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NYPD New

Commissioner William Bratton and his executive staff could take satisfaction in the progress made by the New York Police Department (NYPD) toward goals they had set at the outset of 1994 to reduce major crimes in the City. Their efforts had produced better results than even some of them had expected, better even than portrayed in the popular television drama carrying the Department's name. So much better, in fact, that the Commissioner recently had trumpeted the City's rapidly improving crime record to a bond rating agency responsible for rating New York City's debt, pointing out that improvements in quality of life would have an eventual favorable impact on the City's desirability as a place to do business, further strengthening its credit-worthiness.

Although the Department was in the process of delivering results desired by the City's residents, many questioned whether and how the highly-publicized, results-oriented emphasis of Bratton's first twenty-four months as Commissioner could be sustained. (**Exhibit 1** contains a report of New York's crime statistics compared with other major U.S. cities.)

As Bratton's team of deputy commissioners (civilians) and chiefs (uniformed personnel) gathered in his office on a morning in late January, 1996, he pondered the appropriate strategy that would enable his organization to continue to produce results with the budget shortfalls that the City was experiencing. The Thursday, January 25 copy of *The New York Times* on his desk, the very same desk used by Teddy Roosevelt when he was Police Commissioner 100 years earlier, carried a front page article headlined, "Giuliani (Rudolph Giuliani, the Mayor of New York) Weighing Cuts to Police to Help Decrease Budget Deficit." It was no surprise, in that it reflected his recent discussions with Mayor Giuliani, whose administration faced a $2 billion (6%) deficit in fiscal 1995 in spite of significant efforts to reduce the budget.

Bratton opened his weekly Executive Staff meeting by pointing out that achieving a further 10% reduction in major crimes during 1996 was beginning to pale in difficulty and complexity to several other challenges facing the Department. These included reduction in funding from the City, restrictions on ways the Department could deploy its resources and reward performance, and the difficulty of sustaining the momentum that had produced greatly improved results in the past two years. After pointing out that the department was "going into a very stressful year," Bratton challenged his deputies to be as creative in responding to these new challenges as they had in reducing crime.

Professor James L. Heskett prepared this case as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.

History

Founded in 1845, the New York Police Department was the largest municipal police organization in the U.S. At various times in its history, it had been a model for big city policing. However, like other large municipal police organizations, its work was measured in terms of effort, such as the speed with which 911 (emergency) calls were answered and the number of patrols dispatched. From time to time, it had experienced periodic claims of corruption and police brutality.

As Bratton described it:

> We, as an organization, like many police departments in America during the 1970s and 1980s, became very reactive in our approach to crime. . . the traditional or professional policing model that was made up of rapid response: Dial 911 and we'll come very quickly. . .We focused on random patrol as the chief preventive measure—the idea that all these cars riding around would scare the criminals into submission. (Additionally), there was reactive investigation, something we always had done-after-the-fact investigation. And it was often controlled by a strong, centralized organization; in the case of the NYPD, you had to go up to the top of the organization to make even the most basic decisions.[1]

The concept of community policing began to sweep police departments in the U.S. in the late 1980s. Under this concept, individual officers, often the youngest members of the force, were encouraged to spend more time in the neighborhoods, maintain more visibility, gain the confidence of the citizens of a neighborhood, and collect information that would lead to efforts to deter crime. Nevertheless, specialized units trained to handle particular types of crimes, especially those that were drug-related, continued to exist. This reflected a fear that some patrol officers might be tempted to become involved in corrupt activities, such as drug dealing, themselves. In general, community policing initiatives had created a tension between personnel deployment strategies designed to provide maximum visibility of officers and those designed to deal with high-crime areas.

Safe Streets, Safe City Program

In response to increases in crime of near-epidemic proportions, Mayor David Dinkins and the New York City Council had won approval from the State Legislature in 1991 to hire 6,000 officers and pay for them through increased property taxes and a 12.5% surcharge to the City's income tax. The bill specified the total head count of all police in the city to be achieved on August 1 of each year (38,310 for August 1, 1995).

The program, called Safe Streets, Safe City, was due to expire on June 20, 1996. It had been initiated under extensive potential pressures to take a tougher stance on crime. A proposal had been put forth by the Speaker of the City Council to maintain the surcharge, but to use it in the future to finance the repair of increasingly dilapidated schools.

Giuliani Assumes Office

The election of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in November, 1993 opened a new era for the Department. Giuliani, a former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York who had built his reputation as a tough fighter against corruption and organized crime, campaigned and won

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[1] Marie Simonetti Rosen, "Moving the Biggest Mountain," *Law Enforcement News*, June 30, 1995, pp. 8-10. The word in parentheses is the author's.

largely on a campaign that emphasized reductions in New York City's budget deficits and improved crime control. These were to be achieved largely by exempting the Police Department from cuts in budgets for uniformed personnel, cuts that were implemented for nearly every other function of the City's government. However, Giuliani inherited a Police Department that was badly in need of new technology and methods. Work was done by hand that could otherwise be computerized. Communication systems were badly outdated. Often police officers were more poorly armed than the criminals they confronted.

There was a very low level of trust among senior officers as well as between the leadership and the rank-and-file in the Department. One graphic example of this was the denial of access codes to automated criminal history files. Because of this policy, designed to limit misuse of information, officers in one precinct could not gain access to information about crimes committed outside the precinct. As a result, it was nearly impossible for an arresting officer to check a suspect's criminal record. Focus group meetings with frontline patrol people yielded responses such as "this place is not on the level" and "our bosses don't want to fight crime." John Linder, a communications consultant who, as part of an ongoing organization change effort, conducted a survey of what patrol officers believed the Department wanted from them, cited as most important: write summonses, hold down overtime, stay out of trouble, and clear the 911 backlog, in that order. Fighting crime was seventh on the list.

One of Giuliani's first actions was to appoint William Bratton, Police Commissioner of Boston, to a similar post in New York. He was sworn in on January 10, 1994.

Giuliani's New Police Commissioner

A product of a working class family in Dorchester, Massachusetts whose father held full-time jobs in a metal-plating shop by day and the post office at night, William Bratton credited his first police job as a patrolman in Mattapan, a tough neighborhood of Boston, with giving him the self-assurance that some of his detractors tended to regard as bravado. The experience led him, according to one account, to develop:

> . . . a particularly powerful distaste for precinct bosses who stayed away from volatile situations and weighed in afterward with criticism of their subordinates. "When I was working District Fourteen, in Boston, we had a major broo-ha in one of the public parks, and every cop in the district was there . . . There were two sergeants, old-school guys, back in the station, and we were calling for P.S."—patrol supervisors—"and neither one of those bastards would come out. They were two cowards hiding in the station house. We had a lot of them like that in Boston. They didn't want to see anything."[2]

Bratton came to the job of Commissioner with a clear understanding of the problems of police administration in New York City. Before assuming the job that quickly led to his being named Commissioner of Boston's Police Department, he had served as the chief of the New York City Transit Police Department between 1990 and 1992. During that time, he had helped transform a somewhat demoralized force policing a transit system confronting increased robbery, fare beating, and a homeless population of about 5,000 living in transit facilities into an effective deterrent to these problems.

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[2] James Lardner, "The C.E.O. Cop," *The New Yorker*, February 6, 1995, pp. 45-57, at p. 53.

Bratton was an avid reader of management literature and fan of war movies. He occasionally referred to citizens as "customers," criminals as "competition," police officers as "sales representatives," and reduced crime as "profit." He and his wife, Cheryl Fiandaca, a former criminal-defense lawyer who was teaching at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, lived with five cats and a dog in a two-bedroom apartment on Central Park South and were frequently seen at cultural events as well as some of the City's better restaurants.

