

GameF1 Smart Contract Review

Deliverable: Smart Contract Audit Report

Security Report

November 2021

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Report Summary

Title	GameF1 Smart Contract Audit		
Project Owner	GameF1		
Туре	Public		
Reviewed by	Vatsal Raychura	Revision date	19/11/2021
Approved by	eNebula Solutions Private Limited	Approval date	19/11/2021
		Nº Pages	30

Overview

Background

GameF1's team requested that eNebula Solutions perform an Extensive Smart Contract audit.

Project Dates

The following is the project schedule for this review and report:

- **November 19**: Smart Contract Review Completed (Completed)
- **November 19**: Delivery of Smart Contract Audit Report (Completed)

Review Team

The following eNebula Solutions team member participated in this review:

- Sejal Barad, Security Researcher and Engineer
- Vatsal Raychura, Security Researcher and Engineer

Coverage

Target Specification and Revision

For this audit, we performed research, investigation, and review of the smart contract of GameF1.

The following documentation repositories were considered in-scope for the review:

 GameF1 Project: https://github.com/GAMEF1/GF1/blob/main/f1.sol

Introduction

Given the opportunity to review GameF1 Project's smart contract source code, we in the report outline our systematic approach to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistencies between smart contract code and design document, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts is ready to launch after resolving the mentioned issues, there are no critical or high issues found related to business logic, security or performance.

About GameF1: -

Item	Description
Issuer	GameF1
Platform	Solidity
Audit Method	Whitebox
Latest Audit Report	Number 19, 2021

The Test Method Information: -

Test method	Description
Black box testing	Conduct security tests from an attacker's perspective externally.
Grey box testing	Conduct security testing on code modules through the scripting tool, observing the internal running status, mining weaknesses.
White box testing	Based on the open-source code, non-open-source code, to detect whether there are vulnerabilities in programs such as nodes, SDK, etc.

The vulnerability severity level information:

Level	Description	
Critical	Critical severity vulnerabilities will have a significant effect on the	
	security of the DeFi project, and it is strongly recommended to fix the	
	critical vulnerabilities.	
High	High severity vulnerabilities will affect the normal operation of the DeFi	
	project. It is strongly recommended to fix high-risk vulnerabilities.	
Medium	Medium severity vulnerability will affect the operation of the DeFi	
	project. It is recommended to fix medium-risk vulnerabilities.	
Low	Low severity vulnerabilities may affect the operation of the DeFi project	
	in certain scenarios. It is suggested that the project party should	
	evaluate and consider whether these vulnerabilities need to be fixed.	
Weakness	There are safety risks theoretically, but it is extremely difficult to	
	reproduce in engineering.	

The Full List of Check Items:

Category	Check Item	
	Constructor Mismatch	
	Ownership Takeover	
	Redundant Fallback Function	
	Overflows & Underflows	
	Reentrancy	
	MONEY-Giving Bug	
Pacia Cadina Puga	Blackhole	
Basic Coding Bugs	Unauthorized Self-Destruct	
	Revert DoS	
	Unchecked External Call	
	Gasless Send	
	Send Instead of Transfer	
	Costly Loop	
	(Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries	
	(Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables	
	Transaction Ordering Dependence	
	Deprecated Uses	
Semantic Consistency Checks	Semantic Consistency Checks	
	Business Logics Review	

	Functionality Checks	
	Authentication Management	
	Access Control & Authorization	
Advanced DeFi Scrutiny	Oracle Security	
Advanced Deri Scrutiny	Digital Asset Escrow	
	Kill-Switch Mechanism	
	Operation Trails & Event Generation	
	ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling	
	Frontend-Contract Integration	
	Deployment Consistency	
	Holistic Risk Management	
	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array	
	Using Fixed Compiler Version	
Additional Recommendations	Making Visibility Level Explicit	
	Making Type Inference Explicit	
	Adhering To Function Declaration	
	Strictly	
	Following Other Best Practices	

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used in This Audit:

Category	Summary
Configuration	Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software.
Data Processing Issues	Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functionality that processes data.
Numeric Errors	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.
Security Features	Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management. (Software security is not security software.)
Time and State	Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper management of time and state in an environment that supports simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple systems, processes, or threads.
Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes	Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function.
Resource Management	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.

Behavioral Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behaviors from code that an application uses.
Business Logics	Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can be devastating to an entire application.
Initialization and Cleanup	Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used for initialization and breakdown.
Arguments and Parameters	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use arguments or parameters within function calls.
Expression Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written expressions within code.
Coding Practices	Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an ex pilotable vulnerability will be present in the application. They may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the product has not been carefully developed or maintained.

