

# Vote Brokers Replication Paper

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## Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>GitHub</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Paper Overview</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>What I was able to replicate</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Literature Review</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>References</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Appendix</b>	<b>4</b>

## 1 Introduction

I am replicating “Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Russia and Venezuela” by Timothy Frye, Ora John Reuter and David Szakonyi.

## 2 GitHub

All analysis for this paper be found in the original paper (<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/vote-brokers-clientelist-appeals-and-voter-turnout-evidence-from-russia-and-venezuela/45FE0BE1216FCD8744B02A82919B328A>) and data verse (<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/YSVMS2>) My Github repo for this project is located under my username, cpatvakanian. <sup>[^1]</sup>

### 3 Paper Overview

For my final replication project, I decided to look at Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Russia and Venezuela, a paper by Timothy Frye, Ora John Reuter and David Szakonyi. The paper looks at two countries, Russia and Venezuela, to what factors, if any, in clientelist exchange. The authors specifically look at the role of brokers and leverage in these two cases. The study uses survey data to explore Russian and Venezuelan brokers and how they perform in monitoring voting.

The goal is basically to understand how are monitors pressured by upper management in order to carry out clientelism and skew the voting. To understand this, the authors use a few models, such as difference of means between the different type of brokers and methods of leveraging, in both Russia and Venezuela. They also run fixed effect linear regressions to see what influence the skewing of the voting turnout for a couple of different scenarios, but actually include very few variables in their regression which is strange. The paper also has very specific demographics of the type of individuals they are looking at, which is good because it is specific but might also be a drawback because it limits the scope of the study. This paper ultimately finds that in Russia and Venezuela, different types of brokers and methods can influence voter turnout differently, which seems to be expected.

### 4 What I was able to replicate

In this paper for the most part I was able to replicate all of the graphics. The tables I couldn't use the old code to make so I hand made them, which I think is not a good idea... I also had an issue combining some of the graphs to have the same legend. I also messed up some of the footnotes on the graphics, and instead used captions. On the regression, the variable order isn't like the original, which I couldn't figure out. Also, I had a lot of trouble getting the exact format from R things like GT to Latex/PDF, so that's why I had to resort to manually doing some things.

### 5 Literature Review

For this paper I looked at a few papers on voting structure in Russia, as I was able to find less on Venezuela. In "How Capitalism was Built", by Anders Aslund, the literature suggests that in many post soviet countries, voting patterns were heavily influenced by the transition to democracy in institutions built. In Russia, the case was that there was not enough a big push to transform after communism, and thus the country had to face more difficulties in long term in ensuring fair and free elections. Additionally, in Olga Popova's

“Corruption, Voting and Employment Status: Evidence from Russian Parliamentary Elections”, Popova finds that controlling for different employment statuses and corruption, people are still likely to vote differently, and more corruption generally induces people to vote more, which I think is to be expected.

## 6 References

I make use of Aslund (2012), Popova (2010), and Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi (2019).


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Frye, Timothy, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi. 2019. “Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Russia and Venezuela.” *World Politics* 71 (4). Cambridge University Press: 710–46. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887119000078>.


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




## 7 Appendix

Panel A: Russia Survey



Panel B: Venezuela Survey





Asked You to Vote	
Your Employer	344
A Party Activist 336	A Government Official 339
Indicates There Will be Negative Consequences For You If You Do Not Vote	
Your Employer	344
A Party Activist 353	A Government Official 337
Offers You a Gift, Money, or Reward for Voting	
Your Employer	374
A Party Activist 360	A Government Official 352
Tells You That Your Firm or Org. Will Suffer if Turnout Among Employees is Low	
Your Employer	372
A Party Activist 362	A Government Official 331

Broker	Asked You to Vote	Indicates There Will be Negative Consequences For You If You Do Not Vote
Your Employer	344	344
A Party Activist	336	336
A Neighborhood Leader	339	339

Table 1: Survey Coverage

Russian Survey (a)

Broker	Asked You to Vote	Indicates There Will be Negative Consequences For You If You Do Not Vote	Offers You a Gift, Money, or Reward for Voting	Tells You That Your Firm or Org. Will Suffer if Turnout Among Employees is Low
Your Employer	344	344	374	372
A Party Activist	336	353	360	362
A Neighborhood Leader	339	337	352	331

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Venezuelan Survey (b)

