

Replication and extension of How Chinese Officials Use the Internet to Construct their Public Image by Jennifer Pan

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Contents

| | | |
|----------|--|-----------|
| 1 | Abstract | 1 |
| 2 | Introduction | 2 |
| 3 | Literature review | 3 |
| 4 | Paper Review | 3 |
| 5 | Replication | 4 |
| 5.1 | Section 3.1: Website Content | 4 |
| 5.2 | Section 4.1: Topics | 4 |
| 5.3 | Section 5.3: Predictive Inference | 4 |
| 6 | Extension | 4 |
| 6.1 | Comparison of alternative regression models in explaining competence and benevolence . . . | 4 |
| 6.2 | Validating geographic randomness of sample | 10 |
| 7 | Conclusion | 13 |
| 8 | Tables and Figures | 14 |
| 9 | Appendixes | 30 |
| | References | 30 |

1 Abstract

Pan (2017) shows that the emphasis on Chinese local government websites on either the competence or benevolence of county executives depends on where they are in the political tenure cycle. I was largely able to replicate these results. My extension confirms that this is the most likely explanation for the observed

effect by comparing the statistical explanatory power of alternative models (e.g. cultural differences among regions, gender differences, etc.) through the leave one out method. In addition, I validate the geographical randomness of the sample through simulations of repeated sampling and the construction of confidence intervals.

2 Introduction

The paper contributes to a larger discussion around the use of government websites in authoritarian regimes. Employing the example of China it suggests that instead of enhancing transparency (as intended by the central authorities) these websites serve as vehicles of self-promotion and communication between regime insiders. To conclude this, Pan employs a random sample of 100 from 2796 county-level government websites, classifies the messaging on individual pages (informative, competency or benevolence signalling) and regresses their respective frequency on a series of variables, including the position of county officials in the tenure cycle. She concludes that the tenure of the county officials and their subsequent promotion (a post-treatment variable) were most directive. This suggests the relevance of these websites in the promotion decisions as well as the importance of tenure on the content being signalled.

To replicate this paper, I used R (R Core Team 2019). Original data and code of the replication paper are available in the Harvard dataverse.¹ The code for the extension is available at my repo.²

In addition to replicating the results, I am interested to understand whether other explanations than the signalling function within authoritarian regimes may better explain the patterns in competence / benevolence described in the paper. I will explore these alternatives by comparing the explanatory power of the variable categories separately and that of a new category: “cultural variations” (includes the macro-region and the county type). The need for this examination is verified because the statistical significance of the included variables changes between as the regressions grow more extensive in the paper. Alternative hypothesis conclusively are:

1. The benevolence/competence patterns may be best explained by regional cultural variations
2. The benevolence/competence patterns may be best explained by the resources at disposal to the official
3. The benevolence/competence patterns may be best explained by internal peer preferences
4. The benevolence/competence patterns may be best explained by characteristics of the prefecture
5. The benevolence/competence patterns may be best explained by the individual abilities of the county officials
6. The benevolence/competence patterns may be best explained by the immediate career success of county officials

Also, the number of observations to construct the regressions varies, obfuscating a comparison between them. The random sample of 100 of the 2,796 counties with website, immediately shrinks by 29 counties due to data unavailability and subsequently another ~23 as our regressions get more ambitious (include more variables). In relation to exploring regional cultural diversity, I seek to validate the geographical randomness of the sample of 100 and the reduced sample of 48.

I find that the regression on tenure cycle is indeed best able to explain website content. In addition, the relevance of the post-treatment promotion variable corroborates the importance of regime-insiders signalling through county websites. This holds true for both the signalling of competence and benevolence. Furthermore, basing the sample on the same set of 48 observations for all regressions does not alter the conclusions we draw. Lastly, the sample of 48 that constitutes the basis of this paper is a geographically random representation of the underlying population of counties.

¹<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2HTWSU>

²https://github.com/Alex1005-stack/Website_use

3 Literature review

The replication paper aims to contribute to the larger discussion around role of the Internet in authoritarian regimes, especially in China. It is part of a shift embracing the complexity of the role of the internet within these regimes and moving away from a simplistic assumption of the internet’s inherent democratic nature and its ascribed power to undermine authoritarian rule. The discussion has become much more nuanced with an emphasis on the deployment by governments and people. (Kalathil and Boas 2003)

While transparency laws are implemented by central authorities with the intention to obtain more information about the performance of local officials, they often turn out to be political instruments for self-promotion among regime insiders (as this paper argues). Research indicates further that transparency does not come to fruition because grievances submitted through these websites are systematically concealed from upper-level authorities when they implicate lower-tier officials or associates connected to lower-tier officials through patronage ties. Information manipulation occurs primarily through omission of wrongdoing rather than censorship or falsification, suggesting that even in the digital age in a highly determined and capable regime where reports of corruption are actively and publicly voiced, it remains a challenge to monitor the behaviour of local regime agents. (Pan and Chen 2018) There is however some disagreement whether creating transparency on local government performance is the primary function of these laws to begin with, or whether these websites are primarily intended as subtle instruments of social control through information delivery, agenda setting, and containment of public dissent. (Jiang and Xu 2009)

The emphasis of local officials on the communication among insiders are corroborated by field experiments testing the responsiveness of local officials. In these, tattling to upper levels of government made county governments considerably more responsive to citizen’s demands. (Chen, Pan, and Xu 2016) This challenges to some degree earlier findings that the capacity of the central state to monitor and control lower level agents has increased in China. It suggests instead that some of the efforts to do so have altered the nature of the interaction rather than shifted the power relationships within it. (Edin 2003)

This isn’t necessarily something negative in of itself, as empirical findings suggest that China uses personnel control to induce desirable outcomes, especially economic gains. (Li and Zhou 2005) This alludes to an associated discussion around the missappropriation of resources in the service of individual image building. China is an example where the political arrangements have created the incentive and the opportunities for irresponsible behaviour among state agents to do so. (Cai 2004)

4 Paper Review

The paper analyses how local government officials use websites intended by the central government to increase transparency, to engineer their public image. It concludes that the internet may be used as a tool for self-promotion in authoritarian regimes. The analysis demonstrates that the websites tend to highlight the competence (achievements) or the benevolence (concern for citizens) of county executives which change based on the tenure of their cycle. The former is more important to officials that are later in their cycle, while the latter is more important to those earlier in the cycle.