At about the time Bratton was appointed to head up the transit police, Jack Maple, a lieutenant in the transit police, came to the attention of the Commissioner through a plan for reducing crime that he had drafted. Maple, given to drinking espresso and wearing bow ties, blazers, and two-tone wing-tip spectator shoes (with a homburg hat in winter), was a sartorial opposite of Bratton (who tended toward Hermes animal ties) and a somewhat distinctive sight even on the streets of New York. (According to Maple, he adopted the dress because, as a short, stocky person, he attracted no attention in his youth as a conventional dresser.) The two hit if off immediately, with Maple, labeled by one journalist as "the Police Department's secret crime-fighting weapon," becoming a co-architect of a plan to turn the Transit Police Department around. As Bratton said more than once to those curious about his attraction to Maple, "Jack grows on you."

The program to transform the transit police was focused on two main thrusts. The first involved an effort to deter petty as well as major crimes committed on the system by attacking "quality of life" misdemeanors. For example, "sweeps" by officers in plain clothes were organized to arrest those avoiding fares ("fare beaters"). The search that was done routinely after arrest often yielded weapons which served to deter more serious crime. In Bratton's words, "A search or the threat of one is, in itself, a deterrent to crime because it encourages people to stop carrying guns." In fact, searches of fare beaters alone had turned up more than 400 concealed weapons in the first year.

The second thrust involved equipping the police with 9 mm. weapons with larger magazines, new autos, and new uniforms to improve their image in their own eyes as well as the public's.

Challenges and Responses: First Steps

Challenges facing the Department in early 1994 included a restive public that had swept Giuliani into office in part for his promises of safer streets; a somewhat demoralized police force whose "business was to stay out of trouble, not to police the city," according to John Linder; and a prior administrative focus on effort (number of patrols dispatched) vs. results (crime reduction).

According to one member of Bratton's executive staff, "there was widespread backbiting, fear of failure, and low performance. The structure of the organization was completely top-down. The Department lacked focus, and without focus a police department can end up being a municipal yo-yo." A former Precinct Commander said that the attitude of the senior staff had been, "You people in the precincts just make work for us."

Upon assuming office, Bratton quickly replaced a number of senior staff members, the largest organization shake-up in some time. Having decided that primary responsibility for day-to-day operations would reside with the 76 precinct commanders, a systematic effort was instituted to determine which of them could adapt to a strategy focused on results. Eventually, three-fourths of all precinct commanders Bratton inherited were moved out of their jobs. In his first 24 months on the job, the average age of the Commissioner's senior staff had fallen from the low 60s to the mid 40s. Bratton took great satisfaction in the result, saying "I would pit my command staff against any *Fortune* 500 company."

Bratton's reputation among police officers as a "cop's commissioner" was reinforced during his first week on the job as he began pushing for weapons with larger 15-round magazines that he had secured for his transit police several years earlier. These had become the envy of, and a source of resentment among, members of the main force required to use non-automatic weapons. Improved bullet-proof vests were ordered along with darker uniforms that conveyed a more authoritative image.

Word got around rapidly among police that this was a commissioner who "backed you up" but who would not hesitate to take disciplinary action if necessary. He was quick to obtain reliable information and, where appropriate, defend officers accused of excessive force. But in the situation involving the disclosure of widespread police corruption in the 30th Precinct just three months into his administration, Bratton accompanied the arresting force, personally removing the badges of offending officers. Later, he called all precinct commanders to headquarters, threw the badges on the table, and announced to the assembled group that he was retiring the badges so that no other police officer would ever have to wear them. A short time later, however, he emphasized to a reporter that he had "no intention of becoming an anticorruption zealot."

The public saw in Bratton an articulate spokesman capable of relating to their concerns. Shortly after taking office, he began making frequent references, both inside and outside the Department, to "taking the City back from criminals one block, one street, and one neighborhood at a time." In contrast to Bratton's popularity with the public, reporters used adjectives like "mouthy" and "cocksure" to describe him. One commented that he had a "consuming interest in media relations." Bratton was so effective in these encounters that some reporters sensed a growing rivalry between him and the Mayor, something that both denied.

"Quality-of-Life" Legislation

Mayor Giuliani, prompted by polls showing that New Yorkers were concerned about a declining "quality of life," characterized by more graffiti and vagrancy, promised to enforce existing laws against those committing what were termed "quality of life" misdemeanors, including urinating in public, spraying graffiti, and disorderly conduct. Much as had been done at the Transit Police Department, police were marshaled to reduce "quality of life" misdemeanors thought to be most important by the citizenry. In the first quarter of 1994, for example, arrests of peddlers, public drinkers, and squeegee cleaners increased 38%, summonses increased 40%, and sales tax violation citations increased 49% over the previous year. The effort achieved its greatest notoriety when it was used to go after what came to be known as "squeegee pests," people who approached stopped autos, cleaned their windshields, and demanded money from their occupants. Squeegee pests were warned then arrested. By increasing efforts begun in mid-1993, squeegee pests practically vanished from the streets by spring of 1994.

In addition, existing laws were used, for example, to arrest graffiti "artists" who spray-painted municipal and other property as well as slum landlords who had allowed their properties to fall into a state of disarray. The theory behind these efforts had two different rationales. The first was the "broken windows" theory that if a broken window is not fixed in a building, soon all windows will be broken. It held that people engaging in one kind of misdemeanor might be inclined to commit others as well, especially that of carrying a concealed or unlicensed gun. Heightened enforcement of these laws resulted in an increased number of searches and increased questioning in a process that turned up several hundred weapons in the first six months of the initiative. Commissioner Bratton referred to these practices as the "linchpin" in his crime-fighting strategies. The idea was not new; when it had been proposed by a consultant to Bratton's predecessor, he had responded, "Give me 50 guys, suspend the Constitution, and we can do that."

Process and Organization Reengineering

Commissioner Bratton often referred to the work of his team as "reengineering an underperforming organization." The fame of the Department and pride of its police officers made this particularly difficult. According to Bratton, "Two years ago, the NYPD, like the emperor, had no clothes. This was an organization that was living on reputation."[3] To help, Bratton hired a consultant, John Linder, who had assisted him previously in Boston.

Linder's "Cultural Diagnostic"

Linder set about to collect data, change perceptions, and provide the basis for action through a detailed questionnaire, called a "cultural diagnostic," that encouraged members of the Department to disclose their feelings about their jobs in return for a promise of anonymity. Based on the returns from this "diagnostic," focus groups were organized in which respondents were promised anonymity in exchange for uncensored opinions. According to this report:

> John Miller, NYPD spokesman...says that cops, trained to defend the Department's image, detested Linder's therapy. "They hated the idea that they had to say it out loud. Linder put these guys through a bureaucratic AA meeting. You had to admit you had a problem, and you had to recount for everyone else in the group how long you'd had the problem and how serious it was."[4]

Reengineering Teams

Based on the results of Linder's effort, Bratton organized 300 members of the Department into 12 teams asked to address the following themes: building community partnerships, geographical vs. functional organizational structure, precinct organization, supervisory training, in-service training, productivity, paperwork, integrity, rewards and career paths, discipline, equipment and uniforms, and technology. Management thought leaders such as Jack Welch and Michael Hammer were brought in to address the teams. The process produced more than 600 recommendations, 80% of which were implemented.

Resulting changes ranged from the obvious to the complex. For example, one early finding from the paperwork team was that there were at least 4,000 forms in active use within the Department. John Linder commented that the forms played a very distinctive role in the personnel strategies of previous administrations:

> These forms were used to hang people down the food chain. As an officer, you had two choices. Either you filled out the form wrong and got flogged for it. Or you filled it out properly and accurately and were asked, "Why didn't you do something about this?" Either way, you couldn't win.

Bratton himself cited several obvious problems with what he termed "bankers' hours":

> The auto-theft squad was working nine to five, and the drug units were mostly working ten to six, with a few going two to ten. . . The warrant unit was getting started at 7:30 a.m., and by the time they read the papers and had their coffee,

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[3] Chris Smith, "The NYPD Guru," *New York*, April 1, 1996, pp. 28-34, at p. 31.

[4] Ibid.