Findings

Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the GameF1's Smart Contract. During the first phase of our audit, we studied the smart contract sourcecode and ran our in-house static code analyzer through the Specific tool. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by tool. We further manually review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	No. of Issues
Critical	0
High	0
Medium	0
Low	2
Total	2

We have so far identified that there are potential issues with severity of **0 Critical**, **0 High**, **0 Medium**, **and 2 Low**. Overall, these smart contracts are well- designed and engineered, though the implementation can be improved and bug free by common recommendations given under POCs.

Functional Overview

(\$) = payable function	[Pub] public
# = non-constant function	[Ext] external
	[Prv] private
	[Int] internal

- + [Int] IERC20
 - [Ext] totalSupply
 - [Ext] balanceOf
 - [Ext] transfer #
 - [Ext] allowance
 - [Ext] approve #
 - [Ext] transferFrom #
- + [Lib] SafeMath
 - [Int] add
 - [Int] sub
 - [Int] sub
 - [Int] mul
 - [Int] div
 - [Int] div
 - [Int] mod
 - [Int] mod
- + Context
 - [Int] _msgSender
 - [Int] _msgData

+ [Lib] Address - [Int] isContract - [Int] sendValue # - [Int] functionCall # - [Int] functionCall # - [Int] functionCallWithValue # - [Int] functionCallWithValue # - [Prv] _functionCallWithValue # + Ownable (Context) - [Int] <Constructor> # - [Pub] owner - [Pub] renounceOwnership # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] transferOwnership # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] geUnlockTime - [Pub] lock # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] unlock # + [Int] IUniswapV2Factory - [Ext] feeTo - [Ext] feeToSetter - [Ext] getPair - [Ext] allPairs - [Ext] allPairsLength - [Ext] createPair # - [Ext] setFeeTo # - [Ext] setFeeToSetter

+ [Int] IUniswapV2Pair - [Ext] name - [Ext] symbol - [Ext] decimals - [Ext] totalSupply - [Ext] balanceOf - [Ext] allowance - [Ext] approve # - [Ext] transfer # - [Ext] transferFrom # - [Ext] DOMAIN_SEPARATOR - [Ext] PERMIT_TYPEHASH - [Ext] nonces - [Ext] permit # - [Ext] MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY - [Ext] factory - [Ext] token0 - [Ext] token1 - [Ext] getReserves - [Ext] price0CumulativeLast - [Ext] price1CumulativeLast - [Ext] kLast - [Ext] mint # - [Ext] burn # - [Ext] swap # - [Ext] skim # - [Ext] sync # - [Ext] initialize # + [Int] IUniswapV2Router01 - [Ext] factory

- [Ext] WETH
- [Ext] addLiquidity #
- [Ext] addLiquidityETH (\$)
- [Ext] removeLiquidity #
- [Ext] removeLiquidityETH #
- [Ext] removeLiquidityWithPermit #
- [Ext] removeLiquidityETHWithPermit #
- [Ext] swapExactTokensForTokens #
- [Ext] swapTokensForExactTokens #
- [Ext] swapExactETHForTokens (\$)
- [Ext] swapTokensForExactETH #
- [Ext] swapExactTokensForETH #
- [Ext] swapETHForExactTokens (\$)
- [Ext] quote
- [Ext] getAmountOut
- [Ext] getAmountIn
- [Ext] getAmountsOut
- [Ext] getAmountsIn
- + [Int] IUniswapV2Router02 (IUniswapV2Router01)
 - [Ext] removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
 - [Ext] removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
 - [Ext] swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
 - [Ext] swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens (\$)
 - [Ext] swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
- + F1 (Context, IERC20, Ownable)
 - [Pub] <Constructor> #
 - [Pub] name
 - [Pub] symbol
 - [Pub] decimals

- [Pub] totalSupply
- [Pub] balanceOf
- [Pub] transfer #
- [Pub] allowance
- [Pub] approve #
- [Pub] transferFrom #
- [Pub] increaseAllowance #
- [Pub] decreaseAllowance #
- [Pub] isExcludedFromReward
- [Pub] totalFees
- [Pub] deliver #
- [Pub] reflectionFromToken
- [Pub] tokenFromReflection
- [Pub] excludeFromReward #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] includeInReward #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Prv] _transferBothExcluded #
- [Pub] excludeFromFee #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Pub] includeInFee #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setTaxFeePercent #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setLiquidityFeePercent #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setMaxTxPercent #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Pub] setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] < Fallback > (\$)

