal finance and those of the state. Given this situation, some ethnic groups have enjoyed privileges by virtue of their participation in government, which opened to them several opportunities. Ethnicity there and then became an effective means to gain access to the state and the basis to organise resistance and protest for political actions.

It has been argued that common background, loyalty and kinship have become criteria for participation in government. Late President Mobutu Sese Seko's response to opposition was the creation of mechanisms that weakened such moves. The decades of misrule and conflicts were followed by unrelenting political crisis dotted by mutinies and absolute collapse of the political system. In October 1995, Cote D'Ivoire witnessed ethnic massacres in Gagnoa and its environs where about 16 people were slain and about 20 others were injured in the opposition stronghold (Attah-Poku, 1998:72).

Sudan, one of the most conflict ridden countries in Africa had gone through a lot of trying times as a result of ethnic manipulations. After two years of independence, the government which was set up by the British was overthrown by a military coup, which led to the emergence of General Ibrahim Abooud, as the leader of a centralised system of governance, which a practically aimed to crush opposition in the South and promote Arabic identity and ethnicity. Several policies were made to further suppress and impoverish the southern province. This continued for a long period of time and generated several conflicts. The main pattern among consecutive political regimes in Khartoum has been to use all measures to create policies that accentuate Islamic law, which to a large extent aroused fears among the predominantly animist and Christian southerners. A referendum was conducted in January 2011 to decide whether or not South Sudan would become a country on its own. However, success of the referendum as peaceful as it was, recorded over 98 percent thereby automatically granting South Sudan the much desired independence with Juba as the capital and largest city of the Republic of South Sudan.

However, similar situations of ethnic rivalry have been found in Ethiopia, Rwanda and Burundi, with many intergroup problems over the

years. Although Ethiopia did not experience colonialism in the strict sense of it, the nature of the Ethiopian state is that which exhibited seclusion, where certain voices were given prominence while others were silenced or muted. The ruling elite were drawn mainly from Amharic speakers who dominated the Ethiopian state so much that Amharic culture and language were presented as synonymous with the Ethiopian state while other ethnic groups were considered as clusters of people without culture, language, and by definition without influence and power. This invariably became a conflict-generating factor amongst the different ethnic groups in the country. Indeed, the centralisation of power coupled with ethnic dominance brought the question of ethnicity and national self-determination to the limelight.

Rwanda and Burundi have also been portrayed as theatres of ethnic conflicts. These two countries have ghastly images of death and suffering which has been attributed to tribal animosity, which had its root in the history of past and present relationships. As a matter of fact, colonial influence caused a lot of imbalance between the two ethnic groups in Rwanda, namely Hutu and Tutsi. Before the colonial encounter, there had been Hutu social institutions and Tutsi kingdoms. At the time when Belgians took over control of the former German colonies in 1916, the colonial territories of "Ruanda-Urundi" had the Hutu majority accounting for 85 per cent of the population and the politically dominant Tutsi minority with 15 per cent of the population. This was used by the Belgians to administer the state structure, while the monarchies were dissolved. With the removal of the Belgian military support, the struggle for power took an ethnic dimension, and later generated severe crises in Rwanda and Burundi. The most popular of these crises was the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which saw the extermination of almost a million Tutsi and hundreds of moderate Hutu.

3.2 Manipulation of Ethnicity

Here, we shall try to look at events in some of the African countries listed to understand how ethnicity has been manipulated, for what purpose, and as well as the identity of those behind such manipulations. It should be reiterated that the exclusive and oppositional nature of contemporary ethnicity in Africa makes it inherently prone to conflict. This emerged in response to state violence and thrives on it. Quite often the incumbent government is on the other side of the protagonists of conflict. This is usually reinforced by the ethnic composition of the government officials who control state power. Thus, the state can itself become a party to ethnic confrontation such that the coercive apparatuses of the state such as the military, police and intelligence units may become involved, raising the level of violence that may be

witnessed. In fact, the participation of the state in ethnic conflict in Rwanda made possible the genocide in that country.

In the belief that it enjoys preponderant force in a conflict situation, the government often rejects overtures for mediation and other peaceful modes of conflict resolution. It often invokes the now outdated principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states in order to prevent external mediation. It only changes its mind when it comes to realise that it may lose the struggle. By then, several factors that fuel violence would have complicated the situation. These include increased distrust, negative anticipation of generalised harm from the other side, placing all the guilt for the conflict on the other side, increased identification of the other side with evil; and increased refusal to empathise with the other side. (Spillman and Spillman, 1991: 57-58).

One of the possible consequences of such situation is the intrusion of irrationality into ethnic antagonism, culminating in an increasingly intense spiral of self-confirming hostile suspicions, counteractions and expectations that are virtually unrelated to the initial cause of antagonism which may increase the possibility of ethnic violence. Under the circumstance, the ethnic factor assumes a self-fulfilling and self-confirming dynamic of its own that culminates in ethnic violence (Alexander, 1938). Fear of subjugation and extermination ensures that ethnic groups make radical demands and escalate the conflict through the use of violence (UNDIR, 1995:50). The most extreme demand is for the ethnic homogenisation of society within a particular territory, which can sometimes lead to forced assimilation. In extreme cases, it may lead to the expulsion or extermination of other groups in a program of ethnic cleansing.

The world community has good reasons to worry about ethnic violence. Such violence has a more destructive character than other forms of violence. It is a messy and no-holds-barred affair in which human lives are greatly devalued. Between 1945 and 1990, for example, ethnic violence caused greater loss of lives worldwide than all other forms of deadly conflicts combined (Stavenhagen, 1990:76). Violation of human rights is of particularly high gravity in conflicts involving ethnic violence (Newland, 1993). On the part of the perpetrators and victims alike, a certain xenophobic collectivism or solidarity is associated with ethnic violence. It involves a collective sense of belonging, mission, self-realisation and self-affirmation. There is a feeling on the part of the individuals of seizing their destiny in their own hands which can be likened in some sense to the dynamics of mob action. Every individual is turned into a soldier by the sole virtue of his or her group identity.

Thus one can understand the intensity of response to perceived injury by members of ethnic groups, up to and including the unleashing of extreme violence in such places as Rwanda, Burundi, Kaduna (Nigeria), and the Rift Valley (Kenya). The aggressive and murderous ethnic militiaman may even believe that his very existence is threatened by the perceived injury to his ethnic group. Similarly, members of the group tend to identify with their co-ethnics. Hence, a poor villager believes that a political office holder from his/her village represents his/her own share of the national cake even though he/she may never receive any material reward from the appointee.

How do we explain this intensity of ethnic violence? Once people are mobilised on the basis of primary identity, the conflict is necessarily intense because they are inclined to believe that they are defending their whole way of life. The tragic enormity of this point is clearly evident in Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, Kosovo, Algeria and Sudan. What makes identity-based conflicts so violent is the way in which the issues in the dispute are emotionally charged. They go right to the heart of what gives the people their sense of themselves by defining a person's bond with his or her community and defining the source of satisfaction for her or his need for identity.

Above all, ethnicity has the power to totalize and transcend other loyalties and obligations. When people's multiple identities are narrowed down to a single focus, social divisions become deeper, more rigid and deeply emotional. In such a condition, identity does not merely distinguish groups but may also cause one group to dehumanise and demonise another. In other words, the problem with ethnic conflicts is that some of the key issues in it are not about material resources that can be negotiated. They often involve status, culture and identity. However, identity and beliefs are non-negotiable. They involve symbolic, cultural and moral values that are not amenable to compromise. Therefore, ethnic conflicts are much less amenable to compromise, negotiation or trade-off. A conflict that threatens the very essence of a people's identity is much more difficult to manage than other types of conflicts.

3.3 Ethnicity as Engine of National Integration

Ethnicity can be a viable tool for national integration if it is used positively because no two ethnic groups are the same in terms of endowment and resources. When such different groups come together to contribute their peculiar advantages to the polity for the benefit of all, there is bound to be mutual benefit. On the contrary, what we find is ethnic mobilisation, evidences of distrust, and different types of demands, which can raise violence amongst different ethnic groups. As previously argued, the state which is expected to be neutral has often

contributed to escalation of hostilities due to her exhibition of biases in addressing issues.

In addition, state centralisation and homogenisation policies, and state growth in general, have the tendency to generate grievances among peripheral ethnic groups whose cultures and political institutions are threatened. It is said that one of the explanations for the absence of ethnic conflict in Australia is the great equality of citizenship rights between the different ethnic groups which live in that country (Medrano, Discussion Paper Series - No. 13). As suggested by Lijphart (1968) "consociational politics" or political arrangements that promote bargaining and representation of conflicting interests can reduce the potential for violence.

3.4 Ethnicity as Threat to National Integration

According to Clifford Geertz (1963), the democratisation of political life resulted in class politics and ethnic politics. The artificial character of newly created states after decolonisation, their lack of a tradition of civil politics, absence of a national market and the absence of a well-developed class system resulted in the primacy of ethnic politics. Gradually, ethnic politics became a mobilisation force on a par with class politics. This situation has continued to generate different reactions as time went on. Also, there could be a serious threat to national integration where "cultural division of labour" is allowed to thrive. In this situation, one dominant ethnic group monopolises the good positions and a subordinate ethnic group is relegated to the bad positions. This results in ethnic demands, that tend to disrupt the social order.

4.0 CONCLUSION

This unit has looked at the influence of ethnicity in some countries. The origin of ethnicity dates back to colonial period. It has the capability of manipulating the affairs of a nation if not put under check. Ethnic groups translate collective dreams into reality through mobilisation. Ethnic rivalry in Africa has become one of the contending issues. For instance, Professor Chinua Achebe described the Nigeria-Biafra war as a war that was precipitated by the bile of ethnic hatred, and created a clique of military class and political adventurers that ruined the country. The situations in most African countries are avoidable only when they produce transparent leadership.

5.0 SUMMARY

Responses to ethnic-oriented issues have been problematic in most African countries considering the diverse ethnic groups on the continent. This unit examined colonial roots of ethnicity with real case examples from various African countries.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. To what extent did colonialism contribute in shaping ethnic identity?
2. What is the nexus between ethnicity and identity – based conflicts in Africa?
3. How would you describe ethnic rivalries in African countries?
4. Critically assess the different ways nations can harness ethnic potentials.

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MODULE 2 ETHNICITY IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT

UNIT 1 SALIENCE OF ETHNICITY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The importance of ethnicity cannot be ignored in the discussion of ethnic identity and its impact on social relationships. Thus, many scholars have observed that ethnicity often have a peculiar character that makes it a discourse. Ethnicity refers to the social elaboration of collective identities whereby individuals see themselves as one among others like themselves. Collectively, people whose boundaries may be loosely or tightly defined distinguish themselves from other people. Agiri (1997) therefore defines ethnicity as group dynamism. He argues that ethnic group consists of people characterised by cultural criteria of symbols including language, value systems and normative behaviour and whose members are anchored in a particular part of the state or territory. In essence, ethnicity is all about social classification emerging from within relationships.

The enduring dimensions of social life around which ethnic identities are built are those one called the centre of gravity of the concept "ethnic" which include ancestry, culture and language to mention but a

few. But the relational nature of ethnicity suggests that we cannot speak of ethnic groups as people who merely share ancestry, culture and language. Through ethnicity, ancestry, culture and language are mobilised in social transactions. People know or say that they are different from others because of the way they speak, the customs and ways of life they hold dear and the continuity of their people through the generations. Ethnicity assists us in defining and explaining the following perceived identities in every society.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss why ethnicity is an important issue
- explain the concept of ancestry
- articulate the relationship between "affect" and "kinship"
- explain how culture and language are related to ethnicity.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Salience of Ethnicity

Ethnicity is a major issue in intergroup relations. This is why people are seen to relate on the basis of ethnic grouping and even allow it to determine their political affiliations. All over the world, from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Israel, Rwanda to South Africa, Sudan to Nigeria, and even the United States of America, ethnicity has played a major role in determining how people relate with one another. As a matter of fact, ethnicity helps in identifying our ancestral background and the process of tracing our source of origin. In addressing the importance of ethnicity, the following perceived identities will be explained.

3.1.1 Ancestry

The concept of ancestry perfectly illustrates the way in which ethnicity constitutes a socially grounded, culturally elaborated and socially construed phenomenon. People commonly know of their fathers and mothers and their grandparents and of a wider network of kin both dead and living to whom they are connected. The way in which these relationships are remembered in societies with stronger or weaker kinship systems is the social foundation of ancestry. People may choose to remember or forget aspects of their past and may choose to venerate some ancestors but discard others. Not only will some people value some ancestors and repudiate others, they will also care a lot about who their ancestors are. What is true of ancestry is thus true of ethnicity; both are simultaneously socially grounded and socially constructed.

Ethnic communities which convey a historically enduring sense of "peoplehood" are defined by Smith (1981) as "ethnie" and his conceptualisation expresses the importance of ancestry as a dimension of ethnicity. According to him, ethnies have vied or colluded with other forms of communities such as city, class, religion, and region in providing a sense of identity among populations and inspiring in them a nostalgia for their past and its traditions. In periods of grave crisis, it has even been able to arouse in them powerful sentiments of anger and revenge for what were seen as attacks on traditional lifestyle and identity.

Ethnicity has provided the foci of identification with ancestors and thereby a means of confronting death, especially violent death at the hands of enemies. By invoking a collective name, by the use of symbolic images of community, by the generation of stereotypes of the community and its foes, by the ritual performance and rehearsal of ceremonies and feasts and sacrifices, by the communal recitation of past deeds and ancient heroes' exploits, men and women have been able to bury their sense of loneliness and insecurity in the face of natural disasters and human violence by freeing themselves to partake of a collectivity and its historic fate which transcends their individual existence (Smith, 1981).

Tied to ancestry is the language of family and kindred by which ethnicity appeals to blood and passion or the ethnicity of calculation and instrumentality. Where people seek support for an ethnic or national cause, they make an appeal to people and the audience will recognise the appeal and the implicit collective identity (Barth, 1970). As Walker Connor (1973) has argued, the language of ethno-nationalism is the language of blood, family, brothers, sisters, mothers, fore fathers, home. Connor provides the example of Mao Zedong of China appealing to family ties deriving from a common ancestor when he persuaded his Chinese communist compatriots which comprises of fathers, brothers, aunts and sisters throughout the country to "transform this glorious future into a new China, all our fellow countrymen, every single zealous descendant of Huang-ti" (Connor, 1973). For him, every ethnie have the same ancestors, they are of the same family, that is, they are all brothers and sisters and no one can divide people who are united by blood ties.

This ideological sense of family and ancestry is characteristic of many instances of nationalism and ethno nationalism. As a matter of fact, the claim is more or less fictive but nonetheless the sentiment of family is prominent because it is seen to be powerful and emotive. However, at the micro social level, relationship within the circle of kin may be the crucial social supports of ethnicity that is reproduced in the sentiments and mentalities of the individual. Instances of this is the urban migrants

in developed societies who pass on their local language to their children and set expectations about dress, marriage and family obligations as well as in-migrants in Africa cities who reproduce some of the obligations of kin in the urban neighbourhood as well as maintaining links with the home village (Abner Cohen, 1981).

In essence, ancestry is one of the benefits of ethnicity. This informal transmission of ethnicity allows social space sometimes to a very great degree, within which the individual can control the transmission of ethnocultural difference.

3.1.2 Affect and Kinship

Another advantage of ethnicity is the issue of affection and kinship. The association of ethnicity with high affect—a deeply felt and enduring identity and allegiance - is expressed through reference to the bonds of kinship. Certainly, the notion of primordialism in its guise as denoting deeply felt attachments, associates affect with kinship. Thus, part of the task of sociological exploration is then the nature of relationship between ethnicity and kinship. This could be seen firstly from the angle of ethnic attachment as an extension of kin and extended kin ties and secondly as what is often refer to as quasi-kinship where ethnic bonds are presented as if they were kin bonds.

As regards nationalism, the rhetoric of ethnicity is filled with the language of kinship. The curiosity is that, where kinship ties may be the most stable is in the relatively closed community prior to migrations, urbanisation and social mobility (and it is in these instances, mostly if contacts with others is slight, that the elaboration of kinship ties into ethnic ties may be least developed). As Eriksen has argued, ethnicity is seen as a dimension of a relationship and it is in relationship with others that ethnicities thrive. It is in the context of new states and modernising societies that ethnicity has been seen primarily as an extension of extended kinship when members of families have become mobile and moved into new sets of relationships outside the restricted locales of birthplace. Some of the best known research and interpretation of ethnicity in Africa relates to social processes of mobility and urbanisation (Cohen, 1974).

From the above statement, three features are of immediate relevance. In the first place, kinship ties described by researchers as “ethnic” are, in part, a function of real and non- fictive kinship. Secondly, these ties are not simple kinship ties but based on new meanings in urban settings which include the redefining of the boundaries of the groups mainly by broader amalgamation of groups which may have been seen in a smaller setting as different. Lastly, these new ethnic ties more or less linked to

real kinship are not necessarily intensely felt and all encompassing in the demands they make on the individual.

Some basic reasons could be drawn from the last point. This is based on the fact that if a person moves out of his or her home community into the growing urban centre and encounters familiar and unfamiliar others, he or she becomes newly aware of his or her ethnic identity. This is precisely the story which describes the experience of African villagers moving into cities and relying on extended kin connections to survive in the new arena (Cohen, 1974). Some ethnic groups have moved to towns or regional centres where they are brought into contact with people with other customs, languages and identities, and where they frequently enter into competitive relationships in politics and the labour market.

Frequently, people who migrate try to maintain their old kinship and neighborhood social networks in the new urban context, and both ethnic quarters and ethnic political groupings often emerge in such urban settings. Although the speed of social and cultural change can be high, people tend to retain their ethnic identity despite having moved to a new environment.

The fact that few of one's closest kin group may be available is a cogent reason why wider circles become the defined group boundary and the necessity for amalgamations where kinship stretches into quasi-kinship. Besides, new set of lessons are also learnt in this urban society especially as it relates to the necessity of getting along with others. Thus, people do feel their ethnic attachments but do not describe them as all encompassing; the structures of everyday life (the work place, market place, the labour union, etc.) are such that inter-ethnic cooperation is frequently called upon. The intensity of ethnic ties creates the opportunity for ethnic activists to fight for their brothers and sisters. No doubt, where conflicts do arise and are ethnically structured, the affect associated with kinship plays its part.

3.1.3 Culture and Language

Ethnicity also articulates around culture and language which is subject to change, redefinition and contestation. Ethnicity should be understood as a social process, as the moving boundaries and identities which people either collectively and individually draw themselves in their social lives. Central to this process is the production and reproduction of culture and the use of language as a marker of social difference and the emblem of a people. At its widest, the term has incorporated so called material culture, the objects created, and the material reproduction of human societies but its principal reference is to the symbolic, to valued

styles and ways of life, to manners and to ritual and custom with respect to birth, marriage and death, food and dress for example.

The interesting part of ethnicity is therefore the fact that culture is connected to the construction of group boundaries. However, culture should not be considered as a fixed quality. Cultures shift both in small incremental steps and in seemingly dramatic moments wherein we imagine we glimpse the end of a way of life or the beginning of a new one. Within an ethnic group, we can typically find that cultural standards are contested and variable. Language stretches across many groups who may think of themselves as ethnically distinct. For instance, among English-speaking Americans, there is a common tongue but within that population of English speakers, attachments to ancestral ethnic identities continue to persist. At the same time, language is undoubtedly a powerful group marker, mostly since, if the language is unknown to outsiders, it is a means of social exclusion. Language use is surrounded by ideas of what is proper and what is pure, and language domains are surrounded by a sense of sacredness and defense against violations or neglect.

These constructions of culture and language in relation to ethnic and national identities cannot be utterly divorced from the appearance, type, and visible differences which have long been associated with the concept of race. Two reasons could be deduced from this statement. The first is that conceptions of color difference and appearance type are themselves culturally constructed and inserted into popular views of "us" and "them" and into ideas of what constitutes beauty and worth. The second one is that where ancestry and culture/language differences are construed into ethnic identities, they are frequently accompanied by visible differences whether permanent or transient.

Where people share ethnic identity and common experience, it is likely that out of this common experience come characteristic mannerisms of speech, dress and posture which people instantly recognise and initiate into the system of social recognition. People may learn and unlearn culture, learn and forget language, change their styles of dress or worship, change the way in which they select marriage partners and do all this in a generation or two or less but physical appearance do not disappear over generations. However, even if the physical differences do not disappear, it is certainly true that the social significance attached to them can change radically, quickly and dramatically (Adam and Moodley, 1993).

4.0 CONCLUSION

The first unit of this module has attempted to help the student to understand why ethnicity is an important factor in discussing social classification which emerges from within relationships. Ethnicity refers to the social elaboration of collective identities whereby individuals see themselves as one among others like themselves. In essence, people whose boundaries may be loosely or tightly defined distinguish themselves from other people through the knowledge of ethnic identity. Good knowledge of our ancestral background assists one in knowing fathers and mothers and their grandparents and of a wider network of kin both dead and alive to whom they are connected. Everyone has the same ancestors, they are of the same family, that is, they are all brothers and sisters and no one can divide people who are united by blood ties. Ethnicity is understood as a social process, as the moving boundaries and identities which people either collectively and individually draw themselves in their social lives mainly in the urban society where they find themselves.

5.0 SUMMARY

Ethnicity is a dimension of a relationship and it is in relationship with others that ethnicities thrive. It is in the context of new states and modernising societies that ethnicity has been seen primarily as an extension of extended kinship when members of families have the opportunity to move out into new sets of relationships outside the restricted locales of their birthplace or towns. Some of the best known research and interpretation of ethnicity in Africa relates to social processes of mobility and urbanisation. If members of any ethnic group are to learn from each other, they must be open to each other in speaking their languages, practicing their cultures and be able to defend and protect their ancestral foundation. In a nutshell, there should be constructions of ancestry, affect and kinship, culture and language in relation to ethnic and national identities which should be separated from appearance and visible differences which have long been associated with the concept of race.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. What is the significance of language among particular group in an urban society?
2. How can culture be promoted in a foreign society?
3. What is the relationship between ethnicity and kinship?

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UNIT 2 ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Various factors, such as civil wars (such as those i.e. experienced in the Sudan, Liberia), boundary conflicts (i.e. between Cameroon and Nigeria) and the fact that the African continent generates one third of the wars in the world have had the combined effect of creating a need for a fundamental reassessment and revision of the approach to the study and understanding of ethnicity and conflict. In discussing ethnicity and conflict, it is important to give specific explanation to words like ethno-national conflicts, race and the relationship between ethnicity and conflict.

In this unit, we introduce some principal themes which include: the distinction between the terms ethnicity and conflict, the concept ethnicity and race, the causes of ethnic conflict and the approaches to understanding ethnic conflict. Ethnic groups are defined here as a community of people who share cultural and linguistic characteristics including history, tradition, myth, and origin.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- examine how nationalism took a new dimension in Africa through the instrument of ethnicity and how this led to conflict in various African states
- examine the concepts of ethnicity and race and how ethnicity sometimes results in racial discrimination

- appraise the approaches to the study of ethnic groups and ethnic conflict.
- highlight some of the causes of ethno-conflict and how this led to conflict in South Africa.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Ethnicity and Conflict

African nations are diverse and are apt to be fractured along racial, ethnic, linguistic or religious lines (Goldsmith, 2010:427). The departing colonial powers bequeathed to the leaders of 'independent' Africa a virtual ethnic time bomb. The boundaries of the new African states reflected colonial, not cultural or national divisions. During the hastily arranged decolonisation processes, and given the personal ambitions of the would-be leaders of the new states, little or no time was available for a sober assessment of the costs and benefits of building the post-colonial state according to an essentially unaltered colonial blueprint. Predictably, independence did not usher in a new era of freedom, peace, and prosperity. Instead, secessions and demands for regional self-determination dominated the agenda of nearly all newly independent African states.

Ironically, nationalism took on a new meaning: it was no longer anti-colonial but anti-state. Its instrument of choice was no longer liberation war but inter-ethnic strife and sometimes genocide. In reality, this could probably not have been prevented. The inherited boundaries are artificial lines on a map, not ethnic/national boundaries. From this perspective, the post-colonial states are in many respects just as artificial and illegitimate as the entities they replaced. In this situation, it is inevitable that political parties will develop along ethnic lines and 'liberation armies' will be formed to reconfigure the new states to take ethnic realities into account.

One good example of an attempt to reconfigure an African state along ethnic lines is the case of Namibia where a secessionist movement is demanding independence for the Caprivi Strip! Before Namibia's current crisis several other African states – the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaïre), Chad, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and the Sudan – have experienced long civil wars involving separatists seeking to establish their own states. The reason for these wars cannot simply be explained by the existence of numerous, often unfriendly, ethnic groups, tribes or nations. Civil wars in Africa, particularly of the secessionist type, reflect these new states' inability to develop an inclusive political system that takes into account the fact that African citizens' primary allegiances are not always to states.

Often, the state must compete with the ethnic group, tribe or nation for the citizen's allegiances because the latter's sense of self is intrinsically attached to such factors as kinship ties, race, language, locality, religion, and tradition. This has significant implications for governance. Many African states still lack administrative and ideological capacity to govern, which means that they are unable to manage, let alone reconcile, ethnic conflicts. Specifically, governance in Africa is still essentially a zero-sum proposition. Most African states have come under the control of one, usually numerically dominant ethnic group. The resources of the state and economy are then used for the benefit of that group, to the detriment of others. This causes resentment, particularly when other groups see themselves as having certain tangible attributes – like economic power, intellectual excellence, or a tradition of military prowess that could be translated into political power. In such cases, when access to political power is denied, civil wars often result. This should not come as a surprise, especially in Africa where control of the state has become a vital political goal for ethnic groups because it provides unobstructed access to jobs, land, education, credit facilities and other highly coveted privileges and sources of wealth.

For dominant groups, control of the state ensures political supremacy and economic dominance. Subordinate groups seek control of the state to ensure that their social, cultural, and economic interests are protected and their political aspirations are fulfilled. When the political arena does not accommodate ethnic groups as interest groups, they become conflict groups with a mandate to insert the group's grievances, claims, anxieties, and aspirations into the national agenda by all means necessary, including war. In extreme cases of real or perceived exclusionist politics, ethnic groups will opt for their own state even if small and insignificant on the world stage to ensure political, economic, cultural and demographic survival. This conforms to the Westphalian logic that places the state, not the nation, tribe or ethnic group, at the centre of world politics. In other words, in the current international system, the state is an indispensable vehicle for an ethnic group, particularly those who aspire to nation-state status, to realise their political aspirations both domestically and internationally.

3.2 Ethnicity and Race

Before Max Weber, race and ethnicity were often seen as two aspects of the same thing. Around 1900 and before the essentialist primordialist understanding of ethnicity became predominant, cultural differences between peoples were seen as being the result of genetically inherited traits and tendencies (Banton, 2007). This was the time when "sciences" such as phrenology claimed to be able to correlate cultural and

behavioral traits of different populations with their outward physical characteristics, such as the shape of the skull.

With Weber's introduction of ethnicity as a social construct, race and ethnicity were divided from each other. However, a social belief in biologically well-defined races lingered on. In 1950, the UNESCO statement "The race Question", signed by some internationally renowned scholars of the time (including Ashley Montague, Claude Levi-Strauss, Gunnar Myrdar, Julian Huxley, and others), concluded that:

> *National, religious, geographic, linguistic and cultural groups do not necessarily coincide with racial groups and the cultural traits of such groups have not demonstrated genetic connection with racial traits. Because serious errors of this kind are habitually committed when the term 'race' is used in popular parlance, it would be better when speaking of human races to drop the term 'race' altogether and speak of 'ethnic groups'* (Metraux, 1950).

In 1982, American cultural anthropologists, summing up forty years of ethnographic research, argued that racial and ethnic categories are symbolic markers for different ways research also noted that people from different parts of the world have been incorporated into a global economy. The opposing interests that divide the working classes are further reinforced through appeals to "racial" and "ethnic" distinctions. Such appeals serve to allocate different categories of workers to rungs on the scale of labour markets, relegating stigmatised populations to the lower levels and insulating the higher echelons from competition from below. Capitalism did not create all the distinctions of ethnicity and race that function to set off categories of workers from one another. It is, nevertheless, the process of labour mobilisation under capitalism that imparts to these distinctions their effective values.

According to Eric (1982), races were constructed and incorporated during the period of European mercantile expansion, and ethnic groups during the period of capitalist expansion. At present, the prevailing understanding of race among social scientists is that it is, like ethnicity, a social construct. Often, ethnicity also connotes shared cultural, linguistic, behavioral or religious traits. For example, to call oneself Jewish or Arab is to immediately invoke a clutch of linguistic, religious, cultural and racial features that are held to be common within each ethnic category. Such broad ethnic categories have also been termed *macro-ethnicity* (Seidner, 1982). This distinguishes them from smaller, more subjective ethnic features, often termed *micro-ethnicity*.

3.3 Ethno-National Conflict

Sometimes, ethnic groups are subject to prejudicial attitudes and actions by the state or its constituents. In the twentieth century, people began to argue that conflicts among ethnic groups or between members of an ethnic group and the state can and should be resolved in one of two ways. Scholars like Jurgen Habermas and Bruce Barry have argued that the legitimacy of modern states must be based on a notion of political rights of autonomous individual subjects. According to this view, the state should not acknowledge ethnic, national or racial identity but enforce political and legal equality of all individuals instead. Others, like Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, argue that the notion of the autonomous individual is itself a cultural construct. This means states must recognise ethnic identity and develop processes through which the particular needs of ethnic groups can be accommodated within the boundaries of the nation-state.

The nineteenth century saw the development of the political ideology of ethnic nationalism, when the concept of race was tied to nationalism first by German theorists including Johann Gottfried von Herder. Instances of societies focusing on ethnic ties, arguably to the exclusion of history or historical context, have resulted in the justification of nationalist goals. Two periods which are commonly used as examples of this are the nineteenth century consolidation and expansion of the German Empire and the twentieth century Third (Greater German) Reich. Each of these periods promoted the pan-ethnic idea that these governments were only acquiring lands that had always been inhabited by ethnic Germans.

The history of late-comers to the nation-state model, such as those arising in the Near East and South-Eastern Europe out of the dissolution of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, as well as those arising out of the former USSR, is marked by inter ethnic conflicts. Such conflicts usually occur within multi-ethnic states, as opposed to between them, as is the case in other regions of the world. Thus, the conflicts are often misleadingly labelled and characterised as civil wars when they are inter-ethnic conflicts in a multi-ethnic state.

