7

The 'New South Africa'

Mandela's inauguration as State President in 1994 was attended by a large number of world leaders, ranging from US Vice-President Al Gore and Britain's Prince Philip to Cuba's Fidel Castro. The 'New South Africa' was immediately accorded universal international acceptance. It was welcomed into the Organization of African Unity, readmitted into the Commonwealth, and established itself as a leader among the non-aligned states. Within the country, emphasis was on the building of a 'new nation' out of wide political differences. The South African Defence Force was amalgamated, although not without some tension, with Umkhonto we Sizwe and APLA guerilla forces. The new flag combined the old colors with those of African nationalism, and the former national anthem was merged with the liberation hymn *Nkosi Sikelela iAfrika* (God Bless Africa).

For the 'New South Africa' was not the product of a revolutionary overthrow but was rather the result of a negotiated settlement. At one level this led to remarkable results. In 1996 the new government approved a constitution with a Bill of Rights that was one of the most liberal in the world, and set up commissions to safeguard gender and individual human rights (Davenport 1998: 49–77). The ending of segregation opened the way for the rapid growth of South Africa's hitherto small black middle class in business and the professions, encouraged by affirmative action policies which took as their model the successful promotion of Afrikaner interests under the former Nationalist Party government. At the same time, Mandela stressed the importance of creating an inclusive nation, following the

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principles of the Freedom Charter that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white'.

A period of general optimism ensued, bolstered by relief that the 'miracle' of South Africa's negotiated revolution had averted major civil conflict. Once majority political power was secured, it was also assumed by many that social and economic benefits would follow for those excluded by a long history of discrimination. But granting everybody the vote could not remove apartheid's legacy of profound economic and social deprivation. The constraints on such transformations were soon to become acutely apparent.

The basis of the ANC's initial attempts at social and economic redress was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), formally adopted in 1994. This had been developed and refined during the transition years of the early 1990s, during which some policies which would alarm potential investors, such as the nationalization of the mining sector or removal of the independence of the Reserve Bank, had been rejected (Jeffery 2010: 239). Its main focus was redress of fundamental inequalities. Funding was provided for local development projects concerned with health care, welfare, education and housing, and resulted in a redistribution of state resources. Some projects achieved notable success, such as the building of thousands of new houses in rural and urban areas, electrification schemes in townships, the provision of free medication to young children and the provision of clinics and water supplies in remoter rural areas (Lodge 1999: 27–39). This was to be organized and driven by the public sector with state support.

However, it soon became clear that the RDP was achieving less than had been hoped. The backlog was enormous and state financial resources inadequate. Taxation levels were already high and although special efforts were put into place to increase effective collection, the tax base was limited (Beall, Gelb and Hassim 2005: 686–7). As a result of this the government made a significant tactical shift. In 1997 the RDP was replaced by a new economic initiative, called the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Policy (GEAR), which stressed free market capitalism, the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the lessening of fiscal and tariff restrictions. The aim was to attract foreign investment, promote job creation, and encourage economic growth as South Africa took its place in a globalizing world market.

The results were mixed. Foreign investment did grow, although not at particularly high levels given other attractive investment markets in the

post-Cold War world, such as Eastern Europe and Asia. The legacy of South Africa's past continued to hamper economic growth. Local manufacturing, such as the textile industry, was not sufficiently competitive in international markets and was also vulnerable to cheaper imports after apartheid-era sanctions had been removed and tariff barriers lowered or adjusted to levels beyond those demanded by international agreements (Marais 2011: 92). The sharp fall in the price of gold led to redundancies in the mining industry: Anglo American instead developed new ventures in South America and West Africa. Apartheid's legacy of a poorly trained work force and consequent low productivity, together with new and progressive labor legislation which ensured wages that were well above those in parts of Asia or Latin America, made the country less attractive to outside investors (Feinstein 2005: 245). Meanwhile local companies and conglomerates, such as the mining houses and insurance companies, took advantage of more relaxed financial control to move capital out of the country. With examples of debt-ridden economies elsewhere in Africa, the South African government was reluctant to borrow heavily from the World Bank.

