

Feasibility and Performance of PQC Algorithms on Microcontrollers *

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Abstract

The eXtended eXternal Benchmarking eXtension (XXBX), which was originally developed to support the Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR), is a tool that can measure the performance of cryptographic algorithms on a variety of microcontrollers. We expanded XXBX from supporting hashing algorithms and authenticated ciphers to include benchmarking of key encapsulation methods and signature schemes in order to support the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization process. This paper describes the changes to XXBX which were necessary to support PQC and presents the first results we obtained for a variety of PQC candidates. This is a work in progress and more PQC algorithms will be benchmarked as microcontroller friendly implementations are becoming available.

1 Introduction

With quantum computers developing at an increasing rate, it is important to take into consideration the security implications that may come along with the technological progress. Quantum algorithms will make possible breaking many of the encryptions and algorithms used for key sharing in a reasonable amount of time [1]. An effort to preemptively design and implement quantum resistant security is vital to maintain proper security standards.

There are many algorithms and key sharing protocols proven to be quantum resistant that have already been developed. However, libraries that implement such algorithms focus on x86 architecture and benchmarking. Embedded devices and the Internet of Things (IoT) lack extensive development. In 2018, IoT devices connected to the Internet numbered close to 23.14 billion. By 2025, that number is predicted to be closer to 75.44 billion [1]. Such a large subset of Internet connected devices cannot be left behind during the rise of quantum computing.

Two such libraries implementing quantum resistant cryptography are known as libpqcrypto [2] and the Open Quantum Safe Project (liboqs) [3]. These libraries, however, target x86 and x86_64 based architectures specifically. There are few efforts keeping IoT devices up-to-date [4].

Embedded devices each come with their own strict memory and power constraints making the implementation of such instruction-heavy algorithms a very complicated effort. One such cryptographic library exists for ARM Cortex-M4 architectures known as pqm4 [5]. However, even this library overlooks some of the memory constraints of many devices. There exist tools to help the development, testing, and benchmarking on these specific environments for example, eXtended eXternal Benchmarking eXtension (XXBX) [6, 7] which extends XBX [8] and SUPERCOP [9]. Since quantum computing is developing at an increased rate, it is vital for tools, such as XXBX, to keep up-to-date with the new emerging cryptographic standards.

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


Figure 1: XXBX Setup

2 Background (XXBX Design)

XXBX can be broken into four parts: eXternal Benchmarking Software (XBS), eXternal Benchmarking Harness (XBH), eXternal Benchmarking Power (XBP), and eXternal Benchmarking Device (XBD). The XBS is the software used to interact with the XBH. The XBH acts as the control center and interface between the XBH and XBD. The XBP regulates the power and current going to the XBD. The XBD is the target device being benchmarked [10].




Figure 2: Block Diagram of XXBX Components

2.1 Flow

The XBS will compile the benchmarking test cases and upload them via TCP to the XBH. The XBH will forward the test cases to the XBD via I2C and send a “start execution” signal. The XBD will execute the uploaded benchmarking test cases and return the results. Along with the results, the XBD will send back the clock cycles taken to execute the benchmark as well as the total stack usage.

During the execution, the XBH measures the power usage at regular intervals by taking samples from the XBP. After the execution is complete, the XBH will gather the power usage and results sent back from the XBD, package them, and send them back to the XBS for analysis [10].

The XBS will take these results and check for success. If successful, the results are uploaded to a database for further analysis. Figure 3 depicts the flow of execution.




Figure 3: XXBX Execution Flow

2.2 XBD Bootloader

The XBD needs to be loaded with a small bootloader that is able to receive commands and respond to the XBH. The main commands used for execution are the following:

1. *Program Flash Request* Loads the benchmarking test case application to the ROM.
2. *Timing Calibration Request* Calibrates the timing differences between the XBH and the XBD to allow for proper timing measurements.
3. *Start Application Request* Switches the execution from the bootloader to the benchmarking test case application.