3.4 Approaches to Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic groups are defined as a community of people who share cultural and linguistic characteristics including history, tradition, myth, and origin. Scholars have been trying to develop a theoretical approach to ethnicity and ethnic conflict for a long time. Some, like Donald Horowitz, Ted Gurr, Donald Rothschild and Edward Azar, agree that the ethnic conflicts experienced today especially in Africa are deep rooted.

These conflicts over race, religion, language and identity have become so complex that they are difficult to resolve or manage. Ethnicity has a strong influence on one's status in a community. Ethnic conflicts are therefore often caused by an attempt to secure more power or access more resources. In other words, conflict in Africa is synonymous with inequality. Wherever such inequality manifests among groups, conflict is inevitable.

Gurr's (1970) *relative deprivation theory* offers an explanation based on an ethnic groups' access to power and economic resources. This is closely related to the position of Horowitz (1985) who noted that group worth is based on the results of economic and political competitions. According to Lake and Rothschild, (1996) ethnic conflict is a sign of state weakness or a state embroiled in ancient loyalties. In this case, states act with bias to favour a particular ethnic group or region, and behaviours such preferential treatment fuel ethnic conflicts. Therefore, in critical or difficult political situations, the effectiveness of governance is dependent on its ability to address social issues and human needs.

Recently, scholars have come out with different approaches to conceptualising ethnicity. With the proliferation of separatist conflicts in North America in the late 20th century, the inadequacies underlying modernisation theory was exposed. The notion that modernity would result in smooth transition from community to association, with gradual dissolution of ethnic affiliations, simply did not work. Contrary to the position of modernisation theory, ethnicity has persisted in North America, Africa and elsewhere. This failure simply means ethnicity will remain, and that the stability of African states is threatened not by ethnicity *per se*, but the failure of national institutions to recognise and accommodate ethnic differences and interests. According to this argument, the lesson for ethnic conflict management is that governments should not discriminate against groups or they will instigate conflict.

The second theory is from the *primordial school* and stresses the uniqueness and the overriding importance of ethnic identity. From their point of view, ethnicity is a biological and fixed characteristic of individuals and communities (Geertz, 1963).

The third theoretical approach is the *instrumentalist* argument (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975). In Africa where poverty and deprivation have become endemic, mostly as a result of distributive injustice, ethnicity remains an effective means of survival and mobilisation. Ethnic groups that coalesce for economic reasons easily disband after achieving their objectives. This corresponds with Benedict Anderson's (1991:5-7) argument that ethnicity is "a construct" rather than a constant.

There are currently hundreds of ethnic conflicts of varying intensity on all continents all over the world. Within the borders of most of states, there are numerous ethnic, national, racial, linguistic or cultural groups. They either do not identify with the dominant model of nation-state; or they are not accepted as full members of the state or the nation, which it purports to be or represent; or they are actually excluded from it. From the perspective of the modern nation-state, the existence of ethnically distinct sub-national groups always represents a potential threat and a destabilising force, particularly when they are politically organised. This is especially the case when power in the state rests principally with a dominant or majority ethnic group.

3.5 Causes of Ethnic Conflict

a. Economic Factors

Economic factors have been identified as one of the major causes of conflict in Africa and elsewhere. Theorists believe that competition for scarce resources is a common factor in almost all ethnic conflicts in Africa. In multi-ethnic societies like Nigeria and South Africa, ethnic communities violently compete for property rights, jobs, education, language, social amenities and good healthcare facilities. In his study, Okwudiba Nnoli (1980) produced empirical examples linking socio-economic factors to ethnic conflict in Nigeria. According to J.S. Furnival, cited in Nnoli (1980:72-3), "the working of economic forces makes for tension between groups with competing interests."

In the case of South Africa, Gerhard Mare confirms that ethnicity and ethnic conflict appear to be a response to the uneven development in South Africa, which caused ethnic groups such as the Xhosas, Zulus and even Afrikaners to mobilise to compete for resources along ethnic lines. It follows therefore that multi-ethnic countries are always likely to experience distributional conflicts.

b. Psychological Factors

Another major cause of ethnic conflict is psychological factors, especially the fear and insecurity of ethnic groups during transition. It has been opined that extremists build upon these fears to polarise the society. Additionally, memories of past traumas magnify these anxieties. These interactions produce a toxic brew of distrust and suspicion that leads to ethnic violence. The fear of white Afrikaners in South Africa on the eve of democratic elections was a good case in point.

Another interesting instance is Nigeria where the fear of domination in all sectors of the economy sometimes creates ethnic tensions especially

among the minority groups in the six geo-political zones.

3.6 Ethnic Conflicts in South Africa

South Africa is a good example of ethnic conflicts in Africa considering its historical insight and significance. For years, historians generally believed that the Mfekane (the crushing) that emerged in the early 19th century was caused by the emergence of an aggressive Zulu kingdom. Recently, however, some historians have contended that the emphasis on Zulu expansion only obscured the role that European colonialism may have played in triggering the violence. While the causes of the Mfekane were still being debated, most historians agreed that the expansion of some chiefdoms in southeastern Africa and the centralisation of others brought emerging states into conflict.

One reason for the conflict may have been the intensified competition for land. Maize was introduced to the region by the early 18th century, and as it became a plentiful staple, population density grew. By the end of the century, excess farming and overgrazing had depleted the amount of usable land. Local chiefdoms, whose economies were based on cattle, were forced to extend and defend their control over year-round grazing lands in order to survive.

Another reason for the conflict may have been the destabilising effect that global trade in slave and ivory had on the region. Colonists from Britain's Cape Colony to the southwest had conducted raids into the region to acquire labour since the 17th century. In the same period, Portuguese traders based at ports on the southeastern coast of Africa fed an increasing demand for slave labour in South American plantations and hunted extensively for ivory for the international market. In response to these incursions, local chiefdoms sought to establish control over the lucrative trade routes and possibly, to organise defenses against slave raids. This led to military expansion and the development of new social and political structures.

A key aspect of this process was the development of the *amabutho* system. In this system, all the young men of chiefdom were grouped into regiments (*amabutho*) according to their age. The *amabutho* served multiple purposes. They were used to perform labour, police the chiefdom's subjects, and defend the chiefdom against outside enemies. For their service, the *amabutho* required reward, particularly in the form of cattle, and this could best be gained by raiding neighbouring peoples. Additional cattle required wider grazing lands, so raids inevitably turned into wars of territorial conquest. In the early years of the 19th century, conflicts over cattle and land were sharpened by a major drought.

4.0 CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, it is clear that ethnicity contributes to conflict in any society. Conflict is a clash of interests between and among parties. Conflict can occur at the individual, family, community and beyond community levels. Ethnic conflict is a conflict between ethnic groups often as a result of ethnic nationalism. Ethnic conflicts are man- made. It is generated from conditions of contested claims over access to or control of scarce resources. In essence, the more the frequency of group and individual interactions in a multi ethnic society, the more the likelihood of ethnic conflict.

Ethnicity and conflict are not recent developments. They featured prominently in time past as different empires and nations fought one another for various reasons. In Africa for instance, great empires like Zulu, Shonghai, Ashanti and even Oyo witnessed one form of ethnic conflict or another. These wars are said to be caused by economic, commercial, political and even religious reasons which led to ethnic conflicts and wars in such societies.

5.0 SUMMARY

This discussion on ethnicity and conflict proceeded from a theoretical examination of the concept of ethnicity as a dimension of relationship among members of a particular group to how they are discriminated racially by other larger groups in the same society. Hence, some factors that contribute to ethnic conflict were discussed and South Africa was discussed as one of the countries where ethnic conflicts have had great effect on the people.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

- Identify and discuss the causes of ethnic conflict you know.
- Discuss the dynamics of ethnic conflicts in Rwanda.
- What was the Mfekane? Discuss its effects on Zulu society and their neighbours.
- What are the consequences of ethnic conflict in Africa?

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UNIT 3 NATURE OF ETHNICITY AS CONFLICT GENERATING FACTOR IN SOCIO-POLITICAL INTERACTIONS

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Discrimination among people of different origins living in the same community have in one way or the other raised questions on how ethnicity leads to conflict in human societies. Ethnicity has been a main preoccupation of scholars since the late 1960s, and it has continued to be a focus of contemporary academic research. The reason for this is not farfetched. It is embedded in the ever-increasing occurrence of entanglements associated with individual and group interactions in the society; and also due to the fact that the relationship between ethnicity and nationality is as complex as that between ethnicity and race. Various forms of inter-ethnic relations in the pre-colonial era have since been supplanted by colonial and the post-colonial political elite who never took time to understand the African ways of identification.

In many places such as the United States of America blacks and whites were not allowed to mingle together, neither were they allowed to be in the same public or private gathering. For instance, blacks in the Southern part of America were discriminated against and stripped of their rights through discriminatory legislations and unlawful segregation that prompted the landmark judgment by the US Supreme Court that banned segregation on the basis of racial differences.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the nature of ethnicity as a conflict-generating factor in socio- political interactions
- specify the major ingredient of racial discrimination and how it has been used in every society to intensify conflict
- highlight the justifications that served to institutionalise racial discrimination in various societies
- show how other forms of discrimination were practiced in some selected states like United States of America in relation to women and minority group rights.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Ethnicity as Conflict-Generating Factor in Socio-Political Interactions

The nature of ethnicity is predetermined by cultural factors of the people, which directly or indirectly informs their perception of themselves and those whom they see as different from them. Religion shapes to a large extent the behaviour of individuals and as a result, relationships are shaped by perception of good and bad. However, history plays a lot of role in determining perception of one group towards the other. The complexity of ethnicity arises from a couple of reasons. First, one's identity is subjective, simply because a person is labeled or labels him/herself as being a member of a particular group does not mean that others will also identify them the same way. Second, there is an overlap of terms that arises in most contemporary discussions on the major cultural divisions within society such as: nation, race, tribe and minority.

As noted above, the fact that ethnicity is predetermined by cultural factors suggests that something is considered very important if it is attached to some form of identity. A likely element of importance in cultural consideration is the factor of "power" or "powerlessness", which is identified with certain groups based on their past history and achievements. This may in fact determine present and future relationships.

Yinger is of the opinion that the pattern of shifts and the ensuing transformation in the interaction and relationship between different ethnic groups will be a crucial component in the examination of the roots and rise of conflicts. He used the case of Nazis in Germany, which rightly reflects an extreme role played by past relationship as an

example of a self-defined group who identified other people's ethnicity for them. Reflecting on the relationship between the Germans and the Jews, it was clear that the Germans believed that the Aryan race was the master race and therefore superior to all other races in the world. This propaganda, particularly towards Jews became a powerful political tool to control, marginalise, and even justify the resolve to exterminate them. This form of disposition can also be found in other cultural settings, where political power is used in defining relationships with people from other ethnic identities, with one group seeing themselves as superior and others as inferior.

The preoccupation with the nation-building project, which is assumed to have begun at the onset of colonisation and is conceptualised as the transfer of loyalties of cultural units to the nation-state, has obstructed any consideration of the possibilities and constraints offered by the actual historical dynamics of the sub-nation groups and formations in pre-colonial Nigeria (Mustapha 1999:27). Indeed, Obaro Ikime (1985) drew attention to various forms of inter-ethnic relations that prevailed in the pre-colonial period but have since been supplanted by the colonial and the post-colonial political elite in most societies.

Mustapha suggests that one possible approach to the national question is to take a cue from pre-colonial state formations which did not promote the indigene-settler distinction in identity formation, but granted full citizenship rights to non-natives that had settled and become important actors in their political economy. Mustapha (2000), Albert (1999), and Ekeh (1996) all noted that pre-colonial histories and cultural differences also matter because they sometimes provide a useful background for understanding contemporary conflicts such as the Zango-Kataf and Ife-Modakeke conflicts among others. The localisation of some of these violent conflicts in rural areas where a particular ethnic group may invoke historical and ancestral claims to the land area, which is the subject of conflict, suggests the emergence of rural ethnicity which was neglected in earlier studies on ethnicity (Egwu, 1998:55).

In addition, recent studies have shifted focus from the so-called major ethnic groups which exclusively preoccupied studies in the period between 1950 and the mid-1970s to minority ethnic groups. While minority politics from the late colonial period to the onset of the Nigerian civil war were subordinated to the conflicts between the major ethnic groups. The state creation exercises that started in 1967 also reconfigured the terrain for contestation and led to the rise of “majority-minorities”. The term was coined to capture the new fortunes of ethnic groups who were hitherto regarded as minorities under the three-region structure but became dominant in the newly created states even though they are still regarded as minorities in the politics of the federation. They include Edo, Ijaw, Tiv and Ibibio peoples.

"Minority-minorities" on the other hand, are those groups that remained minorities in the new states such as Idoma, Itsekiri. In most cases, 'majority-minorities' are often accused of oppressing the 'minority-minorities' with occasional outbreaks of hostilities. This vindicates the position of the Willinks Commission of 1958 that states creation was not the solution to the minority problem. The problem is however compounded by the fact that major ethnic groups also acquired more states in successive state creation exercises. These groups continue to dominate the federation which has witnessed greater fiscal centralisation since the advent of the military in 1966. This provoked dissent from ethnic minorities in the oil producing Niger Delta region who bemoan the continuous reduction of the share of revenue based on the derivation principle since the discovery of oil (Naanen 1995, Mustapha, 2000).

The Niger Delta thus became a site of conflicts which manifest in various forms, ranging from conflicts between communities and the state to conflicts among communities and oil companies, and conflicts between communities (Ojo, 2002). While some have argued that these are environmental conflicts, others have implicated the discrepancy between state and community understanding of security as contributing factors. According to Ibeanu (2000), who assimilates both views, conflicts in the Niger Delta arise from the fact that while the state defines security as the condition where transnational corporations have unrestricted access to oil facilities in order to explore and exploit oil, community conceptions of security focus on guarantee of livelihoods.

The efforts of both parties to each enforce their own security result in violent conflicts. Furthermore, it has been suggested that some of the communal conflicts in the region are proxy wars engineered and executed by state agents to divide and rule the people of the area (Ake, 1996). While these explanations may hold in some cases, it is still difficult to generalise. It has become evident to some scholars that while there is a national template for conflict, each conflict scenario has its own peculiarities and deserves to be studied in its own context. This realisation has resulted in several studies that target specific conflicts in order to offer deeper insights into their origins and transformations (Otite and Albert 1999, IPCR, 2003).

One effort in this direction which focused on the restive Niger Delta arrived at the interesting conclusion that in virtually all the conflicts, the role of ethnic entrepreneurs who mobilise ethnic grievances in pursuit of their material interest has been decisive. Politicians, businessmen and youth leaders have been implicated in virtually all the conflicts. And usually the aim has been to mobilise ethnic grievances to achieve personal individual objectives, which are oftentimes even subversive of collective communal interests' (Isumonah and Gaskia, 2001:74).

However, beyond the refrain of 'low' and 'false' class consciousness that attends instrumentalist theories, one is left to wonder how few 'greedy' characters are able to instigate and sustain conflicts that are against the common interest unless a concerted effort is made to understand the genuine 'grievances' of the apparently voiceless majority. We need to understand what specific political processes endear ethnic leaders to their followers. Explanations of ethnicity would be richer if they combined the historical and structural approaches.

As Mustapha (2000:105-106) has aptly argued there has recently been a tendency for western scholars to focus on the historical aspects in a bid to deconstruct the notion of primordial ethnic groups without relating such historical analysis to current manifestations of the problem which has been the preoccupation of scholars in Africa. The tendency for social constructionists to describe the agency of the colonial state, Christian missionaries, and fledging African elite in the construction of ethnic identities would be tantamount to a fairy tale if it is not related to contemporary developments.

Conversely, studies that focus on what has been described as the rise of sub-ethnicities since the onset of economic crises without relating it to the social history of pan-ethnic identities will end up with a short story that lacks depth. To this end, Harneit-Sievers (2002) came to the conclusion that it is necessary that academic research on ethnicity in should take the pains to take a closer look at local histories as told by people themselves in order to understand the social basis of ethnic identity formation and mobilisation.

3.2 Ethnicity and Nationality

In some cases, especially involving transnational migration, or colonial expansion, ethnicity is linked to nationality. Anthropologists and historians, following the modernist understanding of ethnicity as proposed by Ernest Gellner (2006) and Benedict Anderson (2006) see nations and nationalism as developing with the rise of the modern state system in the seventeenth century. They culminated in the rise of "nation-states" in which the presumptive boundaries of the nation coincided with state boundaries. Thus, in the West, the notion of ethnicity, like race and nation, developed in the context of European colonial expansion, when mercantilism and capitalism were promoting global movements of populations at the same time that state boundaries were being more clearly and rigidly defined. In the nineteenth century, modern states generally sought legitimacy through their claim to represent "nations."

It is true, however, that nation states invariably include populations that

have been excluded from national life for one reason or another. Members of excluded groups, consequently, will either demand inclusion on the basis of equality, or seek autonomy, sometimes even to the extent of complete political separation from their own nation-state (Walter, 1998). Under these conditions—where people moved from one state to another, or one state conquered or colonised peoples beyond its national boundaries, ethnic groups were formed by people who identified with one nation, but lived in another state (Aihway, 1996).

3.3 Racial Discrimination: The American Example

Throughout the history of man, people have assigned identity based on race, both as a means of distinguishing one group from another, but more importantly as a means of control. The dominant culture assigns identity to minority groups as a means of separating them, diminishing their status, and maintaining control over them. Often, this distinction is made on the basis of simple skin color. Through this mechanism of assigning identity, race becomes a political weapon of the majority that has several limiting effects on the oppressed group because it:

- determines freedom of movement within the society
- limits upward mobility from class to class
- prohibits or minimises economic gain
- has a psychological impact on how the oppressed individual perceives him or herself and exists within the confines of the limiting social expectations that have been imposed upon him/her.

The most critical civil rights issue in the United States had to do with the status of its black minority. After the Civil War, the status of former slaves as free people entitled to the rights of citizenship was established by the 13th and 14th Amendments, which were ratified in 1865 and 1868, respectively. The 15th Amendment, which was later ratified in 1870 prohibited race, color, or previous condition of servitude as grounds for denying or abridging the rights of citizens to vote. In addition to these constitutional provisions, Congress enacted several statutes defining civil rights more particularly. The Supreme Court, however, held several of these unconstitutional, including an 1875 Act prohibiting racial discrimination by innkeepers, public transportation providers, and places of amusement.

During the period of Reconstruction, the Republican-dominated federal government maintained troops in Southern American states. Blacks voted and held political offices, including seats in Congress. Two blacks became senators, and 20 were elected to the House of Representatives during that period. The Reconstruction era aroused the bitter opposition

of most Southern whites and after a political compromise was reached between the Republican Party and Southern leaders of the Democratic Party the period came to an end in 1877 with the withdrawal of federal troops from the South.

In the last two decades of the 19th century, blacks in the South were disfranchised and stripped of other rights through discriminatory legislation and unlawful violence. Separate facilities for whites and blacks became a basic rule in southern society. In an 1896 case involving the segregation of railroad passengers: *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*, the Supreme Court held that "separate but equal" public facilities did not violate the Constitution and refused to acknowledge that the separate facilities in use were not in fact equal. During the first half of the 20th century, racial exclusion, either overt or covert, was practiced in most areas of American life.

During World War II (1939-1945) black leaders such as A. Philip Randolph protested segregation in military service, and some reforms were introduced. In 1948 President Harry S. Truman signed an Executive Order integrating the Armed Forces. The 1954 Supreme Court decision in *Brown* v. *Board of Education* represented a turning point however, because it overturned the 1896 "separate but equal" ruling. The Court held that compulsory segregation in public schools denied black children equal protection under the law. It later directed, though ineffectually, that desegregated educational facilities be established nationwide. Subsequent decisions outlawed racial exclusion or discrimination in all government facilities. The Court also upheld federal laws barring discrimination in interstate commerce such as public transportation. A state law against racial intermarriage was also ruled as being unacceptable.

Federal determination to enforce the Supreme Court decision was demonstrated in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957, when President Dwight Eisenhower dispatched troops to secure admission of black students into a "white" high school. Nevertheless, in the Deep South progress toward integration was negligible in the years following the Supreme Court decision. In 1966, for example, the overwhelming majority of southern schools remained segregated. By 1974 however, some 44 percent of black students in the South attended integrated schools, and by the early 1980s the number was approximately 80 percent.

In the North and West of the United States, many black students also attended segregated schools. Such segregation was considered unconstitutional only where it could be proven to have originated in unlawful state action. Public controversy, sometimes violent, continued over the issue of transporting children in school buses long distances

from their homes in order to achieve integration. Busing had become necessary because of the concentration of minority populations in the central areas of many cities. The Supreme Court dealt a blow to such busing in July 1974 by barring it across school-district lines except on a voluntary basis.

In view of these developments, civil rights became a major national political issue for blacks in the 1950s. The first federal civil rights law since the Reconstruction period was enacted in 1957. It called for the establishment of a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and authorised the U.S. Attorney-General to enforce voting rights. In 1960, this legislation was strengthened, and in 1964 a more sweeping Civil Rights Bill outlawed racial discrimination in public accommodations and by employers, unions, and Voting Registrars. After coming to the conclusion that normal judicial procedures were too slow in assuring minority registration and voting, Congress passed a voting rights bill in 1965. The law suspended (and later banned) use of literacy or other voter-qualification tests that had sometimes served to keep blacks off voting lists, authorised appointment of Federal Voting Examiners in areas not meeting certain voter-participation requirements, and provided for federal court to bar discriminatory poll taxes, which were ended by a Supreme Court decision and the 24th Amendment (ratified in 1964). In the aftermath of the assassination of black civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., Congress in 1968 prohibited racial discrimination in federally financed housing, but subsequent attempts to strengthen the law proved abortive.

The struggle for civil rights has not been confined to blacks, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and as the next topic will show, women. Native Americans for decades were forcibly deprived of their lands and denied civil rights. In 1968 Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act, and the federal courts have heard a number of suits designed to restore to Native American tribes rights to their ancestral lands. The elderly have also been deprived of their civil rights, especially in employment and to some degree in housing. Federal and state laws have only been partially successful in solving this problem. Former prisoners and mental patients have suffered legal disabilities after their confinement ended, and resident aliens are sometimes denied equal employment opportunities.

3.4 Discrimination and the Rights of Women in America

Historically, American women have been denied civil rights in suffrage (they were not allowed to vote until a 1920 constitutional amendment), employment, and other areas. In the 1960s, women organised to demand legal equality with men and after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of

1964; they made many gains, especially in the area of employment. During the 1970s, efforts continued to change not only unfair practices but also changed a number of attitudes toward the role of women in society. In 1972 Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the Constitution and submitted it to states for ratification.

The ERA, which was chiefly designed to eradicate legal discrimination against women however failed to win the approval of a sufficient number of states and by the June 1982 deadline, only 35 of the required 38 states had ratified the amendment. Although the ERA failed, the Supreme Court began to rule from the 1970s that laws treating men and women differently were unjustifiable and in the landmark case of *United States* v. *Virginia* in 1996, the Court said that sex discrimination is unconstitutional unless the state that is practicing it can advance an "exceedingly persuasive justification."

After that ruling, women have continued to make gains in certain trades and professions, including financial services, medicine, and law, but problems remain in many areas. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 extended the right to sue their employers for monetary damages to women victims of job bias and established a commission to probe the "glass ceiling" that has prevented women and other minorities from advancing to top management positions.

3.5 Racism as a Justification for Ethnocentrism

Omi and Winant argue that the concept of race developed gradually and was created to justify and explain inequality and exploitation that is characteristic of European colonisation. The expropriation of property, the denial of political rights, the introduction of slavery and other forms of coercive labour, as well as outright extermination, all presupposed a worldview which distinguished Europeans from others who were not. Such a worldview was needed to explain why some should be "free" while others are "enslaved"; why some had rights to land while others did not. Race, and the interpretation of racial differences, was a central factor in that worldview.

The need for a justification for institutionalised racial discrimination led to the biological essentialist framework. In this framework, white European-Americans were viewed as being born inherently superior. Religious debates also raged over the role of race in definitions of humanity; and arguments took place over creation itself, as theories of polygenesis questioned whether God had made only one species of humanity.

In their book *Racial Formation*, Omi and Winant (1994) present race as a relatively recent phenomenon in the United States. They describe how race becomes established in social consciousness, even without anyone having an explicit intention to perpetuate it. They opined that everybody learns some combination or some version of the rules of racial classification, and of their own racial identity, often without obvious teaching or conscious inculcation. Race therefore becomes 'common sense' and a way of comprehending, explaining, and acting in the world. According to Omi and Winant, a racial formation perspective is needed to explain race as “an autonomous field of social conflict, political organisations, and cultural/ideological meaning” (Omi and Winant, 1994).

Omi and Winant define racial formation as “the process by which social, economic and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings.” The racial formation perspective emphasises the extent to which race is a social and political construction that operates at two levels, the micro (individual identity) and the macro (collective social structure). The two levels interact to form a racial social movement when individuals at the micro level are mobilised in response to political racial injustice at the macro level.

A significant aspect of these social expectations presented is the creation of an identity of invisibility. This invisibility serves two primary roles. First, the oppressor develops methods by which he does not have to "see" the oppressed; the refrain “they should know their place" represents this kind of thinking. Secondly, the oppressed develops methods by which he cannot be "seen" by his oppressor by “keeping his head down” and “not rocking the boat”. The authentic identity of the individual remains invisible because the dominant culture refuses to humanise those who are oppressed. Any attempt to establish his authentic identity and sense of place in the world meets with retaliation from the oppressors as a means of maintaining their power. The oppressed have two basic choices: accept their assigned subjugated status as a means of getting along in a society that rejects them; or fight back and risk the consequences of retaliation that the dominant society is likely to inflict upon them.

Discrimination on ethnic grounds is spoken of as "racism" in Trinidad and as "communalism" in Mauritius (Eriksen, 1992a), but the forms of imputed discrimination referred to can be nearly identical. On the other hand, it is true that groups that look different from majority or dominating groups may be less liable to become assimilated into the majority than others, and that it can be difficult for them to escape from their ethnic identity if they wish to. However, this may also be true for

minority groups with an inadequate command of the dominant language. In both cases, their ethnic identity becomes an imperative status, an ascribed aspect of their personhood from which they cannot escape entirely. Race or skin colour as such is not the decisive variable in every society.

Like the words ‘ethnic’ and ‘race’, the word ‘nation’ has a long history (Williams, 1976: 213-4), and has been used in a variety of ways. However, we will concentrate on the sense in which nation and nationalism are used analytically in academic discourses. Like ethnic ideologies, nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents, and by implication, it draws boundaries *vis-a-vis* others, who are regarded as outsiders. The distinguishing mark of nationalism is by definition its relationship to the state. A nationalist will often insist that political boundaries should be coterminous with cultural boundaries, whereas many ethnic groups do not demand control over a state. When the political leaders of an ethnic movement place demands to such an effect, the ethnic movement therefore by definition becomes a nationalist movement.

4.0 CONCLUSION

From the above discourse, it could be stated that people of different ethnic identity who occupy the same region inflict injury upon each other in struggle for political domination in multi-ethnic societies. This has therefore led to the discussion on how ethnicity acts as a conflict generating factor in socio-political interaction. A significant aspect of these social expectations in every ethnic society is the creation of an identity of invisibility. This invisibility serves two primary roles. In the first place the oppressor do not see the oppressed On the other hand, the oppressed develops methods by which he cannot be "seen" by his oppressor.

5.0 SUMMARY

In summary, this unit discussed how ethnicity generates conflict in a socio-political environment. The link between ethnicity and nation is an important one partly because no society can exist without ethnic groups who consider themselves to be nations. As discussed in this unit, these have had important implications for social classes such as women and minority groups in United States of America and other beyond. Above all, this unit examined the origin of racism and racial discrimination as conflict-generating factors in a socio-political setting.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Majority-minority politics is a common feature of multi-ethnic societies. Discuss.
2. What are the key conflict-generating components of racial discrimination?
3. Women and minorities are marginalised by virtue of their identities. Discuss.

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UNIT 4 COLONIALISM AND ETHNIC IDENTITY FORMATION IN AFRICA

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Africa of today presents an excellent laboratory for the study of serious confusion and peculiar problems associated with the issue of colonialism and its after-burn following the struggle for independence by many African states at the beginning of the later part of the last century. A common feature that influenced all the independence movements across the African and other colonised continents was the fact that the colonial masters do not have regard for most African values as most European states administered their colonies differently. Nevertheless, they all manifested similar qualities of paternalism and arrogance, and they all transmitted an institutional legacy - such as the nation-state - that had lasting consequences to their colonies. Dissatisfied with the way most colonial administrations governed their people, African nationalists made moves for independence and succeeded towards the second part of the last century. This unit intends to address how colonialism and ethnic identity formation led to the struggle for independence in Africa.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- examine the linkages between colonialism and ethnicity in the Africa continent
- appraise the unique and common characteristics that led to agitations for independence across Africa and Asia

- highlight the cost of freedom in Africa and beyond
- examine civil society's disposition to issues of ethnicity and the attitudes they fostered in Africa.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Colonial Roots of Ethnicity

As mentioned earlier, Nnoli and some other scholars who researched ethnicity maintained that the colonial strategy of operation in Africa was to divide ethnic groups and pit them against each other so that they could focus their energies on fighting one another rather than engaging in confrontational activities which will disturb the colonial governments while they were preoccupied with exploiting the resources of their colonial possessions. One could also suggest that the corrosive, hierarchical, and divisive nature of capitalism introduced by colonialism is also partly responsible for the severity of ethnic conflicts in Africa.

Colonialism created some sort of favouritism and class divisions, which affected group relationships. It created undue advantage for certain groups, while others were left to fend for themselves. The situation invariably made some groups to perceive other groups as being more economically secure. In reaction to such situations, they often turn to ethnicity as an anchor, particularly if those who are economically well off and the ones who are disadvantaged belong to an identifiable ethnic group. However, the need for every ethnic group to be economically secure exacerbated by the inability or refusal of those who possess wealth to equally distribute resources contributed to incessant ethnic conflagration.

It is important to emphasise that the administrative abnormality of colonialism to a large extent infested many African countries after colonialism. This is evident in the nature of class consciousness that surfaced to cause further stratification in the society. In Liberia, for instance the colonial elites benefited from the antagonistic relations of African-Liberians and Americo-Liberians. Nnoli corroborated his position on the influence of colonialism on group relationship by making reference to Osaghae who observed that underneath conflicts which are apparently ethnic are personal (and class) ambitions which are desperate, opportunistic and violence-prone. This apparently was a negative legacy left behind by the colonial administrations across Africa, though some people have argued that colonialism had come and gone, and that African nations need not continue to blame their political woes on colonialism.