As a result attempts by the state to reduce unemployment or remove inequalities in sectors such as health and education were limited. Despite the emergence of a black middle class, levels of poverty and income inequality actually rose in the late 1990s (Beall, Gelb and Hassim 2005: 683). The GINI coefficient, the index of economic inequality, for South Africa rose between 1994 and 2001 and remains one of the highest in the world. Absolute poverty levels, defined by those who live on less than $1 a day, more than doubled between 1996 and 2002, and although there was some improvement in subsequent years eased by basic government social security grants, there were wide regional differences. Provinces which had incorporated previous homelands, such as KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape and Limpopo had much higher levels of poverty than those in which the wealth of the apartheid era had been concentrated, such as Gauteng or the Western Cape (Jeffery 2010: 318–19). Poverty levels increased in cities as rural inhabitants migrated in search of paid work, however meager, often without success (Maharaj, Desai and Bond 2011: 18–19). Official unemployment levels remained around 25%, again much higher in the more impoverished provinces, but this excluded the very many South Africans who continued to be dependent on casual employment or who worked in the highly erratic informal sector. The liberalization of the economy, as elsewhere at the turn of the twenty-first century, led to the loss of regular wage jobs and as a result some 40% of the adult population were without

regular income (Pons-Vignon 2009). This burden fell particularly highly on women: the national unemployment rate for them in 2003 was 48%, compared to 38% for men, while female-headed households had double the poverty rate of male-headed households (Beall, Gelb and Hassim 2005: 683). Those who had regular employment, and who were represented by trade unions, were in this context a privileged sector. The result for many, as Pons-Vignon has argued, was 'strikingly (and tragically) ironic: access to new, long-awaited, political rights is concomitant with a collapse of the material means of actually using them' (2009: 899).

Although these continued economic disparities were clearly the legacy of the apartheid era, they were exacerbated by global economic conditions and the inability of the South African economy to expand at a time of increasingly competitive international investment and manufacturing markets. Moreover, it was no longer the case that they were solely conditioned by race. A fundamental principle of the RDP was to encourage the deracialization of the economy through legislated black empowerment policies, which 'for the majority of South Africans had a major legitimating impact' (Marais 2011: 406), although it led to resentment and emigration by some white South Africans in both the private and public sector who found their employment prospects blocked. Companies seeking government contracts were required to demonstrate that they had black managerial representation, while the Employment Equity Act of 1998 required all companies to make their workforces demographically representative and set equity targets for black senior management positions. Compliance was varied, not least because of the skills shortages that apartheid-era discriminatory education and training practices had produced. More concerted attempts were made through the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003, although the overall impact remained limited. By 2005 black-owned companies still formed less than 2% of the market capitalization on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Tangri and Southall 2008: 700).

Such policies, combined with the removal of apartheid era racial restrictions, certainly encouraged the rapid emergence of a black capitalist class (Southall 2004). A highly visible wealthy black elite did much to change the profile of South African urban and commercial society and those who were politically and economically well-connected, such as Cyril Ramaphosa and Tokyo Sexwale, became some of the richest people in the country. However, these benefits did not trickle down to the large majority of the population and did little to transform the wide inequalities. Indeed in many ways it

deepened class divisions and income inequality, as the new black middle class swiftly moved away from impoverished townships, educated their children at private schools, used private health care provision and embraced the materialistic life style of urban South Africa (Beall, Gelb and Hassim 2005: 693). Class divisions were replacing the racial divisions of the past. In one sense this was a normalizing process and a marker of South Africa's recovery from the distortions of social engineering which segregation and apartheid had produced. But it was far removed from the wider economic liberation that many had envisaged in the early 1990s. ANC government policy seemed within a short period of time to be primarily serving the interests of local and international capital and 'the ambitions of an emerging black capitalist class' (Marais 2011: 98).

