

APPENDIX. A

As previously discussed, while I dichotomized my trust variable for my main regressions, the original survey question allowed respondents to choose from among five ordinal categories reflecting their feelings about the local government. To check the robustness of my main regression results, I estimated an ordered Probit by using the ordinal version of this trust variable.

The results in Table 8 and 9 predict the difference between voters and non-voters in terms of the probability of falling into each category of the ordinal trust-in-government variable. These specifications control for all the variables included in my main regressions. However, I only report average marginal effects estimates for the voting variable here. As an example of how to interpret these results, the sixth regression specification suggests that, compared to non-voters, voters are about 2.2 percentage points less likely to rate their trust level as “1”, are about 2.9 percentage points less likely to rate their trust level as “2”, are about 1.9 percentage points less likely to rate their trust level as “3”, are about .8 percentage points more likely to rate their trust level as “4”, and are about 6.2 percentage point more likely to rate their trust level as “5”.

The results reported below suggest that there is a negative relationship between voting behavior and mistrust in the local government (“Not trustworthy at all”, “Tend to not trust”, and “Neutral”) and a positive association exists between voting behavior and trust in the local government (“Tend to trust” and “Very Trustworthy”). These differences are statistically significant across all specifications. Thus, these results are consistent with those of my main specifications.

Table 8. Ordered Probit average marginal effects regression estimates (1)

| Regression Specifications | (1) Bivariate | (2) Demographical controls | (3) Economic controls |
|--|--------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| Average marginal effects of voting behavior on different trust levels | | | |
| Not trustworthy at all | -.028*** (.002) | -.028*** (.005) | -.027*** (.004) |
| Tend to not trust | -.038*** (.004) | -.038*** (.002) | -.037*** (.003) |
| Neural | -.024*** (.002) | -.024*** (.002) | -.023*** (.001) |
| Tend to trust | .011*** (.004) | .011*** (.004) | .011*** (.001) |
| Very trustworthy | .080*** (.011) | .078*** (.002) | .077*** (.001) |
| Regional fixed effects | No | No | No |
| Observations | 4657 | 4657 | 4657 |

*Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$. These specifications control for all the variables included in my main regressions.*

Table 9. Ordered Probit average marginal effects regression estimates (2)

| Regression Specifications | (4) Political controls | (5) Regional fixed effects | (6) Other controls |
|--|---------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|
| Average marginal effects of voting behavior on different trust levels | | | |
| Not trustworthy at all | -.026*** (.003) | -.022*** (.001) | -.022*** (.004) |
| Tend to not trust | -.034*** (.004) | -.030*** (.005) | -.029*** (.004) |
| Neural | -.022*** (.000) | -.019*** (.002) | -.019*** (.000) |
| Tend to trust | .010*** (.001) | .008*** (.008) | .008*** (.001) |
| Very trustworthy | .072*** (.000) | .063*** (.004) | .062*** (.001) |
| Regional fixed effects | No | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 4657 | 4657 | 4657 |

*Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$. These specifications control for all the variables included in my main regressions.*

APPENDIX. B

Table 10. Unweighted and unclustered Probit regression results (1)

| Dependent variable | Trust | | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| | (1) Bivariate | (2) Demographical controls | (3) Economic controls | (4) Political controls |
| Key independent variable | | | | |
| Vote | .287*** (.04) | .289*** (.041) | .283*** (.041) | .268*** (.042) |
| Vote*Male | | | | |
| Vote*Party | | | | |
| Demographical controls | | | | |
| Male | | -.106*** (.039) | -.09** (.041) | -.087** (.042) |
| Age | | .004** (.001) | .003** (.002) | .002 (.002) |
| Han | | -.417*** (.065) | -.412*** (.065) | -.414*** (.066) |
| Married | | -.106* (.054) | -.105* (.055) | -.112** (.055) |
| Junior school | | -.137*** (.044) | -.145*** (.044) | -.122*** (.045) |
| Economic controls | | | | |
| Log income | | | -.008 (.008) | -.011 (.008) |
| Status below average | | | -.089** (.04) | -.098** (.04) |
| Political controls | | | | |
| CCP members | | | | .092 (.092) |
| Submissive | | | | .486*** (.05) |
| Competent | | | | -.003 (.049) |
| Complicated | | | | .053 (.045) |
| No influence | | | | -.089** (.042) |