- [Prv] _reflectFee #
- [Prv] _getValues
- [Prv] _getTValues
- [Prv] _getRValues
- [Prv] _getRate
- [Prv] _getCurrentSupply
- [Prv] _takeLiquidity #
- [Prv] calculateTaxFee
- [Prv] calculateLiquidityFee
- [Prv] removeAllFee #
- [Prv] restoreAllFee #
- [Pub] isExcludedFromFee
- [Prv] _approve #
- [Prv] _transfer #
- [Prv] swapAndLiquify #
 - modifiers: lockTheSwap
- [Prv] swapTokensForEth #
- [Prv] addLiquidity #
- [Prv] _tokenTransfer #
- [Prv] _transferStandard #
- [Prv] _transferToExcluded #
- [Prv] _transferFromExcluded #

Detailed Results

Issues Checking Status

1. Floating Pragma

- SWC ID:103Severity: Low
- Location: https://github.com/GAMEF1/GF1/blob/main/f1.sol
- Relationships: CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
- Description: A floating pragma is set. The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.6.12"" It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

```
pragma solidity ^0.6.12;
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Unlicensed
```

 Remediations: Lock the pragma version and also consider known bugs (https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases) for the compiler version that is chosen.

2. State Variable Default Visibility

- SWC ID:108Severity: Low
- Location: https://github.com/GAMEF1/GF1/blob/main/f1.sol
- Relationships: CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards
- Description: State variable visibility is not set. It is best practice to set the
 visibility of state variables explicitly. The default visibility for
 "inSwapAndLiquify" is internal. Other possible visibility settings are public
 and private.

```
712
713 bool inSwapAndLiquify;
714 bool public swapAndLiquifyEnabled = true;
715
```

• Remediations: Variables can be specified as being public, internal or private. Explicitly define visibility for all state variables.