The realities of this situation were also evident in the limitations to the implementation of the laudable ideals of the new constitution. For example, progress on attaining gendered equality was mixed. While women were better represented in public appointments and political positions, notably at parliamentary and cabinet level, there was little meaningful change for most South African women (Walsh and Scully 2006). Indeed the establishment of a Commission for Gender Equality incorporated activists and weakened the effectiveness of grassroots movements struggling for women's rights. Patriarchal values were deeply entrenched by the bolstering of chiefly authority in the Bantustans during the twentieth century and this has not fundamentally changed (Beall, Mkhize and Vawda 2005). Some legislation entrenched patriarchal practices, such as the Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 which strengthened the authority of rural traditional leaders in the former homeland regions to determine land use and distribution. Crime levels against women increased, in particular rape. This may be attributed to the challenges that gender equality posed to a patriarchal order, and especially one in which the masculinity of unemployed and impoverished men was threatened (Moffat 2006). A particularly marked example of this was the practice of 'corrective rape' of black lesbians in urban townships who were vulnerable to the dual challenge that equality on grounds of both gender and sexuality posed to such men. The recognition of gay and lesbian rights under the 1998 constitution and the subsequent legalization of same-sex marriage placed South Africa ahead of many countries in terms of human rights, but has been widely opposed by assertions of the values of 'traditional African culture' and is vulnerable to reaction (Thoreson 2008).

Another area of difficulty was land restoration. Legislation passed in 1994 enabled those dispossessed since the Land Act of 1913 to reclaim their

land. The process had huge symbolic significance for a visible reversal of past injustice although the cut-off date excluded claims from the main era of colonial dispossession and only those who could prove ownership were qualified to lodge claims, thus excluding tenants and sharecroppers who were the main victims of the 1913 Land Act. Moreover, progress was slow. Land could only be returned with the agreement of its current owners, few of whom were inclined to be cooperative. By 2005 less than 3.5% of farmland had been handed over and without the state subsidies provided to commercial farmers throughout most of the twentieth century the profits of their usage were limited (Walker 2005). Most claims came rather from urban areas where forced removals had resulted from the implementation of the Group Areas Act. Rising property values in many of these suburbs meant that evicted owners could rarely afford to pay market figures and so had to be content with financial compensation that fell well below these levels. The process of settlement was cumbersome, and competing claims from some communities further slowed progress (Walker, Bohlin, Hall and Kepe 2010).

Two issues which dominated debates in South Africa in the early 2000s reflected the dilemma of continued economic inequalities. One was the high incidence of HIV/AIDS infection. By 2009 there were 5.2 million people in South Africa with HIV, the highest recorded number of any country in the world and some 17% of the total population (Marais 2011: 262). Some explanations of its levels and spread could be linked to legacies of the past, such as the mobility of young male migrant workers (Phillips 2001). By 2000 it was clear that the rising mortality rate of young South Africans was adversely affecting the labor force while single parent families and orphaned children were straining social services. The demands on the health system were overwhelming, especially when combined with the incidence of secondary infections such as tuberculosis.

The result was that HIV/AIDS treatment became swiftly politicized. During the era of the Mandela government the scale of the problem was barely appreciated, but even when it could no longer be ignored a period of denialism set in (Leclerc-Madlala 2005). Government leaders, and in particular the Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, publicly stated that AIDS was a western disease, that alarmist reports reflected racist stereotypes about African sexuality and that retroviral drugs were potentially toxic. They argued that the problems of poverty and malnutrition were more acute, requiring higher priority when resources were limited. However groups such as the Treatment Action Campaign, headed by the former

anti-apartheid activist Zackie Achmat, led well-organized mass campaigns to demand free medication. The Western Cape and KwaZuluNatal provinces made some provision, but the central government only complied to a limited extent when ordered to do so by the Constitutional Court in 2002 (Iliffe 2006: 142–8). After continued threats of public action, government agreement on wider retroviral provision was secured, but implementation in the subsequent years remained unsteady.