3.2 Colonialism and Ethnicity in Africa

The search for raw materials and spheres of influence led to the struggle for and partition of the Africa continent in the late 19th century by European nations. Some of these nations include Britain, Portugal, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany and Spain to mention but a few. However, the most remarkable are Britain and France in terms of their style of administration and the legacies they bequeathed to their subjects. While the British adopted the indirect rule system of governance, the French and Portuguese opted for assimilation, that is, to assimilate their subjects into French and Portuguese cultures respectively through the policy of assimilation. In other words, their methods of governance were imposed on Africa and Africans without regard for preexisting traditions, belief systems, culture and even native ways of governance.

Besides, the existing map of Africa is a Western colonial creation, drawn with little regard to the boundaries of historic ethnic homelands or ethnic compositions of the subject population. African states and communities were partitioned and divided without regards for the boundary or ethnic demarcations. This has instigated a lot of conflicts within and among several African states. The Cameroon and Nigeria border disputes over Bakassi peninsula and Libya and Chad's dispute over the Aouzou Strip are good examples of such conflict. In demarcating these states, attention was not given to language, culture, and other features of ethnic group. For instance, one can find Yoruba-speaking people in Nigeria as well as in Republic of Benin, and Togo. African traditions were not respected and most of the people lost their ethnic identity as a result.

What the colonial metropoles failed to realise was that there is always a conflict between moral and ethnicity and also political ethnicity and tribalism. Ethnicity has a moral core which constitutes a requirement for states that want to construct nations. Building a national consciousness or nationalism to sustain the nation is a complicated thing because there are competing ethnic nationalisms. The belief that there are 'superior' and 'inferior' groups makes consensus-building more difficult as the challenges of ethnic loyalty may undermine them. If the representatives of the big ethnic groups are only interested in themselves and their groups, the resolution of divisive issues and the protection of minority interests remain difficult.

The political elite see the manipulation of ethnic loyalty as the cheapest and most reliable strategy to acquire and consolidate power. The challenge here is not about the use of nation state against ethnicity but how to develop more plural forms of nationalism which can incorporate

ethnic variations. In essence, the appeal of ethnicity as an instrument of political mobilisation is largely seductive because of its emotional content.

3.3 Colonialism and Independence in African States

In the four centuries between 1500 and 1914, the central theme of world history was the expansion of European power. After 1914, however, a series of events took place that gradually undermined the West's global dominion. The catalyst was World War I (1914-1918). For four years, Europeans slaughtered each other by the millions and laid waste the financial resources of the entire continent. No sooner had Europeans begun to recover from this catastrophe than they stumbled into the greatest economic depression of modern times. Then came World War II (1939-1945). By the end of that bloody conflict, European powers were so exhausted, so poor, and so demoralised they were barely in a position to assert control over their own countries, let alone their colonies. Not surprisingly, nationalist movements throughout Asia and Africa took advantage of Europe's weakness. Within a generation, these movements had swept aside colonial governments and established an assortment of independent states. By the end of the third quarter of the 20th century, 400 years of European dominance had ended in most places in Africa.

3.4 Colonialism and Civil Society

Ekeh (1972, 1975) posits that one of the fundamental consequences of colonialism was the creation of two publics, which contested for the loyalty of Africans. These are:

(1) the primordial public which is made up of ethnic unions, community associations and other primordial groups, established in the colonial period to meet the welfare needs that were denied by the colonial state; and
(2) the civic public whose genealogy begins with the colonial state apparatus and encompasses the symbols and institutions of the post-colonial state.

While the primordial public enjoyed the affection of the people who always thought of what they could do for it without asking for anything in return, the civic public is inundated by greedy citizens with a notion of citizenship that begins and ends at the realm of rights.

Ekeh's argument is that ethnicity has flourished in Nigeria for example because the Nigerian elite who inherited the colonial state have conceptualised development as transferring resources from the civic

public to the primordial public. The civic public is thus a contested terrain where representatives of the primordial public struggle for their share of the national cake. In this struggle, politics is amoral and the end justifies the means. The state is so treated because it is seen as alien, exploitative and oppressive.

3.5 Colonialism and Independence Movements

One can identify a set of common characteristics that influenced all the independence movements across the Asian and African continents. One such characteristic is a common antagonist, namely Europe. To be sure, the various European states administered their colonies differently. Nevertheless, they all manifested similar qualities of paternalism and arrogance, and they all transmitted to their colonies an institutional legacy—such as the nation-state—that had lasting consequences.

The various independence movements also frequently shared elements of contradiction and irony. In many European colonies, for example, local intellectual and political leaders were often educated in Europe or America. There they were exposed to the Western ideals of freedom and equality embodied in the American and French Revolutions. Small wonder, then, that they returned home with these ideals—especially the goal of national sovereignty. The leaders had also learned from another model of political action, the Russian Revolution. The success of the 1917 Marxist revolution in Russia seemed to offer a do-it-yourself template for nationalist intellectuals around the world intent on overthrowing their old regimes. Marxism, when mixed with nationalism, formed an explosive combination that sparked successful revolutions throughout the 20th century from China to Vietnam to Africa and to Cuba. Western leaders therefore, by exporting both nationalism and Marxism, had ironically delivered into the hands of those who resisted them the instruments of their own expulsion.

Another paradox occurred after independence had been granted to the colonies. Freedom did not always bring with it the prosperity and self-government for which so many early leaders had tirelessly worked. In some cases, the newly “free” people woke up to discover that their colonial masters had simply been replaced by local dictators who used the old colonial institutions for their personal gain. In other cases, countries faced new forms of economic exploitation as oppressive as those of the colonial period. Whether that exploitation constituted another form of colonialism, sometimes called neo-colonialism, or whether it was entered into willingly by the new masters of former colonies is a matter that historians are still yet to agree upon. Some historians say that although colonies had previously exercised little choice in how economic resources were developed, newly sovereign

countries did have a choice. They were free to nationalise or expel foreign companies from their countries, and many of them did so.

Apart from the characteristics they shared in common, however, the independence movements also displayed many unique characteristics. Each country faced a different set of challenges. Each had a different historical and cultural legacy that inevitably shaped its response to colonialism and its efforts to overthrow colonial rule. While some countries chose violence, others chose a peaceful method. Some countries achieved independence quickly, while others took much longer. Finally, some countries made a smooth transition to democracy while others moved from the oppression of a colonial power to the oppression of a local dictator.

3.6 The Cost of Political Freedom

The desire for freedom is one of the most enduring characteristics of humankind. While European colonial powers attempted to suppress freedom for colonised peoples, they were keen to achieve it for themselves in their own domains. Only reluctantly did they let go of their colonies in Africa and Asia, and only after it became clear that they had no choice than to do so. One might have hoped that the colonial peoples of the world could have been spared the suffering they had to endure on their long road to freedom. But this was not to be, nor was securing freedom the end of their struggle. No sooner did these countries obtain their freedom than they had to confront the next and perhaps more difficult challenge: deciding what this freedom meant, and what they should do with it. Should they establish democratic institutions, or build the same institutions of repression they themselves had fought against? In many countries, the answers to those questions remain elusive and vague.

In Africa, the experience of independence movements was as diverse as the colonial powers who dominated the continent. They were also as diverse as the remarkable leaders who emerged to forge new nations that emerged after independence. Post-war Britain and France were the first European powers to free themselves from their colonial territories - although not always peacefully, as in the case of Algeria. Portugal on the other hand, held onto its colonies such as Angola and Mozambique until the last possible moment. For the most part, Britain and France left without violence; however, where there were large numbers of European settlers, such as in Kenya and Algeria, independence was granted only after a hard struggle.

By and large, African states were able to obtain independence through a combination of the efforts of African nationalist movements and

Europe's weakness following World War II. Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium had suffered during the war, and Britain was also tired. The first colonies to obtain independence were those in North Africa. Between 1952 and 1956, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco became independent. Algeria followed in 1962. However, French settlers in Algeria were bitterly opposed to the concessions offered and resorted to terrorism and war to prevent them. Finally, after more than a million Algerians had been killed in the attempt to win their independence, the French gave in to their demands.

The French colonies south of the Sahara, which had a total population of about 30 million people, all had active independence movements. They had to wait, however, until General Charles de Gaulle became President of France before their hopes for independence became reality. He alone had the political clout in France to manoeuvre the relinquishment of power in colonial Africa. Within a few years of his assumption of the French presidency, most of the African states were free.

The British experience in sub-Saharan Africa varied widely. In West Africa, freedom came peacefully. In the Gold Coast, which is now Ghana, an independence movement arose in 1947, immediately after World War II. There, one of Africa's most influential leaders, Kwame Nkrumah became prominent and helped Ghana to become the first nation in sub-Saharan Africa to win independence in 1957. Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, became independent in 1960. The British did not necessarily welcome Nigerian independence but did not also attempt to suppress the efforts of Nigeria's nationalists.

Violence appeared to be the only means of achieving independence in East and Central Africa, where there were substantial numbers of white settlers. In Kenya, the white settler community numbered approximately 60,000 people who were adamantly opposed to any concessions to African self-rule and were willing to kill to preserve their privileges. Only after a long and bitter struggle did Kenya obtain independence in 1963.

In Rhodesia or what is now Zimbabwe, white settlers declared independence from Britain in 1965, only to soon establish what amounted to a police state to control the African population. Robert Mugabe stepped forward to lead a resistance movement that overturned white rule in 1980 and established the republic of Zimbabwe. Mugabe then assumed the post of prime minister and proceeded to create a one-party state of his own.

In 1961, South Africa, like Zimbabwe, also severed its ties with Britain and then established a republic ruled by white settlers. The black

African and Indian populations were systematically denied access to positions of political power. New laws, part of a wider policy known as *apartheid*, segregated white and African populations, forcing Africans to live in substandard housing and attend substandard schools. Resistance among the African community grew, especially under the leadership of Nelson Mandela who was imprisoned by the South African government in 1962. When he was released in 1990, Mandela negotiated an end to apartheid and a peaceful transition to democratic rule. In 1994, Mandela became president of South Africa.

The experience of other European colonial powers, such as Belgium in the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi, was fraught with violence, leaving a legacy of hatred and distrust that has poisoned regional politics ever since. The loss of Portuguese colonies such as Angola and Mozambique, both of which later became sites of other bloody wars of liberation, provided an opportunity for the Portuguese people to overthrow their own dictatorship at home. Ironically, in this instance, freedom for colonial peoples led to freedom for the colonisers.

In Asia, the story of independence is most graphically played out in southern and Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines was the first country to achieve its independence after World War II. The United States had acquired the Philippines after the Spanish-American War in 1898 and originally resisted Filipino independence movements. American forces brutally suppressed an armed insurrection between 1899 and 1901. But when Franklin Roosevelt became President of the United States in 1933, American policy changed. In 1934, legislation promising Filipino independence in 1946 was approved by the Congress of the United States. On July 4, 1946, the Philippines became an independent republic.

The rest of Southeast Asia traveled a much more difficult road to freedom. Indonesia had been controlled by the Dutch government since the former Dutch East India Company ceased operations in 1799. The Indonesian nationalist movement began during the 1920s but was suppressed by the Dutch. During World War II, when Indonesia was occupied by the Japanese, nationalists were permitted to organise in return for support of the Japanese war effort. After the war was over, the Dutch attempted to reestablish their control but failed. Indonesia became fully independent in 1949.

In Indochina (present-day Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam), the French had established control in 1883 during the larger scramble by European powers for colonies in the second half of the 19th century. The main leader of the Indochinese independence movement was Ho Chi Minh, who had lived in France and the Soviet Union as a young man. Like his

Indonesian counterparts, Ho took advantage of the Japanese occupation during World War II to strengthen his own power. When the French refused to give up their control after the war, Ho led a guerrilla struggle that culminated in the French withdrawal from Vietnam in 1954. However, Ho gained power only in the northern half of Vietnam. In the early 1960s he began a military campaign to gain control of South Vietnam. In 1975, after a long and destructive war that involved the United States, which supported South Vietnam, his successors succeeded in unifying the two Vietnams into a single country.

In the Malay Peninsula, Britain had gradually increased its influence from the 18th century onwards. In Burma and Malaya, the Japanese occupation during World War II provided an opportunity for independence movements to establish a foothold when the nationalists allied with the Japanese to fight the British. Burma received independence in 1948, followed by Malaya in 1957.

4.0 CONCLUSION

From the above discourse, it could be inferred that the basic consequences of colonialism was the creation of two publics, which contested for the loyalty of Africans. First and foremost, there was a primordial public which comprised of ethnic unions, community associations and other primordial groups, which was founded in the colonial period to meet the welfare needs that were denied by the colonial state. The other was the civic public whose genealogy begins with the colonial state apparatus which include the symbols and institutions of the post-colonial state.

It was discovered that in most part of Africa, ethnic nationalism and ethnicity have become important political issues as many ethnic groups are struggling to move from being groups of common culture to groups of political will, striving for their territorial sovereignty of the groups which they belong.

5.0 SUMMARY

Despite the diverse forms of social, political, and economic organisation, pre-colonial Africa and Asia had several features in common. In essence, the various independence movements shared some element in common. In many European colonies, for example, local intellectual and political leaders were educated in Europe or America. There they were exposed to the Western ideals of freedom and equality embodied in the American and French Revolutions. In a nutshell, this unit has been able to discuss colonialism and ethnicity in Africa and Asia highlighting both the peaceful and sometimes violent

characteristics of the roads to independence in Africa and Asia continents.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. How did colonialism affect post-colonial political development in African societies?
2. Name the African countries colonised by Britain and the nature of their independence.
3. What similarities and differences are there in the colonial policies and modes of disengagement across Africa and Asia?

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UNIT 5 THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OF ETHNICITY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The end of Cold War ushered in an era of great intra-state conflicts propelled by ethnic identity in all parts of the world. This new trend of internal conflict had actually started rearing its head in the 1960s mostly in Africa at the immediate aftermath of colonialism but became more pronounced after the Cold War. Liberal, developmental and modernisation theories of ethnicity all seem to suggest that the phenomenon is evidence traditional, antiquated presence of past relations. Advocates of these theories hold the view that people are motivated either by individual or class interests that are mainly economic or material. The developmentalists predict that ethnicity would perish in the heat of modernity or disappear unceremoniously into the dustbins of history.

Contrary to these positions, experience suggests that ethnicity persists both as a paradigm and political reality. In many instances ethnicity has enhanced and intensified social change, thereby determining its direction, and also informing certain reactions. Some scholars have noted that what is witnessed today is not the atavistic remnants of an earlier age, which is expected to have disappeared with modernisation, but fairly recent creations shaped by social change. For some others, it is useful to look into historic circumstances that led to a current situation where ethnic identification came to be of paramount importance and the pervasive tendency to look down on ethnicity as a retrogressive or false consciousness ought to change.

Thus, in this unit we shall examine the three major theories of ethnicity with a view to finding out how appropriate these theories are in enhancing our understanding of the subject matter.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- identify the theories that explain the concept of ethnicity
- discuss and link these theories to conflicts in Africa
- identify linkages and points of divergence between the theories that explain ethnicity as a social phenomenon.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Ethnicity: Insights from Functionalist Theory

Functionalists view society as a system of separate but inter-related parts that work together in order to maintain stability or social equilibrium. They measure this based on how it contributes to a social system. The emphasis in functionalism is that society naturally leans towards homeostasis, therefore, there is little need for social reform because when one part of society malfunctions, the other parts will adapt and work twice as hard to compensate to maintain stability. Contrary to this position, conflict theorists argue that society is ruled by a 'power elite' which force social classes to compete with one another for resources. They reject the idea that society will 'sort itself out' and instead embrace social reforms to correct inequality.

Those who espouse functionalist theories believe that every society will have different institutions, which have certain functions that contribute to the survival of the social system as a whole, just as the organs of the body have functions which are necessary for the body's survival. Ethnicity as a phenomenon performs functionalist roles when one looks at its tendency to influence people’s reaction in a plight to fight a course. It then becomes an instrument for rallying support. Just like Emile Durkheim emphasised, social equilibrium is achieved, most importantly, through the socialisation of members of the society into the basic values and norms of that society, and this being achieved through ethnic devices.

Functionalist analyses often focus on the individual, usually with the intent to show how individual behavior is molded by broader social forces, though some critics have suggested that functionalist theorists are, in effect, treating individuals either as puppets whose decisions are a predictable result of their location in the social structure and of the

norms and expectations they have internalised, or sometimes as virtual prisoners of the explicit social control techniques that society imposes. What this practically suggests is that man remains a product of his surrounding environment and is susceptible to its influence.

3.2 Relative Deprivation as Basis of Ethnic Differentiation

There are three main critical issues in relative deprivation. The first issue relates to economic slump which are often accompanied by an upsurge in inter-ethnic conflict. The post-communist movement from a controlled economy to a free market in the Eastern Europe and parts of Asia and Africa in recent years has created a host of social problems that provides fertile breeding ground for sectarian sentiments. In other areas, there are policies that discriminate economically for or against certain groups.

The second group of conflict relates to questions of culture. Conflict manifest when there is a demand for autonomy. Many multi-ethnic societies have faced this issue in recent times. As demand for cultural autonomy increase and assimilationist policies are increasingly regarded with suspicion. The third broad pattern of relative deprivation stems from disputes over territory. Territorial disputes are likely to assume the semblance of ethnic ones when ethnic groups are concentrated territorially. In such cases, the manifestation of self-determination is often regarded as an attempt at secession from the existing state.

Politics of patronage and power concentration are both conditions that exacerbate relative deprivation. This gives a negative connotation to ethnicity in an atmosphere of competition as rival groups participate in ceaseless and at times cruel maximisation of economic and social welfare through the control of the state. Groups who find themselves in a position of advantage tend to use such advantages to deprive others of benefits which should accrue to them. In situations where the central government has a total control of economic resources, each group fights it way to representation. This is in fact the nature of ethnic relations in Nigeria and some other African countries. In Zaire, while former President Mobutu was at the helm of affairs, his home town was by far well-developed in terms of social amenities and transport compared to other parts because it received far more attention than other regions of the country.

3.3 Frustration/Aggression and Invocation of Ethnic Identity

In ethnicity, an attempt to play up the issue of group identity or solidarity causes disparity which easily leads to name-calling and all forms of divisive “us” against “them” behaviors. The need to belong is

probably the biggest cause of relational aggression as experienced in group relations. Nnoli (1994) is of the view that ethnicity in Africa arises from the projection of state power by those who control the state. We could from this notion infer that ethnic groups, who controls power in a state have effective tool to lunch aggression against those who are perceived to be the minority.

Nnoli further maintained that the undemocratic character of the state means that in extending political authority throughout the country and organising economic and social activities in the society those who control the state often inflict direct or structural violence on peoples and communities. In some quarters, it has been argued that ethnicity emerges as an inclusive framework for responding to the violence of the state. Invariably, the perceived violence is indirectly towards the groups who are engaged in the maltreatment of others.

Frustration could be seen as a means to an end or as an end in itself. It is a means to an end when an action is directed towards another person with a view of preventing such a person from achieving something. On the other hand, it becomes an end in itself when the outcome of the action causes another person to feel unfulfilled. Anyone who suffers such an experience is said to be frustrated (Oxford, 1997). Aronson (1965) is of the opinion that aggression can be promoted by any unpleasant or aversive situation, such as anger, pain, boredom, and the like. However, the major instigator of aggression is frustration, which sets in when an individual is thwarted in his/her bid to attain a goal. Such situation increases the probability of an aggressive response.

This does not mean frustration always leads to aggression or that frustration is the only cause of aggression. The response of anyone who suffers frustration is in the form of “aggression”. Aggression is often perceived as a hostile act or behaviour in response to a perceived threat. The two situations are common when talking about ethnic relationships, particularly when there is a question of deprivation. Deprivation occurs when a party seeks to gain total control of some situations, and in so doing, deliberately prevent others from participation in aspects of that situation.

Once people are mobilised on the basis of primary identity, the conflict is necessarily intense because they are inclined to believe that they are defending their whole way of life. The tragic enormity of this point is clearly evident in Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, Kosovo, Algeria and Sudan. What makes identity-based conflicts so violent is the way in which the issues in the dispute are emotionally charged. They go right to the heart of what gives the people their sense of themselves, defining a person’s bond with his or her community and defining the source of

satisfaction for his/her need for identity. Above all, ethnicity has the power to totalize and transcend other loyalties and obligations. When people's multiple identities are narrowed down to a single focus, social divisions become deeper, more rigid and deeply emotional. In such a condition, identity does not merely distinguish among groups but may also cause one group to dehumanise and demonise another.

3.4 Primordialism

According to Joireman (2003: 19), "primordialism evokes images of ancient beginnings, evolution and a natural state of being. Most primordialists view ethnicity as defined by or intimately connected with blood ties or kinship or a myth of common origin. There are recognisable types of primordialism, but generally, the position is that the characteristics of ethnicity are naturally given. It holds that ethnicity has existed at all times across human history and that modern ethnic groups have historical continuity that stretches into the far past. For them, the idea of ethnicity is closely linked to the idea of nations and is rooted in the pre-Weber understanding of humanity as being divided into primordially existing groups rooted in kinship and biological heritage. In other words, primordialists believe that ethnic identities are determined at birth and most especially by the ethnic identities of ones parents, and are therefore unchangeable. Ethnicity can also be likened to an ascribed trait, such as a person's sex or age.

One of the most prominent exponents of primodialism is Clifford Geertz. According to Geertz (1963), states are abnormally susceptible to serious disaffection based on primordial attachment that citizens have. This assertion plays out in a remarkable way in Rwanda in 1994 in the attempted annihilation of the entire Tutsi population by their Hutu neighbours who happen to be in the majority.

However, some scholars have pointed out some contradictions or weaknesses inherent in the position of primordialists, which holds that ethnicity is innate and cannot be altered. Yet, we are well aware that ethnicity is in a state of flux and ethnic affinities changes over time. It is possible for a person to be raised in the United States with American parents; attend college in America; and then move to Israel and become an Israeli citizen, completely adapting to that new situation, politically, linguistically and culturally over time. In essence, it is possible for someone to be born and be raised in one culture and then choose another. Moreover, some ethnic identification can be very strong under certain circumstances and completely disappear in other contexts (Joireman, 2003). Primordialism cannot explain the state of individuals who have multiple ethnic identities such as Barack Obama, Tiger Woods, and so on.

3.5 Constructivism

This theory holds that ethnic boundaries are neither something primordially given that cannot be changed, nor can it be constructed and changed in any possible way. Rather, constructivism conceptualises ethnic boundaries as both inborn and socially constructed traits that are built on combinations of ascriptive criteria - such as language, geographical origin or religion – that are present in the population. It lays emphasis on the fluid nature of ethnicity.

Constructivists believe that so many variables give rise to the creation of particular ethnic borders. First, individuals are mostly socialised in homogeneous groups who share the same characteristics, and will develop a concrete sense of identification with this group – making boundaries that cross-cut these identities unlikely. Second, as ethnic boundaries are based on identification with abstract groups, but should be readily available for the individuals to recognise, they will be based on easily identifiable ascriptive criteria. Thus, the number of potential ethnic boundaries is not unlimited. Third, when these criteria allow for multiple ethnic boundary lines to be formed, shared economic and political characteristics can be decisive in explaining why one group is formed rather than another (CCPV, 2006).

The two major proponents of this theory are Benedict Anderson and Terence Ranger. The latter argues that traditions are created and that people migrate into traditions. For example, Africans in the Republic of South Africa have had their identities reconstructed. How do we classify half-castes? Another example that readily comes to mind is the example of the people of Northern Ireland who created a separate identity for themselves because they did not want to have anything to do with the British Crown. According to Nagel (1986) ethnicity is “partly ascribed and partly volitional”. The Eritrean struggle for independence from Ethiopia. The fact that both countries had a common historical experience and share virtually all the characteristics of an ethnic group clearly brings to the fore how ethnic identity can be created over a period and become so significant that people are eager to lay down their lives in defense of that identity.

We can agree with the position of constructivists to the extent that on many occasions, people have had reason to construct their identity to achieve particular goals. However, constructivism does not explain why the lure of ethnicity is so powerful and alluring even to supposedly well educated people who sometimes act basically on primordial sentiments. Again, if you say identity is created, as the primordialists would want us to believe, it will be difficult to maintain such identity. When there are resources to be shared people do often appeal to primordial feeling

rather than constructed identity. In a nutshell, the constructivists are particularly preoccupied with group formation with no explanation to group goals and political motivations.

3.6 Instrumentalism

Instrumentalists view ethnicity as a means to some specific but sometimes hidden political end, and as such, it is focused on the self-serving goals of ethnic groups rather than the general good of all. Instrumentalists believe ethnicity is changeable and that it is not a characteristic acquired at birth that continues over time. Moreover, instrumentalists believe that ethnic identities may be important at some times and in some circumstances but will be completely absent at other times and to that extent, ethnicity is more or less a mask of elite interest. The elite only employ ethnicity to gain certain interests.

It is easy to mobilise people based on ethnicity. This manifested in Nigeria in the first and second republics. During these periods, votes were mobilised based on ethnic sentiments and in reflection of the system of regionalism that was in existence at that time. According to Bacova (1998), people's attachments to particular communities that are of instrumental character are the opposite pole of primordial attachments. These are individuals` affiliations to the communities which are beneficial to them or bring them practical economic and political advantages. They are based on rational awareness and the need for protection of common interests, not closeness. The individual understands the community as an instrument for achieving his goals.

These bonds of an individual to a community are characterised as cool-headed, formal, intentional, purposeful, requiring conscious loyalty and formed on the basis of choice, but also as vague, temporary, intermittent and routine. They prevail in organisations such as trade unions, political parties, professional unions, sports clubs, local interest groups, parent-teacher associations, etc. These groupings can be founded and can cease to exist.

During their struggle for independence, Eritrean leaders clearly sought to instill in the population an understanding of their unity and what it meant to be Eritrean. In this regard, the Eritrean case fits into template of instrumentalist theory which suggests that leaders manipulate identities to achieve personal or communal goals. The presence of drama troupes who toured the country promoting the struggle as well as the use of art and creative writing are all indicative of an attempt to educate the population and manipulate ethnic identity and it was very successful.

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have presented some examples and overview of the major theories of ethnicity as put forward by their proponents. Primordialism has presented and continues to present the components of ethnicity as immediate contiguity, kindred spirits, kin connection of individuals, self-attribution of membership, common culture (language, religion, values, norms), common territory (country, region, nationality) and common biological descent (common ancestors, race, tribe). These emotional features of ethnicity are, according to primordialists, given and undeniable. Ethnicity has its own essence and qualitative core. It provides individuals with their deepest identity. It promotes unity and solidarity, which overcomes all divisions within the community (class, age, sex, qualifications, and so on). It is strongly activated when a community is in danger. The construction of an ethnic identity aims at inventing something new to cope with the cultural threat posed by the dominant other, but it is also a defense of the existing culture that needs to be reinvented, precisely to meet this challenge. Instrumentalists stress circumstantial manipulation of identity. They view human actions as rationally oriented.

It is instructive to state that theories of ethnicity enunciated in this unit do sometimes overlap and find expression in a given community or country. For example, instrumentalism and constructivism could be employed to properly grasp the nature of the Eritrean struggle for independence.

5.0 SUMMARY

Instrumentalism has become a part of scholarly consensus regarding understanding ethnic identity and nationalism. It explains the basis of for nationalism and the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism. However, instrumentalism cannot explain ethnic affiliations that seem to exist without some wider political purpose or goal for either a particular individual or for the elite of that particular group. It equally has difficulty explaining the strength and persistence of ethnicity over time. The individual`s ethnic/national identity (meaning identification of the individual with the elements of his or her ethnic/national world) is associated with his/her inclination to primordial versus instrumental belief about the character of ethnic/national communities. These beliefs are known as social constructions and are conditioned mainly by the history of the particular community.

The relationship between these theories are sometimes complex. The give explanations to the categorical identities invoked by elites and other participants in political and social struggles. These categorical identities

also shape everyday life, offering both tools for grasping preexisting homogeneity and difference and constructing specific versions of such identities.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. How do people create ethnic identity?
2. Which theories explain the phenomenon of ethnicity?
3. Discuss with examples the major tenets of theories of ethnicity that you know.
4. What factors predispose people to pursuing an ethnic rather than national agenda in a multiethnic society? Give examples.

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MODULE 3 ETHNICITY, IDENTITY AND INSURGENCY

UNIT 1 ETHNICITY AS IDENTITY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

It is best to start this unit by going back to the analysis of ethnic group as given by Cohen. To him one of the strongest attributes of an ethnic group is its exclusive heritage and manipulation of symbols. According to him, "Symbols are objects, acts, concepts, or linguistic formations that stand ambiguously for a multiplication of disparate meanings, evoke sentiments and emotions, and impel men to action"(Cohen, 1974). According to Otite (2000) symbols are shared and collective. They constitute viable resources in the struggle over scarce political and economic rewards in state systems. We all grew up to be aware that we belong to one ethnic group or the other. But taking a closer look we discover that ethnicity is a function of an individual's personal choice which is usually used for political gain and other purposes. That is why even if we define ourselves along cultural lines, we tend to emphasise certain aspects more than others. This unit analyzes how identity is formed and how it affects and influences our interactions with others.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- examine the linkage between ethnicity and identity formation processes
- examine the linkage between ethnicity and social class
- explore the extent to which religion is a factor of identity formation
- discuss identify ways in which ethnicity affect inter group relations.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Identity

Identity refers to both group self-awareness of common characteristics and individual self-awareness of inclusion in such a group. Self-awareness may be formulated in broad cultural terms (ethnic identity), in biogenetic terms (racial identity), in terms of sexual orientation (heterosexual/homosexual/bisexual etc.), and in terms of gender. Persons and groups often adhere to multiple and fluid identities; features of which may be selectively relevant in specific social situations.

In the field of social anthropology, some scholars have identified the growth of "hybridity", which refers to a situation where there is dissolution of rigid cultural boundaries between groups usually perceived as separate, and the intermixture of various identities. In effect, this results in the dissolution of identities themselves. Many scholars in this field demonstrate how identities have been and are invented and reinvented for political and other purposes, out of disparate historical and cultural experiences. Other studies have repeatedly shown that - contrary to a group's self-representation and assertion of an identity - identities are driven by contradictions and are not to be understood as perfect unified comprehensive cultural entities.

