

COMP6443 Web Application Security

UNSWTalk Security Assessment

Something Awesome

Leo Liu – z5080336
5-1-2018

Contents

Vulnerabilities Found

List of all the vulnerabilities found on the website with details about the vulnerability

Tests Completed

Sections of the program that seem dodgy are tested, but no vulnerabilities are revealed. If a vulnerability is revealed from a test, it was moved to the vulnerabilities found section.

Bugs Found

A list of bugs that has no effect on the security of the system but should be fixed for a better user experience

Repairs Completed

How the system would be repaired to solve the vulnerabilities and bugs.

Vulnerability Classification

P1 – CRITICAL

Vulnerabilities that cause a privilege escalation on the platform from unprivileged to admin, allows remote code execution, financial theft, etc. Examples: vulnerabilities that result in Remote Code Execution such as Vertical Authentication bypass, SSRF, XXE, SQL Injection, User authentication bypass.

P2 – HIGH

Vulnerabilities that affect the security of the platform including the processes it supports. Examples: Lateral authentication bypass, Stored XSS, some CSRF depending on impact.

P3 – MEDIUM

Vulnerabilities that affect multiple users, and require little or no user interaction to trigger. Examples: Reflective XSS, Direct object reference, URL Redirect, some CSRF depending on impact.

P4 – LOW

Issues that affect singular users and require interaction or significant prerequisites (MitM) to trigger. Examples: Common flaws, Debug information, Mixed Content.

P5 – ACCEPTED RISK

Non-exploitable weaknesses and “won’t fix” vulnerabilities. Examples: Best practices, mitigations, issues that are by design or acceptable business risk to the customer such as use of CAPTCHAS.

Vulnerabilities

vID: 1

Date Discovered: 12th May 2018

URL: /forgetPassword

Severity: P4

Type: Brute Force Information Disclosure

Result: Discover a user's username and email

Description: The system informs you if you entered in a valid username, and then if you entered in a valid email. There is no coded delay for verifying the username and email so a brute force attack could be carried out very quickly.

UNSWtalk

Password Reset

Forgot your password? Enter your email address and zid to reset your password

zID

z5115831

Email

z5115831@unsw.edu.au

Username is incorrect

RESET

Password Reset

Forgot your password? Enter your email address and zid to reset your password

zID

z5115831

Email

z5115831@unsw.edu.au

Email is incorrect

RESET

vID: 2

Date Discovered: 16th May 2018

URL: /createAccount

Severity: P4

Type: Brute Force Information Disclosure

Result: Discover a user's username and email

Description: The system informs you if you entered in a valid username or valid email. There is no coded delay for verifying the username and email so a brute force attack could be carried out very quickly.

VID: 3

Date Discovered: 13th May 2018

URL: /*























Severity: P2

Type: Security Misconfiguration

Result: Discover information of all users

Description: Directory listing is on. The files and directories in the root directory is visible if you simply visit the root directory in your browser, which allows anyone to see all the structure of the project, as well as all user's usernames, and amount of posts they made

Index of /~z5080336/2041/UNSWtalk

Name	Last modified	Size	Description
 Parent Directory	16-May-2018 12:40	-	
 UNSWtalk.cgi	16-Nov-2017 18:35	1k	
 UNSWtalk.py	12-May-2018 21:17	25k	
 UNSWtalkDatabase.db	16-May-2018 00:18	80k	
 __pycache__/	12-May-2018 21:18	-	
 dataset-medium/	22-Feb-2018 15:53	-	
 dataset-small/	22-Feb-2018 15:53	-	
 diary.txt	16-Nov-2017 18:35	2k	
 files.tar	16-Nov-2017 18:35	1.4M	
 functions.py	15-Nov-2017 16:32	20k	
 init	16-Nov-2017 18:35	1k	
 initDB.py	16-Nov-2017 18:35	6k	
 initFiles.py	16-Nov-2017 18:35	1k	
 log.txt	16-Nov-2017 18:35	19k	
 old_profile_page.txt	16-Nov-2017 18:35	10k	
 requirements.txt	16-Nov-2017 18:35	1k	
 setTaggedPosts.py	16-Nov-2017 18:35	3k	
 static/	22-Feb-2018 15:53	-	
 strdup.h	16-Nov-2017 18:35	1k	
 structure.py	16-Nov-2017 18:35	6k	
 submit	16-Nov-2017 18:35	1k	
 templates/	22-Feb-2018 15:53	-	

VID: 4

Date Discovered: 14th May 2018

URL: /profile

Severity: P3

Type: Denial of Service

Result: Prevents data to be written to disk

Description: Uploading files for cover photo and profile image has no size limit. These files are stored on the server so an attacker could upload large files to prevent other users from using the website or uploading their own images.