A second issue which concerned all South Africans, and a factor which at least partially inhibited external investment, was the high level of crime. In 1997 there were 64 murders recorded per 100,000 people, the highest murder rate in the world (Beall, Gelb and Hassim 2005: 683) and cases of violent assault and theft were equally widespread. Property theft might not be surprising in a society with such economic inequalities amongst its population. It was particularly evident in the cities and smaller towns, where migration from impoverished rural areas continued unabated and adult unemployment levels were so high. White South Africans were especially alarmed at the soaring crime rates and it was a key factor in emigration. Highly publicized attacks on white farmers in particular were seen as examples of racial revenge.

However, the large majority of crime victims were black. In part the increasing crime rate was also a matter of visibility: with the removal of segregation, the violence that had been part of the politics of the 1980s in the townships now extended to the wealthier suburbs. There were also new factors. Some township male youth who had been heroes in the struggle years of the 1980s, lacked the education or skills to obtain work and turned to gangsterism in order to maintain their gendered prestige as men of action (Xaba 2001). Police focus on political opponents in the apartheid years had led to the neglect of gang and criminal activities. International travel links after 1990 made the country a focus for drug trafficking (Ellis 1998). The result was the continued growth of gang violence in such economically deprived ghettos as the Cape Flats area of Cape Town, where drug-running gangs vied with armed local vigilante groups such as PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs), formed in 1995 as a predominantly Muslim organization. Elsewhere, the failure of the police to take action, either because of under-resourcing or corruption, and strains on the criminal justice system which produced low prosecution and conviction rates led some communities to take the law into their own hands.

A clear demonstration that violence was inherited from South Africa's recent past was given in the evidence obtained by the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The Commission was established in 1995 under the chairmanship of Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Following the example of Chile, it offered the possibility of amnesty for political crimes committed between 1960 and 1994, in return for full and public testimony by individuals and political parties about actions for which they were responsible. Tutu stressed that only after knowing the truth about such activities could full reconciliation in the country be achieved. Such a process was considered essential to the successful birth of the new nation (Andrews 2007). The subsequent public confessions, both from those who had fought for and against apartheid, revealed the extent of violence carried out during the preceding decades. This was not only in well-publicized events such as the murder of Steve Biko, the Bisho massacre or Winnie Mandela's kidnapping of young activists, but also in the thousands of cases of ordinary South Africans caught up in the spiral of conflict (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998).

Although this process received wide local and international publicity, it was not an unqualified success in bringing about national reconciliation. The TRC's focus on individual actions meant that most whites denied any collective responsibility for apartheid, angering many black intellectuals and politicians (Bundy 2007: 81). Long after the TRC had completed its work, reparations to victims and their families were still unpaid. Those who had suffered expressed considerable and understandable disquiet that perpetrators who confessed were granted amnesty and so escaped subsequent punishment. This situation was made worse when, contrary to the expectations of the commissioners, those who did not confess were not subsequently prosecuted (see Dube 2002). Many offenders refused to give complete evidence, most notably former president P.W. Botha, and those that did often denied culpability. Both those who had acted in the interests of the apartheid state such as 'Third Force' perpetrator Eugene de Kock, and those who had opposed it such as Winnie Mandela, complained that they were being unjustly singled out. F.W. de Klerk brought legal action which prevented the publication in the Commission's final report of a paragraph holding him responsible for authorizing 'Third Force' activities after 1990. The ANC unsuccessfully attempted to prohibit publication of the report altogether on the grounds that the Commission had made no distinction between the human rights violations by agents of the apartheid state and those committed by the liberation movements. As one sympathetic commentator stated ten years later, the TRC had been 'an imperfect solution to a complex situation' (Gobodo-Madikizela 2005).

