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Hartshorne's Dipolar Theism and the Mystery of God

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Abstract Anselm said that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, but he believed that it followed that God is greater than can be conceived. The second formula—essential to sound theology—points to the mystery of God. The usual way of preserving divine mystery is the *via negativa*, as one finds in Aquinas. I formalize Hartshorne's central argument against negative theology in the simplest modal system T. I end with a defense of Hartshorne's way of preserving the mystery of God, which he locates in the actuality of God rather than in the divine existence or essence. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.

Keywords Charles Hartshorne · Thomas Aquinas · Anselm of Canterbury · Dipolar theism · Mystery of God

> [No] necessary being, so far as necessary, can include anything contingent. From this it follows that if God is aware of all truth then the divine knowledge must have contingent aspects. . . . The theological conclusion is that God must be supposed just as truly contingent as necessary; and the apparent inconsistency disappears when one takes into account the distinction between the divine existence and the divine actuality. If I have explained anything

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> clearly, it is this distinction, which so far as I know I am the first to make definitely and clearly. All theology, I hold, implies it.[1]

Anselm's most memorable formula is his characterization of God as that than which nothing greater can be conceived. In the same work, however, in which this formula is found, he says that God is greater than can be conceived. For Anselm, the second formulation is a consequence of the first. A being that is greater than can be conceived is greater than a being whose greatness is completely conceivable.[2] In order to avoid a nasty problem of self-referential incoherence, we should qualify Anselm's second formula to say that, *in some sense*, God is greater than can be conceived. If God is greater than can be conceived *simpliciter* then God simply cannot be conceived. I consider Anselm to have hit upon an insight that is central to any responsible theological discourse. An adequate concept of God must point beyond itself to a mystery not wholly available to our conceptuality. Somewhat paradoxically, but within the tradition of faith seeking understanding, God may be conceived as calling us from beyond the understanding to understand the God that lies beyond.[3]

The danger in speaking of the mystery of God is that it too easily becomes an excuse for uttering nonsense about God. This is part of what Whitehead meant by paying God metaphysical compliments.[4] One attributes to the divine that which contradicts the understanding or the ability to do something that contradicts the understanding. For example, Descartes held that God could create circles with unequal radii.[5] Whatever may be said for this as an account of omnipotence, it is self-defeating as an expression of the mystery of God because it locates that mystery in something we fully understand, namely, that constructing a "circle with unequal radii" is a contradiction in terms. One constructs a circle by fixing the arc of the compass and enclosing the figure. The fixed arc ensures that the radii are equal.

A more usual way of exalting God above all others is the *via negativa*.[6] Thomas Aquinas put the point succinctly, ". . . we cannot know what God is, but rather what

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[1] Hartshorne, C. (1991). A reply to my critics. In L. E. Hahn (Ed.), *The philosophy of Charles Hartshorne* (p. 619). La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.

[2] Anselm (1966). *St. Anselm: Basic writings* (translated by S. N. Deane, with an introduction by Charles Hartshorne) 2nd ed. (p. 7). La Salle, IL: Open Court; *Proslogion*, ch. II, and p. 22; Proslogion, ch. XV.

[3] Kierkegaard faulted Kant for failing to establish the inexplicable as a category. "It is specifically the task of human knowing to understand that there is something it cannot understand and to understand what that is." Hong, H. V., Hong, E. H. (assisted by Malantschuk, Gregor, Eds.) (1975). *Søren Kierkegaard's journals and papers*, Vol. 3 (p. 406, L-R). Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

[4] Whitehead, A. N. (1925). *Science and the modern world* (p. 258; ch. XI, final paragraph). New York: Macmillan.

[5] Anthony Kenny ably brings together the evidence for Descartes' view on omnipotence and necessary truths in Kenny, A. (1979). *The God of the philosophers* (pp. 17–20). Oxford: Clarendon. On this point, Aquinas is a model of moderation, for he denied God this ability. See Aquinas, T. (1956). *On the truth of the Catholic faith, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book Two: Creation* (p. 75; chapter 25, paragraph 14; Translated by James F. Anderson). Garden City, NY: Hanover House.

