

Web Services Security X.509 Certificate Token Profile Version 1.1.1

OASIS Standard

18 May 2012

Specification URIs

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http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1-os.html http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1-os.pdf

Previous version:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd01/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd01.doc (Authoritative)

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd01/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd01.html http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/csd01/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1-csd01.pdf

Latest version:

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Additional artifacts:

This prose specification is one component of a multi-part Work Product which includes:

- Web Services Security Kerberos Token Profile Version 1.1.1. http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-KerberosTokenProfile-v1.1.1-os.html.
- Web Services Security Rights Expression Language (REL) Token Profile Version 1.1.1. http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-rel-token-profile-v1.1.1-os.html.
- Web Services Security SAML Token Profile Version 1.1.1. http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-SAMLTokenProfile-v1.1.1-os.html.
- Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security Version 1.1.1. http://docs.oasisopen.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-SOAPMessageSecurity-v1.1.1-os.html.
- Web Services Security SOAP Message with Attachments (SwA) Profile Version 1.1.1.
 http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-SwAProfile-v1.1.1-os.html.
- Web Services Security Username Token Profile Version 1.1.1. http://docs.oasisopen.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-UsernameTokenProfile-v1.1.1-os.html.

- Web Services Security X.509 Certificate Token Profile Version 1.1.1. http://docs.oasisopen.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1-os.html. (this document)
- XML schemas: http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/xsd/

Related work:

This specification supersedes:

- Web Services Security X.509 Certificate Token Profile 1.1. 01 November 2006. OASIS Standard incorporating Approved Errata. http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/v1.1/wss-v1.1-spec-errata-os-x509TokenProfile.htm
- Web Services Security X.509 Certificate Token Profile 1.1. 01 November 2006. OASIS
 Approved Errata.
 http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/v1.1/wss-v1.1-errata-os-x509TokenProfile.htm

Abstract:

This document describes how to use X.509 Certificates with the Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security [WS-Security] specification.

This document integrates specific error corrections or editorial changes to the preceding specification, within the scope of the Web Services Security and this TC.

This document introduces a third digit in the numbering convention where the third digit represents a consolidation of error corrections, bug fixes or editorial formatting changes (e.g., 1.1.1); it does not add any new features beyond those of the base specifications (e.g., 1.1).

Status:

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1 Introduction (Non-Normative)

This specification describes the use of the X.509 authentication framework with the Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security].

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An X.509 certificate specifies a binding between a public key and a set of attributes that includes (at least) a subject name, issuer name, serial number and validity interval. This binding may be subject to subsequent revocation advertised by mechanisms that include issuance of CRLs, OCSP tokens or mechanisms that are outside the X.509 framework, such as XKMS.

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An X.509 certificate may be used to validate a public key that may be used to authenticate a SOAP message or to identify the public key with a SOAP message that has been encrypted.

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Note that Sections 2.1, 2.2, all of 3, and indicated parts of 5 are normative. All other sections are nonnormative.

2 Notations and Terminology (Normative)

16 This section specifies the notations, namespaces and terminology used in this specification.

2.1 Notational Conventions

- The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD
- 19 NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described
- 20 in RFC 2119.

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When describing abstract data models, this specification uses the notational convention used by the XML Infoset. Specifically, abstract property names always appear in square brackets (e.g., [some property]).

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- When describing concrete XML schemas, this specification uses a convention where each member of an element's [children] or [attributes] property is described using an XPath-like notation (e.g.,
- 27 /x:MyHeader/x:SomeProperty/@value1). The use of {any} indicates the presence of an element wildcard
- 28 (<xs:any/>). The use of @{any} indicates the presence of an attribute wildcard (<xs:anyAttribute/>).

2.2 Namespaces

- 30 Namespace URIs (of the general form "some-URI") represents some application-dependent or context-
- 31 dependent URI as defined in RFC 3986 [URI]. This specification is designed to work with the general
- 32 SOAP [SOAP11, SOAP12] message structure and message processing model, and should be applicable
- 33 to any version of SOAP. The current SOAP 1.1 namespace URI is used herein to provide detailed
- examples, but there is no intention to limit the applicability of this specification to a single version of

35 SOAP.

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The namespaces used in this document are shown in the following table (note that for brevity, the examples use the prefixes listed below but do not include the URIs – those listed below are assumed).