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Table 10 – *Continued from the previous page*

| Dependent variable | Trust | | | |
|---|-------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| | (1) Bivariate | (2) Demographical controls | (3) Economic controls | (4) Political controls |
| Other controls | | | | |
| Religious | | | | |
| Healthy | | | | |
| ⋮ Seldom ^a reader | | | | |
| Internet usage | | | | |
| Often watched TV | | | | |
| Regional FE | No | No | No | No |
| Constant | .251*** (.032) | .655*** (.11) | .756*** (.128) | .481*** (.137) |
| F-statistics and p-values | | | | |
| H₀: vote + vote*male = 0 or | | | | |
| H₀: vote + vote*party= 0 | | | | |
| Sensitivity | 100% | 99.26% | 98.81% | 94.25% |
| Specificity | 0% | 1.68% | 2.14% | 14.96% |
| Observations | 4657 | 4657 | 4657 | 4657 |

*Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.*

Table 11. Unweighted and unclustered Probit regression results (2)

| Dependent variable | Trust | | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | (5) Regional fixed effects | (6) Other controls | (7) Gender interaction | (8) Party interaction |
| Key independent variable | | | | |
| Vote | .214*** (.042) | .215*** (.042) | .184*** (.057) | .215*** (.043) |
| Vote*Male | | | .066 (.082) | |
| Vote*Party | | | | -.010 (.236) |
| Demographical controls | | | | |
| Male | -.074* (.042) | -.083* (.043) | -.125* (.068) | -.083* (.043) |
| Age | .003** (.002) | .003* (.002) | .003* (.002) | .003* (.002) |
| Han | -.348*** (.068) | -.377*** (.07) | -.377*** (.07) | -.377*** (.070) |
| Married | -.103* (.056) | -.102* (.057) | -.102* (.057) | -.102* (.057) |
| Junior school | -.114** (.046) | -.106** (.047) | -.105** (.047) | -.106** (.047) |
| Economic controls | | | | |
| Log income | -.017** (.008) | -.016** (.008) | -.016** (.008) | -.016** (.008) |
| Status below average | -.124*** (.041) | -.12*** (.042) | -.119*** (.042) | -.120*** (.042) |
| Political controls | | | | |
| CCP members | .111 (.093) | .11 (.094) | .107 (.094) | .118 (.215) |
| Submissive | .48*** (.05) | .478*** (.051) | .478*** (.051) | .478*** (.051) |
| Competent | -.004 (.05) | -.004 (.05) | -.005 (.05) | -.004 (.050) |
| Complicated | .047 (.045) | .045 (.045) | .045 (.045) | .045 (.045) |
| No influence | -.074* (.043) | -.074* (.043) | -.075* (.043) | -.074* (.043) |
| Other controls | | | | |
| Religious | | -.103* (.059) | -.104* (.059) | -.103* (.059) |
| Healthy | | .072* (.043) | .072* (.043) | .072* (.043) |

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Table 11 – *Continued from the previous page*

| Dependent variable | Trust | | | |
|---|----------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | (5) Regional fixed effects | (6) Other controls | (7) Gender interaction | (8) Party interaction |
| 3 Seldom reader | | .018 (.057) | .018 (.057) | .019 (.057) |
| Internet usage | | -.075 (.07) | -.073 (.07) | -.075 (.070) |
| Often watched TV | | -.105** (.049) | -.104** (.049) | -.105** (.049) |
| Regional FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | .334** (.145) | .428*** (.164) | .445*** (.166) | .428*** (.164) |
| F-statistics and p-values | | | | |
| H₀: vote + vote*male = 0 or | | | 17.04*** | .78 |
| H₀: vote + vote*party= 0 | | | (.000) | (.377) |
| Sensitivity | 93.48% | 93.19% | 93.09% | 93.19% |
| Specificity | 18.65% | 18.46% | 18.85% | 18.46% |
| Observations | 4657 | 4657 | 4657 | 4657 |

*Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.*

APPENDIX. C

**Table 12. Weighted and clustered Probit regression results without imputed values
(1)**

| Dependent variable | Trust | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| | (1) Bivariate | (2) Demographical controls | (3) Economic controls | (4) Political controls |
| Key independent variable | | | | |
| Vote | .262*** (.054) | .269*** (.063) | .262*** (.068) | .250*** (.070) |
| Vote*Male | | | | |
| Vote*Party | | | | |
| Demographical controls | | | | |
| Male | | -.075* (.041) | -.052 (.039) | -.052 (.034) |
| Age | | .002 (.001) | .001 (.001) | 0 (.001) |
| Han | | -.394*** (.058) | -.390*** (.055) | -.399*** (.045) |
| Married | | -.151*** (.035) | -.141*** (.041) | -.130*** (.045) |
| Junior school | | -.166*** (.010) | -.175*** (.043) | -.149*** (.044) |
| Economic controls | | | | |
| Log income | | | -.012*** (.003) | -.016*** (.003) |
| Status below average | | | -.107** (.052) | -.118** (.051) |
| Political controls | | | | |
| CCP members | | | | .053* (.032) |
| Submissive | | | | .508*** (.020) |
| Competent | | | | .029 (.032) |
| Complicated | | | | .042 (.059) |
| No influence | | | | -.060** (.030) |