> it was ten before they'd start knocking on doors. The department was not really minding the store.[5]

Another study found that the average amount of police officer overtime associated with an arrest was 12 hours. It resulted from the fact that much of an officer's involvement in the preparation and presentation of a complaint by a district attorney had to be done in person, although it was solely within the discretion of a D.A. to alter the process. Because overtime was an important source of income for many officers, they did not complain about the waste of their time in the arrest and complaint process.

In the process of reengineering the organization, a reporting level was eliminated. This meant that precinct commanders, who formally reported to one of 17 division commanders, now reported directly to eight bureau commanders.

Because the incidence of drugs and guns often occurred in overlapping geographic patterns, specialized drug units were replaced with Strategic Narcotics and Gun teams who investigated situations involving both. In addition, new crime control strategies purposely required the formation of teams designed to break down the barriers that had separated the Patrol, Detective, and Organized Crime Control Bureaus.

Development of the Strategies

Many of the ideas developed by the reengineering teams made their way into seven strategies, written by Linder, each of which were published in separate booklets designed for wide distribution under seven titles: (1) Getting Guns off the Streets of New York, (2) Curbing Youth Violence in the Schools and on the Streets, (3) Driving Drug Dealers out of New York, (4) Breaking the Cycle of Domestic Violence, (5) Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York, and (6) Reducing Auto-Related Crime in New York. In response to continuing concerns about police corruption, a seventh strategy was added in mid-1995 titled, "Police Strategy No. 7: Rooting out Corruption; Building Organizational Integrity in the New York Police Department."

Each strategy statement contained a statement of the problem, current practice, specific conditions warranting the strategy, the strategy itself, and changes in laws as well as departmental policies and procedures that would be necessary to facilitate the strategy.

Excerpts from Strategy No. 5 are shown in **Exhibit 2**. When first developed, the strategies were labeled "bullshit" by many frontline police officers. Attitudes had begun to change with their implementation.

Organization

Police work in New York City traditionally had been carried out in three separate organizations. One force was entrusted with general public safety. Another dealt with police work associated with housing issues. The third concerned itself with crime on the city's transit system. One of the new Commissioner's first objectives was to implement the merger of these three departments, a high priority of the new mayor. The three forces were consolidated in April 1995. The job structure and headcounts for the consolidated department are described in **Exhibit 3**. **Exhibit 4** contains an organization chart for the Department.

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[5] Craig Horowitz, "The Suddenly Safer City," *New York*, August 14, 1995, p. 25.

Management by the Numbers

Among the more important initiatives of the new administration were a new emphasis on results vs. effort, reinforced by efforts to computerize statistics and graphics formerly organized by hand, as well as the institution of twice-weekly "CompStat" (computerized crime comparison statistics) crime-strategy meetings based on the more-current information. In addition to introducing new performance measures based on this information, other initiatives involved giving more authority to the 76 precinct commanders, redefining the role of the officers policing neighborhoods, reengineering processes, and introducing new technology. All of this effort, and the results it would produce, was a topic of some debate among those knowledgeable about police work and crime control.

New Performance Measures

New performance measures were instituted for precinct commanders. Instead of being measured on the amount of effort put forth by their units, they would now be held accountable for the quality of their plans for dealing with crime problems. Increased emphasis was placed on efforts thought to lead to crime reduction. These included the proportion of people arrested and searched in connection with misdemeanors and the frequency with which those arrested had their past police records checked at the time they were identified and searched. According to Deputy Commissioner Maple: "You don't get into trouble for increased crime, but for not having a strategy to deal with it."

Performance was monitored daily by the NYPD's leadership. As Bratton put it, "Can you imagine running a bank if you couldn't look at your bottom line every day?"

Results vs. Effort: Reducing Crime

Whether or not crime could be reduced was a matter of some debate among criminologists and sociologists. Since a study commissioned by the Johnson Administration, "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society," was published in 1967, it had become conventional wisdom to assume that most inner-city crime was the inevitable product of poverty and racism. Among the theories used to explain a widespread decline in major crime in large cities between 1991 and 1995 were an improved economy, a smaller number of young males (representing an especially high crime risk in the population), increased numbers of drug dealers either dead or in jail, a switch from crack cocaine (a violence-inducing drug) to heroin (a depressant) as the drug of choice in cities, the settlement of many gang "turf wars," and reduced racism.[6] Rarely was credit given to police ability to control the rate of crime. All of this was perceived by members of the Department as devaluing its recent achievements. One newspaper columnist suggested that the reason for the striking results achieved by the Department was that New Yorkers were not reporting crime as frequently as in the past. One of Bratton's predecessors even suggested that the trends were the result of a conscious decision on the part of drug dealers that crime (other than drug dealing) was bad for business.

In response, Bratton pointed to the dramatic results achieved in New York in contrast to other major cities. He argued that most of the theories that discounted the NYPD's recent accomplishments essentially assumed that all police departments were equally effective, a thesis that would be hard to defend. Instead of measuring and rewarding effort, their approach involved identifying the causes of major crime and deploying resources to reduce the likelihood that crime would occur, effectively utilizing information and technology

[6] Most of these trends were not true for New York City.

For example, statistics suggested that there were three major circumstances associated with many murders: drugs, guns, and people with police records. Locations where drugs were dealt were well-known. People carrying licensed guns were known to the police; unlicensed guns were often found during police searches. With improved technology, such as cellular phones, quick checks could be run on the police records of individuals stopped for various offenses. By reallocating resources to places where drugs, guns, and people with prior records were found, dramatic reductions in murder could be achieved, according to this philosophy. This was accomplished by giving more authority to precinct commanders and holding them accountable for their performance numbers.

Precinct-Level Authority and Accountability

Prior to Bratton's administration, an emphasis on neighborhood policing had resulted in more police being placed "on the beat" in neighborhoods and more authority being given to them to deal with anti-crime initiatives at the grass-roots level, calling in specialized experts from headquarters when necessary. Problems associated with this approach were that some neighborhoods were so crime-ridden that the young officers placed in them couldn't cope with the challenge. Novice police (most likely to be assigned foot patrol in the neighborhood police initiative) were less likely to use good judgment in threatening situations and often were lacking the human relations skills needed by neighborhood police. Precinct commanders had too little real control over the neighborhood police working for them, and resources were more difficult to allocate intelligently than under a plan that would place authority and accountability at a higher level. To correct the situation, Bratton's team decided to focus authority and accountability at the level of the precinct commanders.

The rationale for this action was that individuals at this level could bring sufficient deterrents to bear on difficult crime areas, resources could be reallocated from one "hot spot" to another within the precinct, results could be measured with greater consistency and reliability, and the precinct was a large enough unit to support its own specialized forces. Precinct commanders had been denied greater authority and accountability because it was feared that there was a risk of corruption if headquarters oversight could no longer be achieved through specialized services provided to the precincts.

As a result of this action, officers on neighborhood patrols were freed to concentrate their efforts on relating to neighborhood needs while obtaining leads on possible criminal activity.

The CompStat Meetings

If the precinct commander became the focal point for carrying out crime-reduction strategies, the CompStat meetings and associated activities became the engine for the effort. They were a product of Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple's favorite four-step philosophy for action, a philosophy that had become a mantra in the Department: (1) accurate, timely information, (2) rapid, focused deployment, (3) effective tactics, and (4) relentless follow-up and assessment. Prior to the initiation of the meetings, according to one senior staff member, "crime statistics were a way of keeping score at the end of the year, not a means for managing for results."

What became known as the "Louie and Jack Show," twice-weekly CompStat (computerized statistics) meetings, required precinct commanders to be ready to review their up-to-date computer-generated crime statistics and relate what they were going to be doing to achieve crime reduction. They were led by Chief of Department Louis Anemone and Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple and were held in the Department's "War Room," containing a number of large computer-fed screens and other devices for displaying statistics, at Headquarters in Lower Manhattan. A reporter sitting in on one meeting described it as follows:

Maple called the precinct commanders to the front of the room in turn, questioning, prodding, cajoling, and occasionally teasing information out of them. They discussed ongoing investigations, special operations, and any unusual criminal activity. When the men and women from the 81st Precinct got their call, they were asked to explain a recent spate of shootings.