[6] Within the apophatic tradition I distinguish an intellectual claim and a meditative practice. The intellectual claim is that the most appropriate language for God is negative. The meditative practice is the emptying of concepts from the mind to find or prepare the way for feeling the presence of God. It is only the intellectual claim with which I am here concerned.

He is not . . .”[7] Aquinas then proceeds to remove from the description of God whatever he conceives to be unbefitting of the divine. For example, God is not composed of parts, is unchanging, is lacking in passive potency, and so on. Use of the negative way does not prevent Aquinas from employing positive terms for God; however, the positive terms never come out from under the umbrella of negative theology. They are understood not to be univocal and Aquinas develops a sophisticated theory of analogical predication to make sense of theological affirmations.

Charles Hartshorne accused negative theology of a “metaphysical false modesty.”[8] The modesty is false, in Hartshorne’s view because, in order to deny that a description of deity is fitting, one must have some prior positive notion of God. For Aquinas, analogical predication presupposes negative theology. For Hartshorne, negative theology presupposes some positive knowledge of the essence of God. What I present here is a formalization of Hartshorne’s central argument against Aquinas’s attempt to keep consistently to the negative way. The larger task of explaining or defending Hartshorne’s own account of theological language is beyond the scope of this brief paper.[9] I close by explaining Hartshorne’s own metaphysical modesty, his attempt to locate the mystery of God or the ways in which God is greater than can be conceived.

Hartshorne’s Central Argument

One of Aquinas’s most striking theological denials is that God is unaffected by the creatures. Aquinas says:

> Since, therefore, God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea inasmuch as creatures are really related to Him.[10]

According to this view, what the creatures do has no affect on God. This goes hand-in-hand with Aquinas’s denials that there is passive potency in God and that there are accidents in God. Indeed, God’s very knowledge lacks potency since it is causative. For Aquinas, God is the peak of nobility and thus is the first cause—this,

[7]Pegis, A. C. (Ed.) (1945). *Basic writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas* (Vol. 1, p. 25). New York: Random House; *Summa Theologiae* I, Q. III, Introduction (I make no effort to camouflage the exclusive language in quotations, including quotations from Hartshorne. As an octogenarian, Hartshorne began to use inclusive language for deity).

[8]Hartshorne, C. (1948). *The divine relativity: A social conception of God* (p. 35). New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

[9]In my view, the most searching discussion of Hartshorne’s views on God-talk is Ogden, S. (1984). The experience of God: Critical reflections on Hartshorne’s theory of analogy. In J. B. Cobb, Jr., & F. I. Gamwell (Eds.), *Existence and actuality: Conversations with Charles Hartshorne* (pp. 16–37). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. See also Hartshorne’s response in the same volume, pp. 37–42.

[10]*Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, p. 124; *Summa Theologiae* I, Q 13, a. 7.

because, according to Aquinas, causes are nobler than effects.[11] In other words, God is through and through lacking in contingency.

Hartshorne argues that the denial of real relations in God cannot be sustained if one affirms, as Aquinas does, that God has perfect knowledge of all contingent realities.[12] Hartshorne's argument is stated several places in his writings.[13] I here reconstruct it in the weakest modal system so that its validity is more readily apparent.[14] Let us use the following symbols:

G	God knows all worldly events.
W	Worldly event x exists at t. The variable x can stand for any worldly event that exists at a given time, t, for example, a bird singing.
$\wedge$	and
$\sim$	not
$\rightarrow$	only if (Philonian, or material, conditional)
$\Box$	it is necessary that

The proof is a *reductio*. The first two premises are accepted by all parties to the debate. The third premise, accepted only by Aquinas, is introduced as the assumption from which a contradiction is derived.

