

Industry-Focused Threat Hunting, APT TTP Mapping & Control Alignment

Target Sector: Financial Services (United Kingdom Insurance Focus)

Task 1: Industry Threat Landscape

1.1: Industry Justification

The financial services sector, specifically the United Kingdom insurance industry, represents a high-value target for advanced persistent threat (APT) groups due to the volume of sensitive data, financial assets, and critical services it manages.

Insurance organisations store large amounts of personally identifiable information (PII), financial records, medical data, and risk assessment models, making them attractive targets for espionage, fraud, and long-term intelligence collection. Compromise of such data can enable identity theft, financial crime, and large-scale fraud.

From an operational perspective, insurance providers rely heavily on digital platforms, third-party integrations, and legacy systems to process claims, manage policies, and assess risk. This creates a broad attack surface that sophisticated threat actors can exploit for persistence and lateral movement.

Additionally, the insurance sector plays a critical role in national economic stability and risk management, making it a target of interest for state-sponsored actors seeking strategic intelligence or economic disruption. Regulatory frameworks such as FCA requirements, GDPR, and ISO-aligned controls further increase the impact of security incidents, as breaches can result in significant financial penalties and reputational damage.


Due to its high data value, financial impact, regulatory sensitivity, and systemic importance, the UK insurance sector remains a consistent and attractive target for advanced threat actors.

1.2: Selected APT Groups

Based on open-source threat intelligence and industry-focused research using platforms such as SocRadar, three Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups were identified as having relevance to the financial and insurance sector. These groups have demonstrated capabilities aligned with long-term access, intelligence collection, and exploitation of trusted enterprise environments. The selected APT groups for this assessment are Polonium, Cobalt, and Windigo.

1.3: APT Threat Profiles

A. Polonium



Polonium is an advanced persistent threat group observed conducting long-term espionage-focused operations, with activity reported by multiple security vendors. The group is known for leveraging legitimate cloud services and trusted platforms to maintain persistence and command-and-control, reducing the likelihood of detection by traditional security controls.

Polonium's primary motivation is strategic espionage, focusing on maintaining covert access to victim environments for intelligence collection. Rather than relying heavily on custom malware, the group frequently abuses legitimate services such as Microsoft OneDrive and VPN infrastructure, aligning with living-off-the-land techniques.

This tradecraft presents a significant risk to the financial and insurance sector, where cloud services, third-party integrations, and trusted identities are widely used. Abuse of legitimate platforms can enable Polonium to blend into normal enterprise traffic, making detection and attribution more challenging for SOC teams.

| Threat Group | Tactics | Techniques IDs |
|--------------|-------------------|---|
| Polonium | Collection | T1560, T1005, T1125, T1113, T1530, T1056, T1115 |
| Polonium | Command & Control | T1090, T1071, T1095, T1571, T1572, T1573, T1102, T1105, T1132 |
| Polonium | Credential Access | T1056 |
| Polonium | Defense Evasion | T1036, T1070, T1574, T1078, T1127, T1140, T1218, T1027, T1134 |
| Polonium | Discovery | T1083, T1057, T1033, T1016, T1082 |
| Polonium | Execution | T1053, T1059, T1129, T1569 |
| Polonium | Exfiltration | T1041, T1567 |

| | | |
|----------|----------------------|----------------------------|
| Polonium | Initial Access | T1199, T1078, T1566 |
| Polonium | Persistence | T1547, T1053, T1574, T1078 |
| Polonium | Privilege Escalation | T1574, T1053, T1078, T1134 |
| Polonium | Resource Development | T1588, T1583, T1587 |

References:

[Microsoft Security Blog – Exposing Polonium activity and infrastructure targeting organizations \(2022\)](#)

[Socrader Polonium TTPs](#)

B. Cobalt Group

The screenshot displays the SOCradar interface for the Cobalt threat actor. On the left is a dark sidebar with navigation options like Dark Web Report, IOC Radar, Threat Reports, External Attack Surface, Threat Actor (highlighted), CVE Radar, Campaigns, SOC Tools, BlueBleed, and an Access Now button. The main content area shows the 'Cobalt' profile with a rank of 6, a placeholder image, and a 'Get Free Access to Insights' button. Below this, the 'Also Known As' section lists various aliases. Further down, there are tabs for Details, Mitre ATT&CK, IOC, Yara / Sigma Rules, and References. The 'Target Countries' section lists several nations with a '+26' indicator, and the 'Target Sectors' section lists various industries. At the bottom, there is a section for 'Associated Malware/Software'.