"What's going on?" Maple wanted to know. "Why are these shootings happening? Is it a turf war? No? Well, somebody's not happy. Maybe they're cranky 'cause it's hot, but something's happening." When the shooting locations were put up on the huge map projected on the wall, along with those of drug complaints in the precinct, there was a clear overlap. Maple asked what was being done about the drug spots, and one of the narcotics officers said it was a tough area because the business was done inside and there were lots of lookouts. "That's fine," Maple said. "That's why we're detectives. Tell me what tactics we can employ to penetrate these locations." The detective said they would try some buy-and-bust operations and maybe get a couple of the guys behind the Plexiglas to rat when an arrest was hanging over their heads. Maple wasn't satisfied.

"I want you back here next week with a plan," he said to the precinct captain (normally each precinct comes in once every five weeks).[7]

In order to respond to the kinds of questions posed at CompStat meetings, precinct commanders began bringing with them to the meetings representatives from other bureaus (such as detectives) who were assigned to their precincts. The meetings thus encouraged inter-bureau coordination.

CompStat meetings had become well-known throughout the police world. Given the growing success of the Department, they were visited by police administrators and journalists from other parts of the U.S. and other countries. According to one precinct commander, "If your numbers don't look good, these meetings are not fun." Data displayed at a typical CompStat meeting is presented in **Exhibit 5**.

In addition to organizing CompStat meetings, Chief Anemone and Deputy Commissioner Maple toured the precinct commands, covering as many as 15 in a weekend. During these visits they checked to see, among other things, whether crime strategy maps were up-to-date, proper instructions were being given to patrol officers at roll-call, and communications from headquarters were displayed prominently.

Introduction of New Technology

Efforts to collect, organize, and display crime information by computer, part of a larger effort to modernize the Department's information systems, had required an investment of $500,000. They had become a cornerstone of the Department's strategy, and were thought to have a high return.

New uses of video conferencing technology allowed officers to interact with district attorneys in precincts in order to reduce the average time, much of it overtime, associated with the arrest-to-arraignment process from 14 to a goal of 2 hours. This was critically important in a police force with wages averaging $24 per hour. (At least one district attorney, when advised of the costs incurred by current procedures, had even approved the use of the telephone for an officer's involvement in the arrest process).

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[7] Craig Horowitz, *op.cit*., pp. 21-25.

Other technology-based initiatives, supported by a newly-passed Federal Crime Bill and private sector donations, included the purchase of precinct-based computers and mapping software to develop crime analysis capabilities at the precinct level. Over $14 million of Federal Crime Bill funding also enabled the department to fully implement a larger decentralized arrest processing system project which would be critical to cutting arrest-to-arraignment time through the implementation of videoconferencing, Livescan computerized fingerprinting, photo imaging and enhancing the LAN network.

Continuing Challenges

New York City, according to FBI statistics, accounted for 61% of the total reduction in serious crimes for the entire U.S. during the first six months of 1995. Although Commissioner Bratton and his team could take satisfaction from this, it was clear that the job ahead would be made even more challenging by budgetary limitations, possible changes in the process for arbitrating labor wage disputes, restrictions on the deployment of resources, and the inability to reward good performance, all combined with the need to achieve higher productivity. Corruption within the Department was an issue that had to be given continuing attention. There was a persistent belief by some that the price of crime reduction, in terms of reduced civil rights, was high. And finally, it had become apparent that it would take much longer than two years to effect the attitude changes in the police force that were sought. As consultant Linder commented, "It's clear that the message hasn't filtered down into the ranks." But it would be difficult to sustain the high-intensity effort that had characterized Bratton's first two years in office.

All of this had to be achieved in an organization that had to be operated within constraints imposed by its public-sector nature. **Exhibit 6** represents one view of basic differences between management in the NYPD and private-sector organizations.

Budgetary Limitations

Non-discretionary accounts dominated the Department's annual budget of about $2.3 billion, as shown in **Exhibit 7**. They covered salaries, overtime, shift differentials, uniform allowances, annuity payments and holiday pay for employees, and resulted largely from head counts that were mandated by Safe Streets, Safe City and other legislation as well as wage policies that were determined in large part by linkages between 81 labor contracts that the City had with various labor unions, including the police officers' union.

In discussions with the Mayor, it was clear that City Hall expected savings from payroll and other sources of at least $20 to $30 million in 1996. This was on top of budgetary constraints that had been placed on the Department's OTPS (other than personal services) accounts in 1994 and 1995. In an effort to maintain the size of the police force in service, as promised by the Mayor in his election campaign, the OTPS budget had been cut by 30% (down to $95 million) for fiscal 1996. This had to cover expenditures for such items as supplies, equipment, telephones, fuel, and rent. Some of the results were almost laughable. Jack Maple, for example, pointed out that his unit couldn't afford the supplies needed to display crime information in his office.

Perhaps the most significant cuts in discretionary budgets had come from overtime reduction. This account had been reduced from $113 million in 1993 to $79 million in 1995. While this had helped the Department meet its budget goals, it had hurt morale among frontline officers in the Department who could no longer count on overtime income to help with such things as mortgage payments.

It was quite possible that the Mayor was ready to consider reductions in the size of the police force, although it would be politically difficult for him to allow any of those reductions in the number of police on patrol. His attitude toward head count had begun to change with the possible expiration of the Safe Streets, Safe City initiative, and a significant change in the arbitration process for the City's negotiations with its police and firefighters unions which could increase pay levels significantly. When queried about whether he was ready to abandon the staffing level of 38,310 mandated by legislation, the Mayor had pointed out that, because of attrition, the Department typically operated for most of the year at levels up to 1,800 persons fewer than those mandated.

Labor Contract Dispute Arbitration

Led by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of New York City, the State Legislature had passed and sent to the Governor for signature legislation shifting responsibility for contract dispute arbitration from the City's Office of Collective Bargaining to the State Public Employment Relations Board. It was thought that this action would result in larger salary increases from future arbitration. In its deliberations, the City's agency was required to consider such things as the City's ability to pay awards. In contrast, the State agency was required to take into consideration pay levels of communities surrounding New York City, which were as much as 35% higher than those in the City.

The bill, although vetoed previously by the Governor, had passed with only 8 legislators out of 200 opposing it. Previously, union officials had said they would make passage of the bill a litmus test for lawmakers when they allocated their much-coveted political campaign contributions.

The Mayor publicly had expressed his opposition to the bill and had asked the Governor not to sign it, weathering the criticism of the unions that had supported his political campaign. Privately, he had discussed with Commissioner Bratton whether or not deeper budget cuts would be required if the legislation were to be enacted. On January 25, alongside the report of the progress of the legislation, *The New York Times* reported that:

> Preliminarily, the Mayor has ordered each of his agencies to cut their budgets for the next fiscal year by 7.5 percent, although he has not said that each would have to cut that much. For the Police Department, a cut that size would total $170 million, from a $2.3 billion budget. It remained unclear yesterday what other cuts, if any, (other than 1,000 personnel from the Department yielding estimated savings of $20 to $30 million) would be considered for the Police Department.[8]

Possible Sources of Staffing Reductions

If staffing reductions were required, the Commissioner could achieve them through attrition, which occurred at the rate of about 1,600 police officers and 500 civilians annually, and a postponement of the starting date for the Police Academy class that graduated about 1,800 new recruits each year. The latter would, however, slow down Bratton's efforts to improve the overall quality of Department personnel by imposing tougher entry standards and an improved training program.

This might also require combining positions and moving more officers from "desk jobs" to patrols. In 1995 alone, 500 officers were freed for patrol work who had previously staffed public affairs, personnel, and payroll units prior to the merger of New York City's three police forces.