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```
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-
1.0.xsd
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-
1.0.xsd
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.1.xsd
```

The following namespace prefixes are used in this document:

Prefix	Namespace	
S11	http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/	
S12	http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope	
ds	http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#	
xenc http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#		
wsse	http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd	

wsse11	http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.1.xsd
wsu	http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd

46 Table 1- Namespace prefixes

URI fragments defined in this specification are relative to the following base URI unless otherwise stated:

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 $\label{locality} \mbox{http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0}$

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The following table lists the full URI for each URI fragment referred to in this specification.

URI Fragment	Full URI
#Base64Binary	http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soapmessage-security-1.0#Base64Binary
#STR-Transform	http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soapmessage-security-1.0#STR-Transform
#PKCS7	http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#PKCS7
#X509v3	http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#X509v3
#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier	http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier

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2.3 Terminology

This specification adopts the terminology defined in Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security].

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Readers are presumed to be familiar with the definitions of terms in the Internet Security Glossary [Glossary].

3 Usage (Normative)

- This specification describes the syntax and processing rules for the use of the X.509 authentication
- 63 framework with the Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security]. For the
- 64 purposes of determining the order of preference of reference types, the use of IssuerSerial within
- K509Data should be considered to be a form of Key Identifier

3.1 Token types

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- This profile defines the syntax of, and processing rules for, three types of binary security token using the URI values specified in Table 2.
- If the ValueType attribute is missing, the receiver may interpret it either based on a prior agreement or by parsing the content.

Token	ValueType URI	Description
Single certificate	#X509v3	An X.509 v3 certificate capable of signature-verification at a minimum
Certificate Path	#X509PKIPathv1	An ordered list of X.509 certificates packaged in a PKIPath
Set of certificates and CRLs	#PKCS7	A list of X.509 certificates and (optionally) CRLs packaged in a PKCS#7 wrapper

- 73 Table 2 Token types
- 74 3.1.1 X509v3 Token Type
- 75 The type of the end-entity that is authenticated by a certificate used in this manner is a matter of policy
- that is outside the scope of this specification.
- 77 3.1.2 X509PKIPathv1 Token Type
- 78 The X509PKIPathv1 token type MAY be used to represent a certificate path.
- 79 3.1.3 PKCS7 Token Type
- The PKCS7 token type MAY be used to represent a certificate path. It is RECOMMENDED that applications use the PKIPath object for this purpose instead.
- 82
 The order of the certificates in a PKCS#7 data structure is not significant. If an ordered certificate path is
- converted to PKCS#7 encoded bytes and then converted back, the order of the certificates may not be preserved. Processors SHALL NOT assume any significance to the order of the certificates in the data
- 86 structure. See [PKCS7] for more information.

3.2 Token References

In order to ensure a consistent processing model across all the token types supported by WSS: SOAP Message Security, the wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element SHALL be used to specify all references to X.509 token types in signature or encryption elements that comply with this profile.

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A <wsse: SecurityTokenReference> element MAY reference an X.509 token type by one of the following means:

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Reference to a Subject Key Identifier

The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element contains a <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element that specifies the token data by means of a X.509 SubjectKeyIdentifier reference. A subject key identifier MAY only be used to reference an X.509v3 certificate."

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Reference to a Binary Security Token

The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element contains a wsse:Reference> element that references a local <wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element or a remote data source that contains the token data itself.

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Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number

The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element contains a <ds:X509Data> element that contains a <ds:X509Data> element that uniquely identifies an end entity certificate by its X.509 Issuer and Serial Number.

3.2.1 Reference to an X.509 Subject Key Identifier

The <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element is used to specify a reference to an X.509v3 certificate by means of a reference to its X.509 SubjectKeyIdentifier attribute. This profile defines the syntax of, and processing rules for referencing a Subject Key Identifier using the URI values specified in Table 3 (note that URI fragments are relative to http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0).

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Subject Key Identifier	ValueType URI	Description
Certificate Key Identifier	#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier	Value of the certificate's X.509 SubjectKeyldentifier

116 Table 3 – Subject Key Identifier

117 The <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element from which the reference is made contains the

118 <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element. The <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element MUST have a ValueType

attribute with the value #x509SubjectKeyIdentifier and its contents MUST be the value of the

120 certificate's X.509v3 SubjectKeyldentifier extension, encoded as per the <wsse:Keyldentifier>

121 element's EncodingType attribute. For the purposes of this specification, the value of the

122 SubjectKeyldentifier extension is the contents of the Keyldentifier octet string, excluding the encoding of

the octet string prefix.

3.2.2 Reference to a Security Token

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- 128 The URI reference MAY be internal in which case the URI reference SHOULD be a bare name XPointer
- 129 reference to a <wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element contained in a preceding message header that
- 130 contains the binary X.509 security token data.

3.2.3 Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number

The <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element is used to specify a reference to an X.509 security token by means of the certificate issuer name and serial number.

The <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element is a direct child of the <ds:X509Data> element that is in turn a direct child of the <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element in which the reference is made

3.3 Signature

Signed data MAY specify the certificate associated with the signature using any of the X.509 security token types and references defined in this specification.

An X.509 certificate specifies a binding between a public key and a set of attributes that includes (at least) a subject name, issuer name, serial number and validity interval. Other attributes may specify constraints on the use of the certificate or affect the recourse that may be open to a relying party that depends on the certificate. A given public key may be specified in more than one X.509 certificate; consequently a given public key may be bound to two or more distinct sets of attributes.

It is therefore necessary to ensure that a signature created under an X.509 certificate token uniquely and irrefutably specifies the certificate under which the signature was created.

Implementations SHOULD protect against a certificate substitution attack by including either the certificate itself or an immutable and unambiguous reference to the certificate within the scope of the signature according to the method used to reference the certificate as described in the following sections.

3.3.1 Key Identifier

The <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element does not guarantee an immutable and unambiguous reference to the certificate referenced. Consequently implementations that use this form of reference within a signature SHOULD employ the STR Dereferencing Transform within a reference to the signature key information in order to ensure that the referenced certificate is signed, and not just the ambiguous reference. The form of the reference is a bare name reference as defined by the XPointer specification [XPointer].

The following example shows a certificate referenced by means of a Keyldentifier. The scope of the signature is the <ds:SignedInfo> element which includes both the message body (#body) and the signing certificate by means of a reference to the <ds:KeyInfo> element which references it (#keyinfo). Since the <ds:KeyInfo> element only contains a mutable reference to the certificate rather than the certificate itself, a transformation is specified which replaces the reference to the certificate with the certificate. The <ds:KeyInfo> element specifies the signing key by means of a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element which contains a <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element which specifies the X.509 subject key identifier of the signing certificate.