VID: 5

Date Discovered: 15th May 2018

URL: /*

Severity: P4

Type: Debug Information

Result: Reveals server-side code

Description: The user can trigger server-side errors such as inserting "a" as the pageNum parameter when viewing paginated pages. When they do, a detailed report of errors will be displayed to the user, including snippets of server-side code. If the code is secure, this should not result in any significant exploits (the code is good 😊)

builtins.ValueError

ValueError: invalid literal for int() with base 10: 'nan'

Traceback (most recent call last)

File "/tmp_amd/adams/export/adams/1/cs2041/public_html/Python-3.6.3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1997, in __call__

```
return self.wsgi_app(environ, start_response)
```

File "/tmp_amd/adams/export/adams/1/cs2041/public_html/Python-3.6.3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1985, in wsgi_app

```
response = self.handle_exception(e)
```

File "/tmp_amd/adams/export/adams/1/cs2041/public_html/Python-3.6.3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1540, in handle_exception

```
reraise(exc_type, exc_value, tb)
```

File "/tmp_amd/adams/export/adams/1/cs2041/public_html/Python-3.6.3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/flask/_compat.py", line 33, in reraise

```
raise value
```

File "/tmp_amd/adams/export/adams/1/cs2041/public_html/Python-3.6.3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1982, in wsgi_app

```
response = self.full_dispatch_request()
```

File "/tmp_amd/adams/export/adams/1/cs2041/public_html/Python-3.6.3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1614, in full_dispatch_request

```
rv = self.handle_user_exception(e)
```

File "/tmp_amd/adams/export/adams/1/cs2041/public_html/Python-3.6.3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1517, in handle_user_exception

```
reraise(exc_type, exc_value, tb)
```

File "/tmp_amd/adams/export/adams/1/cs2041/public_html/Python-3.6.3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/flask/_compat.py", line 33, in reraise

```
raise value
```

File "/tmp_amd/adams/export/adams/1/cs2041/public_html/Python-3.6.3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1612, in full_dispatch_request

```
rv = self.dispatch_request()
```

File "/tmp_amd/adams/export/adams/1/cs2041/public_html/Python-3.6.3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/flask/app.py", line 1598, in dispatch_request

```
return self.view_functions[rule.endpoint](**req.view_args)
```

File "/tmp_amd/reed/export/reed/3/z5080336/public_html/2041/UNSWtalk/functions.py", line 427, in wrapper

```
return func(*args, **kwargs)
```

File "/tmp_amd/reed/export/reed/3/z5080336/public_html/2041/UNSWtalk/UNSWtalk.py", line 218, in home

```
pageNum = int(pageNum)
```

ValueError: invalid literal for int() with base 10: 'nan'

The debugger caught an exception in your WSGI application. You can now look at the traceback which led to the error.

To switch between the interactive traceback and the plaintext one, you can click on the "Traceback" headline. From the text traceback you can also create a paste of it.

vID: 6

Date Discovered: 15th May 2018

URL: /*

Severity: P3

Type: Insecure HTTP

Result: Capture user data

Description: Username, password, and all other user info and other data can be sent from client to server (and vice versa) using port 80 HTTP instead of port 443 Secure HTTP. Firefox, being a good Samaritan, pops out numerous warnings when you try to login using http mode.

ⓘ Not secure | cgi.cse.unsw.edu.au/~z5080336/2041/UNSWtalk/UNSWtalk.cgi/login

vID: 7

Date Discovered: 16th May 2018

URL: /*

Severity: P2

Type: XSS

Result: CSRF, Phishing, DoS

Description: All content written by the user as a post are evaluated as HTML



```
54. {% for result in postResults %}
55.     <script>
56.         $('#posts').append(messageBlock('{{result.fromUser}}', '{{result.id}}', '{{result.fromUser}}', '{{result.time}}', '{{result.message}}', '{{result.children|length}}', '{{result.taggedStr}}', '{{result.likes|length}}'))
```

vID: 8

Date Discovered: 16th May 2018

URL: /*

Severity: P2

Type: XSS

Result: CSRF, Phishing, DoS

Description: All content written by the user as a comment are evaluated as HTML

```
home.html x
54      {% for result in postResults %}
55          <script>
56              $("#posts").append(messageBlock('{{result.fromUser}}', '{{result.id}}', '{{result.fromUser}}', '{{result.time}}', '{{result.message}}', '{{result.children|length}}', '{{result.taggedStr}}', '{{result.likes|length}}'))
```