2.3 XBD Application

The application can be considered an extension of the XBD bootloader code. These test cases are compiled with a specific cryptographic operation and algorithm. This creates portable code that sits within the ROM that the XBD switches to upon receiving the start application request.

A wrapper that the XBD bootloader understands connects the application and bootloader. To provide general support for all cryptographic operations, there only exists two buffers for execution of tests: parameter buffer and result buffer. The sizes of these buffers are decided at compilation and are unique to the cryptographic algorithm. It is up to the wrapper to compute the correct addresses of the parameters and results.

2.4 XBS

The XBS comprises of a collection of Python scripts. These scripts complete three main functions: compilation, execution, and data recording.

A configuration file sets the cryptographic operation, the algorithm, the specific implementation to test, and the parameters needed to run the test. During compilation, the XBS will grab the specified implementation and the XBD wrapper code needed to execute the operation. Header files following the libcrypto format are generated and the code is compiled along with any dependencies that may be needed. Upon a successful compilation, the database is initialized with the components needed to properly execute the tests. These components include the follow.

- Operation
- Algorithm
- Implementation
- Parameters
- N columns of operation-specific details

During execution, the compiled application is loaded to the XBD for execution. A checksum is performed if the checksum file is present during compilation. The checksum test is essentially a test of sanity. It tests the algorithm for correctness and ensures it follows the expected behavior of the chosen cryptographic operation. Afterwards, the benchmarking is performed. The number of unique tests executed is equal to the number of parameter sets specified. The configuration can specify the number of trials to run per parameter set.

2.5 XBH

The XBH application controls the execution and behavior of the XBD. It receives commands from the XBS and translates and performs the specified actions on the XBD.

The device which the XBH code runs on must have a frequency equal to or greater than the device being benchmarked for correct results. Timing calibration is needed between the XBH and XBD to correctly estimate the number of clock cycles required to execute the cryptographic algorithm. When the start execution signal is received from the XBD, the XBH will start timing the execution and gather power usage statistics. This stops when the XBD sends the execution ended signal. At which point, the XBH will translate the time taken to clock cycles on the XBD. It then asks for the results and stack usage from the XBD. This all gets packaged and returned to the XBS for analysis.

3 KEMs and Signature Schemes

For XXBX to be useful for benchmarking quantum-resistant cryptography, the functionality must be extended to include key encapsulation methods and signature schemes. This functionality is required in two separate parts of XXBX: XBS and XBD.

3.1 XBS Extension

XBS needs to understand the structure and tests needed to support the new functionality. As noted before, XBS will initialize the database with the components needed to properly execute the tests. During the execution stage, it will grab these components to forward to the XBH. A translation is needed here to package the data into something that XBD will understand. Also, upon return, the data will need to be translated back into something XBS can analyze. This translation should be dependent on the operation but general enough to support many different implementations.

Each trial for KEMs run each of the modes of operation in the following order: key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation, decapsulation failure. For signature schemes, the order is similar: key generation, signing, opening/verifying, forgery detection. The next mode of operation depends on the results of the previous mode. Therefore it is important each mode returns successfully or the trial is cut short, deemed a failure, and continues on to the next trial.

The parameters to package differ based on the mode of operation. And because there are different modes, and extra variable is needed to specify which mode the XBD will run.

The structure of execution results expected back in return follows a similar design. Because both KEMs and signature schemes depend on the result of the previous mode, these structures need to be kept track of during the life of the trial. Fig. 2 depicts both the structure of the parameters and the structure of the returned results.

For KEM key generation mode, no parameters are required just the mode of operation while the results include both the public and secret key. For KEM encapsulation mode, the public key is written to the ROM at the next available block after the application binary. A pointer to this location is provided as a parameter while the results include the session key and ciphertext containing the session key. Lastly, for KEM decapsulation, the secret key is written to ROM (overwriting the public key) and a pointer to its location is provided as an argument along with the ciphertext containing the session key.