Automated Tools Results

Slither: -

```
F1.addLlquldity(uint256,uint256) (f1.sol#1101-1114) ignores return value by unismapVZRouter.addLlquidityETH(value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAnoun
t,0,0,owner(),block.timestamp) (f1.sol#1106-1113)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return
F1.sllowance(address,address).owner (f1.sol#783) shadows:
- Dwnoble.owner() (f1.sol#412-414) (function)
F1.approve(address,address,utnt256).owner (f1.sol#987) shadows:
- Dwnoble.owner() (f1.sol#412-414) (function)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing
swapAndLtqutry(contractTokenBalance) (fl.sol#1025)
swapAndLtqutry(contractTokenBalance) (fl.sol#1025)
swapAndLtqutry(contractTokenBalance) (fl.sol#1100-1113)
suntswapV2Router.addLtqutdttyETM(value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAnount,0,0,owner(),block.tlmestamp) (fl.sol#1100-1113)
suntswapV2Router.swapExactTokenSforETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokenS(tokenAnount,0,owner(),block.tlmestamp) (fl.sol#1892-10)
900
```

```
AndLiquify(uint256) (f1.xol#1842-1881)
                External calls:
                    TAMOPTOKENSFORETH(tokensTOSWepToBME) (fi.sol#1062)
swopTokensForEth(tokensToSwepToBME) (fi.sol#1062)
uniswapM2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportIngFeeOnTransFerTokens(tokenAmount.0,path,address(this),block.tlmstamp) (fi.sol#1692-16
981
                    addLlquidity(tokenBalanceToilquify,bobToilquify) (f1.sol#1971)
- uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH(value: ethAmount)(address(this),tukenAmount,0,8,cwner(),block.timestamp) (f1.sol#1286-1113)
                External calls sending eth:
- addLiquidity(tokenSalanceToLiquify,bnbToLiquify) (fl.xol#1871)
 - moditionint (yitokenusiamen foliquity, omb foliquity) (fi.sol#1971)
- unitempo/Nouther additiouddityEtHylvalue: ethámount)(address(this),tokenámount,0,0,mmer(),black.timestamp) (fi.sol#1106-1113)
State variables written after the call(s):
- additautatty/token#siamcetroliquity,bobfoliquity) (fi.sol#1971)
- allowances[owner][spender] = mount (fi.sol#792)
centrancy in Fi.transferFron(address,address,uint250) (fi.sol#792-790):
                External calls:

Liternal calls:

_transfer(sender,reciplent,amount) (f1.sol#793)

_unismapV2Router.additquid(tyElH(value: ethAmount)(address(this),takenAmount,0,8,owner(),Block.timestamp) (f1.sol#106:1113)

_unismapV2Router.amapExactToken3ForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferToken3(tokenAmount,0,bath,address(this),block.timestamp) (f1.sol#1092-10
External calls sending eth;
- transfer(sender,recipient,anount) (f1.sol#793)
- uniswapt/Shouter.addl(quidityfHi[value: ethAmount)(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner(),block.timestamp) (f1.sol#100-1113)
- marketingAddress.transfer(marketingAddress) (f1.sol#1079)
- State variables written after the call(s):
- approve(sender, magSender(), allowances[sender][_magSender()].sub[amount,SRCI0; transfer amount exceeds allowance)) (f1.sol#794)
- _allowances[owwer][spender() = amount (f1.sol#794)
- Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Oocumenistion#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2
 mentrancy in FI. transfer(address,address,uint250) (filsol#995-1838):
External Calls:
                    External calls sending eth:
- swapAndLiquify(contractTokenBalance) (f1.sol#1825)
- uninwapvZRouter.addLiquidity[TH[value: ethAnnount](eddress(this),tokenAnount,0.0,mwner(),block.timestamp) (f1.sol#186-1113)
- uninwapvZRouter.addLiquidity[TH[value: ethAnnount](eddress(this),tokenAnount,0.0,mwner(),block.timestamp) (f1.sol#186-1113)
                narketingAddress.transfer(marketingBNBToDonate) (f1.sol#1879)
Event emitted after the call(s):
                 - Transfer(sender,reciptent,tfransferAnount) (f1.sol#1143)

-tokenfransfer(from,to,amount,takefee) (f1.sol#1837)

-Transfer(sender,reciptent,tTransferAnount) (f1.sol#1153)
                Transfer(sender, recipient, tiransferandomic (fl.sol#133)

Transfer(sender, recipient, tiransferandomic) (fl.sol#163)

tokenTransfer(from, to, amount, takefee) (fl.sol#163)

tokenTransfer(from, to, amount, takefee) (fl.sol#1837)

Transfer(sender, recipient, tiransferandomic) (fl.sol#1637)

tokenTransfer(from, to, amount, takefee) (fl.sol#1637)
 Heentrancy in F1.constructor() (f1.sol#737-755):
External talls:
- uniswapv2Patr = IUniswapv2Factory(_uniswapv2Router.factury()).createPulr(address(this),_uniswapv2Router.HETH()) (f1.sol#743-744)
 - unitswapyzratir z lonitswapyzratircy; oniswapyzrouter, rac

Event emitted after the coll(s):

- Transfer(address(0), msgSmoder(), tTotal) (f1.sol#754)

Peentrancy in F1.swapAndLiquify(wint256) (f1.sol#3042-1081):

External calls:
                    swapTokensFortth(tokensToSwapToBNB) (f1.sul#3662)
uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAnount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (f1.sol#3692-16
 18)
                - addiqutdity(tokenBalanceToLiquify,bobToLiquify) (fi.sol#1071)
- unliwapV2Router.addilquiddiyETH[value: ethAmeunt](address(this),tokenAmount,6,0,cwner(),block.tlmestamp) (fi.sol#1186-1111)
External calls sending eth:
- additquidity(tokenBalanceToLiquify,bobToLiquify) (fi.sol#1871)