The analysis does so by focusing on a random sample of 100 Chinese counties and their websites. They represent 29 Chinese provinces. Based on sub-groups of that sample they estimate the proportion of posts for competence and benevolence by year in office generated using Hopkins and King (2010) ReadMe software. The author then regresses a “local official first year or last year” binary indicator on the number of competence/benevolence mentions on the websites by county. She extends the number of included variables gradually. The same is then done for benevolence. These variable include county resources and environmental factors, incentives of county party secretaries, incentives of prefecture party secretary and other prefecture-level characteristics, county executive’s ability, age, and gender, post-treatment variable of whether the county executive was promoted. The authors conclude from the regression that When a county executive is in the last year of office, an additional 15% or so of website content is on average dedicated to claims of competence. Similarly, they conclude that When a county executive is in the first year of office,

an additional 10% to 15% of website content is on average dedicated to claims of benevolence. Both results are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

5 Replication

5.1 Section 3.1: Website Content

5.1.1 Figure 1

I have not replicated the figure 1, a map of the various provinces in China and the availability of county government websites in them. This is because this was a manual step in the construction of the paper. I have replicated the data that was used as a basis for that map.

5.2 Section 4.1: Topics

5.2.1 Table 1

I have generated the underlying data for the table. I have not transferred it into the same table form as outlined in the paper.

5.3 Section 5.3: Predictive Inference

5.3.1 Table 3: Regression Results: Competence

Replicated the table, except positioning the constant at the bottom of the table

5.3.2 Table 4: Regression Results: Benevolence

Same as above

6 Extension

6.1 Comparison of alternative regression models in explaining competence and benevolence

One challenge with the regressions is that they are based on a different number of underlying observations. This is because of the data available in relation to the 100 counties selected as a random sample. The number of observations in our sample decreases from 100 to 71 to 70 to 68 to 48.

In a first step I therefore harmonize the regressions by basing them on the same sample throughout - the 48 observations that have all the required data available. I then compare whether the new regressions yield similar results as the regressions in the paper. Only the first four regressions will change (as regressions (5) and (6) in the original paper are already based on the 48 counties). The following tables represent original and new results side by side. The first column being the original results, the second the result based on the 48 counties.

6.1.1 Competence

% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu
 % Date and time: Sat, Apr 25, 2020 - 15:21:28

| Dependent variable: Competence | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Observations | 71 | 48 | 70 | 48 | 70 | 48 | 68 | 48 |
| Beginning Tenure | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.05) | 0.05 (0.05) | -0.01 (0.06) | 0.05 (0.05) | -0.01 (0.06) | 0.06 (0.06) | 0.02 (0.07) |
| End Tenure | 0.15*** (0.05) | 0.14** (0.06) | 0.14** (0.05) | 0.13** (0.06) | 0.13** (0.06) | 0.13* (0.07) | 0.15** (0.06) | 0.18** (0.07) |
| X2009_gdppc_cny | | | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) |
| X2010_illiterateprop | | | -0.004 (0.004) | -0.003 (0.004) | -0.005 (0.004) | -0.003 (0.004) | -0.004 (0.005) | -0.002 (0.005) |
| itemploy | | | -0.0001* (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001* (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) |
| linksall | | | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) |
| county_mediaexp | | | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) |
| sec_first | | | | | 0.03 (0.06) | 0.13** (0.06) | 0.03 (0.06) | 0.11* (0.06) |
| sec_last | | | | | 0.01 (0.05) | 0.04 (0.06) | 0.02 (0.05) | 0.05 (0.06) |
| pref_ps_first | | | | | | | -0.02 (0.06) | 0.08 (0.08) |
| pref_ps_last | | | | | | | 0.06 (0.07) | 0.08 (0.07) |
| pref_ps_edulevel | | | | | | | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.03) |
| pref_2010_gdppc | | | | | | | -0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) |
| Constant | 0.16*** (0.03) | 0.17*** (0.03) | 0.19*** (0.05) | 0.19*** (0.05) | 0.19*** (0.05) | 0.16*** (0.06) | 0.25* (0.12) | 0.25* (0.15) |
| Resource controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Peer controls | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prefecture controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Ability controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Career paths controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6.1.2 Benevolence

% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu
 % Date and time: Sat, Apr 25, 2020 - 15:21:29

| Dependent variable: Benevolence | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Observations | 71 | 48 | 70 | 48 | 70 | 48 | 68 | 48 |
| Beginning Tenure | 0.07 (0.05) | 0.09 (0.06) | 0.10** (0.05) | 0.15** (0.06) | 0.10* (0.05) | 0.15** (0.07) | 0.13** (0.06) | 0.15* (0.08) |
| End Tenure | -0.003 (0.06) | -0.02 (0.07) | 0.03 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.07) | 0.04 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.08) | 0.04 (0.07) | 0.02 (0.10) |
| X2009_gdppc_cny | | | -0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) |
| X2010_illiterateprop | | | 0.003 (0.004) | 0.004 (0.005) | 0.004 (0.004) | 0.004 (0.005) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.004 (0.01) |
| itemploy | | | 0.0000 (0.0001) | 0.0000 (0.0001) | 0.0000 (0.0001) | 0.0000 (0.0001) | 0.0000 (0.0001) | 0.0000 (0.0001) |
| linksall | | | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) |
| county_mediaexp | | | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) |
| sec_first | | | | | 0.01 (0.06) | 0.04 (0.07) | -0.01 (0.07) | 0.04 (0.08) |
| sec_last | | | | | -0.02 (0.05) | 0.01 (0.07) | -0.03 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.07) |
| pref_ps_first | | | | | | | 0.05 (0.06) | 0.03 (0.10) |
| pref_ps_last | | | | | | | 0.01 (0.07) | -0.01 (0.09) |
| pref_ps_edulevel | | | | | | | 0.01 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.04) |
| pref_2010_gdppc | | | | | | | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) |
| Constant | 0.19*** (0.03) | 0.18*** (0.03) | 0.15*** (0.05) | 0.15** (0.06) | 0.15*** (0.05) | 0.14** (0.07) | 0.08 (0.13) | 0.21 (0.19) |
| Resource controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Peer controls | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prefecture controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Ability controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Career paths controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