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Broker	Asked You to Vote	Indicates There Will be Negative Consequences For You If You Do Not Vote	Offers You a Gift, Money, or Reward for Voting	Tells You That Your Firm or Org. Will Suffer if Turnout Among Employees is Low
Your Employer	96	132	113	114
A Party Activist	94	133	113	118
A Neighborhood Leader	125	118	120	124

Table 2: Substantive Effects: Predicted Probabilities by Broker Treatment

Probability of Voting (%)

(a)

	Russia	Venezuela
Employer	28.6	54.2
Party Activist	22.5	44.9
Government Official	23.1	
Neighborhood Leader		40.9

Probability of Not Voting (%)

(b)

	Russia	Venezuela
Employer	35.7	24.4
Party Activist	43.5	32.1
Government Official	42.7	
Neighborhood Leader		35.7



Table 1: Table 3

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Outcome Leverage			Respondent Would Vote Monitoring			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
empparty:gov				0.166** (0.072)			
empparty:perclosesjob100	0.360** (0.167)						
empparty:findnewwork		0.156*** (0.038)					
empparty:num_benefits			0.070** (0.036)				
empparty:supervisor					0.119** (0.059)		
empparty:lengthwork						0.012** (0.006)	
empparty:coworker_weekly							0.063 (0.076)
Observations	1,209	1,532	1,724	1,806	1,567	1,806	1,389

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

The outcome variable is the willingness to turnout outcome (five-point scale) from the survey experiment. The sample includes only respondents who received the employer or political party broker treatment. The employer treatment collapses the data along the inducement treatment arm of the factorial design used in the experiment. The sample is limited to only those who are employed. Chance of job loss measures the probability a respondent believes he or she will lose his or her job in the next twelve months. Hard to find a new job uses a five-point scale to capture the likelihood that if he or she were to lose his or her job, a respondent could find a similar one; higher values indicate more difficulty. Receives benefits captures the number of in-kind benefits (health care, education, transportation subsidies, etc.) respondents received from their employer. Higher values on the three-point scale used in knows supervisor well indicate better familiarity with one's boss. Number of years employed measures the length of time at one's work. Socializes with coworkers captures whether respondents spend time with colleagues outside work. All models include the constituent terms and basic demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, size of settlement, and an indicator for government employment). Models are estimated via ols and cluster errors at the region level.

TABLE 3  
EXAMINING MECHANISMS: RUSSIA SURVEY EXPERIMENT<sup>a</sup>

	<i>Outcome: Respondent Would Vote</i>						
	<i>Leverage</i>				<i>Monitoring</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Employer treatment *	0.360**						
Chance of job loss	(0.167)						
Employer treatment *		0.156***					
Hard to find a new job		(0.038)					
Employer treatment *			0.070**				
Receives benefits			(0.036)				
Employer treatment *				0.166**			
Employed in government				(0.072)			
Employer treatment *					0.119**		
Knows supervisor well					(0.059)		
Employer treatment *						0.012**	
Number of years employed						(0.006)	
Employer treatment *							0.063
Socializes with coworkers							(0.076)
Constituent terms	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Demographics	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	1209	1532	1724	1806	1567	1806	1389

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$

<sup>a</sup>The outcome variable is the willingness to turnout outcome (five-point scale) from the survey experiment. The sample includes only respondents who received the employer or political party broker treatment. The employer treatment collapses the data along the inducement treatment arm of the factorial design used in the experiment. The sample is limited to only those who are employed. *Chance of job loss* measures the probability a respondent believes he or she will lose his or her job in the next twelve months. *Hard to find a new job* uses a five-point scale to capture the likelihood that if he or she were to lose his or her job, a respondent could find a similar one; higher values indicate more difficulty. *Receives benefits* captures the number of in-kind benefits (health care, education, transportation subsidies, etc.) respondents received from their employer. Higher values on the three-point scale used in *knows supervisor well* indicate better familiarity with one's boss. *Number of years employed* measures the length of time at one's work. *Socializes with coworkers* captures whether respondents spend time with colleagues outside work. All models include the constituent terms and basic demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, size of settlement, and an indicator for government employment). Models are estimated via OLS and cluster errors at the region level.

[<sup>1</sup>]: [([https://github.com/cpatvakanian/milestone\\_6](https://github.com/cpatvakanian/milestone_6))]