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# Buffer Overflow: An Overview

# Buffer Overflow



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- *"A condition at an interface under which **more input** can be placed into a buffer or data holding area **than the capacity allocated, overwriting** other information."*
- Used for exploitation
  - Inducing crashes
  - Taking control of program

# Example



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```
1.  #include <stdio.h>
2.  #include <string.h>

3.  int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
4.      int valid = 0;
5.      char str1[8] = "ASECRET";
6.      char str2[8];

7.      gets(str2);

8.      if (strncmp(str1, str2, 8)==0)
9.          valid = 1;

10.     printf("VALID=%d", valid);

11.     return 0;
12. }
```

```
$ ./a.out
```

```
ASECRET
```

```
VALID=1
```

```
$ ./a.out
```

```
HELLO
```

```
VALID=0
```

```
$ ./a.out
```

```
OVERFLOWOVERFLOW
```


```
VALID=1
```

## Why?

# Process Memory Structure Review



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



# Stack Structure Review



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
```
void foo(char* c)
{
    char buf[256];
    strcpy(buf, c);
}
```




# Return to “OVERFLOW” Example



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Before gets(str2)



After gets(str2)

str2=“OVERFLOWOVERFLOW”

# Stack Buffer Overflow



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- Also called *Stack smashing*
  - Overflow when targeted buffer is located on **stack**, as a local variable in **stack frame** of a function
  - Overwrite return address/frame pointer to address of attack code in memory
- Example in next slide
  - Overwrite saved return address (RA)
  - E.g., overwrite saved RA with that of same function to re-execute it.

# Example



```
1. #include <stdio.h>
2. #include <string.h>

3. void prompt(char * tag) {
4.     char inp[16];
5.     printf("Enter value for %s: ", tag);
6.     gets(inp);
7.     printf("Hello your %s is %s\n", tag, inp);
8. }

9. int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
10.    prompt("name");
11. }
```




# Example



- Run debugger to see `prompt()` is located at `0x08048394`
- *inp* is located 24 bytes under current frame ptr
  - So attacker will pad the string by this amount (e.g. 24 A's)
- Choose a nearby stack location (e.g., `0xbffffbe8`) to overwrite current frame register
- Overwrite return address with `0x08048394`
- Combine this data together into binary string:  

```
perl -e `print pack("H*", hex string);`
```

# Example




...

Before `gets(..)` call

```
$ perl -e 'print pack("H*", hex string);' | ./a.out
Enter value for name:
Hello your Re?pyy]uEA is AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAuYu
Enter value for Kyyu:
Hello your Kyyu is NNNN
Segmentation fault
```

\* Little endian  
←



After `gets(..)` call

prompt (..) is called twice!

# Stack Buffer Overflow



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- What if we want to do something more interesting than calling `prompt(..)` twice?
- Can set the return address to point to custom code held within the stack frame (*shellcode*).

# Summary



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- Buffer overflow is a serious threat to systems.
- It is possible to disrupt system and perform unauthorized actions using stack buffer overflow attacks.



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# Buffer Overflow: Defenses

# Buffer Overflow Defenses



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- 3-Steps to Buffer Overflow Exploits
  - A: Inject code via overflow
  - B: Change flow of control to injected code
  - C: Execute injected code

# Defense Categories



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- Compile-Time
  - Programming Language Choice (Step A)
  - Safe Coding (Step A)
  - Extensions / Safe Libraries (Step A)
  - Stack Protection (Step B)
- Run-Time
  - Executable Address Space Protection (Step C)
  - Address Space Randomization (Step B/C)
  - Guard Pages (Step B/C)

# Compile-Time: Prog. Language Choice



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- High-level (e.g. Java)
  - Strongly typed variables
  - Only permitted Operations
  - Range checking
- Downside, resource use



# Compile-Time: Safe Coding



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- Check for available space
- Code for graceful failure

# Compile-Time: Safe Libs./Extensions



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
- Replace standard library routines (e.g. C strings) with safer versions
  - Rewrite source with new calls (like `strncpy(...)`)
- Replace whole library – example “libsafe”
  - provides protection without recompilation
  - Puts additional checks to stop some buffer overflow attacks

# Compile-Time: Stack Protection



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- Check stack frame corruption
- StackGuard
  - Canary value
  - Included in newer gcc
  - No source code change
- StackGuard Cons
  - Needs recompilation
  - Changed stack structure -> change to debuggers
- Canary Requirements?
  - Different for each system
  - Unpredictable



# Compile-Time: Stack Protection



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- Return Address Defender (RAD) and StackShield
  - Copy return address (RA)
  - Safe location – called RAR by RAD folks
  - GCC option
- Con: Needs recompilation
- Pro:
  - No source code change
  - No changes to stack structure

# Run-Time: Executable Address Space Protection



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- Block execution of code on stack and heap
  - Prevents Step C
- No-execute bit
- Assume executable code held elsewhere
- Standard in newer O.S.'s (Vista+, Linux) and 64-bit processors
- Drawback: some legitimate uses for executing code on stack

# Run-Time: Address Space Randomization



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- Stack buffer overflow: need to predict address of buffer in memory (decide what is proper RA value)
- Change address stack location random per process
- Address range is large (32 bit), provides much variation. Larger than most vulnerable buffers.
- Therefore NOP-sled will not work (cannot get it large enough to handle large range.)
- Prevents steps B/C of buffer overflow attack



- Guard Pages
  - Introduce additional pages between critical regions of memory
    - Mark them as illegal
  - Can thwart buffer overflow exploits in global data

# Return to System Call Attack



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- Non-executable stack defense
  - Cannot execute code held in stack
- Make code call library function through a set of memory location manipulations
- RA changed to jump to existing system library function, e.g. `system("shell command line")` in order to launch shell commands.
  - Attack contained in parameters, e.g. "command line"
- Defend by randomizing stack and system libraries



# Summary



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- Buffer overflow is a serious threat to systems.
- It is possible to disrupt system and perform unauthorized actions using stack buffer overflow attacks.
- Shellcode can be used to modify execution of a vulnerable program.
- There exist compile- and run-time protections against these attacks.
- Buffer Overflows can happen on Heap and Global Data sections as well