- unlswapV2Router.addilquiddiyETH[value: ethAmount](address(this),tokenAmount,6,0,cwner(),block.tlmestamp) (fi.sol#1186-1111)
               Event emitted after the call(s):
- Approval(owner,spender,amount) (f1.sol#992)
- additqutdfty(tokenBalanceToLtqutfy,bobToLtqutfy) (f1.sol#1871)
- SwapAndLtqutfy(tokenBalanceToLtqutfyAsBnB,bnbToLtqutfy,tokenBalanceToLtqutfy) (f1.sol#1873)
                External calls:
                    - addLiquidtty(takeoBalanceToLiquify,bnbToLiquify) (fi.sol#1871)
- uniswapy2Router.addLiquidityETH(value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAnount,8,6,owner(),block.timestamp) (fi.sol#186-1113)
External calls sending with
- addLiquidity(takeoBalanceToLiquify,bnbToLiquify) (fi.sol#1871)
- uniswapy2Router.addLiquidityETH(value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAnount,8,0,owner(),block.timestamp) (fi.sol#186-1113)
- marketingAddress.transfer(noriextingAbbToBonate) (fi.sol#1879)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- ConstronarketingfinerAwtingAbbToBonate) (fi.sol#1806)
bentrancy in Fi.transferFrom(address,uint286) (fi.sol#792-796):
External calls:
- transfer(perior recipient abount) (fi.sol#791-796):
                    _transfer(sender,recipient,amount) (f1.sol#793)
- uniswapV2Router.addLiquidityETH(value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAnount,8,8,owner(),block.timestamp) (f1.sol#106-1113)
- uniswapV2Router.swapCxactTokensFortTHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAnount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (f1.sol#1092-10
985
                    transfer(sender, recipient, amount) (f1.sol#793)
- uniswapt/Pouter.addLiquidityETHEvalue: ethAmount)(address(this),tokenAmount,8,0,owner(),block.timestamp) (f1.sol#1100-1113)
- marketingAddress.transfer(marketingBNBToDonate) (f1.sol#1079)
                Event entitled after the call(s):
- Approval(owner, spender, amount) (f1.tol#992)
 __approve(sender,_mcgSender(),_allowances[sender][_msgSender()].sub(amount.EMC28: transfer amount exceeds allowance)) (f1.sol#794)
leference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-DocumentationFreentrancy-vulnerabilities-1
 Dangerous comparisons:
- require(bool,string)(how > _lockTime,Contract is locked until 7 days) (f1.sol#461)
seference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp
Address.laContract(address) (f1.sol#204-273) uses assembly
= INLINE ASA (f1.sol#271)
Address_functionCallWithValue(address_bytes_uint256_string) (f1.sol#357-370) uses assembly
= INLINE ASA (f1.sol#370-373)
Beference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage
```

```
Address. functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (f1.sol#357-378) is never used and should be removed Address.functionCall(address.bytes) (f1.sol#357-319) is never used and should be removed Address.functionCall(address,bytes,string) (f1.sol#327-329) is never used and should be removed Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256) (f1.sol#342-344) is never used and should be removed Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256, string) (f1.sol#322-325) is never used and should be removed Address.scontract(address) (f1.sol#324-271) is never used and should be removed Address.scontvalue(address,uint256) (f1.sol#321-277) is never used and should be removed Address.scontvalue(address,uint256) (f1.sol#321-277) is never used and should be removed Context.septate() (f1.sol#36-239) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256) (f1.sol#269-211) is never used and should be removed SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256,string) (f1.sol#225-228) is never used and should be removed Reference: https://glthub.com/crytic/allther/wiki/betector-DocumentationWdead-code
 taxFee
F1. previousifuldityFee (f1.sul#700) to set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:

    _liquidityFee
    ReFerence: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#function-initializing-state

Low level call in Address.sendValue(address.uint256) (f1.sol#291-297):
- (success) = recipient.call(value: amount)() (f1.sol#295)

Low level call in Address._functionCallWithValue(address.bytes.uint256,string) (f1.sol#357-378):
- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: wetValue)(data) (f1.sol#361)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentstion#low-level-calls
Function IUniswapV2Pair.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() (fl.sol#503) is not in mixedCase
function IUniswapV2Pair.PERMIT_TYPEHASH() (fl.sol#504) is not in mixedCase
Function IUniswapV2Pair.HMIMUM_LIQUIDITY() (fl.sol#523) is not in mixedCase
Function IUniswapV2Pair.HMIMUM_LIQUIDITY() (fl.sol#523) is not in mixedCase
Function IUniswapV2Pair.PHIMIMUM_LIQUIDITY() (fl.sol#523) is not in mixedCase
Forsmeter Fl.setEwapAndLiquifyEnabled(bool)_enabled (fl.sol#897) is not in mixedCase
Forsmeter Fl.setCaulateCastece(uint250)_amount (fl.sol#895) is not in mixedCase
Forsmeter Fl.selculateCastece(uint250)_amount (fl.sol#8962) is not in mixedCase
Variable Fl.starFee (fl.sol#704) is not in mixedCase
Variable Fl.starFee (fl.sol#707) is not in mixedCase
Variable Fl.maxTxAnount (fl.sol#717) is not in mixedCase
Variable Fl.maxTxAnount (fl.sol#717) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-numing-conventions