When comparing the results, a noteworthy difference in regard to competence is the immediate flip in the sign of the coefficient on beginning tenure (in regressions (5) and (6) it also is negative in the original paper). While that coefficient isn't statistically significant for any of the regressions, it suggests that the change in the underlying sample is the most likely explanation for the flip rather than the inclusion of further variables.

In a second step, I go through the various regressions seeking to understand whether any of the tested variable classes (resources, peers, prefecture, ability, career path) explain the observed phenomena better than the ones around tenure. I do so by creating a series of new regressions that include only the variables in the respective variable classes. In addition, I introduce a new series of classes: cultural variations, that includes the variables macro-region and county type.

Please see graphs and tables for the detailed results of all regressions. Subsequently, only the 3 most relevant models for each regression acc to the loo comparison that is about to follow.

6.1.3 Competence

6.1.3.1 linear_1_gl

```
## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     comp ~ mayor_first + mayor_last
## observations: 48
## predictors:  3
## -----
##              Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)  0.2      0.0
## mayor_first  0.0      0.0
## mayor_last   0.1      0.1
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##              Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.1      0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg
```

6.1.3.2 linear_11_gl

```
## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     comp ~ mayor_promote
## observations: 48
## predictors:  2
## -----
##              Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)  0.2      0.0
## mayor_promote 0.1      0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##              Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.1      0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg
```

6.1.3.3 linear_8_gl

```
## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     comp ~ sec_first + sec_last
## observations: 48
## predictors:  3
## -----
##              Median MAD_SD
```

```

## (Intercept) 0.2    0.0
## sec_first   0.1    0.1
## sec_last    0.1    0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.1    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

```

6.1.4 Benevolence

6.1.4.1 linear.1_gl

```

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:      benev ~ mayor_first + mayor_last
## observations: 48
## predictors:   3
## -----
##      Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept) 0.2    0.0
## mayor_first 0.1    0.1
## mayor_last  0.0    0.1
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

```

6.1.4.2 linear.11_gl

```

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:      benev ~ mayor_promote
## observations: 48
## predictors:   2
## -----
##      Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept) 0.2    0.0
## mayor_promote 0.0    0.1
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----

```



```
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg
```

6.1.4.3 linear.12_gl

```
## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     benev ~ macroregion
## observations: 48
## predictors:  3
## -----
##              Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)    0.2    0.0
## macroregionEast 0.0    0.1
## macroregionWest -0.1   0.1
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg
```

I then compare all the available models with the leave-one-out method to see which one of these has the highest explanatory power for the observed phenomena.

6.1.5 Competence

```
##              elpd_diff se_diff
## linear_11_gl  0.0         0.0
## linear_1_gl   0.0         1.5
## linear_10_gl -0.3         2.7
## linear_8_gl   -0.6         3.5
## linear_12_gl -2.4         2.0
## linear_7_gl   -2.7         3.1
## linear_3_gl   -3.0         4.5
## linear_2_gl   -3.1         2.4
## linear_9_gl   -3.8         2.4
## linear_5_gl   -6.7         5.0
## linear_6_gl   -7.1         4.8
## linear_4_gl   -7.6         4.4
```

6.1.6 Benevolence

```
##              elpd_diff se_diff
## linear.1_gl   0.0         0.0
## linear.11_gl  -0.6         2.1
## linear.12_gl  -1.3         2.0
## linear.8_gl   -1.8         1.8
## linear.9_gl   -2.4         2.3
## linear.2_gl   -2.7         2.0
```


```
## linear.10_g1 -2.9      2.1
## linear.7_g1  -4.2      2.3
## linear.3_g1  -5.2      2.4
## linear.4_g1  -9.7      2.7
## linear.6_g1 -12.8      3.0
## linear.5_g1 -13.6      2.8
```

The comparison suggests that the best models for how competent an official is described as, are the tenure based model employed in the paper and whether officials were promoted in the two ensuing years. The later is a post-treatment variable. Rather than providing additional insights on what the factors around an official are that determine the website content, it suggests the relative importance of the website content in determining whether an individual is promoted. In combination this supports the hypothesis of the author that the websites have an important signalling function within the Chinese state apparatus to determine who gets promoted.

6.2 Validating geographic randomness of sample

Subsequently I am simulating repeated sampling. I do so by creating a function that allows me to draw 100 and 48 random samples from the underlying county websites (countyweb). I repeat this step 10000 times, counting the number of counties from each province. I then compare that count with the count of counties in the paper samples (the initial sample of 100 and the 48 counties that we actually conduct the regressions with). The sample of 48 is of particular interest, as the change reduction from a sample of 100 to a sample of 48 was due to data availability.