1. $\Box (G \rightarrow W)$	Axiom of God's infallible knowledge
2. $\sim \Box W$	Assumption of the world's contingency
3. $\Box G$	Thomas's denial of contingency in God
4. $\Box G \rightarrow \Box W$	From 1 by the modal principle: $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$
5. $\Box W$	From 3 and 4 by *modus ponens*
6. $\Box W \wedge \sim \Box W$	From 2 and 5 by conjunction
7. $\sim \Box G$	From 3 through 6 by *reductio* argument

In effect, Hartshorne presents one with the following alternatives. Either God does not know worldly events ($\sim G \wedge W$)—Aristotle's theism or the view of anyone who denies the existence of God; or God's knowledge of worldly events and those events are equally necessary ($\Box G \wedge \Box W$)—pantheism; or God's knowledge of

[11] For God's knowledge as causative: *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, p. 147; *Summa Theologiae* I, Q 14, a. 8. God as the peak of nobility: Aquinas, T. (1955). *On the truth of the Catholic faith, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One: God* (pp. 100 and 121; chapters 16 and 23). Garden City, NY: Hanover House. Causes as nobler than effects, Ibid., p. 104; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk One, chapter 18, paragraph 6.

[12] Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, pp. 135–161; *Summa Theologicae* I, Q 14.

[13] Hartshorne, C. (1990). *The Darkness and the light, A philosopher reflects upon his fortunate career and those who made it possible* (pp. 232–33). Albany: State University of New York Press. Essentially the same argument occurs many places, most notably in *The Divine Relativity,* pp. 13–14 and in his questions to Wild, J. in Rome, Sydney and Beatrice (Eds.) (1964). *Philosophical interrogations* (pp. 158–160). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. William P. Alston discusses, and approves of, this argument and this aspect of Hartshorne's theism. See Alston (1984). Hartshorne and Aquinas: A Via Media. (In *Existence and Actuality* (pp. 83–84), Op cit.).

[14] The system used here, commonly known as *T*, was set out in 1937 by Robert Feys. Its modal axioms are "$\Box p \rightarrow p$" and "$\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$". See Hughes, G. E., & Cresswell, M. J. (1991). *An introduction to modal logic* (pp. 30–31). New York: Routledge. George Shields gives an alternate formalization of the argument using the much richer Lewis S5. See Shields, G. (1983). God, modality and incoherence. *Encounter,* 44/1, 27–39. Using the variables and symbols as I have defined them here, Shields' version concludes to the modal contradiction ($\Box \Box W \wedge \Box \sim \Box W$).

worldly events and the events of the world are equally not necessary ($\sim \Box G \wedge \sim \Box W$)—Hartshorne's alternative. The alternative that is not possible is Aquinas's view that God's knowledge of worldly events lacks contingency but those events are not necessary, ($\Box G \wedge \sim \Box W$).[15]

Aquinas was aware of something like this argument. He replied that the world is indeed necessary, but only with respect to God's knowledge, and not as the world is in itself. God knows the world *as present*, and "*for everything that is, while it is, must necessarily be*."[16] Thus, the world is necessary only in the trivial sense that it is necessary for a thing to exist in order for propositions about it to be known, and this is the case whether the knowing is creaturely or divine. Hartshorne counters that what God knows, supposing the world to be contingent and God's knowledge to be perfect, is that a world exists but *it might have failed to exist*. The addendum, *it might have failed to exist*, is enough to introduce contingency into God's knowledge. This is true also of creaturely knowing. One's *knowledge that q* is contingent if *q* is contingent.

