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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

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Date of Judgment: 11th December, 2017

+ W.P.(C) 6245/2017

KANWAR SINGH

..... Petitioner

Through: Ms.Richa Oberoi, Ms.Sumi Anand
and Mr.Prateek Kohli, Advocates

versus

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

..... Respondents

Through: Ms.Jyoti Tyagi, Adv. for LAC/L&B.
Mr.Sanjeev Sabharwal, Standing
counsel for DDA with Mr.Hem
Kumar and Ms.Simmee Kumari,
Advts.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.KAMESWAR RAO

G.S.SISTANI, J. (ORAL)

1. Counter affidavits have been handed over in Court by learned counsels for the DDA and LAC. The same are taken on record. Copies of the same have been supplied to the counsel for the petitioner.
2. With the consent of the parties, the present writ petition is set down for final hearing and disposal.
3. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner seeks a declaration that the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land bearing Khasra No.98 min (2-14) and 99 (2-13) total admeasuring 5 bighas and 7 biswas situated in the revenue estate of Village Haiderpur, New Delhi are deemed to have lapsed in view of the fact that neither possession of the land has been taken nor compensation has been paid.

4. The necessary facts to be noticed for disposal of this writ petition are that Section 4 notification of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was issued on 24.10.1961. Sections 6 notification was issued on 06.12.1966. An Award was pronounced on 18.07.1980. It is the case of the petitioner that neither the possession has been taken nor compensation has been paid. Hence, the case of the petitioner would be fully covered by the decision rendered by the Apex Court in *Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & ors.*, reported at (2014) 3 SCC 183.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
6. The counsel for the petitioners submits that since the compensation has not been tendered nor possession of the land has been taken over, the petitioner would be entitled to a declaration and compensation under Section 24 (2) of the Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as "the New Act"). In support of the aforesaid submission learned counsel has relied on para 4 of the counter affidavit filed by the LAC, which reads as under:

“4. That it is submitted that for purpose of planned development of Delhi, the answering respondent issued a Notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 24.10.1961 which was followed by Notification u/s 6 of the said Act dated 6.12.1966 in village Haiderpur. That an Award No.50/80-81 was also passed however possession of the subject land could neither be taken nor the compensation be paid as per revenue records.”

7. The reading of the abovesaid paragraph of the counter-affidavit clearly shows that possession of the land in question has not been taken nor compensation has been tendered to the petitioners. As far as the present Khasra number is concerned, counsel for the DDA also submits that possession has not been handed over to them.
8. Having regard to the statement made and stand taken by the respondents in their counter affidavits, we are of the view that the case of the petitioner is fully covered by the decision rendered by the Supreme Court of India in the case of *Pune Municipal Corporation* (supra). Paras 14 to 20 read as under:

“14. Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act enjoins upon the Collector, on making an award under Section 11, to tender payment of compensation to persons interested entitled thereto according to award. It further mandates the Collector to make payment of compensation to them unless prevented by one of the contingencies contemplated in sub-section (2). The contingencies contemplated in Section 31(2) are: (i) the persons interested entitled to compensation do not consent to receive it (ii) there is no person competent to alienate the land and (iii) there is dispute as to the title to receive compensation or as to the apportionment of it. If due to any of the contingencies contemplated in Section 31(2), the Collector is prevented from making payment of compensation to the persons interested who are entitled to compensation, then the Collector is required to deposit the compensation in the court to which reference under Section 18 may be made.

15. Simply put, Section 31 of the 1894 Act makes provision for payment of compensation or deposit of the same in the court. This provision requires that the Collector should tender payment of compensation as awarded by him to the persons interested who are entitled to compensation. If due to happening of any contingency as contemplated in Section 31(2), the

compensation has not been paid, the Collector should deposit the amount of compensation in the court to which reference can be made under Section 18.

16. The mandatory nature of the provision in Section 31(2) with regard to deposit of the compensation in the court is further fortified by the provisions contained in Sections 32, 33 and 34. As a matter of fact, Section 33 gives power to the court, on an application by a person interested or claiming an interest in such money, to pass an order to invest the amount so deposited in such government or other approved securities and may direct the interest or other proceeds of any such investment to be accumulated and paid in such manner as it may consider proper so that the parties interested therein may have the benefit therefrom as they might have had from the land in respect whereof such money shall have been deposited or as near thereto as may be.

17. While enacting Section 24(2), Parliament definitely had in its view Section 31 of the 1894 Act. From that one thing is clear that it did not intend to equate the word “paid” to “offered” or “tendered”. But at the same time, we do not think that by use of the word “paid”, Parliament intended receipt of compensation by the landowners/persons interested. In our view, it is not appropriate to give a literal construction to the expression “paid” used in this sub-section (sub-section (2) of Section 24). If a literal construction were to be given, then it would amount to ignoring procedure, mode and manner of deposit provided in Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act in the event of happening of any of the contingencies contemplated therein which may prevent the Collector from making actual payment of compensation. We are of the view, therefore, that for the purposes of Section 24(2), the compensation shall be regarded as “paid” if the compensation has been offered to the person interested and such compensation has been deposited in the court where reference under Section 18 can be made on happening of any of the contingencies contemplated under Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act. In other words, the

compensation may be said to have been “paid” within the meaning of Section 24(2) when the Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has discharged his obligation and deposited the amount of compensation in court and made that amount available to the interested person to be dealt with as provided in Sections 32 and 33.

18. 1894 Act being an expropriatory legislation has to be strictly followed. The procedure, mode and manner for payment of compensation are prescribed in Part V (Sections 31-34) of the 1894 Act. The Collector, with regard to the payment of compensation, can only act in the manner so provided. It is settled proposition of law (classic statement of Lord Roche in *Nazir Ahmad*[1]) that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.

19. Now, this is admitted position that award was made on 31.01.2008. Notices were issued to the landowners to receive the compensation and since they did not receive the compensation, the amount (Rs.27 crores) was deposited in the government treasury. Can it be said that deposit of the amount of compensation in the government treasury is equivalent to the amount of compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested? We do not think so. In a comparatively recent decision, this Court in *Agnelo Santimano Fernandes*[2], relying upon the earlier decision in *Prem Nath Kapur*[3], has held that the deposit of the amount of the compensation in the state’s revenue account is of no avail and the liability of the state to pay interest subsists till the amount has not been deposited in court.

20. From the above, it is clear that the award pertaining to the subject land has been made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer more than five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It is also admitted position that compensation so awarded has neither been paid to the landowners/persons interested nor deposited in the court. The deposit of compensation amount in the government treasury is of no avail

and cannot be held to be equivalent to compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the subject land acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.”

9. We are of the considered view that the necessary ingredients for the application of Section 24(2) of the New Act as has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of India and this Court in the following cases stand satisfied:

- (1) ***Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & ors.***, reported at (2014) 3 SCC 183;
- (2) **Union of India and Ors v. Shiv Raj and Ors.**, reported at (2014) 6 SCC 564;
- (3) **Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors**, Civil Appeal no.8700/2013 decided on 10.09.2014;
- (4) **Surender Singh v. Union of India & Others**, W.P.(C).2294/2014 decided on 12.09.2014 by this Court; and
- (5) **Girish Chhabra v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors**; W.P.(C).2759/2014 decided on 12.09.2014 by this Court.

10. In view of the discussion above, the petitioner is entitled to a declaration that the acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 with regard to the subject land are deemed to have lapsed. It is so declared.
11. The writ petition stands disposed of. No orders as to costs.

G.S.SISTANI, J

V. KAMESWAR RAO, J

DECEMBER 11, 2017/rb