6.2.1 Random sample of 100




Extension Table 1: Frequency of provinces in sample of 100
Based on simulation of 10000 samples of 100

| Provinces | 2.5 Percentile | 97.5 Percentile | Frequency in paper sample | Outside CI |
|----------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------------------|------------|
| Anhui | 1 | 8 | 5 | No |
| Beijing | 0 | 2 | 1 | No |
| Chongqing | 0 | 4 | 1 | No |
| Fujian | 0 | 7 | 4 | No |
| Gansu | 0 | 7 | 4 | No |
| Guangdong | 1 | 8 | 5 | No |
| Guangxi | 1 | 8 | 2 | No |
| Guizhou | 0 | 7 | 4 | No |
| Hainan | 0 | 3 | 0 | No |
| Hebei | 2 | 11 | 3 | No |
| Heilongjiang | 1 | 9 | 7 | No |
| Henan | 2 | 10 | 6 | No |
| Hubei | 1 | 8 | 4 | No |
| Hunan | 1 | 9 | 2 | No |
| Inner Mongolia | 1 | 8 | 3 | No |
| Jiangsu | 1 | 8 | 5 | No |
| Jiangxi | 0 | 7 | 3 | No |
| Jilin | 0 | 5 | 1 | No |
| Liaoning | 0 | 7 | 3 | No |
| Ningxia | 0 | 3 | 1 | No |
| Qinghai | 0 | 4 | 0 | No |
| Shaanxi | 1 | 8 | 2 | No |
| Shandong | 1 | 9 | 6 | No |
| Shanghai | 0 | 2 | 2 | No |
| Shanxi | 1 | 8 | 3 | No |
| Sichuan | 2 | 11 | 6 | No |
| Tianjin | 0 | 2 | 1 | No |
| Tibet | 0 | 6 | 1 | No |
| Xinjiang | 1 | 7 | 7 | No |
| Yunnan | 1 | 9 | 3 | No |
| Zhejiang | 0 | 7 | 5 | No |

Repeated simulated sampling allows us to conclude that the sample of 100 in the paper is random and thereby representative in terms of geographic sampling. This is because the number of counties from a province in no case is outside the 95% CI interval that we constructed. The graph shows that in some counties, s.a. Heilongjiang or Hennan the county occurrences are rather on the margins of what we would expect to see.

6.2.2 Sample of 48 for modelling



Extension Table 2: Frequency of provinces in sample of 48
Based on simulation of 10000 samples of 48

| Provinces | 2.5 Percentile | 97.5 Percentile | Frequency in paper sample | Outside CI | On lower CI boundary |
|----------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------------------|------------|----------------------|
| Anhui | 0 | 5 | 4 | No | No |
| Beijing | 0 | 2 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Chongqing | 0 | 3 | 1 | No | No |
| Fujian | 0 | 4 | 1 | No | No |
| Gansu | 0 | 4 | 2 | No | No |
| Guangdong | 0 | 5 | 2 | No | No |
| Guangxi | 0 | 5 | 2 | No | No |
| Guizhou | 0 | 4 | 3 | No | No |
| Hainan | 0 | 2 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Hebei | 0 | 6 | 1 | No | No |
| Heilongjiang | 0 | 5 | 2 | No | No |
| Henan | 0 | 6 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Hubei | 0 | 5 | 1 | No | No |
| Hunan | 0 | 5 | 1 | No | No |
| Inner Mongolia | 0 | 4 | 3 | No | No |
| Jiangsu | 0 | 5 | 2 | No | No |
| Jiangxi | 0 | 4 | 2 | No | No |
| Jilin | 0 | 3 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Liaoning | 0 | 5 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Ningxia | 0 | 2 | 0 | No | Yes |

| | | | | | |
|----------|---|---|---|-----|-----|
| Qinghai | 0 | 3 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Shaanxi | 0 | 5 | 1 | No | No |
| Shandong | 0 | 6 | 3 | No | No |
| Shanghai | 0 | 2 | 2 | No | No |
| Shanxi | 0 | 5 | 2 | No | No |
| Sichuan | 0 | 7 | 4 | No | No |
| Tianjin | 0 | 2 | 1 | No | No |
| Tibet | 0 | 4 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Xinjiang | 0 | 5 | 1 | No | No |
| Yunnan | 0 | 5 | 2 | No | No |
| Zhejiang | 0 | 4 | 5 | Yes | No |

Repeated simulated sampling allows us to conclude that the sample of 48 in the paper is likely random and thereby representative in terms of geographic sampling. This is because the number of counties from a province in only one case (Zhejiang) is outside the 95% CI interval that we constructed. The graph shows that there is a surprising amount of states at the lower boundary of 0. This seems plausible due to the small size of the sample (Beijing, Hainan, Henan, Jilin, Liaoning, Ningxia, Qinghai and Tibet). There seems to be no regional pattern among these states (3 East, 2 Central, 3 West).

7 Conclusion

The paper highlights the use of county websites as signalling vehicles among regime insiders. Pan suggests this based on the explanatory power of the tenure cycle of county officials and the content that is being signalled.

To replicate this paper, I used R (R Core Team 2019). Original data and code of the replication paper are available in the Harvard dataverse.³ The code for the extension is available at my repo.⁴

In addition, I confirmed that no other categories of variables available in relation to the county websites is able to explain these patterns better. These categories included:

1. The benevolence/competence patterns may be explained by regional cultural variations
2. The benevolence/competence patterns may be explained by the resources at disposal to the official
3. The benevolence/competence patterns may be explained by internal peer preferences
4. The benevolence/competence patterns may be explained by characteristics of the prefecture
5. The benevolence/competence patterns may be explained by the individual abilities of the county officials
6. The benevolence/competence patterns may be explained by the immediate career success of county officials

In relation to exploring regional cultural diversity, I furthermore validated the randomness of the sample from a geographical viewpoint.

In conclusion, my findings confirm that the regression on tenure cycle among the available categories of data is best able to explain the website content. In line with the larger narrative of the paper, the post-treatment promotion variable suggests the relative importance of website contents in relation to promotion decisions. Using the subset of 48 observations consistently, does not alter these conclusions. Lastly, the sample that constitutes the basis of this paper is a geographically random representation of the underlying counties.