Aquinas's counter-argument is merely a restatement of the first two premises. He argues that the world's events (W) are given on the condition that God knows them (G), from which it does not follow that the world's events are necessary ($\Box W$). Neither Aquinas nor Hartshorne believes that the first premise, by itself, entails the conclusion of the necessity of the world's events. In other words, "$\Box (G \rightarrow W) \rightarrow \Box W$" is false. The falsity of this formula, however, is logically equivalent to the conjunction of the first two premises, as the following derivation demonstrates ($\vee$, means and/or):

$\sim [\Box (G \rightarrow W) \rightarrow \Box W]$	Assumption: falsity of "$\Box (G \rightarrow W) \rightarrow \Box W$"
$\sim [\sim \Box (G \rightarrow W) \vee \Box W]$	Definition of material conditional
$\sim \sim \Box (G \rightarrow W) \wedge \sim \Box W$	DeMorgan's rule
$\Box (G \rightarrow W) \wedge \sim \Box W$	Double negation

On the truth of these propositions, Hartshorne and Aquinas agree. Aquinas affirms, however, not only that God's knowing of the world's events entails that those events exist; he also affirms that there is no contingency in God, symbolically, ($\Box$ G), and that's what leads to the contradiction.

It is open to Thomists to question whether Aquinas is committed to $\Box$ G in any sense that would be damaging to Aquinas's theory. The expression "$\Box$ G" means that it is necessary that God knows a specific worldly event. However, Aquinas holds that God freely creates the universe. If God freely creates the singing bird, then the singing bird's existence is not necessary and therefore God's knowledge of the bird singing is not necessary. Aquinas maintains that God necessarily wills God's own goodness, but

[15] Hartshorne also presents the argument in terms of a choice among an inconsistent triad of propositions: "(1) The world is mutable and contingent; (2) The ground of its possibility is a being unconditionally and in all respects necessary and immutable; (3) The necessary being, God, has ideally complete knowledge of the world." Hartshorne, C. (1976). *Aquinas to Whitehead: Seven centuries of metaphysics of religion* (p. 15). Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Publications. Hartshorne says (2) is the offending statement.

[16] *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, p. 156; *Summa Theologiae* I, Q. 14, a. 3, Obj. 2.

because the divine goodness can exist whether or not the things willed by it exist (e.g. the bird singing), it follows that God does not necessarily will the created order.[17]

Hartshorne's reply is that Aquinas cannot hold that God freely, or nonnecessarily, creates the universe and also maintain that there is no contingency in God. Aquinas's explanation of divine willing posits necessary and nonnecessary volitions in God. God necessarily wills divine goodness, but does not necessarily will things willed by that goodness. Hartshorne concludes:

> Yet all the being of God is held [by Aquinas] to be purely necessary. Ergo, the nonnecessary acts are not in the being of God. Still they are either in God or not in him. If in him, then he has accidents, additional to what is necessary in him. If not in him, what is meant by calling them "his" acts, and why are we assured always that "God's will is his essence"?[18]

Hartshorne's point is that the problem of contingency in God's knowledge resurfaces as the problem of contingency in God's willing the universe into existence. No self-consistent theology can *deny* all contingency in God and *affirm* God's knowing of or God's willing of contingent truths or realities.

Locating the Mystery of God

Why does Aquinas insist on a lack of contingency in God? He offers the following argument:

> The being whose substance has an admixture of potency is liable not to be by as much as it has potency; for that which can be, can not-be. But, God, being everlasting, in His substance cannot not-be. In God, therefore, there is no potency to being.[19]

In other words, if God's substance included potency, God might fail to exist; but this is absurd, so in God there is no potency. The image that Aquinas gives of contingency resembles a kind of metaphysical virus that infects the whole being of the one that has it. Hartshorne is sympathetic to this reasoning insofar as he agrees that God must be incapable of not existing; in this sense, the existence of God has no "admixture of potency." Thus, Hartshorne agrees with Aquinas that God's essence is one with God's existence: to be God is to exist.[20] It is typical of Hartshorne, however, to ask (a) whether principled distinctions can be made that prevent contingency from affecting God's very existence, and (b) whether there are forms of contingency that it would be better for God to have than not to have. Daniel Dombrowski points out that Hartshorne's question is not "Must a perfect being be

[17] *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*: 198–199; *Summa Theologicae* I, Q. 19, a. 3. See also, Aquinas, T. (1955). *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, Bk Two* (p. 68). Garden City, NY: Hanover House; *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, chapter 23.