```
175
                    <ds:Signature
176
                         xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
177
                       <ds:SignedInfo>...
178
                           <ds:Reference URI="#body">...</ds:Reference>
179
                           <ds:Reference URI="#keyinfo">
180
                              <ds:Transforms>
181
                                 <ds:Transform Algorithm="...#STR-Transform">
182
                                    <wsse:TransformationParameters>
183
                                      <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="..."/>
184
                                    </wsse:TransformationParameters>
185
                                 </ds:Transform>
186
                              </ds:Transforms>...
187
                           </ds:Reference>
188
                       </ds:SignedInfo>
189
                       <ds:SignatureValue>HFLP...</ds:SignatureValue>
190
                       <ds:KeyInfo Id="keyinfo">
191
                           <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
192
                              <wsse:KeyIdentifier EncodingType="...#Base64Binary"</pre>
193
                                   ValueType="...#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier">
194
                                 MIGfMa0GCSq...
195
                              </wsse:KeyIdentifier>
196
                           </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
197
                       </ds:KeyInfo>
198
                    </ds:Signature>
199
                 </wsse:Security>
200
              </S11:Header>
201
              <S11:Body wsu:Id="body"
202
                   xmlns:wsu=".../">
203
204
              </S11:Body>
205
           </S11:Envelope>
```

3.3.2 Reference to a Binary Security Token

The signed data SHOULD contain a core bare name reference (as defined by the XPointer specification [XPointer]) to the SecurityToken element that contains the security token referenced, or a core reference to the external data source containing the security token.

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The following example shows a certificate embedded in a <wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element and referenced by URI within a signature. The certificate is included in the <wsse:Security> header as a <wsse:BinarySecurityToken> element with identifier binarytoken. The scope of the signature defined by a <ds:Reference> element within the <ds:SignedInfo> element includes the signing certificate which is referenced by means of the URI bare name pointer #binarytoken. The <ds:KeyInfo> element specifies the signing key by means of a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element which contains a <wsse:Reference> element which references the certificate by means of the URI bare name pointer #binarytoken.