Aristotle suggested that ethnically diverse nations are more prone to internal strife that inhibits economic development than more homogenous nation-states (cited in Mulgan, 1999). This political hypothesis was supported by his (Aristotle) theory that ethnic differences such as race, language, locality, and religion divided state citizens into fundamentally separate and different groups. Consequently, 'us' versus 'them' competitions would emerge, as various ethnic groups compete in zero-sum games to win the spoils of the state for 'their' people.

Recent studies have shown that individuals do define themselves according to culturally ethnic lines. However, it is within the individual's choice to emphasise certain aspects of his/her ethnicity rather than others (Bayart, 2000; Mbembe, 2001). Even though the constructivist theory does not take into account the possibility of ethnic identity as a means to other ends, it does grant some individual freedoms in ethnic choice. Society is constantly evolving as individuals choose to express themselves by emphasising different aspects of their ethnicity.

Utilitarian theory believes that some element of ethnicity is a result of individual human choice. Utilitarians believe that ethnicity is identified by peoples as a means to an end beyond itself. Utilitarian ethnic identity is based upon the presumption that individuals within a society will act collectively to increase the significance of their own interests and preferences. This collective action, however, is based upon each individual's cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, when the costs of collective action outweigh the benefits, the individuals will choose to not collectively aggregate into an ethnic identity. By arguing that ethnic identity is strongly defined by common political and economic conditions, utilitarian ethnic identity theory leaves little room for accretive ties to cultural and traditional similarities (Banton, 1993).

Utilitarian believe that when a nation-state experiences economic instability, a series of economic choices within the structure of informal associations force individuals to rely on their ethnic identities in order to receive or acquire needed scarce resources. As ethnic identity becomes the more prominent means of acquiring or annexing scarce resources that are distributed by the state, zero-sum games that often result in tension and conflict between ethnic groups emerge. Thus, an individual's appeal to, or emphasis on his or her ethnic identity is directly correlated to his or her need to rely upon such a form of identity for personal gain.

Utilitarianism is of the opinion that the strength of an individual's ethnic identity is mostly or completely dependent upon economic and political circumstances. Once a state begins to experience economic instability, ethnic identity becomes an increasingly important identity that helps groups to survive. Berman (1998) demonstrates that as economic conditions deteriorate, cultural identity can quickly transform into political ethnicity. Certain elites and low-level bureaucrats, seeking individual gain, exploit their ethnic identity to further government careers promising to distribute the spoils of the state to others sharing their ethnicity. Once ethnicity becomes politicized within an economy where resources are distributed privately, ethnicity also becomes a vital identity for the people.

Hale (2004) noted that ethnic identity becomes a necessary social identity especially when state resources are scarce and the rule of law is weak. He therefore concludes that massive uncertainties such as economic collapse and social upheavals are widely associated with the broad appeal of encompassing social categories involving ethnic stereotypes (p. 473).

It is important to state that identity in terms of ethnicity, race, minority group status, gender, and sexual orientation is often contrasted with class consciousness—group self-awareness in terms of belonging to the same socioeconomic group. Some anthropologists have also identified the emergence and growth of a new "identity politics" that is distinct from an older "class politics" or what are called "new social movements." The term new social movements refer to gay and lesbian, feminist, civil rights and environmental movements and the term is used to distinguish these from trade unions and other class-based movements. These distinctions sometimes suggest that persons have to choose between uniting for social and political action primarily on the grounds of common membership in perceived ethnic, racial, minority, gender, sexual orientation, or environmental concerns rather than on the grounds of membership in a similar socioeconomic group.

In his analysis, Ekeh (1983) argues that the concept of ethnicity and its attendant variables are essentially an emergent social structure, that is, a carryover effect of colonialism. As he argued, by 1820, it would have horrified an Ekiti man if anyone were to call him a 'Yoruba' man. As far as he was concerned, a Yoruba man is a man from Oyo with whom he would probably need an interpreter in order to communicate effectively with. He also noted the case of Eluwa, the Secretary of the Ibo State Union who confessed that he and others were involved in persuading many 'Igbos' to accept that they were indeed Igbos in the early 1950s. Similarly, Hausa is a composition of several Hausa and non-Hausa tribal organisations that found common relevance in the northern part of modern Nigeria (Ekeh, 1983: 20).

One thing that we get from all these is the fact that ethnicity, which has increasingly become an impediment to cordial inter-group relations amongst Nigerians is not natural, but a construct. The constructionist theory is therefore appropriate for analysing changing inter-group interactions both in Nigeria and other multi-ethnic societies in various parts of the world.

3.2 Identity Formation

Identity formation is the development of the distinct personality of an individual in such a way that it becomes a persisting entity in a

particular stage of life in which individual characteristics are possessed and by which a person is recognised or known. This process defines how individuals see others and themselves. Pieces of the entity's actual identity include a sense of continuity, a sense of uniqueness from others, and a sense of affiliation. Identity formation leads to a number of issues of personal identity and an identity where the individual has some sort of comprehension of him or herself as a discrete and separate entity.

Identities owe their formation and position in society to the operation of social, economic, cultural, and political forces that are inseparable from the forces that create and maintain socioeconomic groups. To that extent, rather than being opposed, identity politics and class politics have the potential to jointly serve as unifying factors in a common political process.

3.3 Ethnicity and Language

We need to stress here that most scholars consider ethnicity to be synonymous with how people are identified, both by themselves and others. For instance, throughout Africa, language stands as the main marker. Language is a critical element because it connects people to a specific place of origin, which then signals a shared history. When we take a look at South Africa, the Zulu and Xhosa speak languages that are almost identical, but the minor differences are enough for people to make the distinction between the two groups. To them, it is very important to their sense of identity because the Zulu and Xhosa have followed very different paths over the last several centuries of history. Some other people have even deeper roots. The Songhai identity existed even before the group ruled a vast West African empire in the 15th and 16th centuries in what is now modern Mali.

The ethnic identities of many other peoples are more recent and often derive largely from external sources. This was the case of the Gogo of central Tanzania. History shows that in the mid-19th century, they lived in several small clan-based chiefdoms that had no sense of being part of a wider Gogo group, even though they shared the same language. The phrase "gogo" was a part of several of the clans' names, and their Nyamwezi neighbours picked up on this as a way to refer to all of them. When Arab and Swahili traders arrived in the area during the mid-19th century, they adopted this designation and passed it along to the first Europeans to enter the area. Because of repeated use, the name Gogo became accepted, eventually by the people themselves.

This way of naming groups on the basis of language similarities became the standard practice during the colonial era. This was done largely for administrative purposes, allowing colonial rulers to appoint chiefs, to

recruit labour, and to collect taxes from so-called tribes occupying specific designated areas. Anthropologists copied this practice and similarly classified ethnic groups by language similarities and locale. Without these external effects, it is unlikely that many of the overarching African ethnic identities would have existed.

3.4 Ethnicity and Class

It is necessary to note that factors other than language play roles in the formation of ethnic identities. This is true in the case of the Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi. Before the advent of colonisation of the region, "Hutu" and "Tutsi" referred to what could be called classes, with the former referring to farmers and the latter designating cattle keepers. The two classes shared a common language, and people moved from being one to the other by way of marriage or the ownership of cattle. When the Germans and subsequently the Belgians colonised the region, they assumed that the Tutsi were rulers, and thus privileged them with education and positions of authority in the colonial state. By the mid-20th century the boundaries between Hutu and Tutsi identities hardened to the point where they started to see themselves as separate peoples. Since the independence of Rwanda and Burundi, this segregation has sometimes prompted both groups to treat the other as a hated enemy in their separate efforts to rule the countries. In essence, they now conceive of themselves as separate ethnic groups.

3.5 Ethnicity and Religion

On some other occasions, a person's religion is the crucial factor defining his or her identity. This is what differentiates Christian Copts from their Muslim neighbours in Egypt. Also people sometimes identify themselves as Arabs because they adopted the religion of Islam and developed supposedly genealogical links to the prophet Muhammad. A very interesting example of how people use ethnicity as basis for identity and differentiating themselves from others is the case involving the pygmy hunter-gatherers of equatorial Africa among whom the Mbuti of the Ituri region of the DRC are identified. African pygmies are known to be the highest population of pygmies in the world. They are estimated to be between 150,000 and 300,000 and have lived in the Congo Valley before the arrival of other peoples. The Mbuti or Bambuti, are the shortest of all human groups, averaging about 130 cm (about 51 inches) in height. Non-African pygmy populations, who are often called Negritos, also represent pygmy populations but blood typing and other studies indicate that the African, Asian, Oceania, and Indian groups are genetically distinct from one another and have independent origins.

While there are indications that the various pygmy groups in equatorial Africa had their own unique languages at some point, they all adopted the languages of nearby Bantu farmers with whom they interacted. In this case, occupation, residence and physical differences all came together to create a sense of ethnic distinctiveness that people recognise.

3.6 Ethnic Identity and Intergroup Relations

Liberia is home to Americo-Liberians, a people who trace their ancestry to freed slaves from North America. Use of English, the protestant religion, and a wide array of other American cultural traits immediately set them apart from their indigenous African neighbours, over whom they exercised almost exclusive dominance until President William Tolbert was overthrown in a military coup in 1980.

Liberia was established by the American Colonisation Society that was founded in 1816 to resettle freed American slaves in Africa. Although an attempt at colonisation had failed in Sierra Leone in 1815, native rulers granted a tract of land on Cape Mesurado, at the mouth of the St. Paul River to American representatives six years later, and the first Americo-Liberians led by Jehudi Ashmun, began the settlement. In 1824, Ralph Randolph, an American agent for the society named the new colony Liberia and the Cape Mesurado settlement, Monrovia. Other separate settlements were later established along the coast. Before long, however, conflicts began to emerge between the settlers and the society in the United States. By the time Joseph Jenkins Roberts became the first black governor in 1841, the decision had been made to give the colonists almost complete control of the government. A constitution modeled on that of the United States was drawn up, and Liberia became an independent republic in July 1847. Roberts was its first president and served until 1856.

As settlers, the Americo-Liberian communities struggled to assert themselves during the 19th century. Claims over interior territory were made not only by the indigenous Mandinka, Kru, and Gola peoples, and by European states that did not recognise Liberian jurisdiction over the interior. With the support of the American government, the Americo-Liberians gained pre-eminence over the interior peoples. In 1931 the League of Nations confirmed that the use of native Africans or the indigenous Mandinka people for forced labour by Americo-Liberians amounted to slavery. The scandal that this created implicated the highest government officials and forced the president and vice president to resign. By 1936, the new government had succeeded in abolishing forced-labour practices in Liberia. The indigenous population, however, was still treated as second-class citizens without voting rights.

In the presidential election of May 1951, women and indigenous property owners voted for the first time, but the few thousand Americo-Liberians living in the coastal region still retained control of the government. Tubman Goldie the incumbent president and candidate of the dominant True Whig Party, was reelected without opposition. The government had suppressed the Reformation and United People's parties. Their leaders, supported mainly by residents of the hinterland, were arrested or exiled following the election. President Tubman was returned to office in the 1955 election, but he narrowly escaped assassination during his victory celebration.

In February 1958, the legislature passed a law making racial discrimination punishable by fine and imprisonment for citizens and by deportation for aliens. During the 1960s a Swedish-American group completed a major iron-ore project near Mount Nimba, and German investors developed iron-ore resources in the Bong Range. The Liberian Bank of Industrial Development and Investment was established in 1965 to provide capital for private investment.

During this time President Tubman had a solid hold on power. After some labour unrest within Liberia and coups elsewhere in Africa, he was given emergency powers in February 1966 for 12 months. In 1967 he was reelected to his sixth term and he was returned the seventh time in May 1971. Two months later he died and was succeeded by William R. Tolbert, Jr., who had been Liberia's vice president since 1951.

During the leadership of Tolbert in the 1970s, Liberia loosened its close ties with the United States and accepted economic aid from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1974 and later in 1978, it joined other developing countries in a trade agreement with the European Community. Domestically, emphasis was placed on bringing the isolated interior into national political life and on improving the economic conditions of the indigenous population. In 1979, however, the country was paralyzed by riots caused by a proposed increase in the price of rice, the staple food. More than 40 people were killed in the violence.

In 1980 Tolbert's opponents, empowered by a court decision recognising them as an opposition party, openly called for his overthrow. Their leader, Gabriel B. Matthews, and a dozen others were arrested. A month later on April 12, a bloody coup was staged by army personnel under the leadership of Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe. Tolbert and many of his aides were killed. A People's Redemption Council, headed by Doe, subsequently suspended the constitution and assumed full legislative and executive powers. More than a dozen officials of the previous regime were publicly executed.

After they gained their independence, most African countries sought to create national identities for their people. These have yet to develop to any significant degree, and for this reason, long held or recently forged ethnic identities are what most people hold onto as an indication of where their true loyalties lay. Ethnic politics have thus become commonplace in Africa, with Rwanda and Burundi illustrating the extreme end of the scale. Zimbabwe is wracked by hostility between Shona and Ndebele. In Nigeria, Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa compete with each other and with other minority groups. At the other end of the scale, ethnic politics is of little importance in Tanzania, which is so diverse that no group is particularly powerful. Sometimes older ethnic rivalries become submerged beneath other differences. This has happened in Sudan, which is plagued by decades of civil war between the Islamic, Arabic-speaking north and the non-Islamic, non-Arabic-speaking south. Although this conflict initially put the long-standing disputes between the Dinka and Nuer of the south on hold, it could surface again now that the Southern Sudan has gained its independence.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, especially festivals in Yorubaland were celebrated communally irrespective of religious creed. It was also easy and mostly a thing of joy for people to move from their ethnic base to other places for residence. This explains the large presence of people from the southern part to the northern part and vice-versa. Although people still live outside their places of origin today, it is always with a lot of fear as people feel relatively unsafe outside their ethic base. Another noticeable dimension is the penchant for people who are looking for whom to employ to show a preference for those who share their religious beliefs. It has also become rife for people to consider religious affiliation before letting out apartments. People also consider religion when making a choice on where to live. All these are new trends, which were not prevalent previously. The point here is that the spirit of accommodation and understanding that underlined the initial interaction of the older generations is gradually changing to discrimination and exclusion among the younger ones. Discriminations and exclusions are now rife almost a century after amalgamation and in spite of the fact that Nigerians are not entirely strange bedfellows, Nigerian peoples do not seem to be getting integrated. What is responsible for this could be located at the realms of politics, ethnicity and religion.

4.0 CONCLUSION

When the identification of a group of people is based on their ethnic affiliation, it usually arises as a result of the mobilisation of ethnic differences to gain advantage in situations of competition, conflict or cooperation. This shows that ethnicity is neither natural nor accidental,

but is the product of a conscious effort by social actors. Ethnic groups are groups with ascribed membership, usually but not always based on claims or myths of common history, ancestry, language, race, religion, culture and territory. While all these variables need not be present before a group is so defined, the important thing is that such a group is classified as having a common identity that distinguishes it from others. It is this classification by powerful agencies such as the state, religious institutions and intelligentsia that objectifies the ethnic group and sets in motion the processes of self-identification or affirmation and recognition by others.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, we have been able to understand that identity refers to both group self- awareness of common unique characteristics and individual self-awareness of inclusion in such group; and that identity may be formulated in broad cultural terms (ethnic identity), in biogenic terms (racial identity), in terms of sexual orientation, and in terms of gender. We also discussed the fact the formation of identities are usually motivated by the operation of social, economic, cultural and political forces. We have also come to the understanding that language is an important element in identification of people since it connects them to a specific place of origin. Apart from language, class is a factor that also plays a role in the formation of ethnic identities.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. What do you understand by the term identity?
2. How is ethnicity used as a basis for identity and how does it affect a society?
3. In what ways has class differences affected post-colonial politics in some African states?

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UNIT 2 INSURGENCY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Ethnicity has sometimes constituted the main reason for resistance against dominant groups or the state itself. In the case of the latter, the major concern is to avoid the dualisation of sovereignty and monopoly of power and for this reason; the state is often unwilling to condone the presence of groups who take up arms against it. This may involve civil disobedience or refusal to obey civil laws or decrees which usually takes the form of passive resistance. People practicing civil disobedience break a law because they consider the law unjust, want to call attention to its injustice, and hope to bring about its repeal or amendment. They are also willing to accept any penalty, such as imprisonment, for breaking the law.

Resistance also includes the activism of groups engaged in a struggle against military or totalitarian occupation or against other forms of social and political oppression. While some people who are involved in resistance use violent tactics, others employ nonviolent strategies. This unit makes an exposition of the major types of insurgencies with relevant example to enable the student have a firm knowledge of the types, characteristics, goals and justifications for insurgencies.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- identify and define what an insurgent group is
- identify the short and long term goals of an insurgent group

- differentiate between insurgent groups and other types of resistance movements.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 What is an Insurgency?

Insurgents are citizens of a country attempting by illegal means to change the way it is governed. They believe that the legal methods available cannot satisfy their demands. Thus, they violate the accepted legal processes of government and use illegal means, which are a combination of political, economic, psychological, and military methods. The term insurgency implies some degree of popular participation, distinguishing it from a coup d'état. An insurgency is usually revolutionary in intent. It aims to replace the current system of government and redirect the society and its institutions. It would change who governs, how, and for what purposes.

In view of the above, it is clear that an insurgency is generally seen as an attempt by an organised element to overthrow the legal government through subversion and armed co-threat. More often than not, this involves paramilitary, guerrilla, or non-violent uprisings directed against a nation-state or its apparatus mostly from within in order to achieve political objectives. Insurgencies vary in organisation, spontaneity, and threat, but all rely on mass participation in one form or another (Miller and King, 2005). There are variants of or degrees of insurgency in relation to the application of violence, but generally it is acts of rebellion against political authority or leadership or against certain state policies. Insurgency, sometimes manifesting as guerrilla warfare, is not new. The very name guerrilla warfare (or "little war") dates back to the Spanish resistance against Napoleon's occupation of Spain between 1809 and 1813. Earlier in time, Darius the Great, King of Persia (558–486 BC), and Alexander the Great (356–323 BC) both fought insurgents during their reigns. The Irish nationalist, Michael Collins, led the insurgency that drove the British out of Ireland in a bloody campaign that took place between 1916 and 1921.

Insurgency continued as a form of war through the ages. In all cases, the weaker side used insurgent tactics to counter the superior military power of its enemies. However, in the 20th century, the political aspects of insurgency came to dominate these struggles. The goal became the destruction of the enemy's political will rather than the exhaustion of his conventional military power. Advances in communications technology and the growth of formal and informal networks have greatly increased the ability of the insurgent to attack the will of enemy decision makers directly (Hammes, 2005: 3).

Fearon and Laitin (2002) see insurgency as a form of military conflict characterised by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. To explain why some countries have experienced civil wars in this period one needs to understand the conditions that favour insurgency, which are largely independent of cultural differences between groups and even group grievances.

Causes of Insurgency

If government and other social organisations are generally meeting the needs of the people, there is little cause for any form of insurgency. However, if significant numbers of people believe their society is not serving them as it should, they will oppose it by any means available to them. A major indicator of an impending insurgency is the fragmentation of a country's leaders. When the society is failing and there is no agreement on solutions, the leaders divide among themselves. The government becomes unable to count on the loyalty of its own members and employees. Government agencies work at cross-purposes. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches may compete for power. Armed forces often disobey the policies of their governments and pursue their own agendas. The private sector is often divided. Land owners and farm workers may be at odds. Industry and labour may be unable to agree on goals and policies.

There is a psychological hierarchy of human needs which provides a virtual psychological rank ordering of what a human being needs most to be satisfied. The general types of needs are:

- physiological needs
- safety needs
- belongingness and love needs
- esteem needs, and
- self-actualisation needs.

Relative deprivation can be experienced at any level of the hierarchy of needs. People become angry when denied food, clothing, housing, jobs, or similar economic needs. However, they can become just as angry if they are denied their human dignity or the opportunity for political participation. Any group that is subjected to social or political discrimination are potential insurgents, and so are people in an authoritarian society who are subject to arbitrary rule.

Even though their government may present economic benefits, people may become discontented when they cannot make decisions affecting their own lives. Since this hierarchy applies to all people, the potential

for insurgency or revolution is not limited to the poorest countries of the world. In fact, it implies the poorest people will devote themselves to basic survival and will not be concerned with political matters.

The causes of insurgency are also not limited to economic problems. In fact, political and social concerns may be more potent revolutionary motives than economics. The necessary conditions for revolution exist when people believe they are being treated unfairly and have no recourse to justice. If a country is poor and people know it but feel they are getting their fair share of what is available, they do not revolt. They accept the situation as the natural conditions of things. When people begin to believe society owes them more than they actually receive, they experience a sense of injustice and relative deprivation.

Whatever the strategy and tactics that they employ, part of the political process of insurgency is the quest to develop anti-government alliances, or the so-called "united fronts." One of the ways an insurgent leadership attracts supporters is through ideologies—a general theory of problem solving that outlines a plan to improve people's lives—which it uses to appeal to social groups and political forces. Insurgent leaders may be completely convinced in their own minds that their political theories are correct. This ideology therefore defines the limits within which they are willing to operate. Insurgents seek to manipulate groups and forces for their own purposes. Thus, they may conceal all or part of their ideology and goals from allies.

The political appeal of insurgents must consider the values of the people. Sometimes insurgents have only a vague idea of the sort of government they will establish when they gain power. Their only goal is short-term: to rid themselves of incumbents. If the existing government is hated enough, such an insurgency can succeed. As we have seen in the case of Libya where confusion set in immediately after Muammar Gadhafi was killed, the defeat of the old government may result in another battle among rival insurgent parties before a new system is established.

3.2 Types and Strategies of Insurgency

Following the Bard O'Neil model that divides insurgency into seven key types (2000), the following types of insurgent movements can be identified:

- *Anarchist*: Aim to eliminate all institutionalised political arrangements; they view authority relationships as unnecessary and illegitimate.

- *Egalitarian*: Aim to impose a new system based on distribution equality and centrally controlled structures to mobilise the people and radically transform the social structure within an existing political community.
- *Traditionalist*: Aim to displace the political system; the values they articulate are primordial and sacred ones rooted in ancestral ties and religion.
- *Pluralist***:** Aim to displace the political system in favour of individual freedom and liberty.
- *Secessionist***:** Aim to withdraw from the present political community and constitute a new and independent political community.
- *Reformist***:** Aim to gain autonomy and reallocate political and material resources within the present political system.
- *Preservationist***:** Aim to maintain the existing political system by engaging in illegal acts against non ruling groups/the authorities who want to change.

According to O'Neill, all the above types of insurgencies can (depending on the environment and strength of the insurgent group), choose from several strategic approaches to reach their political goals. These include strategies such as:

- *The Conspiratorial Strategy*

In this strategy, small and well disciplined conspiratorial groups form a party to exploit grievances that have largely alienated elements of the population from the government. The insurgent does not seek to bring the general population against the government but it will mobilise segments for mass support in riots and demonstrations. When the government is no longer sure of the loyalty of the military and police, the government can be collapsed by terrorism and mass demonstrations.

- *Protracted Popular War Strategy*

This strategy assumes that the government is in a superior position of power and is unlikely to fall without a protracted and significant effort. Success will be reached by a phased battle in which the government is attacked in areas and with means in which the government is not strong. In the first stage (political organisation-terrorism), the organisation and infrastructure of the insurgent is put in place. The focus of the first phase is on building a structure and isolating the government from the people. In the second phase (guerrilla warfare), violent military action are aimed at the government. This makes the government to defend and militarise the country. The last phase, (mobile conventional war), is started when the balance of power is in favour of the insurgent and the government

can be defeated by overt military actions. The transition from one phase to another is seamless and stepping back into a previous phase is done if needed.

- *Military Focus Strategy*

This strategy is a variation of the protected popular war strategy introduced by Che Guevara and Fidel Castro in Cuba. Instead of relying on a revolutionary condition to arise, this strategy is based on accelerating this (political) process by an armed revolt by a core of guerrillas. This strategy is easier to initiate and requires less organisational work, less popular support at the start and less time to plan.

- *Urban (terrorist) strategy*

This strategy employs terrorism within urban areas of a society to destabilise it and its government. The object is to create a crisis in both the government's inactivity or over-reaction decreases the government's credibility. The strategy uses the complexity, freedom of movement and anonymity of urban areas. The growing world population and urbanisation makes the urban strategy the strategy of the future.

These different strategic approaches can all be implemented using violent or non-violent means or a combination of both. The insurgent will choose an approach depending on its own strength and the other players in the environment. Although some strategies focus more on violent means and others on nonviolent/political means, an insurgent can have different goals and can use different strategic approaches and means such as:

- *Propaganda*: Attempts to influence national and international opinion and gain national and international support.
- *Organisation*: Recruiting cadres, training, raising money, creating groups.
- *Terrorism*: Random or targeted bombing, kidnapping, hijacking and sabotage.
- *Guerrilla warfare*: May include the use of terrorism, small scale hit and run attacks, and ambushes on military targets.
- *Conventional warfare*: Full-blown military operations and pitched battles.

Often, the focus is on the violent incidents and the violent means that are used by an insurgent group. To understand an insurgent, therefore, one must examine the insurgent’s goals, its strategic approach, and the

means used by the insurgent. We will examine some of the means in detail in the next sub-units

3.2.1 Guerrilla Warfare

These are irregular, often protracted, warfare that are predominantly targeted against an incumbent government and conducted by paramilitary or voluntary forces operating outside conventional military organisations. From the Spanish for ‘small war’, the term was first used in English to depict Spanish opposition to Napoleon in the Peninsular War (Miller and King, 2005). Although many governments have a tendency to label all violent opposition against them as "terrorism", not all physical, or even violent, confrontations can be described as “terroristic”.

While terrorists attack the public and put the entire population at risk, guerrillas attack legitimate governmental and military targets. The corollary is that guerrillas are legitimate combatants; they are subject to the rules of war and treated as soldiers according to the rules of war. It is crucial - though somewhat difficult, to make the distinction between some guerrilla operations and terrorism since one is a legitimate, even if deadly act, and the other is simply put, a criminal offense. According to the U.S. Army, guerrilla war is comprised of "combat operations conducted in enemy-held territory by predominantly indigenous forces on military or paramilitary basis to reduce the combat effectiveness, industrial capacity, and morale of the enemy. Guerrilla operations are conducted by relatively small groups employing offensive tactics." This definition suggests that guerrillas are more military-oriented in thought and deed than terrorists. Guerrilla targets are military personnel (or police) rather than civilians. Guerrillas, by the nature of their offensive, must rely on significant popular support for their activities. Terrorists neither need, nor seek, such support since their activities are directed toward control of the population through fear. Guerrillas employ mobility, elusiveness and surprise to compensate for their weaknesses in men and equipment- -and they comply with the recognised rules of warfare. By following those rules they earn the right to be treated as soldiers, not criminals.

Generally, it can be said that guerrilla movements have the following characteristics:

- They hold little or no territory.
- They attack when and where they consider the opposition weakest, and withdraw when the enemy gains strength.
- They derive the bulk of their support from the people of the area where they are operating—though there may be some outside

help or "sponsoring power" assistance. Where there is a sponsoring power, the assistance will normally be in the forms of arms or equipment; sometimes it will include providing a "safe-haven" across an international border.

3.2.2 Terrorism

Terrorism involves the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion. Common definitions of terrorism refer only to those violent acts which are intended to create fear or terror in the minds of people, and are perpetrated in pursuit of an ideological objective, and deliberately target or disregard the safety of non-combatants or civilians. Some definitions also include acts of unlawful violence and war.

The history of terrorist organisations suggests that they do not select terrorism for its political effectiveness. Individual terrorists tend to be motivated more by a desire for social solidarity with other members of their organisation than by political platforms or strategic objectives.

Terrorism is, historically, a poor means of waging an insurgent war, if the real goal of the insurgent is to actually win an objective rather than simply engage in fights, frights and flights of fantasy. Terrorism is an attempt to govern, or oppose government, through physical or psychological intimidation. It is the weapon of the politically weak and, often, the morally bankrupt of any society. People generally resort to this form of insurgency only when other forms of irregular warfare are denied them by lack of followers or the availability of other suitable weapons or means by which grievance can be ventilated.

Three things characterise terrorism:

- The individual terrorist (or group of terrorists) must have either the means or perceived potential of violence.
- There is an impersonal frame of reference to violence. Victims are chosen by chance, not reason. The attacker has no particular, personal, score to settle with the individual victim.
- The terrorist purposely spread fear and confusion beyond the immediate victim.

Terrorism involves psychological attack as well as physical assault. There are many types of terrorism:

1. '*Political terrorism*' is fear generated for political purposes. It is what most people refer to as "terrorism".

2. '*Non-political terrorism*' such as organised crime seeks some things other than political ends.

3. '*Quasi-terrorism*' is the use of terrorist techniques (such as the taking of hostages during a bank robbery) in the process of committing a crime. Quasi-terrorists will often adopt the language and rhetoric of political terrorists when they are trapped. This serves as a method of self-justification, a way of hiding basic greed by claiming the violence is been done for some good reasons. While the acts are usually intended to bring about a limited political end, they are not intended to overthrow an entire governmental or social structure.

4. '*State terrorism*' is the control of a population (by a government) primarily through fear. Not only opponents of governments, but governments themselves, employ terrorism. Although many definitions of terrorism restrict it to acts by non-state actors, it can also be argued that states can, and have, been terrorists. States can use force or the threat of force, without declaring war, to terrorise citizens and achieve a political goal. Germany under Nazi rule has been described in this way. It has also been argued that states participate in international terrorism, often by proxy. The United States considers Iran the most prolific sponsor of terrorism because Iran gives arms to groups such as Hezbollah. The United States has also been called terrorist, for example through its covert sponsorship of Nicaraguan Contra Rebels in the 1980s.

5. *Bioterrorism:* refers to the intentional release of toxic biological agents to harm and terrorise civilians, in the name of a political or some other cause. The U.S. Centre for Disease Control has classified the viruses, bacteria and toxins that could be used in an attack of which Category A Biological Diseases are those most likely to do the most damage. These include:

   - Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)
   - Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin)
   - The Plague (Yersinia pestis)
   - Smallpox (Variola major)
   - Tularemia (Francisella tularensis)
   - Hemorrhagic fever, due to Ebola Virus or Marburg Virus.