³<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2HTWSU>

⁴https://github.com/Alex1005-stack/Gov_1006_final_project

8 Tables and Figures

Below tables show the coefficients regressing a series of variables onto the number of competence mentions on the county government website. They compare a series of old regressions (using a diverging subset of the 100 county sample as the basis for the regression) with a series of new regressions (using the same 48 counties as the basis for all regressions and including a series of new regressions)

% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu
 % Date and time: Sat, Apr 25, 2020 - 15:27:33

| Dependent variable: Competence | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Observations | 71 | 48 | 70 | 48 | 70 | 48 | 68 | 48 |
| Beginning Tenure | 0.04 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.05) | 0.05 (0.05) | -0.01 (0.06) | 0.05 (0.05) | -0.01 (0.06) | 0.06 (0.06) | 0.02 (0.07) |
| End Tenure | 0.15*** (0.05) | 0.14** (0.06) | 0.14** (0.05) | 0.13** (0.06) | 0.13** (0.06) | 0.13* (0.07) | 0.15** (0.06) | 0.18** (0.07) |
| X2009_gdppc_cny | | | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) |
| X2010_illiterateprop | | | -0.004 (0.004) | -0.003 (0.004) | -0.005 (0.004) | -0.003 (0.004) | -0.004 (0.005) | -0.002 (0.005) |
| itemploy | | | -0.0001* (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001* (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) |
| linksall | | | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) |
| county_mediaexp | | | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) |
| sec_first | | | | | 0.03 (0.06) | 0.13** (0.06) | 0.03 (0.06) | 0.11* (0.06) |
| sec_last | | | | | 0.01 (0.05) | 0.04 (0.06) | 0.02 (0.05) | 0.05 (0.06) |
| pref_ps_first | | | | | | | -0.02 (0.06) | 0.08 (0.08) |
| pref_ps_last | | | | | | | 0.06 (0.07) | 0.08 (0.07) |
| pref_ps_edulevel | | | | | | | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.03 (0.03) |
| pref_2010_gdppc | | | | | | | -0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) |
| Constant | 0.16*** (0.03) | 0.17*** (0.03) | 0.19*** (0.05) | 0.19*** (0.05) | 0.19*** (0.05) | 0.16*** (0.06) | 0.25* (0.12) | 0.25* (0.15) |
| Resource controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Peer controls | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prefecture controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Ability controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Career paths controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Below tables show the coefficients regressing a series of variables onto the number of benevolence mentions on the county government website. They compare a series of old regressions (using a diverging subset of the 100 county sample as the basis for the regression) with a series of new regressions (using the same 48 counties as the basis for all regressions and including a series of new regressions)

% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu

% Date and time: Sat, Apr 25, 2020 - 15:27:34

| Dependent variable: Benevolence | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Observations | 71 | 48 | 70 | 48 | 70 | 48 | 68 | 48 |
| Beginning Tenure | 0.07 (0.05) | 0.09 (0.06) | 0.10** (0.05) | 0.15** (0.06) | 0.10* (0.05) | 0.15** (0.07) | 0.13** (0.06) | 0.15* (0.08) |
| End Tenure | -0.003 (0.06) | -0.02 (0.07) | 0.03 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.07) | 0.04 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.08) | 0.04 (0.07) | 0.02 (0.10) |
| X2009_gdppc_cny | | | -0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) |
| X2010_illiterateprop | | | 0.003 (0.004) | 0.004 (0.005) | 0.004 (0.004) | 0.004 (0.005) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.004 (0.01) |
| itemploy | | | 0.0000 (0.0001) | 0.0000 (0.0001) | 0.0000 (0.0001) | 0.0000 (0.0001) | 0.0000 (0.0001) | 0.0000 (0.0001) |
| linksall | | | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) |
| county_mediaexp | | | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) | 0.0000 (0.0000) |
| sec_first | | | | | 0.01 (0.06) | 0.04 (0.07) | -0.01 (0.07) | 0.04 (0.08) |
| sec_last | | | | | -0.02 (0.05) | 0.01 (0.07) | -0.03 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.07) |
| pref_ps_first | | | | | | | 0.05 (0.06) | 0.03 (0.10) |
| pref_ps_last | | | | | | | 0.01 (0.07) | -0.01 (0.09) |
| pref_ps_edulevel | | | | | | | 0.01 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.04) |
| pref_2010_gdppc | | | | | | | 0.0000 (0.0000) | -0.0000 (0.0000) |
| Constant | 0.19*** (0.03) | 0.18*** (0.03) | 0.15*** (0.05) | 0.15** (0.06) | 0.15*** (0.05) | 0.14** (0.07) | 0.08 (0.13) | 0.21 (0.19) |
| Resource controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Peer controls | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Prefecture controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Ability controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| Career paths controls | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table compares and ranks them in order of their statistical explanatory power using the leave one out method.

Competence:

| ## | elpd_diff | se_diff |
|-----------------|-----------|---------|
| ## linear_11_gl | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| ## linear_1_gl | 0.0 | 1.5 |
| ## linear_10_gl | -0.3 | 2.7 |
| ## linear_8_gl | -0.6 | 3.5 |
| ## linear_12_gl | -2.4 | 2.0 |
| ## linear_7_gl | -2.7 | 3.1 |
| ## linear_3_gl | -3.0 | 4.5 |
| ## linear_2_gl | -3.1 | 2.4 |

```
## linear_9_gl -3.8      2.4
## linear_5_gl -6.7      5.0
## linear_6_gl -7.1      4.8
## linear_4_gl -7.6      4.4
```

Benevolence:

```
##               elpd_diff se_diff
## linear.1_gl    0.0         0.0
## linear.11_gl  -0.6         2.1
## linear.12_gl  -1.3         2.0
## linear.8_gl   -1.8         1.8
## linear.9_gl   -2.4         2.3
## linear.2_gl   -2.7         2.0
## linear.10_gl  -2.9         2.1
## linear.7_gl   -4.2         2.3
## linear.3_gl   -5.2         2.4
## linear.4_gl   -9.7         2.7
## linear.6_gl  -12.8         3.0
## linear.5_gl  -13.6         2.8
```