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[8] Steven Lee Meyers, "Giuliani Weighing Cuts to Police To Help Decrease Budget Deficit," *The New York Times*, January 25, 1996, pp. Al and B3.

Restrictions on Resource Deployment

The Safe Streets, Safe City initiative, which established staffing targets for each precinct of the City, was a reflection of a general feeling on the part of residents that each precinct should have its "fair share" of police protection. These targets, which reflected conditions in the City in 1989, influenced the assignment of Police Academy graduates. As a result, precinct staffing levels were difficult to adjust to reflect changing police needs. (See **Exhibit 8** for demographic and crime statistics as well as staffing levels for four precincts and **Exhibit 9** for a precinct map of the City.) Most people still had not accepted the argument that crime reduction in heavily impacted crime areas would lead to less crime in low-crime neighborhoods, just as many had trouble believing that searches of those committing minor misdemeanors would eventually lead to reductions in serious crimes.

According to Jack Maple, while specialized units, such as Street Crime (plain clothes), Narcotics, and Vice, could be moved from one precinct to another for 30 days at a time, fully 18,000 frontline patrol personnel "couldn't be moved at a whim."

Nevertheless, he cited the 9th Precinct experience as evidence that moving specialized units worked. He pointed out that the Precinct had started out the first four months of 1995 with major crimes 50% over the previous year. By the end of the year, with the redeployment of specialized units to the Precinct, such crimes were down 4%. Drawing on his extensive reading of military history, Maple cited British use of radar in WWII in defending against enemy aircraft as a model for what the Department should strive for. It provided the RAF with a way of deploying its personnel and equipment quickly.

While attempting to maintain adequate headcount in personnel assigned to precincts, Commissioner Bratton was contemplating assigning 750 of the 1,800 March, 1996 graduates of the Police Academy class to replace more-experienced officers reassigned to the Mayor's announced effort to wage an all-out war against drugs in Brooklyn North. The resulting specialized units would be assigned to ten precincts in which drug-dealing was especially high. This, of course, would make it more difficult to replace frontline personnel in the remaining precincts.

The Brooklyn North initiative would involve the temporary reassignment of 1,200 officers from elsewhere in the Department to the shaded area outlined in **Exhibit 9**. Reassignments would be made from all bureaus. The initiative had created an air of anticipation and excitement in the Department. It was also thought to be a test of conventional thinking regarding restrictions on the deployment of resources.

Rewarding Performance

Jack Maple pointed out that police officers hadn't had a raise in spite of their increasing levels of effectiveness. The situation had been made more tense by the fact that the City Council had voted senior City officials, including a small number of Police Department officials, pay raises up to 20% as of July, 1995. These officials hadn't received pay raises for eight years.

Union labor contracts and civil service statutes made it very difficult to reward outstanding performance. The primary form of monetary incentives was provided by overtime, which had been reduced significantly through the application of stricter management accountability as well as the increased use of technology.

Other forms of recognition commonly employed within the Department were the temporary assignment of patrol officers to work with detective squads for 30 days and other preferred assignments. More often, a simple letter of recognition was written.

Increased Productivity

A declining budget would require increased productivity if the Department was to meet its goal for 1996. Staffing data for major U.S. cities is presented in **Exhibit 10.**

Along with the increased use of information and technology, more controversial means could be attempted to improve productivity. For example, officers could be freed up for other tasks by replacing two-person patrols with one officer. But the outcry from officers, who had fought hard for two-person patrols on the grounds of increased safety, would be great.

Addressing Rising Complaints

With increased enforcement activities and personnel, there had been a 32% increase in 1994 in the number of complaints about police brutality, unfair treatment of citizens by police, and police corruption over the past two years. The Department's analysis of its information disclosed that:

> . . . In 1994 . . . 4 million calls for service were answered in person by officers, 227,453 arrests were made, 5.4 million summonses were written—with a total of 9,922 complaints made by the public for police misconduct. Of the 2,152 cases reviewed in 1994 by the Civilian Complaint Review Board, an independent arm of city government, 5.1% (or 111 cases) were determined by CCRB to be worthy of prosecution in the Department's disciplinary process.

In February 1995, the Mayor created an independent citizens monitor, the Commission to Combat Police Corruption. At the time, plans already were underway in the Department to take steps to correct a situation disclosed in an early-1994 survey of Department personnel that found that "a long-standing, high-level concern about avoiding scandal and criticism had created within the NYPD a culture of organizational fear, self-protection, secrecy, and exclusion—which existed alongside continuing, everyday heroic action by individual members of the service."

Rooting Out Corruption

On June 14, 1995 Police Strategy No. 7: Rooting Out Corruption; Building Organizational Integrity in the New York Policy Department, was published. One of the biggest challenges of this initiative was described in the Strategy as follows:

> . . . contemporary corruption in the NYPD occurs in pockets which, despite universal disapproval among honest officers, are protected by the "blue wall of silence." The tradition of not "ratting" on colleagues is common in most professions, but it is even more pronounced in police and military organizations where members sometimes rely on each other for physical survival. Mutual protection under violent circumstances becomes mutual protection under all . . . The "us versus them" attitude often called the "blue cocoon" can seem to condone disrespect of the public and even abuse of force in these same police and military organizations.

To counteract these tendencies, efforts were initiated to energize the Department's own investigative group, the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB). This was to be done by changing the entire dynamic by which the IAB interacted with Department personnel. In the past, the relationship had been one of distrust, involving obsessive secrecy on the part of the IAB and an unwillingness to cooperate on the part of police officers. To change it, efforts were underway by the IAB to: (1) involve every command level in reducing corruption and brutality, (2) make available within the department monthly reports for each command on complaints broken down to the level of the

precinct and even tour of duty, (3) computerize master profiles of individual officers that cross-referenced data on corruption, brutality, and discourtesy complaints with that regarding record of sick leave, emergency excusal, arrest activity, commendations, and disciplinary actions, (4) provide training to those in command positions about the detection of patterns leading to corruption. As part of a more proactive approach to deterrence, the IAB was encouraged to observe officers as they interacted with IAB officers posing as civilians who might provide opportunities to commit crimes. In addition, the IAB would continue to initiate parallel investigations of complaints brought before the Civilian Complaint Review Board and implement Commissioner Bratton's order to stop giving one day's notice for random drug tests, which had enabled those tested to prepare.

To support the new policy of inclusion concerning issues of corruption, Strategy No. 7 set forth a new policy advocating consideration of a commander's entire record of performance rather than the career-ending loss of command that previously often had resulted when corruption was discovered in any of their units.

Sustaining the Effort

There was some question about whether the efforts of the first two years could be sustained, especially by a Department whose personnel had not received pay raises. As Jack Maple put it: "Armies like to fight short wars. We're slowin' down."

Exhibit 1 Report of Crime Trends in Major U.S. Cities

The percentage decrease in crime for New York City for 1995 vs. 1993 was 25.9%. This compared with a percentage decrease for the 27 of the 29 largest cities (excluding New York and Chicago) of 5.4%.

Total Crime Index for 29 Largest Cities, Listed in Order of Population

City	1993	1995	+ - %
New York	600,346	444,758	-25.9%
Los Angeles	312,790	266,204	-14.9%
Chicago	*	*	*
Houston	141,179	131,602	-6.8%
Philadelphia	97,659	108,278	+10.9%
San Diego	85,227	64,235	-24.6%
Phoenix	96,476	118,126	+22.4%
Dallas	110,803	98,624	-11.0%
Detroit	122,329	119,065	-2.7%
San Antonio	97,671	79,931	-18.2%
San Jose	36,743	36,096	-1.8%
Indianapolis	33,530	30,775	-8.2%
Las Vegas	48,367	60,178	+24.4%
San Francisco	67,345	60,474	-10.2%
Baltimore	91,920	94,855	+3.2%
Jacksonville	67,494	61,129	-9.4%
Columbus	58,604	58,715	+1.9%
Milwaukee	50,435	52,679	+4.4%
Memphis	62,150	65,597	+5.5%
Washington, D.C.	66,758	67,402	+1.0%
El Paso	46,738	41,692	-10.8%
Boston	55,555	52,278	-6.0%
Seattle	62,679	55,507	-11.4%
Nashville	55,500	56,090	+1.0%
Austin	51,468	42,586	-17.6%
Denver	39,796	34,769	-12.6%
Cleveland	40,006	38,665	-3.4%
New Orleans	52,773	53,399	+1.2%
Fort Worth	49,801	39,667	-20.3%
TOTAL	**2,101,796**	**1,988,408**	**-5.4%**

*Note: Data for Chicago is not included because of reporting differences.