VID: 9

Date Discovered: 16th May 2018

URL: /*

Severity: P2

Type: XSS

Result: CSRF, Phishing, DoS

Description: Name of users displayed are evaluated as HTML. Allows users to create usernames with a HTML string to perform XSS attacks.

```
home.html x
54      {% for result in postResults %}
55          <script>
56              $("#posts").append(messageBlock('{{result.fromUser}}', '{{result.id}}', '{{result.fromUser}}', '{{result.time}}', '{{result.message}}', '{{result.children|length}}', '{{result.taggedStr}}', '{{result.likes|length}}'))
```

VID: 10

Date Discovered: 21st May 2018

URL: /verifyAccount

Severity: P4

Type: Brute Force Information Disclosure

Result: Discover a user's username and verify code

Description: The system informs you if you supplied a correct username or not when you attempt to enter the verify link, if the account exists, it informs you the verify code does not match. This function does not have a time delay so attackers can quickly find a list of all users by viewing the server response from z0000000 to z9999999.

```

184
185 @app.route('/verifyAccount', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
186 def verifyAccount():
187     verify_code = request.args.get('verify_code')
188     zid = request.args.get('zid')
189     user = DBSession.query(User).filter_by(zid=zid).first()
190     if not user:
191         return "Account for " + zid + " not found"
192     if user.verify_code != verify_code:
193         return "Verify code " + verify_code + " does not match " + user.verify_code
194     user.account_verified = True

```

vID: 11

Date Discovered: 21st May 2018

URL: /verifyAccount

Severity: P1

Type: RCE

Result: REMOTE CODE EXECUTION omg

Description: When a user is verified, the system will create a directory for them to store their uploaded images, with the following code:

```

207 os.system("mkdir " + os.path.join("static", "dataset", user.zid))

```

user.zid is a user supplied username for themselves, upon testing with

```

>>> path = os.path.join("static", "dataset", "hi; mkdir hello_world")
>>> os.system("mkdir " + path)
mkdir: cannot create directory 'static/dataset/hi': No such file or directory
0
>>> exit()
fried:/mnt/c/Users/fried/Desktop/Something_Awesome/test_verify_code_os $ ls
hello_world

```

It is evident that supplying a username such as “; mkdir hello_world” will create a directory called hello world. The user can then supply dangerous usernames such as “; rm -rf /”

vID: 12

Date Discovered: 22nd May 2018

URL: /api

Severity: P2

Type: Lateral Authentication Bypass

Result: Freely obtain other user's private details

Description: A target user's details as well as their posts can be displayed to any other logged in user, even if the target user set their privacy setting to hide all posts and details from other users (or limit all details and posts to friends only) by visiting
`/api?data=userDetails&action=get&zid=<user>`

```
UNSWtalk.py
357 elif(data == "userDetails"):
358     if(action == "get"):
359         if(values == "json"):
360             if(zid == "all"):
361                 #print([user.toDict() for user in DBSession.query(User).all()])
362                 return json.dumps([user.toDict() for user in DBSession.query(User).all()])
363             else:
364                 return json.dumps(DBSession.query(User).filter_by(zid=zid).first().toDict())
365         else:
366             if(zid == "all"):
367                 return DBSession.query(User).all()
368             else:
369                 return DBSession.query(User).filter_by(zid=zid).first()
```

VID: 13

Date Discovered: 22nd May 2018

URL: /*

Severity: P2

Type: Plain Text Passwords

Result: Passwords St0L3n

Description: Since the server has so many vulnerabilities listed already, storing the passwords in plain text is extremely dangerous as it could easily get leaked.

```
student.txt
2 password: amanda
```