Printing all regressions and their results from extension

Competence

```
## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     comp ~ mayor_first + mayor_last
## observations: 48
## predictors:  3
## -----
##               Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)  0.2      0.0
## mayor_first  0.0      0.0
## mayor_last   0.1      0.1
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##               Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.1      0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     comp ~ mayor_first + mayor_last + X2009_gdppc_cny + X2010_illiterateprop +
##             itemploy + linksall + county_mediaexp
## observations: 48
## predictors:  8
## -----
##               Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)  0.2      0.1
```



```

## mayor_first      0.0    0.1
## mayor_last       0.1    0.1
## X2009_gdppc_cny  0.0    0.0
## X2010_illiterateprop 0.0    0.0
## itemploy         0.0    0.0
## linksall         0.0    0.0
## county_mediaexp  0.0    0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.1      0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:          gaussian [identity]
## formula:          comp ~ mayor_first + mayor_last + X2009_gdppc_cny + X2010_illiterateprop +
##      itemploy + linksall + county_mediaexp + sec_first + sec_last
## observations: 48
## predictors: 10
## -----
##
##      Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)      0.2    0.1
## mayor_first      0.0    0.1
## mayor_last       0.1    0.1
## X2009_gdppc_cny  0.0    0.0
## X2010_illiterateprop 0.0    0.0
## itemploy         0.0    0.0
## linksall         0.0    0.0
## county_mediaexp  0.0    0.0
## sec_first        0.1    0.1
## sec_last         0.0    0.1
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.1      0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:          gaussian [identity]
## formula:          comp ~ mayor_first + mayor_last + X2009_gdppc_cny + X2010_illiterateprop +
##      itemploy + linksall + county_mediaexp + sec_first + sec_last +
##      pref_ps_first + pref_ps_last + pref_ps_edulevel + pref_2010_gdppc
## observations: 48
## predictors: 14
## -----
##
##      Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)      0.3    0.2
## mayor_first      0.0    0.1

```

```

## mayor_last          0.2    0.1
## X2009_gdppc_cny      0.0    0.0
## X2010_illiterateprop 0.0    0.0
## itemploy            0.0    0.0
## linksall            0.0    0.0
## county_mediaexp      0.0    0.0
## sec_first           0.1    0.1
## sec_last            0.0    0.1
## pref_ps_first       0.1    0.1
## pref_ps_last        0.1    0.1
## pref_ps_edulevel    0.0    0.0
## pref_2010_gdppc     0.0    0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.1    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:      comp ~ mayor_first + mayor_last + X2009_gdppc_cny + X2010_illiterateprop +
##      itemploy + linksall + county_mediaexp + sec_first + sec_last +
##      pref_ps_first + pref_ps_last + pref_ps_edulevel + pref_2010_gdppc +
##      mayor_age + mayor_gender + mayor_edulevel
## observations: 48
## predictors:   17
## -----
##
##      Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)      0.4    0.3
## mayor_first      0.0    0.1
## mayor_last       0.2    0.1
## X2009_gdppc_cny  0.0    0.0
## X2010_illiterateprop 0.0    0.0
## itemploy        0.0    0.0
## linksall        0.0    0.0
## county_mediaexp  0.0    0.0
## sec_first       0.2    0.1
## sec_last        0.0    0.1
## pref_ps_first   0.1    0.1
## pref_ps_last    0.1    0.1
## pref_ps_edulevel -0.1    0.0
## pref_2010_gdppc  0.0    0.0
## mayor_age       0.0    0.0
## mayor_genderM   -0.1    0.1
## mayor_edulevel   0.1    0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.1    0.0
##
## -----

```

```

## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:      comp ~ mayor_first + mayor_last + X2009_gdppc_cny + X2010_illiterateprop +
##               itemploy + linksall + county_mediaexp + sec_first + sec_last +
##               pref_ps_first + pref_ps_last + pref_ps_edulevel + pref_2010_gdppc +
##               mayor_age + mayor_gender + mayor_edulevel + mayor_promote
## observations: 48
## predictors:   18
## -----
##               Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)      0.5    0.3
## mayor_first      -0.1    0.1
## mayor_last        0.2    0.1
## X2009_gdppc_cny   0.0    0.0
## X2010_illiterateprop 0.0    0.0
## itemploy          0.0    0.0
## linksall          0.0    0.0
## county_mediaexp   0.0    0.0
## sec_first         0.1    0.1
## sec_last          0.0    0.1
## pref_ps_first     0.1    0.1
## pref_ps_last      0.1    0.1
## pref_ps_edulevel  -0.1    0.0
## pref_2010_gdppc   0.0    0.0
## mayor_age         0.0    0.0
## mayor_genderM     -0.1    0.1
## mayor_edulevel     0.1    0.0
## mayor_promote     0.0    0.1
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##           Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.1    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:      comp ~ X2009_gdppc_cny + X2010_illiterateprop + itemploy + linksall +
##               county_mediaexp
## observations: 48
## predictors:   6
## -----
##               Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)      0.2    0.0
## X2009_gdppc_cny   0.0    0.0
## X2010_illiterateprop 0.0    0.0
## itemploy          0.0    0.0
## linksall          0.0    0.0
## county_mediaexp   0.0    0.0

```

```

##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.1      0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:      comp ~ sec_first + sec_last
## observations: 48
## predictors:   3
## -----
##              Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)  0.2      0.0
## sec_first    0.1      0.1
## sec_last     0.1      0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.1      0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:      comp ~ pref_ps_first + pref_ps_last + pref_ps_edulevel + pref_2010_gdppc
## observations: 48
## predictors:   5
## -----
##              Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)  0.3      0.1
## pref_ps_first 0.1      0.1
## pref_ps_last  0.1      0.1
## pref_ps_edulevel 0.0      0.0
## pref_2010_gdppc 0.0      0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2      0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:      comp ~ mayor_age + mayor_gender + mayor_edulevel
## observations: 48

```

```

## predictors: 4
## -----
##               Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)    0.5    0.2
## mayor_age      0.0    0.0
## mayor_genderM -0.1    0.1
## mayor_edulevel 0.0    0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##       Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.1    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     comp ~ mayor_promote
## observations: 48
## predictors:  2
## -----
##               Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)  0.2    0.0
## mayor_promote 0.1    0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##       Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.1    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     comp ~ macroregion
## observations: 48
## predictors:  3
## -----
##               Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)  0.2    0.0
## macroregionEast 0.0    0.1
## macroregionWest 0.0    0.1
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##       Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