Exhibit 2 Excerpts from the Communication to Police Describing Police Strategy 5: Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
WILLIAM J. BRATTON, POLICE COMMISSIONER

FYI

July 8, 1994 Vol. 2 No. 11

"Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York"

Police Strategy No. 5

On Wednesday, July 6th, Mayor Giuliani and I made public this Department's ambitious agenda for combating the wide range of criminal behavior we commonly refer to as quality-of-life offenses: street prostitution, aggressive panhandlers, sales of alcohol to minors, graffiti vandalism, public urination, unlicensed peddlers, reckless bicyclists and ear-splitting noise churned out by "boombox" cars, loud motorcycles, clubs and spontaneous street parties.

Legally, these crime and disorder problems are classified as misdemeanors and petty offenses. But in the hearts and minds of many New Yorkers, they carry felony weight. No one knows this better than you - the police officers, supervisors and precinct commanders who often hear local residents and merchants register their frustration at community meetings and on the beat.

Linchpin Strategy

Police Strategy No. 5, "Reclaiming the Public Spaces of New York," will serve as a linchpin, holding fast our overall efforts to significantly reduce crime and fear. Like our previous strategies, this plan builds on past successes and seeks to empower precinct commanders.

Tall Order

Clearly, the mayor and the Department's top leadership understand that we are asking a lot of you. Reversing what amounts to decades of declining standards for acceptable behavior on the city's streets is, after all, a tall order. It will take years of hard work. But we will make sure you have the training, the equipment and the support you need to get the job done.

Independence

First, the 75 precinct commanders will have more latitude and direct control over resources to meaningfully address specific quality of life conditions in their respective precincts. They will be relying less on other city agencies and the Department's specialized units, such as PMD, and more on the police officers and supervisors in their commands. For example, precincts battling chronic street prostitution were formerly dependent on fewer than 200 officers from Public Morals to run decoy operations. Now, commanders will be able to routinely deploy precinct personnel, trained by PMD, as undercovers to arrest individuals who patronize prostitutes (Operation John) or arrest "johns" and seize their cars (Operation Losing Proposition) - both formidable proven deterrents.

Similarly precincts with persistent "boombox" car conditions will be given sound meters and the training to conduct Operation Soundtrap to summons motorists and seize their cars.

Limiting Summonses

We are going to be more careful about who gets summonses

Additionally, we are compiling a computerized list of about 10,000 misdemeanor recidivists. Individuals with a history of five or more misdemeanor arrests within the last five years will not be eligible for DATs. Quite simply, we want summonses and DATs to be worth the paper they are written on. The time you spend issuing them is too valuable to waste.

Learning Civil-ity

The Department will continue to make the most of civil laws to put smoke shops, crack houses, illegal massage parlors and other criminal enterprises out of business. We have doubled the Police Department's Civil Enforcement Initiative to make a total of 34 attorneys available to assist precincts.

PRIDE, COMMITMENT, RESPECT

Exhibit 2 (continued)

Chronic EDPs

On June 1st, we kicked off a 90-day pilot program regarding emotionally disturbed people who pose a danger to themselves or others. Our goals are twofold: provide doctors, judges and prosecutors with information they need to make decisions and reduce the amount of time you spend guarding EDPs in hospital emergency rooms. We're partners in this program with Bellevue and Elmhurst Hospitals, the city Health and Hospitals Corporation, the state and city Offices of Mental Health and John Jay. We will closely evaluate its progress.

Moreover, we are developing a computer database of emotionally disturbed persons repeatedly taken into police custody so behavior that is either criminal or otherwise dangerous can be brought to the immediate attention of judges, prosecutors and psychiatrists.

Under-age Drinking

Precinct commanders who have identified bars, delis and clubs that persistently sell alcohol to minors will set up meetings with proprietors and representatives of the State Liquor Authority. Precinct captains and inspectors will explain the law, issue warnings and advise bar and deli owners that specially trained uniformed supervisors will be making regular inspections. Violators risk having their licenses revoked by the SLA. We will also expand our use of police cadets in sting operations.

Graffiti Vandalism

We will be making more use of night scopes to catch criminal mischief makers in the act. Additionally, Deputy Commissioner for Community Affairs Walter Alicea is organizing a conference to brainstorm ideas and duplicate successful programs (like one in the 104th Precinct) which combine education, vigorous enforcement and community service sentences for vandals.

Legislative Boost

Too often, police officers who earnestly try to address quality of life conditions are frustrated by a criminal justice system that fails to support your efforts. We have put together a legislative agenda to lobby for local laws against aggressive panhandling and reckless bicyclists, as well as state legislation allowing police to fingerprint unlicensed peddlers and motorists who drive with suspended licenses.

Meanwhile, we will assertively enforce existing statutes - harassment, assault, menacing, disorderly conduct and criminal mischief - to arrest aggressive panhandlers and others engaging in criminal behavior.

We know the most effective solutions to quality of life offenses combine sustained enforcement action, community involvement and a well coordinated effort by police, prosecutors, judges and other government agencies.

Finally, as the mayor and I stressed to reporters, this initiative will not take away from our strategies to get guns off the street, curb drug sales and reduce violent crime. It will, in fact, help.

As Chief of Department John F. Timoney puts it:

"If you take care of the little things, the big things will follow."

PRIDE, COMMITMENT, RESPECT

Exhibit 3 NYPD Structure and "Head Counts," By Position, January, 1996; and Staffing Levels, August, 1990 to March, 1996

Management Structure

The top management responsibilities in the NYPD were divided among uniformed managers called chiefs and civilian managers called deputy commissioners. Although there were important exceptions, the uniformed chiefs were primarily responsible for police operations and the civilian deputy commissioners oversaw various support functions such as budget, planning, community affairs and technology development.

The Police Commissioner, a civilian appointed by the mayor, was the chief executive officer of the police department with a wide range of responsibilities outside and inside the organization.

The Chief of Department was a four-star chief, the highest uniformed rank in the NYPD. He ran the day-to-day policing business. Reporting directly to the Chief of Department were five three-star bureau chiefs, also known as superchiefs, responsible for the Patrol Services Bureau, the Transit Bureau, and the Housing Bureau.

The Patrol Services Bureau (PSB) managed the 76 precinct commands which were overseen by eight borough commands. (Staffing: 20,838 uniformed personnel and 2,045 civilian personnel).

The Detective Bureau was the investigative arm of the department. There were detective squads in each of the precincts (usually commanded by a lieutenant) and reporting to detective borough commands. The borough commands also oversaw homicide and major crime squads. A traditional problem in the department had been a lack of coordination between detective and patrol operations because they had separate reporting structures in separate bureaus. (Staffing: 3,385 uniformed personnel and 305 civilian personnel).

The Organized Crime Control Bureau (OCCB) was established in 1971 on the heels of the Knapp Commission scandals to place all corruption-prone enforcement functions under a single, centralized command. Like the detective bureau, OCCB had a separate command structure, including divisions for Narcotics, Vice Enforcement, Auto Crime, and Organized Crime Investigations. (Staffing: 2,141 uniformed police and 108 civilians).

The Transit Bureau policed the city's vast subway system. The Transit patrol force worked out of 12 district commands supervised by four borough commands. The Transit Bureau also maintained a Homeless Outreach Unit, a Canine Unit and a Vandals Squad. (Staffing: 3,270 uniformed police and 181 civilians).