6. *Cyberterrorism:* Cyberterrorists use information technology to attack civilians and draw attention to their cause. This may mean that they use information technology, such as computer systems or telecommunications, as a tool to orchestrate a traditional attack. More often, cyberterrorism refers to an attack on information technology itself in a way that would radically disrupt networked services. For example, cyberterrorists could disable networked emergency systems or hack into networks housing critical financial information. There is wide disagreement over the extent of the existing threat by cyberterrorists.

7. *Ecoterrorism:* a recently coined term describing violence in the interests of environmentalism. In general, environmental extremists sabotage property to inflict economic damage on industries or actors they see as harming animals or the natural environment. These have included such business interests as fur companies, logging companies and animal research laboratories.

8. *Narcoterrorism***:** has assumed several meanings since its coining in 1983. It once denoted violence used by drug traffickers to influence governments or prevent government efforts to stop the illicit trade in drug. In the last several years, narcoterrorism has been used to indicate situations in which terrorist groups use drug trafficking to fund their other operations.

Having identified these forms of terrorism, we will take some time to look at examples of terrorist acts, which include, but are not limited to:

- *Bombings*

Bombings are the most common type of terrorist act. Typically, improvised explosive devices are inexpensive and easy to make, they are also smaller than conventional explosive devices and are harder to detect.

- *Kidnappings and Hostage-Taking*

Terrorists use kidnapping and hostage-taking to establish a bargaining position and to elicit publicity. Kidnapping is one of the most difficult acts for a terrorist group to accomplish, but, if a kidnapping is successful, it can gain terrorists money, release of jailed comrades, and publicity for an extended period. Hostage-taking involves the seizure of a facility or location and the taking of hostages. Unlike a kidnapping, hostage-taking provokes a confrontation with authorities. It forces

political authorities to either make dramatic decisions or to comply with the terrorist's demands.

- *Armed Attacks and Assassinations*

Armed attacks include raids and ambushes. Assassinations involve the killing of a selected victim, usually by bombings or through the use of small arms. Sometimes, terrorists assassinate specific individuals for pure psychological effect.

- *Arsons and Firebombing*

Inflammable devices are cheap and easy to hide. Arson and firebombing are easily conducted by terrorist groups that may not be as well-organised, equipped, or trained as a major terrorist organisation. Arson or firebombing against a strategic infrastructure, hotel, government building, police stations or industrial centre leaves or creates the impression that the ruling government is incapable of maintaining order.

- *Hijackings and Skyjackings*

Hijacking is the seizure by force of a surface vehicle, its passengers, and/or its cargo. Skyjacking is the taking of an aircraft, which creates a mobile, hostage barricade situation. It provides terrorists with hostages from many nations and draws heavy media attention. Skyjacking also provides mobility for the terrorists to relocate the aircraft to a country that supports their cause and provides them with a human shield, thus making retaliation difficult.

3.2.3 Civil war

Civil war is generally the end-product of some other form of insurgent warfare. It occurs when opponents are roughly matched in men, equipment and determination. It involves relatively large bodies of military personnel, tactical and strategic planning, as well as operations that are conducted in more or less the same way as they would be during a conventional war. The primary method of fighting a civil war involves military tactics, with police tactics reserved for special operations against spies and suspected supporters of the opposition. Because civil wars usually grow from some other type of insurgency, it is difficult to imagine one occurring spontaneously.

The American Civil War and the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s were started by regional and national coup attempts. The American Revolution was actually a civil war which had its origins in non-violence, but it also had aspects of a legislative coup. This "revolution"

almost developed into conventional combat that are seen in a civil war, but there were also aspects of guerrilla operations, primarily in the South of America.

Apart from the sudden and early collapse of government as was the case in Batista's Cuba, guerrilla wars must go through a civil war stage if the insurgents are to assume full control of power. Of the various forms of insurgent warfare, terrorism is least likely to produce civil war but this is not a rule because the Lebanese civil war stemmed - in large part - from attacks by terrorist factions on the government and each other.

3.2.4 Revolution

Revolution is somewhat similar to civil war because large masses of people are involved and heavy casualties can be expected. While nearly every insurgency is called a revolution, people generally misapply the term because real revolutions are rare. Revolutions occur in both the rural and urban areas, though they are now mainly identified with urban violence. When used in its narrowest sense, a revolution is a popular, nearly-spontaneous uprising by significant minorities or a majority of the population. A revolution normally has social, political, religious, philosophical and moral aspects and it generally pits those who are wealthy, aristocratic, or powerful against those who see themselves as underprivileged.

Revolutions are generally fought with both police and military tactics to crush all forms of opposition. Unlike civil wars, which traditionally pit brother against brother, revolutions pit classes against each other. While there is evidence of leadership in cases of a civil war, there is no evidence that any revolution has actually been planned and led. In the former Soviet Union, for instance, the popular uprising of 1914 was a true Revolution. Lenin and the Marxists came to power in a coup that followed the establishment of a revolutionary government. Revolutionary leaders are therefore people who happen to be at the front of the crowd. As a spontaneous event that lacks extensive planning, revolutions demonstrate, simultaneously in many cases, the irrational cruelty of the mob while showcasing the highest ideals and aspirations of the majority. In a revolution, the power base of the old society is destroyed, while a new power structure evolves.

4.0 CONCLUSION

It is obvious from the foregoing that every group seeks for preservation of its identity and demand for recognition at all times. In doing so, they may employ a variety of means through which they hope to redress their marginalisation, including the use of non-violence resistance as seen in

the case of the Ogoni resistance, or armed violence as used by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND) and the O'dua Peoples' Congress (OPC).

5.0 SUMMARY

Finding reason for any form of insurgency has never been a difficult undertaking because causation can assume several faces, which may vary from the quest to liberate a country from colonial rule; actions taken in pursuit of freedom from serfdom, oppressive taxation or the payment of excessive rents. Usually insurgent groups are motivated by political goals that coincide with the aspirations of certain groups of people be they ethnic, religious, linguistic or ideological in orientation. This way they gain sympathy and local cooperation.

In this unit we defined insurgency as an armed rebellion against constituted authority and if is done by a well defined ethnic grouping, it can be said to be an ethnic insurgency. We also discussed what causes insurgency and the few examples given are poverty, discrimination, religion. We went further to state the different types of insurgency which include non-violence resistance, terrorism, guerrilla war, civil war, and revolutions.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. What is insurgency?
2. What are the factors that may instigate an insurgency?
3. List and discuss types of insurgent groups, their strategies and means.
4. Compare and contrast, guerilla warfare and terrorism.

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UNIT 3 ETHNIC INSURGENCY AND SOCIETY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Insurgency is a form of military conflict characterised by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas. As we have shown, it is a form of warfare that can be harnessed to diverse political agendas, motivations, and grievances. It is clear from our discussion in the previous unit that most forms of insurgency have a devastating effect on the society. It is always the case that insurgencies, whether as calculated or mob action result in massive destruction of infrastructure, lead to massacres and widespread losses of human capital, military personnel, political leaders, youths, entrepreneurs, and impact whole families in one way or the other. This unit discusses ethnic insurgency and its impact on society.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- highlight the nature of ethnic insurgency
- describe how ethnic wars differ from other kinds of conflicts
- state how ethnic insurgency affects the structure of a society
- examine different cases where ethnic groups have waged insurgency and why.

1.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Nature of Ethnic Insurgency

It has been said that insurgency is a technology of military conflict characterised by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerilla warfare from rural base areas (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 75). Simply defined, an ethnic insurgency is a form of militarised conflict that is carried on by persons clearly associated with an ethnic group, which at its most basic level is simply a set of people with common beliefs and behaviors for political ends. Thus, the activities of some groups such as the Ijaw-dominated Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the O'dua Peoples' Congress, the Tiv Militia, the Movement for the Advancement of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Agbekoya are interpreted as ethnic insurgencies in Nigeria.

Within Africa, the Tuareg Rebellion that started in 1990 and lasted till 2007 was an uprising by various Tuareg groups in Niger and Mali with the aim of achieving autonomy or forming their own nation-state. The same is true of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front (EPLF) that fought the government of Ethiopia for the independence of their homelands. The OLF which declared that armed struggle is necessary to achieve the Oromo's right to self-determination became the most prominent armed ethnic group in Ethiopia in the late 1990s, and from 2002 to 2004 it was held responsible for several small bomb attacks in Ethiopia. The insurgency in Ogaden, waged by the separatist Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia's Somali region, began in 1995 and is still ongoing. In Western Sahara, the Sahrawi rebel National Liberation Movement (Polisario Front) battled Spain, Morocco and Mauritania for the decolonisation and independence of the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara from 1973. The war resulted in the Spanish retreat in 1976, the Mauritanian retreat in 1979 and a ceasefire agreement with Morocco. The bigger part of the territory remains under Moroccan occupation. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) which fought the central government in Khartoum from 1983 to 2005 composed mainly of the Dinka tribe; while the Mau Mau which resisted British rule in Kenya between 1952 and 1960 was a Kikuyu ethnic insurgent group. Although the British were able to suppress the conflict before 1960, it set the stage for Kenyan independence in December 1963.

It is noteworthy that Ethiopia holds the dubious distinction of the country with several armed ethnic insurgencies occurring simultaneously. By the end of 1976, insurgencies existed in all of the country's fourteen administrative regions. In addition to the Eritrean secessionists, rebels were highly active in Tigray, where the Tigray

People's Liberation Front (TPLF), formed in 1975, was demanding social justice and self-determination for all Ethiopians. In the southern regions of Bale, Sidamo, and Arsi, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF), active since 1975, had gained control of parts of the countryside in the Ogaden. Under Ali Mirah's leadership, the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) began armed operations in March 1975, and in 1976 it coordinated some actions with the EPLF and the TPLF. By the end of 1987, dissident organisations in Eritrea and Tigray controlled at least 90 percent of both regions.

In Europe, ethnic insurgent groups include the Kurdistan Workers' Party, also known as the PKK, which successfully challenged the Turkish state for many years, while Iraqi Kurds have been locked in an unremittingly violent struggle with the central government in Baghdad almost since the founding of the Iraqi republic in 1958. The ETA or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ("Basque Homeland and Freedom") an armed Basque nationalist and separatist organisation that fought the Spanish government with the goal of gaining independence for separate Basque homeland from 1959 to 1989; and nationalists in the predominantly Muslim region of Chechnya in the southwestern corner of Russia, in fought for full independence from Russia between 1994 to 2009. Ethnic insurgency behaviors sometimes manifest in both symbolic and behavioral patterning national politics. For instance, in Turkey almost 10 million Kurds are forbidden to use their own language or to describe themselves as Kurds. In the 1920s and 1930s, Kurds rebelled against this discrimination, and the government responded with great brutality by deporting thousands of them from their homeland, which resulted in the rise of the PKK as a guerrilla group.

Ethnic insurgency differs considerably from other forms of violence carried out for ideological, religious or some other identity-based reasons. Ethnic insurgents often seek to influence their own constituencies more than the country as a whole. They frequently seek to foster communal identity, in contrast to an identity proposed by the state. Ethnic insurgents often target potential intermediaries who might compromise on identity issues and therefore creates serious problems of control for the state.

Although most analysis of ethnic conflict define it as occurring between a state and an ethnic group, this is not entirely true for all cases. Rather, if violence is described as "ethnic" it must be between ethnic groups, one of which is likely to control the mechanisms of state. Ethnic groups do not live in isolation but are found in ecospheres with many other ethnic groups. Accordingly, they exploit the environment for resources, and they compete with other groups in order to maintain and augment their prospects for survival. When life is threatened, the members of a

group will respond in some way to ensure survival. When the limits of a group's adaptive capacity have been reached but the threat to survival persists, conflict with other groups in the social environment is likely to ensue. More often than not, basic reasons for insurgency and war. These generally include self-defense, territory, patriotism, loyalty, and duty.

Main forms of collective ethnic action in pursuit of an insurgency include strikes, demonstrations, mutinies, protests, sabotage, communal rioting, and terrorism, internal war coups d'état, secessionistic rebellions, civil wars and revolutions, and genocide. Each of these involves further distinctions, for example, going by our previous discussion on terrorism, there are many complexities in defining terrorism, or rebellion.

One basic fact about insurgency is that insurgents are comparatively weak when compared to the governments they are fighting, at least at the start of insurgency operations. To survive, rebels need arms and materiel, money to buy them, or *smugglable* goods to trade for them. They need a supply of recruits to the insurgent way of life, and they may also need information and instruction in the practical details of running an insurgency.

However, a number of factors favour insurgents, and these include:

- The presence of rough terrain, poorly served by roads, at a distance from the centres of state power
- The availability of foreign, cross-border sanctuaries
- The availability of a local population that can be induced not to denounce the insurgents to government agents.

3.2 Effects of Ethnic Insurgency

Ethnic insurgencies are of interest because of the apparent prevalence since the Cold War and because they frequently result in war crimes such as genocide. The post–Cold War period has witnessed a number of ethnically-informed secessionist movements, predominantly within the former communist states. Conflicts have involved secessionist movements in the former Yugoslavia, Transnistria in Moldova, Armenians in Azerbaijan, Abkhaz and Ossetians in Georgia and Chechens in the Russian Federation. Generally, ethnic conflicts are largely conceptualised as the handiwork of cynical politicians who mobilise fear and greed for personal advantage. For example, the ethnic cleansing that has occurred in Eastern Europe served more as a tool for political mobilisation and a means whereby certain leaders created and re-created their justification for holding power, than a program with a predictable or intended outcome. For instance, a UN report indicated

that the purpose of ethnic cleansing was to instill terror in a civilian population, in order to cause them to flee and never return. In all, the following are the effects of ethnic insurgencies:

3.2.1 Social Effects

The social consequences of the ethnic insurgencies are often enormous and cannot be easily quantified, especially the psycho-social ones. Most of the victims of these incidences are left homeless, landless, destitute, injured, dead, abused, to mention but a few of the atrocities resulting from the menace. The immediate and real consequences of the clashes are often felt most at personal and family level. There is always loss of security in the clash-prone areas as civilians take the law into their own hands, targeting perceived enemies. As a result of insecurity, there is always indiscriminate loss of human life. Many people often sustain physical injuries while some others are traumatised. The state of insecurity often interferes with the day-to-day socio-economic and political undertakings within the areas where insurgency take place.

3.2.2 Economic Effects

Civil wars impose substantial costs on domestic economies but the total economic impact of ethnic insurgencies in affected areas is not easy to quantify. There is often gigantic waste of human and economic resources. Clashes usually have lasting consequences that will continue to alter economic development for many years after its end. One overall observation that emerges from a study of the recent clashes in Kenya is the fact that the economic consequences go far beyond the available statistics. Much of the destruction worked to the economic advantage of the perpetrators of the violence and their close aides. Generally, the clashes allowed some groups of people and individuals to capitalise on the insecurity to usurp land or purchase it at throw-away prices from the victims who had no choice than to sell it or otherwise lose them. In a state of insecurity, agricultural activities are often disrupted. In most cases, crops are either destroyed or abandoned because of the widespread violence caused by insurgencies.

There were other subsequent economic problems related to ethnic clashes such as food insecurity, disruption of work on farms, industries and public sector institutions, destruction of private property, land grabbing, destruction of transport and communication infrastructure, diversion of economic resources from consumer products to military and security hardware or their misallocation and unexpected expenditure, inflation and fluctuation in prices among others. As a result of ethnic insurgencies in various parts of the world, thousands of families lost a

lot of personal and household possessions as their houses, farms, shops and other business premises are destroyed or looted.

3.2.3 Political Effects

Ethnic insurgencies trigger the revival of ethnic politics. Over the years, various countries experienced the rise of ethnic insurgencies and tensions which if left to continue eventually turn into ethnic hatred and violence as witnessed in South Africa, Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia. It leaves the impression that politics and political parties are vehicles of ethnic sentiments and interests. The insurgencies that took place in various parts of the world after the end of the Cold War not only increased ethnic animosity and prejudice but also made ethnic politics a reality. Although the common ideology especially among leaders of different ethnic groups is national democracy, reality is ethnic democracy for their supporters is closely related to ethnic nationalism, sectarianism and other forms of parochialism.

3.2.4 Neighbourhood Effects

A civil war involving ethnic groups often has an international element. Major states or regional powers may support or fight on behalf of governments and insurgents or may even engineer the war. Some insurgent movements have an ideological commitment to "conflict diffusion", but such intentional contagion does not seem to be the only way by which neighbourhoods influence civil war. Macro-level studies have found that countries bordering a civil war have an increased risk of experiencing internal conflict and that hosting a large refugee population from a neighbouring state has a clear relationship to conflict incidence.

Neighbours and neighbourhoods are key determinants of a state’s prospect for peace and stability. States typically interact more with immediate neighbours and may operate with similar economic, social and political institutions. However, it is clear that neighbours and regions have an additive effect on internal and international insurgencies. The effects are additive in the sense that in peaceful zones, neighbours bolster traditions of peace; while neighbours in conflict prone zones increase the risk of war and instability. Spillovers of conflict are sometimes the direct consequences of neighbouring unrest and the indirect effects from characteristics of surrounding states. Studies of economic spillovers have established that civil wars in one country directly impact the economies of neighbouring countries and beyond.

4.0 CONCLUSION

From the above discussion we can see that ethnic insurgency is a global phenomenon that has a number of impacts on society. Apart from the fact that many ethnic groups have been able to assert themselves in this way in order to be able to acquire certain rights or claim certain privileges, in several places where it resulted into prolonged civil wars (Ethiopia, Sudan, Chechnya, Spain, Mali and Niger) it created a number of problems for such political systems because it reduced the standards of living and levels of resource availability those societies as a whole when scarce financial resources are channeled to procuring arms and ammunitions rather than for stimulating productive activities, welfare and education services.

5.0 SUMMARY

From our discussions above we have been able to discover that ethnic insurgency is not a strictly African affair and that wherever it has taken place, the death of vulnerable groups within society such as children, women, the aged and the sick is rampant especially in situations when they get caught in the crossfire, proliferation of small arms becomes common and in many cases, this leads to increase in cases of armed robbery, criminality and banditry. We also discovered that when government deploys troops during an outbreak of insurgency, it leads to diversion of scarce human, material and financial resources.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. What is ethnic insurgency?
2. Discuss the various effects of ethnic insurgency on the society?
3. Ethnic insurgency is a global phenomenon. Discuss.

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UNIT 4 CRIME, ATTITUDES, TRAUMA AND DEFECTION IN ETHNIC INSURGENCY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This unit seeks to explain what constitute trauma and the related concept of crime within the context of ethnic insurgency. Crime is the commission of an act or an act of omission that violates the law and is punishable by the state. The print and electronic media are full of reports of serious threats to human lives and the consequent problem of how survivors cope. In this unit, we shall examine these and the concept of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- discuss the phenomena of trauma and its relationship to violence
- specify the major ingredients that lead to trauma for people living in close proximity to violence
- discuss how men and women deal differently with trauma.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Trauma and Insurgency

Simply put, trauma is a psychological state resulting from an extreme experience. It is a known fact that during armed conflicts, one of the associated problems is trauma to victims most of whom are usually non-

combatants while some are actually combatants. Possible causes of trauma in conflict situations include the following:

- physical privation, injury and torture
- imprisonment and or sustained threat of death
- witnessing torture or massacres
- violent or humiliating death of loved ones
- rape
- destitution, loss of home, property, livelihood
- destruction of the victim's community
- forced migration.

During the active phase of the conflict in Somalia, it was reported that the victims claimed they have suffered both physical and psychological effects of the insurgency, ranging from imprisonment, to property damage, and to feeling humiliated. According to a survey, 65 per cent of those surveyed report that a member of their immediate family was killed during the conflicts. Brutal attacks on non-combatants, physical suffering by vulnerable persons, dislocation due to forced migration and property loss were also common. 39 per cent report that someone they knew well was raped; 23 per cent were wounded in the fighting; 20 per cent were imprisoned; nearly 33 per cent lived in an area under enemy control; 63 per cent were forced to leave their homes; 65 per cent said they lost contact with a close relative; and more than 50 per cent report that they suffered serious property damage, had their homes looted (56 per cent) or had combatants take their food (51 per cent). These experiences cut across lines of age, gender and region. Rape and loss has been a major source of trauma to women and has often left them isolated emotionally and feeling that they had suffered as much, if not more, than men.

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is the term used for a cluster of symptoms, including depression, suicide, increased incidence of various forms of mental illness, fatigue, listlessness, repeated recollection of traumatic events, startling easily, and explosive anger. Reactions to post-traumatic stress tend to form a sequence in which initial shock is followed by efforts to cope with and manage the situation. This critical phase is strongly influenced by a person's circumstances. Additional stress factors, such as the need to struggle to find food, have a negative effect on the person's ability to cope; feelings of being out of control or of having lost the capacity for personal choice are additional stress factors. The inability to cope with trauma may result in mental illness. On the other hand, recovery can be helped by positive factors, such as good social networks. Given the support of a close-knit community, individuals who experience such trust and encouragement have often

shown themselves to be highly resilient in the face of trauma induced by conflict, violence, abuse, and torture.

Gender studies carried out in refugee camps in Mozambique, Zambia and Central America have pointed to differences between men and women in the way people deal with trauma. Whereas women tended to worry most about family issues, such as their relationships with their children and husband, men were more likely to worry about factors outside the family, such as the lack of access to public facilities. This can be explained by the gender roles and identities are constructed whereby women are socialised since early childhood into caring roles, with the family as the primary focus. According to these studies, women tended to show greater feelings of helplessness than men. In addition, they appeared to have less access to social support networks beyond the family, as well as less time to make use of those that exist. Single women who have lost their families or other social support may be most at risk.

However, it should be noted that, in some cases, far from providing support, the marriage relationship may be a source of additional stress for women. The inability of parents and particularly mothers, to deal with their own stress can impair the ability of traumatised children to come to terms with their experiences. Women may actually react to stress by withdrawal from their children. In addressing the problems of traumatised children, it is therefore paramount to provide support for those who care for them.

Experiences with providing support to traumatised people indicate the need for the provision of a 'safe space' where people take refuge from the daily struggle for survival to work through their feelings without pressure, and in a therapeutic manner. Such a space offers people the opportunity to share their experiences and hence to give them meaning and value. In other situations, such as that described in the Sri Lankan case study, it seems important to offer women the opportunity to take active roles in rehabilitation programmes, as a medium- to long-term means of overcoming post-traumatic stress.

Trauma resulting from extreme violence may also have the effect of conditioning those who experience it to accept violent behaviour as normal. Men who have been obliged to torture, rape, and kill during warfare may find reintegration into normal society and into their families difficult. As a result, such men may be conditioned by their experiences to inflict violence against others without provocation. Their victims are often their own wives and female relatives. Men who are traumatised in this way may find social relationships difficult to sustain; they may find it hard to determine a satisfactory role for themselves in

households which may have survived for some time without them. The reintegration of men into their families and communities is an important element in the reconstruction process, which can be worked through together with women. This will bring benefits for the community as a whole.

3.2 Trauma and Attitudes to Conflict

Insurgent group's attitudes can change over time through traumatic experiences which can radically alter their attitudes and beliefs about the world and the nature of intergroup dynamics. While trauma is experienced at an individual level and ethnic conflict is largely thought of in terms of mass or group-level unit of analysis. In situations where conflict is pervasive, one might assume that the psychological outcomes of widespread violence are likewise pervasive.

To put this in more concrete terms, there is evidence that some people who are exposed to violent conflict are changed by the experience, such that their ability to perceive threat in a functional, realistic, or rational way becomes impaired. For example, Staub (2006) sees traumatic events preceding PTSD as including such events as military combat, a major disaster, and criminal violence. There is reason to believe that other events that are highly violent (e.g. genocide, protracted civil war, etc.) create a range of psychological "wounds," including a sense of a loss of agency, and loss of positive social identity, in addition to the loss of trust between ethnic groups that generate an increased drive to seek restoration through ethnic identity. People who experience trauma feel diminished and vulnerable, seeing the world, other people, and especially members of groups other than their own as dangerous. In response to such perceived threat, they may strike out, believing that they need to defend themselves (Staub, 2006: 871).

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is the name given in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV) for the condition that first gained widespread currency, after World War I, as 'shell-shock.' In addition to accompanying depression and anxiety disorders, in general, symptoms of PTSD are correlated with: less support for an ethnically inclusive community and less support for ethnic interdependence (ibid: 608); avoidance of ethnic others (ibid: 610); interethnic hatred and a desire for retribution (Cardozo *et al.*, 2000; 2004); diminished belief in the benevolence of people in general, loss of a sense of control/agency and meaning in one's life (Basoğlu *et al.*, 2005); and a greater sense of personal insecurity (Bleich, Gelkopf and Solomon, 2003).

In many cases, in addition to the strong relationship between violence-related stressors and PTSD symptoms, there are also significant relationships between cumulative exposure to such traumas and the abovementioned cognitive/emotional effects regardless of whether or not PTSD is diagnosed (Pham et al, 2004). Moreover, these effects become persistent over time. PTSD symptoms have been measured five to ten years after traumatic events occurred (Pham *et al.*, 2004; Basoğlu *et al*., 2005).

3.3 Ethnic Defection

In the course of waging an ethnic insurgency, the possibility exists for in-groups or the leadership to become divided over objectives, ways or means. When this is allowed to escalate, the most likely thing is for the group to become divided and for some members or groups who may accept the offer of amnesty offered by government or disagree on the need to continue the insurrection, to defect to the side of the state. Where this happens, such groups come to be perceived as enemies of the cause and are treated as such.

According to Kalyvas (2008), ethnic defection involves the mobilisation of members of an ethnic group to fight against their co-ethnics in alliance with state forces dominated by members of a different ethnic group. In this case we look at shifts by active insurgents into active counterinsurgency – providing intelligence to state forces, receiving funding and protection from the government, and engaging in violence against co-ethnics as part of a counterinsurgency campaign. This can involve defection by individuals, organisations, or factions. Ethnic defection is important because ethnicity is argued to be a particularly salient cleavage along which conflicts emerge and persist (Horowitz, 1985). Ethnic groups are often characterised by high internal cohesion and for this reason, intra-ethnic violence can dramatically harden identity boundaries (Kaufmann, 1996).

These factors should normally militate against defection across ethnic boundaries, and thus, it is intriguing to see shifts in loyalty by ethnically-defined armed actors. Defectors are often accused of betrayal, selling-out, and becoming puppets in the hands of the state. A deep stigma of transgression is associated with collaboration that emerge after defections by sub-ethnic groups and this much was evident in Kenya during the Mau Mau uprising when the British succeeded in dividing the Kikuyu and also in Iraq where Kurdish opposition to the Baath regime of Sadam Hussein was watered down the Kurds became polarised.

The dynamics of defection are heightened when active insurgents change sides, particularly since intra-insurgent conflict inevitably also

involves violence against families, sympathisers, and the leadership. Insurgent defection is the most puzzling manifestation of this broader phenomenon because it leaves defectors open to credible charges of hypocrisy and betrayal, and creates a powerful rationale for their rivals to attack or ostracise them as collaborators. Collaboration with the state by individuals who previously fought for an insurgent cause is seen as unacceptable.

Ethnic defection by insurgents is constituted by two processes. First, armed insurgents must change their patterns of targeting and operation, turning their guns against their compatriots and kinsmen rather than government forces. Secondly, defecting insurgents become allied with state security agencies, providing them intelligence and manpower in a sustained relationship. This excludes groups and individuals who drop out of the fight, those who reach negotiated settlements with the state without the consent of other insurgents, and those who attack rival insurgents while also attacking government forces.

3.4 Explanations for Defection during Ethnic Insurgencies

Existing explanations for ethnic defection focus on two primary sets of mechanisms: *ideology* and *state policy*. These mechanisms are discussed below:

3.4.1 Ideological differences

An important branch of research has studied the effects of ideological disagreements on the willingness of armed groups and factions to strike deals with the state. This perspective is applied both to broad questions of conflict resolution and to the more specific question of defection. The argument is that differing political preferences lead to internal dissension, with clear variation in the value leaders and sub-groups place on defeating the state leading to splits that deliver “moderates” to the side of the state (Stedman, 1997; Kydd & Walter, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005). These studies view intra-insurgent disagreements as falling along a spectrum of extremism, suggesting that different leaders and factions have different preferences that condition their response to political situations.

Clashes between those considered as ‘hawks’ (hardliners) and ‘doves’ (moderates) are predicted to occur especially during peace processes that cause internal ideological dissension. If counterinsurgents can offer deals that satisfy the core grievances of moderates, they will be likely to split away and link themselves to the state in order to achieve their political goals. This approach assumes deeply-held preexisting ideological differences that drive insurgent behavior and bears a very

striking resemblance to a "hearts and minds" strategy which holds that "when insurgent factional leaders are provided with the political goods and governance that they desire, they change sides".

3.4.2 Government Policy

Another perspective places its emphasis on state policy, specifically shifts in government control and counterinsurgency policy that create incentives for insurgents abandon the struggle and to join the state to rebuild. The state creates collaborators to serve its purposes and thus, government policy and manipulation explain variation. For instance, Kalyvas (2008) finds that changes in state territorial control encouraged recruitment to collaborationist militias in the course of World War II in Greece. He argues that the "demand" side of defection was provided by the state setting up militias to channel local feuding and revenge into counterinsurgency. Examining the Sudanese case, Johnston (2009) argues that active state manipulation produced new armed groups such as the 'Janjaweed' militia that favoured the Sudanese state and regularly attacked its south Sudanese opponents across the Darfur region. More broadly, Goodwin (2001) emphasises state power and policy in his explanation of the dynamics of insurgency.

Government behaviours precede and instigate insurgent defection by taking advantage of a constant "supply" of defection. Shifts in government policy increase (or decrease) the "demand" for this defection. Specific policies include setting up Village Defense Committees to encourage local defection; blackmailing or paying off insurgent leaders to change their allegiance; and "decapitating" the leadership in order to destabilise the group especially in cases where the insurgency is woven around a single or a few individuals (Jordan, 2009; Lawrence, 2010) leaders. This school of thought is of the opinion that insurgent decision-making should be primarily oriented towards the behaviour of the government.

4.0 CONCLUSION

This fourth unit of our course has tried to help you understand the essence of trauma and defection and how they may be triggered by violence in the course of ethnic insurgencies. Essentially, trauma is a psychological problem resulting from extremely negative experience. Trauma also makes those who experience it to be conditioned to accept violence behavior as a normal way of life. On its part, defection involves the mobilisation of members of an ethnic group to fight against their co-ethnics in alliance with state forces dominated by members of a different ethnic group.