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Table 12 – *Continued from the previous page*

| Dependent variable | Trust | | | |
|---|-------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| | (1) Bivariate | (2) Demographical controls | (3) Economic controls | (4) Political controls |
| Other controls | | | | |
| Religious | | | | |
| Healthy | | | | |
| “Seldom” reader | | | | |
| Internet usage | | | | |
| Often watched TV | | | | |
| Regional FE | No | No | No | No |
| Constant | .240*** (.014) | .764*** (.010) | .904*** (.012) | .580*** (.046) |
| F-statistics and p-values | | | | |
| H₀: vote + vote*male = 0 or | | | | |
| H₀: vote + vote*party= 0 | | | | |
| Sensitivity | 100% | 100% | 98.30% | 93.69% |
| Specificity | 0% | 0% | 3.46% | 16.23% |
| Observations | 4143 | 4143 | 4143 | 4143 |

*Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.*

**Table 13. Weighted and clustered Probit regression results without imputed values
(2)**

| Dependent variable | Trust | | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | (5) Regional fixed effects | (6) Other controls | (7) Gender interaction | (8) Party interaction |
| Key independent variable | | | | |
| Vote | .207*** (.077) | .204*** (.073) | .170** (.084) | .207*** (.068) |
| Vote*Male | | | .067*** (.022) | |
| Vote*Party | | | | -.105 (.161) |
| Demographical controls | | | | |
| Male | -.047* (.027) | -.057** (.027) | -.100*** (.014) | -.057** (.027) |
| Age | .001 (.001) | .001 (.002) | .001 (.002) | .001 (.002) |
| Han | -.329*** (.060) | -.374*** (.034) | -.374*** (.033) | -.373*** (.032) |
| Married | -.117*** (.034) | -.121*** (.031) | -.122*** (.032) | -.121*** (.032) |
| Junior school | -.135*** (.037) | -.127*** (.037) | -.126*** (.037) | -.127*** (.037) |
| Economic controls | | | | |
| Log income | -.02*** (.004) | -.02*** (.004) | -.020*** (.004) | -.020*** (.004) |
| Status below average | -.144*** (.055) | -.146*** (.050) | -.145*** (.049) | -.146*** (.051) |
| Political controls | | | | |
| CCP members | .068** (.028) | .064* (.037) | .058* (.035) | .152 (.172) |
| Submissive | .500*** (.019) | .497*** (.019) | .498*** (.018) | .497*** (.019) |
| Competent | .022 (.032) | .019 (.042) | .019 (.041) | .020 (.043) |
| Complicated | .030 (.057) | .030 (.057) | .030 (.056) | .030 (.056) |
| No influence | -.046* (.026) | -.048* (.027) | -.049* (.026) | -.048* (.026) |
| Other controls | | | | |
| Religious | | -.149** (.068) | -.150** (.068) | -.150** (.068) |
| Healthy | | .047 (.065) | .047 (.065) | .046 (.065) |

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Table 13 – *Continued from the previous page*

| Dependent variable | Trust | | | |
|---|----------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | (5) Regional fixed effects | (6) Other controls | (7) Gender interaction | (8) Party interaction |
| “Seldom” reader | | .048 (.052) | .048 (.054) | .048 (.052) |
| Internet usage | | -.119*** (.041) | -.117*** (.042) | -.119*** (.040) |
| Often watched TV | | -.090*** (.017) | -.090*** (.017) | -.089*** (.016) |
| Regional FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | .411** (.176) | .571*** (.079) | .589*** (.085) | .569*** (.075) |
| F-statistics and p-values | | | | |
| H₀: vote + vote*male = 0 or | | | 14.70*** | .20 |
| H₀: vote + vote*party= 0 | | | (.000) | (.654) |
| Sensitivity | 93.25% | 93.43% | 93.29% | 93.40% |
| Specificity | 18.40% | 18.98% | 18.98% | 19.05% |
| Observations | 4143 | 4143 | 4143 | 4143 |

*Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.*