Cobalt Group is a financially motivated advanced threat actor that has primarily targeted financial institutions. According to Rapid7 and other open-source reporting, the group has conducted sophisticated intrusions aimed at stealing funds by compromising ATM infrastructure, card processing environments, payment platforms, and SWIFT systems.

The group has historically focused on banks across Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, demonstrating strong knowledge of financial transaction workflows and enterprise banking systems. Although one of the group's alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, reporting indicates that Cobalt Group remains active and continues to pose a threat to financial-sector organisations.

Cobalt Group's operations are characterised by long-term access, credential compromise, and the abuse of legitimate administrative tools to move laterally and maintain persistence. The group has also been linked to the Carbanak malware and is believed to share tradecraft and operational overlap with the Carbanak threat group. Their ability to leverage compromised organisations as staging points to access additional victims highlights a mature and expansion-focused attack model.

This combination of financial motivation, operational sophistication, and proven impact against European organisations makes Cobalt Group highly relevant to the insurance sector, which shares similar infrastructure, trust relationships, and sensitive financial data with banking institutions.


| Threat Group | Tactics | Technique IDs |
|--------------|----------------------|--|
| Cobalt | Collection | T1119, T1560, T1113, T1115, T1074, T1185, T1557, T1530, T1114, T1005, T1213, T1125, T1039, T1056, T1123, T1123 |
| Cobalt | Command & Control | T1090, T1071, T1572, T1065, T1568, T1008, T1102, T1573, T1094, T1205, T1001, T1104, T1219, T1105, T1043, |
| Cobalt | Credential Access | T1528, T1003, T1558, T1552, T1503, T1539, T1557, T1187, T1110, T1555, T1081, T1556, T1179, T1056 |
| Cobalt | Defense Evasion | T1070, T1143, T1553, T1484, T1078, T1107, T1506, T1218, T1221, T1222, T1205, T1014, T1197, T1134, T1027, |
| Cobalt | Discovery | T1049, T1012, T1135, T1018, T1016, T1614, T1057, T1046, T1124, T1497, T1482, T1083, T1082, T1033, T1120, |
| Cobalt | Execution | T1106, T1203, T1035, T1086, T1559, T1053, T1059, T1129, T1569, T1204, T1170, T1610, T1085, T1155, T1047 |
| Cobalt | Exfiltration | T1020, T1011, T1567, T1029, T1537, T1048, T1041, T1030 |
| Cobalt | Impact | T1485, T1491, T1489, T1565, T1490, T1486, T1496, T1498, T1529, T1561, T1531 |
| Cobalt | Initial Access | T1189, T1078, T1190, T1133, T1195, T1199, T1566 |
| Cobalt | Lateral Movement | T1080, T1506, T1210, T1021, T1570, T1097, T1051, T1563, T1550 |
| Cobalt | Persistence | T1547, T1176, T1554, T1078, T1133, T1098, T1205, T1136, T1197, T1053, T1158, T1037, T1542, T1546, T1112, |
| Cobalt | Privilege Escalation | T1547, T1068, T1484, T1078, T1098, T1134, T1053, T1037, T1546, T1574, T1548, T1179, T1055, T1543 |
| Cobalt | Reconnaissance | T1589, T1592, T1591, T1596, T1597, T1595, T1590, T1594, T1598 |
| Cobalt | Resource Development | T1583, T1608, T1588, T1585, T1586, T1587, T1584 |

References:

Rapid7 InsightIDR – Cobalt Group

socRader Cobalt TTPs

C. Windigo Group



Windigo is a cybercrime-associated threat group observed conducting broad infrastructure compromise, particularly targeting Linux and Unix servers across multiple regions. According to the *Operation Windigo* report, compromised servers were used to host malicious content, act as proxies or relays, and serve as distribution points for credential-stealing malware and spam. The campaign exploited vulnerabilities in web applications and weak server credentials to gain initial access and establish persistent footholds.

The group's primary motivation is financial gain, often achieved indirectly by compromising server infrastructure and leveraging that access for downstream malicious activity, including credential theft. The pervasive use of backdoored servers allowed Windigo operators to obscure their origin, facilitate additional intrusions, and harvest credentials at scale.