5.0 SUMMARY

Trauma and defection are two of the key issues in conflicts that snowball into insurrection. While the former impacts individuals within groups and may prompt the individual to lose self-esteem and see others as uncaring or lacking understanding, defections lead to the polarisation of an ethnic group to the extent that those who previously saw themselves as comrades and brothers on account of sharing an ethnic identity become bitter enemies.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Explain the concept of trauma and attitudes in ethnic insurgency?
2. What do you understand by ethnic defection?
3. What are the mechanisms used in explaining ethnic defection.

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MODULE 4 RESOLUTION OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS

UNIT 1 RESOLVING CONFLICTS

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Bringing people who have reasons to disagree together is a major challenge in conflict resolution. It should be noted that each of the parties have different feelings about the conflict situation. For this reason, those involved in a resolution process must be sensitive to these varied feelings. Often times, there are misconceptions about the feeling conflict and what it portends in terms of its significance and possible outcomes. Those who mediate may also have a hard time understanding why the belligerents are at each other's throats because they are probably looking at the situation from an outsider's perspective which may not take cognisance of the undercurrents of the problems involved which may range from value differences, to differing perceptions, to resource scarcity, the dynamics of power sharing, and so on. It then becomes highly necessary for interveners to know how to handle the feelings of conflict parties.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- examine a number of factors that make conflicts what they are
- explore the impact of feelings, attitudes and trust on conflict outcomes
- provide a background to later discussions on conflict resolution processes.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 What Parties Feel about Conflict Situations

Most conflicts involve some elements and ingredients of feelings and emotions and this explains why people act or react to situations based on their experience, perceptions and calculations. Doing this without regard for the true intentions of the other party may escalate conflict or make resolution quite problematic. Peace practitioners need to be responsive to feeling of parties, so as to get the true picture of what the situation is rather than what it looks like. The feelings of conflict parties are sometimes determined by the expected or actual outcome of such conflict. While a party may feel unfulfilled with the expected or actual outcome, the other party may have realised or see itself realising certain self-placed goal. This may create ill feelings that may mar or jeopardise social relationships to the level where the society itself becomes fragmented by violence and war as was the case in Rwanda, Sudan, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia. If these feelings are not properly understood and dealt with appropriately, resolution may be faulty.

3.2 Understanding the Attitude of Parties

It is very important to understand the attitude of parties in conflict towards one another and also towards those who are working towards finding a sustainable resolution. As earlier mentioned, the behaviour of individual parties, which have been shaped by the actual or expected outcome of a conflict, goes a long way in determining the ease or difficulty of a resolution processes. There is therefore a need to understand the attitude of parties to one another before, during and after a conflict is resolved so as to know how to consolidate on advances made or guard against future lapses or oversights that may jeopardise resolution. Resolution could fail if proper attention is not devoted to understanding certain salient facts about the conflict and its actual or projected outcome.

3.3 Creating Trust in the Process

Conflict resolution and those handling the process of reconciliations must be acceptable to those who are having a face-off in conflict. This is the only avenue if co-operation of the conflict parties is to be obtained. If parties are in doubt over the credibility of the process or those involved, the exercise may fail right from the outset. The intention of the people handling the process must be made clear to parties, and clear enough to avoid ambiguity. When parties trust the process, there is a likelihood that they get really involved and allow peace to reign. On the other hand, if the parties have doubts about the process, they can do all that they can to frustrate the resolution process.

For parties to co-operate in a resolution process, they must have confidence in the people handling the process. This if achieved will further make the process itself credible to the parties. The argument of each party must be given consideration, and one party must not be given preference to the detriment of another. People handling resolution must respect the thoughts of each of the parties and be ready to work on their positions.

3.4 Addressing Ethnic Conflict in the Context of Relationship

Using the context of relationships to address ethnic conflict remains a very strong tool to the quest to achieve success. This is because relationships between individuals or groups in time past could be used to appeal to the senses of parties in a current conflict. Past cordial relationship could be referred to, most especially where there are spiritual bonds attached. In most African societies where groups have such bonds in existence, they find it difficult to reject a resolution process that is hinged on past relationship. Also in situations where good relationship had never existed, one could understand the reason for a bad relationship and a reluctance to find mutually beneficial resolutions. In other words, knowledge of shared beliefs, bonds of kinship and ethnic identities helps people involved in resolution to gain a firm foothold the quest to appealing to parties to allow a resolution proceed.

3.5 Improving Relationships: Working on Positions, Interests, and Needs

In improving relationships between parties, there is a need to consider, positions, interests, and needs of parties. Each of them is critical to the success of any resolution that interveners may want to bring about. A *Position* is what each side to a conflict openly says they want. In an ethnic conflict for example, ethnic A (e.g., a host population) may say to

ethnic B (e.g. a settler group), that they must leave their community because they constitute serious threat to their security. In turn, ethnic B, may say that such allegation is baseless, and as such, they are ready to fight and maintain their stay. All these are positional statements. This conflict can only be resolved if the *interests* and the *needs* of the two sides are known. The question a good analyst is expected to ask is, Why is it that ethnic A wants ethnic B to leave their territory? However, the answer could be that they are seen as sympathetic to the cause of a perceived enemy of their host. This in the actual sense reveals the interest of ethnic A. A follow-up question could also be asked to know on what condition ethnic A would allow ethnic B to stay. The answer to this question will unveil the need of ethnic A.

The basic needs in a conflict situation generally could be that of identity, security, or survival. The interests and needs of conflict parties could be similar.

3.6 Mutual Benefits from Resolution

For resolution to be effective, all parties involved must be sure that they have received something of benefit from the process. However, the benefit they receive may not be the one they actually expected or not all they wanted to have when the process began, but they must have some need, value or feeling satisfied if they are to support whatever outcome that emerges from the process of resolution. Each party is also concerned about the sincerity of the process, especially those who have been involved in putting up the final agreement. We must note that mending relationships involves a strong conviction on each side that fair play has been applied. Promoting mutual needs, power and other benefits should also be given consideration.

3.7 Encouraging a Healthy Attitude

One very important aspect of relationship building is the promotion of healthy attitude between the parties. This will go a long way in sustaining whatever peace emerges as resolution is achieved. Attitude, as a way of thinking or behaving, could promote good relationship or sever relationships that had once being cordial. Weeks (1994:65) maintained that good attitude can resolve specific conflicts and establish healthy relationship. This to him would further create a foundation for mutual trust and a means to avoid future conflicts.

3.8 Sustaining Positive Outcome of Resolutions

Through positive and effective resolution processes, tensions in many ethnic conflicts have been doused. This is an indication that conflict

resolution is central to the building of relationships. However, it is a fact of life that conflict could still re-occur after resolution. This informs the notion that resolution needs to be adequately sustained, especially in cases involving ethnic conflicts. We have talked about the promotion of healthy attitude as a way of building relationship. It is equally important that actions of parties are closely monitored after resolution has been achieved. This can be realised when certain mechanisms for monitoring interactions are put in place. In addition, monitoring allows interested parties to have early warning if there is a perceived threat to peace. Albert (2001:141) sees monitoring as something that creates the opportunity for parties to be informed in the event that conflict re-escalates and enables them to plan on how to deal with challenges that ensue from social interactions.

4.0 CONCLUSION

How we understand the conflict parties and situations goes a long way in influencing how we approach conflict resolution. We should clarify here that conflict is an outgrowth of diversity and differences. Just like conflict can have negative effects, it could also give an opportunity to clarify relationships, open up alternative possibilities, and provide opportunities for mutual growth. Indeed, conflict has the ability to provide bases to determine the needs, perceptions, power, values, principles, interests, desires, feelings and emotions of the people involved. In situations of ethnic conflicts and some other conflict situations, the above-mentioned elements and processes could make resolution less burdensome and more effective if properly analyzed and employed.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit has examined and analyzed how an intermediary could relate with parties in conflict to achieve a peaceful resolution. It is evident that an insightful intermediary must understand the positions, interests and needs of the conflicting parties as well as the contexts in which the conflicts thrive in order to be able to resolve or transform such conflicts. The parties must have confidence in the intervener because trust is an essential ingredient to getting conflict parties to truly commit themselves to the process of resolution. As we have noted earlier, the goal of resolution is to restore relationships, therefore, outcomes have to be positive and mutually beneficial to the parties.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What do you understand by position, interest and needs of parties in conflict?

What are the objectives of a peace process?
How can a resolution be sustained to avoid a relapse of conflict?

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UNIT 2 RESOLUTION PROCESSES

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Scholars have confirmed that before the advent of the colonialism in African society, social conflicts involving both in-groups and out-groups were monitored and prevented, managed, or resolved through established traditional mechanisms generally understood and accepted by those who inhabit communities. The mechanisms for doing this consisted of traditional institutions such as traditional rulers, council of elders, age grades, chiefs, ancestral cults, religious cults, women societies, guild system and so on. Individuals and groups attitudes and behaviors were also controlled through these mechanisms. However, in contemporary times, new models of resolution that have come into vogue such as litigation and other adversarial processes are being applied in resolving such conflicts and the results have been mixed. In this unit, our concern will be on what resolution of ethnic conflicts entails and this will be discussed to broaden our knowledge about conflict resolution processes generally.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define and clarify the concept “conflict resolution”
- examine the ways and approaches of resolving ethnic conflict
- illustrate the fundamental principles guiding ethnic conflict resolution

- discuss a number of propositions concerning ethnic conflict resolution.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution involves processes that are tailored to ensure that conflict is handled in such manner as to take advantage of its positive tendency while doing away with the negative. It has been generally defined by scholars as a peaceful and mutually satisfactory way to end or significantly de-escalate a conflict situation (Fasesin, 2007: 20). For Schmid (1998), the term conflict resolution refers to peaceful means of terminating bitter confrontations. In describing conflict resolution as an intervention process that addresses the causes of conflict and seeks to build new and lasting relationships between hostile groups, the elements of non-violence, mutual satisfaction and permanent de-escalation is often emphasised by scholars. This is such that virtually all intervention processes that are aligned to the concept of conflict resolution are subsumed under it. These intervention processes could include:

- *Conflict Prevention*: activities that are focused on preventing an outbreak of conflict.
- *Conflict Management*: activities that focused on limiting and avoiding future violence by promoting positive behavioural change.
- *Conflict Settlement*: activities that are focused on ending violent behaviour and conflict by through the instrumentality of peace agreement.
- *Conflict Transformation*: activities that address the wider social and political sources of a conflict and focus on transforming the negative energy of war into positive social and political change.

Conflict prevention, for example, can involve establishing early warning systems, mounting fact- finding missions, mediation and other forms of preventive diplomacy. *Conflict management* might encompass lobbying protagonists, deploying sanctions in support of international law, or using political leverage to gain humanitarian access. Finally, *conflict resolution* itself can comprise a number of activities including confidence building exercises between opposing groups, training in methods of non-violent social transformation, or support for plural civil and political institutions.

It is important to note here that the way a particular conflict resolution process is conceptualised could determine the implied meaning of the intervention processes involved. For instance, the military conception of

conflict resolution defines it mainly in reference to conduct of war and its prevention or termination, which may involve ensuring compliance or deterrence through the threat of or the actual use of force. In other words, it may involve the weakening or annihilation of a conflict party through military action (use of force). This is not unlike the example of violent means of terminating conflicts such as those adopted by Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin. Hitler sought a "final solution" to what he saw as "the Jewish problem"; while Stalin's infamous statement that "where there are no people there are no problems" reflected his belief that resolution of a conflict could involve forced deportation and genocide (Lund, 1990: 4).

It is in connection to these conceptions that Lund opined that:

> *True conflict resolution is significantly different from conflict management or conflict settlement. Full resolution by joint agreement satisfies the underlying needs and interests of conflicting parties and does not sacrifice any of their genuinely important values… If it has to be enforced, it is not a true resolution* (Lund, 1990: 4).

The military conception of conflict resolution is rejected by virtually all peace scholars. Nevertheless, most of them agree that in a violent conflict situation, use of force may be required to make subsequent non–violent resolution possible.

It is in the consideration of this complexity or variation that Burton attempts a general packaging of the term 'conflict resolution' when he posited that the term concerns a number of academic, activist, and (to a lesser extent) military and diplomatic approaches to conflict termination, the reduction of violence, the management and/or settlement of conflict, the solving of problems where there are contradictory goals, and/or the transformation of conflictual relationships. Schmid noted, therefore, that conflict resolution, as opposed to conflict management or conflict settlement, implies approaching conflict in a problem-solving, constructive and non-violent way and recognising the value of the identities of all parties in the relationship and most especially their needs and interests; rather than a violent or destructive 'solution' such as genocide, or a settlement that 'freezes' the current power distribution between opponents (1997: 26).

Conflict resolution entails setting an agenda to assist parties in a conflict or dispute to establish a common ground given certain guiding principles or conditionalities for peaceful coexistence. For some people, it establishes a range of principles, rules and regulations and aspirations that help disputing parties to operate within the tenets of international

law and diplomacy (Aja Akpuru-Aja, 2007:32). As far as Miller is concerned, conflict resolution is "a variety of approaches aimed at terminating conflicts through the constructive solving of problems, distinct from management or transformation of conflict" (2003:8).

Miall *et al.* (2002:21) assert that whenever the issue is about conflict resolution, it is expected that the deep rooted sources of conflict are addressed and resolved, and behaviour is no longer violent, nor are attitudes hostile any longer, while the structure of the conflict has been changed. On the other hand, Mitchell and Banks (1996) use conflict resolution to refer to a number of outcomes including:

(a) an outcome in which the issues in an existing conflict are satisfactorily dealt with through a solution that is mutually acceptable to the parties, that is self-sustaining in the long run and productive of a new, positive relationship between parties that were previously hostile adversaries; and
(b) any process or procedure by which such an outcome is achieved.

For Gaya Best, "conflict resolution connotes a sense of finality, where the parties to a conflict are mutually satisfied with the outcome of a settlement and the conflict is resolved in a true sense" (2006:94).
It is important to emphasise that conflict resolution could sometimes involve intensifying a conflict. Conflict intensification means making hidden conflicts more visible and open for purposeful, non-violent ends (Fisher, 1971: 5). This becomes necessary in a scenario where people are doing well and have enough power and resources to meet their needs.

They may therefore be aloof or refuse to take cognisance of the fact that others are disadvantaged or marginalised. In such situations, the conflict needs to be brought into the open so that the necessary changes can be brought about. Ross acknowledges this in his position that "if disadvantaged groups and individuals refuse to consider open conflict they deny themselves what sometimes is their most effective means of bringing about a needed change" (Ross, 1993: xiv). Martin Luther King Jr. was a phenomenal protagonist of this process. This is aptly indicated in his submission that:

> *Actually we who engage in non-violent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured as long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its pus-flowing ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must likewise*

> *be exposed, with all of the tension its creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured.*

Having come this far, it is pertinent to appreciate the fact that conflict resolution is distinct from conflict management and transformation. This is because conflict resolution in the true sense usually connotes some form of permanence or finality. Hence, some conflicts, especially those over resources, are permanently resolvable from the point of view of needs. A conflict is resolved when the basic needs of parties have been met with necessary 'satisfiers' and their fears allayed. Others, like those over values, may be non-resolvable and can, at best, be transformed, regulated or managed (Best, 2006: 95). It is against this backdrop that Miller defines conflict resolution as "a variety of approaches aimed at terminating conflicts through the constructive solving of problems, distinct from management or transformation of conflict".

Conflict resolution can take place between the two conflicting parties. It however often necessitates the involvement of a third party intervention to balance positions and perspectives. Since conflict is often about conquering, maintaining, or defending positions of power, a major challenge of conflict resolution theory is the need to explain why the powerful would or should be willing to share their power with other weaker parties. Typically, powerful parties have less interest (or incentive) in power-sharing and, by implication, more of an interest in continuing a conflictual relationship or solving it by force rather than by peaceful means. The key challenge for conflict resolution practitioners, therefore, is in how to bring all sides together in a constructive way rather than in a destructive one.

In understanding the fact that the concept 'conflict resolution' has evolved to a level where it cannot be absolutely defined, it is not out of place to simply know in line with the thinking of International Alert (1995), that conflict resolution involves "building bridges between hostile communities, working to clarify issues which represent points of confrontation between them and creating opportunities for developing new relationships based upon a process of peaceful change and grass-root level reconciliation."

According to Nwolise, conflict resolution aims at attaining a number of objectives including, but not limited to the following:

- to address the root (real) causes of the conflict
- to reconcile the conflicting parties genuinely
- to preserve and ensure enduring peace in the society

- to restore peace, remove fear, restore social harmony and make everybody involved in the resolved conflict happy and at peace with each other again through uncovering the truth
- to set the milieu right for societal production and development; and
- to promote good governance, law and order, security of lives and property, collective well being, and happiness (Nwolise, 2003: 39-40).

3.2 Fundamental Principles that Govern Ethnic Conflict Resolution

Resolution of ethnic conflict and the intervention by a third party that brings this about should be governed by the following fundamental principles.

(a) Viewed as a whole, conflict is not inherently destructive or negative. It is a normal aspect of any vibrant community. The danger of viewing ethnic conflict as inherently negative is that attempts to avoid or suppress it at all costs will be seen as justified.

(b) A thorough and comprehensive analysis of the causes and conditions of a conflict that takes all the different perceptions into serious consideration should inform ethnic conflict resolution activities. Superficial and one sided assumptions invariably lead to counterproductive interventions.

(c) Ethnic conflict resolution processes should be inclusive of all parties that are involved. Exclusion is dangerous and likely to create bitterness.

(d) Ethnic conflict resolution activities, like any other conflict management framework should take place with the consent of and preferably at the invitation of the various conflict parties.

(e) The third-party interveners should be non-partisan in their relationship with the disputing parties. The roles of ethnic conflict resolution and that of advocacy should be distinguished and preferably not be performed by the same group of persons or bodies.

3.3 Propositions Concerning the Resolution of Ethnic Conflicts

Without mincing words, it is the responsibility of political leaders and leaders of civil society working individually or in collaboration to resolve conflicts with an ethnic coloration or any other conflict for that matter and to devise appropriate constitutional, political and socio-economic measures that will help them to do so. Numerous historical

instances exist of successful and mostly unsuccessful attempts to resolve conflicts in multiethnic states. There is often the temptation to develop a constitutional model that has the greatest potential for ethnic conflict resolution from such historical experiences and to pass this to governments and policy makers. However, some factors should restrain us from falling into this temptation. These factors include the following:

1. There is no existing constitutional model that can claim to be successful under all conditions. As a matter of fact, viewed from a historical perspective, the prognosis for multiethnic states that succeed in solving ethnic conflict in a non-violent manner is rather poor. While it is certainly useful and necessary to learn from historical instances, the immense difficulty of finding a workable formula has to be acknowledged as well as the fact that the search for such formula is a continuous process. This situation makes it necessary for political and social leaders to engage in activities that enable them to find solutions that will fit their peculiar conditions. Their solutions have to be discovered and forged by themselves because they have to implement and maintain it.
2. Imposed models fail precisely because they are imposed and because they invariably ignore aspects of the local condition. The fashionable notion, for instance, that the holding of free and fair elections in which the majority carries the day is the first necessary step towards solving ethnic conflict shows no regard for the effect of such elections on marginalised and threatened minority groups. Examples of this are the Rwandan, Burundian and Angolan crisis. While we do not dispute the value of democracy, it is clear as Michael (1996) argued, that the insistence of the international community on a specific formula such as the holding of elections to establish rule by the majority inadvertently deprive local leaders of the responsibility to find their own unique solutions that would bring peace and stability to their communities.

Whereas the uncritical prescription of a specific model is not helpful, there is use for taking note of historical examples. It is particularly useful to point to instances of the successful structural accommodation of diversity. The value of noting such examples is that they may provide useful lessons that may find their own unique applications in diverse situations and stimulate the creative investigation of alternative options and keep the hope alive that solutions are possible. The South African experience is a good example, both in terms of the process that was followed to achieve political accommodation, and the constitution that was the outcome of that process. Some of the more salient aspects of the South African examples are:

- The quest for the greatest level of inclusivity in the preliminary process of setting the stage for negotiations and at the negotiating table itself;
- The encouragement of inclusive and constructive conflict resolution procedures at all levels of the society during the transition phase;
- Concerted efforts to ensure significant multi-ethnic and multi-party representation within significant governmental institutions;
- The recognition of group rights by establishing the rights of individuals to associate freely on political, cultural or religious grounds;
- The establishment of the rule of law and the constitutional court as well as the creation of independent institutions to protect civil liberties such as the public protector and the human rights commission.

3.4 Approaches to Resolution of Ethnic Conflicts

It should be noted here that in resolving ethnic conflict, ethnic pluralism and ethnicity should be put into proper perspective, irrespective of the politico-economic system of the plural society concerned. In essence, ethnicity should be viewed as a main force for social change. An example of this is the former USSR, which was a multi ethnic society dominated by Russians. According to Teresa Rakowska- Harmstone (1977), the country's political system recognises the ethnic principle in a federal state structure, but the real power is exercised by a unitary and highly centralised communist party.

Another means of resolving ethnic conflict is by clipping the excesses of the elite in such ethnic groups so that they will not misuse their high class status (position) to exacerbate ethnicity. Class formation that is pruned of its ethnic content can thus become a powerful agent of progress and an area to be focused upon by the central government. This class formation, according to Hyden (1983), is a progressive trend in the African situation but it poses the problem of the right strategies to be adopted in order to produce the right type of elite. Some of the vital steps the federal government of Nigeria has taken in this direction include the establishment of the unity schools, that is, the federal government colleges for boys and girls in each state of the federation. Admissions to these federal government colleges reflect the regional, state and ethnic components of the federation.

The following approaches are therefore vital to the process of resolving conflicts in multi-ethnic societies:

(1) *Negotiation*: through this, a compromise may be arrived at to resolve a problem at hand. At this stage, people are willing to move positions as bargaining is used to satisfy the interests and needs of individuals.
(2) *Joint problem solving*: the concerned people or groups strongly believe they can find solution to their problems together without anybody claiming to be a winner or a loser. There is cooperation in this situation.
(3) *Collaboration/Conciliation*: there exists mutual understanding in searching for common interests as basis for sustainable relationships and agreements. Constructive dialogues are pertinent in this situation.
(4) *Mediation*: concerned individuals rely on help from a neutral person or group to facilitate constructive communication leading to agreement in resolving ethnic disputes.
(5) *Arbitration:* conflict parties agree to submit their problems to a neutral facilitator like a judge and would abide by the decision reached.

To establish a meaningful resolution, those involved in a resolution exercise should put in place an effective atmosphere so as to provide a platform for parties involved to participate without losing trust in the process. They should see that there is a problem which must be jointly addressed from inception. It is also crucial for the parties to understand what they would benefit if the conflict eventually comes to an end. They must also be left to choose the best option to resolve the conflict.

Central to conflict resolution is the need to clarify perceptions that the individual parties have about one another. People interpret reality differently, especially when they have different exposures and experiences. A particular event may indeed happen in a certain way, but individuals can have different perceptions about how and why such an event happened, why it came up at the very time that it did, and the meaning of such event. Many conflicts are the direct result of perceptions and misperceptions. However, people in conflict may disagree on how certain events should be perceived. Unless perception is clarified, effective conflict resolution may not be achieved.

One major task in ethnic conflict resolution is that of designing strategies to appeal to parties in ethnic conflict so as to get them to co-operate in a peace process. As mentioned above, perception has to be clarified, and feelings have to be assuaged, while emotional breakdown should also be dealt with adequately. The target of getting co-operation is mostly directed at those who matter in ethnic conflict. Those working towards resolution must have it in mind that some people are powerful when it comes to making decisions in a group. Oftentimes, this set of

people might not look as if they are important, but one should take a bold step and do a thorough investigation in a bid to identify the main decision makers who can instigate violence or stop their group from taking violent actions. Albert (200,: 54) talked about "positional approach" to identify key players in the community. So also he made mention of "reputational approach" and "decision making approach," all pointing at the fact that some people could be very instrumental to the process of conflict resolution.

In conclusion, the lines of action to follow in generating a sustainable strategy in appealing to parties include but are not limited to:

- identifying the true 'movers' and 'shakers' of the group
- making them feel very important and central to the peace process
- allowing them to pour out their mind on how they feel
- using an interactive approach in appealing to parties.

3.5 Conflict Resolution: A Case Study of the *Fulbe* Ethnic Group

It is said and noted that like every ethnic group in Africa, the *Fulbe* or Fulani who are found in Adamawa and other northern states of Nigeria including Katsina and Sokoto as well as a number of neighbouring countries experience intra ethnic conflicts for which they have developed mechanisms for their resolution and management over the years. The main mechanism entails resorting to what they call *Pulaaku* whereby one is expected to demonstrate patience, perseverance and accommodation by overlooking the gravity of a conflict. This ability to accommodate the offence of the other group is an act of *Pulaaku* which breeds tolerance, self-respect and mutual understanding. No matter the level of the offence and provocation, a Fulbe is encouraged to abide by this practice of *Pulaaku.*

Traditional authorities are another instrument of ethnic conflict settlement among the *Fulbe*. Elders known as *Ndotten* and leaders known as *Ardibe* intervene to mediate in some cases, and apportion blame in interpersonal and intra-clan disputes. However, in a situation where the conflict is an inter-clan conflict, the various heads of the clan groups involved meet with the district head to resolve the conflict.

Related to the above method is the resort to *age grade* system. Some issues involving individuals are referred to the age group for resolution. In the age-group, peer pressure is applied to resolve whatever conflict is at stake. Also, a youth who is initiated into the world of elderhood is expected to be able to manage all conflicts surrounding him before he can qualify to be accorded the new status of an elder.

Another common approach to resolving conflicts among the *Fulbe* ethnic group is through *oath-taking* where disputants swear to demonstrate the validity of their stand. This is based on the belief that if an individual swears falsely, something terrible would befall him or her. As such, by taking the oath, the conflict is considered resolved and thus closed.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Some features of resolved conflicts are: mutual understanding between parties, relaxed behaviour, reduced tension, tolerant attitudes, and hospitable actions (Okolie-Osemene, 2011). Thus, when a community experience conflict within it, there are mechanisms which are adopted by the members of such community for resolving such conflicts. From our case study above, *Pulaaku*, a unique characteristic of the *Fulbe*, has been found to be a very important and effective instrument of managing and resolving conflicts at all levels within the Fulbe people. Other methods outside of such traditional mechanisms include avoidance/withdrawal, mediation, negotiation, intervention by age-group, joint problem solving and so on.

5.0 SUMMARY

Conflict resolution, unlike conflict management or conflict settlement, implies approaching conflict in a problem-solving, constructive and non-violent way and recognising the value of the identities of all parties most especially their needs and interests. A clearer understanding of the concept of conflict resolution laid the foundation for the explanation of the different approaches and principles of ethnic conflict resolution. Various ways of resolving conflict were also discussed and the unit concluded with citation of the Fulbe people to buttress the dynamics of conflict resolution.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. What do you understand by conflict resolution?
2. Conflict resolution is the best approach towards resolving ethnic conflict. Discuss.
3. In what way is conflict resolution different from conflict management?
4. What are the features of resolved conflicts?

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UNIT 3 RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETIES

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Managing conflict in a multi-ethnic society is a very complex undertaking. Apart from the fact that it is often difficult to achieve the required success because of prolonged antagonism, the process is also often temporary in nature. This is why it is often said that “there are no permanent resolutions, only temporary solutions.” The above description, clearly suggests that the key to successful management of inter-ethnic confrontations involves reassuring minority groups and those with comparatively lesser power of their physical safety and belongingness.

To increase stability and positive inter-ethnic relations, the rights and privileges of minority groups needs to be secured. More often than not, this can be achieved where confidence-building measures are undertaken at the national level. Within the context of fears expressed by minority groups and the ambitions of elites, international intervention may be necessary and inevitable. Realistically, however, confidence-building measures and international interventions are imperfect because

in the final analysis, some ethnic groups are still left without any form of reliable safety net and this makes some level of conflict inevitable.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- examine strategies for managing conflicts in multi-ethnic societies
- articulate the features of each strategy
- provide a clear understanding of the uses to which each strategy has been put and why they were chosen.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Resolving Ethnic Conflicts through Power Sharing

When ethnic minorities fear that their exclusion from the decision-making process will leave them exposed and vulnerable to the social and political preferences of majority groups, effective management requires an effort on the part of the state to build representative ruling coalition. In conceding to ethnic minority members a proportionate share of cabinet, civil service, military, and more importantly, local governance positions, the majority-controlled state reaches out to include these minority representatives in public affairs, thereby offering them an important incentive for cooperation and positive collaboration.

In South Africa, for example, former President Nelson Mandela agreed to include power-sharing provisions in the interim constitution that was drawn up in 1994 in an effort to reconcile the minority but economically dominant local white community as well as to build confidence among largely white investors abroad. Power sharing can be informal (e.g., Kenya in the 1960s) or formal (e.g., Nigeria in 1999), and can take place in authoritarian states (e.g., Zambia in the 1980s) or democratic states (e.g., South Africa in mid-1990s).

In both Eastern Europe and Africa, there has been a mixed pattern of "hegemonic exchange" regimes - centrally-controlled one-party or no-party regimes that allow a limited amount of bargaining to take place between state, ethnic, and other elites. Under the authoritarian administrations of Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia or Félix Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire, nationality or ethnic representatives met with the president in cabinet sessions, where strong differences were sometimes aired by group spokespersons behind closed doors. The resulting power-sharing systems are quite diverse; yet, they have in common a form of coordination in which a somewhat autonomous state

and a number of less autonomous ethnic-based and other interests engage in a process of mutual accommodation in accordance with commonly accepted procedural norms, rules, or understandings (Rothschild, 1986: 72). These elite-power-sharing arrangements are inevitably temporary, but while they last, they provide some security for political and ethnic minorities.

Pacted democracy, with its rough reflection of the configurations of elite power, can prove relatively easy to organise in an interim constitutional situation. Elite pacts provide a relatively stable form of governance for a transitional period, but if they remain unresponsive to public demands for change over too long a period, then the pact makers become isolated from their supporters, allowing new uncertainties to surface (Karl,1986: 217–218).

In principle, there is no logical reason why such structural arrangements cannot lead to a more open system of sharing-even full democracy, as happened in Colombia. In reality, however, Colombia possesses a rather unique form of party (not ethnic) relations, creating grave doubts about power-sharing's ability to prove an effective confidence-building mechanism over the long term and in other places. Because of the fragility and temporary nature of these state-inspired inclusive coalitions, such mechanisms are likely to provide only minimal assurances to ethnic minorities. First, as already indicated, with ethnic balances of power nearly always in flux and information being limited, these arrangements are necessarily transitional ones. Second, if poorly negotiated and implemented, the incomplete ethnic contracts may be rejected eventually by the groups they are designed to protect.