[18] Hartshorne, C., & Reese, W. L. (2000). *Philosophers speak of God* (p. 133). Amherst, NY: Humanity.

[19] *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*, Bk One, p. 100; *Summa Contra Gentiles* I, chapter 16, paragraph 2.

[20] *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 28–31; *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q 3, a. 3 and a. 4. *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*, Bk One, pp. 116–121; *Summa Contra Gentiles* I, chapters 21 and 22.

immutable?" but more precisely, "Must a perfect being be immutable in every respect?"[21]

Hartshorne's claim is that God, to be conceived as perfect, must be immutable in some respects and mutable in others. He draws a three-fold distinction among *essence* (what a thing is), *existence* (that a thing is), and *actuality* (the particular state in which a thing is). Because Hartshorne agrees that essence and existence in God are the same, the three-fold distinction is occasionally abbreviated as "existence and actuality." If existence and essence in God are the same, and if God's existence is immutable, then God's essence—or in ordinary language, God's character—must also be immutable. This is indeed Hartshorne's view: God necessarily exists and is necessarily perfect in power, knowledge, and goodness (see Table).

	Creatures	*God*	
Actuality	Man listening to bird singing (contingent)	God knowing the man as listening to the bird (contingent)	*Concrete*
Essence	Human nature as including various cognitive capacities (contingent)	God as knowing whatever is knowable, i.e. as omniscient (necessary)	*Abstract*
Existence	The man existing (contingent)	God existing (necessary)	

There are contingent states in God, and hence God is mutable, in two senses. The particular items of God's awareness, and thus the divine experiences of those items, are contingent. Suppose a particular man (like Charles Hartshorne researching his book on birdsong) is listening to a bird sing at time *t*. This is different than the same man not listening to a bird sing at time *t*. It is contingent whether he is listening or not listening to a bird sing. Consequently, it is contingent whether God knows the man as listening to the bird sing. In other words, God-knowing-this-man-as-*listening*-to-a-bird-at-time-*t* is a different state, and is equally as contingent as, God-knowing-this-man-as-*not-listening*-to-a-bird-at-time-*t*. The two hyphenated phrases differ only in the expressions, "listening" and "not listening"; the identity of the phrases reflects God's necessity while their differences reflect God's contingency. What is not contingent is God's character as all-knowing. Whatever state the man is in, God knows it. Another sense in which God has contingent states is that God experiences and knows the processes of the world. As a new day dawns, so to speak, God comes to know it. Insofar as the events of the day are contingent, so are God's states in knowing them.

[21] Dombrowski, D. (1996). *Analytic theism, Hartshorne, and the concept of God* (p. 39). Albany: State University of New York Press.

The distinction between existence and actuality is one of *logical type* and therefore provides a principled and non-arbitrary way of introducing contingent states into God without threatening God's existence. If this is correct, then the criticism that surfaces from time to time that Hartshorne's dipolar theism is contradictory in attributing contrary properties to God is easily answered.[22] Hartshorne maintains that existence and/or character are related to actuality as the abstract is related to the concrete. This equation is evident in Hartshorne's account of personal identity. One persists from moment to moment as the same person, yet one also changes over time. For Hartshorne, the identity over time is abstract relative to the particular experiences which embody that identity. He analyzes the identity as comprised of two elements:

> (1) Some "defining characteristic" reappearing in each member of a sequence or family of occasions; (2) direct inheritance by appreciably positive prehensions of this character from previous members.[23]