 Rodundant wapression "this (f1.601#237)" incontext (f1.601#231-248)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
```

```
- Transfer(Sender_rectpient,TTransferAnount) (f1.sol##72
tokenTransfer(from,to_anount,takeFee) (f1.sol#
#MTrancy in f1.swapAndLiquify(uint256) (f1.sol#3042-1883):
                   External calls:
- marketingAddress.transfer(marketingBNBToDunate) (fl.sol#1879)
                   External calls sending eth:
- addLiquidity(tokenBalanceToLiquify,bnbToLiquify) (f1.sol#1871)
                   unitwapVZRouter.addiiquidiiyETH(value: ethAnouni)(addr
-_marketingAddress.transfer(MarketingAMBToDunate) (f1.sol#1879)
Event emitted after the call(s):
                                                                                                                                                                 ethAmount)(address(this).tokenAmount.8.0.owner().block.timestamp) (f1.sol#106-1113)

    DonateToMarketing(narketing8NBToDonate) (f1.sol#1800)
    rancy in F1.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (f1.sol#792-796):

                   External gally:
                  - transfer(sender,rectplent,annunt) (f1.sol#793)
- uniswapV2Router additquidityETH(value: ethAnount)(address(this),tokenAnount,6,6,cwner(),block.timestamp) (f1.sol#100-1113)
- marketingAddress.transfer(marketingAddress(this),tokenAnount,6,6,cwner(),block.timestamp) (f1.sol#100-1113)
- tare variables written after the call(s):
- approve(sender, magSender(),allowances[sender][msgSender()].sub(anount,ERC20: transfer annunt exceeds allowance)) (f1.sol#794)
- allowances[owner].subner] - anount (f1.sol#991)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- Approval(owner,spender,manunt) (f1.sol#992)
- anonymeticander manunt (f1.sol#992)
 _approve(sender,_migsender(),_altowances[sender][_migsender()].sub(amount_ERCZE: transfer_amount_exceeds altowance)) (f1.sol#794)
eference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-DocumentationFreentrancy-vulnerabilities-4
Variable funismapV2RouterB1 additquidtty(address, address, uint256, uint256, uint256, uint256) amountADestred (f1.sol#548) to contain to UuniswapV2RouterB1 additquidtty(address, address, uint256, uint256, uint256, uint256, address, uint256) amountADestred (f1.sol#548) to contain the UuniswapV2RouterB1 additquidtty(address, address, uint256, uint256, uint256, address, uint256) amountADestred (f1.sol#549) variable F1, pransferBothExcluded(address, address, uint256).f7ransferAmount (f1.sol#865) to contain to F1. transferFrontxcluded(address, address, uint256).f7ransferAmount (f1.sol#912) to contain the F1. petValues(uint256).f7ransferAmount (f1.sol#912) to contain the F1. petValues(uint256).f7ransfer
  ariable F1. transferStandard(eddress,address,uint250).rTransferAmount (f1.sol#1138) is too similar to F1._transferFromExcluded(address,uint25).tTransferAmount (f1.sol#1157)
ariable F1.reflectionFromToken(uint256,bool).rTransferAmount (f1.sol#813) is too similar to F1._transferTotxcluded(address,uddress,uint256).tTransfer
         unt (fi.sol#1147)
  Table F1. transferBothExcluded(uddress,address,uint250).rTransferAmount (f1.sol#865) is too similar to F1._transferToExcluded(uddress,address,uint2).tTransferAmount (f1.sol#147)
inble F1._transferToExcluded(uddress,address,uint250).rTransferAmount (f1.sol#1147) is too similar to F1._transferFromExcluded(address,address,uint).tTransferAmount (f1.sol#1157)
  orlable F1._getValues(wint256).rfransferAmount (f1.sol#912) is too similar to F1._transferTaExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (f1.sol
 236).tTransferAmount (fi.sol#885)
Fartable Fi._transferStandard(address,address,uint25p).rTransferAmount (fi.sol#1138) is too similar to fi._transferTofxcluded(address,address,uint25p).tTransferAmount (fi.sol#1147)
  ariable Fi.reflectionFrumToken(uint256,bool).rTransferAmount (Fi.sol#831) is too similar to Fi._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmunt (Fi.sol#8138)
 Auriable Fi.reflectionFronToken(wint256,bool).rTransferAmount (fi.sol#831) is too similar to Fi.getTValues(wint256).tTransferAmount (fi.sol#919)
Pariable Fi.reflectionFronToken(wint256,bool).rTransferAmount (fi.sol#831) is too similar to Fi.getValues(wint256).tTransferAmount (fi.sol#911)
Pariable Fi._transferStandard(address,address,wint256).rTransferAmount (fi.sol#8138) is too similar to Fi.getTValues(wint256).tTransferAmount (fi.sol#8138)
    tTrunsferArount (fi.sol#1138)
Frimble Fl._transferFromExcluded(address,address,uint250)_rTransferArount (fi.mol#1137) is too similar to Fl._transferToExcluded(address,address,uint
56).tTransferArount (fi.mol#1147)
        lable F1 _getVelues(wint250).ffransferAncont (E1 sol@912) is too similar to F1._transferStandard(address, address, wint250).tfransferAncount (E1 sol@9
        .
table F1. transferTotxcluded(address,address,uint296).ffransferAmount (f1.5ol#1147) is too similar to F1. transferTotxcluded(address,uddress,utnt29
  ).tframsferAnount (fi.sol#1147)
ariable Fi. transferStandard(address,address,uint256).rframsferAnount (fi.sol#1138) is too similar to Fi. transferStandard(address,address,uint256).t
       masfer/Annunt (fl.solWII36)