The number of people appointed to the cabinet or civil service on the basis of their minority status is not in and of itself a guarantee of proportional group influence (Mattes 1993, 76). Minority representatives can, as was the case in Sudan at various times, be assigned insignificant portfolios and therefore wield only minor influence. Majority and minority parties may also both pull back from power-sharing arrangements; regarding these arrangements as co-opting them into a system they view as still potentially threatening. In Sri Lanka, hardline elements within the minority Tamil community rejected President Chandrika Kumaratunga's1995 proposal giving them control over a semi-autonomous region in the north, a proposal also opposed by some of the more nationalist Sinhalese in her own cabinet (Sisk 1996); at the same time, the insurgent Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam reportedly charged that the government's tactic of peace negotiations was in fact a pretext to cover its planned military offensive. Similarly, hard-liners among the majority Hutu in Rwanda, resentful of the power-sharing provisions of the 1993 Arusha accords, launched a preemptive

strike that included a genocidal assault against both the Tutsis and some Hutu moderates.

When not carefully applied, power-sharing arrangements can backfire. Ethnic elites must be prepared to interact with other elite representatives who they detest passionately. This is something that is difficult to do under normal circumstances and especially in a situation where the norms of collaborative politics are not in place. In order to achieve inclusiveness, should those who design power sharing structures bring ethnic extremists into decision-making bodies to build greater confidence?

In addition to this, knowledge of local circumstances is critically important in assessing the right way to follow. For instance, in situations where a majority African government has perceived its local white community to be useful in achieving its developmental objectives as well as in reassuring others abroad about the safety of their investments in the country - as it happened in Kenya, Zimbabwe or South Africa - new governments swallowed their anger over the humiliations they experienced during the struggle against colonial rule and took care to include white representatives in important cabinet positions.

However, in situations where Africa's ethnic groups regard each other's ambitions for control of the state and its hold on publicly-controlled resources suspiciously, as it happened in Burundi and Rwanda, their essentialist perceptions of their rival's intentions frequently lead to an inflexible stance in favour of appointing their group members rather than outsiders to high government positions. It may be possible to justify the exclusion of ethnic adversaries in such circumstances. Thus, including Hutu extremists in a post-Arusha government in Rwanda, for example, would not likely have led to an easing of inter-ethnic tensions. Moreover, where the majority-dominated state remains unprepared to respond to legitimate minority demands for full participation in decision making activities, power-sharing schemes are likely to unravel and become instead a source of serious insecurity. Power-sharing by itself is not a solution to ethnic fears. While it offers some safeguards against exploitation, it cannot prevent extremist elites and their supporters from dividing society and pulling apart the social fabric. The issue of power sharing cannot be successful without the concept of respect.

The security of ethnic groups is based on reciprocity of respect. Unless each side views its opponent as honorable and having legitimate interests, relations are likely to be marred by a history of intended or unintended insults. Donald Horowitz noted for instance that "the more invidious the intergroup comparison and the larger the area of unacknowledged claims to group legitimacy, the more intense the

conflict, all else being equal" (1985: 215). Ethnic insults can be highly injurious to a group's pride and self-esteem. It widens the social distance between groups and intensifies fears among ethnic minorities that their children will be relegated to second-class status for a long time.

For instance, relations that were marked by polarisation and increasing hostility were aggravated by the contempt that Serbs had for their Muslim compatriots in Bosnia. Describing themselves as the only people in former Yugoslavia "who have the talent, energy, experience, and tradition to form a state," they characterise their adversaries as representing "all that is base, undesirable, and naturally subordinate" (Cigar, 1995: 74–75).

In former Sudan, southerners, with strong memories of slavery and perceptions of low status, become annoyed at any new evidence of disrespect. For this reason, they viewed the Sudanese government's decision to apply Islamic law to them as well as the Muslims living in the country's north, as a confirmation of their second-class status (Amnesty International, 1995: 57). Their resentment boiled over in 1994, when the Minister of State in the President's office at the mediation talks convened in Nairobi by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), allegedly treated both southerners and the IGADD mediators with contempt while rejecting the southerners' call for self-determination and a secular state *(*Sudan Democratic Gazette, 1994, 3).

Sometimes, the fears of ethnic minorities may be overstated. Minorities in Eastern Europe are described as having "an exaggerated fear of the loss of identity" - a legacy of distrust of majority authorities that causes them to make seemingly unreasonable demands for legal guarantees. The majority groups who are usually fearful that this will mark the beginning of moves toward the breakup of their states often refuse to consent to such demands (Watts, 1995: 92–93). In order to build confidence, it is important that state elites take resentments and anxieties by minority ethnic groups seriously. Unless such fears are taken seriously, regimes will be unable to avoid the problem of "wounded tigers." Unless past wrongs are redressed and the sting of disparagement is removed from ethnic interactions, internal negotiations will remain clouded by the shadow of bitterness and suspicion and uncertainty by minority groups over adversarial intentions that will lead to serious conflicts.

3.1.1 Grand Coalitions

Sometimes, more comprehensive forms of power-sharing may be used only for transitional purposes. For example, in South Africa, the

transition from white rule took place under negotiated power-sharing arrangements that guaranteed every major political party (having more than 5% of votes cast) with a proportional share in the governing coalition. This arrangement for a "grand coalition" was, however, only temporary.

3.1.2 Ethnically Designated Office-Holding

Various countries have experimented with rules that specifically require that particular office holders should be somebody of a specific ethnicity or religion. In the period before the civil war in Lebanon, there were power-sharing arrangements that ensured that not all major office-holders were from the same religious community. Similarly, conflicts between natives and "Indians" in Fiji led to a 1999 constitution that contained communal arrangements intended to provide guarantees of Fijian majorities in the legislature regardless of changing demographic realities; with 23 of the 71 seats reserved for native Fijians and only 19 for people of Indian descent. The problem with such fixed rules is that they often attempt to preserve a particular status quo against changing demographic realities. Maintaining them almost invariably means refusing to permit new censuses to take place. The arrangements in Fiji, for example, have proven to be unsustainable. In 1999, the Fijian Labour Party (FLP) not only won all 19 of the Indian communal seats but it also won 18 of the 25 geographically defined "open" seats (each filled using the alternative vote), thus controlling a majority (37 of the 71 seats) in the Fijian legislature. The FLP leader was Indo-Fijian, and assumed the position of Prime Minister – which annoyed some ethnic Fijians and led to a coup by a group advocating a “Fiji for the Fijians” policy and arguing that existing constitutional arrangements failed to provide sufficient guarantees of native Fijian political control in May 2000.

The "Good Friday" agreement of 1998 which is the British-Irish Accord over the future of Northern Ireland that guaranteed political inclusion without the need to treat religious identification as the sole indicator of political identity in Northern Ireland and without attempting to impose a particular balance of power. The strategy used was to require minimal representation for various parties, but to define those groupings entitled to special representation not by the religion of their supporters/representatives but by the policy positions that they espoused e.g., pro-Union, anti-Union, or some other classification (O’Leary,1999).

Another intriguing and unusual feature of the "Good Friday" accord that should be taken seriously, because of the potential for its adoption in other settings is the system the Accord specified for determining the allocation of ministries across political parties. After the positions of

Prime Minister and Associate Prime Minister were allocated, the remaining ministries are determined by using proportional representation. The party that is entitled to the first seat gets first pick of the ten ministries. The party that is entitled to the second seat gets second pick among the nine remaining ministries, etc. The first use of this mechanism worked smoothly (O'Leary, 1999).

3.2 Constitutional Reform

The issue of constitutional reform is related to how political power is achieved legitimately through democratic elections. To manage incessant ethnic conflicts, the constitution must be reformed in such a way that the electoral process will protect the interests of minority groups. Although elections represent only a brief episode in a larger political process, they can have enormous influence on intergroup collaboration and conflict. Where favourable circumstances (i.e., an agreement on the rules of the political game, broad participation in the voting process, and a promising economic environment) exist, elections can promote political stability.

In democratic environments, where institutionalised uncertainty provides many players with an incentive to participate, the election process can legitimatise the outcome (Przeworski, 1991, 26). All groups have a reason to organise and, through coalitions, they are given an opportunity to gain power in the future. This prospect of competing in accordance with the procedural norms of the political system can be reassuring to minority interests. Not only do they have a chance to advance their individual and collective interests, but they have reason to be encouraged by the majority's commitment to the electoral contract. The effect is to preempt conflict.

The implications of elections, however, can also be troubling in multi-ethnic settings. Because opportunities are limited and competition for positions and resources are intense, some leaders can choose to further their individual and collective interests at the expense of the society's overall well-being. As noted above, where ethnic leaders seek to promote their parochial interests by attempting to outflank their rivals through militant appeals to their ethnic kinsmen, the result may be to increase strife and undermine the frail, cross-cutting linkages that buttress democratic regimes.

Ethnic outbidding heightens minority insecurity. Groups make greater demands on the state and on one another. Values of restraint and civility are weakened and suppressed emotions of dominance come to the fore in majority circles. In some circumstances, leaders can repackage and play upon latent grievances in such a way as to foster a collective

response that is highly damaging to their stereotypic enemies. As a result, elections in certain circumstances can prove to be destabilising, threatening minorities with the possibility of discrimination, exclusion, and even victimisation.

In practice, those crafting constitutions have organised elections in two ways to promote inclusive coalitions. First, electoral rules can be set so that candidates are forced to appeal to more than one ethnic group. In an effort to give presidential candidates an incentive to appeal to a broad, cross section of communal groups to gain the necessary support, for example, the aborted 1993 constitution in Nigeria provided that a winning candidate would be deemed to be elected when that person secured a simple majority of the total number of votes cast as well as one-third of the votes cast in each of at least two-thirds of the states. The intent is evident. In securing a majority of votes in a multiethnic society, moderate appeals, with their overarching themes, were expected to win out over parochial ones. The effect of adopting such an electoral system would likely be to build a measure of confidence among ethnic minorities regarding their future political status.

Secondly, electoral rules can also be crafted to ensure some minimal representation of all ethnic groups in the society. Those seeking to encourage minority representation in party lists and in ruling coalitions have looked favourably on systems of proportional representation. For example, in structuring the elections for the Russian State *Duma* (lower chamber of parliament) in 1993, the legal drafters provided for a chamber of 450 members, half on the basis of single-member constituencies and half on the basis of proportional representation.

Similarly, in South Africa, the African National Congress agreed, somewhat reluctantly, to use proportional representation during the transition period to give racial and ethnic minorities a sense of security at a difficult time of transition (Sisk, 1993: 87). However, because the present system seems cumbersome and fails to generate close links between a member of parliament and his or her constituents, ANC leaders are currently thinking of modifying the electoral system to be more like those in Germany or Russia, with their mixtures of proportional representation and plurality voting systems.

The way that state elites structure electoral arrangements is likely to prove critical in building confidence in minority circles. Nigeria's broad based electoral formula and proportional representation are two possible ways of encouraging minority ethnic participation and inclusion; yet, they are likely to endure only as long as they retain support among key groups and state elites. At such time as the majority shifts its concern away from the values of representativeness, a change in electoral rules

can take place. Unless this change is handled fairly and with extreme sensitivity, it can be perceived by minority groups as inimical to their interests. As a consequence, considerable time is required before minorities come to see electoral laws as reliable foundations for their security.

3.3 Constitutional Arrangements

Territorial arrangements of various types may be employed to minimise conflicts between ethnic groups. While it might be thought that differences in patterns of ethnic concentration across wide territorial areas may be used as the basis for “natural” divisions into federal or federating units, ethnic segregation is often fostered by both state and private action, and in extreme cases, the preponderance of ethnic "suspicions." In such cases, creating a demarcation is synonymous with oppression. In many settler states, indigenes were driven off valuable land and confined to reservations in less desirable parts of the country. For example, the Cherokee and Seminole Indians were transported enmasse from Georgia and Florida respectively, to reservations in Oklahoma in the 19th century. In apartheid-era South Africa, minority white settlers attempted to force the majority black population into Bantustans (Transkei, Siske, Boputswanaland, Venda) which amounts to only 13 percent of the nation's land surface.

Dividing ethnic groups via *territorial federalism* in settings where geography and ethnicity are highly coincident may be a sensible way to maintain national unity in the presence of strong ethnic and linguistic divisions. The model for a federal state is one in which the central government has responsibility for matters affecting the polity as a whole, e.g., national defense and foreign policy; while the states and sub-units within them deal with more local matters. Territorial federalism is commonly advocated as the constitutional design appropriate for plural societies -- at least in contexts where ethnic groups are geographically concentrated. Regional autonomy and Federalism started out in the post-colonial world as dirty words because they were thought to be latter-day versions of techniques that colonialists used to divide and rule; but slowly over the decades, many states have come to realise that there is real utility in bringing government down to lower levels where members of ethnic groups will have more say in their own destiny.

On the other hand, because federal arrangements are often seen as concessions to separatist minorities who challenge the dominant ethnic group’s perception of the nature of the state, they may be strongly resisted. In Estonia, for example, with its large proportion (over 30%) of Russian “colonisers”, native Estonians are unwilling to define the state

in federal terms despite the geographic concentration of Russian speakers. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese majority defines the Tamils as interlopers who are not entitled to a share in the state (Eller, 1999).

There is little apparent relationship between a nation's degree of ethnic homogeneity or even ethnic dispersion for that matter, and its likelihood of adopting federal arrangements: some federal nations are effectively mono-ethnic (e.g., Austria, Germany, Venezuela) or do not have ethnic divisions as the basis for territorial units (e.g., the United States), and some multiethnic nations are unitary in form (e.g., Mauritius, Botswana, Indonesia). Nonetheless, at least if we concentrate on long term democracies, a relationship between ethnicity and adoption of federal institutions does seem to be a political reality. As Lijphart (1999) summarises the evidence, in long-term democracies, federal arrangements are most common in societies that are geographically large and/or ethnically and linguistically diverse, while the vast majority of monolingual and mono-ethnic states are unitary in form.

India is perhaps the most striking example of a multi-lingual and multi-ethnic federal nation. While the original division of India into states did not follow the linguistic divisions in the country, additional states were created along linguistic lines and there was also some realigning of state boundaries in the 1950s and thereafter (Brass 1990: 146-156). In Belgium (after 1993) and Switzerland, language and territory tend to coincide with federal arrangements.

3.4 Mono-Ethnic and Multi-Ethnic Electoral Constituencies

The greater the residential concentration of ethnic groups, the harder it will be to create multiethnic constituencies. When there is virtually perfect residential segregation, it may appear inevitable that we will end up with mono-ethnic constituencies. Still, in plural societies, if political leaders are willing to allow for very large constituencies, or to engage in very creative gerrymandering, they can always create constituencies with substantial proportions of more than one ethnic group. However, there is virtually no country that explicitly mandates the creation of multi-ethnic constituencies, but there are many countries where the opposite is true. For example, in the U.S., as a result of the constitutional interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment (added to protect the rights of newly freed slaves after the Civil War) and of language in the Voting Rights of 1965 and the 1982 amendments to that Act, race-conscious districting (involving the drawing of "majority-minority" districts) is mandated in situations where minority candidates of choice can be shown to regularly lose because of patterns of same-race voting and where there exists minority populations large

enough and geographically concentrated enough to form the majority in a single member district (Grofman, Handley and Niemi, 1992; Grofman, 1998).

The extreme case of a mono-ethnic constituency is the *communal roll*, where only members of a given ethnic group may participate such as the *Maori seats* in New Zealand involving only a handful of seats, the Maori seats are relatively non-controversial although there have been calls for their abolition. In contrast, in Fiji, *communal seats* and *communal quotas* are much more controversial because what is at stake has to do with who will control the state.

3.5 Ethnic-Based and Non-Ethnic Based Party Systems

When territory and ethnicity coincide, at least some political parties are likely to be ethnically based parties. There have been attempts to prevent the formation of ethnically-based parties, e.g., Nigeria's constitution had an explicit prohibition against the formation and official recognition of such political parties. But such attempts are often denounced as being both anti-democratic and futile, since they may be circumvented by ethnically-based parties who officially organise around ostensibly non-ethnic issues.

One of the remarkably peculiar responses to the problem of ethnic-based conflict tied to the actions of ethnically-based party leaders came took place in Uganda. A June 29, 2000 referendum sponsored by President Yoweri Museveni was held on whether or not to make a multi-party system illegal, i.e., to endorse a "non-party" system. With 51% turnout, the referendum carried, with 90.7% of those who voted expressing support (Wasswa, 2000).

However, even if political parties form on the basis of ethnicity, this need not be the whole story; there may still be mechanisms that allow for or foster cross-cutting cleavages. For example, in Belgium, while almost all political parties are either Flemish parties or Walloon parties, most of the major parties can be viewed as language-based halves of a larger entity which is ideologically defined. For example, the *Greens* (a political party) became split into a Flemish and a Walloon half since 1982 (Ishiyama and Breuning, 1998: 123).

3.6 Majoritarian and Proportional Electoral Rules

In post-1994 South Africa, even though the ANC could have virtually eliminated any competitors if it instituted a majoritarian electoral system, it deliberately chose proportional representation partly to

reassure whites and partly because it was ideologically committed to the principle of inclusive representation.

3.7 Use of a Parliamentary Rather than Presidential System

Several leading students of comparative politics have argued that presidential systems are particularly harmful in terms of their potential for conflict, especially when coupled with constitutional arrangements that create rival centres of power. For example, badly-defined borders between presidential powers and those of the legislature can be continual irritants leading to political unrest and may trigger crises that lead to the end of democratic rule. Scholars therefore call attention to the instability that is generally characteristic of presidential systems, signaled in most cases by outcomes such as the high probability of military or other coups (e.g., the self-coup by Fujimori in Peru).

However, this point of view remains controversial, with some scholars arguing, among others, that we need to take regional controls into account. For example, Latin America had a high proportion of presidential regimes as well as a high proportion of military coups. The same arguments that are used against presidentialism as a conflict-generating practice have been used to argue that presidentialism increases ethnic conflicts. In particular, presidentialism implies a single powerful office that tends to generate a strong likelihood of winner-take-all competition between rival ethnies.

3.8 Constitutional Protection of Rights

Many countries have constitutions or federal arrangements whose provisions regarding rights either cannot be amended or that require super-majorities or popular referendum. For example, the 1999 Fijian Constitution has various specific safeguards pertaining to native Fijian rights and customs that are deliberately written into it. Moreover, amendment of these provisions requires supermajorities in parliament (3/4 approval) in addition, there has to be a concurrence by the *Council of Chiefs* (see Stockwell, 2001). Similarly, amendments to rights provisions in the Spanish constitution require a 2/3rd vote of both chambers, and automatically dissolve parliament if passed, with the proposed amendment submitted to the people for ratification by amendment. Writing unamendable provisions into a constitution is also not a strange thing. For example, it is not common knowledge that a provision in the U.S. Constitution that each state must have at least one representative in the U.S. House of Representatives cannot be amended.

3.9 Citizenship and Language Policies

Lijphart (1999: 196) observed that although the Swiss Federation has four official languages, twenty-two (22) of the twenty-six (26) cantons and half-cantons are officially unilingual. Only three: Bern, Fribourg, and Balais are bilingual, and even Graubünden the most linguistically polyglot has only three official languages. In Belgium, the "natural" division of the country is three-fold: a Flemish speaking area, a French-speaking area, and a bilingual area around Brussels. Nonetheless, in both countries, school policies encourage/require basic literacy in more than one language. In Spain, too, linguistic divisions are largely territorial in nature. A series of recent decisions there has given legitimacy to the *Catalan* language, whose speakers are concentrated in Catalonia.

In a number of economically developed countries (e.g., Luxembourg), virtually all citizens are minimally bilingual, and many under the age of 40 are trilingual with English as an additional language. In contrast, in Canada, while the central government has been committed since the 1960s to a policy of promoting bilingualism throughout Canada, this has been countered by the insistence of Quebec - the province in which the vast bulk of French speakers are located - on French monolingualism in its province.

Many countries permit schooling in a "native" language alongside schooling in the "official" language of the country, and often, such provisions are embedded in the constitution. In some countries the state takes responsibility for providing such instruction. In the U.S., for example, the Supreme Court held in the 1970s (in an important and still controversial decision) that students have a constitutionally protected right to be taught in a language that allows them to learn, such as their mother tongue. When bilingual education is seen as compromising language learning in the "official language," it is often the subject of backlash. In the U.S., "bilingualism" in the form of Spanish language instruction has been demanded by some Hispanic activists, with the main pedagogical arguments being that teaching of particular topics in one's native language speeded learning and that grammatical skills developed in learning one's native language would help in the acquisition of other languages.

While there was little general resistance to "transitional bilingualism," when it appeared that some schools were requiring bilingual education for students for whom it had no compelling educational justification, and Spanish language instruction was being continued throughout the schooling process as a form of "cultural preservation" rather than being viewed as temporary, with bilingual education serving a secondary role

as a jobs program for Spanish-speaking teachers and paraprofessionals, the backlash was great because of the poor performance of Hispanic students on standardised exams. In California, in particular, there was a successful referendum to end non-transitional forms of bilingual education.

More generally, the growing presence of large numbers of people, especially the large influx of Spanish speakers, whose English language skills are low or nonexistent, has led to a number of campaigns for making English the official language of various states, and for making English the official language of the U.S. as a whole. The U.S. does not have an official language; and one state (New Mexico), is officially bilingual. Similar phenomena are found throughout the world, for example in post-Soviet Bulgaria, where Article 36 of the 1991 Constitution guarantees that "citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian shall have the right to study and use their own language alongside the compulsory study of the Bulgarian language."

In many countries some level of demonstrated competence in the "official" language is required for an immigrant seeking citizenship. Sometimes this language requirement is used as a barrier to limit naturalisation; often, it is used as a litmus test of a willingness to "assimilate." It plays both roles in parts of the former Soviet Union where there are "leftover" Russian-speakers. In Latvia, for example, knowledge of spoken Latvian is required as a prerequisite of naturalisation. In 1994, Latvia also sought to set quotas on naturalisation that would dramatically slow the rate at which Russians living in that country could gain citizenship. However, protest from within and outside the country led to an elimination of the quota, and in 1995 the language provisions of the citizenship law were further eased to allow those who had obtained language instruction in Latvian-only schools or schools with Latvian language classes to automatically satisfy the language competence requirement (see Ishiyama and Breuning, 1998: 95).

3.10 Limited Autonomy

Many scholars have asserted that any form of devolution of political and administrative powers from the central state to minority ethnic groups is only feasible when this is carried out on territorial basis, that is, if the ethnic group in question is territorially concentrated. It therefore means that the only feasible alternative is what is called "non-territorial" autonomy which is limited in nature. In the Republic of South Africa, for example, the constitutional reform of 1984 introduced what can be described as an ambitious experiment in limited autonomy in the dying days of the white minority rule. It was conceived that in addition to the

central state institutions and a measure of territorial devolution, four major groups, whites, colored, Asians and ultimately, Blacks, would each have their own house of parliament to deal with group affairs. Unfortunately, this approach to management of ethnic conflict was discredited on the ground that it was intended to preserve minority rule. The approach however survived in its modified form, namely: the government of "indigenous peoples."

The term 'aborigine' refers to a population that claims to be the original set of inhabitants of its territory but which has been largely displaced by more recent waves of settlers. This population experiences economic, social and political marginalisation, its culture is under threat from the dominant culture of the metropolis, and its members may be stigmatised as inferior. This group may however react defensively by demanding measures for the conservation of such rights that it is keen to retain, including land ownership and possibly a demand for some form of autonomous government. The inevitable interrelationship of this group with the dominant or ruling majority usually involves consideration of limited autonomy as a solution.

A good example that can be considered here is that of the Maori of New Zealand, who constituted about 49 percent of the total population in 1857-58. By 1991, they had declined to 13 percent and are now widely dispersed all over the country. Since 1867, provision has been made for separate parliamentary representation for Maoris, by whom four non-territorial constituencies that cover the whole country, are filled by election from non-Maori electorate. A separate Maori electorate register is maintained; persons of Maori descent may (but are not obliged to) opt for this rather than for the general register. Aside separate parliamentary representation, matters of particular Maori interest are supervised by a network of special Maori institutions, including such non-territorial bodies as District Maori Councils and an umbrella body, the New Zealand Maori Council (see Coakley, 1994).

In Canada, the issue of the indigenous peoples has acquired new importance. In the case of small groups like the *Inuit*, spatial concentration has made a territorial solution realistic. In the case of others, such as the formally registered "status Indians" who constitute about 2 percent of the population, geographical dispersal is such that no cohesive territory can be identified. While the rejection of a constitutional reform package in 1992 led to a postponement not only of federal reform, but also of the issue of Indian self-government, one widely discussed approach called the Courchene proposal which suggests a form of essentially non-territorial jurisdiction in a range of areas similar to that of the federal provinces has been tabled (see Coakley, 1994).

The position of the *Saami* in Norway is also a good case study. They are a population of less than 1 percent and similar issues to those that motivated the Maori and the Canadian Indians have resulted in protest movements and have seen the creation of separate representative institutions. The most ambitious of these was the Saami Assembly that came into existence in 1989. The assembly is consultative in nature, but its limited powers and representational principle are non-territorial, with all of Norway being divided into 13 non-territorial electoral constituencies (see Thompson, 1992).

In each of these three examples, a marginal population that poses no threat to the dominance of the majority has been able to secure institutional recognition of certain privileges. In the case of Canada and New Zealand at least, this minority has been able to advance its cause by using powerful historical arguments by contrasting its own long-established rights against the more recent claims of the more numerous settlers. When the marginal minorities, by contrast, consists mainly of immigrants, as in many of the economically developed states of Western Europe, demands for institutional recognition of ethnic rights tended to be resisted more strongly.

3.11 Total Autonomy

Self-rule is the major demand of many aggrieved ethnic groups in every region of the world. In 1992, a study commissioned by the *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* identified more than sixty states with "active subnational movements seeking self-rule" (Sisk 1996: 1). Many of these groups were seeking their own state. Yet, as the political scientist, Samuel Huntington has noted, after the breakup of colonial empires into their component parts, there has long been a strong opposition to further proliferation of nation states on the part of the major world powers. Some advanced industrial nations had minority populations with separatist leanings. To suppress separatism at home, they may have sought to suppress secessionist and even regional autonomy movements abroad. Perhaps even more importantly, during the Cold War, any changes in national boundaries were feared as destabilising, and those on different sides in a civil war or war for independence often sought allies from opposite sides in the Cold War.

In the case of the U.S., secession still brings up memories of the war between the States (the Civil War). Among Yankees, at least, the movement to secede is associated with a desire to oppress minorities. But the strong bias among U.S. policy makers and academics against any further partition to create (more) ethnically homogeneous states has at least two other sources. First, the U.S. is committed to the nation-state as a form of voluntary social contract, joining those with a commitment

to freedom and not merely those who share ties of blood or culture. Ethnically defined states do not leave open the possibility of choice. Moreover, the exclusive nature of the "ethnic state" is seen as likely to give rise to illiberal and even undemocratic policies that do not recognise natural rights and that are likely to lead to various forms of ethnic segregation, ethnic cleansing or even genocide.

Second, the division of existing nations into ethnically defined segments if carried out to its logical conclusion will lead to the proliferation of mini and micro-states that are not economically viable. Economic hardship is viewed as a route to dictatorship, as well as a continuing push toward illegal immigration to the wealthier nations of the world. Furthermore, despite the clear language on "self-determination" in Article 1.2 of the UN Charter, there remains a strong bias against secession in international law and practice. Nonetheless, recent events including the end of the Cold War have made the existence of secessionist movements at least somewhat more tolerable. For example, the "clean" separation of Czechoslovakia into Slovakia and the Czech Republic (the so-called "velvet divorce") was taken with equanimity in the West, largely because of the democratic way in which the separation occurred and because the ethnic geography and historic borders allowed for partition without the bitterness and violence that accompanied the partition of British India into India and Pakistan for example.

Sometimes, the granting of total autonomy through secession/partition might seem the only viable option. The Hutu-Tutsi conflict might have been mitigated by some form of ethnic partition, with an externally monitored exchange of both territory and persons although this may be complicated by the problems of specifying who is Hutu, and who is Tutsi. An attempt at international mediation in Rwanda in the early 1990s was a failure but, according to information from some witnesses, neither boundary adjustment nor movement of persons was given any form of consideration during that mediation exercise (Kaufmann 1997: 297-8).

However, it may actually amount to wishful thinking to think that moving boundaries or moving people into ethnic spaces are our only choices. According to Cohen (1997), there are simply too many different ethnic/linguistic groups in the world for us to attempt a demarcation of boundaries or even movement of peoples to be a viable solution to the problem of multiethnic societies. Moreover, as Sisk (1996: 2) reminds us, "internal conflicts may be transformed to international conflicts," as was the case between India and Pakistan on the continuing controversy over the fate of Kashmir.

4.0 CONCLUSION

In concluding this section it is necessary to state that, there does not seem to be a single solution to the problem faced by a plural society in terms of managing conflicts that emanate from its ethnic plurality. Democratic success in Mauritania and Trinidad has been based on modified majoritarian institutions. Thus, power sharing is not a necessary condition for ethnic accommodation and relatively stable democracy in plural societies. Democracy has succeeded in Mauritius and Trinidad to the extent that it has, because crosscutting class cleavages provided the foundation for moderate, nationalistic ethnic elites to pursue inclusive multiethnic strategies which toned down the divisive influence of ethnicity and contributed to the development of national identities that reduced ethnic attachments and increased commitment to the democratic process among all ethnic groups. Moreover, Fiji, which possessed semi-convocational arrangements and made use of the alternative vote, illustrates that even the attempts to mix integrative and communal solutions may not help to overcome historical feelings of displacement generated by ethnic in-migration.

It is however, encouraging to note that roughly 80% of the ethnic groups identified by Gurr (1993) only pursued politics actions, or at most engaged in non-violent protests such as mass demonstrations, to achieve their goals. For example, it was through ordinary politics that *Inuits* in Canada were given their own territory.