This type of compromise poses a threat to sectors such as financial services and insurance, where credential theft and unauthorized access can lead to broader network compromise and data exposure.

| Threat Group | Tactics | Technique IDs |
|--------------|------------|---------------|
| Windigo | Collection | T1005 |

| | | |
|---------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Windigo | Command & Control | T1090 |
| Windigo | Discovery | T1082, T1083, T1518 |
| Windigo | Execution | T1059 |
| Windigo | Initial Access | T1189 |
| Windigo | Persistence | T1543 |
| Windigo | Privilege Escalation | T1543 |

Reference:

[ESET. Operation Windigo. \(2014\)](#)

[socRader Windigo TTPs](#)

Task 2: TTP Analysis Using MITRE ATT&CK

2.1 Methodology

This section documents the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) associated with the selected APT groups using the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise framework. Techniques were identified through open-source intelligence, including MITRE ATT&CK documentation, vendor threat reports, and SOC-focused intelligence platforms. Emphasis was placed on post-compromise behavior, particularly credential access, lateral movement, command and control (C2), and persistence techniques relevant to enterprise and insurance environments.

2.2 MITRE ATT&CK Technique Mapping Overview

The following subsections map observed techniques used by Polonium, Cobalt, and Windigo across the ATT&CK lifecycle, highlighting behaviors that enable sustained access and operational impact within financial and insurance sector environments.

2.3 APT-Specific TTP Mapping

TTP ANALYSIS FOR POLONIUM

| APT | Tactics | Technique ID | Technique Name |
|----------|----------------------|--------------|---|
| Polonium | Lateral Movement | T1199 | Trusted Relationship |
| Polonium | Initial Access | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
| Polonium | Command and Control | T1090 | Proxy |
| Polonium | Exfiltration | T1567.002 | Exfiltration over web service: Cloud Storage. |
| Polonium | Resource Development | T1588.002 | Obtain Capabilities: Tools |

Polonium demonstrates a strong preference for abusing legitimate cloud services and trusted relationships to blend malicious activity into normal enterprise traffic. By leveraging valid credentials, cloud-based command and control, and commercial VPN infrastructure, the group significantly reduces detection opportunities based on traditional signature-based controls.

TTP ANALYSIS FOR COBALT GROUP

| APT | Tactics | Technique ID | Technique Name |
|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|---|
| Cobalt Group | Lateral Movement | T1021.001 | Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol. |
| Cobalt Group | Initial Access | T1566.001 | Phishing: Separating Attachment |
| Cobalt Group | Command and Control | T1071.001 | Application layer Protocol: Web Protocols |
| Cobalt Group | Credential Access | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping |
| Cobalt Group | Command and Control | T1090 | Proxy |

The mapped techniques show Cobalt Group's reliance on credential compromise and valid account abuse to maintain access within enterprise environments. Remote services are used to enable lateral movement toward high-value systems, while web-based command-and-control allows attacker traffic to blend with legitimate network activity.

TTP ANALYSIS FOR WINDIGO GROUP

| APT | Tactics | Technique ID | Technique Name |
|------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Windigo | Lateral Movement | T1021 | Remote Services |
| Windigo | Initial Access | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
| Windigo | Persistence | T1547 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution |
| Windigo | Credential Access | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping |
| Windigo | Command and Control | T1102 | Web Service |

Windigo's TTPs indicate a credential-driven intrusion model focused on persistence and internal movement. The use of remote services for lateral movement and web-based command-and-control channels supports stealthy, long-term operations within compromised environments.

3.1 ATT&CK Navigator Layer Creation

ATT&CK v10 has been released Check out the blog post or change for more information.

