



Security Assessment

# Galaxy Finance

Jun 3rd, 2021



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# Summary

This report has been prepared for Galaxy Finance smart contracts, to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of their Smart Contract as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices. We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes;
- Add enough unit tests to cover the possible use cases given they are currently missing in the repository;
- Provide more comments per each function for readability, especially contracts are verified in public;
- Provide more transparency on privileged activities once the protocol is live.

# Overview

## Project Summary

Project Name	Galaxy Finance
Description	Galaxy Finance is the innovative blockchain financial product with "stranger trust network" as its underlying architecture.
Platform	Ethereum
Language	Solidity
Codebase	<a href="https://github.com/GFC-Eco/gfc-documents/blob/main/code/LpPool.full.sol">https://github.com/GFC-Eco/gfc-documents/blob/main/code/LpPool.full.sol</a>
Commits	<1a121e86132b4adb8d478ed8cff08885afb0d54b> <c90f7b346e1076e07aab0ea67886402b8b49270a>

## Audit Summary

Delivery Date	Jun 03, 2021
Audit Methodology	Static Analysis, Manual Review
Key Components	

## Vulnerability Summary

Total Issues	6
● Critical	0
● Major	0
● Medium	0
● Minor	2
● Informational	4
● Discussion	0

# Audit Scope

ID	file	SHA256 Checksum
LPG	LpPool.full.sol	01f348127650b45fef753bf387fc4cf13be31b3392dd6f4b16dc734edc9ffa19

# Findings



Critical	0 (0.00%)
Major	0 (0.00%)
Medium	0 (0.00%)
Minor	2 (33.33%)
Informational	4 (66.67%)
Discussion	0 (0.00%)

ID	Title	Category	Severity	Status
LPG-01	Lack of Input Validation	Volatile Code	● Informational	✓ Resolved
LPG-02	Risk For Weak Randomness	Logical Issue	● Minor	ⓘ Acknowledged
LPG-03	Redundant code	Logical Issue	● Informational	✓ Resolved
LPG-04	Missing Emit Events	Optimization	● Informational	✓ Resolved
LPG-05	SafeMath Not Used	Mathematical Operations	● Informational	✓ Resolved
LPG-06	Potential Calculation Overflow	Volatile Code	● Minor	✓ Resolved

## LPG-01 | Lack of Input Validation

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Volatile Code	● Informational	LpPool.full.sol: 630~632	🟢 Resolved

### Description

The assigned value to `_lp` in the constructor of `LpPool.full.sol` should be verified as a non-zero value to prevent error.

The assigned value to `_gfv` in the constructor of `LpPool.full.sol` should be verified as a non-zero value to prevent error.

The assigned value to `_nft` in the constructor of `LpPool.full.sol` should be verified as a non-zero value to prevent error.

### Recommendation

Check that the passed-in values are non-zero values.

Example:

```
require(lp != address(0), "lp is a zero value");
require(gfv != address(0), "gfv is a zero value");
require(nft != address(0), "nft is a zero value");
```

### Alleviation

The development team heeded our advice and resolved this issue in commit `c90f7b346e1076e07aab0ea67886402b8b49270a`.

## LPG-02 | Risk For Weak Randomness

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	● Minor	LpPool.full.sol: 799	📄 Acknowledged

### Description

It is now well understood that the difficulty or timestamp is not a source of randomness. They can be manipulated if the attacker is also a miner.

### Recommendation

Consider mixing a seed value based on the chainlink random service(<https://docs.chain.link/docs/get-a-random-number/>).

### Alleviation

No alleviation.



## LPG-03 | Redundant code

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	● Informational	LpPool.full.sol: 674	👍 Resolved

### Description

The code `mul(20).div(100)` can be replaced by `div(5)`

### Recommendation

Consider simplifying the code as below:

```
earnGFV = amount.mul(profitTime).div(5).div(duration);
```

### Alleviation

The development team resolved this issue in commit c90f7b346e1076e07aab0ea67886402b8b49270a.

## LPG-04 | Missing Emit Events

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Optimization	● Informational	LpPool.full.sol: 704, 693	👍 Resolved

### Description

Several key actions are defined without event declarations.

### Recommendation

Consider emitting events for key actions.

### Alleviation

The development team heeded our advice and resolved this issue in commit `c90f7b346e1076e07aab0ea67886402b8b49270a`.

## LPG-05 | SafeMath Not Used

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Mathematical Operations	● Informational	LpPool.full.sol: 800	✓ Resolved

### Description

SafeMath is not used making it possible for overflow/underflow, which will lead to an inaccurate message.

### Recommendation

Consider using SafeMath library

```
randomNum.mod(length)
```

### Alleviation

The development team heeded our advice and resolved this issue in commit `c90f7b346e1076e07aab0ea67886402b8b49270a`.

## LPG-06 | Potential Calculation Overflow

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Volatile Code	● Minor	LpPool.full.sol: 672, 681, 684	✓ Resolved

### Description

The calculation of `profitTime` below may cause overflow:

```
672 profitTime = startTime.add(duration).sub(_gfvProfit[account].updateTime);
```

Because the `updateTime` could be assigned to be a value greater than the end time.

```
684 _gfvProfit[account].updateTime = now;
```

### Recommendation

Consider ensuring the `updateTime` less than or equals to the activity end time.

### Alleviation

The development team heeded our advice and resolved this issue in commit `c90f7b346e1076e07aab0ea67886402b8b49270a`.

# Appendix

## Finding Categories

### Mathematical Operations

Mathematical Operation findings relate to mishandling of math formulas, such as overflows, incorrect operations etc.

### Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how `block.timestamp` works.

### Volatile Code

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that may result in a vulnerability.

## Checksum Calculation Method

The "Checksum" field in the "Audit Scope" section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux `"sha256sum"` command against the target file.

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## About

Founded in 2017 by leading academics in the field of Computer Science from both Yale and Columbia University, CertiK is a leading blockchain security company that serves to verify the security and correctness of smart contracts and blockchain-based protocols. Through the utilization of our world-class technical expertise, alongside our proprietary, innovative tech, we're able to support the success of our clients with best-in-class security, all whilst realizing our overarching vision; provable trust for all throughout all facets of blockchain.