```
220
           <S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="...">
221
              <S11:Header>
222
                  <wsse:Security</pre>
223
                      xmlns:wsse="..."
                       xmlns:wsu="...">
224
225
                     <wsse:BinarySecurityToken</pre>
226
                          wsu:Id="binarytoken"
227
                          ValueType="...#X509v3"
228
                          EncodingType="...#Base64Binary">
229
                        MIIEZzCCA9CgAwIBAgIQEmtJZc0...
230
                     </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
231
                     <ds:Signature
```

```
232
                         xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
233
                       <ds:SignedInfo>...
234
                          <ds:Reference URI="#body">...</ds:Reference>
235
                          <ds:Reference URI="#binarytoken">...</ds:Reference>
236
237
                       <ds:SignatureValue>HFLP...</ds:SignatureValue>
238
                       <ds:KeyInfo>
239
                          <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
240
                              <wsse:Reference URI="#binarytoken" />
241
                          </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
242
                       </ds:KeyInfo>
243
                    </ds:Signature>
244
                 </wsse:Security>
245
              </S11:Header>
246
              <S11:Body wsu:Id="body"
247
                  xmlns:wsu="...">
248
249
              </S11:Body>
250
           </S11:Envelope>
```

3.3.3 Reference to an Issuer and Serial Number

The signed data SHOULD contain a core bare name reference (as defined by the XPointer specification [XPointer]) to the <ds:KeyInfo> element that contains the security token reference.

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The following example shows a certificate referenced by means of its issuer name and serial number. In this example the certificate is not included in the message. The scope of the signature defined by the <ds:SignedInfo> element includes both the message body (#body) and the key information element (#keyInfo). The <ds:KeyInfo> element contains a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element which specifies the issuer and serial number of the specified certificate by means of the <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element.

```
262
           <S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="...">
263
              <S11:Header>
264
                 <wsse:Security</pre>
265
                      xmlns:wsse="..."
266
                      xmlns:wsu="...">
267
                    <ds:Signature
268
                           xmlns:ds="...">
269
                       <ds:SignedInfo>...
270
                          <ds:Reference URI="#body">...</ds:Reference>
271
                          <ds:Reference URI="#keyinfo">...</ds:Reference>
272
                       </ds:SignedInfo>
273
                       <ds:SignatureValue>HFLP...</ds:SignatureValue>
274
                       <ds:KeyInfo Id="keyinfo">
275
                          <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
276
                              <ds:X509Data>
277
                                 <ds:X509IssuerSerial>
278
                                    <ds:X509IssuerName>
279
                                       DC=ACMECorp, DC=com
280
                                    </ds:X509IssuerName>
281
                                    <ds:X509SerialNumber>12345678</ds:X509SerialNumber>
282
                                 </ds:X509IssuerSerial>
283
                              </ds:X509Data>
284
                          </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
285
                       </ds:KeyInfo>
286
                    </ds:Signature>
287
                 </wsse:Security>
288
              </S11:Header>
289
              <S11:Body wsu:Id="body"
```