The Housing Bureau maintained nine police service areas (PSAs) to police the 330 public housing developments operated by the New York City Public Housing Authority. (Staffing: 2,155 uniformed police and 178 civilians).

Also reporting to the Chief of Department were the Operations Division, which managed major events and disaster response, and the Support Services Bureau, headed by a civilian director and responsible for the auto fleet, the property clerk, and other support services.

The reporting relationships described above were the formal ones. In practice, the Police Commissioner met with many managers besides his direct reports, and the deputy commissioners, bureau chiefs, and borough chiefs gathered for weekly executive staff meetings with the Police Commissioner, First Deputy Commissioner, and Chief of Department.

Uniform Rank Structure

Police officers had a defined civil service career path. Up to the rank of captain, promotion was controlled by civil service exams for each rank. The entry rank was police officer and the successive ranks were sergeant, lieutenant, and captain. The department's 37,171 uniformed personnel, as of January, 1996 included 25,909 police officers, 4,229 sergeants, 1,365 lieutenants, and 391 captains. The ranks above captain were discretionary, but no one who had not attained the rank of captain could serve in them.

There were 120 deputy inspectors, 65 inspectors, 27 deputy chiefs (one-star), 17 assistant chiefs (two-star), eight bureau chiefs (three-star) and one chief of department (four-star).

The title of detective was not a rank but a discretionary designation. Detectives were paid more than police officers of comparable rank and served in three grades, with Detective Third Grade being the lowest and Detective First Grade being the highest. Detectives retained their underlying civil service title (i.e. police officer). Most detectives served in the Detective Bureau, although there were numerous exceptions serving in other investigative and specialist assignments. There were about 5,000 detectives in the NYPD.

Most of the department's personnel were represented by unions, including all uniformed personnel up to and including the rank of deputy chief. Police officers were represented by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (LBA) and captains and all higher unionized ranks by the Captains Endowment Association (CEA). Among 37,171 uniformed personnel there were only 25 positions that are not unionized.

About 85 percent of the department's 6,800 civilian employees, including most clerical workers and the 911 operators, were represented by various locals of District Council 37, the union which represented the largest share of New York City municipal workers. About 10 percent were represented by the Teamsters Union, with the balance represented by the Communication Workers Union and other unions. Only 83 civilian managers were not unionized.

Staffing Levels, August, 1990 to March, 1996

Personnel Pool	August 22, 1990 (Pre-Safe Streets)	February 28, 1994 (Post-Safe Streets)	March 31, 1995 (Pre-Merger)	March 4, 1996 (Post-Merger)[a]
NYPD	25,465	31,532	29,985	32,134
Transit	4,288	4,216	4,280	3,139
Housing	2,200	2,565	2,804	2,038
Total uniform	31,953	38,311	37,069	37,311
Civilian	7,722	7,746	7,137	7,183
Total department	39,675	46,057	44,206	44,494

[a]Transit merged April 1, 1995; Housing merged May 1, 1995.

Exhibit 4 Organization Chart, New York Police Department, 1995



New York City Police Department
Office of Management Analysis and Planning
Date: September 1995

Exhibit 5 Example of Precinct-Level Data Displayed at CompStat Meetings

PRECINCT COMMANDER PROFILE

JOANNE JAFFE

COMMANDING OFFICER

033 PRECINCT

JOHN FREISEN

Executive Officer

Rank: DEPUTY INSPECTOR C.O. Prev Commands: 001 PCT

Years in Rank: 0yrs 6mos Current Eval: 06/94-AS Date Assigned C.O.: 12/04/95

Appointment Date: 11/07/79 Date of Promotion: 08/04/95

Education: BA,MA Resident Pct:

Other Training: FBI TRAINING CONF

City Council Members:
S.MICHAEL(D.7); G.LINARES(D.10)

State Senator(s):
F.LEICHTER; D.PATTERSON
O.MENDEZ

Transit
District: 03
C.O.: DEP. INSP. JACKSON
Facilities: 174TH ST. YARD

Housing
PSA: 6
C.O.: CAPTAIN DUNNE
Facilities

Precinct Demographics

Total:	0
White:	0.00 %
Black:	0.00 %
Hispanic:	0.00%
Asian:	0.00 %
Amer Ind.:	0.00%
Other:	0.00%

Unfounded Radio Runs

1994	1995	%Change	%CW95	%boro95
2758	11619	221.28	-9.94	-11.74

Domestic Violence (1995)

Radio Runs	DIR's	%Compliance
2198	1904	86.62

Uniform Absence (Avg. Days YTD)

1994	cw94	1995	cw95	LOD94	cwLOD94	LOD95	cwLOD95
0.00	5.76	4.95	6.31	0.00	3.93	1.92	2.96

Precinct Personnel

	pre-safe	1995	1996	%Change
Uniform	0	215	212	-1.40%
Civilian	0	17	15	-11.76%
RIP	No	***	***	***
Dom Viol	***	0	1	******%
Youth Off	***	0	3	******%
SNEU	***	0	7	******%

Precinct Non-Crime

	1995	1996	%Change	%CW
RMP Acc	3	1	-66.67	14.59
Arr O/T	$0	$17179	.....	-57.36
Oper O/T	$0	$10793	.....	-27.93
Total O/T	$0	$44077	.....	-26.69
Park Sum.	7395	6108	17.40	-10.09
Mov Sum.	1937	909	53.07	-31.38
Qual Life	830	632	23.86	-20.79

Integrity Monitoring

	1994	1995	%Change	%C/W	94ratio	95ratio
Bribe Arr	1	8	700.00	-21.7	1: 215.0	1:26.50
Tot CCIB	16	41	156.25	-7.70	1: 13.44	1: 5.17
Force	0	28	.....	***	***	***
Abuse	0	12	.....	***	***	***
Discourtesy	0	18	.....	***	***	***
Off. Lang.	0	1	.....	***	***	***

Legend: All Data through 01/31/96 except: Overtime, paid thru 02/02/96
Uniform Absence thru 12/31/95, Integrity Monitoring through 12/31/95,
Unfounded Radio Runs through 12/31/95,and Domestic Violence through 12/31/95.

Exhibit 5 (continued)

WEEKLY CRIME/COMPLAINT COMPARISON REPORT
REPORT COVERING THE WEEK OF 02/05/96 THROUGH 02/11/96

033 PRECINCT

Date Prepared: 02/13/96

CRIME COMPLAINTS

	1996 WTD	1995 WTD	%CHANGE	1996 MTD	1995 MTD	%CHANGE	1996 YTD	1995 YTD	CURRENT %CHANGE	1994 YTD	2 YEAR %CHANGE	1993 YTD	3 YEAR %CHANGE
MURDER	0	0	******%	0	0	******%	3	2	50.00%	0	******%	0	******%
RAPE	1	0	******%	1	0	******%	8	6	33.33%	5	60.00%	0	******%
ROBBERY	6	11	-45.45%	13	17	-23.53%	73	65	12.31%	66	10.61%	0	******%
FEL. ASSLT	8	12	-33.33%	11	16	-31.25%	40	52	-23.08%	42	-4.76%	0	******%
BURGLARY	4	7	-42.86%	8	12	-33.33%	50	70	-28.57%	77	-35.06%	0	******%
GR.LARCENY	3	5	-40.00%	7	9	-22.22%	26	48	-45.83%	31	-16.13%	0	******%
G.L.A.	8	7	14.29%	11	11	0.00%	45	49	-8.16%	74	-39.19%	0	******%
TOTAL	30	42	-28.57%	51	65	-21.54%	245	292	-16.10%	295	-16.95%	0	******%
SHOOT VIC.	2	2	0.00%	2	2	0.00%	7	7	0.00%	6	16.67%	0	******%
SHOOT INC.	2	1	100.00%	2	1	100.00%	7	5	40.00%	6	16.67%	0	******%
RAPE 1*	0	0	******%	0	0	******%	6	3	100.00%	0	******%	0	******%

