Zelizer (2019) Paper Replication and Extension

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Contents

```
## [1] "0"  "-1" "1"
```

```
## [1] "0"  "-1" "1"  "2"
```

```
##  [1] "0.0"   "-1.0"  "1.0"   "0.-1"  "-1.-1" "1.-1"  "0.1"   "-1.1"  "1.1"
## [10] "0.2"   "-1.2"  "1.2"
```

0.1 Abstract

Zelizer (2019) finds that the cues that legislators take from their peers, in addition to other credible sources of information like briefings, influence their policymaking decisions. I succesfully replicated Zelizer's results. Zelizer took a Bayesian approach to his findings, running 10,000 simulations for each table and figure using for-loops to produce estimates and standard deviations; however, this made his code inefficient and extremely slow Using the rstanarm package, I was able to simplify his code while maintaining the Bayesian integrity of the study. This extension served as both a robustness test of his results and a simplification that makes the study more easily reproducable.

0.2 Literature Review

Studies as early as Matthews and Stimson (1975) and Kingdon (1973) find that cue-taking has a large influence on the decisions made by policy-makers. Kingdon concluded that cue-taking influences around 40% of decisions while Matthews and Stimsonn pinned the number a 75%. More recent observational studies like Masket (2008) found the percentage of votes influenced by cue-taking to be 10%. Masket found that information was shared primarily through deskmates, while Matthews and Stimson found that it wa shared between friends. Coppock (2014) found that information wa shared between ideologically-similar legislators. This paper abets the conclusion that cue-taking influences policy decisions while updating the approach and contributing a new layer of findings. It uses a large dataset from two legislative field experiments, lending it power that previous studies may have lacked, and focuses on legislators who share office suites. The paper contributes the findings that that cues complement complement rather than substitute other sources of expertise as well as that cue-making's influence occurs late in the decision-making process.

[1]

0.3 Figures

0.3.1 Table 3

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[1]All analysis for this paper is availible at https://github.com/mirobergam/Replication-paper

Briefing	NO CUE-TAKING	YES CUE-TAKING
NO	10.4 (1127)	19.1 (372)
YES	20.8 (257)	19.7 (88)

0.3.2 Table 4

```
## [1] 0.7860022
```

```
## [1] 2080
```

Value	Briefing	Cue-Taking	Combined
ITT	4.5	3.5	11.8
SE	1.8	1.6	2.9

0.3.3 Table 5

```
## [1] "no_vote"
## [1] "t"
## [1] "t.spill"
## [1] "t+t.spill"
## [1] "vote"
## [1] "t"
## [1] "t.spill"
## [1] "t+t.spill"
```

Condition	Bills that failed in committee	Bills that reached floor
Briefing	5.685 (2.018)	3.799 (3.519)
Cue-Taking	1.247 (1.748)	6.38 (3.015)
Combined	10.169 (3.152)	10.501 (5.785)

0.3.4 Figure 3

```
##  [1] "0.0"   "-1.0"  "1.0"   "0.-1"  "-1.-1" "1.-1"  "0.1"   "-1.1"  "1.1"
## [10] "0.2"   "-1.2"  "1.2"
```

```
##  0 of 0 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 77 84 91 98 7 of 0 7 14 21 28 35 42 49 56 63 70 77 84 91 98 14 c
```

0.3.5 Figure 4

0.3.6 Bibliography

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