VID: 14

Date Discovered: 22nd May 2018

URL: /api

Severity: P2

Type: Lateral Authentication Bypass

Result: Freely delete any other user's posts

Description: A target user's posts and comments can be removed by any other user by simply visiting the api page like `/api?data=posts&action=remove&zid=<any number>`

```
UNSWtalk.py x
412 elif(action == "remove"):
413     postID = request.args.get("zid")
414     DBSession.query(Post).filter_by(id=postID).delete()
415     return "success"
```

vID: 15

Date Discovered: 22nd May 2018

URL: `/api`

Severity: P2

Type: Lateral Authentication Bypass

Result: Freely do anything as another user

Description: the api page is so full of vulnerabilities as it doesn't check authentication at all and allows you to do everything as another user by simply supplying a different zid when using the api page

```
UNSWtalk.py x
337 @app.route('/api/', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
338 def api():
339     if request.method == "GET":
340         zid = request.args.get("zid")
341         data = request.args.get("data")
342         action = request.args.get("action")
343         values = request.args.get("values")
```

Tests Completed

tID: 1

Date Tested: 10th March 2018


URL: /login

Test: SQL Injection

Aim: To determine if SQL injection is possible for the username and password fields

Method: Testing various SQL injection strings for the username & password fields, as well as reviewing the underlying code

Result: SQL injection at /login username & password is through sqlalchemy queries. Sqlalchemy is pretty good. No SQL injection possible.

A screenshot of a code editor window titled 'functions.py'. The code is a Python function named 'checkLogin' that takes 'zid' and 'password' as arguments. It uses SQLAlchemy to query a database for a user by 'zid'. If the user is not found, it returns False. If found, it checks if the password matches and if the account is verified. If both conditions are met, it returns True; otherwise, it returns False.

```
407 # Checks if the username matches the password
408 def checkLogin(zid, password):
409     user = DBSession.query(User).filter_by(zid=zid).first()
410     if not user:
411         return False
412     if(user.password == password and user.account_verified == True):
413         return True
414     else:
415         return False
```

tID: 2

Date Tested: 11th May 2018

URL: /forgotPassword

Test: RCE

Aim: To determine if the send_main() function in /forgotPassword is vulnerable to RCE since the user can enter variables for the 'mutt' system call

Method: Copied function to a smaller program and tested various data as the 'to' and 'message' field to try to get a remote code execution

Result: RCE not possible as subprocess run only runs the first program and the rest is passed through as string arguments.

```
functions.py x
302 def send_email(to, subject, message):
303
304     mutt = [
305         'mutt',
306         '-s',
307         subject,
308         '-e', 'set copy=no',
309         '-e', 'set realname=UNSWtalk',
310         '-e', 'set content_type=text/html',
311         '--', to
312     ]
313
314     subprocess.run(
315         mutt,
316         input = message.encode('utf8'),
317         stderr = subprocess.PIPE,
318         stdout = subprocess.PIPE,
319     )
```

tID: 3

Date Tested: 12th May 2018

URL: /api

Test: Stored XSS

Aim: To determine if the image names users upload are able to act as a stored XSS when the image is loaded into the page

Method: Uploaded various files with different file names that could potentially be dangerous as well as investigating the underlying code

Result: The test revealed the name of the file the user is uploading does not matter as all files are renamed to 'profileImage.jpg' or 'profileImage.png'

tID: 4

Date Tested: 20th May 2018

URL: /createAccount

Test: SQL Injection

Aim: To determine if there is a set of strings the user can enter to trigger a SQL injection when creating a new user

Method: Testing various SQL injection strings for the username, email and password fields, as well as reviewing the underlying code.

Result: SQL injection is not possible since SQLAlchemy deals with it.

```
UNSWtalk.py x
82
83     newUser = User(
84         zid=zid,
85         email=email,
86         full_name=full_name,
87         password=password,
88         verify_code=verify_code,
89         account_verified=False
90     )
91     DBSession.add(newUser)
92     DBSession.commit()
```

tID: 5

Date Tested: 21st May 2018

URL: /verifyAccount

Test: Authentication Bypass

Aim: To determine if a user is able to bypass verifying their email address, since the code looks kinda dodgy

Method: Test supplying no username, no verify codes to see if it passes the if statement.