Many problems were accentuated by the absence of effective delivery of social services. In part this was because provincial governments in many areas were largely ineffectual and unevenly resourced. They lacked their own funding base and their powers remained vague and ill-defined. Moreover the key politicians within the ANC were now in Parliament, and the ANC's local base in the seven provinces it controlled was consequently weakened. Many of the civics, the local organizations that had been so strong in the revolt of the 1980s, found themselves marginalized (Lodge 1999: 83–4). Several conflicts between province and center resulted in 1996–7, with the ousting of the Gauteng and Free State premiers by the national ANC body. Tensions between former homeland politicians and ANC party cadres were also endemic in provinces such as Mpumalanga. But the inclusion of Inkatha in the government of national unity did lead to a drop in levels of violence between IFP and ANC rivals in KwaZulu-Natal. After the 1999 elections, both parties made a formal alliance in the region's provincial administration.

Political cooperation between predominantly black and white political parties was less easy to achieve. In 1996 de Klerk took the National Party out of the joint national government, renamed it the 'New National Party' and attempted to give it a different identity as the formal Parliamentary opposition with cross-racial membership (Davenport 1998: 87–8). He resigned shortly afterwards, leaving the party under lackluster leadership and without significant black support. Many of its former supporters turned instead to the Democratic Party under Tony Leon, which spoke out against government corruption and called for tougher action against crime. In the 1999 elections, the DP fought the campaign on a slogan of 'Fight Back' (sarcastically referred to by its opponents as 'Fight Black') and increased its proportion of the vote to 9.5% to became the official opposition in Parliament. However it still drew support overwhelmingly from whites, as well as Western Cape colored voters and Indians in KwaZulu-Natal who felt alienated by the ANC's affirmative action policies for Africans (Adhikari 2005: 175–87). The National Party was left rudderless. After a brief flirtation with the DP in 2000–1 (which led to the DP renaming itself as the Democratic Alliance or DA), the National Party formed a coalition with its old foe, the ANC. Its supporters deserted it in droves, and in the 2004 elections it obtained less than 2% of the national vote, in contrast to the DA's 12%. It finally disbanded itself in the following year. De Klerk's gamble in 1990 that the NP would be able to position itself as a viable opposition to an Africanist and socialist government was defeated by the

ANC's adoption of free-market policies and by the stronger position of the DA as an opposition party.

In the absence of a viable opposition, and riding high on its kudos as the party that had resisted apartheid and had been led by Nelson Mandela, the ANC increased its majority in the 1999 elections and again in 2004 when it obtained almost 70% of the total vote. It managed to retain the loyalty of its followers across class lines, including both the labor movement and the rapidly growing black middle classes. However, a number of voters expressed their discontent with ANC policies by abstaining: the percentage of eligible voters who supported the ANC fell from 54% in 1994 to 39% in 2004 (Marais 2011: 376). Tensions were growing between the trade unions and government over the application of GEAR policies and the abandonment of socialist principles. These became more overt after Mandela's retirement in 1999. His successor, Thabo Mbeki, was less universally admired, being associated with the ANC's exiled leadership rather than the internal struggle activists of the 1980s. Disillusionment with GEAR policies meant that the ANC Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, attracted wider support from the unions, the youth and the Communist Party supporters of the ANC alliance. When Zuma was accused of financial corruption and of rape in 2005, Mbeki took the opportunity to dismiss him but this only served to increase tensions within the ANC, especially when Zuma was acquitted on both counts.

This was the background to the tumultuous ANC party conference which took place at Polokwane (in Limpopo province) in 2007 when Mbeki was ousted as party leader and replaced by Zuma. Mbeki's position as national president became untenable and he subsequently resigned to be replaced for a temporary period by his Deputy, Kgalema Motlanthe. Zuma was installed as President after the ANC secured a further electoral victory in 2009.

In part this coup within the ANC was caused by dissatisfaction with the somewhat aloof Mbeki who had been unsympathetic to diverse voices within his own party around issues such as HIV/AIDS policies and economic liberalization. Zuma by contrast was more populist, originating from a rural Kwa-Zulu background, with several wives married under customary law and with greater personal appeal to rank and file party members. The level of popular support provided at his rape trial demonstrated this, as crowds called for the 'burning' of the 'bitch' who was his accuser, to the dismay of gender activists, and as Zuma defiantly sang the liberation song *'Awuleth' Umshini Wami*' (bring me my machine gun) to

his supporters outside the court. Here was a leader who could reinvoke the passions of the struggle era.

