### CS 252A: Computing Lab II

# Project 2

Assignment due: November 12, 2017 via canvas (Please note that grading will be in lab periods on Nov 13 and Nov 15 – so this is a hard deadline. No Extensions under any condition)

## Introduction

In Lecture 5 we discussed a number of mining strategies. In this project you will implement three strategies discussed in class. The <u>optional</u> last exercise is open ended. You may experiment with mining strategies of your own and (if you wish) enter your miner into a classwide tournament. You MAY work with any number of classmates on a tournament submission (but any extra credit earned will be diluted if your group has more than 2 people).

## Getting started

- 1. Download the code from the <u>course website</u> and and import it into your favorite IDE. You can use maven to download the required dependencies.
- 2. Familiarize yourself with the starter code. You should especially look at the Miner interface. All your miners should implement this interface. Look at the JavaDoc that explains what each function does. Additionally, we provide you with an implementation of a CompliantMiner
- 3. Your goal in all parts is to maximize your profit **relative** to the other miners.
- 4. The class MiningSimulation provides a set of tests that your Miners should pass. The revenue goals should be achievable with standard implementations but feel free to try to surpass them. Especially if you plan on entering the class competition.
- 5. To run the tests, you can run the class MiningSimulation as a JUnit test.
- 6. The BitcoinNetwork class maybe useful to understand how the mining process is simulated.

#### Simulation Model

The simulation uses a simplified model of the real Bitcoin network world to simulate the mining and propagation of blocks. A fixed number of blocks will be simulated. You do not need to understand all the details of the simulation but the most important points are

1. The simulation proceeds in discrete iterations where each iteration consists of a mining round and propagation round.

2. Each miner draws a creation time from Exp[hashRate] and the miner with the lowest creationtime mines a block. The probability of mining a block in each iteration for a miner i is, thus:

$$\frac{hashRate_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} hashRate_j}$$

- 3. With small probability a second block gets mined at the same time (by the miner who drew the second smallest number). Both blocks will be propagated at the same time. With even smaller probability a third block is mined and so on.
- 4. If a miner s wants to broadcast a block he draws transmission times for each other miner r from  $Exp[connectivity_s * connectivity_r]$ . If two miners  $s_1$  and  $s_2$  broadcast a block to r at the same time then the probability of  $s_1$ 's block arriving first is:

$$\frac{connectivity_{s_1}}{connectivity_{s_1} + connectivity_{s_2}}$$

- 5. If a miner upon receiving a block wants to broadcast a new block, they draw a set of transmission times for the other agents as in 4. but delayed by the current time. Consequently, there exists a first mover advantage in block propagation.
- 6. The simulation ends at randomized times, using an exponential distribution.

## Submission

Please create a .tar or .zip file of your submission with the name "Project2-<roll>--<roll>--<roll>--<roll>--<roll>--<roll>--<roll>--<roll>--</roll>--</roll>--</roll>--</roll>--</roll>--</roll>--</roll>--</roll>--</roll>--</ro>
(or "Project2-<

We will be testing your miners against the unit tests in the original starter code and some additional unit tests. If you modified any of the starter code, be sure that the miners still work in the original environment.

## Exercises

- 1. Create a "majority miner" called MajorityMiner (by extending the Miner interface) that performs a 51% attack if it is capable. A 51% in this context means extracting as much relative profit as possible. The network may have some natural churn, so your status as a majority miner may be changing.
- 2. Create a "selfish miner" called SelfishMiner that performs a temporary block withholding attack if profitable. This strategy is outlined in <a href="Chapter 5">Chapter 5</a> (Section 5.5) of the NBFMG textbook
- 3. Create a "fee sniping miner" called FeeSnipingMiner that forks to try stealing unusually valuable blocks when profitable. That is, when a block with an unusually large transaction fee is mined by a competitor, your miner should temporarily reject that block and try to re-mine a longer fork where it keeps the large transaction fee for itself.
- 4. (Optional) Design the most powerful miner you can combining the above strategies and others within the rules. Your miner should intelligently handle as many scenarios as possible. We will evaluate it in a variety of settings (to be kept secret) against your fellow students' miners in a tournament. Please name your miner <YourTeamName>Miner . Solutions that hack the API or Java runtime will not be rewarded.