Result: If SQLAlchemy does not find a user, it will most certainly execute line 191 and return before any more of the code is executed. Line 192 will throw an error if the user object is 'blank' and doesn't contain a verify_code. There is no way to generate a user object with a blank verify_code attribute to match with a supplied blank verify_code.

```
UNSWtalk.py x
184
185 @app.route('/verifyAccount', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
186 def verifyAccount():
187     verify_code = request.args.get('verify_code')
188     zid = request.args.get('zid')
189     user = DBSession.query(User).filter_by(zid=zid).first()
190     if not user:
191         return "Account for " + zid + " not found"
192     if user.verify_code != verify_code:
193         return "Verify code " + verify_code + " does not match " + user.verify_code
194     user.account_verified = True
```

Bugs Found

bID: 1

Date Found: 14th May 2018

URL: /profile

Description: Users are able to upload files which are not of an image format, resulting in the image not being displayed, but instead an error icon being displayed.

bID: 2

Date Found: 15th May 2018

URL: /, /search

Description: Home and search uses pagination, suppling a string or blank value into the ?page= query will result in the server crashing (TypeError 'null' or 'string' is not an int)



bID: 3

Date Found: 16th May 2018

URL: /*

Description: When hovering over username at top right corner to obtain dropdown menu, the mouse will clip the loading strip under the header causing the dropdown menu to disappear.

bID: 4

Date Found: 16th May 2018

URL: /createAccount, /forgotPassword


Description: CSS align does not properly align the elements in the center where they should be, also the loading bar does not disappear even after page load.

Repairs Applied

bID: 1

Date Repaired: 23rd May 2018

Repairs Completed: Made the file upload input only accept image files, as well as trying to create a javascript image object with supplied image before storing permanently on disk and displaying image



The screenshot shows a code editor with two tabs. The top tab, labeled 'profile.html', shows a single line of HTML code: `<input type = "file" name = "file" accept="image/*" onChange="validateAndUpload(this);" />`. The bottom tab, also labeled 'profile.html', shows a JavaScript function `validateAndUpload(input)` within a script block. The function takes an `input` parameter, gets the file from `input.files[0]`, and if it exists, creates a new `Image` object. It then sets an `onload` event that logs a message to the console if the image has a width, and finally sets the `src` of the image to a local object URL created from the file.

```
15 {% block pre_scripts %}
16 <script>
17   function validateAndUpload(input){
18     var URL = window.URL || window.webkitURL;
19     var file = input.files[0];
20
21     if (file) {
22       var image = new Image();
23
24       image.onload = function() {
25         if (this.width) {
26           console.log('Image has width, I think it is real image');
27           //TODO: upload to backend
28         }
29       };
30
31       image.src = URL.createObjectURL(file);
32     }
33   };
34 </script>
35 {% endblock %}
```

bID: 2

Date Repaired: 24th May 2018

Repairs Completed: Added a try except block to return the home page if the pageNum throws an exception

```

UNSWtalk.py
215 @app.route('/', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
216 @login_required
217 def home():
218     pageNum = request.args.get("page")
219
220     try:
221         pageNum = int(pageNum)
222     except:
223         return redirect(url_for("home", page=1))

```

vID: 1

Date Repaired: 21st May 2018

Repairs Completed: On an incorrect zID or email, still appear as if it "succeeded" to the client, but not actually send the email. This will prevent brute-force attacks from checking whether the supplied username / email is valid.

vID: 2

Date Repaired: 21st May 2018

Repairs Completed: To make brute force checking details slower, each time you try to create an account, there will be a 5 second delay. This will only (hopefully) sleep the thread of the attacker so no other users will be affected. Alongside DDoS protection offered by CloudFlare, it should be fairly hard to exploit this vulnerability now.

```

UNSWtalk.py
61 # Creates an account
62 @app.route('/createAccount', methods=['POST', 'GET'])
63 def createAccount():
64     if request.method == "POST":
65         time.sleep(5)

```

vID: 3

Date Repaired: 22nd May 2018

Repairs Completed: Added a .htaccess file with directory index off `Options -Indexes`. Now when you try to view the directory you get the error

Access Forbidden

This is an "Error Code 403" message.

You were looking for the file
/~z5080336/2041/UNSWtalk/
which you do not have permission to access.

Please check the URL of the document you are after and make sure it has been entered correctly.

If the error persists, please contact z5080336@cse.unsw.edu.au with a copy of this error message.

Enjoy the [CSE website](#).