MITRE ATT&CK

POLONIUM

COBALT

Windigo

layer by operation

+

Selection Controls

Layer Controls

Technique Controls

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| Reconnaissance | Resource Development | Initial Access | Execution | Persistence | Privilege Escalation | Defense Evasion | Credential Access | Discovery | Lateral Movement | Collection | Command and Control | Exfiltration | Impact |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|---|--|---|---|---|---|--------------|---------------|
| 11 techniques | 8 techniques | 11 techniques | 17 techniques | 23 techniques | 14 techniques | 47 techniques | 17 techniques | 34 techniques | 9 techniques | 17 techniques | 18 techniques | 9 techniques | 15 techniques |
| <div>🔍</div> <div>Search Threat Vendor Data</div> <div>Search Victim-Owned Websites</div> | <div>🔍</div> <div>Trusted Relationship</div> <div>Valid Accounts</div> <div>Wi-Fi Networks</div> | <div>🔍</div> <div>Native API</div> <div>Poisoned Pipeline Execution</div> <div>Scheduled Task/job</div> <div>Serverless Execution</div> <div>Shared Modules</div> <div>Software Deployment Tools</div> <div>System Services</div> <div>Modify Registry</div> <div>User Execution</div> <div>Windows Management Instrumentation</div> | <div>🔍</div> <div>Event Triggered Execution</div> <div>Exclude Control</div> <div>External Remote Services</div> <div>Hide Artifacts</div> <div>Implant Internal Image</div> <div>Process Injection</div> <div>Scheduled Task/job</div> <div>Office Application Startup</div> <div>Power Settings</div> <div>Scheduled Task/job</div> <div>Server Software Component</div> <div>Software Extensions</div> <div>Traffic Signaling</div> <div>Valid Accounts</div> | <div>🔍</div> <div>Escape to Host</div> <div>Event Triggered Execution</div> <div>Exploitation for Privilege Escalation</div> <div>Hijack Execution Flow</div> <div>Process Injection</div> <div>Scheduled Task/job</div> <div>Valid Accounts</div> | <div>🔍</div> <div>Exploitation for Defense Evasion</div> <div>File and Directory Permissions Modification</div> <div>Hide Artifacts</div> <div>Hijack Execution Flow</div> <div>Impair Defenses</div> <div>Impersonation</div> <div>Indicator Removal</div> <div>Indirect Command Execution</div> <div>Masquerading</div> <div>Modify Authentication Process</div> <div>Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure</div> <div>Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy</div> <div>Modify Registry</div> <div>Modify System Image</div> <div>Network Boundary Bridging</div> <div>Obscured Files or Information</div> <div>Plist File Modification</div> <div>Pre-OS Boot</div> <div>Process Injection</div> <div>Reflection Code Injection</div> | <div>🔍</div> <div>Interception</div> <div>Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation</div> <div>Network Sniffing</div> <div>OS Credential Dumping</div> <div>Steal Application Access Token</div> <div>Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates</div> <div>Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets</div> <div>Steal Web Session Cookie</div> <div>Unsecured Credentials</div> | <div>🔍</div> <div>File and Directory Discovery</div> <div>Group Policy Discovery</div> <div>Local Storage Discovery</div> <div>Log Enumeration</div> <div>Network Service Discovery</div> <div>Network Share Discovery</div> <div>Network Sniffing</div> <div>Password Policy Discovery</div> <div>Peripheral Device Discovery</div> <div>Permission Groups Discovery</div> <div>Process Discovery</div> <div>Query Registry</div> <div>Remote System Discovery</div> <div>Software Discovery</div> <div>System Information Discovery</div> <div>System Location Discovery</div> <div>System Network Configuration Discovery</div> <div>System Network Connections Discovery</div> <div>System Owner/User Discovery</div> <div>System Service Discovery</div> <div>System Time Discovery</div> | <div>🔍</div> <div>Authentication Material</div> <div>Data from Local System</div> <div>Data from Network Shared Drive</div> <div>Data from Removable Media</div> <div>Data Staged</div> <div>Email Collection</div> <div>Input Capture</div> <div>Screen Capture</div> <div>Video Capture</div> | <div>🔍</div> <div>Multi-Stage Channels</div> <div>Non-Application Layer Protocol</div> <div>Non-Standard Port</div> <div>Protocol Tunneling</div> <div>Proxy</div> <div>Remote Access Tools</div> <div>Traffic Signaling</div> <div>Web Service</div> | <div>🔍</div> <div>Network Denial of Service</div> <div>Scheduled Transfer</div> <div>Transfer Data to Cloud Account</div> <div>System Shutdown/Reboot</div> | <div>🔍</div> <div>Network Denial of Service</div> <div>Resource Hijacking</div> <div>Service Stop</div> <div>System Shutdown/Reboot</div> | | |

ATT&CK v1.8 has been released! Check out the blog post or changelog for more information.
MIRE ATT&CK

POLONIUM
COBALT
Windigo
layer by operation

Selection Controls
Layer Controls
Technique Controls

Reconnaissance
11 techniques

Resource development
8 techniques

Initial Access
11 techniques

Execution
17 techniques

Persistence
23 techniques

Privilege Escalation
14 techniques

Defense Evasion
47 techniques

Credential Access
17 techniques

Discovery
34 techniques

Lateral Movement
9 techniques

Collection
17 techniques

Command and Control
18 techniques

Exfiltration
9 techniques

Impact
15 techniques

Hoping for Information
Establish Accounts
Search Closed Sources
Search Open Technical Databases
Search Open Websites/Domains
Search Threat Vendor Data
Search Victim-Owned Websites

