Read the following passage carefully and then answer the questions which follow it.

Man lives in the meanings he is able to discern. He extends himself into that which he finds coherent and is at home there. These meanings can be of many kinds and sorts. Men believe in the reality of these meanings whenever they perceive them-unless some intellectual myth in which they also come to believe denies reality to some of them. Men are then in difficulty with themselves about these particular meanings. Since we call 'real' any meaningful entity that we expect to manifest itself in unexpected ways 5in the future, we think of it as something that has a 'life' of its own, so to speak. It is therefore not something we think of as a mere appearance, made up of the coincidental effects of many heterogeneous causes and subject entirely to the independent future manifestations of these separate causes-such as we believe the constellations of the stars to be ...

Many of the coherences that we see around us we may not believe in, therefore, if our theories tell 10us they are not real. We may believe that they are only appearances, illusions, created by the chance interactions of many separate causes...

Although Bishop Butler's common sense told him that everything is what it is and not another thing, our experiences with illusions breed a common sense that knows also that everything is not always what it 'is'(i.e. not always what it seems to us to be). So we cannot avoid the necessity of resorting to a 15personal judgement in order to decide when something is what it is and not another thing. And, as we have seen, our personal judgement is what it is because of the clues we dwell in, including, of course, the general views to which we are committed about the nature of things and the nature of knowledge that will not prevent our belief in the reality of those coherences that we do, in fact, see.

We have seen how we may adopt non-obstructive views with respect to perceptions and to the 20various coherences in nature that are open to our genuine modes of scientific inquiry. But coherences that are thought by us to be artificial, not natural, have had a difficult time being regarded and respected as real in our times, since (1) they seem to be creations of our own, not subject to the external checks of nature-and therefore to be wholly creatures of our own subjective whims and desires-and (2) only tangible things are supposed to be real.

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We have seen, however, that such things as classes and minds, for instance, can be accepted by us as real even though they are not tangible. Classes and minds, however, are not understood to be creations of men. The meanings-the coherent entities which we know as Michelangelo's Moses, Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, the virtue of justice, and the Christian God are not only intangibles, they are regarded by contemporary men as free human creations-not subject to correction by nature. They seem, 30possibly, to have no existence or being at all in the absence of man. Therefore, they would appear to haven existence only in the sense of being present, as such, in somebody's mind and in the sense of being the effect of a heterogeneity of natural causes. They may appear to us to be great and worthy of respect. But what if we suppose that they are only adventitious results of lower motivations or, eventually, of the reactions of atoms? What if we suppose, for example, that justice, although it purports to be a sort of 35universal fairness, is really only that which serves the interest of the ruling and owning class? If we suppose its real meaning, its basis in reality, is the interest of the stronger, as Thrasymachus put to Socrates so long ago, can we then respect it? Any would-be reductionist who could answer, 'Yes, we can, if we can nevertheless see that it is fairness for all-if its meaning can be seen to be exactly that', is asserting that a coherence that he can in fact see has the status in reality that he seems to see it has. But he 40should then also admit that it has a status that cannot be tortured into a reduction to certain other causes or conditions of less import than itself, simply because in such a reduction the meaning that he can see it has would disappear. He should then simply give up his reductionist theory. He ought to be able to see that in fact he has given it up in this case ..

In order to hold these meanings securely in the reverence they seem to him to demand, 45contemporary man therefore needs a theory of these meanings that explains how their coherence is no less real than the perceptual and scientific coherences he so readily accepts. He needs to see how his obvious personal involvement with these meanings is necessarily and legitimately part and parcel of the reality they actually have, that his personal involvement is not at all a reason to regard them as mere subjective fantasies. These meanings will then not seem to be mere appearances to him. They will seem to 50be in truth what they 'are'. That is, he will believe they are what they do honestly seem to him to be.

(Adapted from MICHAEL POLANYI and HARRY PROSCH: Meaning; Chicago and London:

The University of Chicago Press, 1975)

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