Error Information

Requested URL: /~z5080336/2041/UNSWtalk/
Error Status: 403
Error notes: Directory index forbidden by rule: /web/z5080336/2041/UNSWtalk/
Request Protocol: HTTP/1.1
Server Name: cgi.cse.unsw.edu.au
Server Port: 443

VID: 4

Date Repaired: 22nd May 2018

Repairs Completed: Javascript will validate file size to be under 2MB per image so users cannot upload large files.

```
profile.html
69      <input type = "file" name = "file" accept="image/*" onChange="validateAndUpload(this);" />

18      if (this.files[0].size > 2097152) {
19          alert("File is too big")
20      }
```

VID: 5

Date Repaired: 23rd May 2018

Repairs Completed: Copied website into local directory to work on development versions. Live version will have debug turned off in flask settings.

```
601  if __name__ == '__main__':
602      app.secret_key =
603      atexit.register(closeDBSession)
604      app.run(debug=False, host="127.0.0.1", port=9777)
```

VID: 6

Date Repaired: 23rd May 2018

Repairs Completed: Added HTTP to HTTPS redirect in .htaccess

```
GNU nano 2.2.6      File: .htaccess      Modified

RewriteEngine On
# This will enable the Rewrite capabilities

RewriteCond %{HTTPS} !=on
# This checks to make sure the connection is not already HTTPS

RewriteRule ^/?(.*) https://%{HTTP_HOST}%{REQUEST_URI}/$1 [R,L]
# This rule will redirect users from their original location, to the same locat$
# i.e.  http://www.example.com/foo/ to https://www.example.com/foo/
# The leading slash is made optional so that this will work either in httpd.conf
# or .htaccess context

Options -Indexes
AddDefaultCharset utf-8

[ Read 16 lines ]
^G Get Help  ^O WriteOut  ^R Read File  ^Y Prev Page  ^K Cut Text    ^C Cur Pos
^X Exit      ^J Justify   ^W Where Is   ^V Next Page  ^U UnCut Text ^T To Spell
```

 Secure | <https://cgi.cse.unsw.edu.au/~z5080336/2041/UNSWtalk/UNSWtalk.cgi/login>

VID: 7, 8, 9

Date Repaired: 23rd May 2018

Repairs Completed: Jinja2 escape messages using {{ msg | e }}

```
<!-- Home.html -->
54 {% for result in postResults %}
55     <script>
56         $("posts").append(messageBlock('{{result.fromUser|e}}', '{{result.id|e}}', '{{result.fromUser|e}}', '
            '{{result.time|e}}', '{{result.message|e}}', '{{result.children|length}}', '{{result.taggedStr|e}}', '
            '{{result.likes|length}}'))
    </script>
57 </div>
```

VID: 10

Date Repaired: 24th May 2018

Repairs Completed: Verify Account will redirect you to the home page no matter if it's verified or not. Legit users will have their account automatically verified while malicious users won't know if the account was verified or not.

```
184 UNSWalk.py
185 @app.route('/verifyAccount', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
186 def verifyAccount():
187     verify_code = request.args.get('verify_code')
188     zid = request.args.get('zid')
189     user = DBSession.query(User).filter_by(zid=zid).first()
190     if not user:
191         return redirect(url_for("login"))
192     #return "Account for " + zid + " not found"
193     if user.verify_code != verify_code:
194         return redirect(url_for("login"))
195     #return "Verify code " + verify_code + " does not match " + user.verify_code
```

VID: 11

Date Repaired: 24th May 2018

Repairs Completed: instead of `os.system()`, `subprocess.run()` is used similar to the send emails test.

```
207 mkdir = [
208     'mkdir',
209     os.path.join("static", "dataset", user.zid)
210 ]
211
212 subprocess.run(mkdir)
```

VID: 12

Date Repaired: 25th May 2018

Repairs Completed: if requesting user is not target user, target's user privacy checked before sending any response for the api request.

```
359 if (session.get("current_user") != zid):
360     if (DBSession.query(User).filter_by(zid=zid).first().settings.privacy != PrivacyLevel.PUBLIC):
361         return {}
```

VID: 12, 13, 14

Date Repaired: 25th May 2018

Repairs Completed: current user's identity checked with the target user (or owner of a post or account) before authorizing the action

```
412 ▾ elif(action == "remove"):
413     postID = zid
414 ▾     if (session.get("current_user") == DBSession.query(Post).filter_by(id=postID).first().owner):
415         DBSession.query(Post).filter_by(id=postID).delete()
416         return "success"
417     else:
418         return "not authorized"
```