(able Fi_transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAnount (fl.sol#865) is too similar to Fi_getTVolues(uint256).tTransferAnount (fl.sol#865) is too similar to Fi_getTVolues(uint256) is too similar to fl.sol#865) is too similar to fl.sol#865) is too simila
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Fariable F1_getValues(wint250).rTransferAnount (f1.sol#912) is too similar to f1._getTValues(wint250).tTransferAnount (f1.sol#919)

Fariable F1.reflectionFromToken(wint250,bool).rTransferAnount (f1.sol#831) is too similar to F1._transferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTransferFromExcluded(address,wint250).tTra
     ortable F1. transferStandard(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (f1.sul#1138) is too similar to F1._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint25).tFransferAmount (f1.sul#665)
         lable F1. transferfromExcluded(address,address,wint236).rTransferAmount (f1.sol#1137) is too similar to F1._transferStandard(address,address,wint23
.tTransferAmount (f1.sol#1138)
     ariable F1. getRvalues(uint156,uint256,uint256,uint256).rTransferAmount (f1.sol#927) is too similar to F1. getValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (f1.sol
    ariable F1_transferFromExcluded(address,address,vint256).rTransferAmount (f1_solati57) is too similar to F1_transferBothExcluded(address,address,ui
     t256).tTransferAmount (fi.soleB65)
ariable Fi_getRValues(wint356,wint256,wint256).rTransferAmount (Fi.sol#927) is too similar to Fi_transfer5tandard(address.address,wint356).
     Transferamount (f1.sol#1138)
            Lable F1. getXValues(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256).rTrensferAmount (f1.sol#927) is too similar to F1._trensferFconExcluded(address.address.uint2
.tTransferAmount (f1.sol#3157)
           table F1. get#Values(vint256,vint256,vint256,vint256).rTransferAmount (f1.sol#927) is too sintlar to F1._transferAmothExcluded(address.address.vint2.tTransfarAmount (f1.sol#865)
    erlable F1._transferFrontxcluded(address,address,utnt256).rTransferAmount (F1.sol#1157) is too similar to F1._getTValues(utnt256).tTransferAmount (F1
     orlabie F1_getNvalues(wint256,wint256,wint256,wint256).rTransferAmount (f1.sol#927) is too similar to F1_getNvalues(wint256).tTransferAmount (f1.sol#927) is
  Legis)

Legis | Legis 
          table F1. transferTeExcluded(address,address,uint250).rTransferAmount (f1.sol#1147) is too bimilar to F1.getValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (f1.sol#1147)
   #911)
Fariable F1._getValues(vint256).rTransferAmount (f1.sel#912) is too similar to F1._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (f1.
    1#865
    artable f1. transferToExcluded(address,address,uint250).rTransferAmount (f1.sol#1147) is too similar to f1._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint
50).tTransferAmount (f1.sol#805)
artable F1._transferToExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (f1.sol#1147) is too similar to F1._gotTValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (f1.sol#1147) is too similar to F1.sol#1147).tTransferAmount (f1.sol#1147) is too similar to F1._gotTValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (f1.sol#1147) is too similar to F1.gotTValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (f1.sol#1147) is too similar to F1.gotTValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (f1.
    ariable FI, transferStandard(address,address,uint250).rTransferAmount (fi.sol#1138) is too similar to FI, getValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (fi.sol#
   inference: https://github.com/crvtic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-are-top-similar
 F1.slither(onstructorVariables() (f1.sol#868-1105) uses literals with too many digits:

tTotal = 18000860808 * 18 ** 0 * 18 ** 3 (f1.sol#860)
F1.slitherConstructorVariables() (f1.sol#668-1105) uses literals with too many digits:

__naxYxAnount = 18000800000 * 10 ** 0 * 10 ** 5 (f1.sol#710)
Reference: https://glthub.com/crytic/slither/wiki/betector-Documentation#ioo-meny-digits
  encunceOwnership() should be declared external
  Ownable_renounceOwnership() (f1.sel#431-414)
transferOwnership(address) should be declared external
  ransferownership(address) should be declared external:
Omnable transferOmnership(address) (f1.sol#440-444)
geUnlockTime() should be declared external:
Omnable.geUnlockTime() (f1.sol#440-446)
lock(ulnt250) should be declared external:
Ownable.tock(ulnt256) (f1.sol#451-456)
  unlock() should be declared external:
- Ownable.unlock() (f1.spl#459-464)
 name() should be declared external:
Fi.name() (fi.sol#757.759)
symbol() should be declared external:
Fi.symbol() (fi.sol#761-763)
declmals() should be declared external
isExcludedFronMeward(address) should be declared external:
    F1.tsExcludedFronMeward(address) (f1.sol#868-810)
tncludeInFee(address) should be declared external:
    F1.tncludeInFee(address) (f1.sol#879-881)
setSwapAndLiqufyEnabled(bool) should be declared external:
    F1.setSwapAndLiquffyEnabled(bool) (f1.sol#897-984
  lsExcludedFro#Fee(address) should be declared external:
F1.lsExcludedFromFee(address) (F1.sol#983-985)
Reference: https://glthub.com/crytic/slither/wlki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
```