```
290 xmlns:wsu="...">
291 ...
292 </S11:Body>
293 </S11:Envelope>
```

3.4 Encryption

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Encrypted keys or data MAY identify a key required for decryption by identifying the corresponding key used for encryption by means of any of the X.509 security token types or references specified herein.

Since the sole purpose is to identify the decryption key it is not necessary to specify either a trust path or the specific contents of the certificate itself.

The following example shows a decryption key referenced by means of the issuer name and serial number of an associated certificate. In this example the certificate is not included in the message. The <ds:KeyInfo> element contains a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element which specifies the issuer and serial number of the specified certificate by means of the <ds:X509IssuerSerial> element.

```
307
           <S11:Envelope
308
               xmlns:S11="..."
309
               xmlns:ds="..."
310
               xmlns:wsse="..."
311
               xmlns:xenc="...">
312
              <S11:Header>
313
                 <wsse:Security>
314
                    <xenc:EncryptedKey>
315
                       <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="..."/>
316
                       <ds:KeyInfo>
317
                          <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
318
                            <ds:X509Data>
319
                             <ds:X509IssuerSerial>
320
                                 <ds:X509IssuerName>
321
                                    DC=ACMECorp, DC=com
322
                                </ds:X509IssuerName>
323
                                <ds:X509SerialNumber>12345678</ds:X509SerialNumber>
324
                             </ds:X509IssuerSerial>
325
                            </ds:X509Data>
326
                          </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
327
                       </ds:KeyInfo>
328
                       <xenc:CipherData>
329
                          <xenc:CipherValue>...</xenc:CipherValue>
330
                       </xenc:CipherData>
331
                       <xenc:ReferenceList>
332
                          <xenc:DataReference URI="#encrypted"/>
333
                       </xenc:ReferenceList>
334
                    </xenc:EncryptedKey>
335
                 </wsse:Security>
336
              </S11:Header>
337
              <S11:Body>
338
                 <xenc:EncryptedData Id="encrypted" Type="...">
339
                    <xenc:CipherData>
340
                       <xenc:CipherValue>.../xenc:CipherValue>
341
                    </xenc:CipherData>
342
                 </xenc:EncryptedData>
343
              </S11:Body>
344
           </S11:Envelope>
```

The following example shows a decryption key referenced by means of the Thumbprint of an associated certificate. In this example the certificate is not included in the message. The <ds:KeyInfo> element contains a <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element which specifies the Thumbprint of the specified certificate by means of the http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1 attribute of the <wsse:KeyIdentifier> element.