Rather than interpreting the states as being in the self-identical person (as Leibniz did), Hartshorne interprets the self-identical person as being in a causally related sequence of states. He makes a related point—concerning the existence of universals in particulars—as follows:

> It is not that John has the predicate sick-now, but that John-now has the predicate sick. Universals have a certain time independence. For instance, having a temperature of about 104° Fahrenheit is just that, whether at time t or time t^1. But it is not the man simply, but the man-at-time-t that has this property.[24]

The asymmetry between existence and actuality is evident in Hartshorne's claim that to be actual is to exist and to exist is to be *somehow* actualized. The logic of the matter does not change when applied to God. "That God exists is one with his essence and is an analytic truth . . . but how, or in what actual state of experience or knowledge or will, he exists is contingent in the same sense as is our own existence."[25]

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[22] John Wild dismisses dipolar theism in these terms: "So Professor Hartshorne concludes that God is a little bit of both, something in him (existence) being necessary and something else (his knowledge of the world) being contingent. This splits God up into parts that are not only different (which is bad enough), but absolutely contradictory." *Philosophical Interrogations*, op cit., p. 160.

[23] Hartshorne, C. (1972). Personal Identity from A to Z. *Process Studies* 2/3, p. 211.

[24] Ibid., p. 214.

[25] *The Divine Relativity,* p. 87. While medieval philosophers never achieved a dipolar conception of deity, they held a kind of dipolar conception of angels. Aquinas says that angels are not subject to decay and destruction by natural means; they are incorporeal and have no corruptible bodies and so are immortal. Like God, their existence is not affected by the flow of time. Unlike the Thomistic God, however, they are susceptible to change. While their existence is immutable, they have free will, their knowledge can increase, and in a certain sense they can even move from place to place. Aquinas says that between the unqualified changelessness of God's eternity and the qualified changeableness of corporeal existence, there is the qualified immutability of angelic being. The technical expression for this is *æviternity*, which is the mean between the extremes of eternity and time. What neither Aquinas nor any other scholastic philosopher, nor even philosophers to the time of Kant, could conceive is an *æviternal* God. See, *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, p. 499; *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q 10, a. 5.

What, then, of the mystery of God? The confidence with which Hartshorne spoke of God has led some critics to accuse him of knowing too much about God. For example, Martin Gardner, the popular science writer and Hartshorne's one time student said that it bothered him that Hartshorne always seemed to know so much more about God than he did.[26] Hartshorne responded:

> [What Gardner] and so many miss is that what I claim to know is *very little*. The mystery is not what *extreme abstractions* apply to God, but what the divine life concretely is, how God prehends you or me or Hitler, or the feelings of bats, ants, plant cells, atoms. The one "to whom all hearts are open" knows, or loves the concrete *concretely*. We know nothing in that way.[27]

Elsewhere, Hartshorne makes a similar point when he says that to know God as omniscient is not the same as having divine knowledge. In short, to know the God who knows all is not the same as knowing all that God knows. The former is tantamount, in Hartshornean terms, to knowing the essence of God, which is abstract; the later is the same as knowing the full actuality of God, which is concrete.

Since the essence of deity is abstract compared to the actual divine states, what is known of God is very little. To avoid confusion it is necessary to add that the dipolar structure of deity is itself the essence of God. It is an abstract feature of God to have both abstract essence and concrete states. This dipolar structure is embedded in the concrete states of the divine life. Hartshorne noted that what Whitehead called the Consequent Nature of God, no less than the Primordial Nature of God, is grounded in the Divine Actuality.[28] As Hartshorne says, ". . . what we fail to know about the Eminent Actuality can scarcely be exaggerated."[29]