However the Polokwane conference reflected much more than personal factors. Zuma was a member of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and was strongly supported by Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). He thus appealed to those sections of the ANC's alliance with the Communist Party and the trade unions that felt excluded and undermined by the party's neo-liberal economic policies and its apparent inability to bring about a better life for all except the new wealthy elite (Tangri and Southall 2008). There had been much speculation in the media and by party outsiders that the ANC would splinter with the breakaway of its disaffected working class supporters. COSATU in particular had been marginalized and was struggling to retain its credentials in the face of GEAR government policies and when some its key leaders, such as Cyril Ramaphosa, had joined the ranks of the managerial elite (Buhlungu 2005). Protests against poor service delivery and general strikes organized by the trade unions in 2006–7 had limited effect. However loyalty to the ANC ran deep. In 2008 a new party was formed, the Congress of the People (COPE). Its aim was to attract disaffected party members, but it failed to draw significant support from ANC voters in the 2009 elections.

Rather than removing themselves from the party, Zuma supporters contested power within it at Polokwane. The campaign for Zuma marked a reinvigoration of local party branches and a means of retaining the loyalty of those disaffected by the policies of the Mbeki era. It one sense this was an encouraging marker of democratic forces within the ANC and a check to the centralization of power and lack of debate represented by the Mbeki presidency (Butler 2005). However many outside the ANC were dismayed by the specter of a president who had been tainted with corruption charges. Corruption was not new to South African politics, as the examples of the Kruger government in the late nineteenth century, the Muldergate affair in the late 1970s or the looting of state resources in the last years of the apartheid era had indicated (Hyslop 2005). In the Mbeki years corruption within government circles became a major cause of concern. In 2000 a parliamentary committee reported irregularities in the securing of a $9.75 billion arms deal to supply the South African army with equipment from European manufacturers.(Marais 2011: 361). Although proof was not forthcoming it was suspected that considerable bribes had been paid. One of those implicated was Durban businessman Schabir Schaik who was subsequently imprisoned and who had close connections with Zuma. Other scandals,

such as the making of false travel expense claims by over 200 parliamentarians in 2006, did little to bolster public confidence in the government. Mbeki responded by launching an anti-corruption campaign and setting up a special unit called the Scorpions to drive it. Zuma led the opposition to such developments, claiming that allegations were 'malicious misinformation'. The Scorpions were disbanded after Zuma's takeover in 2009 while Schaik was released from prison on the ostensible grounds of ill health.

Such developments led to polarized responses. The DA parliamentary opposition party now led by Helen Zille, a former anti-apartheid investigative journalist, branded Zuma as a man unfit to lead the country because of his association with patriarchy, outmoded traditionalism and corruption. ANC members passionately defended his right to a fair trial, celebrated his acquittals on grounds of state interference, and welcomed his appeal to voters for whom modernity and a liberal capitalist state held little advantage. Zuma's rise to power thus brought to the fore divisions over concepts of the South African nation that had only been partially buried by the euphoria of the Mandela presidency. While African tradition (however defined) had been recognized in public statements and new heritage policies, in practice the 'new South Africa' was a relentlessly modernist state (Coombes 2004). 'Traditional leaders', the legacy of apartheid's attempt to bolster ethnic separatism, were given constitutional recognition by the establishment of a National House of Traditional Leaders in 1997 but they had an ambivalent role and little real impact on national politics (Williams 2009). Zuma's lifestyle gave a reassurance to many that 'traditional' practices such as polygamy would be recognized at the highest public level. In so doing, he gave the ANC a renewed appeal in his own home region of KwaZulu-Natal, at the expense of the IFP. In municipal elections in 2011, a fractured IFP was heavily defeated.