ARREST STATISTICS

	1996 WTD	1995 WTD	%CHANGE	1996 MTD	1995 MTD	%CHANGE	1996 YTD	1995 YTD	CURRENT %CHANGE	1994 YTD	2 YEAR %CHANGE	1993 YTD	3 YEAR %CHANGE
MURDER	0	0	******%	0	0	******%	1	2	-50.00%	0	******%	0	******%
RAPE	0	0	******%	0	0	******%	3	2	50.00%	0	******%	0	******%
ROBBERY	0	3	-100.0%	3	3	0.00%	20	13	53.85%	0	******%	0	******%
FEL. ASSLT	9	9	0.00%	11	12	-8.33%	28	39	-28.21%	0	******%	0	******%
BURGLARY	1	2	-50.00%	2	2	0.00%	8	13	-38.46%	0	******%	0	******%
GR.LARCENY	2	0	******%	4	1	300.00%	12	11	9.09%	0	******%	0	******%
G.L.A.	1	3	-66.67%	1	4	-75.00%	8	16	-50.00%	0	******%	0	******%
TOTAL	13	17	-23.53%	21	22	-4.55%	80	96	-16.67%	0	******%	0	******%
GUN ARRESTS	1	2	-50.00%	2	4	-50.00%	6	21	-71.43%	0	******%	0	******%
NARC ARREST	51	72	-29.17%	71	124	-42.74%	265	442	-40.05%	0	******%	0	******%
PSB ARRESTS	79	105	-24.76%	106	180	-41.11%	438	689	-36.43%	0	******%	0	******%
OCCB ARR.	15	11	36.36%	30	24	25.00%	132	81	62.96%	0	******%	0	******%
D.B. ARR.	3	5	-40.00%	4	5	-20.00%	16	21	-23.81%	0	******%	0	******%
H.B. ARR.	0	12	-100.0%	0	14	-100.0%	4	20	-80.00%	0	******%	0	******%
T.B. ARR.	5	2	150.00%	6	3	100.00%	48	64	-25.00%	0	******%	0	******%
ALL ARRESTS	111	140	-20.71%	159	234	-32.05%	668	916	-27.07%	0	******%	0	******%

SUMMONS ACTIVITY

PARKING	1308	1460	-10.41%	1676	2654	-36.85%	5752	8895	-35.33%	***	***	***	PARKING
MOVING	380	345	10.14%	455	699	-34.91%	1236	2555	-51.62%	***	***	***	MOVING
CRIMINAL	211	80	163.75%	252	177	42.37%	536	687	-21.98%	***	***	***	CRIMINAL
ECB	79	0	******%	97	2	4750.0%	204	14	1357.1%	***	***	***	ECB

FIGURES ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO FURTHER ANALYSIS AND REVISION

Exhibit 6 A Comparison of NYPD Operations and **Private Sector Operations**

Budget

As a city agency, the Police Department did not control either its operating or capital budget. Especially in difficult fiscal times, the Mayor's Office of Management and Budget, in negotiation with the department, set the budget goals and timetables. Budget cutting was a special challenge in the NYPD because 96 percent of the $2.3 billion budget went for salaries, including 87 percent for uniformed salaries. In recent years the cuts had come from either civilian attrition or from other than personnel services (OTPS).

Press

The NYPD received more press scrutiny than any private business and all but a few public agencies. Seven reporters worked full time in police headquarters. The tabloids and the local TV stations filled from a quarter to half their space with crime stories. What police did was news, what police didn't do was news, what police did wrong was big news. Business was conducted in a fishbowl, and it was easy to be distracted from the primary missions of the organization by the heavily covered issue of the day.

Civil Service

The civil service rules constrained management from many practices common in private business. In the lower ranks, people who did good work couldn't be rewarded with promotions. People who were good at exams were offered were the most likely to advance to the captain's rank. On the other hand, some high performers in the field might spend their entire careers as police officers or detectives. Because their titles were discretionary, detectives were an exception to this rule. A first grade detective might be paid as much as lieutenant without passing any exams.

Union

The police unions has considerable political power especially at the state level. In response to union prompting, the New York State legislature had passed a number of laws enhancing the privileges of police officers and restricting the power of the police commissioner and other police managers.

The Public

The NYPD was accountable to the public at every level. The Police Commissioner, as a mayoral appointee, and the NYPD, as a department of the city government, were directly accountable to the Mayor. The department personnel also interacted with many other elected officials from the state and city governments. Precinct commanders attended community board meetings and regularly met with a variety of community representatives. And of course, police officers on patrol interacted with millions of civilians each year. There was an independent Civilian Complaint Review Board which made recommendations to the Police Commissioner in cases where civilians had complained of police misconduct.

Exhibit 7 New York Police Department Budgets, Fiscal 1994-1996

Budgets (in thousands)

	FISCAL 1994	FISCAL 1995	FISCAL 1996
Personal Service	1,656,371	1,930,906	2,167,000
Other Than Personal Service	89,026	120,454	95,228
TOTAL	1,745,397	2,051,360	2,262,228

Exhibit 8 Demographic and Crime Statistics for Four Police Precincts, New York City, 1995 vs. 1993

1995 Demographic Data

	Precinct 014	Precinct 046	Precinct 075	Precinct 103
Population	17162	118435	161387	92559
Total Households	7814	37369	49183	27445
- with persons < 18 yrs	6.68%	55.02%	52.10%	46.73%
same house > 5yrs (%)	44.81%	54.77%	62.10%	60.50%
median household income	$31,860	$14,605	$20,682	$30,092
per capita	$23,804	$6,428	$8,013	$10,860
households with public assist (%)	5.52%	36.53%	25.03%	13.96%
persons below poverty	25.52%	44.08%	30.79%	17.10%
families below poverty	10.07%	42.62%	29.00%	13.93%
persons over 3 yrs	17226	110276	152095	88289
pre-primary %	0.59%	1.60%	1.60%	1.27%
elem or HS %	3.99%	26.33	24.55%	20.50%
college %	12.55%	7.49%	6.88%	9.24%
males less than 16	8774	34670	49399	32494
males unemp %	7.07%	12.26%	9.91%	8.08%
females less than 16	7813	45319	64848	37910
female unemp %	5.82%	7.22%	6.49%	6.69%
persons 16 - 19	505	8086	11378	5417

1995

Seven Crimes:					
	Murder	4	43	44	16
	Rape	39	100	144	69
	Robbery	1329	1591	2397	1488
	Assault	470	1085	1280	787
	Burglary	1893	1857	1531	1055
	Gr. Larceny	6315	646	918	985
	Gr. Larc. Auto	253	588	1717	1088
	TOTAL	10303	5910	8031	5488
Year - End Personnel					
Head Count:	Uniform	433	346	403	286
	Civilian	38	27	26	27

1993

Seven Crimes:					
	Murder	11	64	126	28
	Rape	41	82	122	74
	Robbery	2520	2132	3152	1742
	Assault	670	1086	1474	853
	Burglary	2687	2365	1854	1166
	Gr. Larceny	9365	961	965	1214
	Gr. Larc. Auto	356	875	2665	1591
	TOTAL	15650	7515	10355	6668
Year - End Personnel					
Head Count:	Uniform	395	293	348	256
	Civilian	51	27	30	35

Exhibit 9 A Map of New York City Police Precincts



Exhibit 10 Police Staff Ratios for Major U.S. Cities, 1995

City	Population	# Uniform Employees	Employees Per 100,000 Population
Washington, D.C.	570,000	4,106	720
New York	7,336,224	36,606a	499
Chicago	2,802,494	12,971	463
Philadelphia	1,560,576	6,101	391
Houston	1,758,016	4,935	281
Dallas	1,062,677	2,777	261
San Francisco	741,568	1,823	246
Los Angeles	3,50,381	7,869	222
Phoenix	1,076,108	2,088	194
San Antonio	999,900	1,969	170
San Diego	1,168,785	1,972	169
San Jose	815,235	1,209	148