This lack of knowledge of God is an in-principle lack of knowledge. In one sense, all actuality escapes language since language trades in abstractions. The actuality of our fellow creatures, however, is on a level with our own. We know what it is like to be a human even if we do not know in the concrete what it is like to be this or that particular human individual. Nor are we completely devoid of understanding of what it is like to be another kind of creature. As Hartshorne says, we know that an animal caught in a trap does not have to become human to suffer.[30] Nor do we have to be the animal in order to know something of the quality of its suffering. The distance, however, between a fragmentary human experience and a non-fragmentary divine experience is beyond all of the powers of our imagination to conceive. For example, the divine experience includes, as Hartshorne emphasizes, all past cosmic epochs, whereas our experience includes *knowledge about* only one such epoch.[31]

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[26]Gardner, M. (1983). *The Whys of a philosophical scrivener* (p. 251). New York: Quill.

[27]Viney, D. W. (Ed.) (2001). *Charles Hartshorne's letters to a young philosopher: 1979–1995*. *Logos-Sophia*: *The Journal of the Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society, 11*, 46.

[28]Hartshorne, C. (1991). Peirce, Whitehead, und di sechzehn Ansichten über Gott. In M. Hampe, & H. Maaßen (Eds.). *Die Gifford Lectures und ihre Deutung: Materialien zu Whiteheads ›Prozeβ und Realität‹*, Band 2 (p. 202). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

[29]Hartshorne, C. (1976). Mysticism and Rationalistic Metaphysics. *The Monist, 59/4*, 469. Also published in Wood, R. (Ed.) (1980). *Understanding Mysticism* (p. 421). Garden City, NY: Image.

[30]Hartshorne, C. (1975). *Beyond humanism: Essays in the philosophy of nature* (p. 120). Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith.

[31]*Charles Hartshorne's Letters to a Young Philosopher*, p. 44.

One must add, finally, to the difference between divine and creaturely experience the qualitative difference between knowledge that is fully open to—and in Hartshornean terms fully sympathetic to—its objects and knowledge that necessarily abstracts from its objects. For example, Hartshorne argues that God knows not only that one suffers, but God knows the quality of that suffering. God knows fully *how* others feel without feeling *as* others feel. We do something similar, says Hartshorne, when we vividly remember how we felt trust in something that we now distrust.[32] To be sure, questions can be raised about the very possibility of this sort of knowledge which Henry Simoni-Wastila calls knowledge of "radical particularity."[33] My point, however, is that Hartshorne's dipolar theism provides a robust account of the divine mystery without thereby pretending to sound its depths.

What is said here concerning divine knowledge holds also for other attributes of God. Omnipresence: We know what it is like to have spatial and temporal location. We do not know what it is like to exist in every place and time. Omnipotence: We know what it is to effect and to be affected by aspects of our environment, including our bodies. We do not know what it is like to effect and to be affected by all creatures, to have the universe itself as our internal environment. Also, unlike deity, we do not know the extent of our freedom; sometimes we overestimate our freedom and sometimes we underestimate it. Omnibenevolence: We know what it is to love another, but our love is necessarily restricted and even competitive (we *live* at the expense of others, even if only the nonhuman others). We do not know what it is like to love in a way that is all-inclusive, unqualified, and entirely non-competitive. Hartshorne speaks of religion as the acceptance of our fragmentariness, of the fact that we are fragments of the whole and not the whole itself.[34] Arguably, an essential aspect of this acceptance is to develop a deep appreciation of all of the ways in which God is greater than we can conceive. Hartshorne's view meets the twin Anselmian criteria for the supremely worshipful divine reality, namely, that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived and that God is greater than can be conceived.

[32]Hartshorne, C. (1984). *Creativity in American philosophy* (p. 199). Albany: State University of New York Press.

[33]For references to Simoni-Wastila's interesting articles and a reply to him, see Viney, D. W (2001). Is the Divine Shorn of Its Heart? Responding to Simoni-Wastila. *American Journal of Theology & Philosophy, 22/2*, 154–72.

[34]Hartshorne, C. (1987). *Wisdom as moderation: A philosophy of the middle way* (chapter 6). Albany: State University of New York Press.