```

Benevolence

```

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     benev ~ mayor_first + mayor_last
## observations: 48
## predictors:  3
## -----
##               Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)  0.2      0.0
## mayor_first  0.1      0.1
## mayor_last   0.0      0.1
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##       Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2      0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     benev ~ mayor_first + mayor_last + X2009_gdppc_cny + X2010_illiterateprop +
##             itemploy + linksall + county_mediaexp
## observations: 48
## predictors:  8
## -----
##               Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)    0.2      0.1
## mayor_first    0.1      0.1
## mayor_last     0.0      0.1
## X2009_gdppc_cny 0.0      0.0
## X2010_illiterateprop 0.0      0.0
## itemploy       0.0      0.0
## linksall       0.0      0.0
## county_mediaexp 0.0      0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##       Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2      0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     benev ~ mayor_first + mayor_last + X2009_gdppc_cny + X2010_illiterateprop +
##             itemploy + linksall + county_mediaexp + sec_first + sec_last
## observations: 48
## predictors:  10
## -----
##               Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)    0.1      0.1
## mayor_first    0.1      0.1

```

```

## mayor_last          0.0    0.1
## X2009_gdppc_cny     0.0    0.0
## X2010_illiterateprop 0.0    0.0
## itemploy            0.0    0.0
## linksall            0.0    0.0
## county_mediaexp     0.0    0.0
## sec_first           0.0    0.1
## sec_last            0.0    0.1
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     benev ~ mayor_first + mayor_last + X2009_gdppc_cny + X2010_illiterateprop +
##      itemploy + linksall + county_mediaexp + sec_first + sec_last +
##      pref_ps_first + pref_ps_last + pref_ps_edulevel + pref_2010_gdppc
## observations: 48
## predictors:  14
## -----
##
##      Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)    0.2    0.2
## mayor_first    0.1    0.1
## mayor_last     0.0    0.1
## X2009_gdppc_cny 0.0    0.0
## X2010_illiterateprop 0.0    0.0
## itemploy       0.0    0.0
## linksall       0.0    0.0
## county_mediaexp 0.0    0.0
## sec_first      0.0    0.1
## sec_last       0.0    0.1
## pref_ps_first  0.0    0.1
## pref_ps_last   0.0    0.1
## pref_ps_edulevel 0.0    0.0
## pref_2010_gdppc 0.0    0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     benev ~ mayor_first + mayor_last + X2009_gdppc_cny + X2010_illiterateprop +
##      itemploy + linksall + county_mediaexp + sec_first + sec_last +
##      pref_ps_first + pref_ps_last + pref_ps_edulevel + pref_2010_gdppc +

```

```

##      mayor_age + mayor_gender + mayor_edulevel
## observations: 48
## predictors: 17
## -----
##
##              Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)      0.2    0.4
## mayor_first      0.1    0.1
## mayor_last       0.0    0.1
## X2009_gdppc_cny  0.0    0.0
## X2010_illiterateprop 0.0    0.0
## itemploy        0.0    0.0
## linksall        0.0    0.0
## county_mediaexp  0.0    0.0
## sec_first       0.0    0.1
## sec_last        0.0    0.1
## pref_ps_first   0.0    0.1
## pref_ps_last    0.0    0.1
## pref_ps_edulevel 0.0    0.0
## pref_2010_gdppc 0.0    0.0
## mayor_age       0.0    0.0
## mayor_genderM   0.1    0.1
## mayor_edulevel  0.0    0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:      benev ~ mayor_first + mayor_last + X2009_gdppc_cny + X2010_illiterateprop +
##      itemploy + linksall + county_mediaexp + sec_first + sec_last +
##      pref_ps_first + pref_ps_last + pref_ps_edulevel + pref_2010_gdppc +
##      mayor_age + mayor_gender + mayor_edulevel + mayor_promote
## observations: 48
## predictors: 18
## -----
##
##              Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)      0.1    0.4
## mayor_first      0.2    0.1
## mayor_last      -0.1    0.1
## X2009_gdppc_cny  0.0    0.0
## X2010_illiterateprop 0.0    0.0
## itemploy        0.0    0.0
## linksall        0.0    0.0
## county_mediaexp  0.0    0.0
## sec_first       0.1    0.1
## sec_last        0.0    0.1
## pref_ps_first   0.0    0.1
## pref_ps_last    0.0    0.1
## pref_ps_edulevel 0.0    0.0

```



```

## pref_2010_gdppc      0.0    0.0
## mayor_age            0.0    0.0
## mayor_genderM        0.1    0.1
## mayor_edulevel       0.0    0.0
## mayor_promote        0.1    0.1
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:      benev ~ X2009_gdppc_cny + X2010_illiterateprop + itemploy + linksall +
##      county_mediaexp
## observations: 48
## predictors:   6
## -----
##
##      Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)    0.2    0.1
## X2009_gdppc_cny 0.0    0.0
## X2010_illiterateprop 0.0    0.0
## itemploy        0.0    0.0
## linksall        0.0    0.0
## county_mediaexp 0.0    0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:      benev ~ sec_first + sec_last
## observations: 48
## predictors:   3
## -----
##
##      Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept) 0.2    0.0
## sec_first   0.0    0.1
## sec_last    0.0    0.1
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg

```

```

## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     benev ~ pref_ps_first + pref_ps_last + pref_ps_edulevel + pref_2010_gdppc
## observations: 48
## predictors:  5
## -----
##              Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)    0.3    0.1
## pref_ps_first    0.0    0.1
## pref_ps_last   -0.1    0.1
## pref_ps_edulevel 0.0    0.0
## pref_2010_gdppc 0.0    0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     benev ~ mayor_age + mayor_gender + mayor_edulevel
## observations: 48
## predictors:  4
## -----
##              Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)    0.2    0.3
## mayor_age       0.0    0.0
## mayor_genderM   0.0    0.1
## mayor_edulevel  0.0    0.0
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     benev ~ mayor_promote
## observations: 48
## predictors:  2
## -----
##              Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)    0.2    0.0
## mayor_promote  0.0    0.1
##