5.0 SUMMARY

We summarise this section by demonstrating why democracy tends to be unstable in a plural society. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) construct a five-stage paradigm to demonstrate why democracy is inherently unstable in ethnically-divided societies. The first stage *pre-independence* is marked by elite-level interethnic cooperation. Throughout this period, ethnic differences are submerged by colonial rule (a common enemy) and common aspirations for independence, which explains the early successes of democratising states. It is during stage two (*post-independence*) that strains begin to develop within the multiethnic coalitions over the distribution of resources. Politicians respond by generating demand for national issues (e.g., development) and remain intentionally ambiguous on communal issues. If they do this successfully, the multiethnic coalition remains in power.

Stage three (*the early period of democratic rule*) marks a critical turning point in the democratisation process. The state's ability to manage the pressures created during this stage determines whether or not it spirals into a deeply divided society or evolves to become more pluralistic in

orientation. During this period, national issues lose their salience, politicians "fan the embers" of ethnic chauvinism, and ethnic appeals made by political leaders strain the unity of the multiethnic governing coalition.

Clearly, multiethnic coalitions cannot be sustained during stage three because of the actions of outbidders - ethnic entrepreneurs who adopt extremist ethnic positions designed to advance the interests of a particular ethnic group. The success of outbidders depends on their ability to convince ethnic group members that ethnic extremism is necessary to protect the group from domination by other groups. If their appeals succeed, then they can pressurise moderate ethnic leaders by accusing them of betraying their ethnic group. If their appeals do not find a receptive audience, then they will have little impact on the direction of politics in plural societies.

The force that underlies their success is the ever-increasing salience of ethnicity. It is during stage four, when ethnicity becomes the defining political division that the governing multiethnic coalition disintegrates. In plural societies that have become hyper-ethicized (where ethnicity defines all political matters), multiethnic appeals no longer find an audience. Ethnic elites have difficulties cooperating with each other when forced to mend fences in their ethnic communities. When ethnic elites can no longer appeal to multiethnic constituencies, they end up falling back on ethnically based parties, which furthers the "security dilemma" inherent in a situation of low social trust and intense ethnic division.

During stage four, ever-increasing ethnic salience, the divisive impact of ethnic out bidders, the consolidation of ethnically-exclusive parties, and the breakdown of trust and cooperation among ethnic groups inevitably leads to the creation of an ethnically-exclusive state, where public goods become the preserve of the advantaged ethnic group and ethnicity the criterion for their distribution. The state's inability to insure public goods reinforces ethnic attachments and drives a spiral of deligitimation. Individuals seek out alternative sources of public goods and bases of statehood in their ethnic community. In a vicious cycle, ethnic communalism breeds attitudes of illegitimacy that reduce the states' effectiveness and thereby contributes to greater illegitimacy.

The creation of an ethnically-exclusive state inevitably leads to the fifth and final stage, where democracy collapses and ethnic conflict ensues. Given ever increasing ethnic salience and deepening ethnic divisions, the actions of outbidders, and the breakdown of multiethnic parties, ethnic movements that demand total control over the state emerge. Driven by concerns for communal self-preservation, ethnic elites exploit

the state to secure and maintain ethnic group advantage. Democracy collapses because the temptation for majorities to enhance their power and minorities to seize power by nondemocratic means is overwhelming.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. List five approaches to ethnic conflict management and give one example each of where it has been employed.
2. Why is relocation and separation of ethnic boundaries a difficult solution to ethnic problems?

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UNIT 4 CASE STUDIES IN THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Ethnic conflicts end by either the defeat of one party involved in such a conflict or by an intervention by a third party to bring the conflict to an end. This unit will assess the essence of third party interventions in ethnic conflicts through a comparative examination of the methods and attempts by other bodies in resolving such conflicts. In discussing this, some integrated conflict management mechanisms will be spelt out in order to widen our knowledge about third party intervention especially in situations of ethnic conflict.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define and explain the core concepts of peacemaking and peacekeeping as mechanisms of conflict resolution
- explore the intricacies of peacemaking and peace keeping in a number of societies where inter-ethnic relationships have been marred by conflict
- examine the impact of resolution options undertaken by third parties in an attempt to deal with the challenges presented by ethnic conflicts.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Peacemaking

This is one of the methods or technique of resolving conflicts generally irrespective of whether they are ethnic or not. According to Akindele (1990), peacemaking is the act of settling disputes or conflict through mediation, arbitration and reconciliation. Peacemaking is usually a role played by a neutral and trusted party who concentrates on the goals and the attitude of the conflicting parties. Peacemakers may be individuals, organisations like churches, International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, States or multilateral bodies like the United Nations, African Union, the European Union and so on.

In order for a peacemaker to achieve success in carrying out this assignment, (s)he must win the confidence of the conflicting parties by being impartial, neutral and reliable. (S)he must also have their consent or agreement before peace can be made. Thus, Young (1967), made the observation that what could be considered as ingredients of peacemaking include trustworthiness, prestige, firmness, authority, independence, knowledge of vital information and flexibility wherever necessary to move negotiations forward. The following are the major tasks of a peace maker:

- It is the duty of the peacemaker to forestall an escalation of conflict or diffuse an escalating conflict situation.
- (S)he is to provide the circumstances for face-saving by one or more of the belligerents where necessary.
- To provide basic channel for cross-communication.
- To provide the platform for the warring parties to meet.
- It is also the duty of the peace maker to pay personal visits to each of the conflict parties in order to get first hand information from them, note and study each party's grievance and position.
- Having gathered the basic information, the peacemaker will propose ways and means of resolving the conflict and terminating the belligerency.

From the above, one can therefore say that peacemaking is essentially a civilian process of managing conflict by the skillful use of diplomacy, diplomats and politicians who may be acting behind the scene. Examples of peacemaking include the United States' efforts under President Carter which enabled Egypt and Israel to sign the *Camp David Accord* in 1978/79.

3.1.1 Camp David Accords (Israeli/Palestinian Conflict)

The *Camp David Accords* as it is popularly referred to was a framework for peace in the Middle East signed by United States President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime minister, Menachem Begin on September 17, 1978 in Washington D.C. The Accords sought to address the conflict between Jews and Arabs over the control of the historic region of Palestine. This conflict had caused a series of wars since 1948, when Israel was created in much of the land that used to be Palestine. In the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel enlarged its territory through annexation, capturing the *Golan Heights* from Syria, the *West Bank* from Jordan, and the *Gaza Strip* and the *Sinai Peninsula* from Egypt. The Arab nations attempted to recapture the territories in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, making considerable advances but they were eventually repelled by Israeli forces.

In November 1977, Sadat visited Jerusalem to initiate peace talks between Egypt and Israel. Shortly after talks had stalled, Carter invited Sadat and Begin and their senior aides to the presidential retreat in Camp David, situated in the American State of Maryland, for a series of meetings in September 1978. After 13 days of negotiations, the leaders announced the conclusion of two accords that provided the basis for continuing peace negotiations:

1. a *Framework for Peace in the Middle East,* and
2. a *Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel*.

The Middle East framework outlined principles for a comprehensive peace settlement, focusing on the future of the *West Bank* and the *Gaza Strip*. It called for the withdrawal of Israel's military government (although Israel could retain forces in specified areas to ensure its security) and for the election of self-governing authorities by residents of these territories, both within a five-year period. It also stated that Israel and Egypt, along with Jordan and "representatives of the Palestinian people," should participate in negotiations to resolve the final status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israel's relations with Jordan, and Israel's right to exist within secure and recognised borders. The Egypt-Israel framework called for Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and the establishment of normal, peaceful relations between the two states.

The Egyptian cabinet approved the accords on September 19th. For Egypt, the connection between the two Accords was crucial; it feared that fellow Arab states would view a separate Egypt-Israel peace agreement as a betrayal of the Palestinians. The Israeli parliament also

approved the Accords on September 28. Negotiations between Egypt and Israel to implement the accords led to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty signed at the White House on March 26, 1979. The two nations ended the state of war between them and exchanged ambassadors, and Israel gradually withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula.

Despite peace between Egypt and Israel, the two sides were unable to make substantial progress on broader Arab-Israeli peace. Most of the Arab world reacted negatively to the Accords and the Treaty. The Arab League ousted Egypt and moved its headquarters from Cairo in Egypt, to Tunis, Tunisia. Other Arab states broke off relations with Egypt. Egyptian Islamic radicals within the military later assassinated Sadat in October 1981. In Israel, although it was clear that the Accords were unpopular among more radical right-wing parties in Israel, Begin was reelected as Israeli Prime Minister in 1981.

3.1.2 The "Good Friday" Agreement (Northern Ireland Conflict)

The *"Good Friday" Agreement* was something that could be described as a historic breakthrough in one of the world's most violent conflict. The 65-page document, signed in 1998, attempted to address political relationships *within* Ireland (which was previously a union of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland), and *between* the two Irish countries and the United Kingdom. The Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble insisted that the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair amend the agreement to ensure that no one in the proposed Northern Ireland Assembly could hold office if it had links to paramilitary groups that were still engaged in violence. Though he refused to make the amendment, Mr. Blair ensured that politicians who were linked to paramilitaries who refused to hand over weapons would not hold office in the Northern Ireland government that was later constituted. Contrary to expectations, political groups that had military wings such as the Ulster Unionist, SDLP and Sinn Fein welcomed the agreement. On the other hand, DUP leader Ian Paisley called it "more treacherous" than the *Sunningdale Agreement* which was signed when the United Kingdom established the first power sharing executives two decades earlier (BBC, 1998). The final agreement was posted to every household in Northern Ireland and put to a referendum which was also held in the Irish Republic on May 22, 1998. The result was overwhelmingly in favour of the agreement because 71.2% of people in Northern Ireland and 94.39% in the Republic voted in favour of the agreement.

3.2 Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement operations are usually undertaken to end military or violent exchanges or acts of aggression involving two antagonistic parties, with or without the consent of one or more parties to the conflict in order to create a permanent and viable environment or the guarantees that will bring about such conditions. Peace enforcement is typically associated with the employment of military forces in order to generate 'negative peace', or the absence of violent conflict engagement. Such activities are usually considered as a phase in more extensive operations, including peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but attempts to distinguish and define the interplay among such initiatives remain controversial.

Although peace enforcement is predominantly understood in terms of military interventions, a broader interpretation includes the use of a wide range of collectively-enacted sanctions by any party to a given conflict in order to end the violent hostilities (Miller & King, 2005). A very typical and most resent example of a peace enforcement mission in Africa was NATO's intervention in the Libyan crisis which finally led to the removal of Muammar Ghadafi from power. In essence, peace enforcement is largely a military operation, and it is a decisive confrontation that is adopted when it becomes clear that interveners could no longer afford to be neutral.

Three risks are involved in a situation of escalated violence. The first is that the international peacekeepers and peace enforcement personnel run a high risk of losing their lives and jeopadising their health. The second is that, the mandate to reduce the afflictions of the populations is also at risk. The third is that restoration of ceasefire in order to reopen communication links between parties becomes more difficult (Akpuru-Aja, 2007: 60).

3.3 Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is another technique that is used in resolving any form of conflicts, be it an ethnic or religious conflict. However, there is no single definition of the word 'peacekeeping'; neither is there a peacekeeping concept in the United Nations Charter even though the concept is frequently used to describe a form of operation tailored to the management of conflict by the UN. The concept however flows from the idea of peaceful settlement of disputes engraved in the UN Charter. Thus, the United Nations itself conceptualises peacekeeping as an operation undertaken by the United Nations that involve the use of military personnel that do not have enforcement powers, in order to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.

It should be noted here that apart from the United Nations, other international organisations such as the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) do mount peacekeeping missions. As a matter of fact, the Peace Academy defined peacekeeping as "the containment, prevention, moderation and termination of hostilities through the medium of a peaceful third-party intervention, organised and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers and civilians to restore and maintain order" (cited in Nwolise, 2004).

The objectives of peacekeeping essentially include the control of conflict, diffusion of tension and provision of a stabilised and conducive atmosphere for conflicting parties to talk peace and resolve the conflict between them. At the beginning of each peacekeeping operation, the key objective is to separate the conflicting parties by interposing the peacekeepers in-between the conflicting parties and then maintaining or securing a ceasefire. Once these objectives are achieved, a peace making machinery is put in motion to bring the parties together for peace negotiations and agreements that aim at resolving the conflict and terminating the peace mission itself.

According to the UN Peacekeeping (2008), effective peacekeeping involves the usage of force at the tactical level with the permission of the main parties to the conflict and the host authorities to defend the peacekeepers and their mandate, especially in situations where the State is unable to provide security and public order. For this reason, a number of professionals and groups play important roles in peacekeeping operations. These include: the military, human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs, administrators and economists, de-miners, electoral observers, humanitarian workers, police officers and legal experts, experts in public information and communication.

As at 2005, peacekeepers in Africa constituted nearly 50,000 out of the 65,000 UN peacekeepers worldwide. A lot of factors have contributed to the need for peacekeeping operations in Africa, a key factor being Africa's history of colonialism and conflicts. The end of the Cold War which coincided with the breakdown of state structures as well as their institutions in countries such as Somalia, Liberia, DR Congo and Sierra Leone in addition to disputes over natural resources—such as diamonds in Sierra Leone, cobalt and gold in the DRC—resulted in armed conflicts that grew into disastrous warfare involving warlords, mercenaries, child soldiers and militias. A massive supply of weapons and small arms from Eastern Europe in the 1990s escalated the conflicts. Apart from these, unrest and armed violence in most African countries that have no central government led to instability which usually spilled over national borders. In response, the international community (mostly

through the United Nations) has often chosen to deploy peacekeeping troops to such conflict theatres (CFR, 2005).

In pursuit of its mandate, a United Nations peacekeeping operation must work continuously to ensure that it does not lose the consent of the main parties, while ensuring that the peace process moves forward. This requires that all peacekeeping personnel have a thorough understanding of the history and prevailing customs and culture in the mission area, as well as the capacity to assess the interests and motivation of the parties.

Since the inception of UN peacekeeping operations, many countries (including many in Africa) have received assistance from one peacekeeping organisations or the other. Such countries include, Rwanda, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Sudan, and so on. To support this, we examine the peacekeeping mission in Sudan which was engaged in a civil war for a long time. From the early days of independence when the government launched a brutal crackdown on rebellion in the region, the conflict continued despite international mediation efforts and more than 200, 000 people (mostly civilians) died in the violence or from starvation and disease. Refugee camps swelled with more than 2 million displaced people creating a humanitarian emergency.

Sudan is home to an ethnic mosaic of people most of whom are Muslim Arabs. Next to them, the Fur people make up the largest non-Arab group in the region. In addition, there are between 30 and 90 ethnic groups or tribes in Darfur. Arabs of the Juhayna lineage comprise 40 percent of the population and the majority of them live in southern Darfur.

Two allied rebel groups emerged in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The SLA had grown from a coalition of anti-Janjaweed local defense groups, with distinct Zaghawa and Fur factions, and an educated leadership with national aspirations. The JEM had its origins in Sudan's Islamist movement and was led by non-Arab Islamists who were expelled from the government of Omar Hassan al-Bashir. The Darfurian rebels sought the restoration of Darfur as a single autonomous region, reversing the administrative reorganisations of the 1990s that had divided Darfur into three states. They also sought a settlement to many local grievances, especially over land rights.

In February 2003 the SLA launched attacks on government military garrisons in the Jebel Marra massif of central Darfur. Khartoum responded with a ferocious counterinsurgency campaign. In two massive offensives in 2003 and 2004, government forces halted the military threat posed by the rebellion. In the process, they inflicted immense

violence on the civilian population, targeting communities that were suspected to be supporting rebels.

The spearhead of the counterinsurgency campaign was the Janjaweed militia, which brutally attacked non-Arab communities in Darfur. Well-armed Janjaweed fighters, riding in small bands on camels or horses, pillaged and burned entire villages and massacred inhabitants. Janjaweed operations were well coordinated and synchronised with air force bombings. This pattern followed the government's long-established strategy of using militias in the civil war in southern Sudan between 1983 and 2004. Official denials of government sponsorship of the Janjaweed have not been convincing. According to a UN estimate, at least 200,000 people have died in the Darfur conflict. Some other estimates put the death toll closer to 400,000. The most unfortunate aspect of the Sudanese conflict is that civilians have accounted for the majority of casualties as victims of violence, starvation, and disease.

The civilian population suffered atrocities such as the destruction of entire villages, the slaughter of inhabitants, the widespread rape of women, and the deliberate contamination of water wells in order to poison those who depended on them. In 2004, former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell condemned the atrocities perpetrated by the government and Janjaweed in Darfur as genocide. In 2005 the International Criminal Court (ICC) began an investigation into war crimes committed in Darfur by both sides. In April 2007, the ICC issued warrants against two Sudanese men, one of whom is a member of the government, on charges of war crimes. However, Sudan is not a signatory to the ICC, and the government refused to surrender the two men to the court for prosecution.

3.3.1 Peacekeeping Operations in Sudan

Chad led the first efforts at mediating the Darfur conflict. The resulting ceasefire agreements reached in September 2003 and April 2004 were signed but were soon breached. The African Union (AU) also deployed peacekeeping troops to Darfur with a limited mandate to observe the ceasefire. The AU later took over the mediation process and convened peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria. The talks resulted in a detailed peace agreement being placed before the Sudanese government and rebel groups in Darfur in May 2006. The SLA had splintered into various factions, and only one faction signed the peace agreement with Khartoum. Subsequently, a new round of escalated fighting broke out in Darfur. Efforts to obtain a ceasefire and further peace talks continued into 2007.

In June 2007, the Sudanese government agreed to a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force in Darfur. AU officials hailed the agreement as a breakthrough, but other observers cautioned that there is need for caution because the government had reneged on previous agreements. Sudan reportedly insisted that a majority of the peacekeeping forces be made up of African soldiers. In July of that year, the UN Security Council authorised the creation of a 26,000-member peacekeeping force to be deployed in Darfur. The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was launched at the beginning of 2008 and it has remained in place even after the independence of South Sudan.

3.3.2 Peacekeeping Operations in Liberia

Civil war in Liberia claimed the lives of more than 250,000 people most of who were civilians and led to a complete breakdown of law and order. It also displaced hundreds of thousands of people, both internally and beyond the borders, resulting in some 850,000 refugees in the neighboring countries. Fighting began in late 1989, and by early 1990, a large number of deaths had already occurred in confrontations involving government forces and fighters of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor.

From the outset of the conflict, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) undertook various initiatives aimed at a peaceful settlement. The United Nations supported ECOWAS in its efforts to end the civil war. These efforts included establishing an ECOWAS's observer force called the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in 1990.

In 1992, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Liberia, and the Secretary-General appointed a Special Representative to assist in talks between ECOWAS and the warring parties. After ECOWAS brokered a peace agreement in Cotonou, Benin Republic in 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) under Security Council Resolution 866. Its task was to support ECOMOG in implementing the *Cotonou Peace Agreement*, especially compliance with and impartial implementation of the agreement by all parties. UNOMIL was the first United Nations peacekeeping mission undertaken in cooperation with a peacekeeping operation already established by another organisation.

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established in September 2003 to monitor a ceasefire agreement in Liberia following the resignation of President Charles Taylor and the conclusion of the Second Liberian Civil War. It consisted of up to 15,000 United Nations military personnel and 1,115 police officers, along with a civilian

component. It superseded the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).

The 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the ensuring two-year-long Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) brought together two rebel forces, the former government and members of civil society.

The protagonists in the second Liberian civil war (2000 – 2003) complied with the agreement and the peace process held. This culminated in the conduct of the 11 October, 2005 elections, the 8th November presidential run-off and the 16th January, 2006 inauguration of Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as the new Liberian Head of State. The exile of Charles Taylor did not end some pockets of conflicts that posed significant challenges to the peacekeeping operations under United Nations and the International Criminal Court had to issue a warrant of arrest that led to the arrest and ongoing prosecution of Charles Taylor in The Hague.

3.3.3 Peacekeeping Operations in DR Congo

For more than six years, the Congolese army was fighting a group of Rwandan rebels known as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (DFLR) who had lived in eastern Congo for more than 16 years. They are mostly Hutu and some of their leaders were implicated in the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. The military mission which began in concert with the Rwandan army in January 2009 was supported by UN peacekeepers. This operation has been controversial because the military operations have caused the deaths of over a thousand civilians, the raping of several thousand of them and displacement of around a million people. Rwandan rebels and Congolese army were both accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The controversy surrounding the United Nations' peacekeeping mission in the Congo was such that peacekeepers were put in a difficult position as the operations progressed because their mandate essentially became contradictory: they were mandated to protect civilians while at the same time support a Congolese army that is often killing civilians.

4.0 CONCLUSION

From the examples provided above, it becomes very obvious that the United Nations and the rest of the international community actually face various challenges in trying to bring stability to African states that are facing ethnic conflicts of the violent dimension. The problem of effective intervention in ethnically motivated conflicts and violence is complex because the obstacles are conceptual, contextual, political and

practical in nature. The lack of political will, public support, financial and other resources, and the lukewarm commitment of Western countries to the resolution of these ethnically motivated conflicts are making the task of peacemakers very difficult.

The former United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali's book *An Agenda for Peace* published in 1992 attempted to distinguish between a new array of 'conflict management tools' that are available to the international community, including preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuliding. Unfortunately, most of these tools did not come with clear instructional manuals that would have made it possible for most actors to internalise the principles and practices established during half a century of United Nations peacekeeping.

5.0 SUMMARY

The mechanisms of peacemaking discussed above show that the management of violent ethnic conflict whether at the national or international level should be adequately carried out. It should involve actions that will look into the conflicts situation first of all before delving into resolving it. In essence, peacemaking as a mechanism should provide the platform for the actual resolution of a conflict. Peacekeeping on the other hand should be generally accepted as a desirable strategy of managing an ethnic conflict. In summary, peacemaking and peace keeping have been identified and discussed as some of the mechanisms or tools used in resolving conflict by third parties who intervene in ethnic conflict situation in any society.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. List and explain the types of third party interventions that you know.
2. What are the functions and characteristics of an interverner?
3. Discuss any peacekeeping case study that you know aside from the ones provided in this material.

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UNIT 5 RESPONDING TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The rate of response to danger signals matters a lot in every society and should be effectively encouraged by decision makers. Sometimes stakeholders do not take early indicators of impending crises serious and do not respond to signals and issues that need attention until they degenerate into full-blown conflict. It is pertinent to note that genuine conflict prevention is the responsibility of the government, civil society, Non-Governmental Organisations and the organised private sector.

Early warning refers to the provision of timely and effective information through both and private institutions that allow individuals exposed to hazards to take actions that will help prevent risk and facilitate the prevention of conflict through effective response. In other words, early warning has to do with identifying the slow but steady onset of hazards or sources of hazards that may impact negatively on sustainable peace, stability and development.

According to the International Strategy for Disaster Resolution report of 2007, Early Warning System (EWS) involves a chain of concerns: understanding and mapping the hazards; monitoring and forecasting impending events; processing and disseminating understandable warnings to political authorities and the population; and undertaking appropriate and timely actions in response to warnings. Mwanasali (2006:195) believes that the primary measure of the effectiveness of an early warning system is its ability to trigger rapid reaction to a degenerating crisis situation. It identifies trouble spots in the society, issues warnings and initiates prompt response to forestall the outbreak of

conflict. Fusato (2003) maintains that one of the frameworks of early-warning puts the markers of early warning into two categories: signs and indicators. The aim of conflict early warning is to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent response strategies can be formulated to either prevent violent conflict or limit its destructive effects (Cilliers, 2006). For instance, Albert (2009:398) described early warning as a process of communicating information perceived about threats early enough for decision-makers to take actions that will deter it.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- state what constitutes early warning signals in ethnic conflict
- discuss what the nature of response to be put to use
- identify those involved in the conflict
- state what the cause of the conflict is.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Early Warning Signals and Indicators in Ethnic Conflict

Early warning is the first step in successful conflict prevention. In fact, the goal of early warning is not to predict whether or not violent conflict will occur, but to facilitate prevention by calling attention to potential dangers. In their work, Doe and Suifon (2003:2) see early warning as a process of preventing the likelihood of violent conflicts or preventing the possibility of a resurgence or re-escalation of violence and identifying the windows of opportunities for peace. Conflict may abate, but its ethnic causes, costs and consequences carry legacies of doubt about whether there are effective and durable settlements to such lethal quarrels. To some extent, such foreboding stems from apprehension about the true nature of conflict - in particular, whether ethnic bitterness is ever properly ended. Such misgivings add to analytical uncertainty surrounding the actual nature and dynamics of ethnic conflict.

The essence of developing an early warning system or initiating early warning signs is to provide timely response in order to avert impending ethnic or other forms of crisis. Fusato (2003) sees *indicators* as data that tell about changes in political and economic conditions when monitored over time; while *signs* do not always appear, their appearance indicate fundamental changes in a country's situation or the deterioration of inter-group relations, such as increases in ethnic conflicts, harassment of people by some groups, psychological threats or even structural violence. There are three categories of conflict indicators:

1. ***Structural/Root Causes of Conflict***

Structural factors, such as ethnic or religious diversity, colonial history, natural resources or land distribution, are mostly static and change slowly over time. These factors alone do not cause violent conflict, but can be manipulated, by powerful political figures for example, in such a way as to exacerbate growing tensions.

2. ***Proximate Causes of Conflict***

Proximate causes bring a country closer to the outbreak of violent conflict through the interplay of structural factors. Proximate causes are not static, but can change over time. Examples include government type and increase in poverty level.

3. ***Conflict Triggers***

Conflict triggers are concrete single events that unleash violence. Depending on the context, any event can be a trigger: the sudden death of a president, the incarceration of important leaders of the opposition, or the announcement of a rise in prices of foods or fuel.

3.2 The Nature of Response

Response to conflicts should be preventive and not reactive if the objective is to avert ethnic conflict. This would go a long way to strengthen the mechanisms put in place to track any impending crisis. In addition to the behavioral responses summarised by the various conflict styles, we have emotional, cognitive and physical responses to conflict.

These are important windows into our experience during conflict, for they frequently tell us more about what is the true source of threat that we perceive; by understanding people's thoughts, feelings and physical responses to conflict, we may get better insights into the best potential responses to the situation.

- ***Emotional responses:*** These are the feelings people experience in conflict, ranging from anger and fear to despair and confusion. Emotional responses are often misunderstood, as people tend to believe that others feel the same as they do. Thus, differing emotional responses are confusing and, at times, threatening.
- ***Cognitive responses:*** These are people's ideas and thoughts about a conflict, often present as inner voices or internal observers in the midst of a conflict situation. Through sub-vocalisation (that is, self-talk), we come to understand these cognitive responses. Such differing cognitive responses

contribute to emotional and behavioral responses, where self-talk can either promote a positive or negative feedback loop in the conflict situation.

- **Physical responses:** These types of responses can play an important role in people's ability to meet their specific needs that pushed them into a conflict situation. These responses are similar to those we experience in high-anxiety situations, and they may be managed through stress management techniques. Establishing a calmer environment in which emotions can be managed is more likely if the physical response is addressed effectively.

Conflict prevention experts are able to give us direction to help prevent violent conflict by asking: Who do we warn, when, of what and how? The answers to these questions give us conflict indicators. Conflict indicators help us understand what causes conflict and whether or not the conflict is likely to break out into armed violence – vital information that shapes violence prevention response.

Scholars are of the view that the problem with early warning is more often than not associated with poor response, not lack of early warning. It is always possible that the people who issue the warning are not the people that initiate the response. To properly identify the nature of response, proper knowledge of the features of early warning system is very important. Early warning acquires information "close to the ground" or through field-based networks of monitors. It uses multiple sources of information and both qualitative/quantitative analytical methods; identify the causes of conflict; provides regular reports, and updates on conflict dynamics to key national and international stakeholders. In addition, it often maintains strong link to responders or response mechanisms; and capitalises on appropriate communication and information technology.

3.3 Early Warning Factors

Seven key factors provide reliable early warnings of violent conflict. These key factors include:

1. Socio-economic conditions
2. State and institution strength/weakness
3. Regional/international consequences
4. National security
5. Public discourse, ideological factors and elite behaviour
6. Human rights and civil liberties
7. Political actors.

It is crucial to identify factors that generate and escalate conflicts. To make these realistic, conflict indicators must be taken into consideration and examined at the right time. The indicators include data which when studied over a given period of time give insight into economic and political conditions. They are long-term in perspective and include quantitative and qualitative information such as crime rates among certain groups, trends in unemployment, negative attitudes, forms of expression and political association.

Conflict early warning faces some challenges especially when it is not followed with timely response. For instance, there were signs and even indicators during the 2011 general elections in Nigeria that some groups were already mobilising for the post-presidential election violence which led to loss of many lives. The violence would have been prevented if security agencies responded swiftly to early warning signs.

3.4 Developing Early Warning and Effective Early Response for Prevention

Kett and Rowson (2007) believe that while wars emerge out of various complex factors and circumstances, the broad strokes of conflict prevention are clear enough: being responsive to grievances, alleviating poverty, building community-to-community engagement and trust, promoting economic equity, employment, education, and building national institutions that have the demonstrated capacity to mediate conflict and thus earn the confidence of populations. That is essentially the broad, traditional, peacebuilding agenda.

Prevention requires a conflict mitigation toolkit that contains a broad range of policy measures and concrete actions designed to spread and entrench the shift from ‘warfare to welfare’. Before the Rwanda genocide in 1994, there were signs of possible crisis but unfortunately, there was no timely response both from the then Organisation of African Unity (now African Union) and the international community. The United Nations and United States government were blamed for not acting fast with early warning signals provided by the media which broadcasted hate messages that inflamed tensions and created fear in the minds of people who were targeted by such messages.

4.0 CONCLUSION

With effective early warning system in place, ethnic conflicts would easily be managed and transformed at the right time. Part of the challenges of having functional early warning system is institutional problems associated with policy implementation. It is the responsibility of all stakeholders in every country to ensure that response to early

warning signals is timely and that adequate actions are taken. It is unfortunate that many countries, especially in Africa, are not prepared for the challenges confronting them because their responses to conflicts are poor. It is the responsibility of governments at all levels to ensure that violent conflicts are detected early before they occur. In order to avert the occurrence of violent conflicts, rapid response to the early indicators of such conflicts is necessary.

5.0 SUMMARY

This unit has addressed ways of promoting early warning and response mechanisms to prevent ethnic conflicts. From what has been discussed in this unit, it is evident that the importance of determining the nature of response, identifying parties to conflicts as well as the root causes of conflicts are crucial in building and responding to early warning system in ethnic conflicts.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Discuss the concept of early warning and identify early warning signs with examples.
2. What do you understand by conflict prevention?
3. What are indicators? Differentiate between signs and indicators.
4. Explain the features of early warning?

7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

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