```
351
          <S11:Envelope
352
               xmlns:S11="..."
353
               xmlns:ds="..."
354
               xmlns:wsse="..."
               xmlns:xenc="...">
355
356
             <S11:Header>
357
                 <wsse:Security>
358
                    <xenc:EncryptedKey>
359
                       <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="..."/>
360
                       <ds:KeyInfo>
361
                          <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
362
                                  <wsse:KeyIdentifier</pre>
363
                             ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-
364
          soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1" >LKiQ/CmFrJDJqCLFcjlhIsmZ/+0=
365
                               </wsse:KeyIdentifier>
366
                          </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
367
                       </ds:KeyInfo>
368
                       <xenc:CipherData>
369
                          <xenc:CipherValue>.../xenc:CipherValue>
370
                       </xenc:CipherData>
371
                       <xenc:ReferenceList>
372
                          <xenc:DataReference URI="#encrypted"/>
373
                       </xenc:ReferenceList>
374
                    </re></re>
375
                 </wsse:Security>
376
             </S11:Header>
377
              <S11:Body>
378
                <xenc:EncryptedData Id="encrypted" Type="...">
379
                    <xenc:CipherData>
380
                       <xenc:CipherValue>.../xenc:CipherValue>
381
                    </xenc:CipherData>
382
                 </xenc:EncryptedData>
383
             </S11:Body>
384
          </S11:Envelope>
```

3.5 Error Codes

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When using X.509 certificates, the error codes defined in the WSS: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security] MUST be used.

If an implementation requires the use of a custom error it is recommended that a sub-code be defined as an extension of one of the codes defined in the WSS: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security]

4 Threat Model and Countermeasures (Non-Normative)

The use of X.509 certificate token introduces no new threats beyond those identified in WSS: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security].

Message alteration and eavesdropping can be addressed by using the integrity and confidentiality mechanisms described in WSS: SOAP Message Security [WS-Security]. Replay attacks can be addressed by using message timestamps and caching, as well as other application-specific tracking mechanisms. For X.509 certificates, identity is authenticated by use of keys, man-in-the-middle attacks are generally mitigated.

It is strongly RECOMMENDED that all relevant and immutable message data be signed.

It should be noted that a transport-level security protocol such as SSL or TLS [RFC2246] MAY be used to protect the message and the security token as an alternative to or in conjunction with WSS: SOAP Message Security specification [WS-Security].

5 References

410	The following are normative references		
411 412	[Glossary]	Informational RFC 2828, Internet Security Glossary, May 2000. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc/2828.txt	
413 414	[KEYWORDS]	S. Bradner, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, RFC 2119, Harvard University, March 1997, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt	
415 416	[RFC2246]	T. Dierks, C. Allen., <i>The TLS Protocol Version, 1.0.</i> IETF RFC 2246 January 1999. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt	
417	[SOAP11]	W3C Note, "SOAP: Simple Object Access Protocol 1.1," 08 May 2000.	
418 419	[SOAP12]	W3C Recommendation, "SOAP Version 1.2 Part 1: Messaging Framework", 23 June 2003.	
420 421 422	[URI]	T. Berners-Lee, R. Fielding, L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax," RFC 3986, MIT/LCS, Day Software, Adobe Systems, January 2005.	
423 424 425	[WS-Security]	Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security Version 1.1.1. 18 May 2012. OASIS Standard. http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-SOAPMessageSecurity-v1.1.1-os.html.	
426 427	[PKCS7]	PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard RSA Laboratories, November 1, 1993. http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2129	
428 429	[PKIPATH]	http://www.itu.int/rec/recommendation.asp?type=items⟨=e&parent=T-REC-X.509-200110-S!Cor1	
430 431 432	[X509]	ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (1997 E): Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework, June 1997.	
433	The following are non-normative references		
434 435	[XML-ns]	T. Bray, D. Hollander, A. Layman. <i>Namespaces in XML. W3C Recommendation</i> . January 1999. http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xml-names-19990114	
436 437	[XML Encrypt]	W3C Recommendation, "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing," 10 December 2002	
438 439	[XML Signature]	D. Eastlake, J. R., D. Solo, M. Bartel, J. Boyer , B. Fox , E. Simon. <i>XML-Signature Syntax and Processing</i> , W3C Recommendation, 12 February 2002.	
440			

6 Conformance

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An implementation conforms to this specification if it meets the requirements in Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 3.

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Senthil	Sengodan	Nokia
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Lloyd	Burch	Novell
Ed	Reed	Novell
Charles	Knouse	Oblix
Prateek	Mishra	Oracle
Vamsi	Motukuru	Oracle
Ramana	Turlapi	Oracle
Vipin	Samar	Oracle
Jerry	Schwarz	Oracle
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Andrew	Nash	Reactivity
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B. Revision History

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Revision	Date	Editor	Changes Made
WD01	17-January- 2011	Carlo Milono	Corrected/added hyperlinks where missing; added Status section
WD02	8-February- 2011	Carlo Milono	Added Related Work to reflect v1.1.1 of the specs; changed References for SOAP Message Security to reflect v1.1.1; Changed WD# to 2; Added Date; Moved Current Members to Previous and added new Current Members; saved document under wd02; entered the Revision History Merged Old Current Contributors with
			Old Previous, created a New Current Contributors.
WD03	16-March-2011	David Turner	Corrected and updated links.
CSD01	2-May-2011	TC Admin	Generated from WD03
CSD02-draft	16-May-11	David Turner	Added conformance statement and corrected a few formatting issues.