Establish Accounts
Obtain Capabilities
Stage Capabilities

Phishing
Replication Through Removable Media
Supply Chain Compromise
Trusted Relationship
Valid Accounts
Wi-Fi Networks

Administration Command
Input Injection
Inter-Process Communication
Native API
Poisoned Pipeline Execution
Scheduled Task/Job
Serverless Execution
Shared Modules
Software Deployment Tools
System Services
User Execution
Windows Management Instrumentation

Compromise Host Software Binary
Create Account
Create or Modify System Component
Event Triggered Execution
Exclusive Control
External Remote Services
Hijack Execution Flow
Implant Internal Image
Modify Authentication Process
Process Injection
Scheduled Task/Job
System Registry
Office Application Startup
Power Settings
Pre-OS Boot
Scheduling Task/Job
Server Software Component
Software Extensions
Traffic Signaling

Boot or Log On Initialization Scripts
Create or Modify System Process
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
Escape to Host
Event Triggered Execution
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Hijack Execution Flow
Process Injection
Indicator Removal
Indirect Command Execution
Valid Accounts

Hides or Information
Deploy Container
Direct Volume Access
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
Email Spoofing
Execution Guardrails
Exploitation for Defense Evasion
File and Directory Permissions Modification
Hide Artifacts
Hijack Execution Flow
Impair Defenses
Impersonation
Indicator Removal
Indirect Command Execution
Masquerading
Modify Authentication Process
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy
Modify Registry
Modify System Image
Network Boundary

Forge Web Credentials
Input Capture
Modify Authentication Process
Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
Network Sniffing
OS Credential Dumping
Steal Application Access Token
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Steal Web Session Cookie
Unsecured Credentials

Cloud Storage Object Discovery
Container and Resource Discovery
Debugger Execution
Device Driver Discovery
Domain Trust Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
Log Enumeration
Network Service Discovery
Network Sniffing
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Registry
Remote System Discovery
Software Discovery
System Information Discovery
System Location Discovery
System Network

Replication Through Removable Media
Software Deployment Tools
Taint Shared Content
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Group Policy Discovery
Local Storage Discovery
Log Enumeration
Network Service Discovery
Network Sniffing
Password Policy Discovery
Peripheral Device Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Registry
Remote System Discovery
Software Discovery
System Information Discovery
System Location Discovery
System Network


Clipboard Data
Data from Cloud Storage
Data from Configuration Repository
Data from Information Repositories
Data from Local System
Data from Network Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Screen Capture
Video Capture

Resonance
Encrypted Channel
Fallback Channels
Hide Infrastructure
Ingress Tool
Multi-Stage Channels
Non-Application Layer Protocol
Non-Standard Port
Protocol Tunneling
Proxy
Remote Access Tools
Traffic Signaling
Web Service

Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Exfiltration Over Web Service
Scheduled Transfer
Transfer Data to Account
System Shutdown/Reboot

Email Bouncing
Endpoint Denial of Service
Financial Theft
Firmware Corruption
Inhibit System Recovery
Network Denial of Service
Resource Hijacking
Service Stop
System Shutdown/Reboot

legend




Separate MITRE ATT&CK Navigator layers were created for each identified APT group (Polonium, Cobalt, and Windigo).

Techniques were selected based on open-source intelligence and mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise matrix to visualise each group's observed behaviour across the attack lifecycle, from initial access through command and control.

Note: Due to display limitations, the screenshot shows a partial view of the ATT&CK Navigator layer. The complete technique set is provided as an exported ATT&CK Navigator layer file in the project repository for full visibility and review.

3.2. Overlap (Combined) Layer Analysis



A combined ATT&CK Navigator layer was generated to identify techniques shared by two or more APT groups. This overlap analysis highlights attacker behaviours that are consistently relied upon across different threat actors targeting the financial and insurance sector.

3.3 High-Frequency and Choke Point Techniques

The overlap analysis of the combined ATT&CK Navigator layer revealed several techniques consistently used across all APT groups. These high-frequency techniques represent operational “choke points” that attackers repeatedly rely on to maintain access and operate within compromised environments.