```

```

## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg


## stan_glm
## family:      gaussian [identity]
## formula:     benev ~ macroregion
## observations: 48
## predictors:  3
## -----
##              Median MAD_SD
## (Intercept)   0.2    0.0
## macroregionEast 0.0    0.1
## macroregionWest -0.1   0.1
##
## Auxiliary parameter(s):
##      Median MAD_SD
## sigma 0.2    0.0
##
## -----
## * For help interpreting the printed output see ?print.stanreg
## * For info on the priors used see ?prior_summary.stanreg

```

Drawing 10,000 repeated samples of 100 counties from the list of all county government websites, we graph the distribution of how many of the counties in the sample are in a particular province for all 31 provinces included in the original data set. The red lines indicate how many counties in a particular province were included the sample employed by the paper.

Frequency distr of counties per province in sample of 100

Geographic distribution of the paper sample acc to 10000 repeated samples



Data from Replication Paper


Based on the logic described above, the table then shows the limits of the 95% confidence intervals for that frequency and whether the observed frequency in the paper were outside these limits (0 counties).

Extension Table 1: Frequency of provinces in sample of 100
Based on simulation of 10000 samples of 100

| Provinces | 2.5 Percentile | 97.5 Percentile | Frequency in paper sample | Outside CI |
|----------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------------------|------------|
| Anhui | 1 | 8 | 5 | No |
| Beijing | 0 | 2 | 1 | No |
| Chongqing | 0 | 4 | 1 | No |
| Fujian | 0 | 7 | 4 | No |
| Gansu | 0 | 7 | 4 | No |
| Guangdong | 1 | 8 | 5 | No |
| Guangxi | 1 | 8 | 2 | No |
| Guizhou | 0 | 7 | 4 | No |
| Hainan | 0 | 3 | 0 | No |
| Hebei | 2 | 11 | 3 | No |
| Heilongjiang | 1 | 9 | 7 | No |
| Henan | 2 | 10 | 6 | No |
| Hubei | 1 | 8 | 4 | No |
| Hunan | 1 | 9 | 2 | No |
| Inner Mongolia | 1 | 8 | 3 | No |
| Jiangsu | 1 | 8 | 5 | No |
| Jiangxi | 0 | 7 | 3 | No |
| Jilin | 0 | 5 | 1 | No |
| Liaoning | 0 | 7 | 3 | No |

| | | | | |
|----------|---|----|---|----|
| Ningxia | 0 | 3 | 1 | No |
| Qinghai | 0 | 4 | 0 | No |
| Shaanxi | 1 | 8 | 2 | No |
| Shandong | 1 | 9 | 6 | No |
| Shanghai | 0 | 2 | 2 | No |
| Shanxi | 1 | 8 | 3 | No |
| Sichuan | 2 | 11 | 6 | No |
| Tianjin | 0 | 2 | 1 | No |
| Tibet | 0 | 6 | 1 | No |
| Xinjiang | 1 | 7 | 7 | No |
| Yunnan | 1 | 9 | 3 | No |
| Zhejiang | 0 | 7 | 5 | No |

Drawing 10,000 repeated samples of 48 counties from the list of all county government websites, we graph the distribution of how many of the counties in the sample are in a particular province for all 31 provinces included in the original data set. The red lines indicate how many counties in a particular province were included the sample employed by the paper.



Based on the logic described above, the table then shows the limits of the 95% confidence intervals for that frequency and whether the observed frequency in the paper were outside these limits (1 county) or on the lower boundary (8 counties).

Extension Table 2: Frequency of provinces in sample of 48
Based on simulation of 10000 samples of 48

| Provinces | 2.5 Percentile | 97.5 Percentile | Frequency in paper sample | Outside CI | On lower CI boundary |
|-----------|----------------|-----------------|---------------------------|------------|----------------------|
|-----------|----------------|-----------------|---------------------------|------------|----------------------|

| | | | | | |
|----------------|---|---|---|-----|-----|
| Anhui | 0 | 5 | 4 | No | No |
| Beijing | 0 | 2 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Chongqing | 0 | 3 | 1 | No | No |
| Fujian | 0 | 4 | 1 | No | No |
| Gansu | 0 | 4 | 2 | No | No |
| Guangdong | 0 | 5 | 2 | No | No |
| Guangxi | 0 | 5 | 2 | No | No |
| Guizhou | 0 | 4 | 3 | No | No |
| Hainan | 0 | 2 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Hebei | 0 | 6 | 1 | No | No |
| Heilongjiang | 0 | 5 | 2 | No | No |
| Henan | 0 | 6 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Hubei | 0 | 5 | 1 | No | No |
| Hunan | 0 | 5 | 1 | No | No |
| Inner Mongolia | 0 | 4 | 3 | No | No |
| Jiangsu | 0 | 5 | 2 | No | No |
| Jiangxi | 0 | 4 | 2 | No | No |
| Jilin | 0 | 3 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Liaoning | 0 | 5 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Ningxia | 0 | 2 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Qinghai | 0 | 3 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Shaanxi | 0 | 5 | 1 | No | No |
| Shandong | 0 | 6 | 3 | No | No |
| Shanghai | 0 | 2 | 2 | No | No |
| Shanxi | 0 | 5 | 2 | No | No |
| Sichuan | 0 | 7 | 4 | No | No |
| Tianjin | 0 | 2 | 1 | No | No |
| Tibet | 0 | 4 | 0 | No | Yes |
| Xinjiang | 0 | 5 | 1 | No | No |
| Yunnan | 0 | 5 | 2 | No | No |
| Zhejiang | 0 | 4 | 5 | Yes | No |

9 Appendixes

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