This contrasted with Mbeki's concepts of Africa. His alignment with liberal economic policies was matched by his ambitions for giving South Africa a key role internationally and especially within Africa. At the time of the launching of GEAR in 1997, he started to promulgate the concept of an 'African Renaissance', by which the country would lead the continent out of its poverty and alienation. This certainly marked an assertion of the need to emphasize Africa in the construction of a South African identity, rather than the indiscriminate notion of the 'rainbow nation' (Bundy 2007:82). But it differed from earlier nationalist or ethnically based movements such as Africanism or Black Consciousness. Mbeki instead promoted the liberalization of African states and their economies to

meet the challenges of globalization, arguing that an African-centered engagement was required to promote trade and sustainable development (Bongmba 2004).

However, there were limits to the extent that South Africans identified with this vision. As Mosselman (2010) has pointed out, the new South African nation continued to be built around exclusionary practices, especially against immigrants from the rest of Africa who flooded across its borders in search of work after 1994. As 'illegals' they were vulnerable to aggressive police and security controls, including the right to be stopped and deported at will if found without a permit in scenes reminiscent of the apartheid era pass law raids. They were also a ready target for xenophobic attack by South Africans who resented their presence at a time of high unemployment. Particularly affected were immigrants who used their links to wider continental networks, such as those of West Africa, to set up as informal traders or those who worked illegally for wages below the legislated minimum. From 2006 there were reported incidents of such attacks, which culminated in violence in May 2008 during which 62 people were killed, mainly from Mozambique, Somalia and Zimbabwe (Jeffery 2010: 377–8).

While Zuma's ascendancy might be interpreted as a reaction within the ANC to the failure of the state to make effective economic and social redress, the first years of his presidency did little to change the situation. Township and rural protests at the lack of service delivery and due to continued poverty were widespread (Maharaj, Desai and Bond 2011: 9–10). In power, Zuma found himself linked to a neo-liberal policy that was difficult to alter in the depressed economic climate of the early 2010s. That the tensions persisted was evident in the rise to public attention of Julius Malema, leader of the ANC Youth League, who had played a key role in mobilizing support for Zuma in the build-up to the ousting of Mbeki at the Polokwane conference. Malema was a powerful orator who inspired crowds with his rhetoric against continued white economic power. By operating within the ANC, although frequently rebuked by its leaders for his intemperance, he tapped the deep-felt loyalty of many to the country's leading liberation organization. In calling for the nationalization of industry and mines, for example, he invoked the clauses of the 1955 Freedom Charter. His populism was decidedly more appealing than that of the trade unions, who only represented those fortunate enough to hold permanent jobs, and more powerful than the weakened civics and NGOs who had formed the grassroots basis of anti-apartheid struggles. It severely alarmed both whites

who feared Malema's racial attacks (symbolized by his use at rallies of the struggle song, *dubul'ibhunu* ('shoot the Boer') and by the black political and economic elite who feared his economic radicalism.

In 2010, in the midst of these uncertainties, South Africa hosted the soccer World Cup. Despite predictions by skeptics, it was a triumphant occasion evoking the optimism and unity of the 'miracle nation' of 1994. Yet many were aware that the realities of post-apartheid South Africa were not quite so successful. Class divisions were gradually replacing racial ones, although the legacy of apartheid meant that deep poverty was still overwhelmingly experienced by black South Africans. Democratic institutions had taken root although electoral racial politics continued to entrench the power of a single party. With the decline of the IFP, the DA was emerging as the only viable national opposition party but it struggled to attract black supporters. Some commentators were gloomy: the neo-liberal South African Institute of Race Relations, for example, published utterly negative accounts of the post-apartheid nation which lambasted failures of social and economic provision on the grounds of inadequate liberalization and damaging black empowerment policies (see Jeffery 2010), while others lamented the continued power of conglomerates and need for greater state intervention to redress inequalities (see Marais 2011). Most took a more cautious line, noting the 'fragile stability' of a democratic South Africa (Beall, Gelb and Hassim 2005). Perhaps, given South Africa's turbulent history, this was in itself a considerable achievement.

Suggestions for further reading

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