Signature schemes are similar. For key generation, no parameters are required and both the public and secret key are returned. For signing, the secret key is written to ROM and a pointer to its location along with the message are passed while the signature is returned. Lastly, for opening/verifying, the public key is written to ROM and a pointer to its location and signature are provided while the results include the verified message.




Figure 4: XXBX Public Key Process

3.2 XBD Extension

XBD needs to translate the Start Application Request instruction to the intended operation. In order to do so, the data or parameters received by the XBS must match a format expected by the XBD. In turn, the results of the test must be packaged in a format the XBS is expecting.

Prior to unpacking the parameters, the XBD has no idea which mode is being performed. Because of which, the same buffer sizes are allocated regardless of the mode of operation. Therefore, the ROM usage calculated during execution do not accurately reflect the differences between modes and should be considered a general size for the algorithm. The size of the buffers are the largest required of the different modes of operation.

Regardless of success, the length of the returned results does not differ. This is particularly useful for ensuring incorrect decapsulation and detecting signature forgeries on the XBS side.

Unlike the XBS, each execution is independent of the previous.

3.3 XBD Standalone

An additional module was added to the XXBX structure. This XBD standalone mode creates an implementation of the algorithm in an environment without the XXBX overhead. It is a combination of XBD bootloader and XBD application stripped down to the core functions required to execute KEM and Signature operations.

This module automates the build process and allows for testing the algorithm in its purest form for accuracy instead of performance. It also allows for easy debugging with attached debuggers (such as GNUs GDB).

Future work on this module will include an analysis of the stack during execution. In the typical XXBX environment, some of the stack is preserved for XBD application overhead. This module is designed to strip that overhead to its bare minimum and allow debuggers to test the logic of the implementation prior to running performance testing with XXBX. The automated build makes this process simple and extensible.

4 IV. Quantum-Resistant Public Key Cryptography

NIST released an initiative to design new quantum-resistant public key cryptographic standards. The algorithms analyzed are many of the candidates submitted to NIST for analysis [10].

SUPERCOP has a repository of KEM and Signature implementation that fix the XBX structure. This repository has many of the candidates for the new post-quantum standard. However, some of these algorithms are not capable of being built in embedded environments particularly because of operating system calls.

Some additional implementations were pulled from pqm4 to replace those in SUPERCOP. Pqm4 has included some libraries and implementations of common dependencies required by a lot of these algorithms that work with the Cortex-M4 architecture [5]. Pqm4 focused on Level III algorithms, so some work was required to fit Level I and Level V versions.

5 Target Device

The ek-tm4c123gxl device was chosen to benchmark using XXBX. The ek-tm4c123gxl has been tested to work well with XXBX and has a large enough memory to work with a decent variety of algorithms. The device specifications are shown in Table I.

6 Algorithm Candidates

The candidates were split into their respective security levels defined by NIST. Table II defines the levels of classification. For KEM algorithms, only levels I, III, and V apply. For signature schemes, all levels technically apply.

6.1 XXBX Constraint

The XBS network connection to the XBH will timeout during very long calculations on the XBD device. This will typically happen around 40 minutes or so.

6.2 Target Device Signature Constraint

The target device has available 32 kB of RAM. Most of the post-quantum signature algorithms exceed this constraint. Memory usage statistic from pqm4 are show below [6]. Most of the algorithms noted above exceed 32 kB worth of RAM. qTesla-I does work in the XBD-Standalone module but fails with the XBD application overhead.

7 Results

There are four categories of results: ROM usage, RAM usage, speed (in clock cycles), and energy consumption.

8 Conclusion

For embedded environments, the strict constraints due to limited memory size and power consumption makes developing IoT devices complicated. If execution time or power consumption are of greatest concern, both Kyber, New Hope, and Saber implementations are good candidates for KEM algorithms. However, if memory usage is of greatest concern, the Three Bears algorithm works better.

Sike takes an incredible amount of time to execute and is not a viable implementation for embedded environments. XXBX is simple and adaptable. It will help users shift current cryptographic standards over to quantum-resistant public key cryptography in embedded environments.

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