Credential Access techniques, particularly the abuse of Valid Accounts (T1078), appeared across all APT groups. This indicates a shared reliance on stolen or compromised credentials to bypass perimeter controls and blend in with legitimate user activity.

In terms of Lateral Movement, the use of Remote Services (T1021) was commonly observed. This technique enables attackers to move between systems using standard administrative protocols, allowing them to reach high-value assets while minimising detection.

For Command and Control, several groups demonstrated the use of Web Services (T1102) and proxy-based communication methods. By leveraging legitimate cloud services and encrypted channels, attackers can disguise malicious traffic as normal business activity, complicating network-based detection.

The recurrence of these techniques across distinct APT groups suggests that defensive controls focused on credential hygiene, privileged access monitoring, and cloud service visibility can significantly reduce risk. **Prioritising detection around these shared techniques provides greater defensive coverage than actor-specific signatures.**

4.1. Overview

This section translates the identified overlapping ATT&CK techniques into actionable security controls aligned with recognised industry frameworks. By mapping high-frequency APT TTPs to

the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) and ISO/IEC 27001 control domains, this analysis demonstrates how threat intelligence can directly inform detection, prevention, and governance decisions within a Security Operations Center (SOC) supporting the insurance sector.

4.2 NIST CSF Mapping Table

Mapping Overlapping APT TTPs to NIST CSF Functions

| Overlapping ATTACK Technique | Threat Description | NIST CSF FUNCTION | Control Focus |
|---|--|--|---|
| T1078 - Valid Accounts | Abuse of legitimate credentials for access and persistence | PR.AC (Protect - Access Control) | Strong IAM, MFA, credential lifestyle management |
| T1199 - Trusted Relationship | Exploitation of third party or partner access | ID.SC (Identify - Supply Chain Risk) | Third party risk management and access segmentation |
| T1133 - External Remote Services | Remote access abuse (VPN, RDP, Cloud Services) | PR.AC | Secure remote access, Conditional access policies |
| T1102 - Web Services (C2) | Command and Control via legitimate cloud platforms | DE.CM (Detect - Continuous Monitoring) | Cloud traffic monitoring and anomaly detection |
| T1567.002 - Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | Data exfiltration Using Cloud services | DE.DP (dTECT - Data Protection) | DLP, outbound traffic inspection |

Mapping these techniques to the NIST CSF highlights how common APT behaviors can be mitigated through strong access control, continuous monitoring, and supply-chain risk management. These controls directly address attacker reliance on legitimate credentials and trusted infrastructure rather than malware-heavy tradecraft.

4.3 ISO/IEC 27001 Mapping Table

Mapping Overlapping APT TTPs to ISO/IEC 27001 Control

| ATTACK Technique | ISO/IEC 27001 Control | Control Objective |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| T1078 - Valid Accounts | Access Control | Prevent Unauthorised use of legitimate accounts |
| T1199 - Trusted Relationship | Supplier Relationship | Reduce third party access risk |
| T1133 - External Remote Services | Network Security | Secure Remote and external connections |

| | | |
|---|------------------------|--|
| T1102 - Web Services (C2) | Logging & Monitoring | Detect abnormal use of legitimate services |
| T1567.002 - Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | Information Protection | Prevent unauthorised data movement. |

Aligning these TTPs to ISO/IEC 27001 control demonstrates how governance-driven security controls can reduce exposure to attacker techniques that exploit trust, credentials, and legitimate infrastructure.

Conclusion

This assessment demonstrated how industry-focused threat intelligence can be operationalised to support security decision-making within the UK insurance sector. By analysing APT groups with known relevance to financial services, mapping their behaviours to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, and identifying overlapping techniques, this project highlighted common attacker dependencies on legitimate credentials, trusted relationships, and cloud-based infrastructure.

The use of ATT&CK Navigator enabled visualisation of shared TTPs across Polonium, Cobalt Group and Windigo threat actors, revealing consistent choke points that attackers rely on for persistence, lateral movement, command and control, and data exfiltration. These findings reinforce the importance of behaviour-driven detection and continuous monitoring over signature-based approaches.

By aligning the identified techniques to NIST CSF and ISO/IEC 27001 control, the analysis demonstrated how threat intelligence can directly inform governance, detection, and risk mitigation strategies within a SOC environment. This approach supports the development of more resilient security controls, improved visibility, and informed policy decisions tailored to the insurance industry's threat landscape.

Future work could expand this analysis to include additional threat actors, deeper detection engineering use cases, and validation of controls through simulated attack scenarios.