MythX: -

ine	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
21/	(SWC-113) DoS with Failed Call	Low	Multiple calls are executed in the same transact
23	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	A call to a user-supplied address is executed.
26	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Medium	Read of persistent state following external call
27	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Medium	Write to persistent state following external cal
28	(SWC-187) Reentrancy	Medium	Read of persistent state following external call
28	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Medium	Write to persistent state following external cal
100	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
132	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
155	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
156	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
191	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
227	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "%" discovered
454	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
696	(SWC-161) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
696	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
697	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
697	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "%" discovered
713	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
717	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
717	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
728	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
728	(SWC-161) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
854	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
855	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
856	(SWC-118) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
B56	(SWC-161) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Compiler-rewritable " <uint> - 1" discovered</uint>
856	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
893	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
939	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
940	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
941	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
942	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
958	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
964	(SWC-181) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
1886	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access

Slither: -

```
f1.sol:1:1: Error: Compiler version ^0.6.12 does not satisfy the r semver requirement

f1.sol:454:21: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic

f1.sol:461:17: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic

f1.sol:503:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase

f1.sol:504:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase
```

```
f1.sol:543:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase

f1.sol:680:1: Error: Contract has 21 states declarations but allowed no more than 15

f1.sol:713:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state

f1.sol:903:32: Error: Code contains empty blocks

f1.sol:1097:13: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic

f1.sol:1112:13: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic
```

Basic Coding Bugs

1. Constructor Mismatch

• Description: Whether the contract name and its constructor are not identical to each other.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

2. Ownership Takeover

Description: Whether the set owner function is not protected.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

3. Redundant Fallback Function

o Description: Whether the contract has a redundant fallback function.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

4. Overflows & Underflows

 Description: Whether the contract has general overflow or underflow vulnerabilities

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

5. Reentrancy

 Description: Reentrancy is an issue when code can call back into your contract and change state, such as withdrawing ETHs.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

6. MONEY-Giving Bug

 Description: Whether the contract returns funds to an arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

7. Blackhole

 Description: Whether the contract locks ETH indefinitely: merely in without out.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

8. Unauthorized Self-Destruct

 Description: Whether the contract can be killed by any arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

9. Revert DoS

 Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to DoS attack because of unexpected revert.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

10. Unchecked External Call

o Description: Whether the contract has any external call without checking the return value.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

11. Gasless Send

 $\circ \quad \text{Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to gasless send.}$

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

12. Send Instead of Transfer

 $\circ\quad \text{Description: Whether the contract uses send instead of transfer.}$

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

13. Costly Loop

 Description: Whether the contract has any costly loop which may lead to Out-Of-Gas exception.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

14. (Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries

o Description: Whether the contract use any suspicious libraries.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

15. (Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables

 Description: Whether the contract contains any randomness variable, but its value can be predicated.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

16. Transaction Ordering Dependence

 Description: Whether the final state of the contract depends on the order of the transactions.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

17. Deprecated Uses

• Description: Whether the contract use the deprecated tx.origin to perform the authorization.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

Semantic Consistency Checks

 Description: Whether the semantic of the white paper is different from the implementation of the contract.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

Conclusion

In this audit, we thoroughly analyzed GameF1's Smart Contract. The current code base is well organized but there are promptly some low-level Type issues found in the first phase of Smart Contract Audit.

Meanwhile, we need to emphasize that smart contracts as a whole are still in an early, but exciting stage of development. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

About eNebula Solutions

We believe that people have a fundamental need to security and that the use of secure solutions enables every person to more freely use the Internet and every other connected technology. We aim to provide security consulting service to help others make their solutions more resistant to unauthorized access to data & inadvertent manipulation of the system. We support teams from the design phase through the production to launch and surely after.

The eNebula Solutions team has skills for reviewing code in C, C++, Python, Haskell, Rust, Node.js, Solidity, Go, and JavaScript for common security vulnerabilities & specific attack vectors. The team has reviewed implementations of cryptographic protocols and distributed system architecture, including in cryptocurrency, blockchains, payments, and smart contracts. Additionally, the team can utilize various tools to scan code & networks and build custom tools as necessary.

Although we are a small team, we surely believe that we can have a momentous impact on the world by being translucent and open about the work we do.

For more information about our security consulting, please mail us at – contact@enebula.in